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THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF

THE UNIVERSE:

WHEREIN ALL THE

REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM IS CONFUTED,

AND ITS

IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED.

A TREATISE ON IMMUTABLE MORALITY;

WITH

A DISCOURSE

CONCERNING THE

TRUE NOTION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER;

AND

TWO SERMONS ON 1 JOHN 2:3, 4. AND 1 COR. 15:27.

By RALPH CUDWORTH, D. D.

FIRST AMERICAN EDITION;
WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM;
AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR:

By THOMAS BIRCH, M. A. F. R. S.

IN TWO VOLUMES:
VOL. I.

ANDOVER:
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NEW YORK:
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1837.

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TO

THE RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,

JOSEPH,

LORD BISHOP OF BRISTOL,

AND

DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S.

MY LORD,

THE value of the present work is so universally acknowledged, that to offer any thing here in recommendation of it, might seem equally to reflect upon your Lordship's judgment, as on the character of the excellent Author. It will be a sufficient honor and satisfaction to me, to have contributed in any measure to the improvement of the Intellectual System, and to the spreading a performance, one of the noblest of the last age, and at least as necessary to the present, for supporting the grand foundations of all religion and virtue, against ignorance, sophistry, and every pernicious effect of vice and sensuality upon the human understanding. Such a design, I persuade myself, wants no apology, especially to a person whose writings display the evidence, and whose character exemplifies the beauty and dignity, of Christianity. I shall therefore only add, that upon these accounts, I am, with the highest esteem and veneration,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and most humble servant.

THOMAS BIRCH.

London, Nov. 6, 1742.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The former Edition of the Intellectual System, though the most valuable treasure of the ancient theology and philosophy extant in any language, had one considerable defect, (frequent amongst even the best writers of the last age,) that the references of its numerous quotations were very few, and those obscure and imperfect. Such as were wanting are therefore supplied in the present edition with the utmost exactness, chiefly from Dr. Laurence Mosheim's Latin translation of this work ; those of the Author are included in [ ] to render them more clear and determinate.

The dedication to the House of Commons, in 1647, of the sermon on 1 John 2: 3, 4, omitted in the second and third editions, is restored likewise from the first.

To the whole is prefixed a new life of the Author, wherein is given a very particular account of his several excellent works.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE FIRST AMERICAN EDITION.

We have the satisfaction of presenting to the reading community, the first American edition of the writings of Dr. Cudworth. There has been, for a number of years, much inquiry for his works, and a strong desire expressed for a new and complete edition. The argument for the existence of God, in opposition to the cavils of atheists, which Dr. Cudworth treats with such vast learning, with so great comprehensiveness and frequently with so much strictness of logic, will, it is conceived, be peculiarly appropriate to the present times, when multitudes choose to fall into the ranks of infidelity, and deny the Lord that bought them. The Intellectual System of Cudworth is an immense storehouse of facts and of learned quotation and reference, as well as of arguments and principles.

The present edition is a reprint of the octavo edition, in four volumes, published in London, in 1820. Besides the Intellectual System, it contains a Discourse concerning the True Notion of the Lord's Supper, two Sermons on 1 John 2: 3, 4 and 1 Cor. 15: 57, a Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, and an account of the life and writings of the author by Birch. We have compared large portions of the octavo edition of the Intellectual System with one of the earlier quarto editions, especially where there was any doubt in respect to the sense. The Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality has long been out of print. It is omitted, as far as we can ascertain, in all the editions of the Intellectual System. Only one impression of it, we believe, has ever been published. This is the edition issued in London, in 1731, by James and John Knapton, in 18mo., 303 pages, with a preface by the bishop of Durham.

AN

ACCOUNT

OF

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS

OF

R. CUDWORTH, D. D.

Dr. Ralph Cudworth was son of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, at first fellow of Emanuel College, in the University of Cambridge, and afterwards minister of St. Andrew's Church in that town, and at last rector of Aller, in Somersetshire, and chaplain to James I.[1] He died in August or September, 1624.[2] Though he was a man of genius and learning, he published only a supplement to Mr. W. Perkins's Commentary upon St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, of which, as well as several other works of that divine, he was editor.

Our author's mother was of the family of Machell, and had been nurse to Prince Henry, eldest son of James I, and after Dr. Cudworth's death, married to Dr. Stoughton.[3] Our author himself was born at Aller, in the year 1617, and educated with great care by his father-in-law, Dr. Stoughton; and in 1630 was admitted pensioner in Emanuel College, the Doctor giving him this testimony, "that he was as well grounded in school learning as any boy of his age, that went to the University." July 5, 1632, he was matriculated as a student in the University, and applied himself to all parts of literature with such vigor, that in 1639, he was created master of arts with great applause. Soon after he was chosen fellow of his college, and became an eminent tutor there, and had at one time twenty-eight pupils; an instance scarce ever known before, even in the largest colleges of the University.

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[1] See Dr. John Laurence Mosheim's preface to his Latin translation of Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System. The pages of this preface are not numbered.

[2] Wood, Fasti Oxon. vol. i. col. 187. second edit. London, 1721.

[3] Mosheim *ubi supra*.

Among these was Mr. W. Temple, afterwards famous for his embassies and writings. Not long after, he was presented to the rectory of North Cadbury, in Somersetshire, worth three hundred pounds per annum.

In 1642, he published A Discourse concerning the true Notion of the Lord's Supper. It was printed at London, in quarto, with only the initial letters of his name. Bochart, Spencer, Selden, and other eminent writers quote this discourse with great commendations; and my most ingenious and learned friend, Mr. Warburton, in a letter of excellent remarks upon our author, which he favored me with, styles it a masterpiece in its kind; and observes, that he has undoubtedly given the true nature and idea of the sacrament, and supported it with all his learning. The same year likewise appeared his treatise, entitled, The Union of Christ and the Church a Shadow, by R. C. printed at London, in quarto.

He took the degree of bachelor of divinity in the year 1644, upon which occasion he maintained at the commencement in the University the two following theses: 1. Dantur boni et mali rationes æternæ et indispensabiles: 2. Dantur substantiæ incorporeæ suâ naturâ immortales. Hence it appears, that even at that time he was examining and revolving in his mind those important subjects, which he so long afterwards cleared up with such uncommon penetration in his Intellectual System, and other works.

In the same year, 1644, he was appointed master of Clare Hall, in Cambridge, in the room of Dr. Paske, who had been ejected by the parliamentary visitors. In 1645, Dr. Metcalf having resigned the regius professorship of the Hebrew tongues, Mr. Cudworth was unanimously nominated Oct. 15, by the seven electors, to succeed him. From this time he abandoned all the functions of a minister, and applied himself only to his academical employments and studies, especially that of the Jewish antiquities. And we find the following passage in a manuscript letter of Mr. John Worthington, afterwards master of Jesus College, dated May 12, 1646. "Our learned friend, Mr. Cudworth, reads every Wednesday in the schools. His subject is, Templum Hierosolymitanum." When his affairs required his absence from the University, he substituted Mr. Worthington in his room. March 31, 1647, he preached before the House of Commons, at Westminster, upon a day of public humiliation, a sermon upon John 2: 3, 4, for which he had the thanks of that House returned him on the same day. This sermon was printed the same year, at Cambridge, in quarto, with the following motto in the title-page, *Ἐυσέβει, ὦτέκνον· ὁ γὰρ εὐσεβῶν ἄκρως Χριστιανίζει·* and with a dedication to the House of Commons,

which was omitted in the second and third editions, but restored in the present. In 1651, he took the degree of doctor of divinity. Though the places, which he held in the University, were very honorable, yet he found the revenue of them not sufficient to support him; for which reason he had thoughts of leaving Cambridge entirely; and, indeed, actually retired from it, though but for a short time. This appears from two manuscript letters of Mr. Worthington, the former dated Jan. 6, 1651, where he writes thus: "If through want of maintenance, he (R. C.) should be forced to leave Cambridge, for which place he is so eminently accomplished with what is noble and exemplarily academical, it would be an ill omen." In the latter, dated Jan. 30, 1654, is this passage: "After many tossings, Dr. Cudworth is, through God's providence, returned to Cambridge, and settled in Christ's College, and by his marriage more settled than fixed." For upon the decease of Dr. Sam. Bolton, master of that college, in 1654, our Author was chosen to succeed him, and married the same year. In this station he spent the rest of his life, proving highly serviceable to the University and the whole church of England. In Jan. 1656–7, he was one of the persons nominated by a committee of the parliament to be consulted about the English translation of the Bible; as appears from the following passage of Whitelocke.[1]

"Jan. 16th. At the grand committee for religion, Ordered, that it be referred to a sub-committee to send for, and advise with, Dr. Walton, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Castell, Mr. Clark, Mr. Poulk, Dr. Cudworth, and such others as they shall think fit; and to consider of the translations and impressions of the Bible, and to offer their opinions therein to this committee; and that it be especially commended to the Lord Commissioner Whitelocke to take care of this business.

"This committee, (says Whitelocke,) often met at my house, and had the most learned men in the oriental tongues to consult with in this great business, and divers excellent and learned observations of some mistakes in the translations of the Bible in English; which yet was agreed to be the best of any translation in the world. I took pains in it; but it became fruitless by the parliament's dissolution."

Our author had a great share in the friendship and esteem of John Thurloe, Esq. secretary of state to the protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell, who frequently corresponded with him, and consulted him with regard to the characters of such persons in the University, as

[1] Memorials of the English Affairs, p. 654, edit. Lond. 1732, in fol.

were proper to be employed in political and civil affairs. For which purpose, Dr. Cudworth wrote, among others, the following letter.[1]

"HONORED SIR,

"I must, in the first place, crave your pardon for the delay of this, my second letter, thus long, (for, I suppose, you have received my former in answere to yours,) which, had not some unavoidable occasions hindred me, had come sooner to your hands. Sir, I think there are divers men in the University at this time, of singular parts and accomplishments for learning; some of which are so farre engaged in divinity, that they cannot well divert themselves to other professions or employments: others perhaps so much addicted to a contemplative life, that they could not so well apply themselves to politicall and civill affairs. But for those, which I conceive to be more free and undetermined, I shall here present you with a catalogue of some of their names, such as I conceive best qualified for civill employments. First, Mr. Page, a fellow of King's Colledge, an excellent Latinist, and one, that hath travelled abroad for above ten yeares together. He is above forty years of age; but how he hath been or is affected to the parliament, or present government, I cannot tell. He is now absent from the University, and, I think, at present with the Earle of Devonshire. Secondly, Dr. Bagge, fellow of Caius College, and doctor of physick, a singularly good and ready Latinist; and I beleeve there is none of his yeares in England equal to him in the profession of physick. He hath excellent parts, but I know not certainly, whether being so eminent in that way, (though a very young doctor) he would put himselfe upon state-employment: neither do I fully know how he is affected. There are of Trinity Colledge severall, that are very good Latinists, and well furnisht with all the politer learning; as Mr. Valentine (a sober discreet man) and Mr. Linne (well known for an excellent poet.)

"Mr. Mildmay, of Peter-house, one, whose inclination seems to be peculiarly carried out towards politicall and civil employments, a scholar and a discreet man.

"Mr. Croone, of Emanuell Colledge, a young master of arts, of excellent good parts, and a general scholar.

"Mr. Miles, fellow of Clarehall, formerly my pupill; one that hath no mind to professe divinity, but a very good scholar, and also a junior master of arts.

"Lastly, of Christ Colledge there is a young man, that is master of

[1] Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, Vol. XXXVIII. p. 259.

arts this yeare, one Mr. Leigh, that for his standing is very well accomplished, and I doubt not, but in a very little time, would be exceedinge fitte for any such employment, as you would designe him for.

"Many more names I could set down; but these may suffice for your choice, and you may, if you thinke good, enquire further concerning any of them from some others, and, if you please, from this gentleman, whom I have for that purpose desired to present this to you, Mr. George Rust,[1] fellow of Christ Colledge, who can further enforme and satisfy you concerning them. He is an understanding, pious, discreet man, and himselfe I know to bee a man of exceeding good parts, and a generalle scholar, but one that seemes not so willing to divert himselfe from preaching and divinity, which he hath of late intended; otherwise I know his parts are such, as would enable him for any employment.

"If you please to enquire further from him, and by him signify your further pleasure to me, I shall be ready in this or any thing else, that I am able to expresse my selfe,

"Sir,

"Your affectionately devoted friend and servant,

"R. Cudworth.'

Dr. Cudworth likewise recommended[2] to the secretary, for the place of chaplain to the English merchants at Lisbon, Mr. Zachary Cradock, afterwards provost of Eton College, and famous for his uncommon genius and learning, and his abilities as a preacher.

In Jan. 1658-9, he wrote the following letter to Secretary Thurloe, upon his design of publishing some Latin discourses in defence of Christianity against Judaism.[3]

"Sir,

"Having this opportunity offered by Doctour Solater, who desires to waite upon you, upon your kind invitation, which I acquainted him with, I could do no lesse than accompany him with these few lines to present my service to you. I am perswaded, you will be well satisfied in his ingenuity, when you are acquainted with him. Now I have this opportunity, I shall use the freedom to acquaint you with another busines. I am perswaded by friends to publish some discourses, which I

[1] Afterwards Dean of Dromore, in Ireland.

[2] Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. xliii. p. 329, of the printed Papers, vol. v. p. 522, 523.

[3] Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. lxiii. p. 43.

have prepared in Latine, that will be of a polemicall nature in defense of Christianity against Judaisme, explaining some cheef places of scripture controverted between the Jewes and us, (as Daniel's prophecy of the 70 weekes, never yet sufficiently cleared and improved) and withall extricating many difficulties of chronologie. Which taske I rather undertake, not onely because it is suitable to my Hebrew profession, and because I have lighted on some Jewish writings upon the argument, as have scarcely ever been seen by any Christians, which would the better inable me fully to confute them; but also because I conceive it a worke proper and suitable to this present age. However, though I should not be able myselfe to be any way instrumental to these great transactions of Providence (not without cause, hoped for of many) amongst the Jews; yet I perswade myselfe my pains may not be alltogether unprofitable for the setling and establishing of Christians; or at least I shall give an account of my spending such vacant hours, as I could redeeme from my preaching and other occasions, and the perpetual distractions of the bursarship, which the statutes of this Colledge impose upon me. It was my purpose to dedicate these fruits of my studies to his highnes, (to whose noble father I was much obliged) if I may have leave, or presume so to doe; which I cannot better understand by any than yourselfe, if you shall think it convenient, when you have an opportunity to insinuate any such thing, which I permitte wholy to your prudence. I intend, God willing, to be in London some time in March, and then I shall waite upon you to receve your information. In the mean time craving pardon for this prolixity of mine, and freedome, I subscribe myselfe,

"Your really devoted friend and humble servant,

"R. Cudworth."

Jan. 20, 1658, *Christ's Coll. Cambr.*

The Discourse concerning Daniel's prophecy of the seventy weeks, mentioned in this letter, and which is still extant in manuscript, is highly commended by Dr. Henry More, in his preface, sec. 18. p. 16, to his Explanation of the grand Mystery of Godliness, printed at London, 1660, in folio, where he observes, that Dr. Cudworth in that Discourse, which was read in the public schools of the University, had undeceived the world, which had been misled too long by the over-great opinion they had of Joseph Scaliger, and that taking Funccius's Epocha, he had demonstrated the manifestation of the Messiah to have fallen out at the end of the sixty-ninth week, and his passion in the

midst of the last, in the most natural and proper sense thereof; "which demonstration of his, is of as much price and worth in theology, as either the circulation of the blood in physic, or the motion of the earth in natural philosophy."

Upon the restoration of Charles II. he wrote a copy of verses, published in Academiæ Cantabrigiensis *ΣΩΣΤΡΑ*, sive ad Calorum II. reducem de Regnis ipsi, Musis per ipsum restitutis, Gratulatio, printed at Cambridge, 1660, in quarto. In 1662, he was presented by Dr. Gilbert Sheldon, bishop of London, to the vicarage of Ashwell, in Hertfordshire,[1] to which he was admitted on the 1st of December that year.

In the beginning of the year 1665, he had a design to publish a discourse concerning moral good and evil, as appears from the following extracts of letters written by him and by Dr. Henry More, fellow of his college.[2]

Dr. Cudworth, in a letter to Dr. John Worthington, January, 1664-5.

"You know, I have had this designe concerning good and evil, or natural ethicks, a great while; which I begun above a year agoe, (when I made the first sermon in the chapel about the argument) to study over anew, and dispatch a discourse about it. No man had so frequently exhorted me to it, and so earnestly, as this friend.—But about three months since unexpectedly he told me on a suddain, he had begun a discourse on the same argument. The next day in writing I imparted my mind more fully and plainly to him. Whereupon he came to me, and told me, he would speak with me about it after a day or two. So he did; and then excused the business; that he could not tell, whether I would dispatch and finish it or no, because I had been so long about it; that Mr. Fullwood and Mr. Jenks, had sollicited him to do this, and that you were very glad, that he would undertake it. But now he understood I was resolved to go through with it, he was very glad of it, that he would desist, and throw his into a corner. All this I impart to you privately, because a common friend. I have not spoken to any body else but Mr. Standish, and something to Mr. Jenks and Fullwood."

Dr. H. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington, Jan. 24, 1664–5.

"I understand, by Mr. Standish's letter, that he, unawares, speak-

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[1] Newcourt, Repertorium, vol. ii. p. 462.

[2] Communicated by my very learned friend, Mr. John Ward, F. R. S. and professor of Rhetoric in Gresham College.

ing to the master[1] of my Enchiridion Ethicum, he shewed again his disgust, etc.—that, if I persisted in the resolution of publishing my book, he would desist in his, though he had most of it then ready to send up to be licensed that week. I pray you, spur him up to set his to the press. For my part, it is well known, I have no designe at all but to serve the publick ; and that I entered upon the task extreamly against my own will, and yet I have finished it all but a chapter. Whether, or when, I shall publish it, I shall have leisure enough to consider."

Dr. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington, Feb. 7, 1664–5.

"Some few friends at Cambridge were exceeding earnest with me to write a short ethicks, alleging no small reason for it. I did not only heartily reject them more than once, but with great zeal, if not rudeness, alleging several things, which were too long to write, indeed in a manner vilifying the project, preferring experience of life before all such fine systems ; alleging also, that Dr. Cudworth had a design for the greatest curiosity of that subject. But nothing would content them but my setting upon the work, that it was uncertain, when Dr. Cudworth's would come out, and besides, mine being a small treatise, running through the whole body of ethicks, they would not interfere one with another. For my part, till I had by chance told Dr. Cudworth of my purpose, (which I did simply, thinking nothing) and how many chapters I had finished, I knew nothing either of the time, or the scope of his writing, or if he intended a general ethicks. But the effect of those friends' earnestness (to tell you plainly how the case stood) was this : a day or two after their last importunity, I, waking in the morning, and some of their weightiest allegations recurring to my mind, and also remembering, with what an excessive earnestness one of them solicited me to this work (in which I thought there might be something more than ordinary, and that he was actuated in this business, I knew not how,) I began seriously to think with myself of the matter, and at last was so conscientiously illaqueated therein, that I could not absolutely free myself therefrom to this very day. Nor was this only an act of mere conscience, but of present self-denial. For it did very vehemently cross other great and innocent pleasures, that I promised myself in a certain order of my studies, which I had newly proposed to myself at that very time. But when I was once engaged, I proceeded not without some pleasure."

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[1] Dr. Cudworth.

Dr. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington, May 10, 1665.

"I thank you for your freedom both to him and to me. It never came into my mind to print this Enchiridion, till his book was out, unless he would have professed his like of the project. I have new transcribed it all. Mr. Jenks and Mr. Fullwood are exceeding earnest to see it, and would transcribe it for their present satisfaction. But, if they should do so, and it be known, it would, it may be, disgust Dr. Cudworth, whom I am very loth any way to grieve. But if yourself have a mind to see it, and could get a fair and true copy transcribed of it, I would willingly pay the transcriber, and the copy should be yours; for I am loth that what I have writ on so edifying a subject should be lost."

Irreligion began now to lift up its head; but the progress of it was opposed by no person with greater force and learning than by our author. For this purpose, in 1678, he published at London, in folio, his True Intellectual System of the Universe:—The first part, wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and its impossibility demonstrated. The imprimatur by Dr. Samuel Parker, chaplain to Archbishop Sheldon, is dated May 29, 1671, seven years before the publication of this work; which met with great opposition from some of the courtiers of King Charles II. who endeavored to destroy the reputation of it, when it was first published.[1] Nor has it escaped the censures of writers of different parties since that time.

The first piece, which appeared against it, was from a Roman catholic, in a Letter to Mr. R. Cudworth, D. D. printed at the end of a tract, entitled Anti-Haman; or, an Answer to Mr. G. Burnet's Mystery of Iniquity Unveiled; wherein is shewed the Conformity of the Doctrine, Worship, and Practice of the Roman Catholic Church, with those of the purest Times; the Idolatry of the Pagans is truly stated, and the Imputation of Pagan Idolatry clearly confuted; and the Reasons are given, why Catholics avoid the Communion of the Protestant Church. To which is annexed, a Letter to R. Cudworth, D. D. by W. E. Student in Divinity. With Leave of Superiors, 1679, in octavo. This writer attacks Dr. Cudworth's assertion, that though very few of the ancient philosophers thought God to be corporeal, as Epicurus, Strato, etc. yet, that the greatest part of them believed him to be a pure spirit, and adored the only true God, under the names of Jupiter, Mi-

[1] Vide Joannis Clerici Vitam, ad ann. 1711, p. 129, edit. Amstelod. 1711, in octavo

nerva, Osiris and Venus. In opposition to which, his antagonist maintains,[1] "that although all Pagans (nay all men) had naturally a knowledge of the true God, yet those they adored, were men;" in support of which, he urges four proofs taken, 1. From the diversity of their sexes; 2. From their generation; 3. From their death; 4. From their rites. He likewise attempts to confute what Dr. Cudworth has strenuously defended throughout his book, that the unity of God was a prime article of the Pagan creed.

But let us now see, in how severe a manner he was treated, even by a Protestant divine, Mr. John Turner, in his discourse of the Messiah.[2] He tells us,[3] "we must conclude Dr. Cudworth himself to be a Tritheistic; a sect, for which, I believe, he may have a kindness, because he loves hard words, or something else, without either *stick* or *trick*, which I will not name, because his book pretends to be written against it." And again,[4] that, "the most that charity itself can allow the Doctor, if it were to step forth, and speak his most favorable character to the world, is, that he is an Arian, a Socinian, or a Deist."

Mr. Dryden likewise tells us,[5] that our author "has raised such strong objections against the being of a God and providence, that many think he has not answered them." And the late earl of Shaftesbury, in his Moralists, a rhapsody,[6] has the following passage:—"You know the common fate of those, who dare appear fair authors. What was that pious and learned man's case, who wrote the Intellectual System of the Universe? I confess, it was pleasant enough to consider, that though the whole world were no less satisfied with his capacity and learning, than with his sincerity in the cause of the Deity; yet was he accused of giving the upper hand to the Atheists, for having only stated their reasons and those of their adversaries fairly together."

Such was the treatment, which our great author received for his immortal volume: wherein, as Mr. Warburton says,[7] with a boldness uncommon, indeed, but very becoming a man conscious of his own integrity, and of the truth and evidence of his cause, he launched out into

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[1] Page 335, etc.

[2] See p. 16, 17, 19, 162. edit. London, 1685, in 8vo.

[3] Page 17. [4] Page 19.

[5] Dedication of his translation of Virgil's Æneid, vol. ii. p. 378. edit. London, 1730, in 8vo.

[6] Part ii. sec. 3. Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 262. edit. London, 1737, in 8vo.

[7] Preface to vol. ii. of his Divine Legation of Moses, p. 10, 11, 12.

the immensity of the Intellectual System; and, at his first essay, penetrated the very darkest recesses of antiquity, to strip Atheism of all its disguises, and drag up the lurking monster to conviction. Where, though few readers could follow him, yet the very slowest were able to unravel his secret purpose—to tell the world—that he was an Atheist in his heart, and an Arian in his book. However, thus ran the popular clamor against this excellent person. Would the reader know the consequence? Why, the zealots inflamed the bigots:—

'Twas the time's plague, when madmen led the blind;—

The silly calumny was believed; the much-injured author grew disgusted: his ardor slackened; and the rest and far greatest part of the defence never appeared.

The same gentleman, likewise, in his letter to me above cited, observes, that among the other excellences of this work, "all his translations from the Greek writers are wonderfully exact, and a vast judgment and penetration shewn in explaining their sense."

In 1706, there was published at London, in two volumes, in quarto, an abridgment of the Intellectual System, under this title:—A Confutation of the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism; being in a great measure, either an abridgment or an improvement of what Dr. Cudworth offered to that purpose in his true Intellectual System of the Universe. Together with an introduction, in which, among accounts of other matters relating to this treatise, there is an impartial examination of what that learned person advanced, touching the Christian doctrine of a trinity in unity, and the resurrection of the body. By Thomas Wise, B. D. fellow of Exeter College, in Oxford, and chaplain to his Grace, the Duke of Ormond.

In the introduction, Mr. Wise styles Dr. Cudworth's book, the vastest magazine of reasoning and learning, that ever singly appeared against Atheism; and then examines his notions concerning the trinity and the resurrection of the body. With regard to the former, he observes, that Dr. Cudworth having laid down a general proposition, that the heathens universally held but one unmade independent God, comes to show, that the Platonists, in particular, maintained an unity of the Godhead, in their three Divine hypostases, viz. Monad or Good, Mind, and Soul; notwithstanding that they owned these three hypostases to be numerically distinct, or to have distinct singular essences of their own. To vindicate the Platonists on this point, he tells us, that the ancient orthodox Fathers of the Christian church, were generally of no

other persuasion than this—that that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons, or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular or individual, but only one common or universal essence or substance.

"This, (says Mr. Wise,) and other assertions of the like nature in Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System, have made so much noise in the world, that there has hardly been a pamphlet or book written for some years about the blessed trinity, especially in England, and in the heterodox way, which does not bring in Dr. Cudworth upon the stage, and vouch his name and quotations for its purpose. While, on the other hand, the truly orthodox (though often through a misunderstanding of his sense) do aim at his doctrine as a mark of their invectives; and others, who call themselves also by that name, entertaining no little veneration for the very words used by the ancient Fathers, especially when repeated and revived by so learned a person as Dr. Cudworth, and resolving, whatever should come of it, to stand by them, have unhappily fallen into a kind of Tritheism." Mr. Wise therefore endeavors, as much as possible, to clear up and justify our author's doctrine. However, Mr. Robert Nelson, in his life of bishop Bull,[1] declares, that Dr. Cudworth's notion, with regard to the Trinity, was the same with Dr. Samuel Clarke's, and represents it in the following terms:—That the three persons of the trinity are three distinct spiritual substances; but that the Father alone is truly and properly God; that he alone in the proper sense, is supreme; that absolute supreme honor is due to him only; and that he, absolutely speaking, is the only God of the universe, the Son and Spirit being God, but only by the Father's concurrence with them, and their subordination and subjection to him. But to return to Mr. Wise: he next considers our author's opinion about the resurrection, who, as appears from several passages of his Intellectual System, thought, that the resurrection-body will not consist of the same substance with that which was buried; and that it will not be a body of flesh, but an ethereal one; and that the present body is only a seed of the resurrection. However, Mr. Wise shows from other passages in his works, that he has as plainly asserted the resurrection of the same numerical body, as in some places he has denied it.

In the year 1703, etc. Monsieur le Clerc gave large extracts of the Intellectual System in his Bibliotheque Choisie, tom. i. ii. iii. v. vii. viii. ix. which engaged him in a dispute with Monsieur Bayle, concerning Dr. Cudworth's notion of plastic natures. Monsieur Bayle, in his Contin-

[1] Sec. lxi. p. 339, 340, edit. London, 1714, in 8vo.

uation des Penseés diverses sur les Comites,[1] had observed, that "the Atheists are very much perplexed, how to account for the formation of animals, which they ascribed to a cause which was not conscious of what it did, and yet followed a regular plan, without knowing according to what plan it went to work. But Dr. Cudworth's Plastic Nature, and Dr. Grew's Vital Principle[2] are exactly in the same case; and thus they take away the whole strength of this objection against the Atheists. For if God could communicate such a plastic power, it follows, that it is not inconsistent with the nature of things, that there be such agents. They may therefore exist of themselves, will the adversary say; whence it would also follow, that the regularity which we observe in the universe, may be the effect of a blind cause, which was not concious of what it did." Mr. Bayle, however, owned, that Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew, were not aware of the consequence, which, according to him, followed from their system. Monsieur Le Clerc returned an answer in the fifth volume of his Bibliotheque Choisie;[3] wherein he observed that the plastic or vital natures, which these two writers admit, cannot in the least favor the Atheists; because these natures are only instruments in the hand of God, and have no power or efficacy but what they receive from him, who rules and directs all their actions. That they are only instrumental causes produced and employed by the chief and First Cause; and that it cannot be said that a palace has been built up without art, because not only hammers, rules, saws, etc. but even the arms of men, which made use of these instruments, are destitute of knowledge. It is sufficient that the mind of the builder directed all these things, and employed them in the execution of his design. It is therefore plain, that the Atheists, who deny the being of an intelligent Cause, cannot retort the argument of Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew upon them. Monsieur Bayle, in his answer,[4] endeavored to show, that if these writers had considered the plastic natures only as instruments in the hand of God, this system would have been exposed to all the difficulties to which the Cartesian hypothesis is liable, and which they intend to avoid. That therefore we must suppose their opinion to have been, that these natures are active principles, which do not want to be continually set on and directed; but that it is

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[1] Tom. i. Sec. 21.

[2] See Dr. Nehemiah Grew's Cosmologia Sacra, printed at London, 1701, in folio.

[3] Page 283, etc.

[4] Hist. des Ouvrages des Scavans, Août. 1704. Art. 7, p. 380, etc.

sufficient if God does but put them in a proper situation, and superintend their actions, to set them right, if it be necessary. This being the case, Monsieur Bayle pretends, that the argument may be retorted against those writers. For, says he, since when the order and regularity of this world are alleged as a proof of the being of a God, it is supposed that a being cannot produce a regular work, without having an idea of it; yet, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic natures which produce plants and animals, have not the least idea of what they do. If it be answered, that they have been created with that faculty by a Being, who knows all, and whose ideas they only put in execution; the Stratonician will reply, that if they do it only as efficient causes, this is as incomprehensible as that which is objected to him; since it is as difficult for any being to perform a scheme, which it does not understand, but which another understands, as it is to perform a scheme which no being at all has any notion of. Since you acknowledge, will the Stratonician say, that God could endow some creatures with a power of producing excellent works, though without any knowledge: you must also confess, that there is no necessary connexion between the power of producing excellent works, and the idea and knowledge of their essence, and of the manner of producing them: consequently, you ought not to assert, that these things cannot subsist separately in nature, and that nature cannot have of itself what, according to you, the plastic beings received from God. In short, Monsieur Bayle asked, whether these writers maintained, that the plastic and vital natures are only passive instruments in the hand of God, as Monsieur Le Clerc seemed to suppose by his comparison with an architect. Monsieur Le Clerc answered,[1] that according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic natures were not passive instruments; but that they are under God's direction, who conducts them, though we cannot explain after what manner. Nor can the Atheists, added he, retort the argument, because God is the author of the regularity and order with which the plastic natures act; whereas, according to the Atheists, matter moves of itself, without any cause to direct it, and to give it a power of moving regularly. This dispute was carried on still further, with some warmth, and a great many repetitions on both sides. But what has been said is sufficient to give the reader a notion of this controversy, for the progress of which he may consult the following books:—Histoire des Ouvrages des Scavans. Decemb. 1704, art. 12. Bibliotheque Choisie, tom. vii. art. 7. Répons aux Questions d'un Provincial, tom. iii. chap.

[1] Biblioth. Choisie, tom. vi. art. 7, p. 422.

179. Bibliotheque Choisie, tom. ix. art. 10. Réponse pour Mr. Bayle à Mr. Le Clerc, p. 31, annexed to the fourth volume of the Repons. aux Quest. d'un Provincial.—Upon the whole, Mr. Warburton, in his letter to me above cited, is of opinion, that our author's "Plastic Life of Nature is fully overthrown by Monsieur Bayle, whose superiority in that dispute with Monsieur Le Clerc, is clear and indisputable."

Monsieur Le Clerc expressed his wishes,[1] that some man of learning would translate the Intellectual System into Latin; but this design though resolved upon and attempted by several persons in Germany,[2] was never executed till the year 1733, when Dr. Mosheim published his translation of it under the following title:—Radulphi Cudworth, Theologiæ Doctoris et in Academiâ Cantrabrigiensi Professoris, Systema Intellectuale hujus Universi, seu de veris Naturæ Rerum originibus Commentarii; quibus omnis eorum Philosophia, qui Deum esse negant, funditùs evertitur. Accedunt reliqua ejus Opuscula. Johannes Laurentius Moshemius, Theologiæ Doctor, serenisissimi Ducis Brunsvicensis à Consiliis Rerum sanctiorum. Abbas Cœnobiorum Vallis S. Mariæ et Lapidis S. Michælis, omnia ex Anglico Latinè vertit, recensuit, variis Observationibus et Dissertationibus illustravit, et auxit. Jenæ, 2 vols. in folio. Dr. Mosheim, in his preface, represents the difficulties of translating this work to be very great; and observes some mistakes, which Monsieur Le Clerc has committed with regard to the sense of our author in his extracts in the Bibliotheque Choisie. Monsieur Bourdelin, a member of the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, had begun a translation of the Intellectual System into French,[3] but was prevented from completing it by his death, which happened in May, 1717.

But to return to our author: in 1678, he was installed prebendary of Gloucester.[4] He died at Cambridge, June 26, 1688; and was interred in the chapel of Christ's College, with the following inscription on his monument:—

"Here lyeth the body of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, late Master of Christ's College, about thirty years Hebrew Professor, and Prebendary of Gloucester. He died the 26th of June 1688, in the seventy-first year of his age."

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[1] Biblioth. Choisie, tom. i. p. 65. [2] See Dr. Mosheim's preface.

[3] See his Eloge in Hist. de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, tom. ii. p. 562, edit. Amsterdam.

[4] Survey of the Cathedrals of York, etc. by Browne Willis, Esq. p. 743, edit. London, 1727, in 4to.

He was a man of very extensive learning, excellently skilled in the learned languages and antiquity, a good mathematician, a subtile philosopher, and a profound metaphysician. He embraced the mechanical or corpuscular philosophy; but, with regard to the Deity, intelligences, genii, ideas, and in short the principles of human knowledge, he followed Plato, and even the latter Platonists.[1] A great number of writers commend his piety and modesty; and bishop Burnet[2] having observed, that Dr. Henry More studied to consider religion as a seed of deiform nature, and in order to this, set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers; chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin; and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature, tells us, that "Dr. Cudworth carried this on with a great strength of genius, and a vast compass of learning;" and that "he was a man of great conduct and prudence; upon which his enemies did very falsely accuse him of craft and dissimulation." The late earl of Shaftesbury[3] styles him an excellent and learned divine, of highest authority at home and fame abroad.

Besides his sermon on 1 John 2 : 3, 4, above-mentioned, he published likewise another, on 1 Cor. 15: 57, the third edition of both which was printed at London, 1676, in folio.

He left several posthumous works, most of which seem to be a continuation of his Intellectual System, of which he had given the world only the first part. One of these was published by Dr. Edward Chandler, bishop of Durham, at London, in 1731, under this title, A treatise concerning eternal and immutable Morality. In the preface[4] to which, the bishop observes, that in this book our author "proves the falseness of the consequences with respect to natural justice and morality in God, which are deducible from the principles of those that maintain the second sort of Fate, denominated by him Theologic. And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part of his first book against Material Fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper antidote to the poison in some of Mr. Hobbes's, and others' writings, who revived in that age the exploded opinions of Protagoras and other ancient Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal discriminations of moral good and evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary productions of Divine or human will. Against the ancient and modern patrons of this doctrine, no one hath writ bet-

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[1] Mosheim, *ubi supra.*

[2] History of his Own Time, vol. i. p. 187.

[3] Characteristics, vol. iii. chap. 2, p. 64.

[4] Pages 9, 10, 11.

ter than Dr. Cudworth. His book is indeed a demonstration of the truth of the contrary opinion, and is drawn up with that beauty, clearness, and strength, as must delight as well as convince the reader, if I may judge of the affection of others from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just idea of the writer's good sense, as well as vast learning. We are not certain, that this treatise is quoted so perfect as the author designed it; but it appears from the manuscript, that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the press."

The titles and subjects of the rest of our author's manuscripts are as follow:

A Discourse of moral Good and Evil, in several folios, containing near 1000 pages.

Heads of the chapters of one of those books.

Chap. 1. The opinions of the ancient adversaries of natural justice explained, p. 1.

2. Objections against morality, p. 11.

3. Answers to the first objection, p. 29.

4. Answers to the second and third objections, p. 45.

5. Inconsistencies with a commonwealth, p. 49.

6. Justice by God's arbitrary command, p. 79.

7. The sixth and seventh objections answered, p. 112.

8. Pleasure; wherein the ancient Hedonic philosophy is explained, and it is largely debated, whether pleasure is the *summum bonum*, p. 117.

9. Answer to the ninth objection, p. 175.

10. Notion of morality settled, p. 198.

11. Happiness; and the philosophy of Epicurus concerning it examined and refuted, p. 253.

12. True happiness in Divine life, p. 296.

13. Result of the former discourse; incorporeal substance Deity, p. 303.

14. Controversy of liberty stated. A new philosophical hypothesis, p. 336.

15. Objections against liberty. *Τὸ ἀγαθὸν φαινόμενον.*

16. Argument from the phenomenon of incontinency, p. 382.

Heads of another book of Morality, wherein Hobbes's philosophy is explained.

Prolegomena; to show, that if nothing is naturally just or unjust,

nothing can be made so.—Chap. 2. Not by laws.—Chap. 3. Not by laws of nature.—Chap. 4. Not by covenants.—Chap. 5. To explain his doctrine generally and particularly.—Chap. 6. State of nature.—Chap. 7. Laws of nature.—Chap. 8. Common representative.—Chap. 9. To discover his equivocations.—Chap. 10. About obligation.—Chap. 11. According to him there can be no Ethic.—Chap. 12. Judgment on his politics, that no politic can be built on these principles.

A discourse on Liberty and Necessity, in which the grounds of the Atheistical philosophy are confuted, and morality vindicated and explained. This book contains 1000 pages in folio.

Heads of the chapters of one of the books.

Chap. 1. The necessity of all human actions asserted by three sorts of men, and in different ways:—First, Some Christian theologers of the latter age. Secondly, the old Zenonian Stoics. Thirdly, the Democritical Physiologers or Atheistical Fatalists, p. 1.

2. Christian Fatalists pleading, p. 37.
3. The Stoical Fatalists pleading, p. 70.
4. Atheistical Fatalists pleading, p. 84.
5. Answer to the phenomena objected, p. 119.
6. Of motion and sense, p. 167.
7. Of intellection, p. 196.
8. Answer to Hobbes's Reflections, p. 305.
9. Morality, p. 317.

Heads of the chapters of another book, De libero Arbitrio.

Chap. 1. Dreams.—2. Indifferences.—3. General account.—4. Particular or full account.—5. Definition and particular account.—6. An imperfection not formally in God.—7. Arguments to prove such a thing.—8. That that, which rules all, is not ἀνάγκη ἀπαραίτητος, but προνοία ἱλασμὸς.—9. Answer to the objection, μηδὲν ἀναίτιον.—10. Contingencies.—11. Argument for necessity, taken from the nature of God.

Upon Daniel's prophecy of the LXX weeks, wherein all the interpretations of the Jews are considered and confuted, with several of some learned Christians. In two volumes, in folio.

Of the verity of the Christian religion against the Jews. Dr. Cudworth mentions this in his MSS. but it is not yet found.

A Discourse of the Creation of the World, and Immortality of the Soul, in 8vo.

Hebrew learning.

An explanation of Hobbes's notion of God, and of the extension of spirits.

Our author had several sons, who probably died young, but he left one daughter, Damaris, who was second wife to Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in the County of Essex, Bart.[1] by whom she had a son, the late Francis Cudworth Masham, Esq.[2] one of the Masters of the High Court of Chancery, and accountant-general of the said Court, and foreign apposer in the Court of Exchequer. This lady had a great friendship with Mr. Locke, who died at her house at Oates, where he had resided for several years before. She was distinguished for her uncommon genius and learning; and in the year 1696 published at London, in 12mo. without her name, A discourse concerning the Love of God.[3] She introduces this tract with observing, that "whatever reproaches have been made by the Romanists, on the one hand, of the want of books of devotion in the church of England, or by the dissenters on the other, of a dead and lifeless way of preaching, it may be affirmed, that there cannot any where be found so good a collection of discourses on moral subjects, as might be made of English sermons, and other treatises of that nature, written by divines of our church: which books are certainly in themselves of the greatest, and most general use of any; and do most conduce to that, which is the chief aim of Christianity—a good life." She then animadverts upon those who undervalue morality,[4] and others, who strain the duties of it to an impracticable pitch, and pretend to ascend by it to something beyond or above it;[5] and afterwards proceeds to consider the conduct of those who build their practical and devotional discourses upon principles which will not bear the test, but which oblige them to lay down such assertions of morality, as sober and well-disposed Christians cannot understand to be practicable.[6] And here she applies herself to the examination of Mr. John Norris's[7] scheme in his Practical Discourses and other treatises, wherein he maintains, that "mankind are obliged strictly, as their duty, to love with desire, nothing but God only, every degree of desire of any creature whatsoever being sinful:" which assertion Mr. Norris defends upon this ground, that God, not the creature, is the immediate efficient

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[1] He died at his seat at Oates on Sunday, the third of March, 1702-3, in the 77th year of his age.

[2] He died May 17, 1731.

[3] It contains 126 pages, besides the preface.

[4] Pages 2, 3.

[5] Pages 3, 4, 5, 6.

[6] Page 7.

[7] This divine borrowed his hypothesis from Father Mallebranche.

cause of our sensations; for whatsoever gives us pleasure has a right to our love: but God only gives us pleasure, therefore he only has a right to our love. This hypothesis is considered with great accuracy and ingenuity by Lady Masham, and the bad consequences of it represented in a strong light. Her Discourse was translated into French by Mr. Peter Coste, and printed at Amsterdam, in 1705. She lies buried in the cathedral church of Bath, where a monument is erected to her memory, with the following inscription:

"Near this place lies Dame Damaris Masham, daughter of Ralph Cudworth, D. D. and second wife of Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in the county of Essex, Bart. who to the softness and elegancy of her own sex added several of the noblest accomplishments and qualities to the other.

"She possessed these advantages in a degree unusual to either, and tempered them with an exactness peculiar to herself.

"Her learning, judgment, sagacity, and penetration, together with her candor and love of truth, were very observable to all that conversed with her, or were acquainted with those small treatises she published in her life-time, though she industriously concealed her name.

"Being mother of an only son, she applied all her natural and acquired endowments to the care of his education.

"She was a strict observer of all the virtues belonging to every station of her life; and only wanted opportunities to make these talents shine in the world, which were the admiration of her friends.

"She was born on the 18th of January, 1658, and died on the 20th of April, 1708."

THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE.

Γυμνάσιον τῆς ψυκῆς Ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία, Τέλος δὲ Ἡ θεία.

ORIGENES.

TO THE

RIGHT HONORABLE

HENEAGE LORD FINCH,

Baron of Daventry, Lord High Chancellor of England, and one of his Majesty's most Honorable Privy Council.

MY LORD,

The many favors I have formerly received from you, as they might justly challenge, whenever I had a fit opportunity, a public and thankful acknowledgement; so have they encouraged me at this time, to the presumption of this dedication to your Lordship. Whom, as your perspicacious wit and solid judgment, together with your acquired learning, render every way a most accomplished and desirable patron; so did I persuade myself, that your hearty affection to religion, and zeal for it, would make you not unwilling, to take that into your protection, which is written wholly in the defence thereof; so far forth, as its own defects, or miscarriages, should not render it incapable of the same. Nor can I think it probable, that in an age of so much debauchery, skepticism, and infidelity, an undertaking of this kind should be judged by you useless or unseasonable. And now, having so fit an opportunity, I could most willingly expatiate in the large field of your lordship's praise, both that I might do an act of justice to yourself, and provoke others to your imitation. But I am sensible, that as no eloquence, less than that of your own, could be fit for such a performance: so the nobleness and generosity of your spirit is such, that you take much more pleasure in doing praiseworthy things, than in hearing the repeated echoes of them. Wherefore, instead of pursuing encomiums, which would be the least pleasing to yourself, I shall offer up my prayers to Almighty God, for the continuation of your lordship's life and health; that so his majesty may long have such a loyal subject

and wise counsellor; the church of England such a worthy patron; the High Court of Chancery such an oracle of impartial justice; and the whole nation such a pattern of virtue and piety. Which shall ever be the hearty desire of,

My Lord,

Your lordship's most humble, and

Most affectionate servant,

R. CUDWORTH.

PREFACE TO THE READER.[1]

THOUGH, I confess, I have seldom taken any great pleasure in reading other men's apologies, yet must I at this time make some myself. First, therefore, I acknowledge, that when I engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, will, as we conceive, serve the design of Atheism, and undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous: and, it is evident, that some have pursued it of late, in order to that end. But afterwards we considered, that this, which is indeed a controversy concerning the True Intellectual System of the Universe, does, in the full extent thereof, take in other things; the necessity of all actions and events being maintained by several persons, upon very different grounds, according to that tripartite fatalism, mentioned by us in the beginning of the first chapter. For first, the Democritic Fate is nothing but the material necessity of all things without a God, in supposing senseless matter, necessarily moved, to be the only original and principle of all things; which therefore is called by Epicurus the Physiological, by us the Atheistic Fate. Besides which, the Divine Fate is also bipartite: some Theists supposing God, both to decree and do all things in us (evil as well as good,) or by his immediate influence to determinate all actions, and so make them alike necessary to us. From whence it follows, that his will is no way regulated or determined by any essential and immutable goodness and justice; or that he hath nothing of morality in his nature, he being only arbitrary will omnipotent. As also that all good and evil moral, to us creatures, are mere thetical or positive things; νόμῳ, and not φύσει, by law or command only, and not by nature. This therefore may be called the Divine Fate immoral, and violent. Again, there being other Divine fatalists, who acknowledge such a Deity, as both suffers other things, besides itself, to act, and hath an essential goodness and justice in its nature, and consequently, that there are things, just and unjust to us naturally,

[1] Preface to the 2d edit. 4to. 1743.

and not by law and arbitrary constitution only; and yet nevertheless take away from men all such liberty as might make them capable of praise and dispraise, rewards and punishments, and objects of distributive justice; they conceiving necessity to be intrinsical to the nature of every thing, in the actings of it, and nothing of contingency to be found any where; from whence it will follow, that nothing could possibly have been otherwise, in the whole world, than it is. And this may be called the Divine Fate moral (as the other immoral) and natural (as the other violent;) it being a concatenation, or implexed series of causes, all in themselves necessary, depending upon a Deity moral (if we may so speak;) that is, such as is essentially good, and naturally just, as the head thereof; the first contriver and orderer of all. Which kind of Divine Fate hath not only been formerly asserted by the Stoics, but also of late by divers modern writers. Wherefore, of the three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the Universe, mentioned in the beginning of this book, one is absolute Atheism, another immoral Theism, or religion without any natural justice and morality (all just and unjust, according to this hypothesis, being mere thetical or factitious things, made by arbitrary will and command only;) the third and last, such a Theism, as acknowledges not only a God, or omnipotent understanding Being, but also natural justice and morality, founded in him, and derived from him; nevertheless no liberty from necessity any where, and therefore no distributive or retributive justice in the world. Whereas these three things are (as we conceive) the fundamentals or essentials of true religion. First, that all things in the world do not float without a head and governor; but that there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all. Secondly, that this God, being essentially good and just, there is φύσει καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, something in its own nature immutably and eternally just and unjust; and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only. And, lastly, that there is something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or, that we are so far forth principals or masters of our own actions, as to be accountable to justice for them, or to make us guilty and blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment accordingly. Which three fundamentals of religion are intimated by the author to the Hebrews in these words:—"He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him out." For to seek out God here, is nothing else but to seek a participation of his image, or the recovery of that nature and life of his which we have been alienated from. And these three things, namely, that all things do not float without a head and governor, but there is an omnipotent understanding Being presiding over all;

that this God hath an essential goodness and justice; and that the differences of good and evil moral, honest and dishonest, are not by mere will and law only, but by nature; and consequently, that the Deity cannot act, influence, and necessitate men to such things as are in their own nature evil; and, lastly, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, but that men have such a liberty or power over their own actions, as may render them accountable for the same, and blameworthy when they do amiss; and, consequently, that there is a justice distributive of rewards and punishments running through the world; I say, these three (which are the most important things that the mind of man can employ itself upon,) taken all together, make up the wholeness and entireness of that which is here called by us the True Intellectual System of the Universe, in such a sense as Atheism may be called a false system thereof; the word Intellectual being added, to distinguish it from the other, vulgarly so called, Systems of the World (that is, the visible and corporeal world,) the Ptolemaic, Tychonic, and Copernican; the two former of which are now commonly accounted false, the latter true. And thus our prospect being now enlarged into a threefold fatalism, or spurious and false hypothesis of the intellectual system, making all things necessary upon several grounds; we accordingly designed the confutation of them all, in three several books. The first, against Atheism (which is the Democritic Fate,) wherein all the reason and philosophy thereof is refelled, and the existence of a God demonstrated; and so that ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, or material necessity of all things, overthrown. The second, for such a God, as is not mere arbitrary will omnipotent, decreeing, doing, and necessitating all actions, evil as well as good, but essentially moral, good, and just; and for a natural *discrimen honestorum et turpium*, whereby another ground of the necessity of all human actions will be removed. And the third and last, against necessity intrinsical and essential to all action, and for such a liberty, or *sui-potestas*, in rational creatures, as may render them accountable, capable of rewards and punishments, and so objects of distributive or retributive justice; by which the now only remaining ground, of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, will be taken away. And all these three under that one general title of the True Intellectual System of the Universe; each book having, besides its own particular title: as, against Atheism; for natural justice and morality, founded in the Deity; for liberty from necessity, and a distributive justice of rewards and punishments in the world. And this we conceive may fully satisfy, concerning our general title, all those who are not extremely critical or captious, at least as many of

them as ever heard of the astronomical systems of the world; so that they will not think us hereby obliged to treat of the hierarchy of angels, and of all the several species of animals, vegetables, minerals, etc.; that is, to write *de omni ente*, of whatsoever is contained within the complexion of the universe. Though the whole scale of entity is here also taken notice of; and the general ranks of substantial beings, below the Deity (or trinity of Divine hypostases) considered; which yet, according to our philosophy, are but two; souls of several degrees (angels themselves being included within that number,) and body, or matter; as also the immortality of those souls proved: which notwithstanding is suggested by us, only to satisfy some men's curiosity. Nevertheless, we confess, that this general title might well have been here spared by us, and this volume have been presented to the reader's view, not as a part or piece, but a whole complete and entire thing by itself, had it not been for two reasons; first, our beginning with those three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, and promising a confutation of them all then, when we thought to have brought them within the compass of one volume; and secondly, every other page, throughout this whole volume, accordingly bearing the inscription of book the first upon the head thereof. This is therefore that, which, in the first place, we here apologize for our publishing one part or book alone by itself, we being surprised in the length thereof; whereas we had intended two more along with it. Notwithstanding which, there is no reason why this volume should be therefore thought imperfect and incomplete, because it hath not all the three things at first designed us; it containing all that belongeth to its own particular title and subject, and being in that respect no piece, but a whole. This indeed must needs beget an expectation of the two following treatises (especially in such as shall have received any satisfaction from this first,) concerning those two other fatalisms, or false hypotheses mentioned, to make up our whole Intellectual System complete; the one to prove, that God is not mere arbitrary will omnipotent, (without any essential goodness and justice) decreeing and doing all things in the world, as well evil as good, and thereby making them alike necessary to us; from whence it would follow, that all good and evil moral are mere thetical, positive, and arbitrary things; that is, not nature, but will: which is the defence of natural, eternal, immutable justice or morality. The other, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, God and all creatures, or essential to all action; but, that there is something ἐφ ἡμῖν, or that we have some liberty or power over our own actions: which is the defence of a distributive or retributive

justice, dispensing rewards and punishments throughout the whole world. Wherefore we think fit here to advertise the reader concerning these, that though they were and still are, really intended by us, yet the complete finishing and publication of them will notwithstanding depend upon many contingencies; not only of our life and health, the latter of which, as well as the former, is to us very uncertain; but also of our leisure, or vacancy from other necessary employments.

In the next place, we must apologize also for the fourth chapter; inasmuch as though, in regard of its length, it might rather be called a book, than a chapter, yet it doth not answer all the contents prefixed to it. Here therefore must we again confess ourselves surprised, who, when we wrote those contents, did not suspect in the least, but that we should have satisfied them all within a lesser compass. And our design then was, besides answering the objection against the naturality of the idea of God, from the Pagan Polytheism (we having then so fit an occasion,) to give such a further account of the idolatry and religion of the Gentiles, as might prepare our way for a defence of Christianity, to be subjoined in the close; it being not only agreeable to the sense of ancient doctors, but also expressly declared in the Scripture, that one design of Christianity was to abolish and extirpate the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry. And our reasons for this intended defence of Christianity were, first, because we had observed, that some professed opposers of Atheism had either incurred a suspicion, or at least suffered under the imputation of being mere Theists, or natural religionists only, and no hearty believers of Christianity, or friends to revealed religion. From which either suspicion or imputation therefore we thought it justice to free ourselves, we having so unshaken a belief and firm assurance of the truth of the whole Christian doctrine. But, secondly, and principally, because we had further observed it to have been the method of our modern Atheists, to make their first assault against Christianity, as thinking that to be the most vulnerable: and that it would be an easy step for them, from thence, to demolish all religion and Theism. However, since the satisfying the former part of those contents had already taken up so much room, that the pursuit of the remainder would have quite excluded our principally intended confutation of all the atheistic grounds; the forementioned objection being now sufficiently answered, there was a necessity, that we should there break off, and leave the further account of the Pagan idolatry and religion, together with our defence of Christianity, to some other more convenient opportunity.

And now we shall exhibit to the reader's view a brief and general

synopsis of the whole following work, together with some particular reflections upon several parts thereof, either for his better information concerning them, or for their vindication; some of which, therefore, will be of greater use, after the book has been read, than before. The first chapter is an account of the Atomic physiology, as made the foundation of the Democritic Fate: where the reader is to understand, that this Democritic Fate, which is one of the three false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, there mentioned, is the very self-same thing with the Atomic Atheism, the only form of Atheism, that hath publicly appeared upon the stage, as an entire philosophic system, or hath indeed been much taken notice of in the world for these two thousand years past. For, though it be true, that Epicurus, (who was also an Atomic Atheist, as is afterwards declared, having, in all probability, therefore a mind to innovate something, that he might not seem to have borrowed all from Democritus,) did by violence introduce liberty of will into his hypothesis; for the solving whereof, he ridiculously devised, that his third motion of Atoms, called by Lucretius—

———Exiguum Clinamen Principiorum:

Yet was this, as Cicero[1] long since observed, a most heterogeneous patch, or *assumentum* of his, and altogether as contradictious to the tenor of his own principles, as it was to the doctrine of Democritus himself. There can be nothing more absurd, than for an Atheist to assert liberty of will; but, it is most of all absurd, for an Atomic one. And, therefore, our modern Atheists do here plainly disclaim Epicurus, (though otherwise so much admired by them,) and declare open war against this liberty of will; they apprehending, that it would unavoidably introduce incorporeal substance; as also well knowing, that necessity, on the contrary, effectually overthrows all religion, it taking away guilt and blame, punishments and rewards; to which might be added also prayers and devotions.

And as there was a necessity for us here, to give some account of that ancient Atomic physiology, with which Atheism now became thus blended and complicated; so do we, in this first chapter, chiefly insist upon two things concerning it. First, that it was no invention of Democritus nor Leucippus, but of much greater antiquity; not only from that tradition transmitted by Posidonius, the Stoic, that it derived its original from one Moschus, a Phœnician, who lived before the Trojan wars, (which plainly makes it to have been Mosaical;) but also

[1] De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 25.

from Aristotle's affirmation, that the greater part of the ancient philosophers entertained this hypothesis ; and further, because it is certain, that divers of the Italics, and particularly Empedocles, before Democritus, physiologized atomically, which is the reason he was so much applauded by Lucretius. Besides which, it is more than a presumption, that Anaxagoras his Homœomery, or similar Atomology, was but a degeneration from the true and genuine Atomology of the ancient Italics, that was an Anomœomery, or doctrine of dissimilar and unqualified atoms. Wherefore all that is true concerning Democritus and Leucippus, is only this, that these men were indeed the first atheizers of this ancient Atomic physiology, or the inventors and broachers of the Atomic Atheism. Which is Laertius his true meaning, (though it be not commonly understood,) when he recordeth of them, that they were the first, who made unqualified atoms the principles of all things in the universe without exception ; that is, not only of inanimate bodies, (as the other ancient religious Atomists, the Italics, before had done,) but also of soul and mind.

And whereas, we conceive this Atomic physiology, as to the essentials thereof, to be unquestionably true, viz.—That the only principles of bodies are magnitude, figure, sight, motion, and rest ; and that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are really nothing, but several combinations of these, causing several fancies in us ; (which excellent discovery, therefore, so long ago made, is a notable instance of the wit and sagacity of the ancients ;) so do we in the next place make it manifest, that this Atomic physiology, rightly understood, is so far from being either the mother or nurse of Atheism, or any ways favorable thereunto, (as is vulgarly supposed) that it is indeed the most directly opposite to it of any, and the greatest defence against the same. For, first, we have discovered, that the principle, upon which this Atomology is founded, and from whence it sprung, was no other than this, nothing out of nothing, in the true sense thereof ; or, that nothing can be caused by nothing ; from whence it was concluded, that in natural generations there was no new real entity produced, which was not before : the genuine consequence whereof was two-fold ; that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are no entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, sight and motion of parts ; and that souls are substances incorporeal, not generated out of matter. Where we have showed, that the Pythagoric doctrine, of the pre-existence of souls, was founded upon the very same principles with the Atomic physiology. And it is from this very principle, rightly understood, that ourselves afterwards undertake to demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all

Atheism. Moreover, we have made it undeniably evident, that the intrinsic constitution of this Atomic physiology also is such, as that whosoever admits it, and rightly understands it, must needs acknowledge incorporeal substance; which is the absolute overthrow of Atheism. And from hence alone it is certain to us, without any testimonies from antiquity, that Democritus and Leucippus could not possibly be the first inventors of this philosophy, they either not rightly understanding it, or else wilfully depraving the same; and the Atomic Atheism being really nothing else, but a rape committed upon the Atomic physiology. For which reason, we do by no means here applaud Plato, nor Aristotle, in their rejecting this most ancient Atomic physiology, and introducing again, that unintelligible first matter, and those exploded qualities and forms, into philosophy. For though this were probably done by Plato, out of a disgust and prejudice against the Atomic Atheists, which made him not so well consider nor understand that physiology; yet was he much disappointed of his expectation herein, that atomology, which he exploded, (rightly understood,) being really the greatest bulwark against Atheism; and, on the contrary, those forms and qualities, which he espoused, the natural seed thereof, they, besides their unintelligible darkness, bringing something out of nothing, in the impossible sense; which we show to be the inlet of all Atheism. And thus, in this first chapter, have we not only quite disarmed Atheism of Atomicism, or showed, that the latter, (rightly understood) affordeth no manner of shelter or protection to the former; but also made it manifest, that it is the greatest bulwark and defence against the same; which is a thing afterwards further insisted on.

As to the second chapter, we have no more to say, but only this; that here we took the liberty to reveal the arcana mysteries of Atheism, and to discover all its pretended grounds of reason, that we could find any where suggested in writings, those only excepted, that are peculiar to the Hylozoic form (which is directly contrary to the Atomic,) and that to their best advantage too; nevertheless to this end, that these being afterwards all baffled and confuted, Theism might, by this means, obtain the greater and juster triumph over Atheism.

In the third chapter, we thought it necessary, in order to a fuller confutation of Atheism, to consider all the other forms thereof, besides the Atomic. And here do we, first of all, make a discovery of a certain form of Atheism, never before taken notice of by any modern writers, which we call the Hylozoic: which, notwithstanding, though it were long since started by Strato, in way of opposition to the Democritic and Epicurean hypothesis, yet because it afterwards slept in perfect silence

and oblivion, should have been here by us passed by silently, had we not had certain knowledge of its being of late awakened and revived by some, who were so sagacious, as plainly to perceive, that the Atomic form could never do their business, nor prove defensible, and therefore would attempt to carry on this cause of Atheism, in quite a different way, by the life and perception of matter ; as also that this, in all probability, would, ere long, publicly appear upon the stage, though not bare-faced, but under a disguise. Which Atheistic hypothesis is partly confuted by us, in the close of this chapter, and partly in the fifth.

In the next place, it being certain, that there had been other philosophic Atheists in the world before those Atomics, Epicurus and Democritus ; we declare, out of Plato and Aristotle, what that most ancient Atheistic hypothesis was ; namely, the education of all things, even life and understanding itself, out of matter, in the way of qualities, or as the passions and the affections thereof, generable and corruptible. Which form of Atheism is styled by us, not only Hylopathian, but also Anaximandrian ; however, we grant some probability of that opinion, that Anaximander held an Homœomery of qualified atoms, as Anaxagoras afterwards did ; the difference between them being only this, that the latter asserted an unmade mind, whereas, the former generated all mind and understanding out of those qualified atoms, hot and cold, moist and dry, compounded together ; because we judged this difference not to be a sufficient ground to multiply forms of Atheism upon. And here do we give notice of that strange kind of religious Atheism, or Atheistic Theogonism, which asserted, not only other understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, but also, amongst those, one Supreme or Jupiter too ; nevertheless native, and generated at first out of night or chaos (that is, senseless matter,) as also mortal and corruptible again into the same.

Besides which, there is yet a fourth Atheistic form taken notice of, out of the writings of the ancients, (though perhaps junior to the rest, it seeming to be but the corruption and degeneration of Stoicism) which concluded the whole world, not to be an animal (as the Pagan Theists then generally supposed,) but only one huge plant or vegetable, having an artificial, plantal, and plastic nature, as its highest principle, orderly disposing the whole, without any mind or understanding. And here have we set down the agreement of all the Atheistic forms (however differing so much from one another,) in this one general principle, viz.—That all animality, conscious life and understanding, is generated out of senseless matter, and corruptible again into it.

Wherefore, in the close of this third chapter, we insist largely upon

an artificial, regular, and plastic nature, devoid of express knowledge and understanding, as subordinate to the Deity; chiefly in way of confutation of those Cosmo-plastic and Hylozoic Atheisms. Though we had a further design herein also, for the defence of Theism; forasmuch as without such a nature, either God must be supposed to do all things in the world immediately, and to form every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands; which seemeth not so becoming of him, and would render his providence, to human apprehensions, laborious and distractious; or else the whole system of this corporeal universe must result only from fortuitous mechanism, without the direction of any mind; which hypothesis once admitted, would unquestionably, by degrees, supplant and undermine all Theism. And now, from what we have declared, it may plainly appear, that this digression of ours, concerning an artificial, regular, and plastic nature, (subordinate to the Deity) is no wen, or excrescency in the body of this book; but a natural and necessary member thereof.

In the fourth chapter, after the idea of God fully declared, (where we could not omit his essential goodness and justice, or, if we may so call it, the morality of the Deity, though that be a thing properly belonging to the second book, the confutation of the Divine Fate immoral) there is a large account given of the Pagan Polytheism; to satisfy a very considerable objection, that lay in our way from thence, against the naturality of the idea of God, as including oneliness and singularity in it. For had that, upon inquiry, been found true, which is so commonly taken for granted, that the generality of the Pagan nations had constantly scattered their devotions amongst a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, they acknowledging no sovereign Numen; this would much have stumbled the naturality of the Divine idea. But now it being, on the contrary, clearly proved, that the Pagan theologers all along acknowledged one sovereign and omnipotent Deity, from which all their other gods were generated or created; we have thereby not only removed the forementioned objection out of the way, but also evinced, that the generality of mankind have constantly had a certain prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the actual existence of a God, according to the true idea of him. And this was the rather done fully and carefully by us, because we had not met with it sufficiently performed before; A. Steuchus Eugubinus having labored most in this subject, from whose profitable industry, though we shall no way detract, yet whosoever will compare what he hath written with ours, will find no just cause to think ours superfluous and unnecessary, much less, a transcription out of his. In which, besides other

things, there is no account at all given of the many Pagan, poetical, and political gods, what they were ; which is so great a part of our performance, to prove them really to have been but the polyonymy of one God. From whence it follows, also, that the Pagan religion, though sufficiently faulty, yet was not altogether so nonsensical, as the Atheists would represent it, out of design, that they might from thence infer all religion to be nothing but a mere cheat and imposture ; they worshipping only one supreme God, in the several manifestations of his goodness, power, and providence throughout the world, together with his inferior ministers. Nevertheless, we cannot deny, that being once engaged in this subject, we thought ourselves the more concerned to do the business thoroughly and effectually, because of that controversy lately agitated concerning idolatry (which cannot otherwise be decided, than by giving a true account of the Pagan religion,) and the so confident affirmations of some, that none could possibly be guilty of idolatry, in the Scripture sense, who believed one God, the Creator of the whole world ; whereas it is most certain, on the contrary, that the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry consisted, not in worshipping many creators, or uncreateds, but in giving religious worship to creatures, besides the Creator ; they directing their devotion, (as Athanasius[1] plainly affirmeth of them,) *ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, καὶ πολλοῖς γενετοῖς*, to one uncreated only ; but, besides him, to many created gods. But as for the polemic management of this controversy, concerning idolatry, we leave it to other learned hands, that are already engaged in it.

Moreover, we have, in this fourth chapter, largely insisted also upon the Trinity. The reason whereof was, because it came in our way, and our contents engaged us thereunto, in order to the giving a full account of the Pagan theology, it being certain, that the Platonics and Pythagoreans, at least, if not other Pagans also, had their trinity, as well as Christians. And we could not well avoid the comparing of these two together : upon which occasion, we take notice of a double Platonic trinity ; the one spurious and adulterated, of some latter Platonists ; the other true and genuine, of Plato himself, Parmenides, and the ancients. The former of which, though it be opposed by us to the Christian trinity, and confuted, yet betwixt the latter and that, do we find a wonderful correspondence ; which is largely pursued in the Platonic Christian apology. Wherein, notwithstanding, nothing must be looked upon, as dogmatically asserted by us, but only offered, and submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters ; we confining

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[1] Oratione IV. contra Arianos T. I. Operum, p. 469.

ourselves in this mysterious point of the holy trinity, within the compass of those its three essentials declared :—First, that it is not a trinity of mere names and words, or of logical notions only ; but of persons or hypostases.—Secondly, that none of those persons or hypostases are creatures, but all uncreated.—And, lastly, that they are all three, truly and really one God. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that we did therefore the more copiously insist upon this argument, because of our then designed defence of Christianity ; we conceiving, that this parallelism, betwixt the ancient or genuine Platonic, and the Christian trinity, might be of some use to satisfy those amongst us, who boggle so much at the trinity, and look upon it as the choak-pear of Christianity ; when they shall find, that the freest wits among the Pagans, and the best philosophers, who had nothing of superstition to determine them that way, were so far from being shy of such an hypothesis, as that they were even fond thereof. And that the Pagans had indeed such a Cabala amongst them (which some perhaps will yet hardly believe, notwithstanding all that we have said,) might be further convinced, from that memorable relation in Plutarch,[1] of Thespesius Solensis, who, after he had been looked upon as dead for three days, reviving, affirmed, amongst other things, which he thought he saw or heard in the mean time in his ecstasy, this of three gods in the form of a triangle, pouring in streams into one another ; Orpheus his soul being said to have arrived so far ; accordingly as from the testimonies of other Pagan writers we have proved, that a trinity of Divine hypostases was a part of the Orphic Cabala. True, indeed, our belief of the holy trinity is founded upon no Pagan Cabala, but only Scripture revelation; it being that, which Christians are, or should be, all baptized into. Nevertheless these things are reasonably noted by us to this end, that that should not be made a prejudice against Christianity and revealed religion, nor looked upon as such an affrightful bugbear or *mormo* in it, which even Pagan philosophers themselves, and those of the most accomplished intellectuals, and uncaptivated minds, though having neither councils, nor creeds, nor Scriptures, had so great a propensity and readiness to entertain, and such a veneration for.

In this fourth chapter, we were necessitated, by the matter itself, to run out into philology and antiquity ; as also in the other parts of the book, we do often give an account of the doctrine of the ancients ; which, however, some over-severe philosophers may look upon fastidiously, or undervalue and depreciate, yet as we conceived it often ne-

[1] Libro de his, qui sero à Numine puniuntur, tom. ii. Oper. p. 563. s.

cessary, so possibly may the variety thereof not be ungrateful to others; and this mixture of philology, throughout the whole, sweeten and allay the severity of philosophy to them; the main thing, which the book pretends to, in the mean time, being the philosophy of religion. But, for our parts, we neither call philology, nor yet philosophy, our mistress; but serve ourselves of either, as occasion requireth.

As for the last chapter, though it promise only a confutation of all the Atheistic grounds, yet we do therein also demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all Atheism, and the actual existence of a God. We say demonstrate, not *à priori*, which is impossible and contradictious; but by necessary inference from principles altogether undeniable. For we can by no means grant to the Atheists, that there is no more than a probable persuasion or opinion to be had of the existence of a God, without any certain knowledge or science. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that whosoever shall read these demonstrations of ours, and understand all the words of them, must therefore of necessity be presently convinced, whether he will or no, and put out of all manner of doubt or hesitancy, concerning the existence of a God. For we believe that to be true, which some have affirmed, that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, as of a triangle having three angles equal to two right, whereby men's judgments may be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain at least skeptical about them. Wherefore mere speculation, and dry mathematical reason, in minds unpurified, and having a contrary interest of carnality, and a heavy load of infidelity and distrust sinking them down, cannot alone beget an unshaken confidence and assurance of so high a truth as this, the existence of one perfect understanding Being, the original of all things. As it is certain, also, on the contrary, that minds cleansed and purged from vice may, without syllogistical reasonings, and mathematical demonstrations, have an undoubted assurance of the existence of a God, according to that of the philosopher, ἡ κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀριστων Εἶναι, Purity possesses men with an assurance of the best things; — whether this assurance be called a vaticination or Divine sagacity (as it is by Plato and Aristotle,) or faith, as in the Scripture. For the Scripture faith is not a mere believing of historical things, and upon inartificial arguments or testimonies only; but a certain higher and Divine power in the soul, that peculiarly correspondeth with the Deity. Notwithstanding which, knowledge or science added to this faith, according to the Scripture advice, will make it more firm and stedfast,

and the better able to resist those assaults of sophistical reasonings that shall be made against it.

In this fifth chapter, as sometimes elsewhere, we thought ourselves concerned, in defence of the Divine wisdom, goodness, and perfection against Atheists, to maintain (with all the ancient philosophic Theists) the perfection of the creation also; or, that the whole system of things, taken altogether, could not have been better made and ordered than it is. And, indeed, this Divine goodness and perfection, as displaying and manifesting itself in the works of nature and providence, is supposed in Scripture to be the very foundation of our Christian faith; when that it is defined to be the substance and evidence *rerum sperandarum;* that is, of whatsoever is (by a good man) to be hoped for. — Notwithstanding which, it was far from our intention therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in Nature nor Providence could be otherwise than it is; or that there is nothing left to the free will and choice of the Deity. And though we do, in the third section, insist largely upon that ancient Pythagoric Cabala, that souls are always united to some body or other, as also, that all rational and intellectual creatures consist of soul and body; and suggest several things from reason and Christian antiquity in favor of them both: yet would we not be understood to dogmatize in either of them, but to submit all to better judgments.

Again, we shall here advertise the reader (though we have cautioned concerning it in the book itself,) that in our defence of incorporeal substance against the Atheists, however we thought ourselves concerned to say the utmost that possibly we could, in way of vindication of the ancients, who generally maintained it to be unextended (which to some seems an absolute impossibility;) yet we would not be supposed ourselves dogmatically to assert any more in this point than what all incorporealists agree in, that there is a substance specifically distinct from body; namely, such as consisteth not of parts separable from one another, and which can penetrate body, and lastly, is self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from that of local motion. And thus much is undeniably evinced by the arguments before proposed. But whether this substance be altogether unextended, or extended otherwise than body, we shall leave every man to make his own judgment concerning it.

Furthermore, we think fit here to suggest, that whereas throughout this chapter and whole book, we constantly oppose the generation of souls, that is, the production of life, cogitation, and understanding, out of dead and senseless matter; and assert all souls to be as substantial

as matter itself: this is not done by us, out of any fond addictedness to Pythagoric whimseys, nor indeed out of a mere partial regard to that cause of Theism neither, which we are engaged in (though we had great reason to be tender of that too;) but because we were enforced thereunto, by dry mathematical reason; it being as certain to us, as any thing in all geometry, that cogitation and understanding can never possibly result out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and local motions (which is all that ourselves can allow to body) however compounded together. Nor indeed in that other way of qualities, is it better conceivable how they should emerge out of hot and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin; according to the Anaximandrian Atheism. And they who can persuade themselves of the contrary, may believe, that any thing may be caused by any thing; upon which supposition we confess it impossible to us to prove the existence of a God from the phenomena.

In the close of this fifth chapter, because the Atheists do in the last place pretend, Theism and religion to be inconsistent with civil sovereignty, we were necessitated briefly to unravel and confute all the Atheistic ethics and politics (though this more properly belong to our second book intended;) where we make it plainly to appear, that the Atheist's artificial and factitious justice is nothing but will and words; and that they give to civil sovereigns no right nor authority at all, but only belluine liberty and brutish force. But, on the contrary, as we assert justice and obligation, not made by law and commands, but in nature, and prove this, together with conscience and religion, to be the only basis of civil authority, so do we also maintain all the rights of civil sovereigns; giving both to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's.

And now, having made all our apologies and reflections, we have no more to add, but only the retractation or retraction of one passage (Chap. V.;) where mentioning that opinion of a modern Atheistic writer, that cogitation is nothing else but local motion, we could not think Epicurus and Democritus to have sunk to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence, as this; whereas we found cause afterwards, upon further consideration, to change our opinion herein. Forasmuch as when Epicurus derived liberty of will in men, merely from that motion of senseless atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular; it is evident, that, according to him, volition itself must be really local motion. As indeed in the Democritic fate, and material necessity of all things, it is implied, that human cogitations are but mechanism and motion. Notwithstanding which, both Democritus and Epicurus supposed that the world was made without cogitation, though by local motion.

So that the meaning of these besotted Atheists (if at least they had any meaning) seems to have been this, that all cogitation is really nothing else but local motion ; nevertheless all motion not cogitation, but only in such and such circumstances, or in bodies so modified.

And now we are not ignorant, that some will be ready to condemn this whole labor of ours, and of others in this kind, against Atheism, as altogether useless and superfluous; upon this pretence, that an Atheist is a mere chimera, and there is no such a thing any where to be found in the world. And indeed we could heartily wish, upon that condition, that all this labor of ours were superfluous and useless. But as to Atheists, these so confident exploders of them are both unskilled in the monuments of antiquity, and unacquainted with the present age they live in ; others having found too great an assurance, from their own personal converse, of the reality of them. Nevertheless, this labor of ours is not intended only for the conversion of downright and professed Atheists (of which there is but little hope, they being sunk into so great a degree of sottishness,) but for the confirmation of weak, staggering and skeptical Theists. And unless these exploders of Atheists will affirm, also, that all men have constantly an unshaken faith and belief of the existence of a God, without the least mixture of a doubtful distrust and hesitancy (which, if it were so, the world could not possibly be so bad as now it is,) they must needs grant, such endeavors as these, for the confirming and establishing of men's minds in the belief of a God, by philosophic reasons, in an age so philosophical, not to be superfluous and useless.

THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF

THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

1. The fatal necessity of all human actions and events maintained upon three several grounds, which are so many false hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe.—2. Concerning the mathematical or astrological Fate.—3. Concerning the opinion of those, who suppose a Fate superior to the highest Deity.—4. The moderation of this discourse. 5. The Atheistical hypothesis or Democritical Fate being founded upon the Atomical physiology: the necessity of giving an account of it, and that first briefly described.—6. The antiquity of this physiology, and the account which is given of it by Aristotle.—7. A clear and full record of the same physiology in Plato, that hath not been taken notice of.—8. That neither Democritus, nor Leucippus, nor Protagoras, nor any Atheists, were the first inventors of this philosophy; and of the necessity of being thoroughly acquainted with it, in order to the confutation of Atheism.—9. The tradition of Posidonius, the Stoic, that Moschus, an ancient Phœnician, was the first inventor of the Atomical physiology. — 10. That this Moschus, the inventor of the Atomical physiology, was probably the same with Mochus, the physiologer, in Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests, and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon.—11. Other probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was acquainted with the Atomical physiology.—12. That Pythagoras's Monads were Atoms.—13. Proved plainly, that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean, physiologized atomically.—14. The same further convinced from Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and Stobæus.—15. That Anaxagoras was a spurious Atomist, or unskilful imitator of that philosophy.—16. That Ecphantus, the Pythagorean, Xenocrates, Heraclides, Diodorus, and Metrodorus Chius, were all ancient assertors of the Atomical physiology; together with Aristotle's testimony, that the ancient physiologers generally went that way.—17. How Aristotle is to be reconciled

with himself, and the credit of other writers to be salved, who impute this philosophy to Leucippus and Democritus; that they were the first Atheizers of it, or the founders of that philosophy, which is Atheistically Atomical.—18. That the Atomists, before Democritus, were assertors of a Deity and substance incorporeal.—19. A confutation of these neoterics, who deny that incorporeal substance was ever asserted by any of the ancients, and the antiquity of that doctrine proved from Plato, who himself professedly maintained it.—20. That Aristotle likewise asserted incorporeal substance.—21. That Epicurus endeavored to confute this opinion, as that which Plato and others of the ancients had maintained.—22. That all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the soul, and a Deity distinct from the world, held incorporeal substance; and that besides Thales, Pythagoras was a grand champion for the same, who also asserted a Divine triad.—23. Parmenides an assertor of incorporeal substance, together with all those, who maintained that all things did not flow, but something stand.—24. Empedocles vindicated from being either an Atheist or Corporealist at large.—25. Anaxagoras a plain assertor of incorporeal substance.—26. Inferred that the ancient Atomists before Democritus were both Theists and Incorporealists.—27. That there is not only an inconsistency between Atomology and Theology, but also a natural cognation proved from the origin of the Atomical physiology, and first a general account thereof.—28. A more particular account of the origin of this philosophy, from that principle of reason, That in nature, nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing.—29. That the same principle, which made the ancients discard substantial forms and qualities, made them also to assert incorporeal substance.—30. That from the same ground of reason also they asserted the immortality of souls.—31. That the doctrine of the pre-existence and transmigration of souls had its original from hence also.—32. That the ancients did not confine this to human souls only, but extend it to all souls and lives whatsoever.—33. All this proved from Empedocles, who asserted the pre-existence as well as the post-existence of all souls upon that ground.—34. A censure of this doctrine; that the reason of it is irrefragable for the post-eternity of all human souls; and that the hypothesis of the creation of human souls, which salves their immortality without pre-existence, is rational.—35. A new hypothesis to salve the incorporiety of the souls of brutes, without their post-existence and successive transmigrations.—36. That this will not prejudice the immortality of human souls.—37. That the Empedoclean hypothesis is more rational than the opinion of those, that would make the souls of brutes corporeal.—38. That the constitution of the Atomical physiology is such, that whosoever entertains it, and thoroughly understands it, must needs hold incorporeal substance in five particulars.—39. Two general advantages of the Atomical or mechanical physiology; first, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible.—40. The second advantage of it, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substance.—41. Concluded, that the ancient Moschical philosophy consisted of two parts, Atomical physiology, and theology or pneumatology.—42. That this entire philosophy was afterwards mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some the other.—43. That Leucippus and Democritus, being atheistically inclined,

took the Atomical physiology, endeavoring to make it subservient to Atheism; and upon what occasion they did it, and how unsuccessfully.—44. That Plato took the theology and pneumatology of the ancients, but rejected their Atomical physiology, and upon what accounts.—45. That Aristotle followed Plato herein, with a commendation of Aristotle's philosophy.

They, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, do it upon one or other of these two grounds—either because they suppose, that necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον, a thing impossible or contradictious, which can have no existence any where in nature; the sense of which was thus expressed by the Epicurean poet.[1]

——Quod res quæque Necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis, etc.

That every thing naturally labors under an intestine necessity:—or else, because, though they admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determined by the will and decrees of this Deity, as that they are thereby made necessary to us. The former of these two opinions, that contingent liberty is πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον, such a thing as can have no existence in nature, may be maintained upon two different grounds: either from such an hypothesis as this, that the universe is nothing else but body and local motion; and nothing moving itself, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, material and mechanical necessity, must needs reign over all things; or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.

Plotinus[2] makes another distribution of Fatalists, which yet in the conclusion will come to the same with the former; διττοὺς ἄν τις θέμενος τούτους οὐκ ἂν οἱ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποτυγχάνοι, οἱ μὲν γαρ ἀφ᾽ ἑνός τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ οὕτω· A man, (saith he) will not do amiss, that will divide all Fatalists first into these two general heads, namely, that they derive all things from one principle or not;—the former of which may be called Divine Fatalists, the latter Atheistical.

[1] Lucret. lib. ii. v. 289, etc.

[2] Libro de Fato, Ennead. iii. lib. i. c. 2. p. 230.

Which Divine Fatalists he again subdivides into such, as first make God by immediate influence to do all things in us; as in animals the members are not determined by themselves, but by that which is the hegemonic in every one: and, secondly, such as make Fate to be an implexed series or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief. The former seems to be a description of that very Fate, that is maintained by some neoteric Christians; the latter is the Fate of the Stoics.

Wherefore Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three heads: first, such as, asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of Fate, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity, that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is now done in it: which Fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow. And, lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which Fate Epicurus[1] calls *τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένην*, the Fate of the Naturalists—that is, indeed, the Atheists, the assertors whereof may be called also the Democritical Fatalists. Which three opinions concerning Fate are so many several hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe: all which we shall here propose, endeavoring to show the falseness of them, and then substitute the true mundane system in the room of them.

II. The mathematical or astrological Fate so much talked of, as it is a thing no way considerable for the grounds of it, so whatsoever it be it must needs fall under one or other of those two general heads in the Plotinical distribution last mentioned, so as either to derive all things from one principle, or not. It seems to have had its first emersion amongst the Chaldeans from a certain kind of blind Polytheism (which is but a better sort of disguised Atheism,) but it was afterwards adopted and fondly nursed by the Stoics, in a way of subordination to their Divine Fate; for Manilius, Firmicus, and other masters of that sect, were great promoters of it. And there was too much attributed to as-

[1] Vide Epistol. Epicuri ad Menecœum, apud Diogen. Laertium, lib. x. segm. 134, p. 659, edit. Meibomii.

trology also by those that were no Fatalists, both Heathen and Christian philosophers, such as were Plotinus, Origen, Simplicius, and others; who, though they did not make the stars to necessitate all human actions here below, they supposed, that Divine Providence (foreknowing all things) had contrived such a strange coincidence of the motions and configurations of the heavenly bodies with such actions here upon earth, as that the former might be prognostics of the latter. Thus Origen[1] determines, that the stars do not make but signify; and that the heavens are a kind of Divine volume, in whose characters they that are skilled may read or spell out human events. To the same purpose, Plotinus,[2] *Φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα ἐπὶ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἀλλὴν χρεὶαν τὴν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ γράμματα βλέποντας, τοὺς τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας τὸ σημαινόμενον· ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ ὑψηλὸς ὄρνις σημαίνει ὑψηλάς τινας πράξεις·* The motion of the stars was intended for the physical good of the whole; but they afford also another use collaterally in order to prognostication, namely, that they who are skilled in the grammar of the heavens may be able, from the several configurations of the stars, as it were letters, to spell out future events, by making such analogical interpretations as they use to do in augury; as when a bird flies high, to interpret this of some high and noble exploit.—And Simplicius,[3] in like manner, *Σύμφωνός ἐστὶν ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιφορὰ τῇ προβόλῃ τῶν ψυχῶν τῇ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐρχομένη εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, οὐκ ἀναγκάζουσα μὲν τὰς τῶνδε ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τῶνδε, σύμφωνος δὲ οὖσα ταῖς ὀρέξεσιν αὐτῶν.* The fatal conversion of the heavens is made to correspond with the production of souls into generation at such and such times, not necessitating them to will this or that, but conspiring agreeably with such appetites and volitions of theirs.—And these philosophers were the rather inclinable to this persuasion from a superstitious conceit which they had, that the stars, being animated, were intellectual beings of a far higher rank than men. And since God did not make them, nor any thing else in the world, singly for themselves alone, but also contribute to the public good of the universe, their physical influence seeming inconsiderable, they knew not well what else could be worthy of them, unless it were to portend human events. This indeed is the best sense that can be made of astrological prognos-

[1] Vide P. Dan. Huetium Origenianor. lib. ii. c. viii. sec. v. p. 129.

[2] Libro de Fato, Ennead. iii. lib. i. c. vi. p. 233. videas etiam Ennead. ii. lib. iii. c. i. p. 137, et c. vii. p. 140, 141.

[3] Comment. in Epictetum, c. i. p. 26, edit. Salmasii.

tication; but it is a business that stands upon a very weak and tottering, if not impossible foundation.

III. There is another wild and extravagant conceit, which some of the Pagans had, who though they verbally acknowledged a Deity, yet supposed a certain Fate superior to it, and not only to all their other petty gods, but also to Jupiter himself. To which purpose is that of the Greek poet Latined by Cicero,[1] "Quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem;" and that of Herodotus,[2] *Τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν ἀδυνατον ἐστιν ἀποφυγέειν καὶ τῷ Θεῷ·* It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destined Fate:—and *δοῦλος Θεός ἀνάγκης*,[3] God himself is a servant of necessity.—According to which conceit, Jupiter in Homer[4] laments his condition, in that the Fates having determined, that his beloved Sarpedon should be slain by the son of Menætius, he was not able to withstand it. Though all these passages may not perhaps imply much more than what the Stoical hypothesis itself imported; for that did also in some sense make God himself a servant to the necessity of the matter, and to his own decrees, in that he could not have made the smallest thing in the world otherwise than now it is, much less was able to alter any thing: according to that of Seneca,[5] "Eadem necessitas et Deos alligat. Irrevocabilis divina pariter atque humana cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor ac rector scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semel jussit." One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on Divine and human things. The very maker and governor of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but once command, but he always obeys.—But if there were this further meaning in the passages before cited, that a necessity without God, that was invincible by him, did determine his will to do all things; this was nothing but a certain confused and contradictious jumble of Atheism and Theism both together; or an odd kind of intimation, that however the name of God be used in compliance with vulgar speech and opinion, yet indeed it signifies nothing but material necessity; and the blind motion of matter is really the highest numen in the world. And here that of Balbus the Stoic, in Cicero,[6] is opportune: "Non est natura Dei præ-

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[1] De Divinat. lib. ii. c. x. p. 3196, edit. Verburgii.

[2] Lib. i. c. xci. p. 38. ed. Gronovii.

[3] Vide Menandri et Philemonis reliquias a Jo. Clerico editas, p. 307.

[4] Iliad, 1. μ.

[5] De Providentia, c. v. p. 195, edit. Jo. Fred. Gronovii.

[6] De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. c. xxx. p. 3000.

potens et excellens, siquidem ea subjecta est ei vel necessitati vel naturæ, quâ cœlum, maria, terræque reguntur. Nihil autem est præstantius Deo. Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens aut subjectus Deus." God would not be the most powerful and excellent being, if he were subject to that either necessity or nature, by which the heavens, seas and earth are governed. But the notion of a God implies the most excellent being. Therefore, God is not obedient or subject to any nature.—

IV. And now we think fit here to suggest, that however we shall oppose those three Fatalisms before mentioned, as so many false hypotheses of the mundane system and economy, and endeavor to exclude that severe tyranness, as Epicurus calls it, of Universal Necessity reigning over all, and to leave some scope for contingent liberty to move up and down in, without which neither rational creatures can be blame worthy for any thing they do, nor God have any object to display his justice upon, nor indeed be justified in his providence; yet, as we vindicate to God the glory of all good, so we do not quite banish the notion of Fate neither, nor take away all Necessity; which is a thing the Clazomenian philosopher[1] of old was taxed for, affirming *μηδὲν τῶν γινομένων γίνεσθαι καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ εἶναι κενὸν τοῦτο τοὔνομα.* That nothing at all was done by Fate, but that it was altogether a vain name.—And the Sadduceans among the Jews have been noted for the same:[2] *Τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιοῦντες, οὔτε κατ᾽ αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τιθέντες·* They take away all Fate, and will not allow it to be any thing at all, nor to have any power over human things, but put all things entirely into the hands of men's own free will.—And some of our own seem to have approached too near to this extreme, attributing perhaps more to the power of free will, than either religion or nature will admit. But the hypothesis, that we shall recommend as most agreeable to truth, of a *πρόνοια ἱλάσμος*, placable providence—of a Deity essentially good, presiding over all, will avoid all extremes, asserting to God the glory of good, and freeing him from the blame of evil; and leaving a certain proportionate contemperation and commixture of contingency and necessity both together in the world; as nature requires a mixture of motion and rest, without either of which there could be no generation. Which temper was observed by several of the ancients; as the Phari-

[1] Anaxagoras, who was censured for this opinion by Alexander Aphrodisiensis de Fato, sec. ii. p. 11, edit. Lond. 1658, in 12mo.

[2] Josephi Antiq. Judaic. lib. xiii. c. v. sec. ix. p. 649, tom. i. edit. Havercampi.

saic sect amongst the Jews, who determined,[1] *τινα καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἶναι ἔργον, τινὰ δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν,* That some things and not all were the effects of Fate, but some things were left in men's own power and liberty:—and also by Plato[2] amongst the philosophers, *Πλάτων ἐκρίνει μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν καὶ βίων, συνεισάγει δὲ καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν.* Plato inserts something of Fate into human lives and actions, and he joins with it liberty of will also.—He doth indeed suppose human souls to have within themselves the causes of their own changes to a better or worse state, and every where declares God to be blameless for their evils; and yet he[3] somewhere makes the three fatal sisters, notwithstanding, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, to be busy about them also. For according to the sense of the ancients, Fate is a servant of Divine Providence in the world, and takes place differently upon the different actings of free-willed beings. And how free a thing soever the will of man may seem to be to some, yet I conceive it to be out of question, that it may contract upon itself such necessities and fatalities, as it cannot upon a sudden rid itself of at pleasure. But whatsoever is said in the sequel of this discourse by way of opposition to that Fatalism of the neoteric Christians, is intended only to vindicate what was the constant doctrine of the Christian church in its greatest purity (as shall be made manifest), and not to introduce any new-fangled conceit of our own.

V. We must now proceed to give a more full and perfect account of these three several Fates, or hypotheses of the mundane system before mentioned, together with the grounds of them, beginning first with that, which we principally intend the confutation of, the Atheistical or Democritical Fate; which, as it is a thing of the most dangerous consequence of all, so it seems to be most spreading and infectious in these latter times.

Now this Atheistical system of the world, that makes all things to be materially and mechanically necessary, without a God, is built upon a peculiar physiological hypothesis, different from what hath been generally received for many ages; which is called by some Atomical or corpuscular, by others Mechanical; of which we must therefore needs give a full and perfect account. And we shall do it first in general,

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[1] Id. ibid.

[2] Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophorum, lib. i. c. xxvii. p. 844. t. ii. oper. edit. Francof. 1599, fol.

[3] Vide Platon. de Republica, l. x. p. 520.

briefly, not descending to those minute particularities of it, which are disputed amongst these Atomists themselves, in this manner.

The Atomical physiology supposes, that body is nothing else but διαστατόν ἀντίτυπον, that is, extended bulk; and resolves, therefore, that nothing is to be attributed to it, but what is included in the nature and idea of it, viz.—more or less magnitude with divisibility into parts, figure, and position, together with motion or rest, but so as that no part of body can ever move itself, but is always moved by something else. And consequently it supposes, that there is no need of any thing else besides the simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion (which are all clearly intelligible as different modes of extended substance) to solve the corporeal phenomena by; and therefore, not of any substantial forms distinct from the matter; nor of any other qualities really existing in the bodies without, besides the results or aggregates of those simple elements, and the disposition of the insensible parts of bodies in respect of figure, site and motion; nor of any intentional species or shows, propagated from the objects to our senses: nor, lastly, of any other kind of motion or action really distinct from local motion (such as generation and alteration,) they being neither intelligible, as modes of extended substance, nor any ways necessary. Forasmuch as the forms and qualities of bodies may well be conceived to be nothing but the result of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, variously compounded together, in the same manner as syllables and words in great variety result from the different combinations and conjunctions of a few letters, or the simple elements of speech; and the corporeal part of sensation, and particularly that of vision, may be solved only by local motion of bodies, that is, either by corporeal effluvia (called *simulacra*, *membranæ*, and *exuviæ*) streaming continually from the surface of the objects, or rather as the later and more refined Atomists[1] conceived, by pressure made from the object to the eye, by means of light in the medium. So that[2] ὡς διὰ βακτηρίας τοῦ ταθέντος ἀέρος τὸ βλεπόμενον ἀναγγέλλεται· the sense taking cognizance of the object by the subtile interposed medium, that is tense and stretched (thrusting every way from it upon the optic nerves,) doth by that as it were by a staff touch it. Again, generation and corruption may be sufficiently explained by concretion and secretion, or local mo-

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[1] Vide Cartesii Dioptric. c. i. et ii. p. 50. tom. i. oper. ed. Amstelod. 1692, in 4to.

[2] Apollodorus apud Diogenem Laertium, lib. vii. segm. 157, p. 466. vide etiam Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. iv. c. xv. tom. ii. oper. p. 911.

tion, without substantial forms and qualities. And, lastly, those sensible ideas of light and colors, heat and cold, sweet and bitter, as they are distinct things from the figure, site, and motion of the insensible parts of the bodies, seem plainly to be nothing else but our own fancies, passions, and sensations, however they be vulgarly mistaken for qualities in the bodies without us.

VI. Thus much may suffice for a general account of the Atomical physiology. We shall in the next place consider the Antiquity thereof, as also what notice Aristotle hath taken of it, and what account he gives of the same. For though Epicurus went altogether this way, yet it is well known, that he was not the first inventor of it. But it is most commonly fathered on Democritus, who was senior both to Aristotle and Plato, being reported to have been born the year after Socrates; from whose fountains Cicero[1] saith, that Epicurus watered his orchards, and of whom Sex. Empiricus[2] and Laertius[3] testify, that he did *ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας*, cashier qualities;—and Plutarch,[4] that he made the first principles of the whole universe *ἀτόμους ἀπόιους, καὶ ἀπαθεῖς*, atoms devoid of all qualities and passions.—But Laertius[5] will have Leucippus, who was somewhat senior to Democritus, to be the first inventor of this philosophy, though he wrote not so many books concerning it as Democritus did. Aristotle, who often takes notice of this philosophy, and ascribes it commonly to Leucippus and Democritus jointly, gives us this description of it in his Metaphysics:[6] *Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναί φασι, λέγοντες οἷον τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων φασὶ ταύτας μέντοι τρεῖς, σχῆμά τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν, διαφέρειν γὰρ τὸ ὂν ῥυσμῷ καὶ διαθιγῇ καὶ τροπῇ·* Leucippus and his companion Democritus make the first principles of all things to be Plenum and Vacuum (body and space,) whereof one is Ens, the other Non-ens, and the differences of the body, which are only figure, order, and position, to be the causes of all other things.—Which differences they call by these names, Rysmus, Diathige, and Trope. And in his book, De Anima[7]

[1] De Nat. Deor. lib. i. c. xliii. p. 2948. t. ix. oper.

[2] Lib. ii. adv. Logicos, p. 459. Vide etiam lib. vi. adv. Musicos, p. 367. et. lib. i. adv. Logicos, p. 399.

[3] Lib. ix. segm. 72. p. 586.

[4] Libro adversus Colotem, tom. ii. oper. p. 1110.

[5] Lib. ix. segm. 30. p. 567.

[6] Lib. i. c. iv. p. 268. tom. iv. oper.

[7] Lib. i. cap. ii. p. 4. tom. ii. oper.

having declared that Democritus made fire and the soul to consist of round atoms, he describes those atoms of his after this manner, *οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούηενα ξύσματα ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτίσι, ὧν τὴν πανσπερμίαν στοιχεῖα λέγει Δημόκριτος τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος·* They are (saith he,) like those ramenta or dusty particles which appear in the sun-beams, an omnifarious seminary whereof Democritus makes to be the first elements of the whole universe, and so doth Leucippus likewise.—Elsewhere[1] the same Aristotle tells us, that these two philosophers explained generation and alteration, without forms and qualities, by figures and local motion: *Δημόκριτος και Λεύκιππος ποιήσαντες τά σχήματα τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τούτων ποιοῦσι, διακρίσει μὲν καὶ συγκρίσει γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν, τάξει, δὲ καὶ θέσει ἀλλοίωσιν*: Democritus and Leucippus having made figures (or variously figured atoms,) the first principles, make generation and alteration out of these; namely, generation together with corruption from the concretion and secretion of them, but alteration from the change of their order and position.—Again, he elsewhere[2] takes notice of that opinion of the Atomists, that all sense was a kind of touch, and that the sensible qualities of bodies were to be resolved into figures, imputing it not only to Democritus, but also to the generality of the old Philosophers, but very much disliking the same:—*Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατον τι ποιοῦσι πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητα ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσι καὶ εἰς σχήματα ἀνάγουσι τοὺς χύμους·* Democritus and most of the physiologers here commit a very great absurdity, in that they make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities into figures of insensible parts or atoms.—And this opinion he endeavors to confute by these arguments. First, because there is contrariety in qualities, as in black and white, hot and cold, bitter and sweet, but there is no contrariety in figures; for a circular figure is not contrary to a square or multangular; and therefore there must be real qualities in bodies distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts. Again, the variety of figures and dispositions being infinite, it would follow from thence, that the species of colors, odors, and tastes should be infinite likewise, and reducible to no certain number. Which arguments I leave the professed Atomists to answer. Furthermore, Aristotle somewhere also censures that other fundamental principle of this Atomical physiology, that the sensible ideas of colors and tastes, as red, green, bitter, and sweet, formally considered, are only passions and fancies in us, and not real qualities in the object without. For as in

[1] De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. i. c. ii. p. 700. tom. i. oper.

[2] De Sensu et Sensibili, c. iv. p. 70. tom. ii. oper.

a rainbow there is really nothing without our sight, but a rorid cloud diversely refracting and reflecting the sun-beams, in such an angle; nor are there really such qualities in the diaphanous prism; when refracting the light, it exhibits to us the same colors of the rainbow; whence it was collected, that those things are probably the phantasms of the sentient, occasioned by different motions on the optic nerves; so they conceived the case to be the same in all other colors, and that both the colors of the prism and the rainbow were as real as other colors, and all other colors as fantastical as they; and then by parity of reason they extended the business further to the other sensibles. But this opinion Aristotle condemns in these words:[1] *Οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, λευκὸν οὔτε οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὔτε χύμον ἄνευ γεύσεως·* The former physiologers were generally out in this, in that they thought there was no black or white without the sight, nor no bitter or sweet without the taste.—There are other passages in Aristotle concerning this philosophy, which I think superfluous to insert here; and I shall have occasion to cite some of them afterward for other purposes.

VII. But in the next place it will not be amiss to show, that Plato also hath left a very full record of this mechanical or Atomical physiology (that hath hardly been yet taken notice of,) which notwithstanding he doth not impute either to Democritus (whose name Laertius[2] thinks he purposely declined to mention throughout all his writings,) or to Leucippus, but to Protagoras. Wherefore in his Theætetus, having first declared in general,[3] that the Protagorean philosophy made all things to consist of a commixture of parts (or atoms,) and local motion, he represents it, in particular, concerning colors, after this manner;[4] *ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν οὕτωσὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι, ἀλλὰ μέλαν τε καὶ λευκόν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς παραβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγεννημένον, καὶ ὃ δὲ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός·* First, as to that which belongs to the sight, you must conceive that which is called a white or black color not to be any thing absolutely existing, either without your eyes, or within your eyes: but black and white, and every other color, is caused by different motions made upon the eye from objects differently modified: so that it is nothing either in the agent nor the patient absolutely, but something

[1] De Anima. lib. ii. c. i. p. 43. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Lib. ix. segm. 40. p. 571. [3] Page 118. [4] Ibid. p. 119.

which arises from between them both.—Where it follows immediately, ἢ σὺ δυσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον σχῆμα τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ; Can you or any man else be confident, that as every color appears to him, so it appears just the same to every man and animal, any more than tastes and touches, heat and cold do?—From whence it is plain, that Protagoras made sensible qualities not to be all absolute things existing in the bodies without, but to be relative to us, and passions in us; and so they are called presently after τίνα ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα, certain fancies, seemings or appearances in us. But there is another passage,[1] in which a fuller account is given of the whole Protagorean doctrine, beginning thus: Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἥρτηται ἥδε οἰτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, etc. The principle upon which all these things depend, is this, that the whole universe is motion (of atoms) and nothing else besides; which motion is considered two ways, and accordingly called by two names, action and passion; from the mutual congress, and as it were attrition together of both which, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which though infinite in number, yet may be reduced to two general heads, sensibles and sensations, that are both generated at the same time; the sensations are seeing and hearing and the like, and the correspondent sensibles, colors, sounds, etc. Wherefore when the eye, or such a proportionate object meet together, both the αἰσθητὸν and the αἴσθησις, the sensible idea of white and black, and the sense of seeing, are generated together, neither of which would have been produced, if either of those two had not met with the other. Καὶ τ᾽ ἄλλα δὲ οὕτω ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ᾽ αὐτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ, πάντα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως· The like is to be conceived of all other sensibles, as hot and cold, etc. that none of these are absolute things in themselves, or real qualities in the objects without, but they are begotten from the mutual congress of agent and patient with one another, and that by motion; so that neither the agent has any such thing in it before its congress with the patient, nor the patient before its congress with the agent. Ἐκ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ποιοῦντος καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος πρὸς τὰ ἄλληλα συνγιγνομένων καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντων, τὰ μὲν ποῖα ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ

[1] Lib. ix. segm. 40. p. 120.

δὲ αἰσθανόμενα· But the agent and patient meeting together, and begetting sensation and sensibles, both the object and the sentient are forthwith made to be so and so qualified, as when honey is tasted, the sense of tasting and the quality of sweetness are begotten both together, though the sense be vulgarly attributed to the taster, and the quality of sweetness to the honey.—The conclusion of all which is summed up thus, οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ, ἀλλὰ τινὶ αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, That none of those sensible things is any thing absolutely in the objects without, but they are all generated or made relatively to the sentient.—There is more in that dialogue to this purpose, which I here omit; but I have set down so much of it in the author's own language, because it seems to me to be an excellent monument of the wisdom and sagacity of the old philosophers; that which is the main curiosity in this whole business of the mechanical Atomical philosophy being here more fully and plainly expressed, than it is in Lucretius himself, viz. that sensible things, according to those ideas that we have of them, are not real qualities absolutely existing without us, but ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα, fancies or phantasms in us: so that both the Latin interpreters Ficinus and Serranus, though probably neither of them at all acquainted with this philosophy, as being not yet restored, could not but understand it after the same manner; the one expressing it thus—"Color ex aspectu motuque medium quiddam resultans est. Talis circa oculos passio;" and the other, "Ex varia aspicientis diathesi, variaque sensilis specie colores varios et videri et fieri, ita tamen ut sint φανταστὰ, nec nisi in animo subsistant." However, it appears by Plato's manner of telling the story, and the tenor of the whole dialogue, that himself was not a little prejudiced against this philosophy. In all probability the rather, because Protagoras had made it a foundation both for Skepticism and Atheism.

VIII. We have now learnt from Plato, that Democritus and Leucippus were not the sole proprietaries in this philosophy, but that Protagoras, though not vulgarly taken notice of for any such thing (being commonly represented as a sophist only) was a sharer in it likewise; which Protagoras, indeed, Laertius,[1] and others, affirm to have been an auditor of Democritus; and so he might be, notwithstanding what Plutarch tells us,[2] that Democritus wrote against his taking away the absolute nature of things. However, we are of opinion, that neither De-

[1] Lib. ix. segm. 50. p. 575, 576. Videas etiam A. Gellium Noct. Attic. lib. v. c. iii. et Suidam voce Πρωταγόρας.

[2] Libro adversus Colotem, tom. ii. oper. p. 1108, 1109.

mocritus, nor Protagoras, nor Leucippus, was the first inventor of this philosophy; and our reason is, because they were all three of them Atheists (though Protagoras alone was banished for that crime by the Athenians) and we cannot think, that any Atheists could be the inventors of it, much less that it was the genuine spawn and brood of Atheism itself, as some conceit, because, however these Atheists adopted it to themselves, endeavoring to serve their turns of it, yet, if rightly understood, it is the most effectual engine against Atheism that can be. And we shall make it appear afterwards, that never any of those Atheists, whether ancient or modern (how great pretenders soever to it) did thoroughly understand it, but perpetually contradicted themselves in it. And this is the reason, why we insist so much upon this philosophy here, not only because without the perfect knowledge of it, we cannot deal with the Atheists at their own weapon; but also because we doubt not but to make a sovereign antidote against Atheism out of that very philosophy, which so many have used as a *vehiculum* to convey this poison of Atheism by.

IX. But besides reason, we have also good historical probability for this opinion, that this philosophy was a thing of much greater antiquity than either Democritus or Leucippus. And first, because Posidonius, an ancient and learned philosopher, did (as both Empiricus[1] and Strabo[2] tell us) avouch it for an old tradition, that the first inventor of this Atomical philosophy, was one Moschus, a Phœnician, who, as Strabo also notes, lived before the Trojan wars.

X. Moreover, it seems not altogether improbable, but that this Moschus, a Phœnician philosopher, mentioned by Posidonius, might be the same with that Mochus, a Phœnician physiologer, in Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests, and prophets, he affirms that Pythagoras, sometimes sojourning at Sidon (which was his native city,) had conversed: which may be taken for an intimation, as if he had been by them instructed in that Atomical physiology, which Moschus, or Mochus, the Phœnician, is said to have been the inventor of. Mochus or Moschus, is plainly a Phœnician name, and there is one Mochus, a Phœnician writer, cited in Athenæus, whom the Latin translator calls Moschus; and Mr. Seldon approves of the conjecture of Arcerius, the publisher of Jamblichus, that this Mochus was no other man than the celebrated Moses of the Jews, with whose successors, the Jewish philosophers, priests, and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. Some fantastic Atomists perhaps would here catch at this, to

[1] Lib. ix. advers. Mathemat. p. 621. [2] Lib. xvi. p. 718.

make their philosophy to stand by Divine right, as owing its original to revelation ; whereas philosophy being not a matter of faith, but reason, men ought not to affect (as I conceive) to derive its pedigree from revelation, and by that very pretence, seek to impose it tyrannically upon the minds of men, which God hath here purposely left free to the use of their own faculties, that so finding out truth by them, they might enjoy that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from thence. But we aim here at nothing more, than a confirmation of this truth, that the Atomical physiology was both older than Democritus, and had no such atheistical original neither. And there wants not other good authority for this, that Pythagoras did borrow many things from the Jews, and translate them into his philosophy.

XI. But there are yet other considerable probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was not unacquainted with the Atomical physiology. And first from Democritus himself, who, as he was of the Italic row, or Pythagoric succession, so it is recorded of him in Laertius,[1] that he was a great emulator of the Pythagoreans, and seemed to have taken all his philosophy from them, insomuch that if chronology had not contradicted it, it would have been concluded, that he had been an auditor of Pythagoras himself, of whom he testified his great admiration in a book entitled by his name. Moreover, some of his opinions had a plain correspondency with the Pythagoric doctrines, forasmuch as Democritus[2] did not only hold, *φέρεσθαι ἀτόμους ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δινουμένας*, that the atoms were carried round in a vortex ; — but altogether with Leucippus, *τὴν γῆν ὀχεῖθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον δινουμένην*, that the earth was carried about the middle or centre of this vortex (which is the sun) turning in the meantime round upon its own axis.—And just so the Pythagoric opinion is expressed by Aristotle,[3] *τὴν γὴν ἓν τῶν ἄστρων οὖσαν κύκλῳ φερομένην περὶ τὸ μέσον νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ποιεῖν·* That the earth, as one of the stars (that is a planet,) being carried round about the middle or centre (which is fire or the sun,) did in the meantime by its circumgyration upon its own axis make day and night. — Wherefore it may be reasonably from hence concluded, that as Democritus's philosophy was Pythagorical, so Pythagoras's philosophy was likewise Democritical, or Atomical.

XII. But that which is of more moment yet, we have the authority of Ecphantus, a famous Pythagorean for this, that Pythagoras's Mo-

[1] Lib. ix. segm. 38. p. 570.

[2] Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573. et segm. 30. p. 567.

[3] De Cœlo, lib. ii. c. xiii. p. 658. tom. i. oper.

nads, so much talked of, were nothing else but corporeal Atoms. Thus we find it in Stobæus,[1] *τὰς Πυθαγορικὰς Μονάδας οὗτος πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο σωματικάς*, Ecphantus (who himself[2] asserted the doctrine of Atoms) first declared, that the Pythagoric Monads were corporeal,—i. e. Atoms. And this is further confirmed from what Aristotle[3] himself writes of these Pythagoreans and their Monads, *τάς Μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος·* they suppose their Monads to have magnitude. — And from that he elsewhere[4] makes Monads and Atoms to signify the same thing, *οὐδέν διαφέρει Μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια σμικρά·* It is all one to say monades or small corpuscula.—And Gassendus[5] hath observed out of the Greek epigrammatist,[6] that Epicurus's Atoms were sometimes called Monads too :—

———μάτην Ἐπῖκουρον ἐάσον
Ποῦ τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν καί τινες αἱ Μονάδες.

XIII. But to pass from Pythagoras himself; that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean also, did physiologize atomically, is a thing that could hardly be doubted of, though there were no more proof for it than that one passage of his in his philosophic poems :[7]

———φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἑκάστου
Ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διαλλαξίς τε μιγέντων·

Nature is nothing but the mixture and separation of things mingled; or thus, There is no production of any thing anew, but only mixture and separation of things mingled.—Which is not only to be understood of animals, according to the Pythagoric doctrine of the transmigration of souls, but also, as himself expounds it, universally of all bodies, that their generation and corruption is nothing but mixture and separation; or, as Aristotle[8] expresses it, *σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις*, concretion and secretion of parts, together with change of figure and order. It may perhaps be objected, that Empedocles held four elements, out of which he

[1] Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27. edit. Plantin. 1575. fol.

[2] Stob. ubi supra, lib. i. c. xxv. p. 48.

[3] Metaphys. lib. xi. c. vi. tom. iv. oper. p. 424.

[4] De Anima, lib. ii. c. vi. p. 13. tom. ii. oper.

[5] Physices sect. i. lib. iii. c. iv. p. 256. tom. i. oper. et in Notis ad lib. ix. Diog. Laertii, p. 70. tom. v. oper.

[6] Antholog. Græcor. Epigram. lib. i. xv. p. 32. edit. Francof. 1600. fol.

[7] Vide Pult. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. c. xxx. p. 885. tom. ii. oper.

[8] De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. ii. c. vi. p. 739. tom. i. oper.

would have all other bodies to be compounded ; and that as Aristotle affirms,[1] he made those elements not to be transmutable into one another neither. To which we reply, that he did indeed make four elements, as the first general concretion of atoms, and therein he did no more than Democritus himself, who, as Laertius writes,[2] did from atoms moving round in a vortex, *πάντα συγκρίματα γεννᾶν πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν, εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ ἀτόμων τινῶν συστήματα,* generate all concretions, fire, water, air, and earth, these being systems made out of certain atoms.—And Plato further confirms the same ; for in his book De Legibus[3] he describes (as I suppose) that very Atheistical hypothesis of Democritus, though without mentioning his name, representing it in this manner ; that by the fortuitous motion of senseless matter were first made those four elements, and then out of them afterward sun, moon, stars, and earth. Now both Plutarch[4] and Stobæus[5] testify, that Empedocles compounded the four elements themselves out of atoms. *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα, καὶ οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων·* Empedocles makes the elements to be compounded of other small corpuscula, which are the least, and as it were the elements of the elements.—And the same Stobæus again observes,[6] *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα·* Empedocles makes the smallest particles and fragments of body (that is, atoms,) to be before the four elements. — But whereas Aristotle affirms, that Empedocles denied the transmutation of those elements into one another, that must needs be either a slip in him, or else a fault in our copies ; not only because Lucretius, who was better versed in that philosophy, and gives a particular account of Empedocles's doctrine (besides many others of the ancients,) affirms the quite contrary ; but also because himself, in those fragments of his still preserved, expressly acknowledges this transmutation.

Καὶ φθείνει εἰς ὄλληλα, καὶ αὔξεται ἐν μέρει αἴσης.

XIV. Besides all this, no less author than Plato affirms, that according to Empedocles, vision and other sensations were made by *ἀποῤ-*

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[1] Id. 734. et lib. i. c. iii. p. 699.

[2] Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

[3] Lib. x. p. 666. oper.

[4] De Placitis Philos. lib. i. c. xvii. p. 883. tom. ii. oper. Vide etiam c. xiii. p. 883.

[5] Eclog. Physic. lib. i. c. xx. p. 36.

[6] Ibid. lib. i. c. xvii. p. 33.

ῥοαὶ σχημάτων, the defluxions of figures, — or effluvia of atoms (for so Democritus's Atoms are called in Aristotle σχήματα, because they were bodies which had only figure without qualities,) he supposing that some of these figures or particles corresponded with the organs of one sense, and some with the organs of another. [1] Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀποῤῥοάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὓς καὶ δὶ ὧν αἱ ἀποῤῥοαὶ πορεύονται, καὶ τῶν ἀποῤῥοῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἑνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι· You say, then, according to the doctrine of Empedocles, that there are certain corporeal effluvia from bodies of different magnitudes and figures, as also several pores and meatus's in usdiversely corresponding with them : so that some of these corporeal effluvia agree with some pores, when they are either too big or too little for others. — By which it is evident, that Empedocles did not suppose sensations to be made by intentional species or qualities, but as to the generality, in the Atomical way; in which notwithstanding there are some differences among the Atomists themselves. But Empedocles went the same way here with Democritus, for Empedocles's ἀποῤῥοαὶ σχημάτων, defluxions of figured bodies,—are clearly the same thing with Democritus's εἰδώλων εἰσκρίσεις, insinuation of simulchra ; or, exuvious images of bodies. —And the same Plato adds further,[2] that according to Empedocles, the definition of color was this, ἀποῤῥοὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός, The defluxion of figures, or figured corpuscula (without qualities) commensurate to the sight and sensible. — Moreover, that Empedocles's physiology was the very same with that of Democritus, is manifest also from this passage of Aristotle,[3] Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Δημόκριτον λανθάνουσιν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς οὐ γενέσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ποιοῦντες, ἀλλὰ φαινόμενεν γένεσιν· ἐνυπάρχον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκκρίνεσθαί φάσιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου τῆς γενέσεως οὔσης· Empedocles and Democritus deceiving themselves, unawares destroy all generation of things out of one another, leaving a seeming generation only : for they say, that generation is not the production of any new entity, but only the secretion of what was before inexistent ; as when divers kinds of things confounded together in a vessel, are separated from one another. — Lastly, we shall confirm all this by the clear testimony of Plutarch, or the writer De Placitis Philosophorum :[4] Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ πάντες ὅσοι κατὰ συναθροισμὸν τῶν λεπτομερῶν σωμάτων κοσμοποιοῦσι, συγκρίσεις μὲν καὶ διακρίσεις εἰσάγουσι, γενέσεις δὲ καὶ φθορὰς οὐ κυρίως, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ποῖον ἐξ ἀλ-

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[1] Plato in Menone, p. 14. [2] Ibid.

[3] De Cœlo, lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 680. tom. i. oper.

[4] Lib. i. c. xxiv. p. 884. oper.

λοιώσεως, κατὰ δὲ πόσον οὐκ συναθροισμοῦ ταύτας γίνεσθαι· Empedocles and Epicurus, and all those that compound the world of small atoms, introduce concretions and secretions, but no generations or corruptions properly so called; neither would they have these to be made according to quality by alteration, but only according to quantity by aggregation.—And the same writer sets down the order and method of the Cosmopœia, according to Empedocles;[1] *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὸν μὲν αἰθέρα πρῶτον διακριθῆναι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τὴν γῆν ἐξ ἄγαν περισφιγγομένης τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς περιφορᾶς, ἀναβλύσαι τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐξ οὗ θυμιαθῆναι τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν μὲν οὔρανον ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐκ πυρός·* Empedocles writes, that ether was first of all secreted out of the confused chaos of atoms, afterwards the fire, and then the earth, which being constringed, and as it were, squeezed by the force of agitation, sent forth water bubbling out of it; from the evaporation of which did proceed air; and from the ether was made the heavens, from fire the sun.—We see, therefore, that it was not without cause, that Lucretius[2] did so highly extol Empedocles, since his physiology was really the same with that of Epicurus and Democritus; only that he differed from them in some particularities, as in excluding a vacuum, and denying such physical minima as were indivisible.

XV. As for Anaxagoras, though he philosophized by Atoms, substituting concretion and secretion, in the room of generation and corruption, insisting upon the same fundamental principle, that Empedocles, Democritus, and the other Atomists did; which was (as we shall declare more fully afterward) that nothing could be made out of nothing, nor reduced to nothing; and therefore, that there were neither any new productions, nor destructions of any substances or real entities: yet, as his Homœomeria is represented by Aristotle, Lucretius, and other authors, that bone was made of bony atoms, and flesh of fleshy, red things of red atoms, and hot things of hot atoms; these atoms being supposed to be endued originally with so many several forms and qualities essential to them, and inseparable from them, there was indeed a wide difference between his philosophy and the Atomical. However, this seems to have had its rise from nothing else but this philosopher's not being able to understand the Atomical hypothesis, which made him decline it, and substitute this spurious and counterfeit Atomism of his own in the room of it.

XVI. Lastly, I might add here, that it is recorded by good authors, concerning divers other ancient philosophers, that were not addicted to Democriticism or Atheism, that they followed this Atomical way of

[1] Lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 887. [2] Lib. i. vers. 744, 745.

physiologizing, and therefore in all probability did derive it from those religious Atomists before Democritus. As for example; Ecphantus, the Syracusian Pythagorist, who, as Stobæus writes, made *τὰ ἀδιαίρετα σώματα καὶ τὸ κενὸν*, indivisible bodies and vacuum, the principles of physiology, and as Theodoret also testifies, taught *ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον*, that the corporeal world was made up of atoms; —Xenocrates,[1] that made *μεγέθη ἀδιαίρετα*, indivisible magnitudes, the first principles of bodies; Heraclides,[2] that resolved all corporeal things into *ψήγματα καὶ θραύσματά τινα ἐλάχιστα*, certain smallest fragments of bodies;—Asclepiades,[3] who supposed all the corporeal world to be made *ἐξ ἀνομοίων καὶ ἀνάρμων ὄγκων* not of similar parts (as Anaxagoras) but of dissimilar and inconcinn moleculæ, i. e. atoms of different magnitude and figures; and Diodorus,[4] that solved the material phænomena by *ἀμερῆ τὰ ἐλάχιστα*, the smallest indivisibles of body. And lastly, Metrodorus[5] (not Lampsacenus, the Epicurean, but) Chius, who is reported also to have made indivisible particles and atoms the first principles of bodies. But what need we any more proof for this, that the Atomical physiology was ancienter than Democritus and Leucippus, and not confined only to that sect, since Aristotle himself[6] in the passages already cited, doth expressly declare, that besides Democritus, the generality of all the other physiologers went that way; *Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων*, etc. Democritus and the most of the physiologers make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities, as the tastes of bitter and sweet, etc. into figures.—And again,[7] he imputes it generally to all the physiologers that went before him, *οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι*, the former physiologers (without any exception) said not well in this, that there was no black and white without the sight, nor bitter and sweet without the taste.—Wherefore, I think, it cannot be reasonably doubted, but that the generality of the old physiologers before Aristotle and Democritus, did pursue the Atomical way, which is to resolve the corporeal phænomena, not into forms, qualities, and species, but into figures, motions, and fancies.

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[1] Vide Georg. Pachymer. libellum *περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν*, qui extat inter Aristotelis opera, tom. ii. cap. i. p. 819.

[2] Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 883. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Vide Sextum Empiric. Hypotypos. Pyrrhon. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 136.

[4] Sext. Empiric. lib. i. adv. Physicos, sect. 863. p. 621. vide etiam lib. iii. Hypothes. cap. iv. p. 136.

[5] Vide Stobæi Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27.

[6] Lib. de Sensu et Sensibili, cap. iv. p. 70, tom. ii. oper.

[7] De Animo, lib. ii. cap. i. p. 43. tom. ii. oper.

XVII. But then there will seem to be no small difficulty in reconciling Aristotle with himself, who doth in so many places plainly impute this philosophy to Democritus and Leucippus, as the first source and original of it; as also in salving the credit of Laertius, and many other ancient writers, who do the like, Democritus having had for many ages almost the general cry and vogue for Atoms. However, we doubt not but to give a very good account of this business, and reconcile the seemingly different testimonies of these ancient writers, so as to take away all contradiction and repugnancy between them. For although the Atomical physiology was in use long before Democritus and Leucippus, so that they did not make it, but find it; yet these two, with their confederate Atheists (whereof Protagoras seems to have been one) were undoubtedly the first, that ever made this physiology to be a complete and entire philosophy by itself, so as to derive the original of all things in the whole universe from senseless atoms, that had nothing but figure and motion, together with vacuum, and made up such a system of it, as from whence it would follow, that there could not be any God, not so much as a corporeal one. These two things were both of them before singly and apart. For there is no doubt to be made, but that there hath been Atheism lurking in the minds of some or other in all ages; and perhaps some of those ancient Atheists did endeavor to philosophize too, as well as they could, in some other way. And there was Atomical physiology likewise before, without Atheism. But these two thus complicated together, were never before Atomical Atheism, or Atheistical Atomism. And therefore, Democritus and his comrade Leucippus, need not be envied the glory of being reputed the first inventors or founders of the Atomical philosophy atheized and adulterated.

XVIII. Before Leucippus and Democritus, the doctrine of Atoms was not made a whole entire philosophy by itself, but looked upon only as a part or member of the whole philosophic system, and that the meanest and lowest part too, it being only used to explain that which was purely corporeal in the world; besides which, they acknowledged something else, which was not mere bulk and mechanism, but life and self activity, that is, immaterial or incorporeal substance; the head and summity whereof, is the Deity distinct from the world. So that there have been two sorts of Atomists in the world, the one Atheistical, the other Religious. The first and most ancient Atomists holding incorporeal substance, used that physiology in a way of subordination to theology and metaphysics. The other, allowing no other substance but body, made senseless atoms and figures, without any mind and

understanding (i. e. without any God) to be the original of all things; which latter is that, that was vulgarly known by the name of Atomical philosophy, of which Democritus and Leucippus were the source.

XIX. It hath been indeed of late confidently asserted by some, that never any of the ancient philosophers dreamed of any such thing as incorporeal substance; and therefore they would bear men in hand, that it was nothing but an upstart and new-fangled invention of some bigotical religionists; the falsity whereof, we shall here briefly make to appear. For though there have been doubtless in all ages, such as have disbelieved the existence of any thing but what was sensible, whom Plato[1] describes after this manner; *οἳ διατείνοιντ' ἄν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσὶν, ὡς ἄρα νοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστί.* That would contend, that whatsoever they could not feel or grasp with their hands, was altogether nothing;—yet this opinion was professedly opposed by the best of the ancient philosophers, and condemned for a piece of sottishness and stupidity. Wherefore, the same Plato tells us, that there had been always, as well as then there was, a perpetual war and controversy in the world, and, as he calls it, a kind of gigantomachy betwixt these two parties or sects of men; the one, that held there was no other substance in the world besides body; the other, that asserted incorporeal substance. The former of these parties or sects is thus described by the philosopher: *Οἳ μὲν τὶς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι ταῖς χερσὲν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες, τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων, δμσχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν·* These (saith he) pull all things down from heaven and the invisible region, with their hands to the earth, laying hold of rocks and oaks; and when they grasp all these hard and gross things, they confidently affirm, that that only is substance, which they can feel, and will resist their touch; and they conclude, that body and substance are one and the self-same thing; and if any one chance to speak to them of something which is not body, i. e. of incorporeal substance, they will altogether despise him, and not hear a word more from him. And many such the philosopher there says he had met withal. The other he represents in this manner; *Οἳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου τόπου ἀμύνονται νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη, βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τὶς ἀεὶ ξυνέστηκε·* The adversaries of

[1] In Sophista, p. 160.

these Corporealists do cautiously and piously assault them from the invisible region, fetching all things from above by way of descent, and by strength of reason convincing, that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms are the true or first substance, and not sensible things. But betwixt these two there hath always been (saith he) a great war and contention.—And yet in the sequel of his discourse, he adds, that those Corporealists were then grown a little more modest and shame-faced than formerly their great champions had been, such as Democritus and Protagoras; for however they still persisted in this, that the soul was a body, yet they had not, it seems, the impudence to affirm, that wisdom and virtue were corporeal things, or bodies, as others before and since too have done. We see here, that Plato expressly asserts a substance distinct from body, which sometimes he calls *οὐσίαν ἀσώματον*, incorporeal substance,—and sometimes *οὐσίαν νοητήν*, intelligible substance,—in opposition to the other which he calls *αἰσθητήν*, sensible.—And it is plain to any one, that hath had the least acquaintance with Plato's philosophy, that the whole scope and drift of it, is to raise up men's minds from sense to a belief of incorporeal things as the most excellent; *τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα λόγῳ μόνον, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ, σαφῶς δείκνυται,* as he writes in another place;[1] for incorporeal things, which are the greatest and most excellent things of all, are (saith he) discoverable by reason only, and nothing else.—And his subterraneous cave, so famously known, and so elegantly described by him,[2] where he supposes men tied with their backs towards the light, placed at a great distance from them, so that they could not turn about their heads to it neither, and therefore could see nothing but the shadows (of certain substances behind them) projected from it, which shadows they concluded to be the only substances and realities, and when they heard the sounds made by those bodies that were betwixt the light and them, or their reverberated echoes, they imputed them to those shadows which they saw; I say, all this is a description of the state of those men, who take body to be the only real and substantial thing in the world, and to do all that is done in it; and therefore often impute sense, reason, and understanding, to nothing but blood and brains in us.

XX. I might also show in the next place, how Aristotle did not at all dissent from Plato herein, he plainly asserting,[3] *ἄλλην οὐσίαν παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ*, another substance besides sensibles,—*οὐσίαν χωριστὴν καὶ κεχωρισμένην τῶν αἰσθητῶν* a substance separable and also actually

[1] In Politico, p. 282. oper.

[2] De Repub. lib. vii. p. 483.

[3] Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. vii. p. 480. tom. iv. oper. et in multis aliis locis.

separated from sensibles,—*ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν*, an immoveable nature or essence—(subject to no generation or corruption) adding, that the Deity was to be sought for here: nay, such a substance, *ἣν μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι*, as hath no magnitude at all, but is impartial and indivisible.—He also blaming Zeno (not the Stoic, who was junior to Aristotle, but an ancient philosopher of that name) for making God to be a body, in these words;[1] *αὐτὸς γὰρ σῶμα λέγει εἶναι τὸν Θεόν· εἴτε δὲ τόδε τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε ὅτι δήποτε αὐτὸς λέγων· ἀσώματος γὰρ ὢν πῶς ἂν σφαιροειδὴς εἴη; ὅταν οὕτως οὔτ' ἂν κινοῖτο, οὔτ' ἂν ἠρεμοῖ, μηδαμοῦ τε ὤν· ἐπεὶ δὲ σῶμά ἐστι, τί ἂν αὐτὸ κωλύει κινεῖθαι·* Zeno implicitly affirms God to be a body, whether he mean him to be the whole corporeal universe, or some particular body; for if God were incorporeal, how could he be spherical? nor could he then either move or rest, being not properly in any place: but if God be a body, then nothing hinders but that he may be moved.—From which and other places of Aristotle, it is plain enough also, that he did suppose incorporeal substance to be unextended, and as such, not to have relation to any place. But this is a thing to be disputed afterwards. Indeed some learned men conceive Aristotle to have reprehended Zeno without cause, and that Zeno made God to be a sphere, or spherical, in no other sense, than Parmenides did in that known verse of his:[2]

Πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρας ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ.

Wherein he is understood to describe the Divine eternity. However, it plainly appears from hence, that according to Aristotle's sense, God was *ἀσώματος*, an incorporeal substance distinct from the world.

XXI. Now this doctrine, which Plato especially was famous for asserting, that there was *οὐσία ἀσώματος*, incorporeal substance,—and that the souls of men were such, but principally the Deity; Epicurus taking notice of it, endeavored with all his might to confute it, arguing sometimes after this manner:[3] There can be no incorporeal God (as Plato maintained,) not only because no man can frame a conception of an incorporeal substance, but also because whatsoever is incorporeal must needs want sense, and prudence, and pleasure, all which things are included in the notion of God; and therefore, an incorporeal Deity is a contradiction.—And concerning the soul of man: [4]*οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον*

[1] Libro de Zenone, Xenophane, et Gorgia, cap. iv. p. 844. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Apud Aristot. in libro jam laudato, cap. iv. p. 843. tom. ii. oper. et apud Platonem in Sophista, et veterum alios.

[3] Cicero de Natur. Deor. llb. i. cap. xii. p. 2897. tom. ix. oper.

[4] Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 67, 68. p. 630.

εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσι, etc. They who say, that the soul is incorporeal, in any other sense, than as that word may be used to signify a subtile body, talk vainly and foolishly; for then it could neither be able to do nor suffer any thing It could not act upon any other thing, because it could touch nothing; neither could it suffer from any thing, because it could not be touched by any thing; but it would be just like to vacuum or empty space, which can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only yield bodies a passage through it.—From whence it is further evident, that this opinion was professedly maintained by some philosophers before Epicurus's time.

XXII. But Plato and Aristotle were not the first inventors of it; for it is certain, that all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the human soul, and a God distinct from this visible world (and so properly the Creator of it and all its parts,) did really assert incorporeal substance. For that a corporeal soul cannot be in its own nature immortal and incorruptible, is plain to every one's understanding, because of its parts being separable from one another; and whosoever denies God to be incorporeal, if he make him any thing at all, he must needs make him to be either the whole corporeal world, or else a part of it.—Wherefore, if God be neither of these, he must then be an incorporeal substance. Now Plato was not the first who asserted these two things, but they were both maintained by many philosophers before him. Pherecydes Syrus, and Thales, were two of the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks; and it is said of the former of them,[1] that by his lectures and disputes concerning the immortality of the soul, he first drew off Pythagoras from another course of life to the study of philosophy. Pherecydes Syrus (saith Cicero)[2] "primus dixit animos hominum esse sempiternos" And Thales, in an epistle,[3] directed to him, congratulates his being the first, that had designed to write to the Greeks concerning Divine things; which Thales also (who was the head of the Ionic succession of philosophers, as Pythagoras of the Italic) is joined with Pythagoras and Plato, by the writer "De Placitis Philosophorum,"[4] after this manner, *οὗτοι πάντες οἱ προτεταγμένοι ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται, φύσει λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ οὐσίαν νοητὴν·* All these determined the soul to be incorporeal, making it to be naturally self-moving (or self-active) and an intelligible substance,—

[1] Vide Augustin. cap. cxxxvii. p. 308. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Tusculan. Quæst. lib. i. c. xvi. p. 2586. tom. viii. oper.

[3] Apud Diogen. Lært. lib. i. segm. 43. p. 25.

[4] Lib. iv. cap. iii. p. 908.

that is not sensible. Now he, that determines the soul to be incorporeal, must needs hold the Deity to be incorporeal much more. "Aquam dixit Thales esse initium rerum (saith Cicero,)[1] Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret." Thales said that water was the first principle of all corporeal things, but that God was that mind, which formed all things out of water.—For Thales was a Phœnician by extraction, and accordingly seemed to have received his two principles from thence, water, and the Divine Spirit moving upon the waters. The first whereof is thus expressed by Sanchoniathon,[2] in his description of the Phœnician theology, *χάος θολερὸν, ἐρεβῶδες*, a turbid and dark chaos;—and the second is intimated in these words, *ἠράσθη τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν ἰδίων ἀρχῶν*, the Spirit was affected with love towards its own principles;—perhaps expressing the force of the Hebrew word, *Merachepheth*, and both of them implying an understanding prolifical goodness, forming and hatching the corporeal world into this perfection; or else a plastic power, subordinate to it. Zeno (who was also originally a Phœnician) tells us,[3] that Hesiod's chaos was water; and that the material heaven as well as earth was made out of water (according to the judgment of the best interpreters) is the genuine sense of Scripture, 2 Pet. 3: 5, by which water some perhaps would understand a chaos of atoms confusedly moved. But whether Thales were acquainted with the Atomical physiology or no,[4] it is plain that he asserted, besides the soul's immortality, a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

We pass to Pythagoras, whom we have proved already to have been an Atomist; and it is well known, also, that he was a professed Incorporealist. That he asserted the immortality of the soul, and consequently its immateriality, is evident from his doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration: and that he likewise held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world, is a thing not questioned by any. But if there were any need of proving it (because there are no monuments of his extant,) perhaps it might be done from hence, because he was the chief propagator of that doctrine amongst the Greeks, concerning three hypostases in the Deity.

For, that Plato and his followers held, *τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστασεῖς*, three

[1] De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2894. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Apud Euseb. de Præparatione Evangelica, lib. ii. cap. x. p. 33.

[3] Vide Scholiast. in Apollon. Argonautic. lib. iv. vers. 676. s. citatum ab Hug. Grotio, in Notis ad lib. i. de Veritate Relig. Christ. sec. xvi. p. 30, 31.

[4] Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. cap. xvi. p. 883.

hypostases in the Deity, that were the first principles of all things—is a thing very well known to all; though we do not affirm, that these Platonic hypostases are exactly the same with those in the Christian trinity. Now Plato himself sufficiently intimates this not to have been his own invention; and Plotinus tells us, that it was *παλαιὰ δόξα*, an ancient opinion before Plato's time, which had been delivered down by some of the Pythagorics. Wherefore, I conceive this must needs be one of those Pythagoric monstrosities, which Xenophon covertly taxes Plato for entertaining, and mingling with the Socratical philosophy, as if he had thereby corrupted the purity and simplicity of it. Though a Corporealist may pretend to be a Theist, yet I never heard that any of them did ever assert a trinity, respectively to the Deity, unless it were such an one as I think not fit here to mention.

XXIII. That Parmenides, who was likewise a Pythagorean, acknowledged a Deity distinct from the corporeal world, is evident from Plato.[1] And Plotinus tells us also, that he was one of them that asserted the triad of Divine hypostases. Moreover, whereas there was a great controversy amongst the ancient philosophers before Plato's time,[2] between such as held all things to flow (as namely Heraclitus and Cratylus,) and others, who asserted that some things did stand, and that there was *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, a certain immutable nature—to wit, an eternal mind, together with eternal and immutable truths (amongst which were Parmenides and Melissus); the former of these were all Corporealists (this being the very reason why they made all things to flow, because they supposed all to be body), though these were not, therefore, all of them Atheists. But the latter were all both Incorporealists and Theists; for whosoever holds incorporeal substance, must needs, according to reason, also assert a Deity.

And although we did not before particularly mention Parmenides amongst the Atomical philosophers, yet we conceive it to be manifest from hence, that he was one of that tribe, because he was an eminent assertor of that principle, *οὐδὲν οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων*, that no real entity is either made or destroyed, generated or corrupted. —Which we shall afterwards plainly show, to be the grand fundamental principle of the Atomical philosophy.

XXIV. But whereas we did evidently prove before, that Empedocles was an Atomical physiologer, it may, notwithstanding, with some color of probability, be doubted, whether he were not an Atheist, or at

[1] In Parmenide.

[2] Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 130, 131.

least a Corporealist, because Aristotle accuses him of the following things. First,[1] of making knowledge to be sense, which is, indeed, a plain sign of a Corporealist; and, therefore in the next place also,[2] of compounding the soul out of the four elements, making it to understand every corporeal thing by something of the same within itself, as fire by fire, and earth by earth; and lastly,[3] of attributing much to fortune, and affirming, that divers of the parts of the animals were made such by chance, and that there were at first certain mongrel animals, fortuitously produced, that were *βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα*, such as had something the shape of an ox, together with the face of a man (though they could not long continue);—which seems to give just cause of suspicion, that Empedocles atheized in the same manner that Democritus did.

To the first of these we reply, that some others, who had also read Empedocles's poems, were of a different judgment from Aristotle as to that, conceiving Empedocles not to make sense but reason the criterion of truth. Thus Empiricus informs us:[4] Others say, that, according to Empedocles, the criterion of truth is not sense, but right reason; and also that right reason is of two sorts, the one *θεῖος*, or Divine, the other *ἀνθρώπινος*, or human: of which the Divine is inexpressible, but the human declarable.—And there might be several passages cited out of those fragments of Empedocles's poems yet left, to confirm this; but we shall produce only this one:

Γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον.[5]

To this sense; Suspend thy assent to the corporeal senses, and consider every thing clearly with thy mind or reason.

And as to the second crimination, Aristotle[6] has much weakened his own testimony here, by accusing Plato also of the very same thing. *Πλατὼν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ, γινώσκεται γὰρ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον, τα δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι·* Plato compounds the soul out of the four elements, because like is known by like, and things are from their principles.—Wherefore it is probable, that Empedocles might be no

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[1] Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. iii. p. 45. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Arist. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Id. de Partibus Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 470. tom. ii. oper. et Physicor. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 475. et. 477.

[4] Lib. vii. adv. Math. sec. 122. p. 396.

[5] Ib. sec. 125. p. 347.

[6] De Anima, l. i. c. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. op.

more guilty of this fault (of making the soul corporeal, and to consist of earth, water, air, and fire) than Plato was, who, in all men's judgments, was as free from it as Aristotle himself, if not more. For Empedocles[1] did, in the same manner as Pythagoras before him, and Plato after him, hold the transmigration of souls, and consequently both their future immortality and pre-existence; and therefore must needs assert their incorporeity: Plutarch[2] rightly declaring this to have been his opinion; *Εἶναι καὶ τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας·* That as well those who are yet unborn, as those that are dead, have a being.—He also asserted human souls to be here in a lapsed state;[3] *μετανάναστας, καὶ ξένους, καὶ φυγάδας*, wanderers, strangers, and fugitives from God; declaring, as Plotinus tells us,[4] that it was a Divine law, *ἁμαρτανούσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα*, that souls sinning should fall down into these earthly bodies. But the fullest record of the Empedoclean philosophy concerning the soul is contained in this of Hierocles,[5] *Κάτεισι καὶ ἀποπίπτει τῆς εὐδαίμονος χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος,—φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.—Ἄνεισι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἕξιν ἀπολαμβάνει,*

Εἰ φεύξει τὰ περὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν ἀτερπέα χῶρον,
Ἔνθα φόνος τε κότος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν.

Εἰς ὃν οἱ ἐκπεσόντες—Ἄτης

—ἀνὰ λειμῶνα τε καὶ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν.

Ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις τοῦ φεύγοντος τὸν τῆς Ἄτης λειμῶνα πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπείγεται λειμῶνα, ὃν ἀπολιπὼν τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς πτεροῤῥυήσεως εἰς γήινον ἔρχεται σῶμα, Ὀλβίου—αἰῶνος ἀμελθεὶς· Man falleth from his happy state, as Empedocles the Pythagorean saith,—by being a fugitive, apostate, and wanderer from God, actuated with a certain mad and irrational strife or contention.—But he ascends again, and recovers his former state,—if he decline, and avoid these earthly things, and despise this unpleasant and wretched place, where murder and wrath, and a troop of all other mischiefs reign. Into which place, they who fall, wander up and down through the field of Ate and darkness. But the desire of him

[1] Diogen. Laert. lib. viii. segm. 78. p. 359. et Plut. de Solertia Animal. tom. ii. p. 964. oper.

[2] Libro Adv. Colotem, p. 1113, tom. ii. oper.

[3] Plutarch. de Exilio, p. 607.

[4] De Animæ Descensu in Corpora, En. iv. lib. viii. cap. i. p. 468.

[5] In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina, p. 186.

that flees from this field of Ate carries him on towards the field of truth; which the soul at first relinquishing, and losing its wings, fell down into this earthly body, deprived of its happy life.—From whence it appears that Plato's *πτεροῤῥύησις* was derived from Empedocles and the Pythagoreans.

Now, from what hath been already cited, it is sufficiently manifest, that Empedocles was so far from being either an Atheist or a Corporealist, that he was indeed a rank Pythagorist, as he is here called. And we might add hereunto, what Clemens Alexandrinus observes,[1] that, according to Empedocles, *ἢν ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως διαβιώσωμεν, μακάριοι μὲν ἐνταῦθα, μακαριώτεροι δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀπαλλαγὴν· οὐ χρόνῳ τινὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐν αἰῶνι ἀναπαύεσθαι δυνάμενοι, Ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, ἐν δὲ τραπέζαις*, etc. If we live holily and justly, we shall be happy here, and more happy after our departure hence; having our happiness not necessarily confined to time, but being able to rest and fix in it to all eternity; feasting with the other immortal beings, etc.—We might also take notice, how, besides the immortal souls of men, he acknowledged Demons or angels; declaring that some of these fell from heaven, and were since prosecuted by a Divine Nemesis. For these in Plutarch[2] are called *οἱ θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανοπετεῖς ἐκεῖνοι τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονες·* Those Empedoclean Demons lapsed from heaven, and pursued with Divine vengeance;—whose restless torment is there described in several verses of his.[3] And we might observe, likewise, how he acknowledged a natural and immutable justice, which was not topical and confined to places and countries, and relative to particular laws, but catholic and universal, and every where the same, through infinite light and space; as he expresses it with poetic pomp and bravery:

> [4] *Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον, διά τ᾽ εὐρυμέδοντος*
> *Αἰθέρος, ἠνεκέως τέταται, διά τ᾽ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.*

And the asserting of natural morality is no small argument of a Theist.

But what then shall we say to those other things, which Empedocles is charged with by Aristotle, which seem to have so rank a smell of Atheism? Certainly those mongrel and biform animals, that are said to have sprung up out of the earth by chance, look as if they were more akin to Democritus than Empedocles; and probably it is the fault

[1] Stromatum, lib. v. p. 722.

[2] De vitando ære alieno, tom. ii. oper. p. 830.

[3] Apud Plut. de Exilio, tom. ii. oper. p. 607.

[4] Apud Aristot. Rhetoric. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 737. tom. iii. oper.

of the copies, that it is read otherwise, there being no other philosopher that I know of, that could ever find any such thing in Empedocles's poems.[1] But for the rest, if Aristotle do not misrepresent Empedocles, as he often doth Plato, then it must be granted, that he being a mechanical physiologer, as well as theologer, did something too much indulge to fortuitous mechanism; which seems to be an extravagancy, that mechanical philosophers and Atomists have been always more or less subject to. But Aristotle doth not charge Empedocles with resolving all things into fortuitous mechanism, as some philosophers have done of late, who yet pretend to be Theists and Incorporealists, but only that he would explain some things in that way. Nay, he clearly puts a difference betwixt Empedocles and the Democritic Atheists, in these words subjoined;[2] *Εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς*, etc. which is as if he should have said, "Empedocles resolved some things in the fabric and structure of animals into fortuitous mechanism: but there are certain other philosophers, namely, Leucippus and Democritus, who would have all things whatsoever in the whole world, heaven, and earth, and animals, to be made by chance and the fortuitous motion of atoms, without a Deity." It seems very plain, that Empedocles's Philia and Neikos, his friendship and discord, which he makes to be the *ἀρχὴ δραστήριος*, the active cause,—and principle of motion in the universe, was a certain plastic power, superior to fortuitous mechanism; and Aristotle himself acknowledges somewhere as much. And Plutarch tells us,[3] that, according to Empedocles, the order and system of the world is not the result of material causes and fortuitous mechanism, but of a Divine wisdom, assigning to every thing *οὐκ ἣν ἡ φύσις δίδωσι χώραν, ἀλλ' ἣν ἡ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον ποθεῖ σύνταξις·* not such a place as nature would give it, but such as is most convenient for the good of the whole.—Simplicius,[4] who had read Empedocles, acquaints us, that he made two worlds, the one intellectual, the other sensible; and the former of these to be the exemplar and archetype of the latter. And so the writer De Placitis Philosophorum observes,[5] that Empedocles made *δύο ἡλίους, τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, τὸν δὲ φαινόμενον*, two suns, the one archetypal and intelligible, the other apparent or sensible.—

But I need take no more pains to purge Empedocles from those two

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[1] Some verses of Empedocles, wherein he expressly maintains that opinion, are extant in Ælian de Natura Animalium, lib. xvi. c. xxix.

[2] Physicor. lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 470. oper.

[3] Symposiac. lib. i. Quæst. ii. p. 618.

[4] Commentar. ad Aristot. libr. Physicor. p. 74. b. edit. Græc. Aldinæ.

[5] Lib. ii. cap. xx. p. 900. tom. ii. oper. Plutarchi.

imputations of Corporealism and Atheism, since he hath so fully confuted them himself in those fragments of his still extant. First, by expressing such a hearty resentment of the excellency of piety, and the wretchedness and sottishness of Atheism in these verses:

[1] *Ὄλβιος ὃς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,*
Δειλὸς δ' ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.

To this sense: He is happy, who hath his mind richly fraught and stored with the treasures of Divine knowledge; but he is miserable, whose mind is darkened as to the belief of a God.—And, secondly by denying God to have any human form, or members,

[2] *Οὐ μὲν γὰρ βροτεῇ κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κέκασται*, etc.

Or otherwise to be corporeal,

[3] *Οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθ' οὐδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτὸν*
Ἡμετέροις, ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν.

And then positively affirming what he is,

[4] *Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον,*
Φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῆσιν.

Only a holy and ineffable mind, that by swift thoughts agitates the whole world.—

XXV. And now we shall speak something also of Anaxagoras, having showed before, that he was a spurious Atomist. For he likewise agreed with the other Atomists in this, that he asserted incorporeal substance in general, as the active cause and principle of motion in the universe, and particularly an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world; affirming, that there was besides atoms, *Νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος*, (as it is expressed in Plato[5]) An ordering and disposing mind, that was the cause of all things.—Which mind (as Aristotle tells us[6]) he made to be *μόνον τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγῆ καὶ καθαρόν*, the

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[1] Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. cap. xiv. p. 733.

[2] Apud Tzetz. Chiliad. xiii. Hist. cccclxiv. v. 80. et Ammonium in Comment. in Aristotel. *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, fol. 107. edit. Aldin.

[3] Apud Clem. Alexandr. Stromat. lib. v. p. 694.

[4] Apud Tzetz. et Ammonium, ubi supra.

[5] In Phædon. p. 393. oper.

[6] De Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 6. tom. ii. oper.

only simple, unmixed, and pure thing—in the world. And he supposed this to be that, which brought the confused chaos of omnifarious atoms into that orderly compages of the world that now is.

XXVI. And by this time we have made it evident, that those Atomical physiologers, that were before Democritus and Leucippus, were all of them Incorporealists: joining theology and pneumatology, the doctrine of Incorporeal substance and a Deity, together with their Atomical physiology. This is a thing expressly noted concerning Ecphantus, the Pythagorean, in Stobæus,[1] *Ἔκφαντος ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, διοικεῖσθαι δὲ ἀπὸ προνοίας·* Ecphantus held the corporeal world to consist of atoms, but yet to be ordered and governed by a Divine providence:—that is, he joined atomology and theology both together. And the same is also observed of Arcesilaus, or perhaps Archelaus, by Sidonius Apollinaris;[2]

> Post hos Arcesilaus divina mente paratam
> Conjicit hanc molem, confectam partibus illis,
> Quas atomos vocat ipse leves.

Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of atoms, but yet, notwithstanding, held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the same, as the first principle of activity in it; so in like manner did all the other ancient Atomists generally before Democritus, join theology and incorporealism with their Atomical physiology. They did atomize as well as he, but they did not atheize; but that Atheistical atomology was a thing first set on foot afterward by Leucippus and Democritus.

XXVII. But because many seem to be so strongly possessed with this prejudice, as if Atheism were a natural and necessary appendix to Atomism, and therefore will conclude, that the same persons could not possibly be Atomists, and Incorporealists or Theists, we shall further make it evident, that there is not only no inconsistency betwixt the Atomical physiology and theology, but also that there is, on the contrary, a most natural cognation between them.

And this we shall do two manner of ways: first, by inquiring into the origin of this philosophy, and considering what grounds or principles of reason they were, which first led the ancients into this Atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. And secondly, by making it

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[1] Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xxv. p. 48.

[2] Carm. xv. in Epithalamio Polemi et Araneolæ, v. 94, p. 132. edit. Savaronis.

appear, that the intrinsical constitution of this physiology is such, that whosoever entertains it, if he do but thoroughly understand it, must of necessity acknowledge, that there is something else in the world besides body.

First, therefore, this Atomical physiology seems to have had its rise and origin from the strength of reason, exerting its own inward active power and vigor, and thereby bearing itself up against the prejudices of sense, and at length prevailing over them, after this manner. The ancients considering and revolving the ideas of their own minds, found that they had a clear and distinct conception of two things, as the general heads and principles of whatsoever was in the universe; the one whereof was passive matter, and the other active power, vigor and virtue. To the latter of which belongs both cogitation, and the power of moving matter, whether by express consciousness or no. Both which together may be called by one general name of life; so that they made these two general heads of being or entity, passive matter and bulk, and self-activity or life. The former of these was commonly called by the ancients the *τὸ πάσχον*, that which suffers and receives,—and the latter the *τὸ ποιοῦν*, the active principle,—and the *τὸ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*, that from whence motion springs.[1]—"In rerum natura (saith Cicero[2] according to the general sense of the ancients) duo quærenda sunt; unum, quæ materia sit, ex qua quæque res efficiatur; alterum, quæ res sit quæ quicque efficiat:" There are two things to be inquired after in nature; one, what is the matter out of which every thing is made; another, what is the active cause or efficient.—To the same purpose Seneca,[3] "Esse debet aliquid unde fiat, deinde à quo fiat; hoc est causa, illud materia:" There must be something out of which a thing is made, and then something by which it is made; the latter is properly the cause, and the former the matter.—Which is to be understood of corporeal things and their differences, that there must be both matter, and an active power, for the production of them. And so also that of Aristotle,[4] *οὔσης αἰτίας μιᾶς μὲν ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φάμεν τῆς κινήσεως, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς ὕλης·* That, from whence the principle of motion is, is one cause, and the matter is another.—Where Aristotle gives that name of

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[1] *αἴτιον δραστήριον καὶ ποθητόν.* Philo.

[2] De Finibus bonorum et malorum, lib. i. cap. vi. p. 2346. tom. viii. oper.

[3] Epistol. lxv. tom. ii. oper. p. 160.

[5] Physicor. lib. ii. cap. iii. p. 463. tom. i. oper,

cause to the matter also, though others did appropriate it to the active power. And the writer De Placitis Philosophorum[1] expresses this as the general sense of the ancients: *ἀδύνατον ἀρχὴν μίαν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι, οἷον οὐκ ἄργυρος ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔκπωμα γενέσθαι ἂν μὴ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾖ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ξύλου, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὕλης.* It is impossible, that matter alone should be the sole principle of all things, but there must of necessity be supposed also an agent or efficient cause: as silver alone is not sufficient to make a cup, unless there be an artificer to work upon it. And the same is to be said concerning brass, wood, and other natural bodies.—

Now as they apprehended a necessity of these two principles, so they conceived them to be such, as could not be confounded together into one and the same thing or substance, they having such distinct ideas and essential characters from one another; the Stoics being the only persons, who, offering violence to their own apprehensions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make these two distinct things to be one and the same substance. Wherefore, as the first of these, viz. matter, or passive extended bulk, is taken by all for substance, and commonly called by the name of body; so the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that which acts upon the matter, and hath a commanding power over it, must needs be substance too, of a different kind from matter or body; and therefore immaterial or incorporeal substance. Neither did they find any other entity to be conceivable, besides these two, passive bulk or extension, which is corporeal substance, and internal self-activity or life, which is the essential character or substance incorporeal; to which latter belongs not only cogitation, but also the power of moving body.

Moreover, when they further considered the first of these, the material or corporeal principle, they being not able clearly to conceive any thing else in it, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest, which are all several modes of extended bulk, concluded therefore, according to reason, that there was really nothing else existing in bodies without, besides the various complexions and conjugations of those simple elements, that is, nothing but mechanism. Whence it necessarily followed, that whatsoever else was supposed to be in bodies, was, indeed, nothing but our modes of sensation, or the fancies and passions in us begotten from them, mistaken for things really existing without

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[1] Lib. i. cap. iii. p. 876. tom. i. oper. Plutarchi.

us. And this is a thing so obvious, that some of those philosophers, who had taken little notice of the Atomical physiology, had notwithstanding a suspicion of it; as for example, Plotinus,[1] who writing of the criterion of truth, and the power of reason, hath these words, *Καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἃ δὲ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχη τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ τοῦ δεῖ ἡ διανοίας τῶν κρινόντων·* Though the things of sense seem to have so clear a certainty, yet, notwithstanding, it is doubted concerning them, whether (the qualities of them) have any real existence at all in the things without us, and not rather a seeming existence only, in our own passions; and there is need of mind or understanding to judge in this case, and to determine the controversy, which sense alone cannot decide.—But the ancient physiologists concluded without any hesitancy, *οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαί με, καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι,* That the nature of honey in itself, is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it;—*διαφέρειν δὲ τό πάθος τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τά μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνειν, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τά ἑαυτῶν πάθη·* But that the passion of sense differed from the absolute nature of the thing itself without; the senses not comprehending the objects themselves, but only their own passions from them.—

I say, therefore, that the ancients concluded the absolute nature of corporeal things in themselves to be nothing but a certain disposition of parts, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, which in taste cause us to be differently affected with those senses of sweetness and bitterness, and in sight with those fancies of colors, and accordingly in the other senses with other fancies; and that the corporeal world was to be explained by these two things, whereof one is absolute in the bodies without us, the various mechanism of them; the other relative only to us, the different fancies in us, caused by the respective differences of them in themselves. Which fancies or fantastic ideas, are no modes of the bodies without us, but of that only in ourselves, which is cogitative or self-active, that is, incorporeal. For the sensible ideas of hot and cold, red and green, etc. cannot be clearly conceived by us as modes of the bodies without us, but they may be easily apprehended as modes of cogitation, that is, of sensation, or sympathetical perception in us.

The result of all which was, that whatsoever is either in ourselves,

[1] Libro, quod intelligibilia non sint extra intellectum, Ennead. v. lib. v. cap. i. p. 520.

or the whole world, was to be reduced to one or the other of these two principles; passive matter and extended bulk, or self-active power and virtue; corporeal or incorporeal substance; mechanism or life; or else to a complication of them both together.

XXVIII. From this general account, which we have now given of the origin of the Atomical physiology, it appears, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance sprung up together with it. But this will be further manifest from that which follows. For we shall in the next place show, how this philosophy did, in especial manner, owe its original to the improvement of one particular principle of reason, over and besides all the rest; namely, that famous axiom, so much talked of amongst the ancients,

[1] De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti;

That nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing. — For though Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius abused this theorem, endeavoring to carry it further than the intention of the first Atomists, to the disproving of a Divine creation of any thing out of nothing by it; "Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitùs unquam;"[2] and consequently of a Deity: yet as the meaning of it was at first confined and restrained, that nothing of itself could come from nothing, nor go to nothing, or that according to the ordinary course of nature (without an extraordinary Divine power) nothing could be raised from nothing, nor reduced to nothing: it is not only an undoubted rule of reason in itself, but it was also the principal original of that Atomical physiology, which, discarding forms and qualities, acknowledged really nothing else in body besides mechanism.

Wherefore, it was not in vain, or to no purpose, that Laertius, in the life of Democritus,[3] takes notice of this as one of his Dogmata, *μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι,* that nothing was made or generated out of nothing, nor corrupted into nothing; — this being a fundamental principle, not only of his Atheism, but also of that very Atomical physiology itself, which he pursued. And Epicurus, in his epistle to Herodotus,[4] plainly fetches the beginning of all his philosophy from hence: *Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὐδὲν φθείρεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγίνετο τὸ ἐκφαινόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, πᾶν ἐκ πάντος ἐγίνετ' ἂν, σπερμάτων γε οὐδὲν προσδεόμενον· καὶ*

[1] Persii Satir. iii. ver. 84. [2] Lucret. lib. i. ver. 151.

[3] Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 572.

[4] Apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 38, 39. p. 619, etc.

εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπολώλει τά πράγματα οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς ἃ διελύετο· We fetch the beginning of our philosophy (saith he) from hence, that nothing is made out of nothing or destroyed to nothing; for if things were made out of nothing, then every thing might be made out of every thing, neither would there be any need of seeds. And if whatsoever is corrupted were destroyed to nothing then all things would at length be brought to nothing.—Lucretius in like manner beginning here, insists more largely upon those grounds of reason hinted by Epicurus. And first, that nothing can be made of nothing he proves thus :

[1] Nam si de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus
Omne genus nasci posset : nil semine egeret :
E mare primum homines et terra posset oriri
Squamigerum genus, etc.
Nec fructus iidem arboribus constare solerent,
Sed mutarentur : ferre omnes omnia possent.
Præterea cur vere rosam, frumentare calore,
Vites autumno fundi suadente videmus ? etc.
Quod si de nihilo fierent, subito exorerentur
Incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni.

In like manner he argues, to prove that nothing is corrupted into nothing :

[2] Huc accedit uti quicque in sua corpora rursum
Dissolvat natura ; neque ad nihilum interimatres :
Nam si quid mortale a cunctis partibus esset,
Ex oculis res quæque repente erepta periret.
Præterea quæcunque vetustate amovet ætas,
Si penitus perimit, consumens materiam omnem,
Unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitæ
Redducit Venus ? aut redductum Dædala tellus
Unde alit atque auget ? generatim pabula præbens, etc.
[3] Haud igitur penitus pereunt quæcunque videntur,
Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura ; nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur nisi morte adjutam aliena.

In which passages, though it be plain, that Lucretius doth not immediately drive at Atheism, and nothing else, but primarily at the es-

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[1] Lucret. lib. i. ver. 160, etc. [2] Id. lib. i. ver. 216, etc.
[3] Id. lib. i. ver. 263, etc.

tablishing of a peculiar kind of Atomical physiology, upon which indeed these Democritics afterward endeavored to graft Atheism; yet, to take away that suspicion, we shall in the next place show, that, generally, the other ancient physiologers also, who were Theists, did likewise build the structure of their philosophy upon the same foundation, that nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing: as, for example, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Of Parmenides and Melissus, Aristotle thus writes,[1] *οἰδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαί φάσιν οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων·* They say that no real entity is either generated or corrupted, — that is, made anew out of nothing, or destroyed to nothing. And Simplicius tells us,[2] that Parmenides gave a notable reason for the confirmation of this assertion, that nothing in nature could be made out of nothing, *αἰτίαν τοῦ δεῖν πάντως ἐξ ὄντος, γίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον, θαυμαστῶς ὁ Παρμενίδης προστέθηκεν, ὅλως γάρ φήσιν, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τίς ἡ ἀποκλήρασις τοῦ τότε γενέσθαι ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἀλλα μὴ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον·* Because if any thing be made out of nothing, then there could be no cause, why it should then be made, and neither sooner nor later.—Again Aristotle[3] testifies of Xenophanes and Zeno, that they made this a main principle of their philosophy, *μὴ ἐνδεχέσθαι γίνεσθαι μηδέν ἐκ μηδενὸς,* that it cannot be, that any thing should be made out of nothing:—and of this Xenophanes, Sextus the philosopher tells us,[4] that he held *ὅτι εἷς καὶ ἀσώματος θεός·* That there was but one God, and that he was incorporeal,—speaking thus of him:

> *Εἷς θεὸς ἔντε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,*
> *Οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοιΐος, οὔτε νοήμα.*

Aristotle[5] also writes in like manner concerning Empedocles, *ἅπαντα ταῦτα κἀκεῖνος ὁμολογεῖ ὅτι ἐκ τε μὴ ὄντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι, τό τε ὂν*

[1] De Cœlo, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 668. tom. i. oper.

[2] Commentar. in Libros physicos Aristot. fol. 22. b. edit. Græc.

[3] Libro de Xenophane, Gorgia, et Zenone, cap. i. p. 834. tom. ii. oper.

[4] Dr. Cudworth was led into a mistake by Henry Stephens, who, in his *Poesis Philosophica,* p. 36, where he states this opinion of Xenophanes concerning the Deity, and produces the verses which contain it, tells us, that he had borrowed them from Sextus the philosopher, by whom he undoubtedly means Sextus Empiricus. But though this latter writer, in his Hypotypos. Pyrrhon. lib. i. cap. xxxiii. p. 59, gives a large account of Xenophanes's opinion concerning God; yet we do not find in any part of his writings what is quoted from him by Stephens, who should have cited to that purpose Clemens Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. c. xiv. p. 714.

[5] De Xenophane, etc. cap. ii. p. 836.

ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄῤῥηκτον. Empedocles acknowledges the very same with other philosophers, that it is impossible any thing should be made out of nothing, or perish into nothing.—And as for Anaxagoras, it is sufficiently known to all, that his Homœomeria, or doctrine of similar atoms (which was a certain spurious kind of Atomism) was nothing but a superstructure made upon this foundation. Besides all which, Aristotle[1] pronounces universally concerning the ancient physiologers, without any exception, that they agreed in this one thing, περὶ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης οἱ περὶ φύσεως, ὅτι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον· The physiologers generally agree in this (laying it down for a grand foundation) that it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing. — And again, he calls this κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν, the common opinion of naturalists;—intimating, also, that they concluded it the greatest absurdity, that any physiologer could be guilty of, to lay down such principles, as from whence it would follow, that any real entity in nature did come from nothing, and go to nothing.

Now, it may well be supposed, that all these ancient physiologers (the most of which were also Theists) did not keep such a stir about this business for nothing; and therefore we are in the next place to show, what it was that they drove at in it. And we do affirm, that one thing, which they all aimed at, who insisted upon the forementioned principle, was the establishing some Atomical physiology or other, but most of them at such as takes away all forms and qualities of bodies (as entities really distinct from the matter and substance,) and resolves all into mechanism and fancy. For it is plain, that if the forms and qualities of bodies be entities really distinct from the substance, and its various modifications, of figure, site, and motion, that then, in all the changes and transmutations of nature, all the generations and alterations of body (those forms and qualities being supposed to have no real existence any where before,) something must of necessity be created or produced miraculously out of nothing; as likewise reduced into nothing in the corruptions of them, they having no being any where afterward. As for example; whenever a candle is but lighted or kindled into a flame, there must needs be a new form of fire, and new qualities of light and heat, really distinct from the matter and substance, produced out of nothing, that is, created; and the same again reduced into nothing, or annihilated, when the flame is extinguished. Thus, when water is but congealed at any time into snow, hail, or ice, and

[1] Physicor. lib. i. cap. v. p. 451. tom. i. oper.

when it is again dissolved ; when wax is by liquefaction made soft and transparent, and changed to most of our senses ; when the same kind of nourishment taken in by animals is turned into blood, milk, flesh, bones, nerves, and all the other similar parts ; when that which was in the form of bright flame, appears in the form of dark smoke ; and that which was in the form of vapor, in the form of rain or water, or the like ; I say, that in all these mutations of bodies, there must needs be something made out of nothing. But that in all the Protean transformations of nature, which happen continually, there should be real entities thus perpetually produced out of nothing and reduced to nothing, seemed to be so great a paradox to the ancients, that they could by no means admit of it. Because, as we have already declared, first they concluded it clearly impossible by reason, that any real entity should of itself rise out of nothing ; and secondly, they thought it very absurd to bring God upon the stage, with his miraculous extraordinary power, perpetually at every turn ; as also, that every thing might be made out of every thing, and there would be no cause in nature for the production of one thing rather than another, and at this time rather than that, if they were miraculously made out of nothing. Wherefore they sagaciously apprehended, that there must needs be some other mystery or intrigue of nature in this business, than was commonly dreamed of, or suspected ; which they concluded to be this, that in all these transformations there were no such real entities of forms and qualities distinct from the matter, and the various disposition of its parts, in respect of figure, site, and motion (as is vulgarly supposed) produced and destroyed ; but that all these feats were done, either by the concretion and secretion of actually inexistent parts, or else by the different modifications of the same pre-existent matter, or the insensible parts thereof. This only being added hereunto, that from those different modifications of the small particles of bodies (they being not so distinctly perceived by our senses,) there are begotten in us certain confused phasmata or phantasmata, apparitions, fancies, and passions, as of light and colors, heat and cold, and the like, which are those things, that are vulgarly mistaken for real qualities existing in the bodies without us; whereas, indeed, there is nothing absolutely in the bodies themselves like to those fantastic ideas that we have of them ; and yet they are wisely contrived by the Author of nature for the adorning and embellishing of the corporeal world to us.

So that they conceived, bodies were to be considered two manner of ways, either as they are absolutely in themselves, or else as they are relatively to us : and as they are absolutely in themselves, that so there

never was any entity really distinct from the substance produced in them out of nothing, nor corrupted or destroyed to nothing, but only the accidents and modifications altered. Which accidents and modifications are no entities really distinct from their substance; forasmuch as the same body may be put into several shapes and figures, and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk, without the production of any new entities really distinct from the substance of his body. So that the generations, corruptions, and alterations of inanimate bodies are not terminated in the production or destruction of any substantial forms, or real entities distinct from the substance, but only in different modifications of it. But secondly, as bodies are considered relatively to us, that so besides their different modifications and mechanical alterations, there are also different fancies, seemings, and apparitions begotten in us from them; which unwary and unskilful philosophers mistake for absolute forms and qualities in bodies themselves. And thus they concluded, that all the phenomena of inanimate bodies, and their various transformations, might be clearly resolved into these two things; partly something that is real and absolute in bodies themselves, which is nothing but their different mechanism, or disposition of parts in respect of figure, site, and motion; and partly something that is fantastical in the sentient.

That the Atomical physiology did emerge after this manner from the principle of reason, that nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, might be further convinced from the testimony of Aristotle,[1] writing thus concerning it: *Ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τ' ἀναντία ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐξ μὴ ὄντων· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως· τὸ λειπόν ἤδε συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν· ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν.* The ancient physiologers concluded, that because contraries were made out of one another, that therefore they were before (one way or other) inexistent; arguing in this manner, that if whatsoever be made, must needs be made out of something or out of nothing, and this latter (that any thing should be made out of nothing) is impossible, according to the general consent of all the ancient physiologers; then it follows of necessity, that all corporeal things are made or generated out of things that were really before and inexistent, though by reason of the smallness of their bulks they were insensible to us.—Where Aristotle plainly intimates, that all the ancient phi-

[1] Physicor. lib. i. cap. v. p. 451.

losophers, whosoever insisted upon this principle, that nothing comes from, nor goes to nothing, were one way or other Atomical, and did resolve all corporeal things into *ὄγκους τινὰς διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα ἀναισθήτους ἡμῖν*, certain moleculæ or corpuscula, which by reason of their smallness were insensible to us,—that is, into atoms. But yet there was a difference between these Atomists, forasmuch as Anaxagoras was such an Atomist, as did notwithstanding hold forms and qualities really distinct from the mechanical modifications of bodies. For he not being able (as it seems) well to understand that other Atomical physiology of the ancients, that, exploding qualities, solved all corporeal phenomena by mechanism and fancy; and yet acknowledging, that that principle of theirs, which they went upon, must needs be true, that nothing could of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing, framed a new kind of atomology of his own, in supposing the whole corporeal world or mass of matter to consist of similar atoms, that is, such as were originally endued with all those different forms and qualities that are vulgarly conceived to be in bodies, some bony, some fleshy, some fiery, some watery, some white, some black, some bitter, some sweet, and the like, so that all bodies whatsoever had some of all sorts of these atoms (which are in a manner infinite) specifically differing from one another in them. [1]*πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμίχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γίνεται, φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα, καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλιστα ὑπερέχοντος διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων*, etc. That all things were in every thing mingled together, because they saw, that every thing was made of every thing; but that things seemed to differ from one another, and were denominated to be this or that, from those atoms, which are most predominant in the mixture, by reason of their multiplicity:—whence he concluded, that all the generations, corruptions, and alterations of bodies were made by nothing but the concretions and secretions of inexistent and pre-existent atoms of different forms and qualities, without the production of any new form and quality out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing. This very account Aristotle gives of the Anaxagorean hypothesis: *ἔοικε Ἀναξαγόρας οὕτως ἄπειρα οἰνθῆναι τὰ στοιχεῖα, διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν, τὴν κοινὴν δόξην τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γινομένου οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.* Anaxagoras seemeth, therefore, to make infinite atoms endued with several forms and qualities to be the elements of bodies, because he supposed that common opinion of physiologers to be true, that nothing is made of nothing.—But all the other ancient physiologers that were before Anax-

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[1] Ibid.

agoras, and likewise those after him, who, insisting upon the same principle of nothing coming from nothing, did not Anaxagorize, as Empedocles, Democritus, and Protagoras, must needs make ὄγκους ἀνομοίους, dissimilar moleculæ, and ἀτόμους ἀποίους, atoms unformed and unqualified, otherwise than by magnitude, figure, and motion, to be the principles of bodies, and cashiering forms and qualities (as real entities distinct from the matter,) resolve all corporeal phenomena into mechanism and fancy. Because, if no real entity can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, then one of these two things is absolutely necessary, that either these corporeal forms and qualities, being real entities distinct from the matter, should exist before generations and after corruptions, in certain insensible atoms originally such, according to the Anaxagorean doctrine; or else, that they should not be real entities distinct from the matter, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, together with different fancies. And thus we have made it evident, that the genuine Atomical physiology did spring originally from this principle of reason, that no real entity does of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing.

XXIX. Now we shall in the next place show, how this very same principle of reason, which induced the ancients to reject substantial forms and qualities of bodies, and to physiologize atomically, led them also unavoidably to assert incorporeal substances; and that the souls of men and animals were such, neither generated nor corrupted. They had argued against substantial forms and qualities, as we have showed, in this manner, that since the forms and qualities of bodies are supposed by all to be generated and corrupted, made anew out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, that therefore they could not be real entities distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications of it in respect of figure, site, and motion, causing different sensations in us; and were all to be resolved into mechanism and fancy. For as for that conceit of Anaxagoras, of pre and post-existent atoms, endued with all those several forms and qualities of bodies ingenerably and incorruptibly, it was nothing but an adulteration of the genuine Atomical philosophy, and a mere dream of his, in which very few followed him. And now they argue contrariwise for the souls of men and animals, in this manner; because they are plainly real entities distinct from the substance of matter and its modification; and men and brutes are not mere machines, neither can life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, appetite and will, ever result from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; that therefore they are not corporeally generated and corrupted, as the forms and qualities of

bodies are. Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋπάρχοντος. It is impossible for a real entity to be made or generated from nothing pre-existing.—Now, there is nothing of soul and mind, reason and understanding, nor indeed of cogitation and life, contained in the modifications and mechanism of bodies; and, therefore, to make soul and mind to rise out of body whensoever a man is generated, would be plainly to make a real entity to come out of nothing, which is impossible. I say, because the forms and qualities of bodies are generated and corrupted, made and unmade, in the ordinary course of nature, therefore they concluded, that they were not real entities distinct from the substance of body and its various modifications; but because soul and mind is plainly a real entity distinct from the substance of body, its modification and mechanism; that therefore it was not a thing generated and corrupted, made and unmade, but such as had a being of its own, a substantial thing by itself. Real entities and substances are not generated and corrupted, but only modifications.

Wherefore these ancients apprehended, that there was a great difference betwixt the souls of men and animals, and the forms and qualities of other inanimate bodies, and consequently betwixt their several productions: forasmuch as in the generation of inanimate bodies there is no real entity acquired distinct from the substance of the thing itself, but only a peculiar modification of it. The form of stone, or of timber, of blood, flesh, and bone, and such other natural bodies generated, is no more a distinct substance or entity from the matter, than the form of a house, stool, or table is: there is no more new entity acquired in the generation of natural bodies, than there is in the production of artificial ones. When water is turned into vapor, candle into flame, flame into smoke, grass into milk, blood, and bones, there is no more miraculous production of something out of nothing, than when wool is made into cloth, or flax into linen; when a rude and unpolished stone is hewn into a beautiful statue; when brick, timber, and mortar, that lay together before disorderly, is brought into the form of a stately palace; there being nothing neither in one nor other of these, but only a different disposition and modification of pre-existent matter. Which matter of the universe is always substantially the same, and neither more nor less, but only Proteanly transformed into different shapes. Thus we see, that the generation of all inanimate bodies is nothing but the change of accidents and modifications, the substance being really the same, both before and after. But in the generations of men and animals, besides the new disposition of the parts of matter and its organization, there is also the acquisition and conjunction of

another real entity or substance distinct from the matter, which could not be generated out of it, but must needs come into it some other way. Though there be no substantial difference between a stately house or palace standing, and all the materials of the same ruinated and demolished, but only a difference of accidents and modifications; yet, between a living man and a dead carcass, there is, besides the accidental modification of the body, another substantial difference, there being a substantial soul and incorporeal inhabitant dwelling in the one and acting of it, which the other is now deserted of. And it is very observable, that Anaxagoras[1] himself, who made bony and fleshy atoms, hot and cold, red and green, and the like, which he supposed to exist before generations and after corruptions, always immutably the same (that so nothing might come from nothing, and go to nothing,) yet he did not make any animalish atoms sensitive and rational. The reason whereof could not be, because he did not think sense and understanding to be as real entities as hot and cold, red and green; but because they could not be supposed to be corporeal forms and qualities, but must needs belong to another substance that was incorporeal. And therefore Anaxagoras could not but acknowledge, that all souls and lives did pre and post-exist by themselves, as well as those corporeal forms and qualities, in his similar atoms.

XXX. And now it is already manifest, that from the same principle of reason before mentioned, that nothing of itself can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, the ancient philosophers were induced likewise to assert the soul's immortality, together with its incorporiety or distinctness from the body. No substantial entity ever vanisheth of itself into nothing; for if it did, then in length of time all might come to be nothing. But the soul is a substantial entity, really distinct from the body, and not the mere modification of it; and, therefore, when a man dies, his soul must still remain and continue to have a being somewhere else in the universe. All the changes that are in nature, are either accidental transformations and different modifications of the same substance, or else they are conjunctions and separations, or anagrammatical transpositions of things in the universe; the substance of the whole remaining always entirely the same. The generation and corruption of inanimate bodies is but like the making of a house, stool, or table, and the undermaking or marring of them again; either different modifications of one and the same substance, or else divers mixtures

[1] Vide Aristot. de Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. et Metaphysic. lib. i. c. iii. tom. iv. p. 266.

and separations, concretions and secretions. And the generation and corruption of animals is likewise nothing but

———*μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων,*

The conjunction of souls together with such particular bodies, and the separation of them again from one another,—and so as it were the anagrammatical transposition of them in the universe. That soul and life, that is now fled and gone from a lifeless carcass, is only a loss to that particular body or compages of matter, which by means thereof is now disanimated; but it is no loss to the whole, it being but transposed in the universe, and lodged somewhere else.

XXXI. It is also further evident, that this same principle, which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanency after death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its *προΰπαρξις*, or pre-existence, and consequently its *μετενσωμάτωσις*, or transmigration. For that which did pre-exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of these ancients admitted it also, yet, Timæus Locrus,[1] and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation that is made of men's souls by vice. Aristotle tells us again,[2] agreeably to what was declared before, *ὅτι μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαί τι προΰπάρχοντος*· that the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent:—and therefore they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals pre-existed before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely, its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there ever any of the ancients before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence: they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted. And, therefore, the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly begun here: first, to prove its pre-existence, proceeding

[1] De Anima Mundi et Natura, inter Scriptores Mythologicos a Tho. Gale editos, p. 566.

[2] De Generatione et Corruptiono, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 704. tom. i. oper.

thence afterward to establish its permanency after death. This is the method used in Plato,[1] *ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῶδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι·* Our soul was somewhere, before it came to exist in this present human form; and from thence it appears to be immortal, and such as will subsist after death.—And the chief demonstration of the soul's pre-existence to the ancients before Plato, was this, because it is an entity really distinct from body or matter, and the modifications of it; and no real substantial entity can either spring of itself out of nothing, or be made out of any other substance distinct from it, because nothing can be made *ἐκ μηδενὸς ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπάρχοντος*, from nothing either in-existing or pre-existing;—all natural generations being but the various dispositions and modifications of what was before existent in the universe. But there was nothing of soul and mind in-existing and pre-existing in body before, there being nothing of life and cogitation in magnitude, figure, site, and motion. Wherefore this must needs be, not a thing made or generated, as corporeal forms and qualities are, but such as hath a being in nature ingenerably and incorruptibly. The mechanism of human body was a thing made and generated, it being only a different modification of what was before existent, and having no new entity in it distinct from the substance: and the totum or compositum of a man or animal may be said to be generated and corrupted, in regard of the union and disunion, conjunction and separation of those two parts, the soul and body. But the soul itself, according to these principles, is neither a thing generable nor corruptible, but was as well before the generation, and will be after the deaths and corruptions of men, as the substance of their body, which is supposed by all to have been from the first creation, and no part of it to be annihilated or lost after death, but only scattered and dispersed in the universe. Thus the ancient Atomists concluded, that souls and lives being substantial entities by themselves, were all of them as old as any other substance in the universe, and as the whole mass of matter, and every smallest atom of it is: that is, they who maintained the eternity of the world, did consequently assert also *æternitatem animorum* (as Cicero calls it,) the eternity of souls and minds. But they, who conceived the world to have had a temporary beginning or creation, held the coevity of all souls with it, and would by no means be induced to think, that every atom of senseless matter and particle of dust had such a privilege and pre-eminency over the souls of men and animals, as to be the senior to them. Syne-

[1] In Phædone, p. 382.

sius, though a Christian, yet having been educated in this philosophy, could not be induced by the hopes of a bishopric, to stifle or dissemble this sentiment of his mind,[1] ἀμείψει τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀξιώσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῆ νομίζειν· I shall never be persuaded to think my soul to be younger than my body.—But such, it seems, was the temper of those times, that he was not only dispensed withal as to this, but also as to another heterodoxy of his concerning the resurrection.

XXXII. It is already plain, also, that this doctrine of the ancient Atomists concerning the immateriality and immortality, the pre and post-existence of souls, was not confined by them to human souls only, but extended universally to all souls and lives whatsoever; it being a thing that was hardly ever called into doubt or question by any before Cartesius, whether the souls of brutes had any sense, cogitation, or consciousness in them or no. Now all life, sense, and cogitation was undoubtedly concluded by them to be an entity really distinct from the substance of body, and not the mere modification, motion, or mechanism of it; life and mechanism being two distinct ideas of the mind, which cannot be confounded together. Wherefore they resolved, that all lives and souls whatsoever, which now are in the world, ever were from the first beginning of it, and ever will be; that there will be no new ones produced, which are not already, and have not always been, nor any of those, which now are, destroyed, any more than the substance of any matter will be created or annihilated. So that the whole system of the created universe, consisting of body, and particular incorporeal substances or souls, in the successive generations and corruptions, or deaths of men and other animals, was, according to them, really nothing else but one and the same thing perpetually anagrammatized, or but like many different syllables and words variously and successively composed out of the same pre-existent elements or letters.

XXXIII. We have now declared, how the same principle of reason, which made the ancient physiologers to become Atomists, must needs induce them also to be Incorporealists; how the same thing which persuaded them, that corporeal forms were no real entities distinct from the substance of the body, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, convinced them, likewise, that all cogitative beings, all souls and lives whatsoever, were ingenerable and incorruptible, as well pre-existent before the generation of particular animals, as post-existent after their deaths and corruptions. Nothing now remains but only to show more particularly, that it was *de facto* thus;

[1] Epistol. cv. p. 249. oper.

that the same persons did, from this principle (that nothing can come from nothing, and go to nothing), both atomize in their physiology, taking away all substantial forms and qualities, and also theologize and incorporealize, asserting souls to be a substance really distinct from matter, and immortal, as also to pre-exist. And this we shall do from Empedocles, and first, from that passage of his cited before in part:

[1] *Ἄλλὸ δὲ σοι ἐρέω, φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ*
Θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη (al. lect. τελεύτη,)
Ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων
Ἐστὶ, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισι.

Which I find Latined thus:

Ast aliud dico; nihil est mortalibus ortus,
Est nihil interitus, qui rebus morte panatur;
Mistio sed solum est, et conciliatio rerum
Mistilium; hæc dici solita est mortalibus ortus.

The full sense whereof is plainly this, that there is no *φύσις*, or production of any thing, which was not before; no new substance made, which did not really pre-exist; and, therefore, that in the generations and corruptions of inanimate bodies, there is no form or quality really distinct from the substance produced and destroyed, but only a various composition and modification of matter. But in the generations and corruptions of men and animals, where the souls are substances really distinct from the matter, that there, there is nothing but the conjunction and separation of souls and particular bodies, existing both before and after, not the production of any new soul into being, which was not before, nor the absolute death and destruction of any into nothing. —Which is further expressed in these following verses:

[2] *Νήπιοι, οὔ γὰρ σφιν δολιχύφρονες εἰσὶ μέριμναι,*
Οἳ δὴ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐπίζουσιν,
Ἤτοι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἅπάντη.

To this sense; that they are infants in understanding, and short-sighted, who think any thing to be made, which was nothing before, or any

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1 Apud Plutarch. advers. Colotem, p. iv. tom. ii. oper. et ex parte apud Aristot. de Generatione et Corruptione, lib. i. c. i. p. 698. tom. i. oper.

2 Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. ii. oper.

thing to die, so as to be destroyed to nothing.—Upon which Plutarch glosses after this manner: *οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὀντὸς, οὐδὲ φθορὰν ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντη, τουτέστι τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀφολύουσαν·* Empedocles does not here destroy generation, but only such as is out of nothing; nor corruption, but such as is into nothing.—Which, as we have already intimated, is to be understood differently in respect to inanimate and animate things; for in things inanimate, there is nothing produced or destroyed, because the forms and qualities of them are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only diverse mixtures and modifications. But in animate things, where the souls are real entities really distinct from the substance of the body, there is nothing produced nor destroyed neither, because those souls do both exist before their generations, and after their corruptions; which business, as to men and souls, is again more fully expressed thus:—

[1] *Οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο,*
Ὡς ὄφρα μέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι,
Τόφρα μέν οὖν εἰσι, καὶ σφη πάρα δεινὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,
Πρὶν δὲ παγέντε βροτοὶ καὶ λυθέντες οὐδὲν ἄρ εἰσί.

That good and ill did first us here attend,
And not from time before, the soul descend;
That here alone we live, and when
Hence we depart, we forthwith then
Turn to our old non-entity again;
Certes ought not to be believed by wise and learned men.

Wherefore, according to Empedocles, this is to be accounted one of the vulgar errors, that men then only have a being and are capable of good and evil, when they live here that which is called life; but that both before they were born, and after they are dead; they are perfectly nothing.

And besides Empedocles, the same is represented by the Greek tragedian also,[2] as the sense of the ancient philosophers;

Θνήσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γινομένων,
Διακρινόμενον δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο
Μόρφην ἑτέραν ἀπέδειξεν.

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[1] Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Euripid. in Chrysippo apud Clement. Alexandr. Stromat. lib. vi. p. 750.

That nothing dies or utterly perisheth; but things being variously concreted and secreted, transposed and modified, change their form and shape only, and are put into a new dress.—

Agreeably whereunto, Plato also tells us,[1] that it was *παλαιὸς λόγος*, an ancient tradition or doctrine before his time, *τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι, οἰδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων·* that as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living;—and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men more properly a nativity or birth into life, and what is called generation into life, was comparatively rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies to a body more thin and subtile, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more crass and terrestrial. [2]*τὶς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, το κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν·* who knows whether that which is called living be not indeed rather dying; and that which is called dying, living?—

Moreover, this was called the doctrine of Pythagoras himself, that no real entity perishes in corruptions, nor is produced in generations, but only new modifications and transpositions made; is fully expressed by the Latin poet,[3] both as to animate and to inanimate things. Of the first thus:

> Nec perit in tanto quicquam (mihi credite) mundo,
> Sed variat, faciemque novat: nascique vocatur
> Incipere esse aliud, quam quod fuit ante; morique
> Desinere illud idem. Cum sint huc forsitan illa,
> Hæc translata illuc: summa tamen omnia constant.

Of the second, that the souls of animals are immortal, did pre-exist and do transmigrate, from the same ground, after this manner:

> Omnia mutantur; nihil interit: errat et illinc,
> Huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoslibet occupat artus

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1 In Phædone, p. 381.

2 This passage of Euripides is cited by many of the ancients, as Plato, Cicero, Clemens Alex. and Sextus Empiricus. See the notes of Dr. Potter, now Archbishop of Canterbury, on Clem. Alexand. Stromat. lib. iii. cap. iii. p. 517. et Jo. Albert Fabricius on Sextus Empiric. Hypotyp. Pyrrohn. lib. iii. cap. xxiv. p. 185.

3 Ovid. Metam. lib. xv. ver. 254. et ver. 165.

Spiritus, eque feris humana in corpora transit,
Inque feras noster, nec tempora deperit ullo.
Utque novis facilis signatur cera figuris,
Nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas servat easdem,
Sed tamen ipsa eadem est; animam sic semper eandem
Esse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras.

Wherefore though it be a thing, which hath not been commonly taken notice of, of late, yet we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that all those ancient philosophers who insisted so much upon this principle, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων· that no real entity is either generated or corrupted,—did therein at once drive at these two things: first, the establishing of the immortality of all souls, their pre and post-existence, forasmuch as being entities really distinct from the body, they could neither be generated nor corrupted; and secondly, the making of corporeal forms and qualities to be no real entities distinct from the body and mechanism thereof, because they are things generated and corrupted, and have no pre and post-existence. Anaxagoras, in this latter, being the only dissenter; who supposing those forms and qualities to be real entities likewise, distinct from the substance of body, therefore attributed perpetuity of being to them also, pre and post-existence, in similar atoms, as well as to the souls of animals.

And now we have made it sufficiently evident, that the doctrine of the incorporeity and immortality of souls, we might add also, of their pre-existence and transmigration, had the same original, and stood upon the same basis with the Atomical physiology; and therefore it ought not at all to be wondered at (what we affirmed before) that the same philosophers and Pythagoreans asserted both those doctrines, and that the ancient Atomists were both Theists and Incorporealists.

XXXIV. But now to declare our sense freely concerning this philosophy of the ancients, which seems to be so prodigiously paradoxical, in respect of that pre-existence and transmigration of souls; we conceive indeed, that this ratiocination of theirs from that principle, that nothing naturally or of itself, comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, was not only firmly conclusive against substantial forms and qualities of bodies, really distinct from their substance, but also for substantial incorporeal souls, and their ingenerability out of matter, and particularly for the future immortality or post-existence of all human souls. For since it is plain, that they are not a mere modification of body or matter, but an entity and substance really distinct from it, we have no

more reason to think, that they can ever of themselves vanish into nothing, than that the substance of the corporeal world, or any part thereof, can do so. For that in the consumption of bodies by fire, or age, or the like, there is the destruction of any real substance into nothing, is now generally exploded as an idiotical conceit; and certainly it cannot be a jot less idiotical to suppose, that the rational soul in death is utterly extinguished.

Moreover, we add also, that this ratiocination of the ancients would be altogether as firm and irrefragable likewise for the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, as it is for their post-existence and future immortality, did we not (as indeed we do) suppose souls to be created by God immediately, and infused in generations. For they being unquestionably a distinct substance from the body, and no substance according to the ordinary course of nature, coming out of nothing, they must of necessity either pre-exist in the universe before generations, and transmigrate into their respective bodies; or else come from God immediately, who is the fountain of all, and who at first created all that substance that now is in the world besides himself. Now the latter of these was a thing, which those ancient philosophers would by no means admit of; they judging it altogether incongruous to bring God upon the stage perpetually, and make him immediately interpose every where, in the generations of men and all other animals, by the miraculous production of souls out of nothing. Notwithstanding which, if we well consider it, we shall find, that there may be very good reason on the other side for the successive Divine creation of souls; namely, that God did not do all at first, that ever he could or would do, and put forth all his creative vigor at once, in a moment, ever afterwards remaining a spectator only of the consequent results, and permitting nature to do all alone, without the least interposition of his at any time, just as if there were no God at all in the world. For this may be and indeed often hath been, the effect of such an hypothesis as this, to make men think, that there is no other God in the world but blind and dark nature. God might also, for other good and wise ends unknown to us, reserve to himself the continual exercise of this his creative power, in the successive production of new souls. And yet these souls, nevertheless, after they are once brought forth into being, will, notwithstanding their juniority, continue as firmly in the same, without vanishing of themselves into nothing, as the substance of senseless matter, that was created many thousand years before, will do.

And thus our vulgar hypothesis of the new creation of souls, as it is rational in itself, so it doth sufficiently solve their incorporeity, their fu-

ture immortality, or post-eternity, without introducing those offensive absurdities of their pre-existence and transmigration.

XXXV. But if there be any such, who, rather than they would allow a future immortality or post-existence to all souls, and therefore to those of brutes, which consequently must have their successive transmigrations, would conclude the souls of all brutes, as likewise the sensitive soul in man, to be corporeal, and only allow the rational soul to be distinct from matter; to these we have only thus much to say, that they, who will attribute life, sense, cogitation, consciousness, and self-enjoyment, not without some footsteps of reason many times, to blood and brains, or mere organized bodies in brutes, will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, as most probably they do not intend any such thing. For either all conscious and cogitative beings are incorporeal, or else nothing can be proved to be incorporeal. From whence it would follow also, that there is no Deity distinct from the corporeal world. But though there seem to be no very great reason, why it should be thought absurd, to grant perpetuity of duration to the souls of brutes, any more than to every atom of matter, or particle of dust that is in the whole world; yet we shall endeavor to suggest something towards easing the minds of those, who are so much burthened with this difficulty; viz. that they may, if they please, suppose the souls of brutes, being but so many particular eradiations or effluxes from that source of life above, whensoever and wheresoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive them, and to be actuated by them, to have a sense and fruition of themselves in it, so long as it continues such; but as soon as ever those organized bodies of theirs, by reason of their indisposition, become incapable of being further acted upon by them, then to be resumed again and retracted back to their original head and fountain. Since it cannot be doubted, but what creates any thing out of nothing, or sends it forth from itself by free and voluntary emanation, may be able either to retract the same back again to its original source, or else to annihilate it at pleasure.

And I find, that there have not wanted some among the gentile philosophers themselves, who have entertained this opinion, whereof Porphyry is one: *λύεται ἕκάστη δύναμις ἄλογος εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζωὴν τοῦ πάντος*, every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole.—

XXXVI. Neither will this at all weaken the future immortality or post-eternity of human souls. For if we be, indeed, Theists, and do in very good earnest believe a Deity, according to the true notion of it, we must then needs acknowledge, that all created being whatsoever

owes the continuation and perpetuity of its existence, not to any necessity of nature without God, and independently upon him, but to the Divine will only. And, therefore, though we had never so much rational and philosophical assurance, that our souls are immaterial substances, distinct from the body, yet we could not for all that, have any absolute certainty of their post-eternity, any otherwise than as it may be derived to us from the immutability and perfection of the Divine nature and will, which does always that which is best. For the essential goodness and wisdom of the Deity is the only stability of all things. And for aught we mortals know, there may be good reason, why that grace or favor of future immortality and post-eternity, that is indulged to human souls, endued with reason, morality, and liberty of will, (by means whereof they are capable of commendation and blame, reward and punishment,) that so they may be objects for Divine justice to display itself upon after this life, in different retributions, may, notwithstanding, be denied to those lower lives and more contemptible souls of brutes, alike devoid both of morality and liberty.

XXXVII. But if any, for all this, will still obstinately contend for that ancient Pythagoric and Empedoclean hypothesis, that all lives and souls whatsoever are as old as the first creation, and will continue to eternity, or as long as the world doth, as a thing more reasonable and probable than our continual creation of new souls, by means whereof they become juniors both to the matter of the world and of their own bodies, and whereby also (as they pretend) the Divine creative power is made too cheap and prostituted a thing, as being famulative always to brutish, and many times to unlawful lusts and undue conjunctions; but especially than the continual decreation and annihilation of the souls of brutes; we shall not be very unwilling to acknowledge thus much to them, that, indeed, of the two, this opinion is more reasonable and tolerable than that other extravagancy of those, who will either make all souls to be generated, and consequently to be corporeal, or at least the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes. For, besides the monstrosity of this latter opinion, in making two distinct souls and perceptive substances in every man, which is a thing sufficiently confuted by internal sense, it leaves us also in an absolute impossibility of proving the immortality of the rational soul, the incorporeity of any substance, and, by consequence, the existence of any Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

And as for that pretence of theirs, that senseless matter may as well become sensitive, and, as it were, kindled into life and cogitation, as a body, that was devoid of life and heat, may be kindled into fire and

flame; this seems to argue too much ignorance of the doctrine of bodies, in men otherwise learned and ingenious; the best naturalists having already concluded, that fire and flame is nothing but such a motion of the insensible parts of a body, as whereby they are violently agitated, and many times dissipated and scattered from each other, begetting in the meantime those fancies of light and heat in animals. Now, there is no difficulty at all in conceiving, that the insensible particles of a body, which were before quiescent, may be put into motion; this being nothing but a new modification of them, and no entity really distinct from the substance of body, as life, sense, and cogitation are. There is nothing in fire and flame, or a kindled body, different from other bodies, but only the motion or mechanism, and fancy of it. And, therefore, it is but a crude conceit, which the Atheists and Corporealists of former times have been always so fond of, that souls are nothing but fiery or flammeous bodies. For though heat in the bodies of animals be a necessary instrument for soul and life to act by in them, yet it is a thing really distinct from life; and a red-hot iron hath not, therefore, any nearer approximation to life than it had before, nor the flame of a candle than the extinguished snuff or tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the agitation of the insensible parts. We might also add, that, according to this hypothesis, the souls of animals could not be numerically the same throughout the whole space of their lives; since that fire, that needs a pabulum to prey upon, doth not continue always one and the same numerical substance. The soul of a new-born animal could be no more the same with the soul of that animal several years after, than the flame of a new-lighted candle is the same with that flame that twinkles last in the socket; which, indeed, are no more the same than a river or stream is the same at several distances of time. Which reason may be also extended further to prove the soul to be no body at all, since the bodies of all animals are in a perpetual flux.

XXXVIII. We have now sufficiently performed our first task, which was to show, from the origin of the Atomical physiology, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance must needs spring up together with it. We shall, in the next place, make it manifest, that the inward constitution of this philosophy is also such, that whosoever really entertains it, and rightly understands it, must of necessity admit incorporeal substance likewise. First, therefore, the Atomical hypothesis, allowing nothing to body, but what is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, or can clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or less magnitude, with divisibility, figure, site, motion, and

rest, together with the results of their several combinations, cannot possibly make life and cogitation to be qualities of body; since they are neither contained in those things before-mentioned, nor can result from any *συζυγίαι*, or conjugations of them. Wherefore it must needs be granted, that life and cogitation are the attributes of another substance distinct from body, or incorporeal.

Again, since according to the tenor of this physiology, body hath no other action belonging to it but that of local motion, which local motion, as such, is essentially heterokinesy, that which never springs originally from the thing itself moving, but always from the action of some other agent upon it; that is, since no body could ever move itself, it follows undeniably, that there must be something else in the world besides body, or else there could never have been any motion in it. Of which we shall speak more afterwards.

Moreover, according to this philosophy, the corporeal phenomena themselves cannot be solved by mechanism alone without fancy. Now fancy is no mode of body, and therefore must needs be a mode of some other kind of being in ourselves, that is, cogitative and incorporeal.

Furthermore, it is evident from the principles of this philosophy, that sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion from bodies without, in that it supposeth, that there is nothing really in bodies like to those fantastic ideas that we have of sensible things, as of hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, and the like, which, therefore, must needs owe their being to some activity of the soul itself; and this is all one as to make it incorporeal.

Lastly, from this philosophy, it is also manifest, that sense is not the *κριτήριον* of truth concerning bodies themselves, it confidently pronouncing, that those supposed qualities of bodies, represented such by sense, are merely fantastical things; from whence it plainly follows, that there is something in us superior to sense, which judges of it, detects its fantastry, and condemns its imposture; and determines what really is and is not, in bodies without us, which must needs be a higher self-active vigor of the mind, that will plainly speak it to be incorporeal.

XXXIX. And now this Atomical physiology of the ancients seems to have two advantages or pre-eminences belonging to it, the first whereof is this, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible to us; since mechanism is a thing that we can clearly understand, and we cannot clearly and distinctly conceive any thing in bodies else. To say that this or that is done by a form or quality, is nothing else but to say, that it is done we know not how; or, which is yet more absurd, to

make our very ignorance of the cause, disguised under those terms of forms and qualities, to be itself the cause of the effect.

Moreover, hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, etc. formally considered, may be clearly conceived by us as different fancies and vital passions in us, occasioned by different motions made from the objects without upon our nerves; but they can never be clearly understood as absolute qualities in the bodies themselves, really distinct from their mechanical dispositions; nor is there, indeed, any more reason, why they should be thought such, than that, when a man is pricked with a pin, or wounded with a sword, the pain which he feels should be thought to be an absolute quality in the pin or sword. So long as our sensible ideas are taken either for substantial forms or qualities in bodies without us, really distinct from the substance of the matter, so long they are perfectly unintelligible by us. For which cause, Timæus Locrus,[1] philosophizing (as it seemeth) after this manner, did consentaneously thereunto determine, that corporeal things could not be apprehended by us, otherwise than *αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ*, by sense and a kind of spurious or bastardly reason;—that is, that we could have no clear conceptions of them in our understanding. And, for the same reason, Plato[2] himself distinguisheth betwixt such things as are *νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτά·* comprehensible by the understanding with reason,—and those which are only *δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου*, which can only be apprehended by opinion, together with a certain irrational sense;—meaning plainly, by the latter, corporeal and sensible things. And accordingly the Platonists frequently take occasion, from hence, to enlarge themselves much in the disparagement of corporeal things, as being, by reason of that smallness of entity that is in them, below the understanding, and not having so much *οὐσίαν* as *γένεσιν*,[3] essence as generation,—which, indeed, is fine fancy. Wherefore, we must either, with these philosophers, make sensible things to be *ἀκατάληπτα* or *ἀπερίληπτα*, altogether incomprehensible and inconceivable—by our human understandings, (though they be able, in the meantime, clearly to conceive many things of a higher nature,) or else we must entertain some kind of favorable opinion concerning that which is the ancientest of all physiologies, the Atomical or mechanical, which alone renders sensible things intelligible.

XL. The second advantage, which this Atomical physiology seems

[1] De Anima Mundi, inter Scriptor. Mytholog. a Tho. Gale editos. p. 545.

[2] Vide Theætetum, p. 139. s. oper. Sophistam. p. 166, 167. et de Repub. lib. vii. p. 484.

[3] Plato de Republica, ubi supra.

to have, is this, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substances, by settling a distinct notion of body. He that will undertake to prove, that there is something else in the world besides body, must first determine what body is, for otherwise he will go about to prove, that there is something besides he knows not what. But now, if all body be made to consist of two substantial principles, whereof one is matter devoid of all form (and therefore of quantity, as well as qualities,) from whence these philosophers[1] themselves conclude, that it is incorporeal: the other, form, which, being devoid of all matter, must needs be incorporeal likewise. (And thus Stobæus[2] sets down the joint doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle; *ὃν τρόπον τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀσώματον, οὕτως και τὴν ὕλην τοῦ εἴδους χωρισθέντος οὐ σῶμα εἶναι, δεῖν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τῆς συνόδου, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπόστασιν·* That in the same manner, as form alone separated from matter is incorporeal, so neither is matter alone, the form being separated from it, body. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both these, matter and form together, to make up the substance of the body.)—Moreover, if to forms, qualities be likewise superadded, of which it is consentaneously also resolved by the Platonists, *ὅτι αἱ ποιότητες ἀσώματοι*, that qualities are incorporeal,—as if they were so many spirits possessing bodies;[3] I say, in this way of philosophizing, the notions of body and spirit, corporeal and incorporeal, are so confounded, that it is impossible to prove any thing at all concerning them; body itself being made incorporeal (and therefore every thing incorporeal;) for whatsoever is wholly compounded and made up of incorporeals, must needs be itself also incorporeal.

Furthermore, according to this doctrine of matter, forms, and qualities in body, life and understanding may be supposed to be certain forms or qualities of body. And then the souls of men may be nothing else but blood or brains, endued with the qualities of sense and understanding; or else some other more subtle, sensitive, and rational matter, in us. And the like may be said of God himself also; that he is nothing but a certain rational, or intellectual, subtile and fiery body, pervading the whole universe; or else that he is the form of the whole corporeal world, together with the matter making up but one substance. Which conceits have been formerly entertained by the best of those ancients, who were captivated under that dark infirmity of mind, to think, that there could be no other substance besides body.

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[1] *Ἀσώματος δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη*—Matter is incorporeal. Plotin. p. 164.

[2] Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 29.

[3] Alcinous, cap. 11. [Introd. in Philos. Platon. p. 479.]

But the ancient Atomical philosophy, settling a distinct notion of body, that it is διαστατὸν ἀντίτυπον, a thing impenetrably extended,—which hath nothing belonging to it but magnitude, figure, site, rest, and motion, without any self-moving power, takes away all confusion; shows clearly how far body can go, where incorporeal substance begins; as also, that there must of necessity be such a thing in the world.

Again, this discovering not only that the doctrine of qualities had its original from men's mistaking their own fancies for absolute realities in bodies themselves; but also, that the doctrine of matter and form sprung from another fallacy or deception of the mind, in taking logical notions, and our modes of conceiving, for modes of being, and real entities in things without us; it showing, likewise, that because there is nothing else clearly intelligible in body, besides magnitude, figure, site and motion, and their various conjunctions, there can be no such entities of forms and qualities really distinct from the substance of body; makes it evident, that life, cogitation, and understanding can be no corporeal things, but must needs be the attributes of another kind of substance distinct from body.

XLI. We have now clearly proved these two things; first, that the physiology of the ancients, before, not only Aristotle and Plato, but also Democritus and Leucippus, was Atomical or mechanical. Secondly, that as there is no inconsistency between the Atomical physiology and theology, but indeed a natural cognation: so the ancient Atomists, before Democritus, were neither Atheists nor Corporealists, but held the incorporeity and immortality of souls, together with a Deity distinct from the corporeal world. Wherefore, the first and most ancient Atomists did not make ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων, they never endeavored to make up an entire philosophy out of Atomology; but the doctrine of Atoms was to them only one part or member of the whole philosophic system, they joining thereunto the doctrine of incorporeal substance and theology, to make it up complete; accordingly, as Aristotle hath declared in his Metaphysics, that the ancient philosophy consisted of these two parts, φυσιολογία and θεολογία or ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία physiology, and theology or metaphysics. Our ancient Atomists never went about, as the blundering Democritus afterwards did, to build up a world out of mere passive bulk, and sluggish matter, without any ἀρχαὶ δραστήριοι, any active principles, or incorporeal powers; understanding well, that thus they could not have so much as motion, mechanism, or generation in it; the original of all that motion that is in bodies springing from something that is not body, that is, from incorporeal substance. And yet, if local motion could have been supposed

to have risen up, or sprung in upon this dead lump and mass of matter, nobody knows how, and without dependence upon any incorporeal being, to have actuated it fortuitously; these ancient Atomists would still have thought it impossible for the corporeal world itself to be made up, such as now it is, by fortuitous mechanism, without the guidance of any higher principle. But they would have concluded it the greatest impudence or madness, for men to assert, that animals also consisted of mere mechanism; or, that life and sense, reason and understanding, were really nothing else but local motion, and consequently, that themselves were but machines and automata. Wherefore, they joined both active and passive principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, mechanism and life, Atomology and Pneumatology; and, from both these united, they made up one entire system of philosophy, correspondent with, and agreeable to, the true and real world without them. And this system of philosophy, thus consisting of the doctrine of incorporeal substance (whereof God is the head,) together with the Atomical and mechanical physiology, seems to have been the only genuine, perfect, and complete.

XLII. But it did not long continue thus; for, after a while, this entire body of philosophy came to be mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some another; some snatching away the Atomical physiology, without the pneumatology and theology; and others, on the contrary, taking the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, without the Atomical or mechanical physiology. The former of these were Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras, who took only the dead carcass or skeleton of the old Moschical philosophy, namely, the Atomical physiology; the latter, Plato and Aristotle, who took, indeed, the better part, the soul, spirit, and quintessence of it, the theology and doctrine of Incorporeals, but unbodied, and divested of its most proper and convenient vehicle, the Atomical physiology, whereby it became exposed to sundry inconveniences.

XLIII. We begin with Leucippus and Democritus; who, being atheistically inclined, quickly perceived, that they could not, in the ordinary way of physiologizing, sufficiently secure themselves against a Deity, nor effectually urge Atheism upon others; forasmuch as Heraclitus and other philosophers, who held that all substance was body, as well as themselves, did, notwithstanding, assert a corporeal Deity, maintaining, that the form of the whole corporeal world was God, or else that he was ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα, a certain kind of body or matter, as (for example) a methodical and rational fire, pervading (as a soul) the whole universe; the particular souls of men and animals being but, as

it were, so many pieces cut and sliced out of the great mundane soul: so that, according to them, the whole corporeal universe, or mass of body, was one way or other a God, a most wise and understanding animal, that did frame all particularities within itself in the best manner possible, and providently govern the same. Wherefore, those Atheists now apprehending, upon what ticklish and uncertain terms their Atheistical philosophy then stood, and how that those very forms and qualities, and the self-moving power of body, which were commonly made a sanctuary for Atheism, might, notwithstanding, chance to prove, contrariwise, the latibulum and asylum of a Deity, and that a corporeal God (do what they could) might lie lurking under them, assaulting men's minds with doubtful fears and jealousies; understanding, moreover, that there was another kind of physiology set on foot, which, banishing those forms and qualities of body, attributed nothing to it but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, without any self-moving power; they seemed presently to apprehend some great advantage to themselves and cause from it; and therefore, greedily entertained this Atomical or mechanical physiology, and violently cutting it off from that other part, the doctrine of Incorporeals, which it was naturally and vitally united to, endeavored to serve their turns of it. And now joining these two things together, the Atomical physiology, which supposes, that there is nothing in body but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, and that prejudice or prepossession of their own minds, that there was no other substance in the world besides body; between them both they begat a certain mongrel and spurious philosophy, atheistically Atomical, or atomically Atheistical.

But though we have so well proved, that Leucippus and Democritus were not the first inventors, but only the depravers and adulterators of the Atomical philosophy; yet, if any will, notwithstanding, obstinately contend, that the first invention thereof ought to be imputed to them, the very principles of their Atheism seeming to lead them naturally to this, to strip and divest body of all those forms and qualities, it being otherwise impossible for them, surely and safely, to exclude a corporeal Deity; yet so, as that the wit of these Atheists was also much to be admired, in the managing and carrying on of those principles in such a manner, as to make up so entire a system of philosophy out of them, all whose parts should be so coherent and consistent together; we shall only say thus much: that if those Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy, they were certainly very unhappy and unsuccessful in it, whilst endeavoring by it to secure themselves from the possibility and danger of a corporeal God, they unawares laid a foundation for the

clear demonstration of an incorporeal one, and were indeed so far from making up any such coherent frame as is pretended, that they were forced every where to contradict their own principles. So that nonsense lies at the bottom of all, and is interwoven throughout their whole Atheistical system; and that we ought to take notice of the invincible power and force of truth, prevailing irresistibly against all endeavors to oppress it; and how desperate the cause of Atheism is, when that very Atomical hypothesis of their's, which they would erect and build up for a strong castle to garrison themselves in, proves a most effectual engine against themselves, for the battering of all their Atheistical structure down about their ears.

XLVI. Plato's mutilation and interpolation of the old Moschical philosophy was a great deal more excusable, when he took the theology and metaphysics of it, the whole doctrine of incorporeals, and abandoned the Atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. Which in all probability he did, partly because those forementioned Atheists having so much abused that philosophy, adopting it as it were to themselves, he thereupon began to entertain a jealousy and suspicion of it; and partly, because he was not of himself so inclinable to physiology as theology, to the study of corporeal as of Divine things; which some think to be the reason, why he did not attend to the Pythagoric system of the corporeal world, till late in his old age. His genius was such, that he was naturally more addicted to ideas than to atoms, to formal and final than to material causes. To which may be added, that the way of physiologizing by matter, forms, and qualities, is a more huffy and fanciful thing than the other; and lastly, that the Atomical physiology is more remote from sense and vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so easily understood. For which cause many learned Greeks of later times, though they had read Epicurus's works, and perhaps Democritus's too, yet they were not able to conceive, how the corporeal and sensible phenomena could possibly be solved without real qualities; one instance whereof might be given in Plutarch, writing against Colotes, the Epicurean. Wherefore Plato, that was a zealous assertor of an incorporeal Deity, distinct from the world, and of immortal souls, seriously physiologized only by matter, forms, and qualities, generation, corruption, and alteration; and he did but play and toy sometimes a little with atoms and mechanism; as where he would compound the earth of cubical, and fire of pyramidal atoms, and the like. For that he did therein imitate the Atomical physiology, is plain from these words of his; [1]πάντα οὖν δεῖ ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ οὕτως, ὡς καθ' ἓν

[1] In Timæ. p. 537. oper.

ἕκαστον οὐδὲν ὁρώμενον ἐφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν, τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι· All these cubical and pyramidal corpuscula of the fire and earth, are in themselves so small, that by reason of their parvitude, none of them can be perceived singly and alone, but only the aggregations of many of them together.—

XLV. And Aristotle here trod in Plato's footsteps, not only in the better part, in asserting an incorporeal Deity, and an immovable First Mover; but also in physiologizing by forms and qualities, and rejecting that mechanical way by atoms, which had been so generally received amongst the ancients. Wherefore, though the genius of these two persons was very different, and Aristotle often contradicteth Plato, and really dissents from him in several particularities; yet, so much I think may be granted to those reconcilers (Porphyry, Simplicius, and others,) that the main essentials of their two philosophies are the same.

Now, I say, the whole Aristotelical system of philosophy is infinitely to be preferred before the whole Democritical; though the former hath been so much disparaged, and the other cried up of late amongst us. Because, though it cannot be denied, but that the Democritic hypothesis doth much more handsomely and intelligibly solve the corporeal phenomena, yet in all those other things, which are of far the greatest moment, it is rather a madness than a philosophy. But the Aristotelic system is right and sound here, as to those greater things; it asserting incorporeal substance, a Deity distinct from the world, the naturality of morality, and liberty of will. Wherefore, though a late writer of politics does so exceedingly disparage Aristotle's Ethics, yet we shall do him this right here to declare, that his ethics were truly such, and answered their title; but that new model of ethics, which hath been obtruded upon the world with so much fastuosity, and is indeed nothing but the old Democritic doctrine revived, is no ethics at all, but a mere cheat, the undermining and subversion of all morality, by substituting something like it in the room of it, that is a mere counterfeit and changeling, the design whereof could not be any other than to debauch the world.

We add further, that Aristotle's system of philosophy seems to be more consistent with piety, than the Cartesian hypothesis itself, which yet plainly supposeth incorporeal substance. Forasmuch as this latter makes God to contribute nothing more to the fabric of the world, than the turning round of a vortex or whirlpool of matter; from the fortuitous motion of which, according to certain general laws of nature, must proceed all this frame of things that now is, the exact organization and successive generation of animals, without the guidance of any mind or wisdom. Whereas Aristotle's nature is no fortuitous principle, but

such as doth nothing in vain, but all for ends, and in every thing pursues the best; and therefore can be no other than a subordinate instrument of the Divine wisdom, and the manuary opificer or executioner of it.

However, we cannot deny, but that Aristotle hath been taxed by sundry of the ancients, Christians and others, for not so explicitly asserting these two things, the immortality of human souls, and providence over men, as he ought to have done, and as his master Plato did. Though to do him all the right we can, we shall observe here, that in his Nicomachian Ethics,[1] he speaks favorably for the latter; *εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εὔλογον χαίρειν αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο γὰρ εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαποῦντας μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν, ὃς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους, ὀρθῶς τε καλῶς πράττοντας·* If God take any care of human things, as it seems he doth, then it is reasonable to think also, that he is delighted with that which is the best, and nearest akin to himself (which is mind or right reason), and that he rewards those who most love and honor it (as taking care of such things as are most pleasing to him), in doing rightly and honestly.—A very good sentence, were it not ushered in with too much of scepticism. And as for the point of the soul's immortality, it is true, that whereas other philosophers, before Aristotle, asserted the pre-existence, incorporeity, and immortality of all souls, not only the rational, but the sensitive also (which in men they concluded to be one and the same substance,) according to that of Plato's *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος,* every soul is immortal,—they resolving that no life nor cogitation could be corporeal; Aristotle, on the contrary, doth expressly deny the pre-existence, that is, the separability, incorporeity, and immortality, of all sensitive souls, not in brutes only, but also every where, giving his reason for it in these words:[2] *ὅτι μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε πάσας προϋπάρχειν, φάνερόν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσων γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματικὴ, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν· ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὰς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς εἰσέναι οἷόν τε ἀχωρίστους οὔσας, οὔτ᾽ ἐν σώματι εἰσιέναι.* That all souls cannot pre-exist, is manifest from hence, because those principles, whose action is corporeal, cannot possibly exist without the body, as the power of walking without the feet. Wherefore it is impossible, that these sensitive souls (pre-existing) should come into the body from without, since they can neither come alone

[1] Lib. x. cap. ix. p. 185. tom. iii. oper.

[2] De Generat. et Corruptione, lib. ii. cap. iii. p. 618. tom. ii. oper.

by themselves naked and stripped of all body, they being inseparable from it: neither can they come in with a body, that is, the seed.—This is Aristotle's argument, why all sensitive souls must needs be corporeal, because there is no walking without feet, nor seeing without eyes. But at the same time he declares, that the mind or intellect does pre-exist and come in from without, that is, is incorporeal, separable, and immortal, giving his reason for it in like manner:[1] *λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια·* It remains, that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only Divine; since its energy is not blended with that of the body's, but it acts independently upon it.—Notwithstanding which, Aristotle elsewhere[2] distinguishing concerning this mind or intellect, and making it to be two-fold, agent and patient, concludes the former of them only to be immortal, but the latter corruptible; *τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτὸς*, the agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible:—where some interpreters, that would willingly excuse Aristotle, contend, that by the passive intellect is not meant the patient, but the fantasy only, because Aristotle should otherwise contradict himself, who had before affirmed the intellect to be separable, unmixed, and inorganical, which they conceive must needs be understood of the patient. But this salvo can hardly take place here, where the passive intellect is directly opposed to the agent. Now what Aristotle's agent understanding is, and whether it be any thing in us, any faculty of our human soul or no, seems to be a thing very questionable, and has therefore caused much dispute amongst his interpreters; it being resolved by many of them to be the Divine intellect, and commonly by others, a foreign thing. Whence it must needs be left doubtful, whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us. And the rather because, laying down this principle, that nothing is incorporeal, but what acts independently upon the body, he somewhere plainly determines, that there is no intellection without corporeal phantasms. That, which led Aristotle to all this, positively to affirm the corporeity of sensitive souls, and to stagger so much concerning the incorporeity of the rational, seems to have been his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal substance are confounded together, so that the limits of each could not be discerned by him. Wherefore we cannot applaud Aristotle for this; but that which we commend him for, is chiefly these

[1] Ibid. [2] De Anima, lib. iii. cap. vi. p. 50. tom. ii. oper.

four things: first, for making a perfect incorporeal intellect to be the head of all: and secondly, for resolving, that nature, as an instrument of this intellect, does not merely act according to the necessity of material motions, but for ends and purposes, though unknown to itself; thirdly, for maintaining the naturality of morality; and lastly, for asserting the τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, autexousy, or liberty from necessity.

CHAPTER II.

In this chapter are contained all the grounds of reason for the Atheistic hypothesis.—1. That the Democritic philosophy, which is made up of these two principles, Corporealism and Atomism complicated together, is essentially Atheistical.—2. Though Epicurus, who was an Atomical Corporealist, pretended to assert a democracy of gods, yet he was, for all that, an absolute Atheist; and that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves.—3. That the Democritical philosophy is nothing else but a system of Atheology, or Atheism swaggering under the glorious appearance of philosophy. And, though there be another form of Atheism, which we call Stratonical, yet the Democritic Atheism is only considerable; all whose dark mysteries will be here revealed.—4. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists in order to a confutation, the Divine assistance and direction ought to be implored.—5. That there are two things here to be performed; first, to show what are the Atheists' pretended grounds of reason against the Deity; and, secondly, how they endeavor either to solve or confute the contrary phenomena. The first of those grounds, that no man can have an idea or conception of God, and that he is an incomprehensible nothing.—6. The second Atheistic argument, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor no omnipotence, because nothing can come from nothing; and, therefore, whatsoever substantially is, was from eternity self-existent, and uncreated by any Deity.—7. The third pretended reason against a Deity, that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, because there is no other substance but body.—8. The Atheists' pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal substances sprung from a ridiculous mistaking of abstract names and notions for realities. They impudently make the Deity to be but the chief of spectres, and an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. Their fourth argument against a Deity, that to suppose an incorporeal mind to be the original of all things, is but to make a mere accident and abstract notion to be the first cause of all.—9. Their fifth argument; a confutation of a corporeal Deity from the principles of Corporealism itself, that matter being the only substance, and all other differences of things nothing but accidents, generable and corruptible, no living understanding being can be essentially incorruptible. The Stoical God incorruptible, only by accident.—10. Their sixth ratiocination from a complication of Atomicism; that the first principle of all things whatsoever in the universe is Atoms, or corpuscula devoid of all qualities, and consequently of sense and understanding (which spring up afterwards from a certain composition of them,) and therefore mind or Deity was not the first original of all.—11. In the seventh place they disprove the world's animation, or its being governed by a living, understanding, animalish na-

ture, presiding over the whole ; because sense and understanding are a peculiar appendix to flesh, blood, and brains, and reason is no where to be found but in human form.—12. The eighth Atheistic ground, that God being taken by all for a most happy, eternal, and immortal animal (or living being,) there can be no such thing, because all living beings are concretions of atoms, that were at first generated, and are liable to death and corruption by the dissolution of their compages. And that life is no simple primitive nature, but an accidental modification of compounded bodies, which, upon the disunion of their parts, vanisheth into nothing.—13. The ninth pretended Atheistic demonstration, that by God is meant a first cause or mover, which was not before moved by any thing else without it; but nothing can move itself, and therefore there can be no unmoved mover, nor any first in the order of causes, that is, a God.—14. Their further proof of this principle, that nothing can move itself, with an Atheistic corollary from thence, that no thinking being could be a first cause, no cogitation arising of itself without a cause ; which may be reckoned a tenth argument.—15. Another mystery of Atheism, that all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing without the knower, and a passion from them ; and, therefore, the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause.—16. The twelfth argumentation, that things could not be made by a God, because they are so faulty and ill made, that they were not contrived for the good of man; and that the deluge of evils, that overflows all, shows that they did not proceed from any Deity.—17. The thirteenth instance of the Atheists against a Deity, from the defect of Providence, that, in human affairs, all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion.—18. The fourteenth Atheistic ground, that it is not possible for any one being to animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the whole world at once: but, if it were possible, that such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconsistent with happiness.—19. Several bold but slight queries of Atheists, why the world was not made sooner ? and what God did before ? why it was made at all, since it was so long unmade ? and, how the architect of the world could rear so huge a fabric ?—20. The Atheists' pretence, that it is the great interest of mankind, that there should be no God; and that it was a noble and heroic exploit of the Democritics, to chase away that affrightful spectre out of the world, and to free men from the continual fear of a Deity and punishment after death, embittering all the pleasures of life.—21. Another pretence of theirs, that Theism is inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it introducing a fear greater than the fear of the leviathan ; and that any other conscience allowed of besides the civil law (being private judgment,) is, *ipso facto*, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature.—22. The Atheists' conclusion from the former premises, as set down in Plato and Lucretius, that all things sprung originally from nature and chance, without any mind or God, that is, proceeded from the necessity of material motions, undirected for ends; that infinite atoms, devoid of life and sense, moving in infinite space from eternity, by their fortuitous rencontres and entanglements, produced the system of the whole universe, and as well animate as inanimate things.

I. Having, in the former chapter, given an account of the genuine and primitive Atomical philosophy, which may be called the Moschical; we are, in the next place, to consider the Democritical, that is, the atheized and adulterated Atomology: which had its origin from nothing else but the joining of this heterogeneous and contradictious principle to the Atomical physiology, that there is no other substance in the world besides body. Now we say, that that philosophy, which is thus compounded and made up of these two things, Atomicism and Corporealism complicated together, is essentially Atheistical, though neither of them alone be such. For the Atomical physiology, as we have declared already, is in its own nature sufficiently repugnant to Atheism. And it is possible for one, who holds, that there is nothing in the world besides body, to be persuaded, notwithstanding, of a corporeal Deity, and that the world was at first framed and is still governed by an understanding nature lodged in the matter. For thus some of these Corporealists have fancied the whole universe itself to be a God, that is, an understanding and wise animal, that ordered all things within itself, after the best manner possible, and providentially governed the same. Indeed, it cannot be denied, but that this is a very great infirmity of mind, that such persons lie under, who are not able to conceive any other substance besides body, by which is understood that which is impenetrably extended, or else, in Plato's language, which hath *προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν*, that thrusts against other bodies, and resists their impulse; —or, as others express it, which is *τόπου πληρωτικὸν*, that so fills up place—as to exclude any other body or substance from co-existing with it therein; and such must needs have, not only very imperfect, but also spurious and false conceptions of the Deity, so long as they apprehend it to be thus corporeal; but yet it does not, therefore, follow, that they must needs be accounted Atheists. But, whosoever holds these two principles (before mentioned) together, that there is no other substance besides body, and that body hath nothing else belonging to it but magnitude, figure, sight, and motion, without qualities: I say, whosoever is that confounded thing of an Atomist and Corporealist jumbled together, he is essentially and unavoidably that which is meant by an Atheist, though he should in words never so much disclaim it, because he must needs fetch the original of all things from senseless matter; whereas, to assert a God, is to maintain, that all things sprung originally from a knowing and understanding nature.

II. Epicurus, who was one of those mongrel things before mentioned (an Atomical Corporealist, or Corporeal Atomist,) did, notwithstanding, profess to hold a multifarious rabble and democracy of gods,

such as though they were ἀνθρωπόμορφοι,[1] of human form,—yet they were so thin and subtile, as that, comparatively with our terrestrial bodies, they might be called incorporeal ; they having not so much *carnem* as *quasi-carnem*, nor *sanguinem* as *quasi-sanguinem*, a certain kind of aerial or etherial flesh and blood ; which gods of his were not to be supposed to exist any where within the world, upon this pretence, that there was no place in it fit to receive them :

> [2] Illud item non est, ut possis credere sedes
> Esse Deûm sanctas, in mundi partibus ullis.

And, therefore, they must be imagined to subsist in certain intermundane spaces, and Utopian regions without the world, the deliciousness whereof is thus elegantly described by the poet :

> [3] Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
> Adspergunt, neque nix acri concreta pruina
> Cana cadens violat, semperque innubilus æther
> Integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet.

Whereunto was added, that the chief happiness of these gods consisted "in omnium vacatione munerum," in freedom from all business and employment,—and doing nothing at all, that so they might live a soft and delicate life. And, lastly, it was pretended, that though they had neither any thing to do with us, nor we with them, yet they ought to be worshipped by us for their own excellent natures' sake and happy state.

But whosoever had the least sagacity in him could not but perceive, that this theology of Epicurus was but romantical, it being directly contrary to his avowed and professed principles, to admit of any other being, than what was concreted of atoms, and consequently corruptible ; and that he did this upon a politic account, thereby to decline the common odium, and those dangers and inconveniences which otherwise he might have incurred by a downright denial of a God, to which purpose it accordingly served his turn. Thus Posidonius,[4] rightly pronounced, "Nullos esse deos Epicuro videri ; quæque is de diis immortalibus dixerit, invidiæ detestandæ gratia dixisse." Though he was partly jocular in it also, it making no small sport to him, in this manner, to delude

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[1] Vide Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 2907. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Lucret. lib. v. ver. 147. [3] Id. lib. iii. ver. 19.

[4] Apud Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xliv. p. 2949. tom. ix. oper.

and mock the credulous vulgar ;[1] "Deos jocandi causa induxit Epicurus perlucidos et perflabiles, et habitantes tanquam inter duos lucos, sic inter duos mundos propter metum ruinarum." However, if Epicurus had been never so much in earnest in all this, yet, by Gassendus's leave, we should pronounce him to have been not a jot the less an Atheist, so long as he maintained, that the whole world was made *μηδενὸς διατάττοντος ἢ διατάξοντος τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας*, without the ordering and direction of any understanding being, that was perfectly happy and immortal ;—and fetched the original of all things in the universe, even of soul and mind, *ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀπρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν κίνησιν*, from senseless atoms fortuitously moved. — He, together with Democritus, hereby making the world to be, in the worst sense, *ᾠὸν τῆς νυκτὸς*, an egg of the night, —that is, not the offspring of mind and understanding, but of dark, senseless matter, of Tohu and Bohu, or confused chaos ; and deriving the original of all the perfections in the universe from the most imperfect being, and the lowest of all entities, than which nothing can be more atheistical. And as for those romantic monogramous gods of Epicurus, had they been seriously believed by him, they could have been nothing else but a certain kind of aerial and spectrous men, living by themselves, nobody knows where, without the world ; [2]*Ἐπίκουρος ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει Θεὸν ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸν φύσιν πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς·* Epicurus, according to vulgar opinion, leaves a God ; but, according to the nature of things, none at all.—

And as Epicurus, so other Atheists, in like manner, have commonly had their vizards and disguises ; Atheism, for the most part, prudently choosing to walk abroad in masquerade. And, though some over-credulous persons have been so far imposed upon hereby, as to conclude, that there was hardly any such thing as an Atheist any where in the world, yet they that are sagacious may easily look through these thin veils and disguises, and perceive these Atheists oftentimes insinuating their Atheism even then, when they most of all profess themselves Theists, by affirming, that it is impossible to have any idea or conception at all of God : and that, as he is not finite, so he cannot be infinite, and that no knowledge or understanding is to be attributed to him ; which is, in effect, to say, that there is no such thing. But whosoever entertains the Democritic principles, that is, both rejects forms and qualities of body, and makes all things to be body, though he pretend never so

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[1] Cicero de Divin. l. ii. c. xvii. p. 3202. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Vide Sext. Empir. adv. Mathemat. lib. ix. p. 565. edit. Fabricii.

much to hold a corporeal Deity, yet he is not at all to be believed in it, it being a thing plainly contradictious to those principles.

III. Wherefore, this mongrel philosophy, which Leucippus, Democritus, and Protagoras were the founders of, and which was entertained afterwards by Epicurus, that makes (as Laertius writes)[1] ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, senseless atoms to be the first principles—not only of all bodies (for that was a thing admitted before by Empedocles and other Atomists that were Theists,) but also of all things whatsoever in the whole universe, and therefore of soul and mind too; this, I say, was really nothing else but a philosophical form of Atheology, a gigantic and Titanical attempt to dethrone the Deity, not only by solving all the phenomena of the world without a God, but also by laying down such principles, from whence it must needs follow, that there could be neither an incorporeal nor corporeal Deity. It was Atheism openly swaggering under the glorious appearance of wisdom and philosophy.

There is, indeed, another form of Atheism, which (insisting on the vulgar way of philosophizing by forms and qualities) we, for distinction sake, shall call Stratonical; such as, being too modest and shamefaced to fetch all things from the fortuitous motion of atoms, would, therefore, allow to the several parts of matter a certain kind of natural (though not animal) perception, such as is devoid of reflexive consciousness, together with a plastic power, whereby they may be able artificially and methodically to form and frame themselves to the best advantage of their respective capabilities; something like to Aristotle's nature, but that it hath no dependence at all upon any higher mind or Deity. And these Atheists may be also called Hylozoic (as the other Atomic,) because they derive all things in the whole universe, not only sensitive, but also rational souls, together with the artificial frame of animals, from the life of matter. But this kind of Atheism seems to be but an unshapen embryo of some dark and cloudy brains, that was never yet digested into an entire system, nor could be brought into any such tolerable form, as to have the confidence to show itself abroad in full and open view. But the Democritic and Atomic Atheism, as it is the boldest and rankest of all Atheisms, it not only undertaking to solve all phenomena by matter fortuitously moved, without a God, but also to demonstrate, that there cannot be so much as a corporeal Deity; so it is that alone, which, pretending to an entire and coherent system, hath publicly appeared upon the stage, and therefore doth, in a manner, only deserve our consideration.

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[1] Lib. x. segm. 41. p. 620. et alias.

And now we shall exhibit a full view and prospect of it, and discover all its dark mysteries and profundities; we being much of this persuasion, that a plain and naked representation of them will be a confutation at least; not doubting but it will be made to appear, that though this monster, big swoln with a puffy show of wisdom, strut and stalk so gigantically, and march with such a kind of stately philosophic grandeur, yet it is, indeed, but like the giant Orgoglio, in our English poet, a mere empty bladder, blown up with vain conceit, an Empusa, phantasm, or spectre, the offspring of night and darkness, nonsense and contradiction.

And yet, for all that, we shall not wrong it the least in our representation, but give it all possible advantages of strength and plausibility, that so the Atheists may have no cause to pretend (as they are wont to do, in such cases) that either we did not understand their mysteries, nor apprehend the full strength of their cause, or else did purposely smother and conceal it. Which, indeed, we have been so far from, that we must confess we were not altogether unwilling this business of theirs should look a little like something, that might deserve a confutation. And whether the Atheists ought not rather to give us thanks for mending and improving their arguments, than complain that we have any way impaired them, we shall leave it to the censure of impartial judgments.

IV. Plato[1] tells us, that even amongst those Pagans in his time there was generally such a religious humor, that *πάντες ὅσοι κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσι, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ καὶ σμίκρου καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος, Θεὸν ἀεὶ ποῦ ἐπικαλοῦσι·* Whosoever had but the least of seriousness and sobriety in them, whensoever they took in hand any enterprise, whether great or small, they would always invoke the Deity for assistance and direction.—Adding moreover, that himself should be very faulty, if in his Timæus, when he was to treat about so grand a point, concerning the whole world, *εἰ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενής ἐστι,* whether it were made or unmade,—he should not make his entrance thereinto by a religious invocation of the Deity. Wherefore certainly it could not be less than a piece of impiety in a Christian, being to treat concerning the Deity itself, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists out of their dark corners, in order to a confutation, and the better confirmation of our faith in the truth of his existence, not to implore his direction and assistance. And I know no reason, but that we may well do it in that same litany of Plato's, *κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνω μὲν μά-*

[1] In Timæo, p. 235.

λιστα, ἑπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, that we may first speak agreeably to his own mind, or becomingly of his nature, and then consentaneously with ourselves.

V. Now there are these two things here to be performed by us, first to discover and produce the chief heads of arguments, or grounds of reason, insisted on by the Atheists, to disprove a Deity, evincing withal briefly the ineffectualness and falseness of them: and secondly, to show how they endeavor either to confute or solve, consistently with their own principles, all those phenomena, which are commonly urged against them to prove a Deity and incorporeal substance; manifesting likewise the invalidity thereof.

The grounds of reason alleged for the Atheistical hypothesis are chiefly these that follow. First, That we have no idea of God, and therefore can have no evidence of him; which argument is further flourished and descanted upon in this manner. That notion or conception of a Deity, that is commonly entertained, is nothing but a bundle of incomprehensibles, unconceivables, and impossibles; it being only a compilement of all imaginable attributes of honor, courtship, and compliment which the confounded fear and astonishment of mens' minds made them huddle up together, without any sense or philosophic truth. This seems to be intimated by a modern writer[1] in these words: "The attributes of God signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are not sufficient premises to infer truth, or convince falsehood." And the same thing again is further set out, with no small pretence to wit, after this manner: "They that venture to dispute philosophically, or reason of God's nature from these attributes of honor, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when one, ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak lets fall his hat, and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity." The meaning of which, and other like passages of the same writer, seems to be this; that the attributes of God (by which his nature is supposed to be expressed) having no philosophic or reality in them, had their only original from a certain rustic astonishment of mind, proceeding from excess of fear, raising up the phantasm of a Deity, as a bugbear for an object to itself and affrighting men into all manner of

[1] Hobbes.

confounded nonsense, and absurdity of expressions concerning it, such as have no signification, nor any conception of the mind answering to them. This is the first argument, used especially by our modern Democritics, against a Deity, that because they can have no fantastic idea of it, nor fully comprehend all that is concluded in the notion thereof, that therefore it is but an incomprehensible nothing.

VI. Secondly, another argument much insisted on by the old Democritic Atheists, is directed against the Divine omnipotence and creative power, after this manner. By God is always understood a creator of something or other out of nothing. For however the Theists be here divided amongst themselves, some of them believing, that there was once nothing at all existing in this whole space, which is now occupied by the world, besides the Deity, and that he was then a solitary being, so that the substance of the whole corporeal universe had a temporary beginning, and novity of existence, and the duration of it hath now continued but for so many years only: others persuading themselves, that though the matter and substance at least (if not the form also) of the corporeal world, did exist from eternity, yet nevertheless, they both alike proceeded from the Deity by way of emanation, and do continually depend upon it, in the same manner as light, though coeval with the sun, yet proceeded from the sun, and depends upon it, being always, as it were, made anew by it; wherefore, according to this hypothesis, though things had no antecedent non-entity in time, yet they were as little of themselves, and owed all their being as much to the Deity, as if they had been once actually nothing, they being, as it were, perpetually created out of nothing by it. Lastly, others of those Theists resolving, that the matter of the corporeal universe was not only from eternity, but also self-existent and uncreated or independent upon any Deity as to its being; but yet the forms and qualities of all inanimate bodies, together with the souls of all animals in the successive generations of them (being taken for entities distinct from the matter,) were created by the Deity out of nothing. We say, though there be such difference among the Theists themselves, yet they all agree in this, that God is, in some sense or other, the creator of some real entity out of nothing, or the cause of that which otherwise would not have have been of itself, so that no creation out of nothing (in that enlarged sense) no Deity. Now it is utterly impossible, that any substance or real entity should be created out of nothing, it being contradictious to that indubitable axiom of reason, *de nihilo nihil*, from nothing nothing. The argument is thus urged by Lucretius, according to the minds of Epicurus and Democritus:

[1] Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet,
Nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam.
Quippe ita formido mortales continet omnes,
Quod multa in terris fieri cœloque tuentur,
Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possunt, ac fieri divino numine rentur:
Quas ob res, ubi viderimus nil posse creari
De nihilo, tum quod sequimur, jam tutius inde
Perspicemus, et unde queat res quæque creari,
Et quo quæque modo fiant opera sine divum.

It is true, indeed, that it seems to be chiefly levelled by the poet against that third and last sort of Theists before-mentioned, such as Heraclitus and the Stoics (which latter were contemporary with Epicurus), who held the matter of the whole world to have been from eternity of itself uncreated, but yet the forms of mundane things in the successive generations of them (as entities distinct from the matter) to be created or made by the Deity out of nothing. But the force of the argument must needs lie stronger against those other Theists, who would have the very substance and matter itself of the world, as well as the forms, to have been created by the Deity out of nothing. Since nothing can come out of nothing, it follows, that not so much as the forms and qualities of bodies (conceived as entities really distinct from the matter), much less the lives and souls of animals, could ever have been created by any Deity, and therefore certainly not the substance and matter itself. But all substance and real entity, whatsoever is in the world, must needs have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Nothing can be made or produced but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter. And this is done by motions, mixtures, and separations, concretions and secretions of atoms, without the creation of any real distinct entity out of nothing; so that there needs no Deity for the effecting of it, according to that of Epicurus, ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῆ προσαγέσθω, no Divine power ought to be called in for the solving of those phenomena.—To conclude, therefore, if no substance, nor real entity can be made, which was not before, but all whatsoever is, will be, and can be, was from eternity self-existent; then creative power, but especially that attribute of omnipotence, can belong to nothing; and this is all one as to say, there can be no Deity.

VII. Thirdly, the Atheists argue against the stricter and higher

[1] Lib. i. vers. 150, etc.

sort of Theists, who will have God to be the creator of the whole corporeal universe and all its parts out of nothing, after this manner: that which created the whole mass of matter and body, cannot be itself body; wherefore this notion of God plainly implies him to be incorporeal. But there can be no incorporeal Deity, because by that word must needs be understood, either that which hath no magnitude nor extension at all, or else that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body. If the word be taken in the former sense, then nothing at all can be so incorporeal, as to be altogether unextended and devoid of geometrical quantity, because extension is the very essence of all existent entity, and that which is altogether unextended is perfectly nothing. There can neither be any substance, nor mode or accident of any substance, no nature whatsoever unextended. But if the word incorporeal be taken in the latter sense, for that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body, namely so as to penetrate bodies and coexist with them, this is also a thing next to nothing; since it can neither act upon any other thing, nor be acted upon by, or sensible of, any thing; it can neither do nor suffer any thing.

[1] Nam facere et fungi nisi corpus nulla potest res.

Wherefore, to speak plainly, this can be nothing else but empty space or vacuum, which runs through all things, without laying hold on any thing, or being affected from any thing. This is the only incorporeal thing, that is or can be in nature, space, or place; and therefore to suppose an incorporeal Deity is to make empty space to be the creator of all things.

This argument is thus proposed by the Epicurean poet:

[2] ———Quodcunque erit esse aliquid, debebit id ipsum
Augmine vel grandi vel parvo————
Cui si tactus erit, quam vis levis exiguusque,
Corporum augebit numerum summamque sequetur:
Sin intactile erit, nulla de parte quod ullam
Rem prohibere queat per se transire meantem,
Scilicet hoc id erit vacuum quod inane vocamus.

Whatsoever is, is extended or hath geometrical quantity or mensurability in it; which, if it be tangible, then it is body, and fills up a place in the world, being part of the whole mass; but if it be intangible, so

[1] Lucret. lib. i. vers. 444, etc. [2] Id. lib. i. vers. 434, etc.

that it cannot resist the passage of any thing through it, then it is nothing else but empty space or vacuum.—There is no third thing besides these two, and therefore whatsoever is not body, is space or nothing:

[1] ———Præter inane et corpora tertia per se,
Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.

Thus the ancient Epicureans and Democritics argued; there being nothing incorporeal but space, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But because this seems to give advantage to the Theists, in making space something, or that which hath a real nature or entity without our conception, from whence it will follow, that it must needs be either itself a substance, or else a mode of some incorporeal substance; the modern Democritics are here more cautious, and make space to be no nature really existing without us, but only the phantasm of a body, and, as it were, the ghost of it, which has no reality without our imagination. So that there are not two natures of body and space, which must needs infer two distinct substances, one whereof must be incorporeal, but only one nature of body. The consequence of which will be this, that an incorporeal substance is all one with an incorporeal body, and therefore nothing.

VIII. But because it is generally conceived, that an error cannot be sufficiently confuted, without discovering τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους, the cause of the mistake;—therefore, the Atheists will, in the next place, undertake to show likewise the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances, and from what misapprehension it sprung; as also take occasion from thence, further to disprove a Deity.

Wherefore they say, that the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances proceeded chiefly from the abuse of abstract names, both of substances (whereby the essences of singular bodies, as of a man or horse, being abstracted from those bodies themselves, are considered universally) as also of accidents, when they are considered alone without their subjects or substances. The latter of which is a thing, that men have been necessitated to in order to the computation or reckoning of the properties of bodies, the comparing of them with one another, the adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing of them; which could not be done, so long as they are taken concretely together with their subjects. But yet, as there is some use of those abstract names, so the abuse of them has been also very great; forasmuch as, though they be really the names of nothing, since the essence of this and that man is

[1] Id. lib. i. vers. 446.

not any thing without the man, nor is an accident any thing without its substance, yet men have been led into a gross mistake by them, to imagine them to be realities existing by themselves. Which infatuation hath chiefly proceeded from scholastics, who have been so intemperate in the use of these words, that they could not make a rational discourse of any thing, though never so small, but they must stuff it with their quidities, entities, essences, hæcceities, and the like. Wherefore, these are they, who, being first deluded themselves, have also deluded the world, introducing an opinion into the minds of men, that the essence of every thing is something without that thing itself, and also eternal; and, therefore, when any thing is made or generated, that there is no new being produced, but only an antecedent and eternal essence clothed (as it were) with a new garment of existence; as, also, that the mere accidents of bodies may exist alone by themselves without their substances. As, for example, that the life, sense, and understanding of animals, commonly called by the names of soul and mind, may exist without the bodies or substances of them by themselves, after the animals are dead; which plainly makes them to be incorporeal substances, as it were, the separate and abstract essences of men. This hath been observed by a modern writer in these words:—"Est hominum abstractorum tum in omni vita, tum in philosophia, magnus et usus et abusus. Abusus in eo consistit, quod cum videant aliqui, considerari posse, id est, inferri in rationes, accidentium incrementa et decrementa, sine consideratione corporum, sive subjectorum suorum (id quod appellatur abstrahere), loquuntur de accidentibus, tanquam possint ab omni corpore separari: hinc enim originem trahunt quorundam metaphysicorum crassi errores. Nam ex eo, quod considerari potest cogitatio, sine consideratione corporis, inferre solent non esse opus corporis cogitantis." It is a great abuse that some metaphysicians make of these abstract names, because cogitation can be considered alone without the consideration of body, therefore, to conclude, that it is not the action or accident of that body that thinks, but a substance by itself.—And the same writer elsewhere observes, that it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul (that is, his life) can walk, separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. —By which means the vulgar are confirmed in their superstitious belief of ghosts, spirits, demons, devils, fairies, and hobgoblins, invisible powers and agents, called by several names, and that by those persons whose work it ought to be, rather to free men from such superstition. Which belief at first had another original, not altogether unlike the former; namely, from men's mistaking their own fancies for things re-

ally existing without them. For, as in the sense of vision, men are commonly deceived, in supposing the image behind the glass to be a real thing existing without themselves, whereas, it is, indeed, nothing but their own fancy : in like manner, when the minds of men, strongly possessed with fear, especially in the dark, raise up the phantasms of spectres, bugbears, or affrightful apparitions to them, they think them to be objects really existing without them, and call them ghosts and spirits, whilst they are indeed nothing but their own fancies; so the phantasm, or fancy of a Deity (which is, indeed, the chief of all spectres), created by fear, has upon no other account been taken for a reality. To this purpose, a modern writer, "From the fear that proceeds from the ignorance, itself, of what it is that hath the power to do men good or harm, men are inclined to suppose and feign to themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them, as also in the time of unexpected good success to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancies their gods." Which, though it be prudently spoken in the plural number, that so it might be diverted and put off to the heathen gods; yet he is very simple, that does not perceive the reason of it to be the same concerning that one Deity which is now commonly worshipped; and that, therefore, this also is but the creature of men's fear and fancy, the chief of all fantastic ghosts and spectres, as it were an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. This (we say) was the first original of that vulgar belief of invisible powers, ghosts, and gods; men's taking their own fancies for things really existing without them. And as for the matter and substance of these ghosts, they could not, by their own natural cogitation, fall into any other conceit, but that it was the same with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth, or in a looking-glass to one that is awake, thin aerial bodies, which may appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion, that such spirits were incorporeal and immaterial, could never enter into the minds of men by nature, unabused by doctrine; but it sprung up from those deceiving and deceived literati, scholastics, philosophers, and theologers, enchanting men's understandings, and making them believe, that the abstract notions of accidents and essences could exist alone by themselves, without the bodies, as certain separate and incorporeal substances.

To conclude, therefore, to make an incorporeal mind to be the cause of all things, is to make our own fancy, an imaginary ghost of the world, to be a reality; and, to suppose the mere abstract notion of an accident, and a separate essence, to be not only an absolute thing

by itself, and a real substance incorporeal, but also the first original of all substances, and of whatsoever is in the universe. And this may be reckoned for a fourth Atheistic ground.

IX. Fifthly, the Atheists pretend further to prove, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; as also, from the principles of Corporealism itself to evince, that there can be no corporeal Deity after this manner. No man can devise any notion of substance, than that it is a thing extended, existing without the mind, not imaginary, but real and solid magnitude; for, whatsoever is not extended, is nowhere and nothing. So that *res extensa* is the only substance, the solid basis and *substratum* of all. Now this is the very self-same thing with body; for ἀντιτυπία, or resistance, seems to be a necessary consequence and result from extension, and they that think otherwise can show no reason why bodies may not also penetrate one another, as some Corporealists think they do; from whence it is inferred, that body or matter is the only substance of all things. And whatsoever else is in the world, that is, all the differences of bodies, are nothing by several accidents and modifications of this extended substance, body, or matter. Which accidents, though they may be sometimes called by the names of real qualities and forms, and though there be different apprehensions concerning them amongst philosophers, yet generally they agree in this, that there are these two properties belonging to them; first, that none of them can subsist alone by themselves, without extended substance or matter, as the basis and support of them; and, secondly, that they may be all destroyed without the destruction of any substance. Now, as blackness and whiteness, heat and cold, so likewise life, sense, and understanding, are such accidents, modifications, or qualities of body, that can neither exist by themselves, and may be destroyed without the destruction of any substance or matter. For if the parts of the body of any living animal be disunited and separated from one another, or the organical disposition of the matter altered, those accidents, forms, or qualities of life and understanding, will presently vanish away to nothing, all the substance of the matter still remaining one where or other in the universe entire, and nothing of it lost. Wherefore, the substance of matter and body, as distinguished from the accidents, is the only thing in the world that is incorruptible and undestroyable. And of this it is to be understood, that nothing can be made out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, i. e. that every entire thing, that is made or generated, must be made of some pre-existent matter; which matter was from eternity self-existent and unmade, and is also undestroyable, and can never be reduced to nothing.

It is not to be understood of the accidents themselves, that are all makeable and destroyable, generable and corruptible. Whatsoever is in the world, is but ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα, matter so and so modified or qualified, all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature destroyable, and the matter itself (as the basis of them, not necessarily determined to this or that accident) is the only ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, the only necessarily existent. The conclusion, therefore, is, that no animal, no living understanding body, can be absolutely and essentially incorruptible, this being an incommunicable property of the matter; and, therefore, there can be no corporeal Deity, the original of all things, essentially undestroyable.

Though the Stoics imagined the whole corporeal universe to be an animal or Deity, yet this corporeal god of theirs was only by accident incorruptible and immortal; because they supposed that there was no other matter, which, existing without this world, and making inroads upon it, could disunite the parts of it, or disorder its compages. Which, if there were, the life and understanding of this Stoical God, or great mundane animal, as well as that of other animals in like cases, must needs vanish into nothing. Thus from the principles of Corporealism itself, it plainly follows, that there can be no corporeal Deity, because the Deity is supposed to be ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, a thing that was never made, and is essentially undestroyable, which are the privileges and properties of nothing but senseless matter.

X. In the next place, the Atheists undertake more effectually to confute that corporeal God of the Stoics and others, from the principles of the Atomical philosophy, in this manner. All corporeal Theists, who assert, that an understanding nature or mind, residing in the matter of the whole universe, was the first original of the mundane system, and did intellectually frame it, betray no small ignorance of philosophy and the nature of body, in supposing real qualities, besides magnitude, figure, site and motion, as simple and primitive things, to belong to it; and that there was such a quality or faculty of understanding in the matter of the whole universe, co-eternal with the same, that was an original thing uncompounded and underived from any thing else. Now, to suppose such original qualities and powers, which are really distinct from the substance of extended matter and its modifications, of divisibility, figure, site, and motion, is really to suppose so many distinct substances, which, therefore, must needs be incorporeal. So that these philosophers fall unawares into that very thing, which they are so abhorrent from. For this very quality or faculty of understanding, in the matter of the universe, original and underived from

any other thing, can be indeed nothing else but an incorporeal substance. Epicurus suggested a caution against this vulgar mistake concerning qualities, to this purpose:—"Non sic cogitandæ sunt qualitates, quasi sint quædam per se existentes naturæ seu substantiæ, siquidem id mente assequi non licet; sed solummodo ut varii modi sese habendi corporis considerandæ sunt."

Body, as such, hath nothing else belonging to the nature of it, but what is included in the idea of extended substance, divisibility, figure, site, motion, or rest, and the results from the various compositions of them, causing different fancies. Wherefore, as vulgar philosophers make their first matter (which they cannot well tell what they mean by it), because it receives all qualities, to be itself devoid of all quality; so we conclude, that atoms (which are really the first principles of all things) have none of those qualities in them, which belong to compounded bodies; they are not absolutely of themselves black or white, hot or cold, moist or dry, bitter or sweet, all these things arising up afterwards from the various aggregations and contextures of them, together with different motions. Which Lucretius confirms by this reason, agreeable to the tenor of the Atomical philosophy, that if there were any such real qualities in the first principles, then, in the various corruptions of nature, things would at last be reduced to nothing:

[1] Immutabile enim quiddam superare necesse est,
Ne res ad nihilum redigantur funditus omnes;
Proinde colore cave contingas semina rerum,
Ne tibi res redeant ad nilum funditus omnes.

Wherefore, he concludes, that it must not be thought, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black principles:

[2] ———Ne ex albis alba rearis
Principiis esse,————
Aut ea quæ nigrant, nigro de semina nata:
Neve alium quemvis, quæ sunt induta, colorem,
Propterea genere hunc credas, quod materiaï
Corpora consimili sint ejus tincta colore:
Nullus enim color est omnino materiaï
Corporibus, neque par rebus, neque denique dispar.

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[1] Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 750, 751, 754, 755.

[2] Id. lib. ii. ver. 730, etc.

Adding, that the same is to be resolved likewise concerning all other sensible qualities as well as colors:

> [1] Sed ne forte putes solo spoiliata colore
> Corpora prima manere; etiam secreta teporis
> Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, calidique vaporis:
> Et sonitu sterila, et succo jejuna feruntur,
> Nec jaciunt ullum proprio de corpore odorem.

Lastly, he tells us, in like manner, that the same is to be understood also concerning life, sense, and understanding; that there are no such simple qualities or natures in the first principles, out of which animals are compounded, but that these are in themselves altogether devoid of life, and sense, understanding:

> [2] Nunc ea, quæ sentire videmus cunque, necesse 'st
> Ex insensilibus tamen omnia confiteare
> Principiis constare: neque id manifesta refutant,
> Sed magis ipsa manu ducunt, et credere cogunt,
> Ex insensilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.
> Quippe videre licet, vivos existere vermes
> Stercore de tetro, putrorem cum sibi nacta 'st
> Intempestivis ex imbribus humida tellus.

All sensitive and rational animals are made of irrational and senseless principles, which is proved by experience, in that we see worms are made out of putrefied dung, moistened with immoderate showers.—

Some, indeed, who are no greater friends to a Deity than ourselves, will needs have that sense and understanding, that is in animals and men, to be derived from an antecedent life and understanding in the matter. But this cannot be, because if matter as such had life and understanding in it, then every atom of matter must needs be a distinct percipient animal and intelligent person by itself; and it would be impossible for any such men and animals as now are to be compounded out of them, because every man would be *variorum animalculorum acervus*, a heap of innumerable animals and percipients.

Wherefore, as all the other qualities of bodies, so likewise life, sense, and understanding, arise from the different contextures of atoms devoid of all those qualities, or from the composition of those simple elements of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, in the same manner

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[1] Id. lib. ii. ver. 841, etc. [2] Id. lib. ii. ver. 684, etc.

as from a few letters variously compounded all that infinite variety of syllables and words is made:

> [1] Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis
> Cum quibus et quali positura contineantur;
> Namque eadem cœlum, mare, terras, flumina, solem
> Significant, eadem, fruges, arbusta, animantes;
> Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiaï
> Intervalla, viæ, connexus, pondera, plagæ,
> Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,
> Cum permantur, mutari res quoque debent.

From the fortuitous concretions of senseless unknowing atoms did rise up afterwards, in certain parts of the world called animals, soul and mind, sense and understanding, counsel and wisdom. But to think, that there was any animalish nature before all these animals, or that there was an antecedent mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom, by which all animals themselves, together with the whole world, were made and contrived, is either to run round in a senseless circle, making animals and animality to be before one another infinitely; or else to suppose an impossible beginning of an original understanding quality in the matter. Atoms in their first coalitions together, when the world was making, were not then directed by any previous counsel or preventive understanding, which were things as yet unborn and unmade,

> [2] Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
> Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt,
> Nec quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.

Mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom, did not lay the foundations of the universe; they are no archical things, that is, they have not the nature of a principle in them; they are not simple, original, primitive, and primordial, but as all other qualities of bodies, secondary, compounded, and derivative, and therefore they could not be architectonical of the world. Mind and understanding is no God, but the creature of matter and motion.

The sense of this whole argument is briefly this. The first principle of all things in the whole universe is matter, or atoms devoid of all qualities, and consequently of all life, sense, and understanding;

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[1] Id. lib. ii. ver. 1012. [2] Id. lib. i. ver. 1020.

and therefore the original of things is no understanding nature or Deity.

XI. Seventhly, the Democritic Atheists argue further after this manner : they who assert a Deity, suppose ἔμψυχον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, the whole world to be animated,—that is, to have a living, rational, and understanding nature presiding over it. Now it is already evident from some of the premised arguments, that the world cannot be animated, in the sense of Platonists, that is, with an incorporeal soul, which is in order of nature before body, it being proved already, that there can be no substance incorporeal ; as likewise that it cannot be animated neither in the Stoical sense, so as to have an original quality of understanding or mind in the matter ; but yet nevertheless some may possibly imagine, that as in ourselves and other animals, though compounded of senseless atoms, there is a soul and mind, resulting from the contexture of them, which being once made, domineers over the body, governing and ordering it at pleasure ; so there may be likewise such a living soul and mind, not only in the stars, which many have supposed to be lesser deities, and in the sun, which has been reputed a principal deity ; but also in the whole mundane system, made up of earth, seas, air, ether, sun, moon, and stars altogether ; one general soul and mind, which, though resulting at first from the fortuitous motion of matter, yet being once produced, may rule, govern, and sway the whole, understandingly, and in a more perfect manner than our souls do our bodies ; and so long as it continues, exercise a principality and dominion over it. Which, although it will not amount to the full notion of a God, according to the strict sense of Theists, yet it will approach very near unto it, and endanger the bringing in of all the same inconveniences along with it. Wherefore they will now prove, that there is no such soul or mind as this (resulting from the contexture of atoms,) that presides over the corporeal universe, that so there may not be so much as the shadow of a Deity left.

It was observed before, that life, sense, reason, and understanding, are but qualities of concreted bodies, like those other qualities of heat and cold, etc. arising from certain particular textures of atoms. Now as those first principles of bodies, namely, single atoms, have none of those qualities in them, so neither hath the whole universe any (that it can be denominated from) but only the parts of it. The whole world is neither black nor white, hot nor cold, pellucid nor opaque, it containing all those qualities in its several parts. In like manner, the whole has no life, sense, nor understanding in it, but only the parts of it, which are called animals. That is, life and sense are qualities, that

arise only from such a texture of atoms as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, with head, heart, bowels, nerves, muscles, veins, arteries, and the like :

[1] ———Sensus jungitur omnis
Visceribus, nervis, venis, quæcunque videmus,
Mollia mortali consistere corpore creta ;

And reason and understanding, properly so called, are peculiar appendices to human shape ;[2] "Ratio nusquam esse potest nisi in hominis figura." From whence it is concluded, that there is no life, soul, nor understanding acting the whole world, because the world hath no blood nor brains, nor any animalish or human form.[3] "Qui mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi naturam, in quam figuram cadere posset." Therefore the Epicurean poet concludes upon this ground, that there is no Divine sense in the whole world :

[4] Dispositum videtur ubi esse et crescere possit
Seorsim anima atque animus ; tanto magis inficiandum,
Totum posse extra corpus formamque animalem,
Putribus in glebis terrarum, aut solis in igni,
Aut in aqua durare, aut altis ætheris oris.
Haud igitur constant divino prædita sensu,
Quandoquidem nequeunt vitaliter esse animata.

Now if there be no life nor understanding above us, nor round about us, not any where else in the world, but only in ourselves and fellow-animals, and we be the highest of all beings ; if neither the whole corporeal system be animated, nor those greater parts of it, sun, moon, nor stars, then there can be no danger of any Deity.

XII. Eighthly, the Democritic Atheists dispute further against a Deity in this manner : the Deity is generally supposed to be *ζῶν μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον*, a perfectly happy animal, incorruptible and immortal. Now there is no living being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore none perfectly happy neither. For, according to that Democritic hypothesis of atoms in vacuity, the only incorruptible things will be these

[1] Id. lib. ii. ver. 903, etc.

[2] Velleius apud Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 2907.

[3] Id. Ibid. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2893. tom. ix. oper.

[4] Lucret. lib. v. ver. 143, etc.

three: first of all vacuum or empty space, which must needs be such, because it cannot suffer from any thing, since it is *plagarum expers*,

[1] Et manet intactum, nec ab ictu fungitur hilum.

Secondly, the single atoms, because by reason of their parvitude and solidity they are indivisible: and lastly, the *summa summarum* of all things, that is, the comprehension of all atoms dispersed every where throughout infinite space.

[2] ———Quia nulla loci stat copia certum
Quo quasi res possint discedere dissoluique.

But according to that other hypothesis of some modern Atomists (which also was entertained of old by Empedocles) that supposes a plenity, there is nothing at all incorruptible, but the substance of matter itself. All systems and compages of it, all *συγκρίματα* and *ἀθροίσματα*, all concretions and coagmentations of matter divided by motion, together with the qualities resulting from them, are corruptible and destroyable: [3]*quæ est coagmentatio rerum non dissolubilis?* Death destroys not the substance of any matter; for as no matter came from nothing, but was self-eternal, so none of it can ever vanish into nothing; but it dissolves all the aggregations of it.

[4] Non sic interimit mors res, ut materiaï
Corpora conficiat, sed cœtum dissupat ollis.

Life is no substantial thing, nor any primitive or simple nature; it is only an accident or quality arising from the aggregation and contexture of atoms and corpuscula, which when the compages of them is disunited and dissolved, though all the substance still remain scattered and dispersed, yet the life utterly perishes and vanisheth into nothing. No life is immortal; there is no immortal soul, nor immortal animal or Deity. Though this whole mundane system were itself an animal, yet being but an aggregation of matter, it would be both corruptible and mortal. Wherefore, since no living being can possibly have any security of its future permanency, there is none that can be perfectly happy. And it was rightly determined by our fellow-atheists, the Hedonics and

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[1] Id. lib. v. vers. 358. Addas etiam lib. iii. vers. 814.

[2] Id. lib. iii. vers. 815.

[3] Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2891. tom. ix. oper.

[4] Lucret. lib. ii. vers. 1001.

Cyrenaics,[1] εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρτον, perfect happiness is a mere notion,—a romantic fiction, a thing which can have no existence any where. This is recorded to have been one of Democritus's chief arguments against a Deity, because there can be no living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. [2] "Cum Democritus, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne Deum ita tollit omnino, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat?"

XIII. A ninth pretended demonstration of the Democritic Atheists is as followeth. By God is understood a first cause or mover, which being not before acted upon by any thing else, but acting originally from itself, was the beginning of all things. Now it is an indubitable axiom, and generally received among philosophers, that nothing can move itself, but *quicquid movetur, ab alio movetur*, whatsoever is moved, is moved by something else;—nothing can act otherwise than it is made to act by something without it, acting upon it. The necessary consequence whereof is this, that there can be no such thing as any first mover, or first cause, that is, no God. This argument is thus urged by a modern writer,[3] agreeably to the sense of the ancient Democritics; "Ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum, non inferretur, id quod inferri solet, nempe Eternum Immobile, sed contra Æternum Motum, siquidem ut verum est, nihil moveri a seipso, ita etiam verum est nihil moveri nisi a moto." From hence, that nothing can move itself, it cannot be rightly inferred, as commonly it is, that there is an eternal immoveable mover (that is, a God,) but only an eternal moved mover; or that one thing was moved by another from eternity, without any first mover. Because as it is true, that nothing can be moved from itself; so it is likewise true, that nothing can be moved but from that which was itself also moved by something else before;—and so the progress upwards must needs be infinite, without any beginning or first mover. The plain drift and scope of this ratiocination is no other than this, to show that the argument commonly taken from motion, to prove a God (that is, a first mover or cause,) is not only ineffectual and inconclusive; but also that, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated from that very topic of motion, that there can be no absolutely first mover, no first in the order of causes, that is, no God.

XIV. Tenthly, because the Theists conceive that though no body

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1 Diog. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 94. p. 135.

2 Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. xii. p. 2897.

3 Hobbes's Element. Philosoph. part iv. sive Physic. cap. xxvi. sec. i. p. 204.

can move itself, yet a perfect cogitative and thinking being might be the beginning of all, and the first cause of motion; the Atheists will endeavor to evince the contrary, in this manner. No man can conceive how any cogitation, which was not before, should rise up at any time, but that there was some cause for it, without the thinker. For else there can be no reason given, why this thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, should start up. Wherefore this is universally true of all motion and action whatsoever, as it was rightly urged by the Stoics, that there can be no κίνησις ἀναίτιος, no motion without a cause, i. e. no motion, which has not some cause without the subject of it, or, as the same thing is expressed by a modern writer, "Nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it." Wherefore, no thinking being could be a first cause, any more than an automaton or machine could. To this purpose, it is further argued, than these two notions, the one of a knowing understanding being, the other of a perfectly happy being, are contradictious, because all knowledge essentially implies dependance upon something else, as its cause; "scientia et intellectus signum est potentiæ ab alio dependentis, id quod non est beattissimum." They conclude, that cogitation, and all action whatsoever, is really nothing else but local motion, which is essentially heterokinesy, that which can never rise of itself, but is caused by some other agent without its subject.

XV. In the eleventh place, the Democritic Atheists reason thus: if the world were made by any antecedent mind or understanding, that is, by a Deity; then there must needs be an idea, platform, and exemplar of the whole world before it was made; and consequently actual knowledge, both in order of time and nature, before things. But all knowledge is the information of the things themselves known; all conception of the mind is a passion from the things conceived, and their activity upon it; and is therefore junior to them. Wherefore, the world and things were before knowledge and the conception of any mind, and no knowledge, mind, or Deity before the world as its cause. This argument is thus proposed by the Atheistic poet:

[1] Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa
Notities hominum Di vis unde insita primum,
Quid vellent facere, ut sciren, animoque viderent?
Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum,
Quidnam inter sese permutato ordine possent,
Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?

[1] Lucret. lib. v. ver. 182.

How could the supposed Deity have a pattern or platform in his mind, to frame the world by, and whence should he receive it? How could he have any knowledge of men before they were made, as also what himself should will to do, when there was nothing? How could he understand the force and possibility of the principles, what they would produce when variously combined together, before nature and things themselves, by creating, had given a specimen?—

XVI. A twelfth argumentation of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists against a Deity is to this purpose: that things could not be made by a Deity, that is supposed to be a being every way perfect, because they are so faulty and so ill made: the argument is thus propounded by Lucretius:[1]

> Quod si jam rerum ignorem primordia quæ sint,
> Hoc tamen ex ipsis cœli rationibus ausim
> Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
> Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
> Naturam rerum, tanta stat prædita culpa.

This argument, *a cœli rationibus*, from astronomy, or the constitution of the heavens, is this: [2] that the mundane sphere is so framed, in respect of the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, as renders the greatest part of the earth uninhabitable to men and most other animals; partly by that excess of heat in the torrid zone (containing all between the tropics,) and partly from the extremity of cold in both the frigid zones, towards either pole. Again, whereas the Stoical Theists contemporary with Epicurus concluded, that the whole world was made by a Deity, only for the sake of men,

> [3] ————Horum omnia causa
> Constituisse Deum fingunt———

it is urged on the contrary, that a great part of the habitable earth is taken up by seas, lakes, and rocks, barren heaths and sands, and thereby made useless for mankind; and that the remainder of it yields no fruit to them, unless expunged by obstinate labor; after all which men are often disappointed of the fruits of those labors by unseasonable weather, storms, and tempests. Again, that nature has not only pro-

[1] Lib. ii. ver. 177. et lib. v. ver. 196.

[2] Vid. Lucret. lib. v. ver. 205, 206. et Cicer. in Somnio Scipionis cap. vi. p. 3981. tom. xi. oper.

[3] Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 174, 175.

duced many noxious and poisonous herbs, but also destructive and devouring animals, whose strength surpasseth that of men's; and that the condition of mankind is so much inferior to that of brutes, that nature seems to have been but a step-mother to the former, whilst she hath been an indulgent mother to the latter. And to this purpose, the manner of men's coming into the world is thus aggravated by the poet:

[1] Tum porro puer, ut sævis projectus ab undis
Navita, nudus humi jacet, infans, indigus omni
Vitai auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit:
Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum 'st,
Quoi tantum in vita restet transire malorum.

But on the contrary, the comparative advantages of brutes and their privileges, which they have above men, are described after this manner:

[2] At variæ crescunt pecudes, armenta, feræque:
Nec crepitacula eis opu' sunt nec quoiquam adhibenda 'st
Almæ nutricis blanda atque infracta loquela;
Nec varias quærunt vestes pro tempore cœli.
Denique non armis opus est, non mœnibus altis,
Queis sua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia large
Tellus ipsa parit, naturaque Dædala rerum.

And lastly, the topic of evils in general, is insisted upon by them, not those which are called *culpæ*, evils of fault (for that is a thing which the Democritic Atheists utterly explode in the genuine sense of it,) but the evils of pain and trouble; which they dispute concerning, after this manner. [3] The supposed Deity and maker of the world was either willing to abolish all evils, but not able; or he was able, but not willing; or thirdly, he was neither willing nor able; or else lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. Now that the supposed creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all evils, is plain, because then there would have been no evils at all left. Wherefore, since there is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it must needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was impotent; or else he was able and not willing, and then he was envious; or lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both impotent and envious.

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[1] Id. lib. v. ver. 223. [2] Id. ibid.

[3] Vide Lactat. de Ira Dei. cap. xiii. p. 942. edit. Walchii.

XVII. In the twelfth place, the Atheists further dispute in this manner. If the world were made by any Deity, then it would be governed by a providence; and if there were any providence, it must appear in human affairs. But here it is plain, that all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion; things happening alike to all, to the wise and foolish, religious and impious, virtuous and vicious. (For these names the Atheist cannot choose but make use of, though, by taking away natural morality, they really destroy the things.) From whence it is concluded, that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven by the tumbling billows of careless fortune and chance. The impieties of Dionysius,[1] his scoffing abuses of religion, and whatsoever was then sacred, or worshipped under the notion of a God, were most notorious; and yet it is observed, that he fared never a jot the worse for it. "Hunc nec Olympius Jupiter fulmine percussit, nec Æsculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem interemit; verum in suo lectulo mortuus, in Tympanidis rogum illatus est, eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus nactus erat, quasi justam et legitimam, hæreditatis loco tradidit:" Neither did Jupiter Olympius strike him with a thunderbolt, nor Æsculapius inflict any languishing disease upon him; but he died in his bed, and was honorably interred, and that power, which he had wickedly acquired, he transmitted, as a just and lawful inheritance, to his posterity.—And Diogenes the Cynic, though much a Theist, could not but acknowledge, that Harpalus, a famous robber or pirate in those times, who, committing many villainous actions, notwithstanding lived prosperously, did thereby "Testimonium dicere contra deos," bear testimony against the gods.[2]—Though it has been objected by the Theists, and thought to be a strong argument for providence, that there were so many tables hung up in temples, the monuments of such as, having prayed to the gods in storms and tempests, had escaped shipwreck; yet, as Diagoras observed, "Nusquam picti sunt, qui naufragium fecerunt," there are no tables extant of those of them who were shipwrecked.[3]—Wherefore, it was not considered by these Theists, how many of them that prayed as well to the gods, did notwithstanding suffer shipwreck; as also how many of those, which never made any devotional addresses at all to any Deity, escaped equal dangers of storms and tempests.

Moreover, it is consentaneous to the opinion of a God, to think, that thunder, rattling in the clouds with thunderbolts, should be the imme-

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[1] Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. iii. cap. xxxv. p. 3101.

[2] Id. ib. cap. xxxiv. p. 3099.

[3] Ibid. cap. xxxviii. p. 3104.

diate significations of his wrath and displeasure: whereas it is plain that these are flung at random, and that the fury of them often lights upon the innocent, whilst the notoriously guilty escape untouched; and therefore we understand not, how this can be answered by any Theists.

[1] Cur, quibus, incautum scelus aversabile cumque est,
Non faciunt, icti flammas ut fulguris halent,
Pectore perfixo; documen mortalibus acre?
Et potius nullæ sibi turpis conscius reii,
Volvitur in flammis innoxius, inque peditur,
Turbine coelesti subito correptus, et igni?

Now the force of this argument appears to be very powerful because it hath not only staggered and confounded Theists in all ages, but also hath effectually transformed many of them into Atheists. For Diagoras Melius[2] himself was once a superstitious religionist, insomuch that being a dithyrambic poet, he began one of his poems with these words, *κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχην πάντα τελεῖται,* all things are done by God and fortune.—But, being injured afterwards by a perjured person, that suffered no evil nor disaster thereupon, he therefore took up this contrary persuasion, that there was no Deity. And there have been innumerable others, who have been so far wrought upon by this consideration, as if not absolutely to disclaim and discard a Deity, yet utterly to deny providence, and all care of human affairs by any invisible powers. Amongst whom the poet was one, who thus expressed his sense:

[3] Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
Aspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios, rursus labefacta cadebat
Relligio, causæque viam non sponte sequebar
Alterius, vacuo quæ currere semina motu
Affirmat, magnumque novas per inane figuras,
Fortuna, non arte regi; quæ numina sensu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri.

XVIII. A thirteenth argumentation of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists is to this purpose: that whereas the Deity is supposed to be such a being, as both knows all that is done every where in the most distant places of the world at once, and doth himself immediately order

[1] Lucret. lib. vi. ver. 389, etc.

[2] Vide Sext. Empiric. lib. ix. adver. Mathemat. suc. liii. p. 561.

[3] Claudian. in Rufinum, lib. i. ver. 12, etc.

all things; this is, first, impossible for any one being thus to animadvert and order all things in the whole universe:

> [1] Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
> Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
> Quis pariter coelos omneis convertere? et omneis
> Ignibus ætheriis terras suffire feraceis?
> Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto;
> Nubibus ut tenebras faciat, cœlique serena
> Concutiat sonitu? etc.

And, secondly, if it were supposed to be possible, yet such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconsistent with a happy state; nor could such a Deity ever have any quiet enjoyment of himself, being perpetually filled with tumult and hurlyburly: [2]*οὐ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματείαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ' ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προςδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίνεται·* Distraction of business and solicitous cares, displeasures and favors, do not at all agree with happiness but they proceed from imbecility, indigency, and fear:—[3]*Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται, ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον·* That which is happy and incorruptible, would neither have itself any business to do, nor create any to others; it would neither have displeasure nor favor towards any other persons, to engage it in action; all this proceeding from indigency.—That is, favor and benevolence, as well as anger and displeasure, arise only from imbecility. That which is perfectly happy, and wanteth nothing, *ὅλον ὂν περὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τῆς ἰδίας εὐδαιμωνίας*, being wholly possessed and taken up in the enjoyment of its own happiness—would be regardless of the concernments of any others; and mind nothing besides itself, either to do it good or harm. Wherefore, this *curiosus et plenus negotii deus*,[4] this busy, restless, and pragmatical Deity, that must needs intermeddle and have to do with every thing in the whole world, is a contradictious notion, since it cannot but be the most unhappy of all things.

XIX. In the next place, the Atheists dispute further by propounding several bold queries, which they conceive unanswerable, after this manner. If the world were made by a Deity, why was it not made by

[1] Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 1094, etc.

[2] Epicur. in Epist. ad Herodotum apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 77. p. 634.

[3] Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 139. 661.

[4] Velleius apud Cicer. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xx. p. 2911.

him sooner? or, since it was so long unmade, why did he make it at all? [1]"Cur mundi ædificator repente extiterit, innumerabilia ante sæcula dormierit?" How came this builder and architect of the world to start up upon a sudden, after he had slept for infinite ages—and bethink himself of making a world? For, certainly, if he had been awake all that while, he would either have made it sooner, or not at all; because, there was either something wanting to his happiness before, or nothing: if there had been any thing wanting before, then the world could not have been so long unmade; but if he were completely happy in himself without it, then *μηδὲν ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἔμελλεν ἐπιχειρεῖν πράξεσι*, wanting nothing, he vainly went about to make superfluous things.—All desire of change and novelty argues a fastidious satiety, proceeding from defect and indigency:

> [2] Quidve novi potuit tanto post, ante quietos
> Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
> Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur
> Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accidit ægri
> Temporo in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret ævum,
> Quid potuit novitas amorem accendere tali?

Did this Deity, therefore, light up the stars, as so many lamps or torches, in that vast abyss of infinite darkness, that himself might thereby have a more comfortable and cheerful habitation? Why would he then content himself from eternity, to dwell in such a melancholic, horrid, and forlorn dungeon?

> [3] An, credo, in tenebris vita et mœrore jacebat,
> Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo?

Was company and that variety of things, by which heaven and earth are distinguished, desirable to him? Why then would he continue solitary so long, wanting the pleasure of such a spectacle? Did he make the world and men in it to this end, that himself might be worshipped and adored, feared and honored by them? But what could he be the better for that, who was sufficiently happy alone in himself before? Or did he do it for the sake of men, to gratify and oblige them?

> [4]———At quid immortalibus atque beatis
> Gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti,

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[1] Id. ibid. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 2891.

[2] Lucret. lib. v. ver. 169, etc.

[3] Id. ibid. ver. 175, 176.

[4] Id. ibid. ver. 166.

Ut nostra quicquam causa gerere aggrediantur?

Again, if this were done for the sake of men, then it must be either for wise men or for fools: if for wise men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for fools, what reason could there be, why the Deity should seek to deserve so well at their hands? Besides this, what hurt would it have been to any of us (whether wise or foolish) never to have been made?

[1] Quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis?
Natus enim debet quicunque est, velle manere
In vita, donec retinebit blanda voluptas:
Qui nunquam vero vitæ gustavit amorem,
Nec fuit in numero, quid obest non esse creatum?

Lastly,[2] if this Deity must needs go about moliminously to make a world, ἐργάτου δίκην καὶ τέκτονος, like an artificer and carpenter,—what tools and instruments could he have to work withal? what ministers and subservient opificers? what engines and machines for the rearing up of so huge a fabric? How could he make the matter to understand his meaning, and obey his beck? how could he move it, and turn it up and down? for if incorporeal, he could neither touch nor be touched, but would run through all things, without fastening upon any thing; but if corporeal, then the same thing was both materials and architect, both timber and carpenter, and the stones must hew themselves, and bring themselves together, with discretion, into a structure.

XX. In the last place, the Atheists argue from interest (which proves many times the most effectual of all arguments) against a Deity; endeavoring to persuade, that it is, first, the interest of private persons, and of all mankind in general; and, secondly, the particular interest of civil sovereigns, and commonwealths, that there should neither be a God, nor the belief of any such thing entertained by the minds of men; that is, no religion. First, they say, therefore, that it is the interest of mankind in general; because so long as men are persuaded, that there is an understanding being infinitely powerful, having no law but his own will (because he has no superior,) that may do whatever he pleases at any time to them, they can never securely enjoy themselves or any thing, nor be ever free from disquieting fear and solicitude. What the poets fable of Tantalus in hell, being always in fear of a huge stone hanging over his head, and ready every moment to tumble down upon

[1] Id. ibid. ver. 177, etc.

[2] Vide Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2890.

him, is nothing to that true fear, which men have of a Deity, and religion, here in this life, which, indeed, was the very thing mythologized in it:

> [1] Nec miser impendens magnum timet aere saxum
> Tantalus, (ut fama est) cassa formidine torpens:
> Sed magis in vita, divum metus urget inanis
> Mortales, casumque timent, quemcumque ferat fors.

For, besides men's insecurity from all manner of present evils, upon the supposition of a God, the immortality of souls can hardly be kept out, but it will crowd in after it; and then the fear of eternal punishments after death will unavoidably follow thereupon, perpetually embittering all the solaces of life, and never suffering men to have the least sincere enjoyment.

> [2]———Si certum finem esse viderent
> Ærumnarum homines, aliquo ratione valerent
> Religionibus, atque minis obsistere vatum.
> Nunc ratio nulla est restandi, nulla facultas:
> Æternas quoniam pœnas in morte timendum.
> Ignoratur enim, quæ sit natura animai,
> Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur;
> Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta,
> An tenebras Orci visat vastasque lacunas.

Wherefore it is plain, that they who first introduced the belief of a Deity and religion, whatever they might aim at in it, deserved very ill of all mankind, because they did thereby infinitely debase and depress men's spirits under a servile fear:

> [3] Efficiunt animos humiles, formidine divum,
> Depressosque premunt ad terram:

As also cause the greatest griefs and calamities, that now disturb human life,

> [4] Quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantoque nobis
> Volnera, quas lachrymas peperere minoribu' nostris?

There can be no comfortable and happy living, without banishing from

[1] Lucret. lib. iii. ver. 993.
[2] Id. lib. i. ver. 108, etc.
[3] Id. lib. vi. ver. 51.
[4] Id. lib. v. ver. 1195.

our mind the belief of these two things, of a Deity, and the soul's immortality;

[1] Et metus ille foras præceps Acheruntis agendus
Funditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo,
Omnia suffundens mortis nigrore, neque ullam
Esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit.

It was, therefore, a noble and heroical exploit of Democritus and Epicurus, those two good-natured men, who, seeing the world thus oppressed under the grievous yoke of religion, the fear of a Deity, and punishment after death, and taking pity of this sad condition of mankind, did manfully encounter that affrightful spectre, or empusa, of a providential Deity; and by clear philosophic reasons, chase it away, and banish it quite out of the world; laying down such principles, as would solve all the phenomena of nature without a God:

[2] Quæ bene cognita si teneas, natura videtur
Libera continuo, dominis privata superbis,
Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis agere expers.

So that Lucretius does not, without just cause, erect a triumphal arch or monument to Epicurus, for this conquest or victory of his obtained over the Deity and religion, in this manner:

[3] Humana ante oculos fœde quum vita jaceret
In terris, oppressa gravi sub relligione,
Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat,
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans;
Primum Graius homo mortales tendere contra
Est oculos ausus, primusque obsistere contra;
Quem nec fama deum nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compressit cœlum, etc.

XXI. That it is also the interest of civil sovereigns and of all commonwealths, that there should neither be Deity nor religion, the Democritic Atheists would persuade in this manner: A body politic or commonwealth is made up of parts, that are all naturally dissociated from one another, by reason of that principle of private self-love, who therefore can be no otherwise held together than by fear. Now, if there be any greater fear than the fear of the leviathan, and civil representative,

[1] Id. lib. iii. ver. 37.

[2] Id. lib. ii. ver. 1089. [3] Id. lib. i. ver. 63.

the whole structure and machine of this great coloss must needs fall a-pieces and tumble down. The civil sovereign reigns only in fear; wherefore, unless his fear be the king and sovereign of all fears, his empire and dominion ceases. But, as the rod of Moses devoured the rods of the magicians, so certainly will the fear of an omnipotent Deity, that can punish with eternal torments after death, quite swallow up and devour that comparatively petty fear of civil sovereigns, and consequently destroy the being of commonwealths, which have no foundation in nature, but are mere artificial things, made by the enchantment and magical art of policy. Wherefore, it is well observed by a modern writer, That men ought not to suffer themselves to be abused by the doctrine of separated essences and incorporeal substances (such as God and the soul,) built upon the vain philosophy of Aristotle, that would fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names (as of hell, damnation, fire, and brimstone,) as men fright birds from the corn with an empty hat, doublet, and a crooked stick. And again: if the fear of spirits (the chief of which is the Deity) were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

Moreover, the power of civil sovereigns is perfectly indivisible; it is either all or nothing; it must be absolute and infinite, or else it is none at all. Now it cannot be so, if there be any other power equal to it, to share with it, much less if there be any superior (as that of the Deity) to check it and control it. Wherefore, the Deity must of necessity be removed and displaced, to make room for the Leviathan to spread itself in.

Lastly, it is perfectly inconsistent with the nature of a body politic that there should be any private judgment of good or evil, lawful or unlawful, just or unjust allowed. But conscience (which Theism and religion introduces) is private judgment concerning good and evil; and therefore the allowance of it, is contradictious to civil sovereignty and a commonwealth. There ought to be no other conscience (in a kingdom or commonwealth) besides the law of the country; the allowance of private conscience being, *ipso facto*, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature. Upon all these accounts it must needs be acknowledged, that those philosophers, who undermine and weaken Theism and religion, do highly deserve of all civil sovereigns and commonwealths.

XXII. Now from all the premised considerations, the Democritics confidently conclude against a Deity; that the system and compages of the universe had not its original from any understanding nature; but that mind and understanding itself, as well as all things else in the

world, sprung up from senseless nature and chance, or from the unguided and undirected motion of matter. Which is therefore called by the name of nature, because whatsoever moves is moved by nature and necessity; and the mutual occursions and rencounters of atoms, their *plagæ*, their strokes and dashings against one another, their reflections and repercussions, their cohesions, implexions, and entanglements, as also their scattered dispersions and divulsions, are all natural and necessary; but it is called also by the name of chance and fortune, because it is all unguided by any mind, counsel, or design.

Wherefore, infinite atoms of different sizes and figures, devoid of all life and sense, moving fortuitously from eternity in infinite space, and making successively several encounters, and consequently various implexions and entanglements with one another, produced first a confused chaos of these omnifarious particles, jumbling together with infinite variety of motions, which afterward, by the tugging of their different and contrary forces, whereby they all hindered and abated each other, came, as it were, by joint conspiracy, to be conglomerated into a vortex or vortexes; where, after many convolusions and evolutions, molitions and essays (in which all manner of tricks were tried, and all forms imaginable experimented,) they chanced, in length of time, here to settle, into this form and system of things, which now is, of earth, water, air, and fire; sun, moon, and stars; plants, animals, and men; so that senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, and material chaos, were the first original of all things.

This account of the *cosmopœia*, and first original of the mundane system, is represented by Lucretius[1] according to the mind of Epicurus, though without any mention of those vortices, which were yet an essential part of the old Democritic hypothesis.

Sed quibus ille modis conjectus materiai
Fundarit cœlum, ac terram, pontique profunda,
Solis, lunai cursus, ex ordine ponam.
Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt:
Nec, quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.
Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum,
Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri,
Omni modisque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter se possent congressa creare:

[1] Lib. v. ver. 417, etc.

Proptera fit, uti magnum volgata per ævum,
Omnigenos cœtus, et motus experiundo,
Tandem ea conveniant, quæ ut convenere, repente
Magnarum rerum fiant exordia sæpe,
Terrai, maris, et cœli, generisque animantum.

But because some seem to think that Epicurus was the first founder and inventor of this doctrine, we shall here observe, that this same Atheistic hypothesis was long before described by Plato, when Epicurus was as yet unborn; and therefore doubtless according to the doctrine of Leucippus, Democritus, and Protagoras; though that philosopher, in a kind of disdain (as it seems) refused to mention either of their names: [1]πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδεν τούτων· καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τέ καὶ ηλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι, παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ ξυμπέπτωκεν, αρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, etc. ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τὸν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ᾽ οὐρανόν· καὶ ζῶα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων· οὐ διὰ νοῦν (φάσιν) οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν, οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ, τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, etc. The Atheists say, that fire, water, air, and earth (i. e the four elements) were all made by nature and chance: and none of them by art or mind (that is, they were made by the fortuitous motion of atoms, and not by any deity,) and that those other bodies, of the terrestrial globe, of the sun, the moon, and the stars (which by all, except these Atheists, were, in those times, generally supposed to be animated, and a kind of inferior Deities,) were afterwards made out of the aforesaid elements, being altogether inanimate. For they being moved fortuitously, or as it happened, and so making various commixtures together, did, by that means, at length produce the whole heavens and all things in them, as likewise plants and animals here upon earth; all which were not made by mind, nor by art, nor by any God; but, as we said before, by nature and chance; art, and mind itself, rising up afterwards from the same senseless principles in animals.

[1] Plato, de Legibus, lib. x. p. 666, oper.

CHAPTER III.

An introduction to the confutation of the Atheistic grounds, in which is contained a particular account of all the several forms of Atheism.—1. That the grounds of the Hylozoic Atheism could not be insisted on in the former chapter, together with those of the Atomic, they being directly contrary each to other; with a further account of this Hylozoic Atheism.—2. A suggestion, by way of caution, for the preventing of all mistakes, that every Hylozoist must not therefore be condemned for an Atheist, or a mere counterfeit histrionical Theist.—3. That, nevertheless, such Hylozoists as are also Corporealists, can by no means be excused from the imputation of Atheism, for two reasons.—4. That Strato Lampsacenus, commonly called Physicus, seems to have been the first assertor of the Hylozoic Atheism, he holding no other God but the life of nature in matter.—5. Further proved, that Strato was an Atheist, and that of a different form from Democritus, he attributing an energetic nature, but without sense and animality, to all matter.—6. That Strato, not deriving all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as the Democritic Atheists did, nor yet acknowledging any one plastic nature to preside over the whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together in the several parts of matter, must therefore needs be an Hylozoic Atheist.—7. That the famous Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but rather an Heraclitic corporeal Theist.—8. That Plato took no notice of the Hylozoic Atheism, nor of any other than what derives the original of all things from a mere fortuitous nature; and, therefore, either the Democritical or the Anaximandrian Atheism, which latter will be next declared.—9. That it is hardly imaginable, there should have been no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus, there being in all ages, as Plato observes, some or other sick of the Atheistic disease. That Aristotle affirms many of the first philosophers to have assigned only a material cause of the mundane system, without either efficient or intending cause; they supposing matter to be the only substance, and all things else nothing but the passions and accidents of it, generable and corruptible.—10. That the doctrine of these Materialists will be more fully understood from the exceptions which Aristotle makes against them: his first exception, that they assigned no cause of motion, but introduced it into the world unaccountably.—11. Aristotle's second exception, that these Materialists did assign no cause *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, of well and fit, and give no account of the orderly regularity of things. That Anaxagoras was the first Ionic philosopher who made mind and good a principle of the universe.—12. Concluded, that Aristotle's Materialists were downright Atheists, not merely because they held all substance to be body, since Heraclitus and Zeno did the like, and

yet are not therefore accounted Atheists (they supposing their fiery matter to be originally intellectual, and the whole world to be an animal); but because these made stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the only principle.—13. As also, because they supposed every thing besides the substance of matter, life and understanding, and all particular things, to be generable and corruptible, and, consequently, that there could be no other God, than such as was native and mortal. That those ancient Theologers, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods out of night and chaos, were only verbal Theists, but real Atheists; senseless matter being to them the highest Numen.—14. The great difference observed betwixt Aristotle's Atheistical Materialists and the Italic philosophers, the former determining all things besides the substance of matter, to be made or generated, the latter, that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; thereupon both destroying qualities and forms of body, and asserting the ingenerability and incorporeity of souls.—15. How Aristotle's Atheistic Materialists endeavored to baffle and elude that axiom of the Italic philosophers, that nothing can come from nothing nor go to nothing; and that Anaxagoras was the first among the Ionics, who yielded so far to that principle, as from thence to assert incorporeal substance, and the pre-existence of qualities and forms in similar atoms, forasmuch as he conceived them to be things really distinct from the substance of matter.—16. The error of some writers, who, because Aristotle affirms, that the ancient philosophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer, that they were all Theists, and that Aristotle contradicts himself in representing many of them as Atheists. That the ancient Atheists did generally κοσμοποιεῖν, assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning; as also some Theists did maintain its eternity, but in a way of dependency upon the Deity. That we ought here to distinguish betwixt the system of the world, and the substance of the matter, all Atheists asserting the matter to have been, not only eternal, but also such independently upon any other being.—17. That Plato and others concluded this Materialism, or Hylopathian Atheism, to have been at least as old as Homer, who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods. And that this indeed was the ancientest of all Atheisms, which, verbally acknowledging gods, yet derived the original of them all from night and chaos. The description of this Atheistic hypothesis in Aristophanes, that night and chaos first laid an egg, out of which sprung forth love, which afterwards mingling with chaos, begat heaven and earth, animals, and all the gods.—18. That, notwithstanding this, in Aristotle's judgment, Parmenides, Hesiod, and others, who made love, in like manner, senior to all the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheists; they understanding this love to be an active principle, or cause of motion in the universe, which therefore could not rise from an egg of the night, nor be the offspring of chaos, but must be something in order of nature before matter. Simmias Rhodius's Wings, a poem in honor of this heavenly love. This not that love which was the offspring of Penia and Porus in Plato. In what rectified sense it may pass for true theology, that love is the supreme Deity and original of all things.—19. That though Democritus and Leucippus be elsewhere taxed by Aristotle for this very thing, that they assigned only a material cause

of the universe; yet they were not the persons intended by him in the fore-cited accusation, but certain ancienter philosophers, who also were not Atomists, but Hylopathians.—20. That Aristotle's Atheistic Materialists were all the first Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras, Thales being at the head of them. But that Thales is acquitted from this imputation of Atheism by several good authors (with an account how he came to be thus differently represented); and, therefore, that his next successor, Anaximander, is rather to be accounted the prince of this Atheistic philosophy.—21. A passage out of Aristotle objected, which, at first sight, seems to make Anaximander a Divine philosopher, and therefore hath led both modern and ancient writers into that mistake. That this place well considered proves the contrary, that Anaximander was the chief of the old Atheistic philosophers.—22. That it is no wonder, if Anaximander called senseless matter the τὸ θεῖον, or God, since to all Atheists that must needs be the highest Numen; also how this is said to be immortal, and to govern all; with the concurrent judgment of the Greek scholiast upon this place.—23. A further account of the Anaximandrian philosophy, manifesting it to have been purely Atheistical.—24. What ill judges the vulgar have been of Theists and Atheists; as also that learned men have commonly supposed fewer Atheists than indeed there were. Anaximander and Democritus Atheists both alike, though philosophizing different ways. That some passages in Plato respect the Anaximandrian form of Atheism, rather than the Democritical.—25. Why Democritus and Leucippus new modelled Atheism into the Atomic form.—26. That besides the three forms of Atheism already mentioned, we sometimes meet with a fourth, which supposes the universe, though not to be an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having one plastic nature in it, devoid of understanding and sense, which disposes and orders the whole.—27. That this form of Atheism, which makes one plastic life to preside over the whole, is different from the Hylozoic, in that it takes away all fortuitousness, and subjects all to the fate of one plastic methodical nature.—28. Though it be possible, that some in all ages might have entertained this Atheistical conceit, that things are dispensed by one regular and methodical, but unknowing senseless nature, yet it seems to have been chiefly asserted, by certain spurious Heraclitics and Stoics. And, therefore, this form of Atheism, which supposes one cosmoplastic nature, may be called Pseudo-Zenonion.—29. That, besides the Philosophic Atheists, there have been always enthusiastic and fanatical Atheists, though in some sense all Atheists may be said also to be both enthusiasts and fanatics, they being led by an ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, or irrational impetus.—30. That there cannot easily be any other form of Atheism, besides those four already mentioned, because all Atheists are Corporealists, and yet all Corporealists not Atheists, but only such as make the first principle of all things not to be intellectual.—31. A distribution of Atheisms producing the former quaternio, and showing the difference between them.—32. That they are but bunglers at Atheism who talk of sensitive and rational matter; and that the canting astrological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves.—33. Another distribution of Atheisms; that they either derive the original of things from a merely fortuitous principle, the unguided motion of matter, or else from a plastic and methodical, but sense-

less nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what asserted it.—34. That of these four forms of Atheism, the Atomic[3] or Democritical, and the Hylozoic or Stratonical, are the chief; and that these two being once confuted, all Atheism will be confuted.—35. These two forms of Atheism being contrary to one another, how we ought in all reason to insist rather upon the Atomic; but that afterwards we shall confute the Hylozoic also, and prove against all Corporealists, that no cogitation nor life belongs to matter.—36. That, in the meantime, we shall not neglect any form of Atheism, but confute them all together, as agreeing in one principle; as also show, how the old Atomic Atheists did sufficiently overthrow the foundation of the Hylozoists.—37. Observed here, that the Hylozoists are not condemned merely for asserting a plastic life, distinct from the animal (which, with most other philosophers, we judge highly probable, if taken in a right sense), but for grossly misunderstanding it, and attributing the same to matter. The plastic life of nature largely explained.—38. That though the confutation of the Atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse; yet we having reason to violate those laws, crave the reader's pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of Plato's, that it is not only moral vitiosity, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affectation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind; as likewise, that the Atheists, making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonable undertaking to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations. That we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurors; and that all forms of Atheism are nonsense and impossibiliy.

I. We have now represented the grand mysteries of Atheism, which may be also called the mysteries of the kingdom of darkness; though indeed some of them are but briefly hinted here, they being again more fully to be insisted on afterward, where we are to give an account of the Atheists' endeavors to solve the phenomenon of cogitation. We have represented the chief grounds of Atheisms in general, as also that most notorious form of Atheism in particular, that is called Atomical. But whereas there hath been already mentioned another form of Atheism, called by us Hylozoical; the principles hereof could not possibly be insisted on in this place, where we were to make the most plausible plea for Atheism, they being directly contrary to those of the Atomical, so that they would have mutually destroyed each other. For, whereas the Atomic Atheism supposes the notion or idea of body to be nothing but extended resisting bulk, and consequently to include no manner of life and cogitation in it; Hylozoism, on the contrary, makes all body, as such, and therefore every smallest atom of it, to have life essentially belonging to it (natural perception and appetite) though without any animal sense or reflexive knowledge, as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but too incomplete and inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance, called body. By reason of

which life (not animal, but only plastical), all parts of matter being supposed able to form themselves artificially and methodically (though without any deliberation or attentive consideration), to the greatest advantage of their present respective capabilities, and therefore also sometimes by organization to improve themselves further into sense and self-enjoyment in all animals, as also to universal reason and reflexive knowledge in men; it is plain, that there is no necessity at all left, either of any incorporeal soul in men to make them rational, or of any Deity in the whole universe to solve the regularity thereof. One main difference betwixt these two forms of Atheism is this, that the Atomical supposes all life whatsoever to be accidental, generable and corruptible; but the Hylozoic admits of a certain natural or plastic life, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, though attributing the same only to matter, as supposing no other substance in the world besides it.

II. Now to prevent all mistakes, we think fit here by way of caution to suggest, that as every Atomist is not therefore necessarily an Atheist, so neither must every Hylozoist needs be accounted such. For whoever so holds the life of matter, as notwithstanding to assert another kind of substance also, that is immaterial and incorporeal, is no ways obnoxious to that foul imputation. However, we ought not to dissemble, but that there is a great difference here betwixt these two, Atomism and Hylozoism, in this regard; that the former of them, namely Atomism (as hath been already declared) hath in itself a natural cognation and conjunction with Incorporeism, though violently cut off from it by the Democritic Atheists; whereas the latter of them, Hylozoism, seems to have altogether as close and intimate a correspondence with Corporealism; because, as hath been already signified, if all matter, as such, have not only such a life, perception, and self-active power in it, as whereby it can form itself to the best advantage, making this a sun, and that an earth or planet, and fabricating the bodies of animals most artificially, but also can improve itself into sense and self-enjoyment; it may as well be thought able to advance itself higher, into all the acts of reason and understanding in men; so that there will be no need either of an incorporeal immortal soul in men, or a Deity in the universe. Nor indeed is it easily conceivable, how any should be induced to admit such a monstrous paradox as this is, that every atom of dust or other senseless matter is wiser than the greatest politician and the most acute philosopher that ever was, as having an infallible omniscience of all its own capabilities and congruities; were it not by reason of some strong prepossession, against incorporeal sub-

stance and a Deity: there being nothing so extravagant and outrageously wild, which a mind once infected with Atheistical sottishness and disbelief will not rather greedily swallow down, than admit a Deity, which to such is the highest of all paradoxes imaginable, and the most affrightful bugbear. Notwithstanding all which, it may not be denied, but that it is possible for one, who really entertains the belief of a Deity and a rational soul immortal, to be persuaded, first, that the sensitive soul in men as well as brutes is merely corporeal; and then that there is a material plastic life in the seeds of all plants and animals, whereby they do artificially form themselves; and from thence afterward to descend also further to Hylozoism, that all matter, as such, hath a kind of natural, though not animal life in it: in consideration whereof, we ought not to censure every Hylozoist, professing to hold a Deity and a rational soul immortal, for a mere disguised Atheist, or a counterfeit histrionical Theist.

III. But though every Hylozoist be not therefore necessarily an Atheist, yet whosoever is an Hylozoist and Corporealist both together, he that both holds the life of matter in the sense before declared, and also that there is no other substance in the world besides body and matter, cannot be excused from the imputation of Atheism, for two reasons; first, because though he derive the original of all things, not from what is perfectly dead and stupid as the Atomic Atheist doth, but from that which hath a kind of life or perception in it, nay an infallible omniscience, of whatsoever itself can do or suffer, or of all its own capabilities and congruities, which seems to bear some semblance of a Deity; yet all this being only in the way of natural, and not animal perception, is indeed nothing but a dull and drowsy, plastic and spermatic life, devoid of all consciousness and self-enjoyment. The Hylozoists' nature is a piece of very mysterious nonsense, a thing perfectly wise, without any knowledge or consciousness of itself; whereas a Deity, according to the true notion of it, is such a perfect understanding being, as with full consciousness and self-enjoyment is completely happy. Secondly, because the Hylozoic Corporealists, supposing all matter, as such, to have life in it, must needs make infinite of those lives, (forasmuch as every atom of matter has a life of its own) co-ordinate and independent on one another, and consequently, as many independent first principles, no one common life or mind ruling over the whole. Whereas, to assert a God, is to derive all things ἀφ᾽ ἑνός τινος, from some one principle,—or to suppose one perfect living and understanding being to be the original of all things, and the architect of the whole universe.

Thus we see, that the Hylozoic Corporealist is really an Atheist,

though carrying more the semblance and disguise of a Theist, than other Atheists, in that he attributes a kind of life to matter. For indeed every Atheist must of necessity cast some of the incommunicable properties of the Deity, more or less, upon that which is not God, namely, matter; and they, who do not attribute life to it, yet must needs bestow upon it necessary self-existence, and make it the first principle of all things, which are the peculiarities of the Deity. The Numen, which the Hylozoic Corporealist pays all his devotions to, is a certain blind she-god or goddess, called Nature, or the life of matter; which is a very great mystery, a thing that is perfectly wise, and infallibly omniscient, without any knowledge or consciousness at all; something like to that *τῶν παίδων αἴνιγμα* (in[1] Plato) *περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου βολῆς τῆς νυκτερίδος*, that vulgar enigma or riddle of boys concerning an eunuch striking a bat; a man and not a man, seeing and not seeing, did strike and not strike, with a stone and not a stone, a bird and not a bird, etc. the difference being only this, that this was a thing intelligible, but humorsomely expressed; whereas the other seems to be perfect nonsense, being nothing but a misunderstanding of the plastic power, as shall be showed afterwards.

IV. Now the first and chief assertor of this Hylozoic Atheism was, as we conceive, Strato Lampsacenus,[2] commonly called also Physicus, that had been once an auditor of Theophrastus, and a famous Peripatetic, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine Peripatetic into a new-formed kind of Atheist. For Velleius, an Epicurean Atheist in Cicero, reckoning up all the several sorts of Theists, which had been in former times, gives such a character of this Strato, as whereby he makes him to be a strange kind of Atheistical Theist, or Divine Atheist, if we may use such a contradictious expression: his words are these, [3] "Nec audiendus Strato, qui Physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quæ causas gignendi, augendi, minuendive habeat, sed careat omni sensu." Neither is Strato, commonly called the Naturalist or Physiologist, to be heard, who places all Divinity in nature, as having within itself the causes of all generations, corruptions, and augmentations, but without any manner of sense.—Strato's Deity therefore was a certain living and active, but senseless nature. He did not fetch the original of all things, as the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, from a mere fortuitous motion of atoms, by

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[1] De Rep. l. 5. p. 468.

[2] Vide Diogen. Laert. segm. 58. p. 298.

[3] De Nat. De. l. 1. cap. xiii. p. 2902.

means whereof he bore some slight semblance of a Theist; but yet he was a downright Atheist for all that, his God being no other than such a life of nature in matter, as was both devoid of sense and consciousness, and also multiplied together with the several parts of it. He is also in like manner described by Seneca in St. Augustine[1] as a kind of mongrel thing, betwixt an Atheist and a Theist; "Ego feram aut Platonem, aut Peripateticum Stratonem, quorum alter deum sine corpore fecit, alter sine animo?" Shall I endure either Plato, or the Peripatetic Strato, whereof the one made God to be without a body, the other without a mind?—In which words Seneca taxes these two philosophers, as guilty of two contrary extremes; Plato, because he made God to be a pure mind, or a perfectly incorporeal being; and Strato, because he made him to be a body without a mind, he acknowledging no other Deity than a certain stupid and plastic life, in all the several parts of matter without sense. Wherefore, this seems to be the only reason, why Strato was thus sometimes reckoned amongst the Theists, though he were indeed an Atheist, because he dissented from that only form of Atheism, then so vulgarly received, the Democritic and Epicurean, attributing a kind of life to nature and matter.

V. And that Strato was thus an Atheist, but of a different kind from Democritus, may further appear from this passage of Cicero's;[2] "Strato Lampsacenus negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quæcunque sint docet omnia esse effecta natura, nec ut ille, qui asperis, et lævibus, et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta hæc esse dicat, interjecto inani; somnia censet hæc esse Democriti, non docentis, sed optantis." Strato denies, that he makes any use of a God, for the fabricating of the world, or the solving the phenomena thereof; teaching all things to have been made by nature; but yet not in such a manner, as he who affirmed them to be all concreted out of certain rough and smooth, hookey and crooked atoms, he judging these things to be nothing but the mere dreams and dotages of Democritus, not teaching but wishing.—Here we see, that Strato denied the world to be made by a Deity or perfect understanding nature, as well as Democritus: and yet that he dissented from Democritus notwithstanding, holding another kind of nature, as the original of things, than he did, who gave no account of any active principle and cause of motion, nor of the regularity that is in things. Democritus's nature was nothing but the fortuitous motion of matter; but Strato's nature was an inward

[1] De Civ. Dei, l. 6. c. 10. sec. i. p. 122. tom. vii. oper. ed Benedict.

[2] Acad. Quæst. l. 4. cap. 38. p. 2318. tom. viii. oper.

plastic life in the several parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best advantage, according to their several capabilities, without any conscious or reflexive knowledge. "Quicquid aut sit aut fiat, (says the same author)[1] naturalibus fieri, aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus." Strato teaches whatsoever is, or is made, to be made by certain inward natural forces and activities.—

VI. Furthermore it is to be observed, that though Strato thus attributed a certain kind of life to matter, yet he did by no means allow of any one common life, whether sentient and rational, or plastic and spermatic only, as ruling over the whole mass of matter and corporeal universe; which is a thing in part affirmed by Plutarch,[2] and may in part be gathered from these words of his; *τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῶον εἶναί φησι, τόδε κατὰ φύσιν ἕπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην, ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἶτα οὕτω περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον.* Strato affirmeth that the world is no animal (or god,) but that what is natural in every thing, follows something fortuitous antecedent, chance first beginning, and nature acting consequently thereupon.—The full sense whereof seems to be this, that though Strato did not derive the original of all mundane things from mere fortuitous mechanism, as Democritus before him had done, but supposed a life and natural perception in the matter, that was directive of it; yet, not acknowledging any one common life, whether animal or plastic, as governing and swaying the whole, but only supposing the several parts of matter to have so many plastic lives of their own, he must needs attribute something to fortune, and make the mundane system to depend upon a certain mixture of chance and plastic or orderly nature both together, and consequently must be an Hylozoist. Thus we see, that these are two schemes of Atheism, very different from one another;[3] that, which fetches the original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided motion of matter, without any vital or directive principle; and that, which derives it from a certain mixture of chance and the life of matter both together, it supposing a plastic life, not in the whole universe, as one thing, but in all the several parts of matter by themselves; the first of which is the Atomic and Democritic Atheism, the second the Hylozoic and Stratonic.

VII. It may perhaps be suspected by some, that the famous Hippocrates, who lived long before Strato, was an assertor of the Hylozoic

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[1] Ibid. [2] Advers. Colotem. p. 1115. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Vide Lactant. de Ira Dei, cap. x. p. 918.

Atheism, because of such passages in him as these,[1] *ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐκ τοῦ σάου*[2] *μαθοῦσα τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν·* Nature is unlearned or untaught, but it learneth from itself what things it ought to do :—and again *ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ τὰς ἐφόδους, οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας·* Nature finds out ways to itself, not by ratiocination.—But there is nothing more affirmed here concerning nature by Hippocrates, than what might be affirmed likewise of the Aristotelic and Platonic nature, which is supposed to act for ends, though without consultation and ratiocination. And I must confess, it seems to me no way misbecoming of a Theist, to acknowledge such a nature or principle in the universe, as may act according to rule and method for the sake of ends, and in order to the best, though itself do not understand the reason of what it doth ; this being still supposed to act dependently upon a higher intellectual principle, and to have been first set a work and employed by it, it being otherwise nonsense. But to assert any such plastic nature, as is independent upon any higher intellectual principle, and so itself the first and highest principle of activity in the universe, this indeed must needs be, either that Hylozoic Atheism already spoken of, or else another different form of Atheism, which shall afterwards be described. But though Hippocrates were a Corporealist, yet we conceive he ought not to lie under the suspicion of either of those two atheisms ; forasmuch as himself plainly asserts a higher intellectual principle, than such a plastic nature, in the universe, namely an Heraclitic corporeal God, or understanding fire, immortal, pervading the whole world, in these words ;[3] *Δοκέει δέ μοι ὃ καλέομεν θερμόν, ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι, καὶ νοιεῖν πάντα, καὶ ὁρῆν, καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι·* It seems to me, that that which is called heat or fire is immortal and omniscient, and that it sees, hears, and knows all things, not only such as are present, but also future.—Wherefore, we conclude, that Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but an Heraclitic corporeal Theist.

VIII. Possibly it may be thought also, that Plato, in his Sophist, intends this Hylozoic atheism, where he declares it as the opinion of many, [4]*τὴν φύσιν πάντα γεννᾶν, ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης·* That nature generates all things from a certain spontaneous principle, without any reason and understanding.—But here

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[1] VI. Epidem. sect. 5. sect. 2. tom. ii. oper. p. 1184.

[2] Al. lect. *καὶ οὐ μαθοῦσα, τὰ δέοντα ποιέει.*

[3] De Princip. aut Carnibus. sect. 1. p. 249. tom. i. oper.

[4] P. 168. oper.

the word αὐτομάτης may be as well rendered fortuitous as spontaneous; however, there is no necessity, that this should be understood of an artificial or methodical unknowing nature. It is true, indeed, that Plato himself seems to acknowledge a certain plastic or methodical nature in the universe, subordinate to the Deity, or that perfect mind, which is the supreme governor of all things; as may be gathered from these words of his, τὴν φύσιν μετὰ λόγου καὶ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ νῷ τὰ πάντα διακοσμεῖν· that nature does rationally (or orderly) together with reason and mind, govern the whole universe.—Where he supposes a certain regular nature to be a partial and subordinate cause of things under the Divine intellect. And it is very probable, that Aristotle derived that whole doctrine of his concerning a regular and artificial nature, which acts for ends, from the Platonic school. But as for any such form of Atheism, as should suppose a plastic or regular, but senseless nature either in the whole world, or the several parts of matter by themselves, to be the highest principle of all things, we do not conceive, that there is any intimation of it to be found any where in Plato. For in his De Legibus, where he professedly disputes against Atheism, he states the doctrine of it after this manner,[1] τὰ μὲν μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην· that nature and chance produceth all the first, greatest, and most excellent things, but that the smaller things were produced by human art.—The plain meaning whereof is this, that the first original of things, and the frame of the whole universe, proceeded from a mere fortuitous nature, or the motion of matter unguided by any art or method. And thus it is further explained in the following words, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων, etc. That the first elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were all made by nature and chance, without any art or method; and then, that the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and the whole heavens, were afterward made out of those elements, as devoid of all manner of life,—and only fortuitously moved and mingled together; and lastly, that the whole mundane system, together with the orderly seasons of the year, as also plants, animals, and men, did arise after the same manner, from the mere fortuitous motion of senseless and stupid matter. In the very same manner does Plato state this controversy again, betwixt the Theists and Atheists, in his Philebus; [2]Πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα, καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον, ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῆ δυναμιν, καὶ τὰ ὅπη ἔτυχεν; ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυγα-

[1] Lib. x. p. 665, 666. [2] P. 28. ed. Ser.

στὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν; Whether shall we say, O Protarchus, that this whole universe is dispensed and ordered, by a mere irrational, temerarious, and fortuitous principle, and so as it happens; or contrariwise (as our forefathers have instructed us) that mind, and a certain wonderful wisdom, did at first frame, and does still govern all things?—

Wherefore we conclude, that Plato took no notice of any other form of Atheism, as then set on foot, that such as derives all things from a mere fortuitous principle, from nature and chance; that is, the unguided motion of matter, without any plastic artificialness or methodicalness, either in the whole universe, or the parts of it. But because this kind of Atheism, which derives all things from a mere fortuitous nature, had been managed two manner of ways, by Democritus in the way of Atoms, and by Anaximander and others in the way of Forms and Qualities (of which we are to speak in the next place;) therefore the Atheism, which Plato opposes, was either the Democritic or the Anaximandrian Atheism; or else (which is most probable) both of them together.

IX. It is hardly imaginable, that there should be no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato[1] long[2] since concluded, that there have been Atheists, more or less, in every age, when he bespeaks his young Atheist after this manner; *Οὐ σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε, γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες·* The full sense whereof seems to be this: Neither you, my son, nor your friends (Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras) are the first, who have entertained this opinion concerning the gods, but there have been always some more or less sick of this atheistic disease.—Wherefore, we shall now make a diligent search and inquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers, who atheized before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of Atheism they entertained.

Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, speaking of the quaternio of causes, affirms, that many of those, who first philosophized, assigned only a material cause of the whole mundane system, without either intending or efficient cause. The reason whereof he intimates to have been this, because they asserted matter to be the only substance; and that whatsoever else was in the world, besides the substance or bulk of matter, were all nothing else but *πάθη*, with different passions and affections, accidents and qualities of matter, that were all generated out of it, and corruptible again into it; the substance of matter always remaining the same, neither generated nor corrupted, but from eternity unmade;

[1] De Legibus, lib. x. p. 665. [2] P. 888. ed. Ser.

Aristotle's words are these: [1]*τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει μόνον ᾠήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων, ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἐστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται πρώτου, καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης, τοῖς δε πάθεσι μεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοιχεῖον, καὶ ταύτην τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι·* Most of those, who first philosophized, took notice of no other principle of things in the universe, than what is to be referred to the material cause; for that, out of which all things are, and out of which all things are first made, and into which they are all at last corrupted and resolved, the substance always remaining the same, and being changed only in its passions and qualities; this they concluded to be the first original and principle of all things.—

X. But the meaning of these old Material philosophers will be better understood by those exceptions, which Aristotle makes against them, which are two: first, that because they acknowledged no other substance besides matter, that might be an active principle in the universe, it was not possible for them to give any account of the original of motion and action. [2]*Εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσα φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἔκ τινος ὡς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ἐστὶν, διὰ τί τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ τί τὸ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτό· λέγω δὲ οἷον, οὔτε τὸ ξύλον, οὔτε τὸ χαλκὸς αἴτιον τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλον κλίνην, ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον· τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ζητεῖν ἐστι τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ζητεῖν ἀρχὴν, ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίημεν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως·* Though all generation be made never so much out of something as the matter, yet the question still is, by what means this cometh to pass, and what is the active cause which produceth it? because the subject matter cannot change itself; as, for example, neither timber, nor brass, is the cause, that either of them are changed, for timber alone does not make a bed, nor brass a statue, but there must be something else as the cause of the change; and to inquire after this is to inquire after another principle besides matter, which we would call that, from whence motion springs.—In which words Aristotle intimates, that these old Material philosophers shuffled in motion and action into the world unaccountably, or without a cause: forasmuch as they acknowledged no other principle of things besides passive matter, which could never move, change, or alter itself.

XI. And Aristotle's second exception against these old Material philosophers is this: that since there could be no intending causality in senseless and stupid matter, which they made to be the only principle of all things, they were not able to assign *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν*, any cause of well and fit,—and so could give no account of the regular and

[1] Lib. 1. c. 3. tom. iv. oper. p. 264. [2] Arist. Met. l. 1. c. 3. p. 265.

orderly frame of this mundane system ;[1] *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ γέγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἴσως οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐθὲν, εἰκὸς αἴτιον εἶναι· οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτω, καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει·* That things partly are so well in the world, and partly are made so well, cannot be imputed either to earth or water, or any other senseless body ; much less is it reasonable to attribute so noble and excellent an effect as this to mere chance or fortune.—Where Aristotle again intimates, that as these Material philosophers shuffled in motion into the world without a cause, so likewise they must needs suppose this motion to be altogether fortuitous and unguided ; and thereby in a manner make fortune, which is nothing but the absence or defect of an intending cause, to supply the room both of the active and intending cause, that is, efficient and final. Whereupon Aristotle subjoins a commendation of Anaxagoras, as the first of the Ionic philosophers, who introduced mind or intellect for a principle in the universe ; that in this respect he alone seemed to be sober and in his wits, comparatively with those others that went before him, who talked so idly and atheistically. For Anaxagoras's principle was such, saith Aristotle, as was *ἅμα τοῦ καλῶς αἰτία, καὶ τοιαύτη ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει*, at once a cause of motion, and also of well and fit ;—of all the regularity, aptitude, pulchritude, and order, that is in the whole universe. And thus it seems Anaxagoras himself had determined : [2]*Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς νοῦν λέγει*, Anaxagoras saith, that mind is the only cause of right and well ;—this being proper to mind to aim at ends and good, and to order one thing fitly for the sake of another. Whence it was, that Anaxagoras concluded good also, as well as mind, to have been a principle of the universe, [3]*Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴν, ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον·* Anaxagoras makes good a principle, as that which moves ; for, though mind move matter, yet it moves it for the sake of something, and being itself, as it were, first moved by good : so that good is also a principle.—And we note this the rather, to show how well these three philosophers, Aristotle, Plato, and Anaxagoras, agreed all together in this excellent truth, that mind and good are the first principle of all things in the universe.

XII. And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that these old Materialists in Aristotle, whoever they were, were downright Atheists ; not so much because they made all substance to be body or matter, for Heraclitus first, and after him Zeno, did the like, deriving the original of all things from fire, as well as Anaximenes did from air, and Thales

[1] Met. l. 1. c. 3. p. 266. [2] Arist. de An. lib. 1. c. 2. p. 5. tom. ii. oper.
[3] Arist. Met. l. 14. c. 10. p. 485. tom. iv. oper.

is supposed by Aristotle[1] to have done from water, and that with some little more seeming plausibility, since fire, being a more subtile and moveable body than any other, was therefore thought by some ancients to be ἀσωματώτατον, the most incorporeal of all bodies, as earth was for that cause rejected by all those corporeal philosophers from being a principle, by reason of the grossness of its parts. But Heraclitus and Zeno, notwithstanding this, are not accounted Atheists, because they supposed their fiery matter to have not only life, but also a perfect understanding originally belonging to it, as also the whole world to be an animal: whereas those Materialists of Aristotle made senseless and stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the first principle and root of all things. For, when they supposed life and understanding, as well as all other differences of things, to be nothing but mere passions and accidents of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it, and indeed to be produced, but in a secondary way, from the fortuitous commixture of those first elementary qualities, heat and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin, they plainly implied the substance of matter in itself to be devoid of life and understanding. Now, if this be not Atheism, to derive the original of all things, even of life and mind itself, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, then there can be no such thing at all.

XIII. Moreover, Aristotle's Materialists concluded every thing besides the substance of matter (which is in itself indifferent to all things,) and consequently all particular and determinate beings, to be generable and corruptible. Which is a thing, that Plato takes notice of as an Atheistic principle, expressing it in these words: ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδὲν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται,[2] that nothing ever is, but every thing is made and generated.—Forasmuch as it plainly follows, from hence, that not only all animals and the souls of men, but also if there were any gods, which some of those Materialists would not stick, at least verbally to acknowledge, (meaning thereby certain understanding beings superior to men,) these likewise must needs have been all generated, and consequently be corruptible. Now to say that there is no other God, than such as was made and generated, and which may be again unmade, corrupted, and die, or that there was once no God at all till he was made out of the matter, and that there may be none again, this is all one as to deny the thing itself. For a native and mortal God is a pure contradiction. Therefore, whereas Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, tells us of certain

[1] Metaphysic. lib. i. c. iii. p. 265. tom. iv. oper. [2] In Theæt.

theologers,[1] *οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες*, such as did generate all things (even the gods themselves) out of night and chaos,—we must needs pronounce of such theologers as these, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods (without exception) out of senseless and stupid matter, that they were but a kind of atheistical Theologers, or theological Atheists. For, though they did admit of certain beings, to which they attributed the name of gods, yet according to the true notion of God, they really acknowledged none at all (i. e. no understanding nature as the original of things,) but Night and Chaos, senseless and stupid matter, fortuitously moved, was to them the highest of all Numens. So that this theology of theirs was a thing wholly founded in atheistical nonsense.

XIV. And now we think it seasonable here to observe, how vast a difference there was betwixt these old Materialists in Aristotle, and those other philosophers, mentioned before in the first chapter, who determined, *οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων·* That no real entity at all was generated or corrupted,—for this reason, because nothing could be made out of nothing. These were chiefly the philosophers of the Italic or Pythagoric succession; and their design in it was not, as Aristotle was pleased somewhere to affirm, *ἀνελεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν γένησιν*, to contradict common sense and experience, in denying all natural generations and alterations: but only to interpret nature rightly in them, and that in way of opposition to those Atheistic Materialists, after this manner: that in all the mutations of nature, generations, and alterations, there was neither any new substance made, which was not before, nor any entity really distinct from the pre-existing substances, but only that substance which was before diversely modified; and so nothing produced in generations, but new modifications, mixtures, and separations of pre-existent substances.

Now this doctrine of theirs drove at these two things: first, the taking away of such qualities and forms of body, as were vulgarly conceived to be things really distinct from the substance of extended bulk, and all its modifications of more or less magnitude, figure, site, motion, or rest. Because, if there were any such things as these, produced in the natural generations and alterations of bodies, there would then be some real entity made *ἐκ μηδενὸς ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπάρχοντος*, out of nothing inexistent or pre-existent.—Wherefore they concluded, that these supposed forms and qualities of bodies were really nothing else but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter, in respect of

[1] Lib. 14. c. 6. p. 477.

magnitude, figure, site and motion, or rest; or different concretions and secretions, which are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only cause different phasmata, fancies, and apparitions in us.

The second thing, which this doctrine aimed at was the establishing the incorporeity and ingenerability of all souls. For, since life, cogitation, sense, and understanding, could not be resolved into those modifications of matter, magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or into mechanism and fancy, but must needs be entities really distinct from extended bulk, or dead and stupid matter; they concluded, that therefore souls could not be generated out of matter, because this would be the production of some real entity out of nothing inexisting or pre-existing; but that they must needs be another kind of substance incorporeal, which could no more be generated or corrupted, than the substance of matter itself; and, therefore, must either pre-exist in nature, before generations, or else be divinely created and infused in them.

It hath been already proved in the first chapter, that the upshot of that Pythagoric doctrine, that nothing could be generated out of nothing pre-existing, amounted to those two things mentioned, viz. the asserting of the incorporeity and ingenerability of souls, and the rejecting of those fantastic entities of forms and real qualities of bodies, and resolving all corporeal phenomena into figures or atoms, and the different apparitions or fancies caused by them. But the latter of these may be further confirmed from this passage of Aristotle's, where, after he had declared that Democritus and Leucippus made the soul and fire to consist of round atoms or figures, like those *ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα*, those *ramenta* that appear in the air when the sunbeams are transmitted through crannies; he adds, [1]*ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν, ἔθασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν, ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ, τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν.* And that which is said amongst the Pythagoreans seems to have the same sense, for some of them affirm, that the soul is those very *ξύσματα, ramenta*, or atoms; but others of them, that it is that which moves them:—which latter doubtless were the genuine Pythagoreans. However, it is plain, from hence, that the old Pythagoreans physiologized by *ξύσματα*, as well as Democritus; that is, figures and atoms, and not qualities and forms.

But Aristotle's Materialists, on the contrary, taking it for granted, that matter, or extended bulk, is the only substance, and that the qualities and forms of bodies are entities really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site, motion, or rest: and finding

[1] Nat. Ausc. l. 1. c. 2. [This reference is a mistake, for the passage is lib. 1. de Anima, cap. ii. p. 4. tom. ii. oper.

also, by experience, that these were continually generated and corrupted, as likewise that life, sense, and understanding were produced in the bodies of such animals, where it had not been before, and again extinguished at the death or corruption of them, concluded, that the souls of all animals, as well as those other qualities and forms of bodies, were generated out of the matter, and corrupted again into it; and, consequently, that every thing that is in the whole world, besides the substance of matter, was made or generated, and might be again corrupted.

Of this Atheistic doctrine, Aristotle speaks elsewhere, as in his book *De Cœlo.*[1] *εἰσι γάρ τινες οἳ φασὶν, οὐθὲν ἀγέννετον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι· μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες· οἱ δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαί τε φασὶ, καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθὲν· ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν·* There are some who affirm, that nothing is ingenerable, but that all things are made; as Hesiod especially, and also among the rest they who first physiologized, whose meaning was, that all other things are made (or generated) and did flow, none of them having any stability; only that there was one thing (namely, matter) which always remained, out of which all those other things were transformed and metamorphosed.—Though, as to Hesiod, Aristotle afterwards speaks differently. So likewise in his Physics, after he had declared, that some of the ancients made air, some water, and some other matter, the principle of all things; he adds, [2]*τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων, καὶ ἕξεις, καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τούτων μὲν ὅτιοῦν εἶναι ἀΐδιον· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις·* This they affirmed to be all the substance or essence that was; but all other things, the passions, affections, and dispositions of it; and that this, therefore, was eternal, as being capable of no change, but all other things infinitely generated and corrupted.—

XV. But these Materialists being sometimes assaulted by the other Italic philosophers, in the manner before declared, that no real entities, distinct from the modifications of any substance, could be generated or corrupted, because nothing could come from nothing, nor go to nothing; they would not seem plainly to contradict that theorem, but only endeavored to interpret it into a compliance with their own hypothesis, and distinguish concerning the sense of it in this manner: that it ought to be understood only of the substance of matter, and nothing else, viz. that no matter could be made or corrupted, but that all other things whatsoever, not only forms and qualities of bodies, but also souls; life,

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[1] L. 3. c. 1. p. 668. tom. i. oper. [2] L. 2. c. 1. p. 463. oper.

sense, and understanding, though really different from magnitude, figure, site, and motion, yet ought to be accounted only the *πάθη*, the passions and accidents of this matter, and therefore might be generated out of it, and corrupted again into it, and that without the production or destruction of any real entity, matter being the only thing that is accounted such. All this we learn from these words of Aristotle,[1] *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης· ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτη φαμὲν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι ἁπλῶς ὅναν γίγνεται καλὸς ἢ μουσικός, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις, διὰ τὸ ὑπομένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸν Σωκράτη αὐτόν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ἢ μίαν, ἢ πλείους μιᾶς, ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται τὰ ἄλλα, σωζομένης ἐκείνης·* The sense whereof is this: And, therefore, as to that axiom of some philosophers, that nothing is either generated or destroyed, these Materialists admit it to be true in respect of the substance of matter only, which is always preserved the same; as, say they, we do not say, that Socrates is simply or absolutely made, when he is made either handsome or musical, or that he is destroyed when he loseth those dispositions, because the subject Socrates still remains the same; so neither are we to say, that any thing else is absolutely either generated or corrupted, because the substance or matter of every thing always continues. For there must needs be some certain nature, from which all other things are generated, that still remaining one and the same.—

We have noted this passage of Aristotle's the rather, because this is just the very doctrine of Atheists at this day; that the substance of matter or extended bulk is the only real entity, and therefore the only unmade thing, that is neither generable nor creatable, but necessarily existent from eternity; but whatever else is in the world, as life and animality, soul and mind, being all but accidents and affections of this matter (as if therefore they had no real entity at all in them,) are generable out of nothing and corruptible into nothing, so long as the matter, in which they are, still remains the same. The result of which is no less than this, that there can be no other gods or god, than such as was at first made or generated out of senseless matter, and may be corrupted again into it. And here indeed lies the grand mystery of Atheism, that every thing besides the substance of matter is made or generated, and may be again unmade or corrupted.

However, Anaxagoras, though an Ionic philosopher, and therefore, as shall be declared afterwards, successor to those Atheistic Material-

[1] Metaph. l. 1. c. 3. p. 264. tom. iv. oper.

ists, was at length so far convinced by that Pythagoric doctrine, that no entity could be naturally generated out of nothing, as that he departed from his predecessors herein, and did for this reason acknowledge mind and soul, that is, all cogitative being, to be a substance really distinct from matter, neither generable out of it nor corruptible into it; as also that the forms and qualities of bodies (which he could not yet otherwise conceive of than as things really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site, and motion,) must for the same cause pre-exist before generations in certain similar atoms, and remain after corruptions, being only secreted and concreted in them. By means whereof he introduced a certain spurious Atomism of his own; for whereas the genuine Atomists before his time had supposed *ὄγκους ἀνομοίους*, dissimilar atoms,—devoid of all forms and qualities, to be the principles of all bodies, Anaxagoras substituted in the room of them his *ὁμοιομέρεια*, his similar atoms,—endued from eternity with all manner of forms and qualities incorruptibly.

XVI. We have made it manifest, that those Material philosophers, described by Aristotle, were absolute Atheists, not merely because they made body to be the only substance, though that be a thing, which Aristotle himself justly reprehends them for also in these words of his,[1] *ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἕν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν, καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι, τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶνδε ἀσωμάτων οὔ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων·* They who suppose the world to be one uniform thing, and acknowledge only one nature as the matter, and this corporeal or indued with magnitude, it is evident, that they err many ways, and particularly in this, that they set down only the elements of bodies, and not of incorporeal things, though there be also things incorporeal.—I say, we have not concluded them Atheists, merely for this reason, because they denied incorporeal substance, but because they deduced all things whatsoever from dead and stupid matter, and made every thing in the world, besides the bare substance of matter, devoid of all quality, generable and corruptible.

Now we shall take notice of an objection, made by some late writers, against this Aristotelic accusation of the old philosophers, founded upon a passage of Aristotle's own, who elsewhere, in his book *De Cœlo*,[2] speaking of the heaven or world, plainly affirms, *γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν*, that all the philosophers before himself did assert

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[1] Metaph. l. 1. c. 7. p. 274. tom. iv. oper.

[2] L. 1. c. 10. p. 132. tom. i. oper.

the world to have been made, or have had a beginning.—From whence these writers infer, that therefore they must needs be all Theists, and hold the Divine creation of the world; and consequently, that Aristotle contradicts himself, in representing many of them as Atheists, acknowledging only one material principle of the whole universe, without any intending or efficient cause. But we cannot but pronounce this to be a great error in these writers, to conclude all those, who held the world to have been made, therefore to have been Theists; whereas it is certain on the contrary, that all the first and most ancient Atheists did (in Aristotle's language) *κοσμοποιεῖν ἢ γεννᾷν τὸν κόσμον*, make or generate to the world,—that is, suppose it not to have been from eternity, but to have had a temporary beginning; as likewise that it was corruptible, and would, some time or other, have an end again. The sense of which Atheistic philosophers is represented by Lucretius in this manner:[1]

> Et quoniam docui, mundi mortalia templa
> Esse, et nativo consistere corpore cœlum,
> Et quæcunque in eo fiunt, fientque, necesse
> Esse ea dissolvi.

And there seems to be indeed a necessity, in reason, that they, who derive all things from a fortuitous principle, and hold every thing besides the substance of matter to have been generated, should suppose the world to have been generated likewise, as also to be corruptible. Wherefore, it may well be reckoned for one of the vulgar errors, that all Atheists held the eternity of the world.

Moreover, when Aristotle subjoins immediately after, *ἀλλὰ γενόμενον, οἱ μὲν ἀΐδιον, οἱ δὲ φθαρτὸν*, that though the ancient philosophers all held the world to have been made, yet, notwithstanding, they were divided in this, that some of them supposed, for all that, that it would continue to eternity such as it is, others, that it would be corrupted again; the former of these, who conceived the world to be *γενόμενον*, but *ἀΐδιον*, made, but eternal, were none of them Atheists, but all Theists. Such as Plato, whom Aristotle seems particularly to perstringe for this, who in his Timæus introduceth the supreme Deity bespeaking those inferior gods, the sun, moon, and stars (supposed by that philosopher to be animated) after this manner:[2] *ἃ δὴ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα, ἄλυτα, ἐμοῦγε θέλοντος, τὸ μὲν οὖν δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν· τόγε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ, λύειν ἐθέλειν, κακοῦ· δὴ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ, οὐδ' ἄλυτοι*

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[1] Lib. vi. ver. 43. Adde lib. v. ver. 236.

[2] Timæ. p. 41. Ser.

τὸ πάμπαν· οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας· τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες· Those things, which are made by me, are indissoluble by my will; and though every thing which is compacted, be in its own nature dissolvable, yet it is not the part of one that is good, to will the dissolution or destruction of any thing that was once well made. Wherefore, though you are not absolutely immortal, nor altogether indissolvable, yet notwithstanding you shall not be dissolved, nor ever die; my will being a stronger band to hold you together, than any thing else can be to loosen you.—Philo and other Theists followed Plato in this, asserting, that though the world was made, yet it would never be corrupted, but have a post-eternity. Whereas all the ancient Atheists, namely, those who derived the original of things from nature and fortune, did at once deny both eternities to the world, past and future. Though we cannot say, that none but Atheists did this; for Empedocles and Heraclitus, and afterward the Stoics, did not only suppose the world likewise generated, and to be again corrupted, but also that this had been, and would be done over and over again, in infinite vicissitudes.

Furthermore, as the world's eternity was generally opposed by all the ancient Atheists, so it was maintained also by some Theists, and that not only Aristotle,[1] but also before him, by Ocellus Lucanus[2] at least, though Aristotle thought not fit to take any notice of him; as likewise the latter Platonists universally went that way, yet so, as that they always supposed the world to have as much depended upon the Deity, as if it had been once created out of nothing by it.

To conclude, therefore: neither they, who asserted the world's generation and temporary beginning, were all Theists, nor they, who maintained its eternity, all Atheists; but before Aristotle's time, the Atheists universally, and most of the Theists, did both alike conclude the world to have been made; the difference between them lying in this, that the one affirmed the world to have been made by God, the other by the fortuitous motion of matter.

Wherefore, if we would put another difference betwixt the Theists and Atheists here, as to this particular, we must distinguish betwixt the system of the world and the substance of the matter. For the ancient Atheists, though they generally denied the eternity of the world, yet they supposed the substance of the matter, not only to have been eter-

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[1] Physic. Auscultat. lib. viii.

[2] περὶ πάντων φύσεως, inter Scriptor. Mythol. a Tho. Gale editos. p. 501.

nal, but also self-existent and independent upon any other Being; they making it the first principle and original of all things, and consequently the only Numen. Whereas the genuine Theists, though many of them maintained the world's eternity, yet they all concluded, both the form and substance of it to have always depended upon the Deity, as the light doth upon the sun; the Stoics with some others being here excepted.

XVII. Aristotle tells us, some were of opinion, that this Atheistic philosophy, which derives all things from senseless and stupid matter in the way of forms and qualities, was of great antiquity, and as old as any records of time amongst the Greeks; and not only so, but also that the ancient Theologers themselves entertained it:[1] *Εἰσὶ δέ τινες, οἱ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως, καὶ πρώτους θολογήσαντας, οὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως διαλαβεῖν· Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τήθυν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν· τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον· ὅρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν.* There are some who conceive, that even the most ancient of all, and the most remote from this present generation, and they also who first theologized, did physiologize after this manner; forasmuch as they made the Ocean and Tethys to have been the original of generation; and for this cause the oath of the gods is said to be by water (called by the poets Styx,) as being that from which they all derived their original. For an oath ought to be by that, which is most honorable; and that which is most ancient, is most honorable.—In which words it is very probable, that Aristotle aimed at Plato; however, it is certain, that Plato, in his Thoætetus,[2] affirms this Atheistic doctrine to have been very ancient, *ὅτι πάντα ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως,* that all things were the offspring of flux and motion,—that is, that all things were made and generated out of matter; and that he chargeth Homer with it, in deriving the original of the gods themselves in like manner from the Ocean (or floating matter) in this verse of his,

Ὠκεαιόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,

The father of all gods the Ocean is,
Tethys their mother.

Wherefore, these indeed seem to have been the ancientest of all Atheists, who, though they acknowledged certain beings superior to men, which they called by the name of gods, did notwithstanding really

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[1] Met. l. 1. c. 3. tom. iv. oper. p. 265. [2] P. 118.

deny a God, according to the true notion of him, deriving the original of all things whatsoever in the universe from the ocean, that is, fluid matter, or, which is all one, from night and chaos; and supposing all their gods to have been made and generated, and consequently to be mortal and corruptible. Of which Atheistic theology Aristophanes gives us the description in his Aves,[1] after this manner: "That at first was nothing but Night and Chaos, which laying an egg, from thence was produced Love, that mingling again with Chaos, begot heaven, and earth, and animals, and all the gods."

Χάος ἦν, καὶ νύξ, ἔρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον, καὶ Τάρταρος εὐρύς.
Γῆ δ', οὐδ' ἀὴρ, οὐδ' οὐρανὸς ἦν· ἐρέβους δ' ἐν ἀπείροσι κόλποις
Τίκτει πρώτιστον ὑπηνέμιον νὺξ ἡ μελανόπτερος ᾠόν.
Ἐξ οὗ περιτελλομέναις ὥραις ἔβλαστεν Ἔρως ὁ ποθεινός.
Στίλβων νῶτον πτερύγοιν χρυσαῖν· εἰκὼς ἀνεμώκεσι δίναις.
Οὗτος δὲ χάει πτερόεντί μιγεὶς νυχίῳ, κατὰ Τάρταρον εὐρὺν,
Ἐνεόττευσε γένος ἡμέτερον, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνήγαγεν ἐς φῶς,
Πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν Ἔρως συνέμιξεν ἅπαντα.

First, all was chaos, one confused heap;
Darkness enwrapt the disagreeing deep;
In a mixt crowd the jumbling elements were,
Nor earth, nor air, nor heaven did appear;
Till on this horrid vast abyss of things,
Teeming Night, spreading o'er her coal-black wings,
Laid the first egg; whence, after time's due course,
Issu'd forth Love (the world's prolific source)
Glistening with golden wings; which fluttering o'er
Dark Chaos, gendered all the numerous store
Of animals and gods, etc.

And whereas the poet there makes the birds to have been begotten between love and chaos before all the gods; though one might think this to have been done jocularly by him, merely to humor his plot; yet Salmasius[2] conceives, and not without some reason, that it was really a piece of the old Atheistic cabala, which therefore seems to have run thus: That chaos or matter confusedly moved being the first original of all, things did from thence rise up gradually from lesser to greater perfection. First, inanimate things, as the elements, heaven, earth,

[1] Ver. 694. p. 404. edit. Kusteri.

[2] Exercitat. Plinian. in Solinum, tom. i. p. 309.

and seas; then brute animals; afterwards men, and last of all the gods. As if not only the substance of matter, and those inanimate bodies of the elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, according to the sense of those Atheistic theologers,[1] *φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα,* first in order of nature before God, as being themselves also gods,—but also brute animals at least, if not men too. And this is the Atheistic creation of the world, gods and all, out of senseless and stupid matter, or dark chaos, as the only original Numen; the perfectly inverted order of the universe.

XVIII. But though this hypothesis be purely atheistical, that makes Love, which is supposed to be the original deity, to have itself sprung at first from an egg of the night; and, consequently, that all deity was the creature or offspring of matter and chaos, or dark fortuitous nature; yet Aristotle somewhere conceives, that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, and some others, who did in like manner make Love the supreme deity, and derive all things from Love and Chaos, were to be exempted out of the number of those Atheistic Materialists before described; forasmuch as they seemed to understand by love, an active principle and cause of motion in the universe; which, therefore, could not spring from an egg of the night, nor be the creature of matter, but must needs be something independent on it, and in order of nature before it: [2]*ὑποπτεύσειε δ' ἄν τις, Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος, Ἔρωτα ἢ Ἐπιθυμίαν, ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχήν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης. Καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν,*

Πρώτιστον μὲν (φησὶν) ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.

Ἡσίοδος δὲ,

Πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γενετ' · αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ εὐρύστερνος,———
Ἠδ' ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν.

ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αἰτίαν, ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνέξει τὰ πράγματα · τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι περὶ τοῦ τις πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον · One would suspect, that Hesiod, and if there be any other who made love or desire a principle of things in the universe, aimed at this very thing (namely, the settling of another active principle besides matter:) for Parmenides, describing the generation of the universe, makes Love to be the senior of all the gods; and Hesiod, after he had

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1 De Gen. et Cor. lib. 2. c. 6. p. 735. tom. i. oper.

2 Aristot. Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iv. p. 267.

mentioned chaos, introducing Love as the supreme Deity. As intimating herein, that besides matter, there ought to be another cause or principle, that should be the original of motion and activity, and also hold and conjoin all things together. But how these two principles are to be ordered, and which of them was to be placed first, whether Love or Chaos, may be judged of afterwards.—In which latter words Aristotle seems to intimate, that Love, as taken for an active principle, was not to be supposed to spring from Chaos, but rather to be in the order of nature before it: and, therefore, by this love of theirs must needs be meant the Deity. And, indeed, Simmias Rhodius, in his Wings, a hymn made in honor of this Love, that is senior to all the gods, and a principle in the universe, tells us plainly, that it is not Cupid, Venus's soft and effeminate son, but another kind of love:

Οὔτί γε Κύπριδος παῖς·
Ὠκυπέτας δ' αὐτὸς Ἔρως καλεῦμαι
Οὔτι γὰρ ἔκρινα βιάζειν, παράγω δὲ πειθοῖ
Γαῖα, θαλάσσας τε μυχοὶ, οὐρανίων πᾶς τε θεός μοι ἔκει,
Τῶν δ' ἐγὼν ἐκνοσφισάμην ὠγύγιον σκᾶπτρον, ἐκρᾳηνά τέ σφιν θέμιστας.

I'm not that wanton boy,
The sea-froth goddess's only joy.
Pure heavenly Love I hight, and my
Soft magic charms, not iron bands, fast tye
Heaven, earth, and seas. The gods themselves do readily
Stoop to my laws. The world dances to my harmony.

Moreover, this cannot be that Love neither, which is described in Plato's *Symposium*, (as some learned men have conceived), that was begotten between Penia and Porus, this being not a divine but Demoniac thing (as the philosopher there declares), no God, but a demon only, or of a middle nature. For it is nothing but *φιλοκαλία*, or the love of pulchritude as such, which, though rightly used, may perhaps wing and inspire the mind to noble and generous attempts, and beget a scornful disdain in it of mean, dirty, and sordid things; yet is capable of being abused also, and then it will strike downward into brutishness and sensuality. But at best it is an affection belonging only to imperfect and parturient beings; and therefore could not be the first principle of all things. Wherefore, we see no very great reason but that, in a rectified and qualified sense, this may pass for true theology; that Love is the supreme Deity and original of all things; namely, if it be meant eternal, self-originated, intellectual Love, or essential and

substantial goodness, that having an infinite overflowing fulness and fecundity, dispenses itself uninvidiously, according to the best wisdom, sweetly governs all, without any force or violence (all things being naturally subject to its authority, and readily obeying its laws), and reconciles the whole world into harmony. For the Scripture telling us, that God is love, seems to warrant thus much to us, that love in some rightly qualified sense is God.

XIX. But we are to omit the fabulous age, and to descend to the philosophical, to inquire there, who they were among the professed philosophers, who atheized in that manner before described. It is true, indeed, that Aristotle, in other places, accuses Democritus and Leucippus of the very same thing, that is, of assigning only a material cause of the universe, and giving no account of the original of motion; but yet it is certain, that these were not the persons intended by him here; those which he speaks of being *τινὲς τῶν πρότων φιλοσοφήσαντων*, some of the first and most ancient philosophers of all.—Moreover, it appears by the description of them, that they were such as did not philosophize in the way of atoms, but resolved all things whatsoever in the universe into *ὕλη* and *πάθη τῆς ὕλης*, matter, and the passions or affections, qualities and forms of matter; so that they were not Atomical, but Hylopathian philosophers. These two, the old Materialists and the Democritics, did both alike derive all things from dead and stupid matter, fortuitously moved; and the difference between them was only this, that the Democritics managed this business in the way of atoms, the other in the more vulgar way of qualities and forms: so that, indeed, this is really but one and the same Atheistic hypothesis, in two several schemes. And as one of them is called the Atomic Atheism, so the other, for distinction sake, may be called the Hylopathian.

XX. Now Aristotle tells us plainly, that these Hylopathian Atheists of his were all the first philosophers of the Ionic order and succession, before Anaxagoras. Wherefore Thales being the head, he is consentaneously thereunto by Aristotle made to be *ἄρχηγος τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας*, the prince and leader of this kind of Atheistical philosophy, —he deriving all things whatsoever, as Homer had done before him, from water, and acknowledging no other principle but the fluid matter.

Notwithstanding which accusation of Aristotle's, Thales is far otherwise represented by good authors: Cicero[1] telling us, that, besides water which he made to be the original of all corporeal things, he asserted also mind for another principle, which formed all things out of water; and

[1] De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2894. tom. ix. oper.

Laertius[1] and Plutarch[2] recording, that he was thought to be the first of all philosophers, who determined souls to be immortal. He is said also to have affirmed,[3] that God was πρεσβύτατον πάντων, the oldest of all things, and that the world was ποιήμα θεοῦ, the workmanship of God. —Clemens[4] likewise tells us, that being asked, εἰ λανθάνει τὸ θεῖον πράσσων τι ὁ ἄνθρωπος; καὶ πῶς, εἶπεν, ὅσγε οὐδὲ διανοούμενος· whether any of a man's actions could be concealed from the Deity? he replied, not so much as any thought.—Moreover, Laertius[5] further writes of him, that he held τὸν κόσμον ἔμψυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη, that the world was animated, and full of demons.—Lastly, Aristotle[6] himself elsewhere speaks of him as a Theist; καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες ψυχὴν μεμίχθαι φασίν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ὠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. Some think (saith he) that soul and life is mingled with the whole universe; and thence, perhaps, was that of Thales, that all things are full of gods. Wherefore, we conceive, that there is very good reason, why Thales should be acquitted from this accusation of Atheism. Only we shall observe the occasion of his being thus differently represented, which seems to have been this; because as Laertius[7] and Themistius[8] intimate, he left no philosophic writings or monuments of his own behind him (Anaximander being the first of all the philosophic writers:) whence probably it came to pass, that, in after times, some did interpret his philosophy one way, some another; and that he is sometimes represented as a Theist, and sometimes again as a downright Atheist.

But, though Thales be thus by good authority acquitted, yet his next successor, Anaximander, can by no means be excused from this imputation; and, therefore, we think it more reasonable to fasten that imputation upon him, which Aristotle bestows upon Thales, that he was ἄρχηγος τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας, the prince and founder of this Atheistic philosophy;—who derived all things from matter, in the way of forms and qualities; he supposing a certain infinite *materia prima*, which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but indifferent to every thing, or a mixture of all, to be the only principle of the universe, and leading

[1] Lib. i. segm. 24. p. 16.

[2] De Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. ii. p. 908. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Diog. Laert. lib. i. segm. 35. p. 21. et Plutarch. in Convivio septem sapientum, p. 153. tom. ii. oper.

[4] Clemens Alex. Stromat. lib. v. p. 704, edit. Potteri.

[5] Lib. i. segm. 27. p. 18.

[6] De Anima, lib. i. cap. p. 17. tom. ii. oper.

[7] Lib. i. segm. 23. p. 15. [8] Orat. xxvi. p. 317. edit. Harduin.

a train of many other Atheists after him, such as Hippo, surnamed ἄθεος by Simplicius and others, Anaximenes, and Diogenes Apolloniates, and many more; who though they had some petty differences amongst themselves, yet all agreed in this one thing, that matter devoid of understanding and life, was the first principle of all things; till at length Anaxagoras stopped this Atheistic current amongst these Ionic philosophers, introducing mind as a principle of the universe.

XXI. But there is a passage in Aristotle's Physics, which seems at first sight to contradict this again; and to make Anaximander also not to have been an Atheist, but a Divine philosopher: where, having declared that several of the ancient physiologers made ἄπειρον, or Infinite, to be the principle of all things, he subjoins these words, διὸ καθάπερ λέγομεν, οὐ ταύτης ἀρχὴ, ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾷν, ὥς φασὶν ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλας αἰτίας, οἷον νοῦν, ἢ φιλίαν. Καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὥσπερ φησὶν ὁ Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων· Therefore, there seems to be no principle of this Infinite, but this to be the principle of other things, and to contain all things, and govern all things, as they all say, who do not make, besides infinite, any other causes, such as mind or friendship; and that is the only real Numen or God in the world, it being immortal and incorruptible, as Anaximander affirms, and most of the physiologers.—From which place some late writers have confidently concluded, that Anaximander, with those other physiologers there mentioned, did, by Infinite, understand God, according to the true notion of him, or an Infinite Mind, the efficient cause of the universe, and not senseless and stupid matter; since this could not be said to be immortal, and to govern all things; and, consequently, that Aristotle grossly contradicts himself, in making all those Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras to have been mere Materialists or Atheists. And it is possible, that Clemens Alexandrinus also might from this very passage of Aristotle's, not sufficiently considered, have been induced to rank Anaximander amongst the Divine philosophers, as he doth in his Protreptic to the Greeks; where, after he had condemned certain of the old philosophers as Atheistic Corporealists, he subjoins these words: [1]τῶν δὲ ἄλλων φιλοσόφων, ὅσοι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὑπερβάντες, ἐπολυπραγμόνησάν τι ὑψηλότερον καὶ περιττότερον, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπειρον καθύμνησαν, ὧν Ἀναξίμανδρος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἦν, καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος, καὶ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Ἀρχέλαος. But of the other philosophers, who transcending all the elements, searched after some higher

[1] Clem. Prot. p. 43. cap. v. p. 57. tom. i. oper.

and more excellent thing, some of them praised Infinite, amongst which was Anaximander the Milesian, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, and the Athenian Archelaus.—As if these three had all alike acknowledged an incorporeal Deity, and made an infinite mind, distinct from matter, the first original of all things.

But that forecited passage of Aristotle's alone, well considered, will itself afford a sufficient confutation of this opinion; where Animaxander, with those other physiologers, is plainly opposed to Anaxagoras, who, besides infinite senseless matter, or similar atoms, made mind to be a principle of the universe, as also to Empedocles, who made a plastic life and nature, called friendship, another principle of the corporeal world; from whence it plainly follows, that Anaximander and the rest supposed not infinite mind, but infinite matter, without either mind or plastic matter, to have been the only original of all things, and therefore the only Deity or Numen.

Moreover, Democritus being linked in the context with Animaxander, as making both of them alike, τὸ ἄπειρον, or Infinite, to be the first principle of all; it might as well be inferred from this place, that Democritus was a genuine Theist, as Anaximander. But as Democritus's only principle was infinite atoms, without any thing of mind or plastic nature; so likewise was Anaximander's an infinity of senseless stupid matter; and, therefore, they were both of them Atheists alike, though Animaxander, in the cited words, had the honor (if it may be so called) to be only named, as being the most ancient of all those Atheistical physiologers, and the ringleader of them.

XXII. Neither ought it at all to seem strange, that Anaximander, and those other Atheistical Materialists, should call infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, the τὸ θεῖον, the Deity or Numen, since to all those, who deny a God (according to the true notion of him), whatsoever else they substitute in his room, by making it the first principle of all things, though it be senseless and stupid matter, yet this must needs be accounted the only Numen, and divinest thing of all.

Nor is it to be wondered at neither, that this infinite, being understood of matter, should be said to be not only incorruptible, but also immortal, these two being often used as synonymous and equivalent expressions. For thus in Lucretius,[1] the corruption of all inanimate bodies is called death:

——————Mors ejus quod fuit ante;

And again,

[1] Lib. i. vers. 672.

[1] Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam aliena.

In like manner mortal is used by him for corruptible :

[2] Nam siquid mortale a cunctis partibus esset,
Ex oculis res quæque repente erepta periret.

And this kind of language was very familiar with Heraclitus,[3] as appears from these passages of his, *πυρὸς θάνατος, ἀέρι γένεσις· καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις·* The death of fire is generation to air ; and the death of air is generation to water ;—that is, the corruption of them. And again, *ψυχῇσιν θάνατος, ὕδωρ γένεσθαι· ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος, γῆν γενέσθαι·* It is death to vapor or air, to be made water ; and death to water, to be made earth.—In which Heraclitus did but imitate Orpheus, as appears from this verse of his, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus :[4]

Ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῇ, θάνατος δ' ὑδάτεσσιν ἀμοιβή·

Besides which, there are many examples of this use of the word *ἀθάνατος*, in other Greek writers, and some in Aristotle[5] himself, who, speaking of the heavens, attributes *ἀθανασία* and *ἀδιότης* to them, as one and the same thing ; and also affirms, that the ancients therefore made heaven to be the seat of the Deity, *ὡς ὄντα μόνον ἀθάνατον*, as being only immortal,—that is, incorruptible.

Indeed, that other expression, at first sight, would stagger one more, where it is said of this *ἄπειρον*, or infinite,—that it doth not only contain, but also govern all things : but Simplicius[6] tells us, that this is to be understood likewise of matter, and that no more was meant by it, than that all things were derived from it, and depended on it, as the first principle ; *ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῖς τοιούτοις περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ τῶν ὑπερ φύσιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ περιέχειν ἔλεγον καὶ κυβερνᾶν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιέχειν ὑπάρχει τῷ ὑλικῷ αἰτίῳ, ὡς διὰ πάντα χωροῦντι, τὸ δὲ κυβερνᾶν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα αὐτοῦ, τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένων·* These philosophers spake only of natural principles, and not of supernatural ; and though they say, that this infinite of theirs does

[1] Lib. i. vers. 264, 265. [2] Lib. i. vers. 219.

[3] Vide Henr. Stephan. in Poesi Philosophic. p. 137.

[4] Stromat. lib. vi. cap. ii. p. 476.

[5] De Cœlo, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 614, 615. tom. i. oper.

[6] Commentar. in octo Libros Physic. Auscultat. Aristot. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 32. edit. Aldin.

both contain and govern all things, yet this is not at all to be wondered at; forasmuch as containing belongs to the material cause, as that which goes through all things, and likewise governing, as that from which all things, according to a certain aptitude of it, are made.—Philoponus[1] (who was a Christian) represents Aristotle's sense in this whole place more fully, after this manner: "Those of the ancient physiologers, who had no respect to any active efficient cause, as Anaxagoras had to mind, and Empedocles to friendship and contention, supposed matter to be the only cause of all things; and that it was infinite in magnitude, ingenerable and incorruptible, esteeming it to be a certain Divine thing, which did govern all, or preside over the compages of the universe, and to be immortal, that is, undestroyable. This Anaximenes said to be air, Thales to be water, but Anaximander, a certain middle thing; some one thing, and some another." *Καὶ οὐδὲν γε θαυμαστόν φησιν, ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς περόδῳ τοὺς πρώτους μὴ ἐπιστήσαντας τῇ ἐφευτηκυία τῶν ὅλων δυνάμει, ἓν τῶν στοιχείων, ὅπερ ἄν ὑπόπτευεν ἕκαστος, αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις τε εἶναι, τοῦτο εὐθὺς καὶ Θεὸν ὑπονοῆσας·* And Aristotle in this passage tells us, that it is no wonder, if they, who did not attend to the active cause, that presides over the universe, did look upon some one of the elements (that which each of them thought to be the cause of all other things) as God. But as they, considering only the material principle, conceived that to be the cause of all things; so Anaxagoras supposed mind to be the principle of all things, and Empedocles, friendship and contention.—

XXIII. But to make it further appear that Anaximander's philosophy was purely Atheistical, we think it convenient to show what account is given of it by other writers. Plutarch in his Placita Philosophorum, does at once briefly represent the Anaximandrian philosophy, and censure it after this manner:[2] *Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι, τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο πάντα φθείρεσθαι, διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους, καὶ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι· λέγει οὖν διά τι ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἐλλείπῃ ἡ γένεσις ἡ ὑφισταμένη· ἁμαρτάνει δὲ οὗτος, τὴν μὲν ὕλην ἀποφαινόμενος, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αἴτιον ἀναιρῶν, τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἢ ὕλη ἐστίν· οὐ δύναται δὲ ἡ ὕλη εἶναι ἐνέργεια, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ὑποκέηται·* Anaximander the Milesian affirms Infinite to be the first principle; and that all things are generated out of it, and corrupted again into it; and therefore that infinite worlds are succes-

[1] Comment. in iv. primos Libros Physicor. lib. i. cap. iii. a. 10. Adde cap. i. edit. Græcæ Venet. 1535, fol.

[2] Lib. i. c. iii. p. 875. tom. ii. oper.

sively generated and corrupted. And he gives the reason why it is infinite, that so there might be never any fail of generations. But he erreth in this, that assigning only a material cause, he takes away the active principle of things. For Anaximander's Infinite is nothing else but matter; but matter can produce nothing, unless there be also an active cause.—Where he shows also, how Anaximenes followed Anaximander herein, in assigning only a material cause of the universe, without any efficient: though he derived from him, in making the first matter to be air, and deriving all things from thence by rarefaction and condensation. Thus, we see, it is plain, that Anaximander's Infinite was no infinite mind, which is the true Deity, but only infinite matter, devoid of any life or active power. Eusebius is more particular in giving an account of Anaximander's Cosmopœia; [1]*τὸ ἄπειρον φύναι τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τοῦ πάντος γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς, ἐξ οὗ δή φησι τούς τε οὐρανοὺς ἀποκεκρίσθαι, καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπείρους ὄντας κόσμους· φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀϊδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ, κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῖδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι, καὶ τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι, ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν· ἧς τινος ἀπορραγείσης καὶ εἴς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους, ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὴν σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας·* Anaximander affirms Infinite (matter) to be the only cause of the generation and corruption of all things; and that the heavens, and infinite worlds, were made out of it, by way of secretion or segregation. Also that those generative principles of heat and cold, that were contained in it from eternity, being segregated when the world was made, a certain sphere or flame of fire did first arise and encompass the air, which surrounds this earth (as a bark doth a tree), which being afterwards broken, and divided into smaller spherical bodies, constituted the sun and moon and all the stars.—Which Anaximandrian Cosmopœa was briefly hinted at by Aristotle in these words, [2]*οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς, ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας, ἐκρίνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι·* Some philosophers generate the world by the secretion and segregation of inexistent contrarieties, as Anaximander speaks.—And elsewhere in his Metaphysics,[3] he takes notice of *Ἀναξιμάνδρου το μίγμα*, Anaximander's mixture of things. —Whence we conclude, that Anaximander's Infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually or potentially, contained all manner of qualities; by the fortuitous secretion and segregation of which, he supposed infinite worlds to be successively generated and corrupted. So that we may now easily guess, whence

[1] Ev. præp. l. i. p. 15. ed. Steph. [2] Phys. l. i. c. 4. [3] Lib. xiv. c. 4.

Leucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how near akin these two Atheistic hypotheses were. But it will not be amiss to take notice also of that particular conceit, which Anaximander had, concerning the first origin of brute animals, and mankind. Of the former, Plutarch gives us this account: [1] *Ἀνξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῷ γεννηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῶα, φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώδεσι, προβαινούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον, καὶ περιῤῥηγνυμένου τοῦ φλοιοῦ, ἐπὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον μεταβιῶναι·* That the first animals were generated in moisture, and encompassed about with certain thorny barks, by which they were guarded and defended; which, after further growth, coming to be more dry and cracking, they issued forth, but lived only a short time after.—And as for the first original of men, Eusebius represents his sense thus: [2] *Ἐξ ἀλλοειδῶν ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεννήθη, ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολυχρονίου δεῖσθαι τιθηνήσεως, διὸ καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι·* Men were at first generated in the bellies of other animals, forasmuch as all other animals, after they are brought forth, are quickly able to feed and nourish themselves, but man alone needs to be nursed up a long time; and therefore could not be preserved at first, in any other way.—But Plutarch expresseth this something more particularly: [3] *Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ἰχθύσιν ἐγγενέσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ τραφέντας καὶ γενομένους ἱκανοὺς ἑαυτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἐκβληθῆναι τηνικαῦτα καὶ γῆς λαβέσθαι.* Anaximander concludes that men were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and being there nourished, till they grew strong, and were able to shift for themselves, they were afterward cast out upon dry land.—Lastly, Anaximander's theology is thus both represented to us, and censured, by Velleius, the Epicurean philosopher in Cicero: [4] "Anaximandri opinio est nativos esse deos, longis intervallis orientes occidentesque, eosque innumerabiles esse mundos; sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intelligere quî possumus?" Anaximander's opinion is, that the gods are native, rising and vanishing again, in long periods of times; and that these gods are innumerable worlds: but how can we conceive that to be a God, which is not eternal?—We learn from hence, that Anaximander did indeed so far comply with vulgar opinion, as that he retained the name of gods; but, however, that he really denied the existence of the thing itself, even according to the judgment of this Epicurean philosopher. Forasmuch as all his gods were native

[1] Pla. Ph. lib. v. c. xix. p. 908. tom. ii. oper. [2] E. P. lib. i.
[3] Symp. lib. 8. Q. 8. p. 730. tom. ii. oper.
[4] De Nat. D. lib. i. c. x. p. 2894. tom. ix. oper.

and mortal, and indeed nothing else, but those innumerable worlds, which he supposed in certain periods of time to be successively generated and destroyed. Wherefore, it is plain, that Anaximander's only real Numen, that is, his first principle, that was ingenerable and incorruptible, was nothing but infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, by the fortuitous secretion of whose inexistent qualities and parts, he supposed, first, the elements of earth, water, air, and fire, and then, the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and both bodies and souls of men and other animals, and lastly, innumerable or infinite such worlds as these, as so many secondary and native gods (that were also mortal,) to have been generated, according to that Atheistical hypothesis described in Plato.[1]

XXIV. It is certain, that the vulgar in all ages have been very ill judges of Theists and Atheists, they having condemned many hearty Theists, as guilty of Atheism, merely because they dissented from them in some of their superstitious rites and opinions. As for example; Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, though he was the first of all the Ionic philosophers (unless Thales ought to be excepted) who made an infinite mind to be a principle, that is, asserted a Deity, according to the true notion of it; yet he was, notwithstanding, generally cried down for an Atheist, merely because he affirmed the sun to be [2]*μύδρον διάπυρον*, a mass of fire, or a fiery globe, and the moon to be an earth;—that is, because he denied them to be animated and endued with understanding souls, and consequently to be gods. So likewise Socrates was both accused, and condemned, for atheistical impiety, as denying all gods, though nothing was pretended to be proved against him, but only this, that he did [3]*θεοὺς διδάσκειν μὴ νομίζειν, οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινὰ εἰςφέρειν*, teach that those were not true gods which the city worshipped, and in the room thereof introduce other new gods.—And lastly, the Christians in the primitive times, for the same reason, were vulgarly traduced for Atheists by the Pagans, as Justin Martyr declares in his Apology,[4] *ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι·* We are called Atheists; and we confess ourselves such, in respect of those gods which they worship, but not of the true God.—And as the vulgar have unjustly condemned many Theists for Atheists, so have they also acquitted many rank Atheists from the guilt of that crime, merely because they externally complied with them, in their religious worship, and forms of speech. Neither is it only the vulgar, that have been imposed upon herein, but also the generality of

[1] De Legibus, lib. x. p. 666. [2] Pla. Apol. Socr. p. 362. [3] Plat. Apol.
[4] P. 56. oper.

learned men, who have been commonly so superficial in this business, as that they have hardly taken notice of above three or four Atheists, that ever were in former times, as, namely, Diagoras, Theodorus, Euemerus, and Protagoras; whereas Democritus and Anaximander were as rank Atheists as any of them all, though they had the wit to carry themselves externally with more cautiousness. And indeed it was really one and the self-same form of Atheism, which both these entertained, they deriving all things alike, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, the difference between them being only this, that they managed it two different ways; Anaximander in the way of qualities and forms, which is the more vulgar and obvious kind of Atheism; but Democritus in the way of atoms and figures, which seems to be a more learned kind of Atheism.

And though we do not doubt at all, but that Plato, in his tenth De Legibus, where he attacks Atheism, did intend the confutation as well of the Democritic as the Anaximandrian Atheism; yet whether it were, because he had no mind to take any notice at all of Democritus, who is not so much as once mentioned by him any where, or else because he was not so perfectly acquainted with that Atomic way of physiologizing, certain it is, that he there describes the Atheistic hypothesis more according to the Anaximandrian than the Democritic form. For when he represents the Atheistic generation of heaven and earth, and all things in them, as resulting from the fortuitous commixture of hot and cold, hard and soft, moist and dry corpuscula; that is clearly more agreeable with the Anaximandrian generation of the world, by the secretion of inexistent contrarieties in the matter, than the Democritic Cosmopœia, by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities and forms.

Some indeed seem to call that scheme of Atheism, that deduces all things from matter, in the way of qualities and forms, by the name of Peripatetic, or Aristotelic Atheism; we suppose for this reason, because Aristotle physiologized in the way of forms and qualities, educing them out of the power of the matter. But since Aristotle himself cannot be justly taxed for an Atheist, this form of Theism ought rather, as we conceive, to be denominated from Anaximander, and called the Anaximandrian Atheism.

XXV. Now the reasons, why Democritus and Leucippus new-modelled Atheism, from the Anaximandrian and Hylopathian into the Atomic form, seems to have been chiefly these:—first, because they, being well instructed in that Atomic way of physiologizing, were really convinced, that it was not only more ingenious, but also more agreeable

to truth; the other, by real qualities and forms, seeming a thing unintelligible. Secondly, because they foresaw, as Lucretius intimates, that the production of forms and qualities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, would prepare an easy way for men's belief of a Divine creation and annihilation. And lastly, because, as we have already suggested, they plainly perceived, that these forms and qualities of matter were of a doubtful nature; and therefore, as they were sometimes made a shelter for Atheism, so they might also prove, on the contrary, an asylum for Corporeal Theism; in that it might possibly be supposed, that either the matter of the whole world, or else the more subtile and fiery part of it, was originally endued with an understanding form or quality, and consequently, the whole an animal or god. Wherefore, they took another more effectual course, to secure their Atheism, and exclude all possibility of a corporeal God, by deriving the original of all things from atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, and having nothing in them, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, as the first principles; it following unavoidably from thence, that life and understanding, as well as those other qualities, could be only accidental and secondary results from certain fortuitous concretions and contextures of atoms; so that the world could be made by no previous counsel or understanding, and therefore by no Deity.

XXVI. We have here represented three several forms of Atheism—the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, and the Stratonical. But there is yet another form of Atheism, different from them all, to be taken notice of, which is such, as supposes one kind of plastic and spermatic, methodical and artificial nature, but without any sense of conscious understanding, to preside over the whole world, and dispose and conserve all things, in that regular frame in which they are. Such a form of Atheism as this is hinted to us in that doubtful passage of Seneca's; [1] "Sive animal est mundus, (for so it ought to be read, and not *anima*) sive corpus natura gubernante, ut arbores ut sata;" whether the whole world be an animal (i. e. endued with one sentient and rational life,) or whether it be only a body governed by (a certain plastic and methodical, but senseless) nature, as trees, and other plants or vegetables. —In which words are two several hypotheses of the mundane system, skeptically proposed by one, who was a corporealist, and took it for granted that all was body. First, that the whole world, though having nothing but body in it, yet was notwithstanding an animal, as our human bodies are, endued with one sentient or rational life and nature,

[1] Nat. Quæst. l. 3. sect. 29.

one soul or mind, governing and ordering the whole. Which corporeal Cosmo-zoism we do not reckon amongst the forms of Atheism, but rather account it for a kind of spurious Theism, or Theism disguised in a Paganic dress, and not without a complication of many false apprehensions, concerning the Deity, in it. The second is, that the whole world is no animal, but, as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body endued with one plastic or spermatic nature, branching out the whole orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be accounted a form of Atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature.

XXVII. Now this form of Atheism, which supposes the whole world (there being nothing but body in it) not to be an animal, but only a great plant or vegetable, having one spermatic form, or plastic nature, which, without any conscious reason or understanding, orders the whole, though it have some nearer correspondence with that Hylozoic form of Atheism before described, in that it does not suppose nature to be a mere fortuitous, but a kind of artificial thing; yet it differs from it in this, that the Hylozoic supposing all matter, as such, to have life essentially belonging to it, must therefore needs attribute to every part of matter (or at least every particular totum, that is one by continuity) a distinct plastic life of its own, but acknowledge no one common life, as ruling over the whole corporeal universe; and consequently impute the original of all things (as hath been already observed) to a certain mixture of chance, and plastic or methodical nature, both together. Whereas the cosmo-plastic Atheism quite excludes fortune or chance, subjecting all things to the regular and orderly fate of one plastic or plantal nature, ruling over the whole. Thus that philosopher before mentioned concludes, that whether the world were an animal (in the Stoical sense) or whether it were a mere plant or vegetable, "Ab initio ejus usque ad exitum, quicquid facere, quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est. Ut in semine, omnis futuri ratio hominis comprehensa est. Et legem barbæ et canorum nondum natus infans habet; totius enim corporis, et sequentis ætatis, in parvo occultoque lineamenta sunt. Sic origo mundi non magis solem et lunam, et vices syderum, et animalium ortus, quam quibus mutarentur terranea, continuit. In his fuit inundatio, quæ non secus quam hyems, quam æstas, lege mundi venit." Whatsoever, from the beginning to the end of it, it can either do or suffer, it was all at first included in the nature of the whole; as in the seed is contained the whole delineation of the future man, and the em-

[1] Nat. Q. l. 3. c. 29.

bryo or unborn infant hath already in it the law of a beard and grey hairs; the lineaments of the whole body, and of its following age, being there described as it were in a little and obscure compendium. In like manner, the original and first rudiments of the world contained in them not only the sun and moon, the courses of the stars, and the generation of animals, but also the vicissitudes of all terrestrial things; and every deluge or inundation of water comes to pass no less by the law of the world (its spermatic or plastic nature) than winter and summer doth.

XXVIII. We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might have entertained such an Atheistical conceit as this, that the original of this whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly, and methodical, but senseless nature lodged in the matter; but we cannot trace the footsteps of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoics, to which sect Seneca, who speaks so waveringly and uncertainly in this point (whether the world were an animal or a plant,) belonged. And, indeed, divers learned men have suspected, that even the Zenonian and Heraclitic Deity itself, was no other than such a plastic nature or spermatic principle in the universe, as in the seeds of vegetables and animals doth frame their respective bodies orderly and artificially. Nor can it be denied, but that there hath been just cause given for such a suspicion; forasmuch as the best of Stoics, sometimes confounding God with nature, seemed to make him nothing but an artificial fire, orderly and methodically proceeding to generation. And it was familiar with them, as Laertius[1] tells us, to call God σπερματικὸν λόγον τοῦ κόσμου, the spermatic reason, or form of the world.—Nevertheless, because Zeno[2] and others of the chief Stoical doctors did also many times assert, that there was φύσις νοερὰ καὶ λογική, a rational and intellectual nature (and therefore not a plastic principle only) in the matter of the universe: as, likewise, that the whole world was an animal, and not a mere plant; therefore, we incline rather to excuse the generality of the first and most ancient Stoics from the imputation of Atheism, and to account this form of Atheism, which we now speak of, to be but a certain degeneracy from the right Heraclitic and Zenonian cabala, which seemed to contain these two things in it; first, that there was an animalish, sentient, and intellectual nature, or a conscious soul and mind, that presided over the whole world, though lodged immediately in the fiery matter of it; secondly, that this sentient and intellectual nature, or corporeal soul and mind of the universe, did contain also under it, or within it, as the inferior part of it, a certain plastic

[1] Lib. vii. segm. 136. p. 450.

[2] Vide Diog. Laert. lib. vii. p. 148. p. 459.

nature, or spermatic principle, which was properly the fate of all things. For thus Heraclitus[1] defined Fate, *λόγον τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ παντὸς διήκοντα, ἢ αἰθέριον σῶμα, σπέρμα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως*· A certain reason passing through the substance of the whole world, or an ethereal body, that was the seed of the generation of the universe.—And Zeno's[2] first principle, as it is said to be an intellectual nature, so it is also said to have contained in it *πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἱμαρμένην γίγνεται,* all the spermatic reasons and forms, by which every thing is done according to fate.—However, though this seems to have been the genuine doctrine, both of Heraclitus and Zeno, yet others of their followers afterwards divided these two things from one another, and taking only the latter of them, made the plastic or spermatic nature, devoid of all animality or conscious intellectuality, to be the highest principle in the universe. Thus Laertius tells us,[3] that Boethus, an eminent and famous Stoical doctor, did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, conscious, or intellectual nature presiding over it; and, consequently, must needs make it to be but "corpus natura gubernante, ut arbores, ut sata," a body governed by a plastic or vegetative nature, as trees, plants, and herbs.—And as it is possible, that other Stoics and Heraclitics might have done the like before Boethus, so it is very probable, that he had after him many followers; amongst which, as Plinius Secundus may be reckoned for one, so Seneca himself was not without a doubtful tincture of this Atheism, as hath been already showed. Wherefore this form of Atheism, which supposes one plastic or spermatic nature, one plantal or vegetative life in the whole world, as the highest principle, may, for distinction sake, be called the Pseudo-Stoical, or Stoical Atheism.

XXIX. Besides these philosophic Atheists, whose several forms we have now described, it cannot be doubted, but that there have been in all ages many other Atheists that have not at all philosophized, nor pretended to maintain any particular Atheistic system or hypothesis, in a way of reason, but were only led by a certain dull and sottish, though confident disbelief of whatsoever they could not either see or feel; which kind of Atheists may, therefore, well be accounted enthusiastical or fanatical Atheists. Though it be true, in the meantime, that even all manner of Atheists whatsoever, and those of them, who most of all pretend to reason and philosophy, may, in some sense, be justly styled

[1] Apud. Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. xxviii. p. 885. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Vide Plutarch. ubi supra. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.

[3] Lib. vii. segm. 143. p. 455.

also both enthusiasts and fanatics. Forasmuch as they are not led or carried on, into this way of atheizing, by any clear dictates of their reason or understanding, but only by an ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, a certain blind and irrational impetus;—they being, as it were, inspired to it by that lower earthly life and nature, which is called in the Scripture oracles, τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου, the spirit of the world, or a mundane spirit,—and is opposed to the τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, the Spirit that is of God.—For, when the apostle speaks after this manner, "We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that is of God," he seems to intimate thus much to us, that as some men were led and inspired by a Divine spirit, so others again are inspired by a mundane spirit, by which is meant the earthly life. Now the former of these two are not to be accounted enthusiasts, as the word is now commonly taken in a bad sense; because the Spirit of God is no irrational thing, but either the very self-same thing with reason, or else such a thing as Aristotle (as it were vaticinating concerning it) somewhere calls λόγου τι κρεῖττον, a certain better and diviner thing than reason;—and Plotinus, ῥίζαν λόγου, the root of reason.—But, on the contrary, the mundane spirit, or earthly life, is irrational sottishness; and they, who are atheistically inspired by it (how abhorrent soever they may otherwise seem to be from enthusiasm and revelations,) are notwithstanding really no better than a kind of bewitched enthusiasts and blind spiritati, that are wholly ridden and acted by a dark, narrow and captivated principle of life, and, to use their own language, in-blown by it, and by it bereft, even in speculative things, of all free reason and understanding. Nay, they are fanatics too, however that word seems to have a more peculiar respect to something of a Deity; all Atheists being that blind goddess Nature's fanatics.

XXX. We have described four several forms of Atheism:—first, the Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from a dead and stupid matter, in the way of qualities and forms, generable and corruptible: secondly, the Atomical or Democritical, which doth the same thing in the way of atoms and figures: thirdly, the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism, which supposes one plastic and methodical but senseless nature, to preside over the whole corporeal universe; and, lastly, the Hylozoic or Stratonical, that attributes to all matter, as such, a certain living and energetic nature, but devoid of all animality, sense, and consciousness. And as we do not meet with any other forms or schemes of Atheism besides these four, so we conceive, that there cannot easily be any other excogitated or devised; and that upon these two following considerations: first, because all Atheists are mere Corpore-

alists, that is, acknowledge no other substance besides body or matter. For as there was never any yet known, who, asserting incorporeal substance, did deny a Deity; so neither can there be any reason, why he that admits the former should exclude the latter. Again, the same dull and earthly disbelief or confounded sottishness of mind, which makes men deny a God, must needs incline them to deny all incorporeal substance also. Wherefore, as the physicians speak of a certain disease or madness, called hydrophobia, the symptom of those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monstrous antipathy to water; so all Atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called Pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances, they being acted also, at the same time, with an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter, and devoutly worship it as the only Numen.

The second consideration is this, because, as there are no Atheists but such as are mere Corporealists, so all Corporealists are not to be accounted Atheists neither: those of them, who, notwithstanding they make all things to be matter, yet suppose an intellectual nature in that matter to preside over the corporeal universe, being in reason and charity to be exempted out of that number. And there have been always some, who, though so strongly captivated under the power of gross imagination, as that an incorporeal God seemed to them to be nothing but a God of words (as some of them call it,) a mere empty sound or contradictious expression, something and nothing put together; yet, notwithstanding, they have been possessed with a firm belief and persuasion of a Deity, or that the system of the universe depends upon one perfect understanding being as the head of it; and thereupon have concluded that ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα, a certain kind of body or matter is God. —The grossest and most sottish of all which Corporeal Theists seem to be those, who contend, that God is only one particular piece of organized matter, of human form and bigness, which, endued with perfect reason and understanding, exerciseth an universal dominion over all the rest. Which hypothesis, however it hath been entertained by some of the Christian profession, both in former and later times, yet it hath seemed very ridiculous, even to many of those Heathen philosophers themselves, who were mere Corporealists, such as the Stoics, who exploded it with a kind of indignation, contending earnestly, [1]μὴ εἶναι θεὸν ἀνθρωπόμορφον, that God (though corporeal) yet must not be conceived

[1] These are the words of Clemens Alexandrinus concerning Xenophanes, Stromat. lib. v. p. 714.

to be of any human shape. And Xenophanes,[1] an ancient philosophic poet, expresseth the childishness of this conceit after this manner :

> *Ἀλλ᾽ εἴτοι χεῖρας γ᾽ εἶχον βόες ἠὲ λέοντες*
> *Ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι, καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες,*
> *Καί κε θεῶν ἰδίας ἔγραφον, καὶ σώματ᾽ ἐποίουν*
> *Τοιαῦθ᾽ οἷόν περ καὶ αὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον.*

If oxen, lions, asses, and horses, had all of them a sense of a Deity, and were able to limn and paint, there is no question to be made, but that each of these several animals would paint God according to their respective form and likeness, and contend, that he was of that shape and no other.—But that other corporeal Theism seems to be of the two rather more generous and genteel, which supposes the whole world to be one animal, and God to be a certain subtile and ethereal, but intellectual matter, pervading it as a soul : which was the doctrine of others before the Stoics, [2]*τὸ πῦρ θεὸν ὑπειλήφατον Ἱππασός τε ὁ Μεταπόντινος καὶ ὁ Ἐφέσιος Ἡράκλειτος*, Hippasus of Metapontus, and Heraclitus the Ephesian, supposed the fiery and ethereal matter of the world to be God.—However, neither these Heraclitics and Stoics, nor yet the other Anthropomorphites, are by us condemned for downright Atheists, but rather looked upon as a sort of ignorant, childish, and unskilful Theists.

Wherefore we see, that Atheists are now reduced into a narrow compass, since none are concluded to be Atheists, but such as are mere Corporealists ; and all Corporealists must not be condemned for Atheists neither, but only those of them, who assert, that there is no conscious intellectual nature, presiding over the whole universe. For this is that, which the adepti in Atheism, of what form soever, all agree in, that the first principle of the universe is no animalish, sentient, and conscious nature, but that all animality, sense, and consciousness, is a secondary, derivative, and accidental thing, generable and corruptible, arising out of particular concretions of matter, organized and dissolved together with them.

XXXI. Now if the first principle and original of all things in the universe be thus supposed to be body or matter, devoid of all animality, sense, and consciousness, then it must of necessity be either perfectly dead and stupid, and without all manner of life ; or else endued with such a kind of life only, as is by some called plastic, spermatical, and

[1] Apud Clem. Alex. ubi supra. p. 715.

[2] Idem in Protreptico, cap. v. p. 55.

vegetative, by others the life of nature, or natural perception. And those Atheists, who derive all things from dead and stupid matter, must also needs do this, either in the way of qualities and forms, and these are the Anaximandrian Atheists ; or else in the way of atoms and figures, which are the Democritical. But those, who make matter endued with a plastic life to be the first original of all things, must needs suppose either one such plastic and spermatic life only in the whole mass of matter or corporeal universe, which are the Stoical Atheists ; or else all matter as such to have life and an energetic nature belonging to it (though without any animal sense or self-perception,) and consequently all the particular parts of matter, and every totum by continuity, to have a distinct plastic life of its own, which are the Stratonic Atheists. Wherefore, there does not seem to be any room now left for any other form of Atheism, besides these four, to thrust in.

And we think fit here again to inculcate, what hath been already intimated, that one grand difference amongst these several forms of Atheism is this, that some of them attributing no life at all to matter, as such, nor indeed acknowledging any plastic life of nature, distinct from the animal, and supposing every thing whatsoever is in the world, besides ὕλη ἄποιος, the bare substance of matter considered as devoid of all qualities (that is, mere extended bulk,) to be generated and corrupted ; consequently resolve, that all manner of life whatsoever is generable and corruptible, or educible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again ; and these are the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms. But the other, which are the Stoical and Stratonical, do, on the contrary, suppose some life to be fundamental and original, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, as being a first principle of things : nevertheless, this not to be any animal, conscious, and self-perceptive life, but a plastic life of nature only ; all Atheists still agreeing in those two fore-mentioned things : first, that there is no other substance in the world besides body ; secondly, that all animal life, sense, and self-perception, conscious understanding and personality, are generated and corrupted, successively educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

XXXII. Indeed we are not ignorant that some, who seem to be well-wishers to Atheism, have talked sometimes of sensitive and rational matter, as having a mind to suppose, three several sorts of matter in the universe, specifically different from one another, that were originally such, and self-existent from eternity ; namely, senseless, sensitive, and rational : as if the mundane system might be conceived to arise from a certain jumble of these three several sorts of matter, as it were scuffling

together in the dark, without a God, and so producing brute animals and men. But as this is a mere precarious hypothesis, their being no imaginable account to be given, how there should come to be such an essential difference betwixt matters, or why this piece of matter should be sensitive, and that rational, when another is altogether senseless; so the suggestors of it are but mere novices in Atheism, and a kind of bungling well-wishers to it. First, because, according to this hypothesis, no life would be produced or destroyed in the successive generations and corruptions of animals, but only concreted and secreted in them; and, consequently, all human personalities must be eternal and incorruptible: which is all one, as to assert the pre and post-existence of all souls from eternity to eternity, a thing that all genuine and thorough-paced Atheists are in a manner as abhorrent from, as they are from the Deity itself. And secondly, because there can be no imaginable reason, given by them, why there might not be as well a certain Divine matter perfectly intellectual and self-existent from eternity, as a sensitive and rational matter. And, therefore, such an hypothesis as this can never serve the turn of Atheists. But all those that are masters of the craft of Atheism, and thoroughly catechised or initiated in the dark mysteries thereof (as hath been already inculcated,) do perfectly agree in this, that all animal, sentient, and conscious life, all souls and minds, and consequently all human personalities, are generated out of matter, and corrupted again into it, or rather educed out of nothing, and reduced into nothing again.

We understand also, that there are certain canting astrological Atheists, who would deduce all things from the occult qualities and influences of the stars, according to their different conjunctions, oppositions, and aspects, in a certain blind and unaccountable manner. But these being persons devoid of all manner of sense, who neither so much as pretend to give an account of these stars, whether they be animals or not, as also whence they derive their original (which, if they did undertake to do atheistically, they must needs resolve themselves at length into one or other of those hypotheses already proposed,) therefore, as we conceive, they deserve not the least consideration. But we think fit here to observe, that such devotees to the heavenly bodies, as look upon all the other stars as petty deities, but the sun as the supreme deity and monarch of the universe, in the meantime conceiving it also to be perfectly intellectual (which is in a manner the same with the Cleanthean hypothesis) are not so much to be accounted Atheists, as spurious, paganical, and idolatrous Theists. And upon all these considerations, we conclude again, that there is no other philosophic form

of Atheism, that can easily be devised, besides these four mentioned, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, the Stoical and the Stratonical.

XXXIII. Amongst which forms of Atheism, there is yet another difference to be observed, and accordingly another distribution to be made of them. It being first premised, that all these forementioned sorts of Atheists (if they will speak consistently and agreeably to their own principles) must needs suppose all things to be one way or other necessary. For though Epicurus introduced contingent liberty, yet it is well known, that he therein plainly contradicted his own principles. And this, indeed, was the first and principal thing intended by us, in this whole undertaking, to confute that false hypothesis of the mundane system, which makes all actions and events necessary upon Atheistic grounds, but especially in the mechanic way. Wherefore, in the next place, we must observe, that though the principles of all Atheists introduce necessity, yet the necessity of these Atheists is not one and the same, but of two different kinds; some of them supposing a necessity of dead and stupid matter, which is that, which is commonly meant by ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, or material necessity, and is also called by Aristotle, an absolute necessity of things; others, the necessity of a plastic life, which the same Aristotle calls an hypothetical necessity. For the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists do both of them assert a material and absolute necessity of all things; one in the way of qualities, and the other of motion and mechanism: but the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists assert a plastical and hypothetical necessity of things only.

Now one grand difference betwixt these two sorts of Atheisms and their necessities lies in this, that the former, though they make all things necessary, yet they suppose them also to be fortuitous; there being no inconsistency between these two. And the sense of both the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms seems to be thus described by Plato,[1] πάντα κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, All things were mingled together by necessity according to fortune.—For that nature, from whence these Atheists derived all things, is at once both necessary and fortuitous. But the Plastic Atheisms suppose such a necessary nature for the first principle of things, as is not merely fortuitous, but regular, orderly, and methodical: the Stoical excluding all chance and fortune universally, because they subject all things to one plastic nature ruling over the whole universe, but the Stratonical doing it in part only, because they derive things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together.

And thus we see, that there is a double notion of nature amongst

[1] De Legibus, lib. x. p. 666. oper.

Atheists, as well as Theists; which we cannot better express than in the words of Balbus the Stoic, personated by Cicero: [1] "Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tanquam via progredientem. Cujus solertiam, nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex, consequi potest imitando; seminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id quanquam perexiguum, nactumque sit materiam, quo ali augerique possit, ita fingat et efficiat, in suo quidque genere, partim ut per stirpes alantur suas, partim ut movere etiam possint, et ex se similia sui generare." Some by nature mean a certain force without reason and order, exciting necessary motions in bodies: but others understand by it such a force, as participating of order proceeds as it were methodically. Whose exquisiteness, no art, no hand, no opificer can reach to by imitation. For the force of seed is such, that though the bulk of it be very small, yet if it get convenient matter for its nourishment and increase, it so forms and frames things in their several kinds, as that they can partly through their stocks and trunks be nourished, and partly move themselves also, and generate their like.—And again: "Sunt qui omnia naturæ nomine appellent, ut Epicurus; sed nos, cum dicimus natura constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glebam, aut fragmentum lapidis, aut aliquid ejusmodi, nulla cohærendi natura; sed ut arborem, ut animalia, in quibus nulla temeritas, sed ordo apparet et artis quædam similitudo." There are some, who call all things by the name of nature, as Epicurus; but we, when we say that the world is administered by nature, do not mean such a nature, as is in clods of earth and pieces of stone, but such as is in a tree or animal, in whose constitution there is no temerity, but order and similitude of art.—Now, according to these two different notions of nature, the four forementioned forms of Atheism may be again dichotomized after this manner—into such as derive all things from a mere fortuitous and temerarious nature, devoid of all order and methodicalness; and such as deduce the original of things from a certain orderly, regular, and artificial, though senseless nature in matter. The former of which are the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms, the latter the Stoical and Stratonical.

It hath been already observed, that those Atheisms, that derive all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as also suppose every thing, besides ὕλη ἄποιος, the bare substance of matter—or extended bulk, to be generated and corrupted; though they asserted the eternity of matter, yet they could not, agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain the

[1] De Nat. De. l. 2. cap. xxxii. p. 3001, tom. ix. oper.

eternity and incorruptibility of the world. And accordingly hereunto, both the Anaximandrian[1] and Democritic[2] Atheists did conclude the world to be γενόμενον καὶ φθαρτὸν, such as was at first made, and should be again corrupted.—And upon this account, Lucretius concerns himself highly herein, to prove both the novity of the world, and also its future dissolution and extinction, that

Totum nativum mortali corpore constat.

But instead of the world's eternity, these two sorts of Atheists introduced another paradox, namely an ἀπειρία κόσμων, an infinity of worlds; —and that not only successive, in that space, which this world of ours is conceived now to occupy, in respect of the infinity of past and future time, but also a contemporary infinity of coexistent worlds, at all times, throughout endless and unbounded space.

However, it is certain, that some persons Atheistically inclined, have been always apt to run out another way, and to suppose, that the frame of things, and system of the world, ever was from eternity, and ever will be to eternity, such as now it is, dispensed by a certain orderly and regular, but yet senseless and unknowing nature. And it is prophesied in Scripture, that such Atheists as these, should especially abound in these latter days of ours; [3]"There shall come in the last days (ἐμπαῖκται) atheistical scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." Which latter words are spoken only according to the received hypothesis of the Jews, the meaning of these Atheists being quite otherwise, that there was neither creation nor beginning of the world; but that things had continued, such as they now are, from all eternity. As appears also from what the apostle there adds by way of confutation, that they "were wilfully ignorant of this, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; and that as the world, that then was, overflowing with water perished, so the heavens and earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, and reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." And it is evident, that some of these Atheists, at this very day, march in the garb of enthusiastical religionists, acknowledging no more a God than a Christ without them, and allegorizing the day of judgment and future conflagration into a kind of seemingly mystical, but really atheistical nonsense. These, if they did

[1] Vide Diog. Laert. lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.
[2] Vide eundem lib. ii. segm. 1, 2. p. 78, 79.
[3] 2 Pet. 3.

philosophize, would resolve themselves into one or other of those two hypotheses before mentioned; either that of one plastic orderly and methodical, but senseless nature, ruling over the whole universe; or else that of the life of matter, making one or other of these two natures to be their own God or Numen; it being sufficiently agreeable to the principles of both these Atheistic hypotheses (and no others) to maintain the world's both antè and post-eternity; yet so as that the latter of them, namely, the Hylozoists, admitting a certain mixture of chance together with the life of matter, would suppose, that though the main strokes of things might be preserved the same, and some kind of constant regularity always kept up in the world, yet that the whole mundane system did not in all respects continue the same, from eternity to eternity, without any variation.[1] But as Strabo tells us, that Strato Physicus maintained, the Euxine sea at first to have had no outlet by Byzantium into the Mediterranean, but that by the continual running in of rivers into it, causing it to overflow, there was in length of time, a passage opened by the Propontis and Hellespont; as also that the Mediterranean sea forced open that passage of the Herculean straits, being a continual isthmus or neck of land before; that many parts of the present continent were heretofore sea, as also much of the present ocean habitable land:—so it cannot be doubted, but that the same Strato did likewise suppose such kind of alterations and vicissitudes as these, in all the greater parts of the mundane system.

But the Stoical Atheists, who made the whole world to be dispensed by one orderly and plastic nature, might very well, and agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain, besides the world's eternity, one constant and invariable course or tenor of things in it, as Plinius Secundus doth, who, if he were any thing, seems to have been one of these Atheists; [2]"Mundum et hoc quod nomine alio cœlum appellare libuit, (cujus circumflexu reguntur cuncta) Numen esse, credi par est, æternum, immensum, neque genitum, neque interiturum————Idem rerum naturæ opus, et rerum ipsa natura." The world, and that which by another name is called the heavens, by whose circumgyration all things are governed, ought to be believed to be a Numen, eternal, immense, such as was never made, and shall never be destroyed.—Where, by the way, it may be again observed, that those Atheists, who denied a God, according to the true notion of him, as a conscious, understanding being, presiding over the whole world, did notwithstanding look upon either the world itself, or else a mere senseless plastic nature in it, as a kind of Numen or Deity, they supposing it to be ingenerable and

[1] Strab. l. 1. [2] Nat. H. l. 2. c. 1.

incorruptible. Which same Pliny, as upon the grounds of the Stoical Atheism, he maintained against the Anaximandrians and Democritics, the world's eternity and incorruptibility; so did he likewise, in way of opposition to that ἀπειρία κόσμων, that infinity of worlds—of theirs assert, that there was but one world, and that finite. In like manner we read concerning that famous Stoic, Boethus, whom Laertius affirms to have denied the world to be an animal (which, according to the language and sense of those times, was all one as to deny a God;) that he also maintained, contrary to the received doctrine of the Stoics, the world's ante-eternity and incorruptibility; Philo, in his treatise περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου, or the Incorruptibility of the World,—testifying the same of him.

Nevertheless it seems, that some of these Stoical Atheists did also agree with the generality of the other Stoical Theists, in supposing a successive infinity of worlds generated and corrupted, by reason of intervening periodical conflagrations; though all dispensed by such a stupid and senseless nature, as governs plants and trees. For thus much we gather from those words of Seneca before cited, where, describing this Atheistical hypothesis, he tells us, that though the world were a plant, that is, governed by a vegetative or plastic nature, without any animality, yet notwithstanding, "ab initio ejus usque ad exitum," etc. it had both a beginning, and will have an end; and from its beginning to its end, all was dispensed by a kind of regular law, even its successive conflagrations too, as well as those inundations or deluges, which have sometimes happened. Which yet they understood after such a manner, as that in these several revolutions and successive circuits or periods of worlds all things should be ἀπαράλλακτα, exactly alike, to what had been infinitely before, and should be again infinitely afterwards. Of which more elsewhere.

XXXIV. This quadripartite Atheism, which we have now represented, is the kingdom of darkness divided, or laboring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself. Insomuch that we might well save ourselves the labor of any further confutation of Atheism, merely by committing these several forms of Atheism together, and dashing them one against another, they opposing and contradicting each other, no less than they do Theism itself. For first, those two pairs of Atheisms, on the one hand the Anaximandrian and Democritic, on the other the Stoical and Stratonical, do absolutely destroy each other; the former of them supposing the first principle of all things to be stupid matter devoid of all manner of life, and contending, that all life as well as other qualities is generable and corruptible,

or a mere accidental thing, and looking upon the plastic life of nature as a figment or fantastic capricio, a thing almost as formidable and altogether as impossible as a Deity; the other, on the contrary, founding all upon this principle, that there is a life and natural perception essential to matter, ingenerable and incorruptible, and contending it to be utterly impossible to give any account of the phenomena of the world, the original of motion, the orderly frame and disposition of things, and the nature of animals, without this fundamental life of nature.

Again, the single Atheisms belonging to each of these several pairs quarrel as much also between themselves. For the Democritic Atheism explodes the Anaximandrian qualities and forms, demonstrating that the natural production of such entities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, is of the two rather more impossible than a Divine creation and annihilation. And, on the other side, the Anaximandrian Atheist plainly discovers, that, when the Democritics and Atomics have spent all their fury against these qualities and forms, and done what they can to solve the phenomena of nature without them another way, themselves do notwithstanding, like drunken men, reel and stagger back into them, and are unavoidably necessitated at last to take up their sanctuary in them.

In like manner, the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists may as effectually undo and confute each other; the former of them urging against the latter, that, besides that prodigious absurdity of making every atom of senseless matter infallibly wise or omniscient, without a consciousness, there can be no reason at all given by the Hylozoists, why the matter of the whole universe might not as well conspire and confederate together into one, as all the single atoms that compound the body of any animal or man; or why one conscious life might not as well result from the totum of the former, as of the latter; by which means the whole world would become an animal, or God. Again, the latter contending, that the Stoical or Cosmo-plastic Atheist can pretend no reason, why the whole world might not have one sentient and rational, as well as one plastic soul in it, that is, as well be an animal as a plant: moreover, that the sensitive souls of brute animals, and the rational souls of men, could never possibly emerge out of one single, plastic, and vegetative soul in the whole universe: and, lastly, that it is altogether as impossible, that the whole world should have life in it, and yet none of its parts have any life of their own, as that the whole world should be white or black, and yet no part of it have any whiteness or blackness at all in it. And, therefore, that the Stoical Atheists, as well as the Stoical Theists, do both alike deny incorporeal substance but in

words only, whilst they really admit the thing itself; because one and the same life, ruling over all the distant parts of the corporeal universe, must needs be an incorporeal substance, it being all in the whole, and all acting upon every part, and yet none of it in any part by itself; for then it would be many, and not one. From all which it may be concluded, that Atheism is a certain strange kind of monster, with four heads, that are all of them perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring one another.

Now, though these several forms of Atheism do mutually destroy each other, and none of them be really considerable and formidable in itself, as to any strength of reason which it hath; yet, as they are compared together among themselves, so some of them may be more considerable than the rest. For, first, as the qualities and forms of the Anaximandrian Atheist, supposed to be really distinct from the substances, are things unintelligible in themselves; so he cannot, with any color or pretence of reason, maintain the natural production of them out of nothing, and the reduction of them again into nothing, and yet withstand a Divine creation and annihilation, as an impossibility. Moreover, the Anaximandrian Atheism is as it were swallowed up into the Democritic, and further improved in it; this latter carrying on the same design, with more seeming artifice, greater plausibility of wit, and a more pompous show of something, where, indeed, there is nothing. Upon which account, it hath for many ages past beaten the Anaximandrian Atheism in a manner quite off the stage, and reigned there alone. So that the Democritic or Atomic Atheism seems to be much more considerable of the two, than the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian.

Again, as for the two other forms of Atheism, if there were any life at all in matter, as the first and immediate recipient of it, then in reason this must needs be supposed to be after the same manner in it, that all other corporeal qualities are in bodies, so as to be divisible together with it, and some of it be in every part of the matter; which is according to the hypothesis of the Hylozoists. Whereas, on the contrary, the Stoical Atheists supposing one life only in the whole mass of matter, after such a manner, as that none of the parts of it by themselves should have any life of their own, do thereby, no less than the Stoical Theists, make this life of theirs to be no corporeal quality or form, but an incorporeal substance; which is to contradict their own hypothesis. From whence we may conclude, that the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism is, of the two, less considerable than the Hylozoic or Stratonical.

Wherefore, amongst these four forms of Atheism, that have been

propounded, these two, the Atomic or Democritical, and the Hylozoic or Stratonical are the chief. The former of which, namely, the Democritic Atheism, admitting a true notion of body, that (according to the doctrine of the first and most ancient Atomists) it is nothing but resisting bulk devoid of all manner of life; yet, because it takes for granted that there is no other substance in the world besides body, does, therefore conclude, that all life and understanding in animals and men is generated out of dead and stupid matter, though not as qualities and forms (which is the Anaximandrian way), but as resulting from the contextures of atoms, or some peculiar composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; and, consequently, that they are themselves really nothing else but local motion and mechanism; which is a thing that some time since was very pertinently and judiciously both observed and perstringed by the learned author[1] of the *Exercitatio Epistolica*,[2] now a reverend bishop. But the latter, namely, the Hylozoic, though truly acknowledging, on the contrary, that life, cogitation and understanding are entities really distinct from local motion and mechanism, and that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and stupid matter, but must needs be somewhere in the world, originally, essentially, and fundamentally: yet, because they take it also for granted, that there is no other substance besides matter, do thereupon adulterate the notion of matter or body, blending and confounding it with life, as making them but too inadequate conceptions of substance, and concluding that all matter and substance, as such, hath life and perception or understanding, natural and unconscious, essentially belonging to it; and that sense and conscious reason or understanding in animals, arises only from the accidental modification of this fundamental life of matter by organization.

We conclude, therefore, that if these two Atheistic hypotheses, which are found to be the most considerable, be once confuted, the reality of all Atheism will be *ipso facto* confuted; there being indeed nothing more requisite to a thorough confutation of Atheism, than the proving of these two things: first, that life and understanding are not essential to matter, as such; and, secondly, that they can never possibly rise out of any mixture or modification of dead and stupid matter whatsoever. The reason of which assertion is, because all Atheists, as was before observed, are mere Corporealists, of which there can be but

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[1] Dr. Seth Ward, Savilian Professor of Astronomy in the University of Oxford; and successively Bishop of Exeter and Salisbury.

[2] Sect. iv. cap. 3.

these two sorts; either such as make life to be essential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible; or else such as suppose life and every thing besides ὕλη ἄποιος, the bare substance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable or corruptible, as rising out of some mixture or modification of it. And as the proving of those two things will overthrow all Atheism, so it will likewise lay a clear foundation for the demonstrating of a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

XXXV. Now that life and perception, or understanding, should be essential to matter, as such, or that all senseless matter should be perfectly and infallibly wise (though without consciousness) as to all its own congruities and capabilities, which is the doctrine of the Hylozoists; this, I say, is an hypothesis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outrageously wild, as that very few men ever could have Atheistic faith enough to swallow it down and digest it. Wherefore, this Hylozoic Atheism hath been very obscure ever since its first emersion, and hath found so few fautors and abettors, that it hath looked like a forlorn and deserted thing. Neither indeed are there any public monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintained, stated, and reduced into any system. Insomuch that we should not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular form of Atheism, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not understood, that Strato's ghost had begun to walk of late; and that among some well-wishers to Atheism, despairing in a manner of the Atomic form, this Hylozoic hypothesis began already to be looked upon, as the rising sun of Atheism,—"Et tanquam spes altera Trojæ," it seemed to smile upon them, and flatter them at a distance, with some fairer hopes of supporting that ruinous and desperate cause.

Whereas, on the contrary, that other Atomic Atheism, as it insists upon a true notion of body, that it is nothing but resisting bulk; by which means, we joining issue thereupon, shall be fairly conducted on to a clear decision of this present controversy, as likewise to the disentangling of many other points of philosophy; so it is that, which hath filled the world with the noise of it, for two thousand years past; that, concerning which several volumes have been formerly written, in which it hath been stated and brought into a kind of system; and which hath of late obtained a resurrection amongst us, together with the Atomic physiology, and been recommended to the world anew, under a specious show of wit and profound philosophy.

Wherefore, as we could not here insist upon both these forms of Atheism together, because that would have been to confound the lan-

guage of the Atheists, and to have made them, like the Cadmean offspring, to do immediate execution upon themselves: so we were in all reason obliged to make our first and principal assault upon the Atomic Atheism, as being the only considerable, upon this account because it is that alone, which publicly confronts the world, and like that proud, uncircumcised Philistine, openly defies the hosts of the living God; intending nevertheless in the close of this whole discourse (that is, the last book,) where we are to determine the right intellectual system of the universe, and to assert an incorporeal Deity, to demonstrate that life, cogitation, and understanding do not essentially belong to matter, and all substance, as such, but are the peculiar attributes and characteristics of substance incorporeal.

XXXVI. However, since we have now started these several forms of Atheism, we shall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither. For in the answer to the second Atheistic ground, we shall confute them altogether at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental principle, That the original of all things in the universe is senseless matter, or matter devoid of all animality or conscious life.—In the reply to the fourth Atheistic argumentation, we shall briefly hint the grounds of reason, from which incorporeal substance is demonstrated. In the examination of the fifth, we shall confute the Anaximandrian Atheism there propounded, which is, as it were, the first sciography and rude delineation of Atheism. And in the confutation of the sixth we shall show, how the ancient Atomic Atheists did preventively overthrow the foundation of Hylozoism. Besides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough confutation, both of the Cosmo-plastic and Hylozoic Atheisms, we shall in this very place take occasion to insist largely upon the plastic life of nature, giving in the first place a true account of it; and then afterwards showing, how grossly it is misunderstood, and the pretence of it abused, by the assertors of both these Atheistic hypotheses. The heads of which larger digression, because they could not be so conveniently inserted in the contents of the chapter, shall be represented to the reader's view at the end of it.

XXXVII. For we think fit here to observe, that neither the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical, nor the Hylozoic or Stratonical Atheists, are therefore condemned by us, because they suppose such a thing as a plastic nature, or life distinct from the animal; albeit this be not only exploded, as an absolute nonentity, by the Atomic Atheists, who might possibly be afraid of it, as that which approached too near a Deity, or else would hazard the introducing of it; but also utterly discarded by some professed Theists of later times, who might notwithstanding have

an undiscerned tang of the Mechanic Atheism hanging about them, in that their so confident rejecting of all final and intending causality in nature, and admitting of no other causes of things, as philosophical, save the material and mechanical only ; this being really to banish all mental, and consequently Divine causality, quite out of the world ; and to make the whole world to be nothing else, but a mere heap of dust fortuitously agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that hath no signatures of mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom at all upon it; nor indeed any other vitality acting in it, than only the production of a certain quantity of local motion, and the conservation of it according to some general laws ; which things the Democritic Atheists take for granted, would all be as they are, though there were no God. And thus Aristotle describes this kind of philosophy, that it made the whole world to consist, [1] *ἐκ σωμάτων μόνον, καὶ μονάδων τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν*, of nothing but bodies and monads (that is, atoms, or small particles of matter) only ranged and disposed together in such an order, but altogether dead and inanimate.—

2. For unless there be such a thing admitted as a plastic nature, that acts *ἕνεκά του*, for the sake of something, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially and methodically, it seems, that one or other of these two things must be concluded ; that either in the efformation and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to pass fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or understanding ; or else, that God himself doth all immediately, and, as it were with his own hands, form the body of every gnat and fly, insect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whose members have so much of contrivance in them, that Galen professed he could never enough admire that artifice, which was in the leg of a fly (and yet he would have admired the wisdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the use of microscopes :) I say, upon supposition of no plastic nature, one or other of these two things must be concluded ; because it is not conceived by any, that the things of nature are all thus administered with such exact regularity and constancy every where, merely by the wisdom, providence, and efficiency of those inferior spirits, demons or angels. As also, though it be true, that the works of nature are dispensed by a Divine law and command, yet this is not to be understood in a vulgar sense, as if they were all effected by the mere force of a verbal law or outward command, because inanimate things are not commendable nor

[1] De Cœl. l. ii. c. 12. p. 656. tom. i. oper.

governable by such a law. And therefore, besides the Divine will and pleasure, there must needs be some other immediate agent and executioner provided, for the producing of every effect; since not so much as a stone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward, merely by the force of a verbal law, without any other efficient cause; but either God himself must immediately impel it, or else there must be some other subordinate cause in nature for that motion. Wherefore, the Divine law and command, by which the things of nature are administered, must be conceived to be the real appointment of some energetic, effectual, and operative cause for the production of every effect.

3. Now to assert the former of these two things, that all the effects of nature come to pass by material and mechanical necessity, or the mere fortuitous motion of matter, without any guidance or direction, is a thing no less irrational than it is impious and atheistical. Not only because it is utterly inconceivable and impossible, that such infinite regularity and artificialness, as is every where throughout the whole world, should constantly result out of the fortuitous motion of matter; but also because there are many such particular phenomena in nature, as do plainly transcend the powers of mechanism, of which, therefore, no sufficient mechanical reasons can be devised—as the motion of respiration in animals: as there are also other phenomena, that are perfectly cross to the laws of mechanism; as, for example, that of the distant poles of the equator and ecliptic, which we shall insist upon afterward. Of both which kinds there have been other instances proposed by my learned friend, Dr. More, in his *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, and very ingeniously improved by him to this very purpose, namely, to evince, that there is something in nature besides mechanism, and consequently substance incorporeal.

Moreover, those Theists who philosophize after this manner, by resolving all the corporeal phenomena into fortuitous mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion of matter, make God to be nothing else in the world, but an idle spectator of the various results of the fortuitous and necessary motions of bodies: and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant, as being a thing wholly enclosed and shut up within his own breast, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him.

Furthermore, all such Mechanists as these, whether Theists or Atheists, do, according to that judicious censure passed by Aristotle,[1] long since, upon Democritus, but substitute as it were χεῖρα ξυ-

[1] De Part. An. l. i. c. p. 473. tom. ii. oper.

λίνην τέκτονος, a carpenter's or artificer's wooden hand, moved by strings and wires, instead of a living hand.—They make a kind of dead and wooden world, as it were a carved statue, that hath nothing neither vital nor magical at all in it. Whereas to those who are considerative, it will plainly appear, that there is a mixture of life or plastic nature, together with mechanism, which runs through the whole corporeal universe.

And whereas it is pretended, not only that all corporeal phenomena may be sufficiently solved mechanically, without any final, intending, and directive causality, but also that all other reasons of things in nature, besides the material and mechanical, are altogether unphilosophical, the same Aristotle[1] ingeniously exposes the ridiculousness of this pretence after this manner: telling us, that it is just as if a carpenter, joiner, or carver should give this account, as the only satisfactory, of any artificial fabric or piece of carved imagery, *ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγίνετο, τόδε ἐπίπεδον*, that because the instruments, axes and hatchets, planes and chisels, happened to fall so and so upon the timber, cutting it here and there, that therefore it was hollow in one place, and plain in another, and the like; and by that means the whole came to be of such a form.—For is it not altogether as absurd and ridiculous, for men to undertake[2] to give an account of the formation and organization of the bodies of animals, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any final or intending causality, as why there was an heart here, and brains there; and why the heart had so many and such different valves in the entrance and outlet of its ventricles; and why all the other organic parts, veins and arteries, nerves and muscles, bones and cartilages, with the joints and members, were of such a form? Because forsooth, the fluid matter of the seed happened to move so and so in several places, and thereby to cause all those differences, which are also diverse in different animals; all being the necessary result of a certain quantity of motion at first indifferently impressed upon the small particles of the matter of this universe turned round in a vortex. But, as the same Aristotle adds, no carpenter or artificer is so simple, as to give such an account as this, and think it satisfactory, but he will rather declare, that himself directed the motion of the instruments, after such a manner, and in order to such ends: [3] *Βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων, οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ, τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου*, etc. *ἀλ-*

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[1] Ubi supra. [2] Vide Cartes. libr. de Homine, et de Formatione Fœtus.

[3] De Part. An. lib. i. cap. 1.

λὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτην, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, ἐρεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιόνδε ἢ τοιονδήποτε τὴν μορφὴν γένηται. A carpenter would give a better account than so, for he would not think it sufficient to say, that the fabric came to be of such a form, because the instruments happened to fall so and so, but he will tell you that it was because himself made such strokes, and that he directed the instruments and determined their motion after such a manner, to this end, that he might make the whole a fabric fit and useful for such purposes.—And this is to assign the final cause. And certainly there is scarcely any man in his wits, that will not acknowledge the reason of the different valves in the heart from the apparent usefulness of them, according to those particular structures of theirs, to be more satisfactory, than any which can be brought from mere fortuitous mechanism, or the unguided motion of the seminal matter.

4. And as for the latter part of the disjunction, that every thing in nature should be done immediately by God himself; this, as, according to vulgar apprehension, it would render Divine Providence operose, solicitous, and distractious, and thereby make the belief of it to be entertained with greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheists; so in the judgment of the writer *De Mundo*, it is not so decorous in respect of God neither, that he should *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, set his own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly, without making use of any inferior and subordinate instruments. [1]*Εἴπερ ἄσεμνον ἦν αὐτὸν δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, καὶ διατελεῖν ἃ βούλοιτο, καὶ ἐφιστάμενον διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπρεπὲς ἂν εἴη τῷ θεῷ. Σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ πρεπωδέστερον τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου διηκούσαν, ἥλιον τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην*, etc. If it were not congruous in respect to the state and majesty of Xerxes, the great king of Persia, that he should condescend to do all the meanest offices himself; much less can this be thought decorous in respect of God. But it seems far more august and becoming of the Divine Majesty, that a certain power and virtue, derived from him, and passing through the universe, should move the sun and moon, and be the immediate cause of those lower things done here upon earth.—

Moreover, it seems not so agreeable to reason neither, that nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superseded or made to signify nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own.

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[1] Cap. 7.

Lastly: this opinion is further confuted by that slow and gradual process, that it is in the generations of things, which would seem to be but a vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as also by those ἁμαρτήματα (as Aristotle calls them) those errors and bungles, which are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irresistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not altogether incapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated and disappointed, by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent agent, as it could despatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it infallibly and irresistibly; no ineptitude or stubbornness of matter being ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore, since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may reasonably be thought to do all things immediately and miraculously; it may well be concluded, that there is a plastic nature under him, which, as an inferior and subordinate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his Providence, which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet so as that there is also, besides this, a higher Providence to be aknowledged, which, presiding over it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes over-rule it; forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively, nor with discretion. And by this means the wisdom of God will not be shut up nor concluded wholly within his own breast, but will display itself abroad, and print its stamps and signatures every where throughout the world; so that God, as Plato[1] (after Orpheus[2]) speaks, will be not only the beginning and end, but also the middle of all things; they being as much to be ascribed to his causality, as if himself had done them all immediately, without the concurrent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause. Notwithstanding which, in this way it will appear also to human reason, that all things are disposed and ordered by the Deity, without any solicitous care or distractious providence.

And indeed those mechanic Theists, who rejecting a plastic nature affect to concern the Deity as little as is possible in mundane affairs, either for fear of debasing him, and bringing him down to too mean offices, or else of subjecting him to solicitous encumberment; and for that cause would have God to contribute nothing more to the mundane system and economy, than only the first impressing of a certain quantity of motion upon the matter, and the after conserving of it, accord-

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[1] De Leg. lib. iv. p. 600. oper. [2] Vide Apul. de Mundo, p. 25.

ing to some general laws; these men, I say, seem not very well to understand themselves in this. Forasmuch as they must of necessity, either suppose these their laws of motion to execute themselves, or else be forced perpetually to concern the Deity in the immediate motion of every atom of matter throughout the universe, in order to the execution and observation of them. The former of which being a thing plainly absurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which these philosophers themselves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any other conclusion than this, that they do but unskilfully and unawares establish that very thing, which in words they oppose; and that their laws of nature concerning motion are really nothing else but a plastic nature acting upon the matter of the whole corporeal universe, both maintaining the same quantity of motion always in it, and also dispensing it (by transferring it out of one body into another) according to such laws fatally impressed upon it. Now, if there be a plastic nature, that governs the motion of matter every where, according to laws, there can be no reason given, why the same might not also extend further to the regular disposal of that matter, in the formation of plants and animals, and other things, in order to that apt coherent frame and harmony of the whole universe.

6. And as this plastic nature is a thing, which seems to be in itself most reasonable, so hath it also had the suffrage of the best philosophers in all ages. For, first, it is well known, that Aristotle concerns himself in nothing more zealously than this, that mundane things are not effected merely by the necessary and unguided motion of matter, or by fortuitous mechanism; but by such a nature as acts regularly and artificially for ends; yet so as that this nature is not the highest principle neither, or the supreme Numen, but subordinate to a perfect mind or intellect; he affirming, that *νοῦς αἴτιον καὶ φύσις τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς*, that mind, together with nature, was the cause of this universe;—and that heaven and earth, plants and animals, were framed by them both; that is, by mind as the principal and directive cause, but by nature as a subservient or executive instrument; and elsewhere joining in like manner, God and nature both together, as when he concludes, That God and nature do nothing in vain.

Neither was Aristotle the first broacher or inventor of this doctrine, Plato before him having plainly asserted the same. For in a passage already cited, he affirms, that nature, together with reason, and according to it, orders all things; thereby making nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, to be a subordinate cause under the reason and wisdom of it. And elsewhere he resolves, that there are *ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι*,

αἷς ὑπηρετούσαις ὁ θεὸς χρῆται, certain causes of a wise and artificial nature, which the Deity uses as subservient to itself;—as also, that there are *ξυναίτια οἷς ξυνεργοῖς θεὸς χρῆται*, con-causes, which God makes use of, as subordinately co-operative with himself.

Moreover, before Plato, Empedocles philosophized also in the same manner, when, supposing two worlds, the one archetypal, the other ectypal, he made *φιλία* and *νεῖκος*, friendship and discord, to be the *ἀρχὴ δραστήριος*, the active principle and immediate operator in this lower world; he not understanding thereby, as Plutarch[1] and some others have conceited, two substantial principles in the world, the one of good, the other of evil; but only a plastic nature, as Aristotle in sundry places intimates; which he called by that name, partly because he apprehended, that the result and upshot of nature in all generations and corruptions amounted to nothing more than mixtures and separations, or concretion and secretion of pre-existent things; and partly because this plastic nature is that, which doth reconcile the contrarieties and enmities of particular things, and bring them into one general harmony in the whole. Which latter is a notion, that Plotinus, describing this very seminary reason or plastic nature of the world (though taking it in something a larger sense than we do in this place,) doth ingeniously pursue after this manner:[2] *Ἀντιθεὶς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη, καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεῆ, πολέμου καὶ μάχης σύσταριν καὶ γένεσιν εἰργάσατο· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν εἷς πᾶς, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη· γενόμενον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τοῖς μέρεσι πολέμιον, οὕτως ἕν ἐστι καὶ φίλον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δράματος λόγος εἷς, ὁ τοῦ δράματος, ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πολλὰς μάχας· τὸ μὲν οὖν δράμα τὰ μεμαχημένα, οἷον εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν, ἄγει σύμφωνον.—ὥς τε μᾶλλον ἄν τις τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ τῇ ἐκ μαχομένων εἰκάσειε.* The seminary reason or plastic nature of the universe, opposing the parts to one another, and making them severally indigent, produces by that means war and contention. And, therefore, though it be one, yet, notwithstanding, it consists of different and contrary things. For there being hostility in its parts, it is nevertheless friendly and agreeable in the whole; after the same manner as in a dramatic poem, clashings and contentions are reconciled into one harmony. And, therefore, the seminary and plastic nature of the world may fitly be resembled to the harmony of disagreeing things.—Which Plotinic doctrine may well pass for a commentary upon Empedocles, accordingly as Simplicius briefly represents his sense,[3] *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο κόσμους συνίστησι, τὸν μὲν*

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[1] De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

[2] En. 3. l. 2. sec. 16. p. 267. oper.

[3] In Arist. de Cœl. l. 1. c. 10. p. 71. edit. Græc. Venet. 1526. fol.

ἡνωμένον καὶ νοητὸν, τὸν δὲ διακεκριμένον καὶ αἰσθητὸν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κόσμῳ τὴν ἕνωσιν ὁρᾷ καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν· Empedocles makes two worlds, the one united and intelligible, the other divided and sensible; and in this lower sensible world, he takes notice both of unity and discord.—

It was before observed, that Heraclitus likewise did assert a regular and artificial nature, as the fate of things in this lower world; for his "reason passing through the substance of all things," or "ethereal body, which was the seed of the generation of the universe," was nothing but that spermatic or plastic nature which we now speak of. And whereas there is an odd passage of this philosopher's record,[1] κόσμον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεῶς οὔ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε, that neither any God nor man made this world,—which, as it is justly derided by Plutarch for its simplicity, so it looks very atheistically at first sight; yet, because Heraclitus hath not been accounted an Atheist, we therefore conceive the meaning of it to have been this, that the world was not made by any whatsoever, after such a manner as an artificer makes a house, by machines and engines, acting from without upon the matter, cumbersomely and moliminously, but by a certain inward plastic nature of its own.

And as Hippocrates followed Heraclitus in this (as was before declared,) so did Zeno and the Stoics also; they supposing, besides an intellectual nature, as the supreme architect and master-builder of the world, another plastic nature as the immediate workman and operator: which plastic nature hath been already described, in the words of Balbus, as a thing, which acts not fortuitously, but regularly, orderly, and artificially. And Laertius tells[2] us, it was defined by Zeno himself after this manner: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐν ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις, καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ' οἵων ἀπεκρίθη· Nature is a habit moved from itself, according to spermatic reasons or seminal principles, perfecting and containing those several things, which in determinate times are produced from it, and acting agreeably to that from which it was secreted.—

Lastly, as the latter Platonists and Peripatetics have unanimously followed their masters herein, whose vegetative soul also is no other than a plastic nature; so the chemists and Paracelsians insist much upon the same thing, and seem rather to have carried the notion on

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[1] Apud Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. ex Timæo, tom. ii. oper. p. 1014. et apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. cap. xiv. p. 711.

[2] In Vita Zen. lib. vii. segm. 148. p. 459.

further, in the bodies of animals, where they call it by a new name of their own—the Archeus.

Moreover, we cannot but observe here, that, as amongst the ancients they were generally condemned for downright Atheists, who acknowledged no other principle besides body or matter, necessarily and fortuitously moved, such as Democritus and the first Ionics: so even Anaxagoras himself, notwithstanding that he was a professed Theist, and plainly asserted mind to be a principle, yet, because he attributed too much to material necessity, admitting neither this plastic nature nor a mundane soul, was severely censured, not only by the vulgar (who unjustly taxed him for an Atheist,) but also by Plato and Aristotle, as a kind of spurious and imperfect Theist, and one who had given great advantage to Atheism. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, thus represents his philosophy:[1] *Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ, πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιΐαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκες ἐστὶ, τότε ἕλκει αὐτὸν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γινομένων ἢ νοῦν·* Anaxagoras useth mind and intellect, that is, God, as a machine in the Cosmopœia; and when he is at a loss to give an account of things by material necessity, then, and never but then, does he draw in mind or God to help him out; but otherwise he will rather assign any thing else for a cause than mind.—Now, if Aristotle censure Anaxagoras in this manner though a professed Theist, because he did but seldom make use of a mental cause for the solving of the phenomena of the world, and only then when he was at a loss for other material and mechanical causes (which it seems he sometimes confessed himself to be,) what would that philosopher have thought of those our so confident Mechanists of later times, who will never vouchsafe so much as once to be beholden to God Almighty for any thing in the economy of the corporeal world, after the first impression of motion upon the matter?

Plato, likewise, in his *Phædo*,[2] and elsewhere, condemns this Anaxagoras by name for this very thing, that though he acknowledged mind to be a cause, yet he seldom made use of it for solving the phenomena; but in his twelfth *De Legibus*, he perstringeth him unnamed, as one who, though a professed Theist, had, notwithstanding, given great encouragement to Atheism, after this manner:[3] *Λέγοντες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανὸν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν ἁμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη σωμάτων, ἅπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος, ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν, τὰ γὰρ δὲ πρὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων πάντα, αὐτοῖς ἐφάνη, τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν φερόμενα,*

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[1] Lib. 1. c. 4. p. 267. tom. iv. oper. [2] P. 393.

[3] P. 967. Steph.

μεστὰ εἶναι λίθων, καί γῆς, καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων σωμάτων, διανεμόντων τὰς αἰτίας παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου, ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐξειργασμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητας· Some of them, who had concluded that it was mind that ordered all things in the heavens, themselves erring concerning the nature of the soul, and not making that older than the body, have overturned all again; for heavenly bodies being supposed by them to be full of stones, and earth, and other inanimate things (dispensing the causes of the whole universe,) they did by this means occasion much Atheism and impiety.—

Furthermore, the same Plato there tells us, that in those times of his, astronomers and physiologers commonly lay under the prejudice and suspicion of Atheism amongst the vulgar, merely for this reason, because they dealt so much in material causes: *Οἱ πολλοὶ διανοοῦνται τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισαμένους, ἀστρονομία τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις, ἀθέους γίγνιθαι, καθεωρακότας ὡς οἷόντε γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις τὰ πράγματ', ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίαις βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν πέρι τελουμένων·* The vulgar think, that they who addict themselves to astronomy and physiology, are made Atheists thereby, they seeing as much as is possible, how things come to pass by material necessities, and being thereby disposed to think them not to be ordered by mind and will, for the sake of good.—From whence we may observe, that, according to the natural apprehensions of men in all ages, they who resolve the phenomena of nature into material necessity, allowing of no final nor mental causality (disposing things in order to ends,) have been strongly suspected for friends to Atheism.

7. But because some may pretend, that the plastic nature is all one with an occult quality, we shall here show, how great a difference there is betwixt these two. For he that asserts an occult quality for the cause of any phenomenon, does indeed assign no cause at all of it, but only declare his own ignorance of the cause: but he that asserts a plastic nature, assigns a determinate and proper cause, nay, the only intelligible cause, of that which is the greatest of all phenomena in the world, namely, the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the orderly, regular, and artificial frame of things in the universe, whereof the mechanic philosophers, however, pretending to solve all phenomena by matter and motion, assign no cause at all. Mind and understanding is the only true cause of orderly regularity; and he that asserts a plastic nature, asserts mental causality in the world; but the fortuitous Mechanists, who, exploding final causes, will not allow mind and understanding to have any influence at all upon the frame of things, can never possibly assign any cause of this grand phenomenon, unless confusion may be said to be the cause

of order, and fortune or chance of constant regularity; and, therefore, themselves must resolve it into an occult quality. Nor, indeed, does there appear any great reason, why such men should assert an infinite mind in the world, since they do not allow it to act any where at all, and therefore must needs make it to be in vain.

8. Now, this plastic nature being a thing, which is not without some difficulty in the conception of it, we shall here endeavor to do these two things concerning it: first, to set down a right representation thereof: and then afterwards to show how extremely the notion of it hath been mistaken, perverted, and abused by those Atheists, who would make it to be the only God Almighty, or first principle of all things.

How the plastic nature is in general to be conceived, Aristotle instructs us in these words:[1] *εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγικὴ ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει·* If the naupegical art, that is, the art of the shipwright, were in the timber itself operatively and effectually, it would there act just as nature doth.—And the case is the same for all other arts. If the œcodomical art, which is in the mind of the architect, were supposed to be transfused into the stones, bricks, and mortar, there acting upon them in such a manner as to make them come together of themselves, and range themselves into the form of a complete edifice, as Amphion was said, by his harp, to have made the stones move, and place themselves orderly of their own accord, and so to have built the walls of Thebes; or if the musical art were conceived to be immediately in the instruments and strings, animating them as a living soul, and making them to move exactly, according to the laws of harmony, without any external impulse: these, and such like instances, in Aristotle's judgment, would be fit iconisms or representations of the plastic nature, that being art itself acting immediately upon the matter as an inward principle in it. To which purpose the same philosopher adds, that this thing might be further illustrated by another instance or resemblance: *μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρεύει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν, τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις.* Nature may be yet more clearly resembled to the medicinal art, when it is employed by the physician in curing himself.—So that the meaning of this philosopher is, that nature is to be conceived as art, acting not from without and at a distance, but immediately upon the thing itself which is formed by it. And thus we have the first general conception of the plastic nature, that it is art itself, acting immediately on the matter as an inward principle.

9. In the next place, we are to observe, that though the plastic na-

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[1] Phys. l. 2. c. 8. pag. 447. tom. i. oper.

ture be a kind of art, yet there are some considerable pre-eminences which it hath above human art; the first whereof is this, that whereas human art cannot act upon the matter otherwise than from without and at a distance, nor communicate itself to it, but with a great deal of tumult and hurlyburly, noise and clatter, it using hands and axes, saws and hammers, and after this manner, with much ado, by knockings and thrustings, slowly introducing its form or idea (as, for example, of a ship or house) into the materials; nature, in the mean time, is another kind of art, which, insinuating itself immediately into things themselves, and there acting more commandingly upon the matter as an inward principle, does its work easily, cleverly, and silently. Nature is art as it were incorporated and embodied in matter, which doth not act upon it from without mechanically, but from within vitally and magically; [1]*οὔτε χεῖρες ἐνταῦθα, οὔτε πόδες, οὔτε τι ὄργανον ἐπακτὸν ἢ σύμφυτον, ὕλης δὲ δεῖ ἐφ᾽ ἧς ποιήσει, καὶ ἣν ἐν εἴδει ποιεῖ, πάντιπου δῆλον· δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχλεύειν ἀφελεῖν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ποιήσεως· ποῖος γὰρ ὠθισμὸς, ἢ τὶς μοχλεία,* etc. Here are no hands, nor feet, nor any instrument, connate or adventitious, there being only need of matter to work upon, and to be brought into a certain form, and nothing else. For it is manifest that the operation of nature is different from mechanism, it doing not its work by trusion or pulsion, by knockings or thrustings, as if it were without that which it wrought upon.—But as God is inward to every thing, so nature acts immediately upon the matter, as an inward and living soul, or law in it.

10. Another pre-eminence of nature above human art is this, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, and therefore consult and deliberate, as also upon second thoughts mend their former work; nature, on the contrary, is never to seek what to do, nor at a stand; and for that reason also (besides another that will be suggested afterwards) it doth never consult nor deliberate. Indeed Aristotle intimates, as if this had been the grand objection of the old Atheistic philosophers against the plastic nature, that because we do not see natural bodies to consult or deliberate, therefore there could be nothing of art, counsel, or contrivance in them: but all came to pass fortuitously.—But he confutes it after this manner: [2]*Ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον, καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται·* It is absurd for men to think nothing to be done for ends, if they do not see that which moves to consult, although art itself doth not consult.—Whence he concludes, that nature may act artifi-

[1] Pl. En. 3. l. 8. sec. 1. p. 344.

[2] Phys. l. 2. c. 8. p 477. tom. i. oper.

cially, orderly, and methodically, for the sake of ends, though it never consult or deliberate. Indeed human artists themselves do not consult properly as they are artists, but whenever they do it, it is for want of art, and because they are to seek, their art being imperfect and adventitious: but art itself, or perfect art, is never to seek, and therefore doth never consult or deliberate; and nature is this art, which never hesitates nor studies, as unresolved what to do, but is always readily prompted; nor does it ever repent afterwards of what it had formerly done, or go about, as it were, upon second thoughts, to alter and mend its former course; but it goes on in one constant unrepenting tenor, from generation to generation, because it is the stamp or impress of that infallibly omniscient art of the Divine understanding, which is the very law and rule of what is simply the best in every thing.

And thus we have seen the difference between nature and human art: that the latter is imperfect art, acting upon the matter from without, and at a distance; but the former is art itself, or perfect art, acting as an inward principle in it. Wherefore, when art is said to imitate nature, the meaning thereof is, that imperfect human art imitates that perfect art of nature, which is really no other than the Divine art itself; as, before Aristotle, Plato had declared in his Sophist,[1] in these words: *τὰ φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ·* Those things, which are said to be done by nature, are indeed done by Divine art.—

II. Notwithstanding which, we are to take notice in the next place, that as nature is not the Deity itself, but a thing very remote from it, and far below it, so neither is it the Divine art, as it is in itself pure and abstract, but concrete and embodied only; for the Divine art considered in itself, is nothing but knowledge, understanding, or wisdom in the mind of God. Now knowledge and understanding, in its own nature, is *κεχωρισμένον τι*, a certain separate and abstract thing,—and of so subtile and refined a nature, as that it is not capable of being incorporated with matter, or mingled and blended with it, as the soul of it. And therefore Aristotle's second instance, which he propounds as most pertinent to illustrate this business of nature by, namely, of the physician's art curing himself, is not so adequate thereunto; because when the medicinal art cures the physician, in whom it is, it doth not there act as nature, that is, as concrete and embodied art, but as knowledge and understanding only, which is art naked, abstract, and unbodied; as also it doth its work ambagiously, by the physician's willing and prescribing to himself the use of such medicaments, as do but conduce, by removing of impediments, to help that, which is nature indeed, or

[1] P. 168. oper.

the inward archeus, to effect the cure. Art is defined by Aristotle[1] to be λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἄνευ ὕλης, the reason of the thing without matter; —and so the Divine art or knowlege in the mind of God, is unbodied reason; but nature is *ratio mersa et confusa*, reason immersed and plunged into matter, and, as it were, fuddled in it, and confounded with it. Nature is not the Divine art archetypal, but only ectypal; it is a living stamp or signature of the Divine wisdom; which, though it act exactly according to its archetype, yet it doth not at all comprehend nor understand the reason of what itself doth. And the difference between these two may be resembled to that between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, the reason of the mind and conception,—called *verbum mentis*, and the λόγος προφορικὸς, the reason of external speech;—the latter of which, though it bear a certain stamp and impress of the former upon it, yet itself is nothing but articulate sound devoid of all understanding and sense. Or else we may illustrate this business by another similitude, comparing the Divine art and wisdom to an architect, but nature to a manuary opificer; the difference betwixt which two is thus set forth by Aristotle pertinently to our purpose:[2] τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν, καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν· οἱ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια, ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα φύσει τινι ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον· τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι' ἔθος. We account the architects in every thing more honorable than the manuary opificers, because they understand the reason of things done; whereas the other, as some inanimate things, only do, not knowing what they do; the difference between them being only this, that inanimate things act by a certain nature in them, but the manuary opificer by habit.—Thus nature may be called the χειροτέχνης, or manuary opificer that acts subserviently under the architectonical art and wisdom of the Divine understanding,[3] ἢ ποιεῖ μὲν οὐκ εἰδυῖα, which does do without knowing the reason of what it doth.—

12. Wherefore, as we did before observe the pre-eminences of nature above human art, so we must here take notice also of the imperfections and defects of it, in which respect it falls short of human art, which are likewise two; and the first of them is this, that though it act artificially for the sake of ends, yet itself doth neither intend those ends,

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[1] De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 472. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Met. l. 1. c. 1. p. 260. tom. iv. oper.

[3] Plotin. libro utrum Stellæ aliquid agant. Ennead. ii. lib. iii. cap. xvii. p. 147.

nor understand the reason of that it doth. Nature is not master of that consummate art and wisdom, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and a drudging executioner of the dictates of it. This difference betwixt nature and abstract art or wisdom is expressed by Plotinus in these words :[1] *τί διοίσει τῆς λεγομένης φύσωες φρόνησις ; ὅτι ἡ μὲν φρόνησις πρῶτον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἔσχατον, ἴνδαλμα γάρ φρονήσεως ἡ φύσις, καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὖν, ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λογὸν ἔχει. οἷον εἰ ἐν κηρῷ βαθεῖ, διικνεῖτο εἰς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος· ἐνάργους μὲν ὄντος τοῦ ἄνω, ἰχνοῦς δὲ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος τοῦ κάτω, ὅθεν οὐδὲ οἶδε φύσις, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ.* How doth wisdom differ from that which is called nature? verily in this manner, that wisdom is the first thing, but nature the last and lowest ; for nature is but an image or imitation of wisdom, the last thing of the soul, which hath the lowest impress of reason shining upon it ; as when a thick piece of wax is thoroughly impressed upon by a seal, that impress, which is clean and distinct in the superior superficies of it, will in the lower side be weak and obscure ; and such is the stamp and signature of nature, compared with that of wisdom and understanding, nature being a thing, which doth only do, but not know.—And elsewhere the same writer declares the difference between the spermatic *λόγοι*, or reasons, and knowledges or conceptions of the mind in this manner :[2] *Πότερα δὲ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οἱ ἐν ψυχῇ νοήματα ; ἀλλὰ πᾶς κατὰ τὰ νοήματα ποιήσει ; ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ὕλῃ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν φυσικῶς, οὐ νόησις, οὐδὲ ὅρασις ἀλλὰ δύναμις τρεπτικὴ τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ ἐδυῖα, ἀλλὰ δρῶσα μόνον, οἷον τύπον καὶ σχῆμα ἐν ὕδατι.* Whether are these plastic reasons or forms in the soul knowledges? but how shall it then act according to those knowledges? for the plastic reason or form acts or works in matter, and that which acts naturally is not intellection nor vision, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, and makes as it were a stamp or figure in water.

And with this doctrine of the ancients, a modern judicious writer, and sagacious inquirer into nature, seems fully to agree, that nature is such a thing as doth not know, but only do ; for after he had admired that wisdom and art, by which the bodies of animals are framed, he concludes that one or other of these two things must needs be acknowledged, that either the vegetative or plastic power of the soul, by which it fabricates and organizes its own body, is more excellent and Divine than the rational ; or else, [3]"In naturæ operibus neque prudentiam nec intellectum inesse, sed ita solum videri conceptui nostro, qui secundum

[1] En. 4. l. 4. c. 13. p. 467. [2] En. 2. l. 3. s. 17. p. 147.

[3] Harv. de Gen. Animal. Ex. 49.

artes nostras et facultates, seu exemplaria a nobismetipsis mutuata, de rebus naturæ divinis judicamus; quasi principia naturæ activa effectus suos eo modo producerent, quo nos opera nostra artificialia solemus:" That in the works of nature there is neither prudence nor understanding, but only it seems so to our apprehensions, who judge of these Divine things of nature according to our own arts and faculties, and patterns borrowed from ourselves; as if the active principles of nature did produce their effects in the same manner as we do our artificial works. —Wherefore we conclude, agreeably to the sense of the best philosophers, both ancient and modern, that nature is such a thing, as, though it act artificially, and for the sake of ends, yet it doth but ape and mimic the Divine art and wisdom, itself not understanding those ends which it acts for, nor the reason of what it doth in order to them; for which cause also it is not capable of consultation or deliberation, nor can it act electively, or with discretion.

13. But because this may seem strange at the first sight, that nature should be said to act ἕνεκάτου, for the sake of ends,—and regularly or artificially, and yet be itself devoid of knowledge and understanding, we shall therefore endeavor to persuade the possibility, and facilitate the belief of it, by some other instances; and first by that of habits, particularly those musical ones of singing, playing upon instruments, and dancing. Which habits direct every motion of the hand, voice, and body, and prompt them readily, without any deliberation or studied consideration, what the next following note or motion should be. If you jog a sleeping musician, and sing but the first words of a song to him, which he had either himself composed, or learned before, he will presently take it from you, and that perhaps before he is thoroughly awake, going on with it, and singing out the remainder of the whole song to the end. Thus the fingers of an exercised lutonist, and the legs and whole body of a skilful dancer, are directed to move regularly and orderly, in a long train and series of motions, by those artificial habits in them, which do not themselves at all comprehend those laws and rules of music or harmony, by which they are governed. So that the same thing may be said of these habits, which was said before of nature, that they do not know, but only do. And thus we see there is no reason, why this plastic nature (which is supposed to move body regularly and artificially) should be thought to be an absolute impossibility, since habits do, in like manner, gradually evolve themselves in a long train or series of regular and artificial motions, readily prompting the doing of them, without comprehending that art and reason, by which they are directed. The forementioned

philosopher illustrates the seminary reason and plastic nature of the universe, by this very instance :[1] *ἡ τοίνυν ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς τεχνική· ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ ὀρχούμενος, κινούμενος εἴη. ὁ γὰρ ὀρχιστὴς, τῇ οὕτω τεχνικῇ ζωῇ ἔοικεν αὐτὸς, καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεῖ, καὶ οὕτω κινεῖ, ὡς τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης πῶς οὔσης.* The energy of nature is artificial, as when a dancer moves; for a dancer resembles this artificial life of nature, forasmuch as art itself moves him, and so moves him as being such a life in him.—And agreeably to this conceit, the ancient mythologists represented the nature of the universe, by Pan playing upon a pipe or harp, and being in love with the nymph, Echo ; as if nature did, by a kind of silent melody, make all the parts of the universe every where dance in measure and proportion, itself being, as it were, in the mean time, delighted and ravished with the re-echoing of its own harmony. Habits are said to be an adventitious and acquired nature, and nature was before defined by the Stoics[2] to be *ἕξις*, or a habit: so that there seems to be no other difference between these two, than this, that whereas the one is acquired by teaching, industry, and exercise ; the other, as was expressed by Hippocrates,[3] is *ἀπαίδευτος καὶ οὐκ μαθοῦσα*, unlearned and untaught,—and may in some sense also be said to be *αὐτοδίδακτος*, self-taught, — though she be indeed always inwardly prompted, secretly whispered into, and inspired by the Divine art and wisdom.

14. Moreover, that something may act artificially and for ends, without comprehending the reason of what it doth, may be further evinced from those natural instincts that are in animals, which without knowledge direct them to act regularly, in order both to their own good, and the good of the universe. As for example : the bees in mellification, and in framing their combs and hexagonial cells, the spiders in spinning their webs, the birds in building their nests, and many other animals in such like actions of theirs, which would seem to argue a great sagacity in them, whereas, notwithstanding, as Aristotle observes,[4] *οὔτε τέχνῃ, οὔτε ζητήσαντα, οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ·* They do these things, neither by art, nor by counsel, nor by any deliberation of their own ;—and, therefore, are not masters of that wisdom, according to which they act, but only passive to the instincts and impresses thereof upon them. And indeed to affirm, that brute animals do all

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[1] En. 3. l. 2. c. 16. p. 267. oper.

[2] Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. vii. segm. 148. p. 459.

[3] Epidemicor. lib. vi. sect. v. p. 509. tom. i. edit. Vander Linden. Vide etiam eundem *περὶ τροφῆς*. Sec. viii. p. 597. tom. i. oper.

[4] Physicor. lib. ii. cap. x. p. 476. tom. i. oper.

these things by a knowledge of their own, and which themselves are masters of, and that without deliberation and consultation, were to make them to be endued with a most perfect intellect, far transcending that of human reason; whereas it is plain enough, that brutes are not above consultation, but below it, and that these instincts of nature in them are nothing but a kind of fate upon them.

15. There is, in the next place, another imperfection to be observed in the plastic nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reason of its own action, so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious of what it doth; in which respect, it doth not only fall short of human art, but even of that very manner of acting, which is in brutes themselves, who, though they do not understand the reason of those actions, that their natural instincts lead them to, yet they are generally conceived to be conscious of them, and to do them by fancy; whereas, the plastic nature in the formation of plants and animals seems to have no animal fancy, no express *συναίσθησις*, con-sense, or consciousness of what it doth. Thus the often commended philosopher:[1] *ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρείττων, φαντασία δὲ μεταξὺ φύσεως τύπου καὶ νοήσεως· ἡ μὲν γὲ οὐθενὸς ἀντίληψιν οὐδὲ σύνεσιν ἔχει.* Nature hath not so much as any fancy in it; as intellection and knowledge is a thing superior to fancy, so fancy is superior to the impress of nature, for nature hath no apprehension nor conscious perception of any thing. In a word, nature is a thing, that hath no such self-perception or self-enjoyment in it, as animals have.

16. Now we are well aware, that this is a thing, which the narrow principles of some late philosophers will not admit of, that there should be any action distinct from local motion besides expressly conscious cogitation. For they making the first general heads of all entity to be extension and cogitation, or extended being and cogitative: and then supposing, that the essence of cogitation consists in express consciousness, must needs by this means exclude such a plastic life of nature, as we speak of, that is supposed to act without animal fancy or express consciousness. Wherefore, we conceive, that the first heads of being ought rather to be expressed thus: resisting or antitypous extension, and life, (i. e. internal energy and self-activity;) and then again, that life or internal self-activity is to be subdivided into such as either acts with express consciousness and synæsthesis, or such as is without it; the latter of which is this plastic life of nature: so that there may be an action distinct from local motion, or a vital energy, which is not

[1] En. 4. l. 4. s. 13. lib. ii. de Dubitat. Animæ. p. 407.

accompanied with that fancy, or consciousness, that is in the energies of the animal life; that is, there may be a simple internal energy, or vital autokinesy, which is without that duplication, that is included in the nature of *συναίσθησις*, con-sense and consciousness,—which makes a being to be present with itself, attentive to its own actions, or animadversive of them, to perceive itself to do or suffer, and to have a fruition or enjoyment of itself. And indeed it must be granted, that what moves matter or determines the motion of it vitally, must needs do it by some other energy of its own, as it is reasonable also to conceive, that itself hath some vital sympathy with that matter, which it acts upon. But we apprehend, that both these may be without clear and express consciousness. Thus the philosopher: [1]*πᾶσα ζωὴ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ φαύλη, ἐνέργεια δὲ, οὐχ ὡς τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, κἂν μὴ αἴσθησίς τις παρῇ, κίνησίς τις οὐκ εἰκῆ.* Every life is energy, even the worst of lives, and therefore that of nature; whose energy is not like that of fire, but such an energy as though there be no sense belonging to it, yet is it not temerarious or fortuitous, but orderly and regular.—

Wherefore this controversy, whether the energy of the plastic nature be cogitation or no, seems to be but a logomachy, or contention about words. For if clear and express consciousness be supposed to be included in cogitation, then it must needs be granted, that cogitation doth not belong to the plastic life of nature; but if the notion of that word be enlarged, so as to comprehend all action distinct from local motion, and to be of equal extent with life, then the energy of nature is cogitation.

Nevertheless, if any one think fit to attribute some obscure and imperfect sense or perception, different from that of animals, to the energy of nature, and will therefore call it a kind of drowsy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation, the philosopher before mentioned will not very much gainsay it: [2]*Εἴτις βούληται σύνεσίν τινα ἢ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ διδόναι, οὐχ οἵαν λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν ἄσθησιν ἢ τὴν σύνησιν, ἀλλ' οἷον εἴτις τὴν τοῦ ὕπνου τῇ τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος προςεικάσειε.* If any will needs attribute some kind of apprehension or sense to nature, then it must not be such a sense or apprehension, as is in animals, but something that differs as much from it, as the sense or cogitation of one in a profound sleep differs from that of one who is awake.—And since it cannot be denied, but that the plastic nature hath a certain dull and obscure idea of that which it stamps and prints upon matter, the same philosopher[3] himself

[1] En. 3. l. 2. c. 16. lib. i. de Provid. p. 267.

[2] En. 3. lib. 8. s. 3. Libro de Natura, contemplat. et uno. p. 345. s.

[3] Ubi. Supra.

sticks not to call this idea of nature, θέαμα and θεώρημα, a spectacle and contemplamen, as likewise the energy of nature towards it, θεωρία ἄψοφος, a silent contemplation;—nay, he allows, that nature may be said to be, in some sense, φιλοθεάμων, a lover of spectacles or contemplation.—

17. However, that there may be some vital energy without clear and express συναίσθησις, con-sense and consciousness, animadversion, attention, or self-perception, seems reasonable upon several accounts. For, first, those philosophers themselves, who make the essence of the soul to consist in cogitation, and again, the essence of cogitation in clear and express consciousness, cannot render it any way probable, that the souls of men in all profound sleeps, lethargies, and apoplexies, as also of embryos in the womb, from their very first arrival thither, are never so much as one moment without expressly conscious cogitations; which, if they were, according to the principles of their philosophy, they must, *ipso facto*, cease to have any being. Now, if the souls of men and animals be at any time without consciousness and self-perception, then it must needs be granted, that clear and express consciousness is not essential to life. There is some appearance of life and vital sympathy in certain vegetables and plants, which, however called sensitive plants and plant-animals, cannot well be supposed to have animal sense and fancy, or express consciousness in them; although we are not ignorant, in the mean time, how some endeavor to solve all those phenomena mechanically. It is certain, that our human souls themselves are not always conscious of whatever they have in them; for even the sleeping geometrician hath, at that time, all his geometrical theorems and knowledges some way in him; as also the sleeping musician, all his musical skill and songs; and, therefore, why may it not be possible for the soul to have likewise some actual energy in it, which it is not expressly conscious of? We have all experience, of our doing many animal actions non-attendingly, which we reflect upon afterwards; s, also, that we often continue a long series of bodily motions, by a mere virtual intention of our minds, and as it were by half a cogitation. That vital sympathy, by which our soul is united and tied fast, as it were with a knot, to the body, is a thing that we have no direct consciousness of, but only in its effects. Nor can we tell, how we come to be so differently affected in our souls, from the many different motions made upon our bodies. As, likewise, we are not conscious to ourselves of that energy, whereby we impress variety of motions and figurations upon the animal spirits of our brain in our fantastic thoughts. For, though the geometrician perceive himself to make lines, triangles, and

circles in the dust with his finger, yet he is not aware, how he makes all those same figures first upon the corporeal spirits of his brain, from whence, notwithstanding, as from a glass, they are reflected to him, fancy being rightly concluded by Aristotle[1] to be a weak and obscure sense. There is also another more interior kind of plastic power in the soul (if we may so call it,) whereby it is formative of its own cogitations, which itself is not always conscious of; as when, in sleep or dreams, it frames interlocutory discourses betwixt itself and other persons, in a long series, with coherent sense and apt connections, in which oftentimes it seems to be surprised with unexpected answers and repartees, though itself were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable. Not only our nictations for the most part when we are awake, but also our nocturnal volutations in sleep, are performed with very little or no consciousness. Respiration, or that motion of the diaphragma and other muscles which causes it (there being no sufficient mechanical account of it,) may well be concluded to be always a vital motion, though it be not always animal; since no man can affirm, that he is perpetually conscious to himself of that energy of his soul, which does produce it when he is awake, much less when asleep. And, lastly, the Cartesian[2] attempts to solve the motion of the heart mechanically, seems to be abundantly confuted by autopsy and experiment, evincing the systole of the heart to be a muscular constriction, caused by some vital principle, to make which, nothing but a pulsific corporeal quality in the substance of the heart itself, is very unphilosophical and absurd. Now, as we have no voluntary imperium at all upon the systole and diastole of the heart, so are we not conscious to ourselves of any energy of our own soul that causes them; and therefore we may reasonably conclude from hence also, that there is some vital energy, without animal fancy or synæthesis, express consciousness and self-perception.

18. Wherefore, the plastic nature, acting neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor hormetically, must be concluded to act fatally, magically, and sympathetically. And thus that curious and diligent inquirer into nature, before commended, resolves: [3]"Natura tanquam fato quodam, seu mandato secundum leges operante, movet;" Nature moveth as it were by a kind of fate or command, acting according to laws.—Fate, and the laws or commands of the Deity,

[1] Lib. iii. de Anima, cap. iii. iv. p. 45. s. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Vide Cartes. Libr. de Homine et de Formatione Fœtus, p. ii. p. 195. s.

[3] Harvey de Gen. An.

concerning the mundane economy (they being really the same thing), ought not to be looked upon, neither as verbal things, nor as mere will and cogitation in the mind of God, but as an energetical and effectual principle, constituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things decreed to pass. The Aphrodisian philosopher,[1] with others of the ancients, have concluded, that fate and nature are but two different names for one and the same thing; and that *τότε εἱμαρμένον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἱμαρμένον*, both that which is done fatally is done naturally, and also whatever is done naturally is done fatally:—but that which we assert in this place is only this, that the plastic nature may be said to be the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. Now, that which acts not by any knowledge or fancy, will or appetite of its own, but only fatally according to laws and impresses made upon it (but differently in different cases), may be said also to act magically and sympathetically. *Ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία* (saith the philosopher,[2]) *ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ νεῖκος*, The true magic is the friendship and discord that is in the universe.—And again, magic is said to be founded *ἐν τῇ συμπαθείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμενων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ προς ἓν ζῶον συντελούντων*, in the sympathy and variety of diverse powers conspiring together into one animal.—Of which passages, though the principal meaning seem to be this, that the ground of magical fascinations is one vital unitive principle in the universe; yet they imply also, that there is a certain vital energy, not in the way of knowledge and fancy, will and animal appetite, but fatally sympathetical and magical. As, indeed, that mutual sympathy, which we have constant experience of, betwixt our soul and our body (being not a material and mechanical, but vital thing), may be called also magical.

19. From what hath been hitherto declared concerning the plastic nature, it may appear, that though it be a thing that acts for ends artificially, and which may be also called the Divine art, and the fate of the corporeal world; yet, for all that, it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature. Forasmuch as it is not master of that reason and wisdom, according to which it acts, nor does it properly intend those ends, which it acts for; nor, indeed, is it expressly conscious of what it doth, it not knowing, but only doing, according to commands and laws impressed upon it. Neither of which things ought to seem strange or incredible, since nature may as well act regularly and artificially, without any knowledge and consciousness of its own, as forms

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[1] Libr. de Fato, sec. 6. p. 25. edit. Londin.

[2] Plotin. lib. ii. de Dubit. Animæ, Ennead. iv. lib. v. cap. xi. p. 434.

of letters compounded together may print coherent philosophic sense, though they understand nothing at all; and it may also act for the sake of those ends, that are not intended by itself, but some higher being, as well as the saw or hatchet in the hand of the architect or mechanic doth: [1] *τὸ σκέπαρνον ἕνεκά του πελεκᾷ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προλογιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ προλογιζομένῳ ὑπηρετοῦν;* the axe cuts for the sake of something, though itself does not ratiocinate, nor intend or design any thing, but is only subservient to that which does so.—It is true, that our human actions are not governed by such exact reason, art and wisdom, nor carried on with such constancy, evenness, and uniformity, as the actions of nature are; notwithstanding which, since we act according to a knowledge of our own, and are masters of that wisdom, by which our actions are directed, since we do not act fatally only, but electively and intendingly, with consciousness and self-perception, the rational life that is in us ought to be accounted a much higher and more noble perfection than that plastic life of nature. Nay, this plastic nature is so far from being the first and highest life, that it is indeed the last and lowest of all lives, it being really the same thing with the vegetative, which is inferior to the sensitive. The difference betwixt nature and wisdom was before observed, that wisdom is the first and highest thing, but nature the last and lowest; this latter being but an umbratile imitation of the former. And to this purpose, this plastic nature is further described by the same philosopher, in these words: [2] *ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς, οὐδ᾽ αὐτονοῦς, οὐδέγε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ γένος· ἠρτημένος δὲ ἐκείνης, καὶ οἷον ἔκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχῆς κατὰ νοῦν διακειμένης γεννησάντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον.* The spermatic reason or plastic nature is no pure mind or perfect intellect, nor any kind of pure soul neither; but something which depends upon it, being as it were an effulgency or erradiation from both together, mind and soul, or soul affected according to mind, generating the same as a lower kind of life.—

And though this plastic nature contain no small part of Divine providence in it; yet, since it is a thing that cannot act electively with discretion, it must needs be granted, that there is a higher and Diviner providence than this, which also presides over the corporeal world itself; which was a thing likewise insisted upon by that philosopher: [3] *Γίνεται τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικοὺς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγους*

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[1] Simplic. in Arist. Phys. l. ii. p. 33. edit. Græc.

[2] En. iii. l. ii. cap. 16. libr. i. de Providentia, p. 267.

[3] En. iv. lib. iv. cap. 39. libr. ii. de Dub. Animæ, p. 433.

περιληπτικοὺς, καὶ τῶν προτέρων, ἢ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν σπερμολόγων λόγους, οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπερματικοῖς λόγοις ἔνι, καὶ τῶν γενομένων, παρὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους· The things in the world are not administered merely by spermatic reasons, but by perileptic (that is, comprehensive, intellectual reasons), which are in order of nature before the other, because in the spermatic reasons cannot be contained that which is contrary to them, etc.—Where, though this philosopher may extend his spermatic reasons further than we do our plastic nature in this place (which is only confined to the motions of matter), yet he concludes, that there is a higher principle presiding over the universe than this. So that it is not *ratio mersa et confusa*, a reason drowned in matter, and confounded with it,—which is the supreme governor of the world, but a providence perfectly intellectual, abstract and released.

20. But, though the plastic nature be the lowest of all lives, nevertheless, since it is a life, it must needs be incorporeal: all life being such. For body being nothing but antitypous extension, or resisting bulk, nothing but mere outside, *aliud extra aliud*, together with passive capability, hath no internal energy, self-activity, or life belonging to it; it is not able so much as to move itself, and therefore much less can it artificially direct its own motion. Moreover, in the efformation of the bodies of animals, it is one and the self-same thing that directs the whole. That which contrives and frames the eye, cannot be a distinct thing from that which frames the ear; nor that which makes the hand, from that which makes the foot; the same thing, which delineates the veins, must also form the arteries; and that which fabricates the nerves, must also project the muscles and joints; it must be the same thing that designs and organizes the heart and brain, with such communications betwixt them; one and the self-same thing must needs have in it the entire idea, and the complete model or platform of the whole organic body. For the several parts of matter distant from one another, acting alone by themselves, without any common directrix, being not able to confer together, nor communicate with each other, could never possibly conspire to make up one such uniform and orderly system or compages, as the body of every animal is. The same is to be said likewise concerning the plastic nature of the whole corporeal universe, in which ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται, all things are ordered together conspiringly into one.—It must be one and the same thing, which formeth the whole, or else it could never have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony. Now that which is one and the same, acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be corporeal.

Indeed Aristotle is severely censured by some learned men for this,

that though he talk every where of such a nature as acts regularly, artificially, and methodically, in order to the best, yet he does no where positively declare, whether this nature of his be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental; which yet is the less to be wondered at in him, because he does not clearly determine these same points concerning the rational soul neither, but seems to stagger uncertainly about them. In the mean time it cannot be denied, but that Aristotle's followers do for the most part conclude this nature of his to be corporeal; whereas, notwithstanding, according to the principles of this philosophy, it cannot possibly be such: for there is nothing else attributed to body in it, besides these three, matter, form, and accidents; neither of which can be the Aristotelic nature. First, it cannot be matter; because nature, according to Aristotle, is supposed to be the principal of motion and activity, which matter in itself is devoid of. Moreover, Aristotle concludes,[1] that they, who assign only a material cause, assign no cause at all *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, of well and fit, of that regular and artificial frame of things which is ascribed to nature; upon both which accounts, it is determined by that philosopher,[2] that *ἡ φύσις μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῆς ὕλης*, nature is more a principle and cause than matter;—and therefore it cannot be one and the same thing with it. Again, it is as plain that Aristotle's nature cannot be the forms of particular bodies neither, as vulgar peripatetics seem to conceive, these being all generated and produced by nature, and as well corruptible as generable. Whereas nature is such a thing as is neither generated nor corrupted, it being the principle and cause of all generation and corruption. To make nature, and the material forms of bodies, to be one and the self-same thing, is all one, as if one should make the seal (with the stamper too,) to be one and the same thing with the signature upon the wax. And, lastly, Aristotle's nature can least of all be the accidents or qualities of bodies; because these act only in virtue of their substance, neither can they exercise any active power over the substance itself in which they are; whereas the plastic nature is a thing that domineers over the substance of the whole corporeal universe, and which, subordinately to the Deity, put both heaven and earth in this frame in which now it is. Wherefore, since Aristotle's nature can be neither the matter, nor the forms, nor the accidents of bodies, it is plain, that, according to his own principles, it must be incorporeal.

21. Now, if the plastic nature be incorporeal, then it must of neces-

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[1] Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 266. tom. iv. oper.

[2] De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 475. tom. ii. oper. Vide etiam Physicor. lib. ii. cap. i. p. 462.

sity be either an inferior power or faculty of some soul, which is also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a lower substantial life by itself devoid of animal consciousness. The Platonists seem to affirm both these together, namely, that there is a plastic nature lodged in all particular souls of animals, brutes, and men, and also that there is a general plastic or spermatic principle of the whole universe distinct from their higher mundane soul, though subordinate to it, and dependent upon it:[1] ἡ λεγομένη φύσις γέννημα ψυχῆς προτέρας δυνατώτερον ζώσης, That which is called nature, is the offspring of an higher soul, which hath a more powerful life in it.—And though Aristotle do not so clearly acknowledge the incorporeity and substantiality of souls, yet he concurs very much with this Platonic doctrine, that nature is either a lower power, or faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life by itself, depending upon a superior soul.

And this we shall make to appear from his book *De Partibus Animalium*,[2] after we have taken notice of some considerable preliminary passages in it in order thereunto. For having first declared, that besides the material cause, there are other causes also of natural generations, namely, these two, ἥτε οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, that for whose sake (or the final cause,) and that from which the principle of motion is,—or the efficient cause; he determines, that the former of these two is the principal: φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη ἣν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος· λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δὲ ὁ λόγος, ὁμοίως, ἔντε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν· The chiefest of these two causes seems to be the final or the intending cause; for this is reason, and reason is alike a principle in artificial and in natural things.—Nay, the philosopher adds, excellently, that there is more of reason and art in the things of nature, than there is in those things that are artificially made by men: μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ το οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. There is more of final or intending causality, and of the reason of good, in the works of nature, than in those of human art.—After which he greatly complains of the first and most ancient physiologers, meaning thereby Anaximander, and those other Ionics before Anaxagoras, that they considered only τὴν ὑλικὴν ἀρχὴν, the material principle and cause of things,—without attending to those two other causes, the principle of motion, and that which aims at ends; they talking only of fire, water, air and earth, and generating the whole world from the fortuitous

[1] Plotin. Libr. de Natura, Contemplatione, et Uno, Ennead. iii. lib. viii. cap. iii. p. 345. oper.

[2] L. 1. c. 1. p. 470. s. tom. ii. oper.

concourse of these senseless bodies. But at length Aristotle falls upon Democritus, who, being junior to those others before mentioned, philosophized after the same Atheistical manner, but in a new way of his own, by atoms; acknowledging no other nature, neither in the universe, nor in the bodies of animals, than that of fortuitous mechanism, and supposing all things to arise from the different compositions of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. Of which Democritic philosophy he gives his censure in these following words: [1]*εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι, τῶν τε ζώων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὀρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι*, etc. If animals and their several parts did consist of nothing but figure and color, then indeed Democritus would be in the right; but a dead man hath the same form and figure of body, that he had before, and yet for all that he is not a man; neither is a brazen or wooden hand a hand, but only equivocally, as a painted physician, or pipes made of stone, are so called. No member of a dead man's body is that which it was before, when he was alive, neither eye, nor hand, nor foot. Wherefore, this is but a rude way of philosophizing, and just as if a carpenter should talk of a wooden hand. For thus these physiologers declare the generations and causes of figures only, or the matter out of which things are made, as air and earth. Whereas, no artificer would think it sufficient to render such a cause of any artificial fabric, because the instrument happened to fall so upon the timber, that therefore it was hollow here, and plane there; but rather because himself made such strokes, and for such ends, etc.

Now, in the close of all, this philosopher at length declares, that there is another principle of corporeal things, besides the material, and such as is not only the cause of motion, but also acts artificially in order to ends, *ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν*, there is such a thing as that which we call nature;—that is, not the fortuitous motion of senseless matter, but a plastic regular and artificial nature, such as acts for ends and good; declaring in the same place, what this nature is; namely, that it is *ψυχή, ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς*, soul, or part of soul, or not without soul;—and from thence inferring, that it properly belongs to a physiologer, to treat concerning the soul also. But he concludes afterwards, *οὐδὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις*, that the whole soul is not nature;—whence it remains, that, according to Aristotle's sense, nature is *ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς*, either part of a soul, or not without soul;—that is, either a lower part or faculty of some conscious soul; or else an inferior kind of life by itself, which is not without soul, but subordinate to it, and dependent on it.

[1] De Part. An. lib. 1. c. 1.

22. As for the bodies of animals, Aristotle[1] first resolves in general, that nature in them is either the whole soul, or else some part of it; *φύσις ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα, καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος τοῦ ζώου, ἤτοι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ, ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς·* Nature, as the moving principle, or as that which acts artificially for ends (so far as concerns the bodies of animals,) is either the whole soul, or else some part of it.—But afterwards he determines more particularly, that the plastic nature is not the whole soul in animals, but only some part of it; *οὐ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, ἀλλά τι μόριον αὐτῆς*, that is, nature in animals, properly so called, is some lower power or faculty lodged in their respective souls, whether sensitive or rational.

And that there is plastic nature in the souls of animals, the same Aristotle elsewhere affirms and proves after this manner: [2]*τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τ᾽ αναντία φερόμενα, τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν· διασπασθήσεται γαρ εἰ μήτι ἔσται τὸ κωλίσον, εἰδ᾽ ἐστὶ, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι·* What is that, which, in the bodies of animals, holds together such things as, of their own nature, would otherwise move contrary ways, and fly asunder, as fire and earth, which would be distracted and dissipated, the one tending upwards, the other downwards, were there not something to hinder them? Now if there be any such thing, this must be the soul, which is also the cause of nourishment and augmentation.—Where the philosopher adds, that though some were of opinion, that fire was that, which was the cause of nourishment and augmentation in animals, yet this was indeed but *συναίτιον πῶς, οὐ μὴν ἁπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ*, only the concause or instrument, and not simply the cause, but rather the soul.—And to the same purpose he philosophizeth elsewhere,[3] *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πέψις δι᾽ ἧς ἡ τροφὴ γίνεται τοῖς ζώοις οὔτε ἄνευ ψυχῆς, οὔτε θερμότητός ἐστι, πυρὶ γὰρ ἐργάζεται πάντα·* Neither is concoction, by which nourishment is made in animals, done without the soul, nor without heat, for all things are done by fire.

And certainly it seems very agreeable to the phenomena, to acknowledge something in the bodies of animals superior to mechanism, as that may well be thought to be, which keeps the more fluid parts of them constantly in the same form and figure, so as not to be enormously altered in their growth by disproportionate nourishment; that, which restores flesh that was lost, consolidates dissolved continuities, incorporates the newly-received nourishment, and joins it continuously with the pre-existent parts of flesh and bone; which regenerates and repairs

[1] De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 473.

[2] De An. l. 2. c. 4. p. 26. s. tom. ii. oper.

[3] De Resp. c. 8. p. 141. tom. ii. oper.

veins consumed or cut off; which causes dentition in so regular a manner and that, not only in infants, but also adult persons; that which casts off excrements, and dischargeth superfluities; which makes things seem ungrateful to an interior sense, that were notwithstanding pleasing to the taste: that nature of Hippocrates,[1] that is the curatrix of diseases, *αἱ φύσιες τῶν νουσέων ἰητροὶ*, and that archeus of the chymists or Paracelsians, to which all medicaments are but subservient, as being able to effect nothing of themselves without it: I say, there seems to be such a principle as this in the bodies of animals, which is not mechanical but vital; and therefore, since entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, we may with Aristotle conclude it to be *μέρος* or *μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς*, a certain part of the soul of those animals, or a lower unconscious power lodged in them.

23. Besides this plastic nature, which is in animals, forming their several bodies artificially, as so many microcosms, or little worlds, there must be also a general plastic nature in the macrocosm, the whole corporeal universe, that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and agree together into one harmony. Concerning which plastic nature of the universe, the author *De Mundo*[2] writes after this manner: *καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διεκόσμησε μία ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις*, one power passing through all things ordered and formed the whole world.—Again, he calls the same[3] *πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔμψυχον, καὶ γόνιμον οὐσίαν*, a spirit, and a living and generative nature;—and plainly declares it to be a thing distinct from the Deity, but subordinate to it and dependent on it. But Aristotle himself in that genuine work of his before-mentioned, speaks clearly and positively concerning the plastic nature of the universe, as well as that of animals, in these words—[4]*φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς ἡ τέχνη, οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοιαύτη ἣν ἔχομεν, καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παντός· διὸ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν μᾶλλον, ἢ τὰ ζῶα τὰ θνητά· τὸ γοῦν τεταγμένον καὶ ὡρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις, ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε, περὶ τὰ θνητὰ μᾶλλον· οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζώων ἕκαστον φύσει φασιν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι· τὸν δ᾽ οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον συστῆναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν φαίνεται.* It seemeth, that as there is art in artificial things, so in the things of nature there is another such like principle or cause, which we ourselves partake of; in the same manner as we do of heat

[1] Epidemic. lib. vi. sect. v. p. 809. tom. i. oper. edit. Vander Linden.

[2] Cap. v. p. 856. inter Arist. opera, tom. i. [3] Ib. cap. iv. p. 852.

[4] De. Part. An. lib. 1. c. 1. p. 474.

and cold, from the universe. Wherefore it is more probable, that the whole world was at first made by such a cause as this (if at least it were made) and that it is still conserved by the same, than that mortal animals should be so; for there is much more of order and determinate regularity in the heavenly bodies than in ourselves; but more of fortuitousness and inconstant irregularity among these mortal things. Notwithstanding which, some there are, who, though they cannot but acknowledge, that the bodies of animals were all framed by an artificial nature, yet they will needs contend, that the system of the heavens sprung merely from fortune and chance; although there be not the least appearance of fortuitousness or temerity in it.—And then he sums up all into this conclusion: *ὥστε εἶναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν·* Wherefore, it is manifest, that there is some such thing as that which we call nature;—that is, that there is not only an artificial, methodical, and plastic nature in animals, by which their respective bodies are framed and conserved; but also, that there is such a general plastic nature likewise in the universe, by which the heavens and whole world are thus artificially ordered and disposed.

24. Now whereas Aristotle, in the forecited words, tells us, that we partake of life and understanding from that in the universe, after the same manner as we partake of heat and cold from that heat and cold that is in the universe; it is observable, that this was a notion borrowed from Socrates (as we understand both from Xenophon and Plato;) that philosopher having used it as an argumentation to prove a Deity. And the sense of it is represented after this manner by the Latin poet:[1]

> Principio cœlum ac terram, camposque liquentes,
> Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra,
> Spiritus inter alit, totosque infusa per artus,
> Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.
> Inde hominum pecundumque genus, vitæque volantûm.

From whence it may be collected, that Aristotle did suppose this plastic nature of the universe to be *ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς*, either part of some mundane soul,—that was also conscious and intellectual (as that plastic nature in animals is,) or at least some inferior principle, depending on such a soul.—And indeed whatever the doctrine of the modern Peripatetics be, we make no doubt at all but that Aristotle himself held the world's animation, or a mundane soul: forasmuch as he

[1] Virgil. Æneid. lib. vi. vers. 724.

plainly declares himself concerning it elsewhere in his book *De Cœlo*[1] after this manner :—*ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ὡς περὶ σωμάτων μόνον αὐτῶν, καὶ μονάδων, τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν, διανοούμεθα· δεῖ δὲ ὡς μετεχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς·* But we commonly think of the heavens as nothing else but bodies and monads, having only a certain order, but altogether inanimate ; whereas we ought, on the contrary, to conceive of them as partaking of life and action :—that is, as being endued with a rational or intellectual life. For so Simplicius[2] there rightly expounds the place ; *δεῖ δὲ ὡς περὶ ἐμψύχων αὐτῶν συλλογίζεσθαι, καὶ λογικὴν ἐχόντων ψυχὴν, ὡς καὶ πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς μετέχειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, τὸ δὲ πράττειν κυρίως κατὰ τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν·* But we ought to think of the heavens as animated with a rational soul, and thereby partaking of action and rational life. For (saith he) though *ποιεῖν* be affirmed not only of irrational souls, but also of inanimate bodies, yet the word *πράττειν* does only denominate rational beings.—But further, to take away all manner of scruple or doubt concerning this business, that philosopher before, in the same book[3] *ῥητῶς* affirmeth, *ὅτι ὁ οὐρανὸς ἔμψυχος, καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἔχει ;* that the heaven is animated and hath a principle of motion within itself :—where, by the heaven, as in many other places of Aristotle and Plato, is to be understood the whole world.

There is indeed one passage in the same book *De Cœlo*, which, at first sight, and slightly considered, may seem to contradict this again ; and therefore probably is that, which hath led many into a contrary persuasion, that Aristotle denied the world's animation :[4] *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε ὑπὸ ψυχῆς εὔλογον ἀναγκαζούσης μένειν ἀΐδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον τ' εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν ἄλυπον καὶ μακαρίαν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν μετὰ βιᾶς οὖσαν, πεφυκότος τοῦ πρώτου σώματος ἄλλως καὶ κινεῖν συνεχῶς, ἄσχολον εἶναι, καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένην ῥαστώνης ἔμφρονος· εἴγε μηδ' ὥσπερ, τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ τῶν θνητῶν ζώων ἐστιν ἀνάπαυσις ἡ περὶ τὸν ὕπνον γινομένη τοῦ σώματος ἄνεσις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον Ἰξίονός τινος μοῖραν κατέχειν αὐτὴν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἄτρυτον·* But it is not reasonable neither to think, that the heavens continue to eternity, moved by a soul necessitating, or violently compelling them. Nor indeed is it possible, that the life of such a soul should be pleasurable or happy : forasmuch as the continual violent motion of a body (naturally inclining to move another way) must needs

[1] Lib. 2. c. 12. p. 656. tom. i. oper.

[2] Comment. in Libr. de Cœlo, f. 126.

[3] Aristot. de Cœlo, lib. ii. cap. ii. p. 642. tom. i. oper.

[4] L. 2. c. 1. p. 640. tom. i. oper.

be a very unquiet thing, and void of all mental repose, especially when there is no such relaxation as the souls of mortal animals have by sleep; and therefore such a soul of the world as this, must of necessity be condemned to an eternal Ixionian fate.—But in these words Aristotle does not deny the heavens to be moved by a soul of their own (which is positively affirmed by him elsewhere,) but only by such a soul as should violently and forcibly agitate, or drive them round, contrary to their own natural inclination, whereby, in the mean time, they tended downwards of themselves towards the centre. And his sense concerning the motion of the heavens, is truly represented by Simplicius, in this manner: *τὸ δὲ ὅλον φύσικον καὶ ἔμψυχον, ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κυρίως κινεῖται, διὰ μέσης τῆς φύσεως.* The whole world or heaven, being as well a natural, as an animalish body, is moved properly by soul; but yet by means of nature also, as an instrument, so that the motion of it is not violent.—But whereas Aristotle there insinuates, as if Plato had held the heavens to be moved by a soul violently, contrary to their nature; Simplicius, though sufficiently addicted to Aristotle, ingeniously acknowledges his error herein, and vindicating Plato from that imputation, shows how he likewise held a plastic nature as well as a mundane soul; and that amongst his ten instances of motion,[1] the ninth is that of nature; *τὴν ἕτερον ἀεὶ κινοῦσαν, καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑφ' ἑτέρου·* that which always moves another, being itself changed by something else;—as the tenth, that of the mundane soul, *τὴν ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερα,* that which originally both moves itself and other things:—as if his meaning in that place were, that though nature be a life and internal energy, yet it acts subserviently to a higher soul as the first original mover.

But the grand objection against Aristotle's holding the world's animation is still behind; namely, from that in his Metaphysics,[2] where he determines the highest starry heaven to be moved by an immoveable mover, commonly supposed to be the Deity itself, and no soul of the world; and all the other spheres likewise to be moved by so many separate intelligences, and not by souls. To which we reply, that indeed Aristotle's first immoveable mover is no mundane soul, but an abstract intellect separate from matter, and the very Deity itself; whose manner of moving the heavens is thus described by him,[3] *κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον,* it moveth only as being loved.—Wherefore, besides this supreme unmoved mover, that philosopher supposed another inferior moved

[1] De Leg. l. 10.

[2] Lib. xiv. cap. vii. viii. ix. p. 476. s. tom. iv. oper.

[3] Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. viii. p. 479.

mover also, that is, a mundane soul, as the proper and immediate efficient cause of the heavenly motions; of which he speaks after this manner: *κινούμενον δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ*, that which itself being moved (objectively, or by appetite and desire of the first good) moveth other things.—And thus that safe and surefooted interpreter, Alex. Aphrodisius, expounds his master's meaning, that the heaven being animated, and therefore indeed moved by an internal principle of its own, is notwithstanding originally moved by a certain immoveable and separate nature, which is above soul,[1] *τῷ νοιεῖν τε αὐτὸ, καὶ ἔφεσιν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἔχειν τῆς ὁμοιώσεως αὐτοῦ*, both by its contemplating of it, and having an appetite and desire of assimilating itself thereunto.—Aristotle seeming to have borrowed this notion from Plato,[2] who makes the constant regular circumgyration of the heavens to be an imitation of the motion or energy of intellect. So that Aristotle's first mover is not properly the efficient, but only the final and objective cause, of the heavenly motions, the immediate efficient cause thereof being *ψυχὴ καὶ φύσις*, soul and nature.—

Neither may this be confuted from those other Aristotelic intelligences of the lesser orbs; that philosopher conceiving in like manner concerning them, that they were also the abstract minds or intellects of certain other inferior souls, which moved their several respective bodies or orbs, circularly and uniformly, in a kind of imitation of them. For this plainly appears from hence, in that he affirms of these his inferior intelligences likewise, as well as of the supreme Mover, that they do *κινεῖν ὡς τέλος*, move only as the end.

Where it is evident, that though Aristotle did plainly suppose a mundane intellectual soul, such as also contained, either in it, or under it, a plastic nature, yet he did not make either of these to be the Supreme Deity; but resolved the first principle of things to be one absolutely perfect mind or intellect, separate from matter, which was *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*,[3] an immoveable nature,—whose essence was his operation, and which moved only as being loved or as the final cause: of which he pronounces in this manner,[4] *ὅτι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις*, that upon such a principle as this, heaven and nature depends;—that is, the animated heaven, or mundane soul, together with the plastic nature of the universe, must of necessity depend upon such an absolutely perfect and immoveable mind or intellect.

Having now declared the Aristotelic doctrine concerning the plastic

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[1] Quæst. Nat. l. 1. c. 1. [2] De Legibus, lib. x. p. 669. et alias.

[3] Aristot. Metaphysicor. lib. xiv. cap. vi. p. 477.

[4] Met. l. 14. c. 7. p. 479. tom. iv. oper.

nature of the universe, with which the Platonic also agrees, that it is, ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, either part of a mundane intellectual soul (that is, a lower power and faculty of it,) or else not without it, but some inferior thing depending on it ;—we think fit to add in this place, that though there were no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle supposed, distinct from the supreme Deity, yet there might notwithstanding be a plastic nature of the universe depending immediately upon the Deity itself. For the plastic nature essentially depends upon mind or intellect, and could not possibly be without it; according to those words before cited, ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ἡ φύσις, nature depends upon such an intellectual principle ;—and for this cause that philosopher does elsewhere join νοῦς and φύσις, mind and nature—both together.

25. Besides this general plastic nature of the universe, and those particular plastic powers in the souls of animals, it is not impossible but that there may be other plastic natures also (as certain lower lives, or vegetative souls) in some greater parts of the universe ; all of them depending, if not upon some higher conscious soul, yet at least upon a perfect intellect presiding over the whole. As for example ; though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a particular plastic life, or vegetative soul of its own, distinct from the mechanism of the body, nor that the whole earth is an animal endued with a conscious soul ; yet there may possibly be, for aught we know, one plastic nature or life belonging to the whole terrestrial (or terraqueous) globe, by which all plants and vegetables, continuous with it, may be differently formed, according to their different seeds, as also minerals and other bodies framed, and whatsoever else is above the power of fortuitous mechanism effected, as by the immediate cause, though always subordinate to other causes ; the chief whereof is the Deity. And this perhaps may ease the minds of those, who cannot but think it too much, to impose all upon one plastic nature of the universe.

26. And now we have finished our first task, which was to give an account of the plastic nature, the sum whereof briefly amounts to this ; that it is a certain lower life than the animal, which acts regularly and artificially, according to the direction of mind, and understanding, reason, and wisdom, for ends, or in order to good, though itself do not know the reason of what it does, nor is master of that wisdom according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner of the same ; it operating fatally and sympathetically, according to laws and commands prescribed to it by a perfect intellect, and impressed upon it ; and which is either a lower faculty of some conscious soul, or

else an inferior kind of life or soul by itself; but essentially depending upon a higher intellect.

We proceed to our second undertaking; which was to show, how grossly those two sorts of Atheists before-mentioned, the Stoical or Cosmo-plastic, and the Stratonical or Hylozoic, both of them acknowledging this plastic life of nature, do mistake the notion of it, or pervert it, and abuse it, to make a certain spurious and counterfeit God-almighty of it (or a first principle of all things,) thereby excluding the true omnipotent Deity, which is a perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, presiding over the universe; they substituting this stupid plastic nature in the room of it.

Now the chief errors or mistakes of these Atheists concerning the plastic nature, are these four following. First, that they make that to be the first principle of all, and the highest thing in the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives; a thing essentially secondary, derivative, and dependent. For the plastic life of nature is but the mere umbrage of intellectuality, a faint and shadowy imitation of mind and understanding; upon which it doth as essentially depend, as the shadow doth upon the body, the image in the glass upon the face, or the echo upon the original voice. So that if there had been no perfect mind or intellect in the world, there could no more have been any plastic nature in it, than there could be an image in the glass without a face, or an echo without an original voice. If there be *Φύσις*, then there must be *Νοῦς*; if there be a plastic nature, that acts regularly and artificially in order to ends, and according to the best wisdom, though itself not comprehending the reason of it, nor being clearly conscious of what it doth; then there must of necessity be a perfect mind or intellect, that is, a Deity, upon which it depends. Wherefore Aristotle does like a philosopher in joining *Φύσις* and *Νοῦς*, nature and mind both together; but these Atheists do very absurdly and unphilosophically, that would make a senseless and unconscious plastic nature, and therefore without any mind or intellect, to be the first original of all things.

Secondly, these Atheists augment the former error, in supposing those higher lives of sense or animality, and of reason or understanding, to rise both of them from that lower senseless life of nature, as the only original fundamental life. Which is a thing altogether as irrational and absurd, as if one should suppose the light, that is in the air or ether, to be the only original and fundamental light, and the light of the sun and stars but a secondary and derivative thing from it, and nothing but the light of the air modificated and improved by condensation; or, as if one should maintain, that the sun and moon, and all the

stars, were really nothing else but the mere reflections of those images, that we see in rivers and ponds of water. But this hath always been the sottish humor and guise of Atheists, to invert the order of the universe, and hang the picture of the world, as of a man, with its heels upwards. Conscious reason and understanding, being a far higher degree of life and perfection, than that dull plastic nature, which does only do, but not know, can never possibly emerge out of it; neither can the duplication of corporeal organs be ever able to advance that simple and stupid life of nature into redoubled consciousness or self-perception; nor any triplication, or indeed milleclupation of them, improve the same into reason and understanding.

Thirdly, for the better coloring of the former errors, the Hylozoists adulterate the notion of the plastic life of nature, confounding it with wisdom and understanding. And though themselves acknowledge, that no animal sense, self-perception, and consciousness belongs to it, yet they will have it to be a thing perfectly wise, and consequently every atom of senseless matter that is in the whole world, to be infallibly omniscient, as to all its own capacities and congruities, or whatsoever itself can do or suffer; which is plainly contradictious. For, though there may be such a thing as the plastic nature, that, according to the former description of it, can do without knowing, and is devoid of express consciousness or self-perception, yet perfect knowledge and understanding, without consciousness, is nonsense and impossibility. Wherefore, this must needs be condemned for a great piece of sottishness in the Hylozoic Atheists, that they attribute perfect wisdom and understanding to a stupid unconscious nature, which is nothing but χειροτέχνης, the mere drudging instrument, or manuary opificer of a perfect mind.

Lastly, these Atheists err in this, that they make this plastic life of nature to be a mere material or corporeal thing; whereas matter or body cannot move itself, much less, therefore, can it artificially order and disposé its own motion. And though the plastic nature be indeed the lowest of all lives, yet, notwithstanding, since it is a life, or internal energy, and self-activity, distinct from local motion, it must needs be incorporeal, all life being essentially such. But the Hylozoists conceive grossly both of life and understanding, spreading them all over upon matter, just as butter is spread upon bread, or plaster upon a wall, and accordingly slicing them out in different quantities and bulks, together with it; they contending, that they are but inadequate conceptions of body, as the only substance; and consequently concluding, that the vulgarly received notion of God is nothing else but such an in-

adequate conception of the matter of the whole corporeal universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, that is supposed to be the cause of all things; which fond dream or dotage of theirs will be further confuted in due place. But it is now time to put a period to this long, though necessary, digression, concerning the plastic life of nature, or an artificial, orderly, and methodical nature.

XXXVIII. Plato gives an account, why he judged it necessary in those times, publicly to propose that Atheistic hypothesis, in order to a confutation, as also to produce rational arguments for the proof of a Deity, after this manner:[1] *Εἰ μὴ κατεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀνθρώποις, οὐδεν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμυνόντων λόγων, ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη·* Had not these Atheistic doctrines been publicly divulged, and made known in a manner to all, it would not have been needful to have confuted them, nor by reasons to prove a Deity; but now it is necessary.—And we conceive, that the same necessity at this time will justify our present undertaking likewise; since these Atheistic doctrines have been as boldly vented, and publicly asserted in this latter age of ours, as ever they could be in Plato's time; when the severity of the Athenian government must needs be a great check to such designs, Socrates having been put to death upon a mere false and groundless accusation of Atheism, and Protagoras (who doubtless was a real Atheist) having escaped the same punishment no otherwise than by flight, his books being, notwithstanding, publicly burnt in the market-place at Athens, and himself condemned to perpetual exile, though there was nothing at that time proved against him, save only this one skeptical passage, in the beginning of a book of his:[2] *περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, εἰθ' ὡς εἰσιν, εἰθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ, πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ χωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἥτε ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου·* Concerning the gods, I have nothing at all to say, either that they be or be not; there being many things, that hinder the knowledge of this matter, both the obscurity of the thing itself, and the shortness of human life. — Whereas Atheism, in this latter age of ours, hath been impudently asserted, and most industriously promoted; that very Atomic form, that was first introduced (a little before Plato's time) by Leucippus, Protagoras, and Democritus, having been also revived amongst us, and that with no small pomp and ostentation of wisdom and philosophy.

It was before observed, that there were two several forms of Atomical philosophy: first, the most ancient and genuine, that was religious,

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[1] De Leg. lib. 10. p. 666. oper.

[2] Diog. La. in vita Prot. lib. ix. segm. 51. p. 576.

called Moshical (or, if you will, Mosaical) and Pythagorical; secondly, the adulterated Atheistic Atomology, called Leucippean or Democritical. Now, accordingly, there have been in this latter age of ours two several successive resurrections or restitutions of those two Atomologies. For Renatus Cartesius first revived and restored the Atomic philosophy, agreeably, for the most part, to that ancient Moschical and Pythagoric form; acknowledging, besides extended substance and corporeal atoms, another cogitative incorporeal substance, and joining metaphysics or theology, together with physiology, to make up one entire system of philosophy. Nor can it well be doubted, but that this physiology of his, as to the mechanic part of it, hath been elaborated by the ingenious author into an exactness at least equal with the best Atomologies of the ancients. Nevertheless, this Cartesian philosophy is highly obnoxious to censure upon some accounts; the chief whereof, is this, that, deviating from that primitive Moschical Atomology, in rejecting all plastic nature, it derives the whole system of the corporeal universe from the necessary motion of matter, only divided into particles insensibly small, and turned round in a vortex, without the guidance or direction of any understanding nature. By means whereof, though it boast of solving all the corporeal phenomena by mere fortuitous mechanism, and without any final or mental causality, yet it gives no account at all of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the orderly regularity and harmony of the mundane system. —The occasion of which miscarriage hath been already intimated; namely, from the acknowledging only two heads of being, extended and cogitative, and making the essence of cogitation to consist in express consciousness; from whence it follows, that there could be no plastic nature, and therefore either all things must be done by fortuitous mechanism, or else God himself be brought immediately upon the stage for the solving of all phenomena. Which latter absurdity our philosopher being over careful to avoid, cast himself upon the former, the banishing of all final and mental causality quite out of the world, and acknowledging no other philosophic causes, besides material and mechanical. It cannot be denied, but that even some of the ancient religious Atomists were also too much infected with this mechanizing humor; But Renatus Cartesius hath not only outdone them all herein, but even the very Atheists themselves also, as shall be showed afterward; and, therefore, as much as in him lies, has quite disarmed the world of that grand argument for a Deity, taken from the regular frame and harmony of the universe. To which gross miscarriage of his there might be also another added, that he seems to make matter necessarily existent

and essentially infinite and eternal. Notwithstanding all which, we cannot entertain that uncharitable opinion of him, that he really designed Atheism; the fundamental principles of his philosophy being such, as that no Atheistic structure can possibly be built upon them. But shortly after this Cartesian restitution of the primitive Atomology, that acknowledgeth incorporeal substance, we have had our Leucippus and Democritus too, who also revived and brought again upon the stage that other Atheistic Atomology, that makes *ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους*, senseless and lifeless atoms, to be the only principles of all things in the universe; thereby necessarily excluding, besides incorporeal substance and immortality of souls, a Deity and natural morality; as also making all actions and events materially and mechanically necessary.

Now there could be no satisfactory confutation of this Atheistic hypothesis, without a fair proposal first made of the several grounds of it to their best advantage, which we have therefore endeavored in the former chapter. The answers to which Atheistic arguments ought, according to the laws of method, to be reserved for the last part of the whole treatise, where we are positively to determine the right intellectual system of the universe; it being properly our work here, only to give an account of the three false hypotheses of the mundane system, together with their several grounds. Nevertheless, because it might not only seem indecorous, for the answers to those Atheistic arguments to be so long deferred, and placed so far behind the arguments themselves, but also prove otherwise really inconvenient, we shall therefore choose rather to break those laws of method (neglecting the scrupulosity thereof,) and subjoin them immediately in this place, craving the reader's pardon for this preposterousness.

It is certain, that the source of all Atheism is generally a dull and earthy disbelief of the existence of things beyond the reach of sense; and it cannot be denied, but that there is something of immorality in the temper of all Atheists, as all atheistic doctrine tends also to immorality. Notwithstanding which, it must not be therefore concluded, that all dogmatic Atheists came to be such merely by means of gross intemperance, sensuality, and debauchery. Plato, indeed, describes one sort of Atheists in this manner:[1] *οἷς ἂν πρὸς τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα, ἀκράτειαι τε ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προσπέσωσι, μνῆμαί τε ἴσχυραι καὶ μαθήσεις ὀξεῖαι παρῶσι·* Such, who together with this opinion, that all things are void of gods, are acted also by intemperance of pleasures and pains, and hurried away with violent lusts, being persons otherwise endued with strong memories and quick wits.—And these are the

[1] De Leg. l. 10. p. 908.

debauched, ranting, and hectoring Atheists. But, besides these, that philosopher[1] tells us, that there is another sort of Atheists also : *οἷς μὴ νομίζουσι θεοὺς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦθος φύσει προσγίνεται δίκαιον, μισοῦντές τε γίγνονται τοὺς κακοὺς, καὶ τῷ δυσχεραίνειν τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὔτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις προσίενται πρόττειν, τούς τε μὴ δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγουσσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους στέργουσιν·* Such who, though they think there be no gods at all, yet, notwithstanding, being naturally disposed to justice and moderation, as they will not do outrageous and exorbitant things themselves, so they will shun the conversation of wicked debauched persons, and delight rather in the society of those that are fair and just.—And these are a sort of externally honest or civilized Atheists. Now what that thing is, which, besides gross sensuality and debauchery, might tempt men to entertain atheistic opinions, the same philosopher also declares ; namely, that it is an affectation of singularity, or of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind. For thus when Clinias had disputed honestly against Atheists, from those vulgar topics of the regularity and harmony of the universe (observable in the courses of sun, moon, and stars, and the seasons of the year,) and of the common notions of mankind, in that both Greeks and barbarians generally agreed in this, that there were gods, thinking he had thereby made a sufficient confutation of Atheism, the Athenian Hospes hereupon discovers a great fear and jealousy, which he had, lest he should thereby but render himself an object of contempt to Atheists, as being a conceited and scornful generation of men. *ΑΘ. φοβοῦμαί γε ὦ μακάριε τοὺς μοχθηροὺς, μὴπως ὑμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν πέρι, τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡγεῖσθε ἀκρατεία μόνον ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ βίον ὁρμάσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν*, etc. I am afraid of those wicked men the Atheists, lest they should despise you : for you are ignorant concerning them, when you think the only cause of Atheism to be intemperance of pleasures and lusts, violently hurrying men's souls on to a wicked life.—Clin. What other cause of Atheism can there be besides this ?—Ath. That which you are not aware of, who live remotely, namely, *Ἀμαθία μάλα χαλεπὴ δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις.* A certain grievous ignorance, which yet, notwithstanding, hath the appearance of the greatest wisdom.—And, therefore, afterwards, when that philosopher goes about to propose the Atheistic hypothesis, he calls it,[2] *τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων*, that which to many seemeth to be the wisest and profoundest of all doctrines.—

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[1] Ibid. [2] De Legibus. l. x. p. 664. oper.

And we find the same thing at this very day, that Atheists make a great pretence to wisdom and philosophy; and that many are tempted to maintain atheistic opinions, that they may gain a reputation of wit by it. Which, indeed, was one reason, that the rather induced us nakedly to reveal all the mysteries of Atheism, because we observed, that so long as these things are concealed and kept up in huggermugger, many will be rather apt to suspect, that there is some great depth and profundity of wisdom lodged in them; and that it is some noble and generous truth, with the bigotic religious endeavor to smother and suppress.

Now the case being thus, it was pertinently suggested also by the forementioned philosopher,[1] *οὐ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι,* That it must needs be a matter of no small moment, for any one to make it appear, that they, who maintain wicked atheistical opinions, do none of them reason rightly, but grossly fumble in all their ratiocinations.—And we hope to effect this in our present undertaking, to make it evident, that Atheists are no such conjurers, as (though they hold no spirits) they would be thought to be; no such gigantic men of reason, nor profound philosophers, but that, notwithstanding all their pretensions to wit, their Atheism is really nothing else, but *ἀμαθία μάλα χαλεπή*, a most grievous ignorance, sottishness, and stupidity of mind in them.

Wherefore we shall in the next place, conjure down all those devils raised and displayed in their most formidable colors, in the precedent chapter; or rather we shall discover, that they are really nothing else, but what these Atheists pretend God and incorporeal spirits to be, mere fantastic spectres and impostures, vain imaginations of deluded minds, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. Neither shall we only confute those Atheistic arguments, and so stand upon our defensive posture, but we shall also assault Atheism even with its own weapons, and plainly demonstrate, that all forms of Atheism are unintelligible nonsense and absolute impossibility to human reason; as we shall likewise over and above, occasionally insert some (as we think) undeniable arguments for a Deity.

The Digression concerning the Plastic Life of Nature, or an artificial, orderly, and methodical Nature, No. 37. Chap. iii.

"1. THAT neither the Hylozoic nor Cosmoplastic Atheists are con-

[1] Ibid. p. 667. s.

demned for asserting an orderly and artificial plastic nature, as a life distinct from the animal, however this be a thing exploded, not only by the Atomic Atheists, but also by some professed Theists, who, notwithstanding, might have an undiscerned tang of the mechanical-atheistic humor hanging about them. 2. If there be no plastic artificial nature admitted, then it must be concluded, that either all things come to pass by fortuitous mechanism, and material necessity (the motion of matter unguided) or else that God doth αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were with his own hands; since Divine laws and commands cannot execute themselves, nor be the proper efficient causes of things in nature. 3. To suppose all things to come to pass fortuitously, or by the unguided motion of matter, a thing altogether as irrational as it is atheistical and impious; there being many phenomena, not only above the powers of mechanism, but also contrary to the laws of it. The mechanic Theists make God but an idle spectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant. Aristotle's judicious censure of the fortuitous Mechanists, with the ridiculousness of that pretence, that material and mechanical reasons are the only philosophical. 4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to reason, that he should αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, nature being quite superseded and made to signify nothing. The same further confuted by the slow and gradual process of things in nature, as also by those errors and bungles, that are committed, when the matter proves inept and contumacious, arguing the agent not to be irresistible. 5. Reasonably inferred, that there is a plastic nature in the universe, as a subordinate instrument of Divine Providence, in the orderly disposal of matter; but yet so as not without a higher providence presiding over it, forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively or with discretion. Those laws of nature concerning motion, which the mechanic Theists themselves suppose, really nothing else but a plastic nature. 6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the best philosophers in all ages, Aristotle, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Zeno, and the Paracelsians. Anaxagoras, though a professed Theist, severely censured, both by Aristotle and Plato, as an encourager of Atheism, merely because he used material and mechanical causes, more than mental and final. Physiologers and astronomers, why vulgarly suspected of Atheism in Plato's time. 7. The plastic nature no occult quality, but the only intelligible cause of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things,

which the mechanic Theists, however pretending to solve all phenomena, can give no account at all of. A God, or infinite mind, asserted, by them, in vain and to no purpose. 8. Two things here to be performed by us; first, to give an account of the plastic nature, and then to show how the notion of it hath been mistaken, and abused by Atheists. The first general account of this plastic nature, according to Aristotle, that it is to be conceived as art itself acting, inwardly and immediately, upon the matter; as if harmony living in the musical instruments should move the strings of them without any external impulse. 9. Two pre-eminences of the plastic nature above human art: —First, that whereas human art acts upon the matter from without cumbersomely and moliminously, with tumult and hurly-burly, nature acting on it from within more commandingly doth its work easily, cleverly, and silently. Human art acts on the matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically. 10. The second pre-eminence of nature above human art, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate, and upon second thoughts mend their former work, nature is never to seek, nor unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent afterwards of what she hath done, changing her former course. Human artists themselves consult not, as artists, but only for want of art; and therefore nature, though never consulting, may act artificially. Concluded, that what is called nature is really the Divine art. 11. Nevertheless, that nature is not the Divine art, pure and abstract, but concreted and embodied in matter, *ratio mersa et confusa;* not the Divine art archetypal, but ectypal. Nature differs from the Divine art, as the manuary opificer from the architect. 12. Two imperfections of the plastic nature, in respect whereof it falls short even of human art; first, that though it act for ends artificially, yet itself neither intends those ends, nor understands the reason of what it doth, and therefore cannot act electively. The difference between the spermatic reasons and knowledge. Nature doth but ape or mimic the Divine art or wisdom, being not master of that reason, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner of it. 13. Proved that there may be such a thing as acts artificially, though itself do not comprehend that art, by which its motions are governed; first from musical habits: the dancer resembles the artificial life of nature. 14. The same further evinced from the instincts of brute animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, without any reason of their own. The instincts in brutes but passive impresses of the Divine wisdom, and a kind of fate upon them. 15. The second imperfection of the

plastic nature, that it acts without animal fancy, *συναίσθησις*, express con-sense, and consciousness, and is devoid of self-perception and self-enjoyment. 16. Whether this energy of the plastic nature be to be called cogitation or no, but a logomachy or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally, must needs do it by some energy of its own, distinct from local motion; but that there may be a simple vital energy, without that duplicity, which is in synæsthesis, or clear and express consciousness. Nevertheless, that the energy of nature might be called a certain drowsy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation. 17. Instances, which render it probable, that there may be a vital energy, without synæsthesis, clear and express con-sense, or consciousness. 18. The plastic nature, acting neither knowingly nor fantastically, acts fatally, magically, and sympathetically. The Divine laws and fate, as to matter, not mere cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetic and effectual principle; and the plastic nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. What magic is, and that nature, which acts fatally, acts also magically and sympathetically. 19. That the plastic nature, though it be the Divine art and fate, yet for all that, it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature; it acting artificially and rationally no otherwise, than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent philosophic sense; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a skilful mechanic. The plastic and vegetative life of nature the lowest of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence than that of the plastic nature governing the corporeal world itself. 20. Notwithstanding which, forasmuch as the plastic nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the same thing, having in it an entire model and platform, an acting upon several distant parts of matter at once coherently, cannot be corporeal; and though Aristotle no where declares whether his nature be corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither doth clearly concerning the rational soul) and his followers conclude it to be corporeal, yet, according to the very principles of that philosophy, it must needs be otherwise. 21. The plastic nature being incorporeal, must either be a lower power lodged in souls, that are also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a distinct substantial life by itself, and inferior kind of soul. How the Platonists complicate both these together; with Aristotle's agreeable determination, that nature is either part of a soul, or not without soul. 22. The plastic nature as to animals, according to Aristotle, a part or lower power of their respective souls. That the phenomena prove a plastic nature or archeus in animals, to make which a distinct thing from the soul, is to multiply entities without necessity.

The soul endued with a plastic power, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of certain other causes not excluded. 23. That besides that plastic principle in particular animals, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general plastic nature in the whole corporeal universe, which likewise, according to Aristotle, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mundane soul, or else something depending on it. 24. That no less according to Aristotle than Plato and Socrates, ourselves partake of life from the life of the universe, as well as we do of heat and cold, from the heat and cold of the universe; from whence it appears, that Aristotle also held the world's animation, with further undeniable proof thereof. An answer to two the most considerable places of that philosopher, that seem to imply the contrary. That Aristotle's first immoveable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellect abstract from matter; but that he supposed this to move only as a final cause, or as being loved, and besides it, a mundane soul and plastic nature, to move the heavens efficiently. Neither Aristotle's nature, nor his mundane soul, the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle conceived, yet notwithstanding there may be a plastic nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 25. No impossibility of some other particular plastic principles; and though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a plastic or vegetative soul of its own, nor that the earth is an animal; yet, that there may possibly be one plastic unconscious nature in the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severally organized and framed, and all things performed, which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism. 26. Our second undertaking, which was to show how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this plastic nature) misunderstand it and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God-Almighty or Numen of it, to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing, that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent upon a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. 27. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of nature, by the mere modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single unconscious life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. 28. Thirdly, in attributing perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousness. 29. Lastly, in making the plastic life of nature to be merely corporeal; the Hylozoists con-

tending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body, as the only substance; and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, the cause of all things."

CHAPTER IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first Atheistic argument. The grand prejudice against the naturality of this idea, as essentially including unity or oneliness in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, removed. Proved that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. What their Polytheism and idolatry was; with some account of Christianity.—1. The either stupid insensibility, or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the word GOD to have any signification, or that there is any other idea answering to it besides the mere phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher ἀπολίθωσις τοῦ νοητικοῦ, the petrification (or dead insensibility) of the mind.—2. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwise, when they deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they have also the same idea of him with Theists, they denying the very same thing which the others affirm.—3. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, that though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things that are made.—4. The two most opposite opinions, concerning that which was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made: one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things; the other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore consciously intellectual. The assertors of this latter opinion, Theists in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is a perfect consciously understanding being (or mind) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things.—5. Observed, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name, and meaning nothing else thereby but a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing. That, according to this notion of the word God, there can be no such thing as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing.—6. In order to the more punctual declaration of the Divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent unmade principles, God and matter; and so God not to be the sole, but only the chief principle.—7. That these are but imperfect and mistaken Theists. Their idea of God declared, with its defectiveness. A latitude in Theism. None to be condemned for absolute Atheists, but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over matter.—8. The most compendious idea of God, an absolutely perfect being. That this includes not only conscious intellectuality and necessary existence, but also omni-causality, omnipotence, and infinite power: and therefore God the sole principal of all, and cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. Pagans acknowledged the

Divine omnipotence. And that the Atheists supposed infinite power to be included in the idea of God, proved from Lucretius.—9. That absolute perfection implies something more than power and knowledge. A vaticination in men's minds of a higher good than either. That God is better than knowledge, according to Aristotle; and that there is morality in the nature of God, wherein his chief happiness consisteth. This borrowed from Plato, who makes the highest perfection, and supreme Deity, to be goodness itself, above knowledge and intellect. God, and the supreme good, according to the Scripture, love. God no soft or fond love, but an impartial law, and the measure of all things. That the Atheists supposed goodness also to be included in the idea of God. The idea of God more explicate and unfolded, a being absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existent; and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things.—10. That this idea of God essentially includes unity or oneliness in it; since there can be but one supreme, one cause of all things, one omnipotent, and one infinitely perfect. This unity or oneliness of the Deity supposed also by Epicurus and Lucretius, who professedly denied a God, according to this idea.—11. The grand prejudice against the naturality of this idea of God, as it essentially includes unity and solitariety, from the Polytheism of all nations formerly, besides the Jews, and of all the wisest men and philosophers: from whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is but artificial, and owes its original to laws and institution. An inquiry to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan Polytheism. That the objectors take it for granted, that the Pagan Polytheists universally asserted many self-existent intellectual beings, and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world.—12. First, the irrationality of this opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phenomena; which renders it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan Polytheists.—13. Secondly, that no such thing at all appears, as that ever any intelligent Pagans asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, independent deities. The Hesiodian gods. The Valentinian Æons. The nearest approach made thereunto by the Manichean good and evil gods. This doctrine not generally asserted by the Greek philosophers, as Plutarch affirmeth. Questioned whether the Persian evil demon, or Arimanius, were a self-existent principle, essentially evil. Aristotle's confutation and explosion of many principles, or independent deities. Faustus the Manichean's conceit, that the Jews and Christians paganized, in the opinion of monarchy, with St. Austin's judgment, concerning the Pagans, thereupon.—14. Concluded that the Pagan Polytheism must be understood according to another equivocation in the word gods, as used for created intellectual beings, superior to men, that ought to be religiously worshipped. That the Pagans held both many gods and one God (as Onatus the Pythagorean declares himself,) in different senses; many inferior deities subordinate to one Supreme.—15. Further evidence of this that the intelligent Pagan Polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities, subordinate to one Supreme: first, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, when occasion was offered, not only no Pagan asserted a multiplicity of independent deities, but also all universally disclaimed it, and professed to acknowledge one supreme God.—16. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, as

might possibly be suspected, but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan theologers, and greatest promoters of Polytheism, was agreeable hereunto; which will be proved, not from suspected writings (as of Trismegist and the Sybils,) but such as are indubitate. First, that Zoroaster, the chief promoter of Polytheism in the eastern parts, acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the world, proved from Eubulus in Porphyry, besides his own words cited by Eusebius.—17. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grecanic Polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Deity, proved by his own words, out of Pagan records.—18. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity.—19. That the poets, who were the greatest depravers of the Pagan theology, and, by their fables of the gods, made it look more aristocratically, did themselves notwithstanding acknowledge a monarchy, one Prince and Father of gods. That famous passage of Sophocles not to be suspected, though not found in any of his tragedies now extant.—20. That all the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, universally asserted a mundane monarchy. Pythagoras, as much a Polytheist as any, and yet his first principle of things, as well as numbers, a monad or unity. Anaxagoras's one mind ordering all things for good. Xenophanes' one and all, and his one God the greatest among the gods. —21. Parmenides' supreme God, one immoveable. Empedocles' both many gods junior to friendship and contention, and his one God, called τὸ ἕν, senior to them. Zeno Eleates' demonstration of one God, in Aristotle.—22. Philolaus's prince and governor of all, God always one. Euclides Megarensis's God, called ἕν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, one the very good. Timæus Locrus's mind and good, above the soul of the world. Antisthenes' one natural God. Onatus's Corypheus.—23. Generally believed and true, that Socrates acknowledged one supreme God; but that he disclaimed all the inferior gods of the Pagans, a vulgar error. Plato also a Polytheist, and that passage, which some lay so great stress upon (that he was serious when he began his epistles with God, but when with gods jocular,) spurious and counterfeit; and yet he was, notwithstanding, an undoubted Monotheist also in another sense; an asserter of one God over all, of a maker of the world, of a first God, of a greatest of the gods. The first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity properly the King of all things, for whose sake are all things; the father of the cause and prince of the world, that is, of the eternal intellect, or λόγος.—24. Aristotle an acknowledger of many gods (he accounting the stars such,) and yet an express asserter of εἷς κοίρανος, one prince, one immoveable mover.—25. Cleanthes and Chrysippus Stoics, though they filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods, yet, notwithstanding, they acknowledged only one God immortal, Jupiter; all the rest being consumed into him, in the successive conflagrations, and afterwards made anew by him. Cleanthes' excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God.—26. Endless to cite all the passages of the later Pagan writers and Polytheists, in which one supreme God is asserted. Excellent discourses in some of them concerning the Deity, particularly Plotinus; who, though he derived all things, even matter itself, from one supreme Deity, yet was a contender for many gods.—27. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the

general belief of the Pagan vulgar; that there was one supreme God, proved from Maximus Tyrius. The Romans' *Deus optimus maximus.* The Pagans, when most serious, spoke of God singularly. *Kyrie Eleeson* part of the Pagans' litany to the supreme God. The more civilized Pagans, at this very day, acknowledge one Supreme Deity, the maker of the world.—28. Plutarch's testimony, that, notwithstanding the variety of Paganic religions, and the different names of gods used in them, yet one reason, mind, or providence ordering all things, and its inferior ministers, were alike every where worshipped.—29. Plain that the Pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, governed by one soul. Some Pagans made this soul of the world their supreme God; others an abstract mind superior to it.—30. The Hebrew doctors generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God, and that all their other gods were but mediators betwixt him and men.—31. Lastly, this confirmed from Scripture. The Pagans knew God. Aratus's Jupiter, and the Athenians' unknown God, the true God.—32. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and showing the occasion of its being misunderstood, three heads requisite to be insisted on. First, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God under many names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, which were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues, and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. First, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to his several attributes and the manifestations of them, his gifts and effects in the world.—33. That, upon the same account, things not substantial were personated and deified by the Pagans, and worshipped as so many several names and notions of one God.—34. That as the whole corporeal world animated was supposed by some of the Pagans to be the supreme God, so he was worshipped in the several parts and members of it (having personal names bestowed upon them) as it were by parcels and piece-meal, or by so many inadequate conceptions. That some of the Pagans made the corporeal world the temple of God only, but others the body of God.—35. The second head proposed, that besides the one supreme God, under several names, the Pagans acknowledged and worshipped also many gods; θεοὺς γεγητοὺς, made gods, created intellectual beings superior to men.—36. The Pythagoric or Platonic trinity of Divine hypostases. And the higher of the inferior deities, according to this hypothesis, Nous, Psyche, and the whole corporeal world; with particular Noes and Henades.—37. The other inferior deities, acknowledged as well by the vulgar as philosophers of three sorts. First, the sun, moon, and stars, and other great parts of the universe animated, called sensible gods.—38. Secondly, their inferior deities invisible, ethereal, and aerial animals, called demons. These appointed by the supreme Deity to preside over kingdoms, cities, places, persons, and things.—39. The last sort of the Pagan inferior deities, heroes and θεάνθρωποι, or men-gods. Euemerus taxed by Plutarch, for making all the Pagan gods nothing but dead men.—40. The third general head proposed, that the Pagans worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues, and sym-

bols. That first of all, before images and temples, rude stones and pillars without sculpture were erected for religious monuments, and called βαιτύλια, or Bethels.—41. That afterwards images, statues, and symbols were used, and housed in temples. These placed in the west-end of the temples to face the east; so that the Pagans entering worshipped towards the west; one probable occasion of the ancient Christians praying towards the east. The golden calf made for a symbolic presence of the God of Israel. —42. All the parts of the entire Pagan religion represented together at once in Plato.—43. That some late writers, not well understanding the sense of Pagans, have confounded all their theology, by supposing them to worship the inanimate parts of the world as such, for gods; therefore distinguishing betwixt their animal and their natural gods. That no corporeal thing was worshipped by the Pagans otherwise, than either as being itself animated with a particular soul of its own, or as being part of the whole animated world, or as having demons presiding over it, to whom the worship was properly directed; or, lastly, as being images or symbols of Divine things.—44. That though the Egyptians be said to have worshipped brute animals, and were generally therefore condemned by the other Pagans; yet the wiser of them used them only as hieroglyphics and symbols.—45. That the Pagans worshipped not only the supreme God, but also the inferior deities, by material sacrifices. Sacrifices or fire-offerings, in their first and general notion, nothing else but gifts and signs of gratitude, and appendices of prayer. But that animal sacrifices had afterwards a particular notion also of expiation fastened on them; whether by Divine direction, or human agreement, left undetermined.—46. The Pagans' apology for the three forementioned things. First, for worshipping one supreme God under many personal names, and that not only according to his several attributes, but also his several manifestations, gifts, and effects, in the visible world. With an excuse for those corporeal Theists, who worshipped the whole animated world as the supreme God, and the several parts of it under personal names, as living members of him.—47. Their apology for worshipping, besides the one supreme God, many inferior deities. That they worshipping them only as inferior could not therefore, be guilty of giving them that honor which was proper to the Supreme. That they honored the supreme God incomparably above all. That they put a difference in their sacrifices; and that material sacrifices were not the proper worship of the supreme God, but rather below him.—48. Several reasons of the Pagans, for giving religious worship to inferior created beings. First, that this honor, which is bestowed upon them, does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandize his state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants.—49. That as demons are mediators betwixt the celestial gods and men, so those celestial gods, and all the other inferior deities, are themselves also mediators betwixt man and the supreme God, and as it were convenient steps, by which we ought with reverence to approach him.—50. That there is an honor in justice due to all those excellent beings that are above us; and that the Pagans do but honor every thing as they ought, in that due rank and place, in which the supreme God hath set it.—51. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over kingdoms, cities, and persons, and the several parts of the corporeal universe, and being many ways

benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice.—52. That the inferior gods, demons, and heroes, being all of them able to do us either good or hurt, and being also irascible, and therefore provokable by our neglect of them, it is as well our interest as our duty to pacify and appease them by worship.—53. Lastly, that it cannot be thought, that the supreme God will envy those inferior gods that worship or honor which is bestowed upon them; nor suspected, that any of those inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselves against the supreme God.—54.—That many of the Pagans worshipped none but good demons, and that those of them, who worshipped evil ones, did it only in order to their appeasement and mitigation, that so they might do them no hurt. None but magicians to be accounted properly devil worshippers, who honor evil demons, in order to the gratification of their revenge, lust and ambition. —55. The Pagans plead, that those demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst them, must needs be good, since there cannot be a greater reproach to the supreme God, than to suppose him to appoint evil demons as presidents and governors over the world, or to suffer them to have so great a sway and share of power in it. The faith of Plato in Divine Providence, that the good every where prevails over the bad, and that the Delphic Apollo was therefore a good demon.—56. The Pagans' apology for worshipping the supreme God in images, statues, and symbols. That these are only schetically worshipped by them, the honor passing from them to the prototype. And that since we living in bodies cannot easily have a conception of any thing without some corporeal image or phantasm, thus much must be indulged to the infirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to the worship of God, corporeally in images, to prevent their running to Atheism.—57. That though it should appear, by this apology of the Pagans, that their case were not altogether so bad as is commonly supposed, yet they cannot be justified thereby in the three particulars above mentioned, but the Scripture condemnation of them is irrefragable, that knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, or sanctify his name: that is, worship him according to his uncommon and incommunicable, his peerless and insociable, transcendent and singular, incomparable and unresemblable nature; but mingled, some way or other, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator. First, that the worshipping of one God in his various gifts and effects, under several personal names, a thing in itself absurd, may also prove a great occasion of Atheism, when the things themselves come to be called by those names, as wine Bacchus, corn Ceres. The conclusion easily following, from thence, that the good things of nature are the only deities. But to worship the corporeal world itself animated, as the supreme God, and the parts of it as the members of God, is plainly to confound God with the creature, and not to glorify him as Creator, nor according to his separate and spiritual nature.—58. To give religious worship to demons or angels, heroes or saints, or any other intellectual creatures, though not honoring them equally with the supreme God, is to deny God the honor of his holiness, his singular, insociable, and incommunicable nature, as he is the only self-originated being, and the Creator of all; of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things. As God is such a being, that there is nothing like him, so ought the worship which is given him to be such as hath

nothing like to it, a singular, separate, and incommunicate worship. They not to be religiously worshipped, that worship.—59. That the religious worship of created spirits proceeded chiefly from a fear, that if they were not worshipped, they would be provoked and do hurt, which is both highly injurious to good spirits, and a distrust of the sufficiency of God's power to protect his worshippers. That all good spirits uninvoked are of themselves officiously ready to assist those, who sincerely worship and propitiate the supreme Deity, and therefore no need of the religious worship of them, which would be also offensive to them.—60. That men's praying to images and statues is much more ridiculous than children's talking to babies made of clouts, but not so innocent; they thereby debasing both themselves and God, not glorifying him according to his spiritual and unresemblable nature, but changing the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of corruptible man or beast.—61. The mistake of those who think none can be guilty of idolatry, that believe one God the maker of the world.—62. That from the same ground of reason, that nothing ought to be religiously worshipped besides the supreme God, or whom he appoints to represent himself (because he ought to be sanctified, and dealt withal, according to his singular nature, as unlike to every thing,) it follows, contrary to the opinion of some opposers of idolatry, that there ought also to be a discrimination made between things sacred and profane, and reverence used in Divine worship. Idolatry and sacrilege allied.—63. Another Scripture charge upon the Pagans, that they were devil-worshippers; not as though they intended all their worship to evil demons or devils as such, but because their Polytheism and idolatry (unacceptable to God and good spirits) was promoted by evil spirits delivering oracles and doing miracles for the confirmation of it, they also insinuating themselves into the temples and statues, therefore the worship was looked upon as done to them. The same thing said of others besides Pagans, that they worshipped devils.—64. Proved that they were evil demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst the Pagans, for the carrying on of that religion, from the many obscene rites and mysteries, not only not prohibited, but also enjoined by them.—65. The same thing further proved from other cruel and bloody rites, but especially that of man-sacrifices. Plutarch's clear acknowledgment, that both the obscene rites and man-sacrifices, amongst the Pagans, owed their original to wicked demons.—66. That the God of Israel neither required nor accepted of man-sacrifices against a modern Diatribist.—67. That what faith soever Plato might have in the Delphic Apollo, he was no other than an evil demon, or devil. An answer to the Pagans' argument from Divine Providence.—68. That the Pagans' religion, unsound in its foundation, was infinitely more corrupted and depraved by means of these four things: —First, the superstition of the ignorant vulgar.—69. Secondly, the licentious figments of poets and fable mongers, frequently condemned by Plato and other wiser Pagans.—70. Thirdly, the craft of priests and politicians. —71. Lastly, the imposture of evil demons, or devils. That by means of these four things, the Pagan religion became a most foul and unclean thing. And as some were captivated by it under a most grievous yoke of superstition, so others strongly inclined to Atheism.—72. Plato not insensible, that the Pagan religion stood in need of reformation; neverthe-

less, supposing many of those religious rites to have been introduced by visions, dreams, and oracles, he concluded, that no wise legislator would of his own head, venture to make an alteration; implying, that this was a thing not to be effected otherwise than by Divine revelation and miracles. The generally received opinion of the Pagans, that no man ought to trouble himself about religion, but content himself to worship God, *νόμῳ πόλεως*, according to the law of that country which he lived in.—73. Wherefore God Almighty, in great compassion to mankind, designed himself to reform the religion of the Pagan world, by introducing another religion of his own framing instead of it; after he had first made a præludium thereunto in one nation of the Israelites, where he expressly prohibited, by a voice out of the fire, in his first commandment, the Pagan Polytheism, or the worshipping of other inferior deities besides himself; and in the second, their idolatry, or the worshipping of the supreme God in images, statues, or symbols. Besides which, he restrained the use of sacrifices: as also successively gave predictions, of a Messiah to come, such as together with miracles might reasonably conciliate faith to him when he came.—74. That afterwards, in due time, God sent the promised Messiah, who was the eternal Word hypostatically united with a pure human soul and body, and so a true *θεάνθρωπος*, or God-man; designing him for a living temple and visible statue or image, in which the Deity should be represented and worshipped; as also after his death and resurrection, when he was to be invested with all power and authority, for a prince and king, a mediator and intercessor betwixt God and men.—75. That this *θεάνθρωπος*, or God-man, was so far from intending to require men-sacrifices of his worshippers, as the Pagan demons did, that he devoted himself to be a catharma and expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; and thereby also abolished all sacrifices or oblations by fire whatsoever, according to the Divine prediction.—76. That the Christian Trinity, though a mystery, is more agreeable to reason than the Platonic; and that there is no absurdity at all in supposing the pure soul and body of the Messiah to be made a living temple or Shechinah, image or statue of the Deity. That this religion of one God and one Mediator, or *θεάνθρωπος*, God-man, preached to the Pagan world, and confirmed by miracles, did effectually destroy all the Pagan inferior deities, middle gods and mediators, demons and heroes, together with their statues and images.—77. That it is no way incongruous to suppose, that the Divine Majesty, in prescribing a form of religion to the world, should graciously condescend to comply with human infirmity, in order to the removing of two such grand evils as Polytheism and idolatry, and the bringing of men to worship God in spirit and in truth.—78. That demons and angels, heroes and saints, are but different names for the same things, which are made gods by being worshipped. And that the introducing of angel and saint-worship, together with image-worship, into Christianity, seems to be a defeating of one grand design of God Almighty in it, and the paganizing of that which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world.—79. Another key for Christianity in the Scripture, not disagreeing with the former, that since the way of wisdom and knowledge proved ineffectual as to the generality of mankind, men might, by the contrivance of the gospel, be brought to God and a holy life (without profound knowledge) in the way

of believing.—80. That, according to the Scripture, there is a higher, more precious, and diviner light, than that of theory and speculation.—81. That in Christianity all the great, goodly, and most glorious things of this world are slurred and disgraced, comparatively with the life of Christ.—82. And that there are all possible engines in it to bring men up to God, and engage them in a holy life.—83. Two errors here to be taken notice of; the first, of those who make Christianity nothing but an Antinomian plot against real righteousness, and as it were a secret confederacy with the devil. The second, of those who turn that into matter of mere notion and opinion, dispute and controversy, which was designed by God only as a contrivance, machine, or engine, to bring men effectually to a holy and godly life.—84. That Christianity may be yet further illustrated, from the consideration of the adversary or Satanical power, which is in the world. This no Manichean substantial evil principle, but a polity of lapsed angels, with which the souls of wicked men are also incorporated, and may therefore be called the kingdom of darkness.—85. The history of the fallen angels in Scripture briefly explained.— 86. The concurrent agreement of the Pagans concerning evil demons or devils, and their activity in the world.—87. That there is a perpetual war betwixt two polities or kingdoms in the world, the one of light, the other of darkness; and that our Saviour Christ, or the Messiah, is appointed the head or chieftain over the heavenly militia, or the forces of the kingdom of light. —88. That there will be at length a palpable and signal overthrow of the Satanical power and whole kingdom of darkness, by θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, God, appearing in an extraordinary and miraculous manner; and that this great affair is to be managed by our Saviour Christ, as God's vicegerent, and a visible judge both of quick and dead.—89. That our Saviour Christ designed not to set up himself factiously against God Almighty, nor to be accounted κύριος θεοῦ, superior to God, but that when he hath done his work, and put down all adversary power, himself will then be subject to God, even the Father, that so God may be all in all.—90. Lastly, having spoken of three forms of religions, the Jewish, Christian, and the Pagan, and there remaining only a fourth, the Mohammedan, in which the Divine monarchy is zealously asserted, we may now conclude, that the idea of God (as essentially including unity in it) hath been entertained in all forms of religion. An account of that seemingly-strange phenomenon of Providence: the rise, growth, and continuance of the Mohammedan religion not to be attempted by us, at least in this place.

1. Having in the former chapter prepared the way, we shall now proceed (with the divine assistance) to answer and confute all those Atheistic arguments before proposed. The first whereof was this, That there is no idea of God, and therefore either no such thing existing in nature, or at least no possible evidence of it.

To affirm, that there is no idea of God, is all one as to affirm, that that there is no conception of the mind answering to that word or name; and this the modern Atheists stick not to maintain, that the word God hath no signification, and that there is no other idea or conception in

men's minds, answering thereunto, besides the mere phantasm of the sound. Now, for any one to go about soberly to confute this, and to prove, that God is not the only word without a signification, and that men do not every where pay all their religious devotions to the mere phantasm of a transient sound, expecting all good from it, might very well seem to all intelligent persons a most absurd and ridiculous undertaking; both because the thing is so evident in itself, and because the plainest things of all can be least proved; [1] for *ὁ πάντα ἀπόδεικτα νενομικὼς, αὐτὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρεῖ·* He that thinks all things to be demonstrable, takes away demonstration itself.—Wherefore we shall here only suggest thus much, that since there are different words for God in several languages, and men have the same notion or conception in their minds answering to them all, it must needs be granted, that they have some other idea or conception belonging to those words, besides the phantasms of their several sounds. And indeed it can be nothing else, but either monstrous sottishness and stupidity of mind, or else prodigious impudence, in these Atheists to deny, that there is any idea of God at all in the minds of men, or that the word hath any signification.

It was heretofore observed by Epictetus, [2] *ἄν τις ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥάδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν λόγον, δι᾽ οὗ μεταπείσει τις αὐτὸν· τοῦτο δ᾽ οὔτε παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γίνεται δύναμιν, οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν·* That if any man will oppose or contradict the most evident truths, it will not be easy to find arguments wherewith to convince him. And yet this, notwithstanding, ought neither to be imputed to any inability in the teacher, nor to any strength of wit in the denier, but only to a certain dead insensibility in him.—Whereupon he further adds, that there is a double *ἀπονέκρωσις*, or *ἀπωλίθωσις*, mortification or petrification of the soul; the one, when it is stupified and besotted in its intellectuals; the other, when it is bedeaded in its morals as to that pudor, that naturally should belong to a man. And he concludes, that either of these states (though it be not commonly so apprehended) is a condition little less deplorable, than that of bodily death; as also that such a person is not at all to be disputed with. For *ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον σίδηρον προσάγω, ἵν᾽ αἴσθηται ὅτι νενέκρωται; αἰσθανόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται; ἔτι χείρων ἐστι τοῦ νεκροῦ, ἐκτέτμηται γὰρ τὸ αἰδῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐντρέττικον·* What sword can one bring, or what fire, by burning or slashing, to make such a one perceive that he is

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1 Procl. in Timæ, p. 176. edit. Græc. Basil. 1534. fol.

2 Arria. lib. i. cap. v. p. 95. Edit. Cantabr.

dead? But if he be sensible, and will not acknowledge it, then he is worse than dead, being castrated as to that pudor, that belongs to a man.—Moreover, that philosopher took notice, that in those times, when this denial of most evident truths proceeded rather from impudence than stupidity or sottishness, the vulgar would be apt to admire it for strength of wit and great learning; *ἂν δέ τίνος τὸ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν·* But if any man's pudor be deaded or mortified in him, we call this power and strength.—

Now, as this was sometimes the case of the Academics, so is it also commonly of the Atheists, that their minds are partly petrified and benumbed into a kind of sottish and stupid insensibility, so that they are not able to discern things that are most evident: and partly depudorated and become so void of shame, as that though they do not perceive, yet they will obstinately and impudently deny the plainest things that are; as this, that there is any idea answering to the word God, besides the phantasm of the sound. And we do rather insist upon this prodigious monstrosity of Atheists in this place, because we shall have occasion afterwards more than once to take notice of it again in other instances, as when they affirm, that local motion and cogitation are really one and the self-same thing, and the like. And we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that it is many times nothing else, but either this shameless impudence, or sottish insensibility in Atheists, that is admired by the ignorant for profoundness of wit and learning, [1]*ἀλλὰ ταύτην δύναμιν εἴπω; μὴ γένοιτο· εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῶν Κιναίδων, καθ᾽ ἣν πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι.* But shall I call this power or wit, and commend it upon that account? no more than I will commend the impudence of the Cinœdi, who stick not publicly to do and say any thing.—

II. But whatever these Atheists deny in words, it is notwithstanding evident, that even themselves have an idea or conception in their minds answering to the word God, when they deny his existence, because otherwise they should deny the existence of nothing. Nor can it be at all doubted, but that they have also the same idea of God with Theists, they denying the existence of no other thing than what these assert. And as in all other controversies, when men dispute together, the one affirming, the other denying, both parties must needs have the same idea in their minds of what they dispute about, or otherwise their whole disputation would be but a kind of Babel language and confusion; so must it be likewise in this present controversy betwixt Theists and

[1] Epictet. apud Arrian. ubi supra, p. 26.

Atheists. Neither indeed would there be any controversy at all between them, did they not both by God, mean one and the same thing; nor would the Atheists be any longer Atheists, did they not deny the existence of that very same thing which the Theists affirm, but of something else.

III. Wherefore, we shall in the next place declare, what this idea of God is, or what is that thing, whose existence they that affirm, are called Theists, and they who deny, Atheists. In order whereunto, we must first lay down this lemma, or preparatory proposition—that as it is generally acknowledged, that all things did not exist from eternity, such as they are, unmade, but that some things were made and generated or produced; so it is not possible that all things should be made neither, but there must of necessity be something self-existent from eternity, and unmade; because if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. The reason of which is so evident and irresistible, that even the Atheists confess themselves conquered by it, and readily acknowledge it for an indubitable truth, that there must be something *ἀγέννητον*, something which was never made or produced—and which therefore is the cause of those other things that are made, something *αὐτόφυες* and *αἰθυπόστατον*, that was self-originated and self-existing, and which is as well *ἀνώλεθρον* and *ἄφθαρτον*, as *ἀγέννητον*, incorruptible and undestroyable, as ingenerable; whose existence therefore must needs be necessary, because if it were supposed to have happened by chance to exist from eternity, then it might as well happen again to cease to be. Wherefore all the question now is, what is this *ἀγέννητον* and *ἀνώλεθρον*, *αὐτόφυες* and *αὐθυπόστατον*, this ingenerable and incorruptible, self-originated and self-existent thing, which is the cause of all other things that are made.

IV. Now there are two grand opinions opposite to one another concerning it; for, first, some contend, that the only self-existent, unmade and incorruptible thing, and first principle of all things, is senseless matter; that is, matter either perfectly dead and stupid, or at least devoid of all animalish and conscious life. But because this is really the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, others on the contrary judge it reasonable, that the first principle and original of all things should be that, which is the most perfect (as Aristotle[1] observes of Pherecydes, and his followers, *τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον τιθέασι*, that they made the first cause and principle of generation to be the best,) and then apprehending, that to be endued with conscious life and understanding is

[1] Metaphysicor. lib. xii. cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv. oper.

a much greater perfection than to be devoid of both, (as Balbus in Cicero declares upon this very occasion, [1]"Nec dubium quin quod animans sit, habeatque mentem, et rationem, et sensum, id sit melius quam id quod his careat") they therefore conclude, that the only unmade thing, which was the principle, cause, and original of all other things, was not senseless matter, but a perfect conscious understanding nature, or mind. And these are they, who are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm, that a perfectly conscious understanding being, or mind, existing of itself from eternity, was the cause of all other things; and they, on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious understanding being self-existent or unmade, are those that are properly called Atheists. Wherefore, the true and genuine idea of God in general, is this, A perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things.

V. But it is here observable, that those Atheists, who deny a God, according to this true and genuine notion of him, which we have declared, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name; partly perhaps as endeavoring thereby, to decline that odious and ignominious name of Atheists, and partly as conceiving, that whatsoever is the first principle of things, ingenerable and incorruptible, and the cause of all other things besides itself, must therefore needs be the divinest thing of all. Wherefore, by the word God, these mean nothing else, but that which is ἀγέννητον, unmade or self-existent, and the ἀρχὴ, or first principle of things. Thus it was before observed,[2] that Anaximander called infinite matter devoid of all manner of life, τὸ θεῖον, or God; and Pliny, the corporeal world, endued with nothing but a plastic unknowing nature, Numen; as also others in Aristotle,[3] upon the same account, called the inanimate elements gods, as supposed first principles of things; θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, for these are also gods.—And indeed Aristotle himself seems to be guilty of this miscarriage of abusing the word God after this manner, when, speaking of love and chaos, as the two first principles of things, he must, according to the laws of grammar, be understood to call them both gods: [4]τούτους μὲν

[1] De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xvii. p. 2978. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Chap. ii. sec. xx.

[3] This is a mistake of Dr. Cudworth, for Aristotle does not speak of those philosophers, who considered the elements as gods, but of Empedocles, and his well known principles of νεῖκος and φίλια. De Generatione et Corruptione, cap. vi. p. 734. tom. i. oper.

[4] Metaph. lib. i. cap. iv. p. 267. tom. iv. oper.

οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι, περὶ τοῦ τίς πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον· Concerning these two (gods) how they ought to be ranked, and which of them is to be placed first, whether love or chaos, is afterwards to be resolved.—Which passage of Aristotle's seems to agree with that of Epicharmus,[1] *Ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὲν χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι θεῶν*, but chaos is said to have been made the first of gods;—unless we should rather understand him thus, that chaos was said to have been made before the gods. And this abuse of the word God is a thing, which the learned Origen took notice of in his book against Celsus, where he speaks of that religious care, which ought to be had about the use of words: [2] *ὁ τοίνυν μεγαλοφυέστερον, κἂν ὀλίγην τούτων περίνοιαν εἰληφὼς, εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἄλλα ἄλλοις ἐφαρμόζειν ὀνόματα πράγμασι, μήποτε ὅμοιον πάθῃ τοῖς τὸ Θεὸς ὄνομα ἐσφαλμένως φέρουσιν, ἐπὶ ὕλην ἄψυχον·* He, therefore, that hath but the least consideration of these things, will take a religious care, that he give not improper names to things, lest he should fall into a like miscarriage with those, who attribute the name of God to inanimate and senseless matter.—Now, according to this false and spurious notion of the word of God, when it is taken for any supposed first principle, or self-existent, unmade thing; whatsoever that be, there neither is nor can be any such thing as an Atheist; since whosoever hath but the least drachm of reason, must needs acknowledge, that something or other existed from eternity unmade, and was the cause of those other things that are made. But that notion or idea of God, according to which some are Atheists and some Theists, is, in the strictest sense of it, what we have already declared, A perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things.—The genuine Theists being those, who make the first original of all things universally to be a consciously understanding nature (or perfect mind); but the Atheists, properly such, as derive all things from matter, either perfectly dead and stupid, or else devoid of all conscious and animalish life.

VI. But that we may more fully and punctually declare the true idea of God, we must here take notice of a certain opinion of some philosophers, who went as it were in a middle betwixt both the former, and neither made matter alone, nor God, the sole principle of all things; but joined them both together, and held two first principles or self-existent unmade beings, independent upon one another—God, and the matter. Amongst whom the Stoics are to be reckoned, who, notwith-

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1 Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. iii. segm. 10. p. 171.

2 Lib. i. p. 19. Cant.

standing, because they held, that there was no other substance besides body, strangely confounded themselves, being by that means necessitated to make their two first principles, the active and the passive, to be both of them really but one and the self-same substance: their doctrine to this purpose being thus declared by Cicero:[1] "Naturam dividebant in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se præbens, ex qua efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant; in eo quod efficeretur, materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam ipsam cohærere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim, quod non alicubi esse cogatur." The Stoics divided nature into two things as the first principles, one whereof is the efficient or artificer, the other that which offers itself to him for things to be made out of it. In the efficient principle they took notice of active force in the patient of matter, but so as that in each of these were both together; forasmuch as neither the matter could cohere together, unless it were contained by some active force, nor the active force subsist of itself without matter, because that is nothing, which is not somewhere.—But besides these Stoics, there were other philosophers, who, admitting of incorporeal substance, did suppose two first principles, as substances really distinct from one another, that were co-existent from eternity—[2]an incorporeal Deity and matter; as for example, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Atticus, and many more; insomuch that Pythagoras himself was reckoned amongst those by Numenius, and Plato by Plutarch and Laertius.

And we find it commonly taken for granted, that Aristotle also was of this persuasion, though it cannot be certainly concluded from thence (as some seem to suppose), because he asserted the eternity of the world; Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, and Simplicius doing the like, and yet, notwithstanding, maintaining, that God was the sole principle of all things, and that matter also was derived from him. Neither will that passage of Aristotle's, in his Metaphysics, necessarily evince the contrary: [3]*Θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις*, God seems to be a cause to all things, and a certain principle;—because this might be understood only of the forms of things.

But it is plain, that Plutarch was a maintainer of this doctrine, from

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[1] Academ. Quæst. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 2231. tom. viii. oper. But Cicero in this passage does not treat of the opinion of the Stoics, but of that of Plato and his ancient followers, or the first Academics.

[2] See Euseb. Præp. Ev. lib. vii. c. 7.

[3] Lib. i. cap. i. p. 263. tom. iv. oper.

his discourse upon the Platonic psychogonia[1] (besides other places :) *βέλτιον οὖν Πλάτωνι πειθομένους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δὲ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτιῶν· τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ, εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν αὐτῆς, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν, ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν παρασχεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας, καὶ ἱματίου, καὶ ἀνδριάντος·* It is, therefore, better for us to follow Plato (than Heraclitus,) and loudly to declare, that the world was made by God. For as the world is the best of all works, so is God the best of all causes. Nevertheless, the substance or matter, out of which the world was made, was not itself made ; but always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer, to be ordered and disposed by him. For the making of the world was not the production of it out of nothing, but out of an antecedent bad and disorderly state, like the making of a house, garment, or statue.

It is also well known, that Hermogenes, and other ancient pretenders to Christianity, did in like manner assert the self-existence and improduction of the matter, for which cause they were commonly called Materiarii, or the Materiarian heretics ; they pretending by this means to give an account (as the Stoics had done before them) of the original of evils, and to free God from the imputation of them. Their ratiocination to which purpose, is thus set down by Tertullian :[2] " God made all things, either out of himself, or out of nothing, or out of matter. He could not make all things out of himself, because himself being always unmade, he should then really have been the maker of nothing : and he did not make all out of nothing, because being essentially good, he would have made *nihil non optimum*, every thing in the best manner, and so there could have been no evil in the world ; but since there are evils, and these could not proceed from the will of God, they must needs arise from the fault of something, and therefore of the matter, out of which things were made." Lastly, it is sufficiently known, likewise, that some modern sects of the Christian profession, at this day, do also assert the uncreatedness of the matter. But these suppose, in like manner as the Stoics did, body to be the only substance.

VII. Now of all these, whosoever they were, who thus maintained two self-existent principles, God and the matter, we may pronounce universally, that they were neither better nor worse, than a kind of imperfect Theists.

They had a certain notion or idea of God, such as it was, which

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[1] Tom. ii. oper. p. 1014. [2] Adver. Hermog. p. 282. Reg.

seems to be the very same with that expressed in Aristotle,[1] *Ζῶον ἄριστον ἀΐδιον*, an animal the best, eternal; and represented also by Epicurus in this manner,[2] *Ζῶον πᾶσαν ἔχον μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας·* an animal, that hath all happiness with incorruptibility.—

Wherein it was acknowledged by them, that besides senseless matter, there was also an animalish and conscious or perceptive nature, self-existent from eternity; in opposition to Atheists, who made matter either devoid of all manner of life, or at least of such as is animalish and conscious, to be the sole principle of all things. For it hath been often observed, that some Atheists attributed a kind of plastic life or nature to that matter, which they made to be the only principle of the universe. And these two sorts of Atheisms were long since taken notice of by Seneca, in these words:[3] "Universum, in quo nos quoque sumus, expers esse consilii, et aut ferri temeritate quadam, aut natura nesciente quid faciat." The Atheists make the universe, whereof ourselves are part, to be devoid of counsel; and, therefore, either to be carried on temerariously and fortuitously, or else by such a nature, as which (though it be orderly, regular, and methodical) yet is, notwithstanding, nescient of what it doth.—But no Atheist ever acknowledged conscious animality to be a first principle in the universe; nor that the whole was governed by any animalish, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over it as the head of it; but as it was before declared, they concluded all animals and animality, all conscious, sentient, and self-perceptive life, to be generated and corrupted, or educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, asserted animality and conscious life to be a first principle or unmade thing in the universe, are to be accounted Theists. Thus Balbus in Cicero declares,[4] that to be a Theist is to assert, "Ab animantibus principiis mundum esse generatum," that the world was generated or produced at first from animant principles;—and that it is also still governed by such a nature; "Res omnes subjectas esse naturæ sentienti," that all things are subject to a sentient and conscious nature, steering and guiding of them.—

But to distinguish this Divine animal from all others, these definers added, that it was *ἄριστον* and *μακαριώτατον*, the best and most happy animal;—and, accordingly, this difference is added to that generical nature of animality by Balbus the Stoic, to make up the idea or defini-

[1] Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. viii. p. 479. tom. iv. oper.

[2] Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. x. segm. 123. p. 655.

[3] Nat. Qu. Præf. l. 1.

[4] De Natura Deor. l. ii. sect. xxx. p. 299. tom. ix. oper.

tion of God complete :[1] "Talem esse deum certa notione animi præsentimus ; primum, ut sit animans ; deinde, ut in omni natura nihil illo sit præstantius." We presage concerning God, by a certain notion of our mind ; first, that he is an animans, or consciously living being ; and then, secondly, that he is such an animans, as that there is nothing in the whole universe, or nature of things, more excellent than him.—

Wherefore these Materiarian Theists acknowledged God to be a perfectly-understanding being, and such as had also power over the whole matter of the universe ; which was utterly unable to move itself, or to produce any thing without him. And all of them, except the Anaxagoreans,[2] concluded, that he was the creator of all the forms of inanimate bodies, and of the souls of animals. However, it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that he was at least the orderer and disposer of all ; and that, therefore, he might upon that account well be called the δημιουργὸς, the maker or framer of the world.

Notwithstanding which, so long as they maintained matter to exist independently upon God, and sometimes also to be refractory and contumacious to him, and by that means to be the cause of evil, contrary to the Divine will ; it is plain, that they could not acknowledge the Divine omnipotence, according to the full and proper sense of it ; which may also further appear from these queries of Seneca,[3] concerning God : "Quantum deus possit ? materiam ipse sibi formet, an data utatur ? Deus quicquid vult efficiat ? an in multis rebus illum tractanda destituant, et a magna artifice prave formentur multa, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, sæpe inobsequens arti est ?" How far God's power does extend ? whether he makes his own matter, or only use that which is offered him ; whether he can do whatsoever he will ; or the materials in many things frustrate and disappoint him, and by that means things come to be ill framed by this great artificer, not because his art fails him, but because that which it is exercised upon, proves stubborn and contumacious ?—Wherefore, I think, we may well conclude, that those Materiarian Theists had not a right and genuine idea of God.

Nevertheless, it does not, therefore, follow, that they must needs be concluded absolute Atheists ; for there may be a latitude allowed in Theism. And though, in a strict and proper sense, they be only Theists who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original

[1] Cicero de Nat. D. l. 2. cap. xvii. p. 2977. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 9. p. 85.

[3] Præfat. lib. i. Quæst. Natur. tom. ii. oper. p. 485.

of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of any thing else; yet it seems reasonable, that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also, who assert one intellectual principle self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists, merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things. And this is certainly most agreeable to common apprehensions; for Democritus and Epicurus would never have been condemned for Atheists, merely for asserting eternal self-existent atoms, no more than Anaxagoras and Archelaus were (who maintained the same thing,) had they not also denied that other principle of theirs, a perfect mind, and concluded, that the world was made, *μηδενὸς διατάττοντος ἢ διαταξαμένου τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχοντος μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας*, without the ordering and disposal of any understanding being, that had all happiness with incorruptibility.—

VIII. The true and proper idea of God, in its most contracted form, is this, a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone, to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable. Now, as absolute perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, so does it not only comprehend (besides necessary existence) perfect knowledge or understanding, but also omni-causality and omnipotence (in the full extent of it,) otherwise called infinite power. God is not only *ζῶον ἄριστον*, and "animans quo nihil in omni natura præstantius," as the Materiarian Theists described him, the best living being; nor, as Zeno Eleates[1] called him, *κράτιστον πάντων*, the most powerful of all things;—but he is also *παγκρατὴς*, and *παντοκράτωρ*, and *παντεξούσιος* absolutely omnipotent, and infinitely powerful; and, therefore, neither matter, nor any thing else, can exist of itself independently upon God; but he is the sole principle and source, from which all things are derived.

But because this infinite power is a thing, which the Atheists quarrel much withal, as if it were altogether unintelligible, and therefore impossible; we shall here briefly declare the sense of it, and render it (as we think) easily intelligible or conceivable, in these two following steps: first, that by infinite power is meant nothing else but perfect power, or

[1] Vide Aristot. Libro de Xenocrate, Zenone, et Gorgia, cap. iii. p. 840. tom. ii. oper.

else, as Simplicius calls it, ὅλη δύναμις, a whole and entire power,—such as hath no allay and mixture of impotency, nor any defect of power mingled with it. And then, again, that this perfect power (which is also the same with infinite) is really nothing else but a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is conceivable, and which does not imply a contradiction; for conception is the only measure of power and its extent, as shall be showed more fully in due place.

Now, here we think fit to observe, that the Pagan Theists did themselves also vulgarly acknowledge omnipotence as an attribute of the deity; which might be proved from sundry passages of their writings:—

Homer. Od. δ'.[1]

——————Θεὸς ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλῳ
Ζεὺς ἀγαθόντε κακόντε διδοῖ, δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα

——————Deus aliud post aliud
Jupiter, bonumque malumque dat, potest enim omnia.

And again, Od. ξ'.[2]

———Θεὸς τὸ μὲν δώσει, τὸ δ' ἐάσει,
Ὅττι κεν ᾧ θύμῳ ἐθέλει, δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

———Deus autem hoc dabit, illud omittet,
Quodcunque ei libitum fuerit, potest enim omnia.

To this purpose also, before Homer, Linus:[3]

Ῥάδια πάντα θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν·

And after him, Callimachus:[4]

Δαίμονι ῥέξαι πᾶν δυνατόν·

All things are possible for God to do, and nothing transcends his power.—

Thus also amongst the Latin poets, Virgil. Æn. I.

Sed pater omnipotens speluncis abdidit atris.

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[1] Vers. 226, 227. [2] Vers. 432, 433.

[3] Apud Jamblichum in Vita Pythag. cap. xxviii. p. 117, 118.

[4] Apud Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 880. tom ii. oper.

Again, Æn. II.

> At pater Anchises oculos ad sydera lætus
> Extulit, et cœlo palmas cum voce tetendit ;
> Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis.

And, Æn. IV.

> Talibus orantem dictis, arasque tenentem
> Audiit Omnipotens.

Ovid, in like manner, Metamorph. I.

> Tum pater omnipotens misso perfregit Olympum
> Fulmine, et excussit subjectum Pelion Ossæ.

And to cite no more, Agatho, an ancient Greek poet, is commended by Aristotle, for affirming nothing to be exempted from the power of God but only this, that he cannot make that not to have been, which hath been ; that is, do what implies a contradiction.

> [1] *Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ Θεὸς στερίσκεται,*
> *Ἀγένητα ποιεῖν, ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα·*

> Hoc namque duntaxat negatum etiam Deo est,
> Quæ facta sunt, infecta posse reddere.

Lastly, that the Atheists themselves under Paganism looked upon omnipotence and infinite power as an essential attribute of the Deity, appears plainly from Lucretius ; when he tells us, that Epicurus, in order to the taking away of religion, set himself to confute infinite power :

> [2] ———Omne immensum peragravit mente animoque,
> Unde refert nobis victor, quid possit oriri,
> Quid nequeat ; finita potestas denique quoique
> Quanam sit ratione, atque alte terminus hærens.
> Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim
> Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

As if he should have said, Epicurus, by showing that all power was finite, effectually destroyed religion : he thereby taking away the object of it, which is an omnipotent and infinitely powerful Deity. And this is a thing, which the same poet often harps upon again, that there is no

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[1] Eth. Nic. l. 4. c. 2. p. 98. tom. iii. oper. [2] L. i. vers. 75, etc.

infinite power, and consequently no Deity, according to the true idea of it. But, last of all, in his sixth book, he condemns religionists, as guilty of great folly, in asserting omnipotence or infinite power (that is, a Deity,) after this manner :

> Rursus in antiquas referuntur religiones,
> Et dominos acres asciscunt, omnia posse,
> Quos miseri credunt, ignari quid queat esse,
> Quid nequeat, finiti potestas denique quoique,
> Quanam sit ratione, atque alte terminus hærens :
> Quo magis errantes tota regione feruntur.

Where though the poet, speaking carelessly, after the manner of those times, seems to attribute omnipotence and infinite power to gods plurally ; yet, as it is evident in the thing itself, that this can only be the attribute of one supreme Deity ; so it may be observed, that in those passages of the poets before cited, it is accordingly always ascribed to God singularly. Nevertheless, all the inferior Pagan deities were supposed by them to have their certain shares of this Divine omnipotence, severally dispensed and imparted to them.

IX. But we have not yet despatched all that belongs to the entire idea of God ; for knowledge and power alone will not make a God. For God is generally conceived by all to be a most venerable and most desirable being ; whereas, an omniscient and omnipotent arbitrary Deity, that hath nothing either of benignity or morality in its nature, to measure and regulate its will, as it could not be truly august and venerable, according to that maxim, *sine bonitate nulla majestas ;* so neither could it be desirable, it being that which could only be feared and dreaded, but not have any firm faith or confidence placed in it. Plutarch, in the life of Aristides :[1] *τὸ Θεῖον τρισὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀφθαρσίᾳ, καὶ δυνάμει, καὶ ἀρετῇ· ὧν σεμνότατον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ θεότατόν ἐστι· ἀφθάρτῳ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τῷ κενῷ, καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις συμβέβηκε· δύναμιν δὲ σεισμοὶ καὶ κέραυνοι, καὶ πνευμάτων ὁρμαὶ καὶ ῥευμάτων ἐπιφοραὶ μεγάλην ἔχουσι,* etc. God seems to excel in these three things, incorruptibility, power, and virtue ; of all which the most Divine and venerable is virtue : for vacuum and the senseless elements have incorruptibility ; earthquakes, and thunders, blustering winds and overflowing torrents, much of power and force. Wherefore, the vulgar being affected three manner of ways towards the Deity, so as to admire its happiness, to fear it, and to honor it ; they esteem the Deity happy for its incorruptibility, they fear it and

[1] P. 322. tom. i. oper.

stand in awe of it for its power, but they worship it, that is, love and honor it, for its justice. — And indeed an omnipotent arbitrary Deity may seem to be in some sense a worse and more undesirable thing, than the Manichean evil god; forasmuch as the latter could be but finitely evil, whereas the former might be so infinitely. However, I think, it can be little doubted, but that the whole Manichean hypothesis, taken all together, is to be preferred before this of one omnipotent arbitrary Deity (devoid of goodness and morality) ruling all things; because there the evil principle is yolked with another principle essentially good, checking and controlling it; and it also seems less dishonorable to God, to impute defect of power than of goodness and justice to him.

Neither can power and knowledge alone make a being in itself completely happy; for we have all of us by nature *μαντευμά τι* (as both Plato and Aristotle call it) a certain divination, presage, and parturient vaticination in our minds, of some higher good and perfection than either power or knowledge. Knowledge is plainly to be preferred before power, as being that which guides and directs its blind force and impetus; but Aristotle himself declares, that there is *λόγου τι κρεῖττον*, which is *λόγου ἀρχὴ*, something better than reason and knowledge, which is the principle and original of all.—For (saith he) *λόγου ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον*.[1] The principle of reason is not reason, but something better.—Where he also intimates this to be the proper and essential character of the Deity; *τὶ οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης, πλὴν ὁ Θεός*: For what is there, that can be better than knowledge, but God? —Likewise the same philosopher elsewhere plainly determines, that there is morality in the nature of God; and that his happiness consisteth principally therein, and not in external things, and the exercise of his power:[2] *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον, ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς, καὶ τῷ ποῖός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν.* That every man hath so much of happiness, as he hath of virtue and wisdom, and of acting according to these, ought to be confessed and acknowledged by us, it being a thing, that may be proved from the nature of God, who is happy, but not from any external goods, but because he is himself (or that which he is) and in such a manner affected according to his nature;—that is, because he is essentially moral and virtuous.

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[1] Eth. Eudem. l. 7. c. 14. p. 384. tom. iii. oper.

[2] De Rep. l. 7. c. 1. p. 569. tom. iii. oper.

Which doctrine of Aristotle's seems to have been borrowed from Plato, who in his dialogues *De Republica*,[1] discoursing about moral virtue occasionally falls upon this dispute concerning the *summum bonum*, or chiefest good ; wherein he concludes, that it neither consisted in pleasure, as such, according to the opinion of the vulgar, nor yet in mere knowledge and understanding, according to the conceit of others, who were more polite and ingenious. [2]*οἶθα ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶαι τό ἀγαθὸν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις· καὶ ὅτιγε οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι, μάλα γελοίως, ὀνειδίζοντες γὰρ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι·* You know that, to the vulgar, pleasure seems to be the highest good ; but to those, who are more elegant and ingenious, knowledge : but they, who entertain this latter opinion, can none of them declare what kind of knowledge it is, which is that highest and chiefest good, but are necessitated at last to say, that it is the knowledge of good, very ridiculously : forasmuch as herein they do but run round in a circle, and upbraiding us for being ignorant of this highest good, they talk to us at the same time, as knowing what it is. And thereupon he adds, *Καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τοῦτο ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ, ὀρθῶς ἡγήσηται. Ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθὸν, ἥλιον δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταυθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ἀμφότερα ὀρθὸν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζόνως τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν τιμητέον.* That though knowledge and truth be both of them excellent things, yet he that shall conclude the chief good to be something which transcends them both, will not be mistaken. For as light, and sight, or the seeing faculty, may both of them rightly be said to be soliform things, or of kin to the sun, but neither of them to be the sun itself ; so knowledge and truth may likewise both of them be said to be boniform things, and of kin to the chief good, but neither of them to be that chief good itself ; but this is still to be looked upon as a thing more august and honorable.—In all which of Plato's there seems to be little more, than what may be experimentally found within ourselves ; namely, that there is a certain, or vital and moral disposition of soul, which is much more inwardly and thoroughly satisfactory, not only than sensual pleasure, but also than all knowledge and speculation whatsoever.

Now whatever this chiefest good be, which is a perfection superior to knowledge and understanding ; that philosopher[3] resolves, that it

[1] De Republica, lib. vi. p. 477. oper. [2] Lib. 6.

[3] Vide Platon. de Republica, lib. ii. p. 431. et Philebum, p. 77, etc.

must needs be first and principally in God, who is therefore called by him, *Ἰδέα τ' ἀγαθοῦ,* the very idea or essence of good.—Wherein he trod in the footsteps of the Pythagoreans, and particularly of Timæus Locrus,[1] who, making two principles of the universe, mind and necessity, adds, concerning the former, *τουτέων τὸν μὲν τᾶς τ' ἀγαθοῦ φύσιος εἶμεν, θεόντε ὀνυμαίνεσθαι ἀρχάντε τῶν ἀρίστων·* The first of these two is of the nature of good, and it is called God, the principle of the best things.—Agreeably with which doctrine of theirs, the Hebrew Cabalists also make Sephirah in the Deity, superior both to Binah and Chochmah (understanding and wisdom,) which they call Chether, or the crown. And some would suspect this Cabalistic learning to have been very ancient among the Jews, and that Parmenides was imbued with it, he calling God in like manner *στεφάνην,* or the crown.—For which, Velleius in Cicero[2] (representing the several opinions of philosophers concerning God,) perstringes him amongst the rest; "Parmenides commentitium quiddam coronæ similitudine efficit, Stephanem appellat, continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit cœlum, quem appellat deum."

But all this while we seem to be to seek, what the chief and highest good superior to knowledge is, in which the essence of the Deity principally consists; and it cannot be denied, but that Plato sometimes talks too metaphysically and cloudily about it; for which cause, as he lay open to the lash of Aristotle, so was he also vulgarly perstringed for it, as appears by that of Amphys the poet in Laertius:[3]

Τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὅ, τι ποτ' ἐστὶν, οὗ σὺ τυγχάνειν
Μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἧττον οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγώ,
Ἢ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀγαθόν·

What good that is, which you expect from hence, I confess, I less understand, than I do Plato's good.—Nevertheless, he plainly intimates these two things concerning it: first, that this nature of good, which is also the nature of God, includes benignity in it, when he gives this account[4] of God's both making the world, and after such a manner—"Because he was good, and that which is good, hath no envy in it; and therefore he both made the world, and also made it as well, and as

[1] Libro de Anima Mundi, cap. i. p. 543. inter Scriptores Mytholog. a Tho. Gale editos.

[2] De Natura Deorum, lib. i. cap. x. p. 2895. oper. tom. ix.

[3] Lib. iii. segm. 27. p. 181.

[4] Vide Platon. in Timæo, p. 527.

like to himself as was possible."—And, secondly, that it comprehends eminently all virtue and justice, the Divine Nature being the first pattern hereof: for which cause virtue is defined to be, an assimilation to the Deity.—Justice and honesty are no factious things, made by the will and command of the more powerful to the weaker, but they are nature and perfection, and descend downward to us from the Deity.

But the Holy Scripture, without any metaphysical pomp and obscurity, tells us plainly, both what is that highest perfection of intellectual beings, which is κρεῖττον λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης, better than reason and knowledge,—and which is also the source, life, and soul of all morality; namely, that it is love or charity. Though I speak with the tongue of men and angels, and have not love, I am but χαλκὸς ἠχῶν, ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον, as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal,—which only makes a noise without any inward life. And though I have prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing; that is, I have no inward satisfaction, peace, or true happiness. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing; I am for all that utterly destitute of all true morality, virtue, and grace. And accordingly it tells us also, in the next place, what the nature of God is—that he is properly neither power nor knowledge (though having the perfection of both in him,) but love. And certainly whatever dark thoughts, concerning the Deity, some men in their cells may sit brooding on, it can never reasonably be conceived, that that which is ἱκανώτατον ἁπάντων καὶ αὐταρκέστατον, the most self-sufficient and self-happy being,—should have any narrow and selfish designs abroad, without itself, much less harbor any malignant and despiteful ones towards its creatures. Nevertheless, because so many are apt to abuse the notion of the Divine love and goodness, and to frame such conceptions of it, as destroy that awful and reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, and make men presumptuous and regardless of their lives; therefore we think fit here to superadd, also, that God is no soft nor fond and partial love, but that justice is an essential branch of this Divine goodness; God being, as the writer *De Mundo*[1] well expresses it, νόμος ἰσοκλινὴς, an impartial law;—and as Plato,[2] μέτρον πάντων, the measure of all things.—In imitation whereof, Aristotle concludes also, that a good man (in a lower and more imperfect sense) is μέτρον too, an impartial measure of things and actions.

[1] Cap. vi. p. 865. tom. i. oper. Aristotelis.

[2] De Legibus, lib. iv. p. 601.

It is evident, that the Atheists themselves, in those former times of Paganism, took it for granted, that goodness was an essential attribute of the Deity, whose existence they opposed (so that it was then generally acknowledged for such, by the Pagan Theists,) from those argumentations of theirs, before-mentioned, the twelfth and thirteenth, taken from the topic of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and want of providence over human affairs. Which, if they were true, would not at all disprove such an arbitrary Deity (as is now fancied by some) made up of nothing but will and power, without any essential goodness and justice. But those arguments of the Atheists are directly levelled against the Deity, according to the true notion or idea of it: and could they be made good, would do execution upon the same. For it cannot be denied, but that the natural consequence of this doctrine, that there is a God essentially good, is this, that therefore the world is well made and governed. But we shall afterwards declare, that though there be evil in the parts of the world, yet there is none in the whole; and that moral evils are not imputable to the Deity.

And now we have proposed the three principal attributes of Deity. The first whereof is infinite goodness with fecundity; the second, infinite knowledge and wisdom; and the last, infinite active and perceptive power. From which Divine attributes, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem to have framed their trinity of archical hypostases, such as have the nature of principles in the universe, and which, though they apprehended as several distinct substances, gradually subordinate to one another, yet they many times extend the *τὸ θεῖον* so far as to comprehend them all within it. Which Pythagoric trinity seems to be intimated by Aristotle in these words: [1] *καθάπερ γὰρ φασι οἱ καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρίσι διώρισται·* As the Pythagoreans also say, the universe, and all things, are determined and contained by three principles.—Of which Pythagoric trinity more afterwards. But now we may enlarge and fill up that compendious idea of God premised, of a being absolutely perfect, by adding thereunto (to make it more particular) such as infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existing, and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things. Which idea of the Deity is sufficient, in order to our present undertaking.

Nevertheless, if we would not only attend to what is barely necessary for a dispute with Atheists, but also consider the satisfaction of other free and devout minds, that are hearty and sincere lovers of this

[1] De Cœl. lib. i. cap. i. p. 610. tom. i. oper.

most admirable and most glorious being, we might venture for their gratification to propose yet a more full, free, and copious description of the Deity, after this manner.—God is a being absolutely perfect, unmade, or self-originated, and necessarily existing; that hath an infinite fecundity in him, and virtually contains all things; as also an infinite benignity or overflowing love, uninvidiously displaying and communicating itself; together with an impartial rectitude, or nature of justice; who fully comprehends himself, and the extent of his own fecundity, and therefore all the possibilities of things, their several natures and respects, and the best frame or system of the whole; who hath also infinite active and perceptive power; the fountain of all things, who made all that could be made, and was fit to be made, producing them according to his own nature (his essential goodness and wisdom), and therefore according to the best pattern, and in the best manner possible, for the good of the whole; and reconciling all the variety and contrariety of things in the universe into one most admirable and lovely harmony. Lastly, who contains and upholds all things, and governs them after the best manner also, and that without any force or violence, they being all naturally subject to his authority, and readily obeying his law. And now we see, that God is such a being, as that, if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing whose existence a good man could possibly more wish or desire.

X. From the idea of God thus declared, it evidently appears that there can be but one such being, and that *Μόνωσις*, unity, oneliness, or singularity is essential to it; forasmuch as there cannot possibly be more than one Supreme, more than one omnipotent, or infinitely powerful Being, and more than one cause of all things besides itself. And however Epicurus, endeavoring to pervert and adulterate the notion of God, pretended to satisfy that natural prolepsis or anticipation in the minds of men, by a feigned and counterfeit asserting of a multiplicity of co-ordinate deities, independent upon one Supreme, and such as were also altogether unconcerned either in the frame or government of the world, yet himself notwithstanding, plainly took notice of this idea of God, which we have proposed, including unity or oneliness in it (he professedly opposing the existence of such a Deity;) as may sufficiently appear from that argumentation of his, in the words before cited:

[1] Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
Inde manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?

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[1] Lib. ii. p. 198. Lamb.

Quis pariter cœlos omnes convertere, et omnes
Ignibus ætheriis terras suffire feraces?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto?

Where he would conclude it to be a thing utterly impossible, for the Deity to animadvert, order, and dispose all things, and be present every where in all the distant places of the world at once; which could not be pretended of a multitude of co-ordinate gods, sharing the government of the world amongst them; and, therefore, it must needs be levelled against a Divine monarchy, or one single, solitary, supreme Deity ruling over all. As, in like manner, when he pursues the same argument further in Cicero, to this purpose, that though such a thing were supposed to be possible, yet it would be, notwithstanding, absolutely inconsistent with the happiness of any being, he still proceeds upon the same hypothesis of one sole and single Deity: [1] Sive ipse mundus Deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum, quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso, versari circum axem cœli admirabili celeritate? sive in ipso mundo Deus inest aliquis, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, hominum commoda vitasque tueatur; næ ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis." Whether you will suppose the world itself to be a god, what can be more unquiet, than without intermission perpetually to whirl round upon the axis of the heaven with such admirable celerity? or whether you will imagine a God in the world distinct from it, who does govern and dispose all things, keep up the courses of the stars, the successive changes of the seasons, and orderly vicissitudes of things, and contemplating lands and seas, conserve the utilities and lives of men: certainly he must needs be involved in much solicitous trouble and employment.—For, as Epicurus here speaks singularly, so the trouble of this theocracy could not be thought so very great to a multitude of co-ordinate deities, when parcelled out among them, but would rather seem to be but a sportful and delightful divertisement to each of them. Wherefore it is manifest, that such an idea of God, as we have declared, including unity, oneliness and singularity in it, is a thing, which the ancient Atheists, under the times of Paganism, were not unacquainted with, but principally directed their force against. But this may seem to be anticipated in this place, because it will fall in afterwards more opportunely to be discoursed of again.

XI. For this is that, which lies as the grand prejudice and objec-

[1] De Nat. D. lib. i. cap. xx. p. 2909. tom. ix. oper.

tion against that idea of God, which we have proposed, essentially including μόνωσιν, singularity or oneliness in it, or the real existence of such a Deity, as is the sole monarch of the universe; because all the nations of the world heretofore (except a small and inconsiderable handful of the Jews), together with their wisest men, and greatest philosophers, were generally looked upon as Polytheists, that is, such as acknowledged and worshipped a multiplicity of gods. Now one God, and many gods, being directly contradictious to one another, it is therefore concluded from hence, that this opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme God, the maker and governor of all, hath no foundation in nature, nor in the genuine ideas and prolepses of men's minds, but is a mere artificial thing, owing its origin wholly to private fancies and conceits, or to positive laws and institutions, amongst Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans.

For the assoiling of which difficulty, (seeming so formidable at first sight,) it is necessary that we should make a diligent inquiry into the true and genuine sense of this Pagan Polytheism. For since it is impossible, that any man in his wits should believe a multiplicity of gods, according to that idea of God before declared, that is, a multiplicity of supreme, omnipotent, or infinitely powerful beings; it is certain, that the Pagan Polytheism and multiplicity of gods, must be understood according to some other notion of the word gods, or some equivocation in the use of it. It hath been already observed, that there were sometime amongst the Pagans such, who, meaning nothing else by gods but understanding beings superior to men, did suppose a multitude of such deities, which yet they conceived to be all (as well as men) native and mortal, generated successively out of matter, and corrupted again into it, as Democritus's idols were. But these Theogonists, who thus generated all things whatsoever, and therefore the gods themselves universally, out of night and chaos, the ocean or fluid matter (notwithstanding their using the name gods) are plainly condemned both by Aristotle and Plato for downright Atheists, they making senseless matter the only self-existent thing, and the original of all things.

Wherefore there may be another notion of the word gods, as taken for understanding beings superior to men, that are not only immortal, but also self-existent and un-made. And, indeed, the assertors of a multiplicity of such gods as these, though they cannot be accounted Theists in a strict and proper sense (according to that idea of God before declared), yet they are not vulgarly reputed Atheists neither, but looked upon as a kind of middle thing betwixt both, and commonly called Polytheists. The reason whereof seems to be this, because it is

generally apprehended to be essential to Atheism, to make senseless matter the sole original of all things, and consequently to suppose all conscious intellectual beings to be made or generated. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, assert (not one but) many understanding beings unmade and self-existent, must needs be looked upon as those who, of the two, approach nearer to Theism than to Atheism, and so deserve rather to be called Polytheists than Atheists.

And there is no question to be made, but that the urgers of the forementioned objection against that idea of God, which includes oneliness and singularity in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, take it for granted, that this is to be understood of many unmade self-existent deities, independent upon one Supreme, that are so many first principles in the universe, and partial causes of the world. And certainly, if it could be made to appear, that the Pagan Polytheists did universally acknowledge such a multiplicity of unmade, self-existent deities, then the argument fetched from thence, against the naturality of that idea of God proposed (essentially including singularity in it.)

XII. But, first, this opinion of many self-existent deities, independent upon one Supreme, is both very irrational in itself, and also plainly repugnant to the phenomena. We say, first, it is irrational in itself, because self-existence and necessary existence being essential to a perfect being, and to nothing else, it must needs be very irrational and absurd to suppose a multitude of imperfect understanding beings self-existent, and no perfect one. Moreover, if imperfect understanding beings were imagined to exist of themselves from eternity, there could not possibly be any reason given, why just so many of them should exist, and neither more nor less, there being indeed no reason why any at all should. But if it be supposed, that these many self-existent deities happened only to exist thus from eternity, and their existence, notwithstanding, was not necessary, but contingent; the consequence hereof will be, that they might as well happen again to cease to be, and so could not be incorruptible. Again, if any one imperfect being whatsoever could exist of itself from eternity, then all might as well do so, not only matter, but also the souls of men, and other animals; and, consequently, there could be no creation by any Deity, nor those supposed deities therefore deserve that name. Lastly, we might also add, that there could not be a multitude of intellectual beings self-existent, because it is a thing, which may be proved by reason, that all imperfect understanding beings or minds do partake of one perfect mind, and suppose also omnipotence or infinite power; were it not, that this is a

consideration too remote from vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so fit to be urged in this place.

Again, as this opinion of many self-existent deities is irrational in itself, so is it likewise plainly repugnant to the phenomena of the world. In which, as Macrobius writes,[1] *omnia sunt connexa*, all things conspire together into one harmony, and are carried on peaceably and quietly, constantly and evenly, without any tumult or hurly-burly, confusion or disorder, or the least appearance of schism and faction; which could not possibly be supposed, were the world made and governed by a rabble of self-existent deities, co-ordinate, and independent upon one Supreme. Wherefore this kind of Polytheism was *obiter* thus confuted by Origen: [2] *πόσῳ οὖν βέλτιον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὀρωμένων πειθόμενον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν εὐταξίαν τοῦ κόσμου σέβειν τὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος ἕνα, καὶ συμπνέοντος αὐτοῦ ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ δυναμένου ὑπὸ πολλῶν δημιουργῶν γεγονέναι, ὡς οὐδ' ὑπὸ πολλῶν ψυχῶν συνέχεσθαι ὅλον τὸν οὐρανὸν κινουσῶν;* How much better is it, agreeably to what we see in the harmonious system of the world, to worship only one maker of the world, which is one, and conspiring throughout with its whole self, and therefore could not be made by many artificers, as neither be contained by many souls, moving the whole heaven?—Now since this opinion is both irrational in itself, and repugnant to the phenomena, there is the less probability, that it should have been received and entertained by all the more intelligent Pagans.

XIII. Who, that they did not thus universally look upon all their gods as so many unmade self-existent beings, is unquestionably manifest from hence, because ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time at least, the Greekish Pagans generally acknowledged a theogonia, a generation, and temporary production of the gods; which yet is not to be understood universally neither, forasmuch as he is no Theist, who does not acknowledge some self-existent deity. Concerning this theogonia, Herodotus writeth after this manner: [3] *ὅθεν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε ἀεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοί τέ τινες τὰ εἴδεα, οὐκ ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μεν πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ πλέοσι· οὗτοι δὲ εἰσὶ οἱ ποιήσαντες Θεογονίαν Ἕλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες.* Whence every one of the gods was generated, or whether they all of them ever were, and what are their forms, is a thing that was not

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[1] In Somn. Scip. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 75.

[2] Contr. Cels. lib. i. p. 18. edit. Cantabrig.

[3] Euter. p. 53. lib. ii. cap. liii. p. 109. edit. Gronov.

known till very lately; for Hesiod and Homer were (as I suppose) not above four hundred years my seniors. And these were they, who introduced the theogonia among the Greeks, and gave the gods their several names:—that is, settled the Pagan theology. Now, if before Hesiod's and Homer's time, it were a thing not known or determined amongst the Greeks, whether their gods were generated, or all of them existed from eternity; then it was not universally concluded by them, that they were all unmade and self-existent. And though, perhaps, some, might in those ancient times believe one way, and some another, concerning the generation and eternity of their gods; yet it does not follow, that they, who thought them to be all eternal, must therefore needs suppose them to be also unmade or self-existent. For Aristotle, who asserted the eternity of the world, and consequently also of those gods of his, the heavenly bodies, did not, for all that, suppose them to be self-existent or first principles, but all to depend upon one principle or original Deity. And, indeed, the true meaning of that question in Herodotus, whether the gods were generated or existed all of them from eternity, is (as we suppose) really no other than that of Plato's, *εἰ γέγονεν ὁ κόσμος ἢ ἀγενής ἐστι·* Whether the world were made or unmade?—and whether it had a temporary beginning, or existed such as it is from eternity; which will be more fully declared afterwards. But ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time, that the theogonia or generation of the gods was settled, and generally believed amongst the Greeks, it is certain, that they could not possibly think all their gods eternal, and therefore much less unmade and self-existent.

But though we have thus clearly proved, that all the Pagan gods were not universally accounted by them so many unmade self-existent deities, they acknowledging a theogonia, or a generation of gods; yet it may be suspected, notwithstanding, that they might suppose a multitude of them also (and not only one) to have been unmade from eternity and self-existent. Wherefore we add, in the next place, that no such a thing does at all appear neither, as that the Pagans or any others did ever publicly or professedly assert a multitude of unmade self-existent deities. For, first, it is plain concerning the Hesiodian gods, which were all the gods of the Greekish Pagans, that either there was but one of them only self-existent, or else none at all. Because Hesiod's gods were either all of them derived from chaos (or the floating water,) love itself being generated likewise out of it (according to that Aristophanic tradition before-mentioned;) or else love was supposed to be a distinct principle from chaos, namely, the active principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, all the theogonia and

cosmogonia was derived. Now, if the former of these were true, that Hesiod supposed all his gods universally to have been generated and sprung originally from chaos, or the ocean; then it is plain, that notwithstanding all that rabble of gods mustered up by him, he could be no other than one of those Atheistic Theogonists before-mentioned, and really acknowledged no God at all, according to the true idea of him; he being not a Theist, who admits of no self-existent Deity. But if the latter be true, that Hesiod supposed love to be a principle distinct from chaos, namely, the active principle of the universe, and derived all his other gods from thence, he was then a right paganic Theist, such as acknowledged indeed many gods, but only one of them unmade and self-existent, all the rest being generated or created by that one. Indeed, it appears from those passages of Aristotle,[1] before cited by us, that that philosopher had been sometimes divided in his judgment concerning Hesiod, where he should rank him, whether among the Atheists or the Theists. For in his book *De Cœlo* he ranks him amongst those, who made all things to be generated and corrupted, besides the bare substance of the matter, that is, amongst the absolute Atheists, and looked upon him as a ringleader of them; but in his Metaphysics, upon further thoughts, suspects that many of those, who made love the chiefest of the gods, were Theists, they supposing it to be a first principle in the universe, or the active cause of things, and that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, was such. Which latter opinion of his is by far the more probable, and therefore embraced by Plutarch,[2] who somewhere determines Hesiod to have asserted one *θεὸν ἀγέννητον*, or unmade Deity; as also by the ancient scholiast upon him, writing thus, that Hesiod's love was *ὁ οὐράνιος ἔρως, ὃς καὶ Θεός· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης νεώτερός ἐστιν·* The heavenly love, which is also God; that other love, that was born of Venus, being junior.—But Joannes Diaconus; *ἔρωτα δὲ ἐνταῦθα νοητέον, οὐ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης παῖδα, πῶς γὰρ τῆς μητρὸς μήπω γεγονύιας οὗτος παράγεται; ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινα προσβυγενῆ ἔρωτα. οἶμαι δὲ τὴν ἐγκατεσπαρμένην φυσικῶς κινητικὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων.* By love here (saith he,) we must not understand Venus's son, whose mother was as yet unborn, but another more ancient love, which I take to be the active cause or principle of motion, naturally inserted into things.—Where, though he do not seem to suppose this love to be God himself, yet he conceives it to be an active principle in the universe derived from God, and not from matter. But this opinion will be further confirmed afterward.

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[1] P. 116. 112. [2] De Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 880.

The next considerable appearance of a multitude of self-existent deities, seems to be in the Valentinian thirty gods and æons, which have been taken by some for such; but it is certain, that these were all of them, save one, generated; they being derived by that fantastic deviser of them, from one self-originated deity, called Bythus. For thus Epiphanius informs us,[1] *τρίακοντα γὰρ καὶ οὗτος Θεοὺς καὶ Αἰῶνας καὶ Οὐρανοὺς βούλεται παρεισάγειν, ὧν ὁ πρῶτός ἐστι Βυθός·* This (Valentinus) would also introduce thirty gods and æons, and heavens, the first of which is Bythus;—he meaning thereby an unfathomable depth and profundity; and therefore, this Bythus was also called by him, *ὁ ἀνοτάτω καὶ ἀκατονόμαστος πατὴρ*, the highest and ineffable Father.

We do indeed acknowledge, that there have been some, who have really asserted a duplicity of gods, in the sense declared, that is, of animalish or perceptive beings self-existent; one as the principle of good, and the other of evil. And this Ditheism of theirs seems to be the nearest approach, that was ever really made to Polytheism; unless we should here give heed to Plutarch,[2] who seems to make the ancient Persians, besides their two gods, the good and the evil, or Oromasdes and Arimanius, to have asserted also a third middle deity, called by them, Mithras; or to some ecclesiastic writers, who impute a trinity of gods to Marcion,[3] (though Tertullian[4] be yet more liberal, and increase the number to an ennead.) For those, that were commonly called Tritheists, being but mistaken Christians and Trinitarians, fall not under this consideration. Now, as for that forementioned Ditheism, or opinion of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident, that its original sprung from nothing else, but first a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of the Deity, together with a conceit, that the evil that is in the world, was altogether inconsistent and unreconcileable with the same; and that, therefore, for the solving of this phenomenon, it was absolutely necessary to suppose another animalish principle self-existent, or an evil god. Wherefore, as these Ditheists, as to all that which is good in the world, held a monarchy, or one sole principle and original; so it is plain, that had it not been for this business of evil (which they conceived could not be solved any other way) they would never have asserted any more principles or gods than one.

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1 Hær. 31. cap. ii. p. 164. tom. i. oper.

2 De Iside et Osiride, tom. ii. p. 369.

3 Vide Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. v. cap. xiii. p. 177. et auctores illos quos Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius laudat ad Constit. Apost. p. 339. tom. i. Patrum Apostol.

4 Libro i. adversus Marcionem, cap. xvi. p. 237, 238.

The chiefest and most eminent assertors of which ditheistic doctrine of two self-existent animalish principles in the universe, a good god and an evil demon, were the Marcionites and the Manicheans; both of which, though they made some slight pretences to Christianity, yet were not by Christians owned for such. But it is certain, that besides these, and before them too, some of the professed Pagans also entertained the same opinion, that famous moralist, Plutarchus Chæronensis being an undoubted patron of it; which in his book *De Iside et Osiride* he represents, with some little difference, after this manner; [1]*μεμιγμένη γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἐναντίων, οὐ μὲν ἰσοσθενῶν δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστίν· ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντὸς, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν βελτίονα δυσμαχοῦσαν·* The generation and constitution of this world is mixed of contrary powers or principles (the one good, the other evil,) yet so as that they are not both of equal force, but the better of them more prevalent: notwithstanding which, it is also absolutely impossible for the worser power or principle to be ever utterly destroyed, much of it being always intermingled in the soul, and much in the body of the universe, there perpetually tugging against the better principle.

Indeed, learned men of later times have, for the most part, looked upon Plutarch here, but either as a bare relater of the opinion of other philosophers, or else as a follower only, and not a leader in it. Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that Plutarch was himself heartily engaged in this opinion, he discovering no small fondness for it, in sundry of his other writings; as, for example, in his Platonic questions, where he thus declares himself concerning it, [2]*ἢ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄνους ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον σῶμα, συνυπῆρχον ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ, καὶ τὸ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεσιν ἔχεν οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν·* or else that which is often affirmed by us is true, that a mad irrational soul, and an unformed disorderly body, did co-exist with one another from eternity, neither of them having any generation or beginning. — And in his *Timæan Psychogonia* he does at large industriously maintain the same, there and elsewhere[4] endeavoring to establish this doctrine, as much as possibly he could, upon rational foundations. As, first, that nothing can be made or produced without a cause; and therefore there must of necessity, be some cause of evil also, and that a positive one too; he representing the opinion of those as very ridiculous, who would make

[1] P. 371. Par. [2] P. 1003. Par. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Libro de Iside et Osiride, p. 369, et Psychogon. p. 1014, 1015. tom. ii. oper.

the nature of evil to be but *ἐπεισόδιον*, an accidental appendix to the world, and all that evil which is in it, to have come in only by the bye, and by consequence, without any positive cause. Secondly, that God being essentially good could not possibly be the cause of evil, where he highly applauds Plato for removing God to the greatest distance imaginable from being the cause of evil. Thirdly, that as God could not, so neither could *ὕλη ἄποιος*, matter in itself devoid of all form and quality, be the cause of evil, noting this to have been the subterfuge of the Stoics. Upon which account he often condemns them, but uncertainly, sometimes as such, who assigned no cause at all of evils, and sometimes again as those, who made God the cause of them. For in his *Psychogonia*[1] he concludes, that unless we acknowledge a substantial evil principle, *αἱ Στοικαὶ καταλαμβάνουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπορίαι, τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιτίως καὶ ἀγεννήτως ἐπεισάγοντες, ἐπεὶ τῶνγε ὄντων οὔτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν, οὔτε τὸ ἄποιον, εἰκός ἐστιν οὐσίαν κακοῦ καὶ γένεσιν παρασχεῖν·* The Stoical difficulties will of necessity overtake and involve us, who introduce evil into the world from nothing, or without a cause, since neither that which is essentially good (as God,) nor yet that which is devoid of all quality (as matter,) could possibly give being or generation to it.—But in his book against the Stoics,[2] he accuses them as those, who made God, essentially good, the cause of evil. *Αὐτοί τὴν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσι οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς παρέσχηκεν, ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς, ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχηκεν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη τὸ κακὸν, εἰ μὲν δι' οὐδὲν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονος ὑπάρχειν·* Themselves make God being good the principle and cause of evil, since matter, which is devoid of quality, and receives all its differences from the active principle that moves and forms it, could not possibly be the cause thereof. Wherefore, evil must of necessity, either come from nothing, or else it must come from the active and moving principle, which is God.—Now from all these premises joined together, Plutarch concludes, that the phenomenon of evil could no otherwise possibly be solved, than by supposing a substantial principle for it, and a certain irrational and maleficent soul or demon, unmade, and co-existing with God and matter from eternity, to have been the cause thereof. And accordingly he resolves, that as whatsoever is good in the soul and body of the universe, and likewise in the souls of men and demons, is to be ascribed to God as its only original; so whatsoever is evil, irregular and disorderly in them, ought to be imputed to this other

[1] P. 1015. tom. ii. oper. [2] P. 1076. tom. ii. oper.

substantial principle, a *ψυχὴ ἄνους καὶ κακοποιὸς*, an irrational and maleficent soul or demon,—which insinuating itself every where throughout the world, is all along intermingled with the better principle:[1] *καὶ μὴ πᾶν εἶναι ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν*, so that neither the soul of the universe, nor that of men and demons, was wholly the workmanship of God, but the lower, brutish, and disorderly part of them the effect of the evil principle.

But, besides all this, it is evident, that Plutarch was also strongly possessed with a conceit, that nothing substantial could be created (no not by Divine power) out of nothing pre-existing; and, therefore, that all the substance of whatsoever is in the world, did exist from eternity unmade; so that God was only the orderer or the methodizer and harmonizer thereof. Wherefore, as he concluded, that the corporeal world was not created by God out of nothing, as to the substance of it, but only the pre-existing matter, which before moved disorderly, was brought into this regular order and harmony by him; in like manner he resolved, that the soul of the world (for such a thing is always supposed by him) was not made by God out of nothing neither, nor out of any thing inanimate and soul-less pre-existing, but out of a pre-existing disorderly soul, was brought into an orderly and regular frame; [2]*ἀκοσμία γὰρ ἦν τὰ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσως, ἀκοσμία δὲ οὐκ ἀσώματος οὐδὲ ἀκίνητος, οὐδὲ ἄψυχος, ἀλλὰ ἄμορφον μὲν καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ σωματικὸν, ἔμπληκτον δὲ καὶ ἄλογον τὸ κινητικὸν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἀναρμοστία ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐχούσης λόγον· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὔτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, οὔτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἁρμόνικον ἄνδρα*, etc. There was unformed matter before this orderly world was made, which matter was not incorporeal, nor unmoved or inanimate, but body discomposed and acted by a furious and irrational mover, the deformity whereof was the disharmony of a soul in it, devoid of reason. For God neither made body out of that which was no body, nor soul out of no soul. But as the musician, who neither makes voice nor motion, does by ordering of them, notwithstanding produce harmony; so God, though he neither made the tangible and resisting substance of body, nor the fantastic and self-moving power of soul, yet taking both these principles pre-existing (the one of which was dark and obscure, the other turbulent and irrational,) and orderly disposing and harmonizing of them, he did by that means produce this most beautiful and perfect animal of the world.—And further, to the same purpose: *οὐχὶ σώματος ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲ ὄγκου καὶ ὕλης, ἀλλά*

[1] Plutarch. de Animæ. Procreat. ex. Timæo, p. 1027.

[2] De Psychog. p. 1014. Par.

συμμετρίας περὶ σῶμα καὶ κάλλους καὶ ὁμοιότητος, ἣν ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργός· ταῦτα δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡς τὴν μὲν οὔτε ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γενομένην οὔτε κόσμου ψυχὴν οὖσαν, ἀλλά τινα φανταστικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς, ἀλόγου δὲ καὶ ἀτάκτου φορᾶς καὶ ὁρμῆς δύναμιν αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀεικίνητον· τὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς διωρμοσάμενος, προςήκουσιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ λόγοῖς, ἐγκατέστησεν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ κόσμου γεγονότος γεννητὴν οὖσαν. God was not the cause or maker of body simply, that is, neither of bulk nor matter, but only of that symmetry and pulchritude which is in body, and that likeness which it hath to himself; which same ought to be concluded also concerning the soul of the world, that the substance of it was not made by God neither; nor yet that it was always the soul of this world, but at first a certain self-moving substance, endowed with a fantastic power, irrational and disorderly, existing such of itself from eternity, which God, by harmonizing, and introducing into it fitting numbers and proportions, made to be the soul and prince of this generated world.—According to which doctrine of Plutarch's, in the supposed soul of the world, though it had a temporary beginning, yet was it never created out of nothing, but only that, which pre-existed disorderly, being acted by the Deity, was brought into a regular frame. And therefore he concludes, *ἡ ψυχὴ νοῦ μετασχοῦσα καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας, οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος, οὐδ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν·* Soul partaking of mind, reason, and harmony, is not only the work of God, but also a part of him; nor is it a thing so much made by him, as from him, and existing out of him.—And the same must he likewise affirm concerning all other souls, as those of men and demons, that they are either all of them the substance of God himself, together with that of the evil demon; or else certain delibations from both, (if any one could understand it) blended and confounded together: he not allowing any new substance at all to be created by God out of nothing pre-existent. It was observed in the beginning of this chapter, that Plutarch was an assertor of two *αὐθυπόστατα* or self-existent principles in the universe, God and matter; but now we understand, that he was an earnest propugnor of another third principle (as himself calls it) besides them both, viz. a *ψυχὴ ἄνους καὶ κακοποιὸς*, a mad, irrational, and maleficent soul or demon;—so that Plutarch was both a Triarchist and a Ditheist, an assertor of three principles, but of two gods; according to that forementioned notion of a God, as it is taken for an animalish or perceptive being self-existent.

We are not ignorant, that Plutarch endeavors with all his might to persuade this to have been the constant belief of all the Pagan nations, and of all the wisest men and philosophers that ever were amongst

them. "For this (saith he, in his book *De Iside et Osiride*)[1] is a most ancient opinion, that hath been delivered down from theologers and law-makers, all along to poets and philosophers: and though the first author thereof be unknown, yet hath it been so firmly believed every where, that the footsteps of it have been imprinted upon the sacrifices and mysteries or religious rites, both of Barbarians and Greeks; namely, that the world is neither wholly ungoverned by any mind or reason, as if all things floated in the streams of chance and fortune, nor yet that there is any one principle steering and guiding all, without resistance or control; because there is a confused mixture of good and evil in every thing, and nothing is produced by nature sincere. Wherefore it is not one only dispenser of things, who, as it were, out of several vessels distributeth those several liquors of good and evil, mingling them together, and dashing them as he pleaseth; but there are two distinct and contrary powers or principles in the world, one of them always leading as it were to the right hand, but the other tugging a contrary way. Insomuch that our whole life, and the whole world, is a certain mixture and confusion of these two; at least this terrestrial world below the moon is such, all being every where full of irregularity and disorder. For if nothing can be made without a cause and that which is good cannot be the cause of evil, there must needs be a distinct principle in nature, for the production of evil as well as good. And this hath been the opinion of the most and wisest men, some of them affirming *θεοὺς εἶναι δύο καθάπερ ἀντιτέχνους*, that there are two gods as it were of contrary crafts and trades, one whereof is the maker of all good, and the other of all evil; but others calling the good principle only a God, and the evil principle a demon, as Zoroaster the magician." Besides which Zoroaster and the Persian magi, Plutarch pretends, that the footsteps of this opinion were to be found also in the astrology of the Chaldeans, and in the mysteries and religious rites, not only of the Egyptians, but also of the Grecians themselves; and, lastly, he particularly imputes the same to all the most famous of the Greek philosophers, as Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle; though his chiefest endeavor of all be to prove, that Plato was an undoubted champion for it: [2] *Ἀλλὰ ταυτὸ Πλάτων οὐκ ἔπαθε τοῖς ὕστερον, οὐδὲ παριδὼν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, τὴν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τρίτην ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν, ὑπόμεινε τῶν λόγων τὸν ἀτοπώτατον, ἐπεισόδιον οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ποιοῦντα τῶν κακῶν φύσιν ἀπ' αὐτομάτου κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ἐπικούρῳ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀκαρὲς ἐγκλίναι τὴν ἄτομον συγχω-*

[1] Tom. ii. oper. p. 369. [2] De Psychog. p. 1015. Pa.

ρουσιν, ὡς ἀναίτιον ἐπεισάγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, αὐτοὶ δὲ κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην, ἑτέρας τε περὶ σῶμα μυρίας ἀτοπίας καὶ δυσχερείας, αἰτίαν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας, κατ᾽ ἐπακουλούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν· ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐχ᾽ οὕτως· ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην διαφορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος. But Plato was not guilty of that miscarriage of later philosophers, in overlooking the third power, which is between the matter and God, and thereby falling into the grossest of all absurdities, that the nature of evils was but an accidental appendix to the world, and came into it merely by chance, nobody knows how. So that those very philosophers, who will by no means allow to Epicurus the smallest declension of his atoms from the perpendicular, alleging, that this would be to introduce a motion without a cause, and to bring something out of nothing, themselves do, notwithstanding, suppose all that vice and misery, which is in the world, besides innumerable other absurdities and inconveniences about body, to have come into it, merely by accidental consequence, and without having any cause in the first principles. But Plato did not so; but divesting matter of all qualities and differences, by means whereof it could not possibly be made the cause of evils, and then placing God at the greatest distance from being the cause thereof, he consequently resolved it into a third unmade principle between God and the matter, an irrational soul, or demon, moving the matter disorderly.—

Now, because Plutarch's authority passeth so uncontrolled, and his testimony in this particular seems to be of late generally received as an oracle, and consequently the thing taken for an unquestionable truth, that the Ditheistic doctrine of a good and evil principle was the Catholic or universal doctrine of the Pagan Theists, and particularly that Plato above all the rest, was a professed champion for the same; we shall therefore make bold to examine Plutarch's grounds for this so confident assertion of his; and principally concerning Plato. And his grounds for imputing this opinion to Plato, are only these three, which follow. First, because that Philosopher in his *Politicus*,[1] speaks of a necessary and innate appetite, that may sometimes turn the heavens a contrary way, and by that means cause disorder and confusion: Secondly, because, in his tenth *De Legibus*, he speaks of two kinds of souls, whereof one is beneficent, but the other contrary: and, lastly, because in his Timæus he supposeth the matter to have been moved disorderly before the world was made; which implies that there was a disorderly and irrational soul consisting with it as the mover of it, mat-

[1] P. 176. oper.

ter being unable to move itself. But as to the first of these allegations, out of Plato's *Politicus*, we shall only observe, that that philosopher, as if it had been purposely to prevent such an interpretation of his meaning there as this of Plutarch's, inserts these very words: [1] *μήτ' αὖ δύο τινε θεὼ, φρονοῦντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτόν.* Neither must any such thing be supposed, as if there were two gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the heavens sometimes one way, and sometimes another.—Which plain declaration of Plato's sense, being directly contrary to Plutarch's interpretation, and this Ditheistic opinion, might serve also for a sufficient confutation of his second ground from the tenth *De Legibus*,[2] as if Plato had there affirmed, that there were two souls moving the heavens, the one beneficent, but the other contrary; because this would be all one as to assert two gods, contrarily minded to one another. Notwithstanding which, for a fuller answer thereunto, we shall further add, that this philosopher did there, first, only distribute souls in general into good and evil, those moral differences properly belonging to that rank of beings, called by him souls, and first emerging in them, according to this premised doctrine, *τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῶν καλῶν, καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων.* Soul is the cause of good and evil, honest and dishonest, just and unjust.—But then, afterwards, making inquiry concerning the soul of the world or heaven, what kind of soul that was, he positively concludes, that it was no other than a soul endued with all virtue. [3] *ΑΘ. ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον, ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν, ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἤτοι τὴν ἐναντίαν. Κλ. Ω ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἐκ γε τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν, ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά.*—ATH. Hosp. Since it is soul that moves all things, we must of necessity affirm, that the heaven or world is moved by some soul or other, adorning and disposing of it, whether it be the best soul, or the contrary. CLIN. O Hospes, it is certainly not holy nor pious to conclude otherwise, than that a soul endued with all virtue, one or more, moves the world.—And as for the last thing urged by Plutarch, that before the world was made, the matter is said by Plato[4] to have been moved disorderly, we conceive, that that philosopher did therein only adhere to that vulgarly-received tradition, which was originally Mosaical, that the first beginning of the Cosmopœia was from a chaos, or matter confusedly moved, afterwards brought into order. And now we think it plainly

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[1] Ibid. p. 175. [2] P. 669. oper. [3] Page 898. Steph.

[4] In Timæo, cap. xiv. p. 527.

appears, that there is no strength at all in any of Plutarch's fore-mentioned allegations, nor any such monster to be found any where in Plato, as this substantial evil principle or god, a wicked soul or demon, unmade and self-existent from eternity, opposite and inimicous to the good God, sharing the empire and dominion of the world with him. Which opinion is really nothing else but the deifying of the devil, or prince of evil spirits, making him a corrival with God, and entitling him to a right of receiving Divine honor and worship.

And it is observable, that Plutarch himself confesseth this interpretation, which he makes of Plato, to be new and paradoxical, or an invention of his own: [1] *καὶ διὰ τὸ πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι δεόμενον παραμυθίας*, such as because it was contrary to the generally received opinion of Platonists, himself thought to stand in need of some apology and defence.—To which purpose, therefore, he adds again: [2] *πρῶτον οὖν ἣν ἔχω περὶ τούτων διάνοιαν, ἐκθήσομαι πιστούμενος τῷ εἰκότι, καὶ παραμυθούμενος, ὡς ἔνεστι, τὸ ἀληθὲς τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παράδοξαν·* I will (saith he) declare mine own opinion first concerning these things confirming it with probabilities, and, as much as possibly I can, aiding and assisting the truth and paradoxicalness thereof. Moreover, Proclus upon the Timæus takes notice of no other philosophers that ever imputed this doctrine to Plato, or indeed maintained any such opinion of two substantial principles of good and evil, but only Plutarch and Atticus (though, I confess, Chaldicius cites Numenius also to the same purpose.) Proclus's words are these: [3] *οἱ μὲν περὶ Πλούταρχον τὸν Χερωνέα καὶ Ἄττικον προεῖναι φασὶ τὴν ἀκόσμητον ὕλην πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως, προεῖναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακεργάτιν ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦτο κινοῦσαν, πόθεν γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἦν, ἢ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς; εἰ δὲ ἄτακτος ἡ κίνησις, ἀπὸ ἀτάκτου ψυχῆς.* Plutarchus Cheronensis and Atticus maintain, that before the generation and formation of the world, there was unformed and disorderly matter existing (from eternity) together with a maleficent soul: for whence, say they, could that motion of the matter in Plato's Timæus proceed, but from a soul? and if it were a disorderly motion, it must then needs come from a disorderly soul.—And as Proclus tells us, that this opinion of theirs had been before confuted by Porphyrius and Jamblichus, as that which was both irrational and impious, so doth he there likewise himself briefly refel it in these two propositions: First, that *πᾶσα ψυχὴ γέννημά ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ*, every soul is the offspring of God,—and there can be no soul, nor any thing else, besides God, self-existing; and, Secondly, *τὸ κακὸν διαιώνιον ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἄτοπον, οὐ γὰρ ὁμότι-*

[1] Psychog. p. 1012. [2] Page 1014. [3] Page 116.

μον τῷ θείῳ τὸ ἄθεον, οὔτε ἐπίσης ἀγέννητον, οὔτε ὅλως ἀντιδιῃρημένον· It is absurd to make evil alike eternal with good, for that which is godless cannot be of like honor with God, and equally unmade, nor indeed can there be any thing at all positively opposite to God.—

But because it may probably be here demanded, what account it was then possible for Plato to give of the original of evils, so as not to impute them to God himself, if he neither derived them from *ὕλη ἄποιος*, unqualified matter (which Plutarch has plainly proved to be absurd), nor yet from a *ψυχὴ ἄνους*, an irrational and maleficent soul of the world, or demon, self-existent from eternity; we shall, therefore, hereunto briefly reply, that though that philosopher derived not the original of evils from unqualified matter, nor from a wicked soul or demon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute them to God neither, but, as it seemeth to the necessity of imperfect beings. For as Timæus Locrus had before Plato determined, that the world was made by God and necessity, so does Plato himself accordingly declare in his Timæus,[1] *ὅτι μεμιγμένη τοῖδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως, νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος·* That the generation of this world is mixed, and made up of a certain composition of mind and necessity both together, yet so as that mind doth also (in some sense) rule over necessity.—Wherefore, though, according to Plato, God be properly and directly the cause of nothing else but good, yet the necessity of these lower imperfect things does unavoidably give being and birth to evils. For, first, as to moral evils (which are the chiefest), there is a necessity, that there should be higher and lower inclinations in all rational beings, vitally united to bodies, and that as autexousious, or free-willed, they should have a power of determining themselves more or less either way; as there is also a necessity, that the same liberty of will (essential to rational creatures), which makes them capable of praise and reward, should likewise put them in a possibility of deserving blame and punishment. Again, as to the evils of pain and inconvenience; there seems to be a necessity that imperfect terrestrial animals, which are capable of the sense of pleasure, should in contrary circumstances (which will also sometimes happen, by reason of the inconsistency and incompossibility of things) be obnoxious to displeasure and pain. And, lastly, for the evils of corruptions and dissolutions; there is a plain necessity, that if there be natural generations in the world, there should be also corruptions; according to that of Lucretius[2] before cited,

[1] Page 533. oper.

[2] Lib. i. vers. 264.

Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam aliena.

To all which may be added, according to the opinion of many, that there is a kind of necessity of some evils in the world for a condiment (as it were) to give a relish and haut-goust to good; since the nature of imperfect animals is such, that they are apt to have but a dull and sluggish sense, a flat and insipid taste of good, unless it be quickened and stimulated, heightened and invigorated, by being compared with the contrary evil. As also, that there seems to be a necessary use in the world of the *κακὰ ἀκούσια*, those involuntary evils of pain and suffering, both for the exercise of virtue, and the quickening and exciting the activity of the world, as also for the repressing, chastising and punishing of those *κακὰ ἑκούσια*, those voluntary evils of vice and action.—Upon which several accounts, probably, Plato concluded, that evils could not be utterly destroyed, at least in this lower world, which, according to him, is the region of lapsed souls: [1] *ἀλλ᾽ οὐτ᾽ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατὸν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, (ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη) οὐτ᾽ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τήνδε θνητὴν φύσιν, καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· διὸ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε, φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα· φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.* But it is neither possible (O Theodorus) that evils should be quite destroyed (for there must be something always contrary to good), nor yet that they should be seated amongst the gods, but they will of necessity infest this lower mortal region and nature. Wherefore, we ought to endeavor to flee from hence with all possible speed; and our flight from hence is this, to assimilate ourselves to God as much as may be; which assimilation to God consisteth in being just and holy with wisdom.—Thus, according to the sense of Plato, though God be the original of all things, yet he is not to be accounted properly the cause of evils, at least moral ones (they being only defects,) but they are to be imputed to the necessity of imperfect beings, which is that *ἀνόγκη πολλὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσα καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσα*, that necessity, which doth often resist God, and as it were shake off his bridle.—Rational creatures being, by means thereof, in a capability of acting contrary to God's will and law, as well as their own true nature and good; and other things hindered of that perfection, which the Divine goodness would else have imparted to them. Notwithstanding which, mind, that is, God, is said also by Plato to rule over necessity, because those

[1] In Theæte, p. 176. Steph.

evils, occasioned by the necessity of imperfect beings, are over-ruled by the Divine art, wisdom, and providence, for good; Typhon and Arimanius (if we may use that language) being, as it were, outwitted by Osiris and Oromasdes, and the worst of all evils made, in spite of their own nature, to contribute subserviently to the good and perfection of the whole; *καὶ τοῦτο μεγίστης τέχνης ἀγαθοποιεῖν τὰ κακά*, and this must needs be acknowledged to be the greatest art of all, to be able to bonify evils, or tincture them with good.—

And now we have made it to appear (as we conceive) that Plutarch had no sufficient grounds to impute this opinion, of two active perceptive principles in the world (one the cause of good, and the other of evil) to Plato. And as for the other Greek philosophers, his pretences to make them assertors of the same doctrine seem to be yet more slight and frivolous. For he concludes the [1]Pythagoreans to have held two such substantial principles of good and evil, merely because they sometimes talked of the *ἐναντιότητες* and *συστοιχίαι*, the contrarieties and conjugations of things, such as finite and infinite, dextrous and sinistrous, even and odd, and the like. As also, that Heraclitus entertained the same opinion, because he spake of *παλίντροπος ἁμονία κόσμου*, a versatile harmony of the world,—whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a bow is successively intended and remitted; as likewise because he affirmed all things to flow, and war to be the father and lord of all. Moreover, he resolves,[2] that Empedocles's friendship and contention could be no other than a good and evil god; though we have rendered it probable, that nothing else was understood thereby but an active spermatic power in this corporeal world, causing vicissitudes of generation and corruption. Again, Anaxagoras is entitled by him to the same philosophy, for no other reason, but only because he made mind and infinite matter two principles of the universe. And, lastly, Aristotle himself cannot escape him from being made an assertor of a good and evil god too, merely because he concluded form and privation to be two principles of natural bodies. Neither does Plutarch acquit himself any thing better, as to the sense of whole nations, when this doctrine is therefore imputed by him to the Chaldeans, because their astrologers supposed two of the planets to be beneficent, two maleficent, and three of a middle nature; and to the ancient Greeks, because they sacrificed not only to Jupiter Olympius,

[1] *Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι οὐδαμοῦ τὸ κακὸν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς παρελάμβανον.* The Pythagoreans no where admitted evil amongst the principles. Syrianus in Aristot. Metaphys. MS. p. 218.

[2] De Iside et Osiride, p. 370.

but also to Hades, or Pluto, who was sometimes called by them the infernal Jupiter. We confess, that his interpretation of the traditions and mysteries of the ancient Egyptians is ingenious, but yet there is no necessity for all that, that by their Typhon should be understood a substantial evil principle, or god self-existent, as he contends. For it being the manner of the ancient Pagans (as shall be more fully declared afterwards to physiologize in their theology, and to personate all the several things in nature ; it seems more likely, that these Egyptians did, after that manner, only *προσωποποεῖν*, personate that evil and confusion, tumult and hurlyburly, constant alteration and vicissitude of generations and corruptions, which is in this lower world, (though not without a Divine providence) by Typhon.

Wherefore, the only probability now left is that of the Persian Magi, that they might indeed assert two such active principles of good and evil, as Plutarch and the Manicheans afterwards did ; and we must confess, that there is some probability of this, because, besides Plutarch, Laertius[1] affirms the same of them, *δύο κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχὰς ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν*, that there are two principles according to the Persian Magi, a good demon and an evil one ;—he seeming to vouch it also from the authorities of Hermippus, Eudoxus, and Theopompus. Notwithstanding which, it may very well be questioned, whether the meaning of those Magi were not herein misunderstood, they perhaps intending nothing more by their evil demon than such a Satanical power as we acknowledge ; that is, not a substantial evil principle, unmade and independent upon God, but only a polity of evil demons in the world, united together under one head or prince. And this, not only because Theodorus in Photius[2] calls the Persian Arimanius by that very name, Satanas ; but also because those very traditions of theirs, recorded by Plutarch himself, seem very much to favor this opinion, they running after this manner :[3] *ἔπεισι δὲ χρόνος εἱμαρμένος, ἐν ᾧ τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον λοιμὸν ἐπάγοντα καὶ λιμὸν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀνάγκη φθαρῆναι παντάπασι καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι, τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐπιπέδου καὶ ὁμαλης γενομένης, ἕνα βίον καὶ μίαν πολιτείαν ἀνθρώπων μακαρίων καὶ ὁμογλώσσων ἁπάτων γενέσθαι·* That there is a fatal time at hand, in which Arimanius, the introducer of plagues and famines, must of necessity be utterly destroyed; and when, the earth being made plane and equal, there shall be but one life, and one polity of men, all happy and speaking the same language.—Or else, as Theopompus[4] himself represented their sense, *τέλος*

[1] In Proœmio, segm. 8. p. 6.

[2] Bibliothec. Cod. lxxxi. p. 199.

[3] De Is. et Osir. 370. Par.

[4] Apud Plutarch. de Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸν Ἅδην, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρῶπους εὐδαίμονας ἔσεσθαι, μήτε τροφῆς δεομένους, μήτε σκίαν ποιοῦντας· τὸν δὲ ταῦτα μηχανησάμενον θεὸν ἠρεμεῖν καὶ ἀναπαίεσθαι χρόνῳ καλῶς μὲν οὐ πολὺν τῷ θεῷ, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ κοιμωμένῳ μέτριον. That in conclusion Hades shall be utterly abolished, and then men shall be perfectly happy, their bodies neither needing food, nor casting any shadow; that God, which contrived this whole scene of things, resting only for the present a certain season, which is not long to him, but like the intermission of sleep to men.—For since an unmade and self-existent evil demon, such as that of Plutarch and the Manicheans', could never be utterly abolished or destroyed; it seems rather probable, that these Persian Magi did, in their Arimanius, either προσωποιεῖν, personate evil only, as we suppose the Egyptians to have done in Typhon; or else understand a Satanical power by it: notwithstanding which, they might possibly sacrifice thereunto (as the Greeks did to evil demons) for its appeasement and mitigation; or else, as worshipping the Deity itself, in the ministers of its wrath and vengeance.

However, from what hath been declared, we conceive it does sufficiently appear, that this ditheistic doctrine of a good and evil god (or a good god and evil demon both self-existent,) asserted by Plutarch and the Manicheans, was never so universally received amongst the Pagans as the same Plutarch pretendeth. Which thing may be yet further evidenced from hence, because the Manicheans professed themselves not to have derived this opinion from the Pagans, nor to be a subdivission under them, or schism from them, but a quite different sect by themselves. Thus, Faustus in St. Augustin:[1] "Pagani bona et mala, tetra et splendida, perpetua et caduca, mutabilia et certa, corporalia et divina, unum habere principium dogmatizant. His ego valde contraria censeo, qui bonis omnibus principium fateor Deum, contrariis vero Hylen (sic enim mali principium et naturam theologus noster appellat.") The Pagans dogmatize, that good and evil things, foul and splendid, perishing and perpetual, corporeal and Divine, do all alike proceed from the same principle. Whereas we think far otherwise, that God is the principle of all good, but Hyle (or the evil demon) of the contrary, which names our theologer (Manes) confound together.—And afterwards Faustus there again determines, that there were indeed but two sects of religion in the world, really distinct from one another, viz. Paganism and Manicheism.[2] From whence it may be concluded,

[1] Contra Faust. lib. 20. c. 3. p. 237. tom. viii. oper. edit. Benedict.

[2] Apud Augustin. ubi supra.

that this doctrine of two active principles of good and evil, was not then looked upon as the generally-received doctrine of the Pagans. Wherefore, it seems reasonable to think, that Plutarch's imputing it so universally to them, was either out of design, thereby to gain the better countenance and authority to a conceit, which himself was fond of; or else, because he being deeply tinctured, as it were, with the suffusions of it, every thing which he looked upon seemed to him colored with it. And indeed, for aught we can yet learn, this Plutarchus Chæronensis, Numenius, and Atticus, were the only Greek philosophers, who ever in public writings positively asserted any such opinion.

And probably St. Athanasius is to be understood of these, when, in his oration *contra Gentes*,[1] he writes thus concerning this opinion: *Ἑλλήνων οὖν τινὲς πλανηθέντες τῆς ὁδοῦ, καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν οὐκ ἐγνωκότες, ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν ἀπεφήναντο· ἁμαρτάνοντες κατὰ δύο ταῦτα, ἢ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀποστεροῦντες τοῦ εἶναι ποιητὴν τῶν ὄντων, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ὄντων κύριος, εἴγε κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ κακία καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει καὶ οὐσίαν, ἢ πάλιν θέλοντες αὐτὸν ποιητὴν εἶναι τῶν ὅλων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ δόσουσιν εἶναι, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ τὸ κακὸν κατ' αὐτούς ἐστι.* Some of the Greeks, wandering out of the right way, and ignorant of Christ, have determined evil to be a real entity by itself, erring upon two accounts: because they must of necessity either suppose God not to be the maker of all things, if evil have a nature and essence by itself, and yet be not made by him; or else that he is the maker and cause of evil; whereas it is impossible, that he, who is essentially good, should produce the contrary.—After which that father speaks also of some degenerate Christians, who fell into the same error; *οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων ἐκπεσόντες τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας, καὶ περὶ τὴν πίστιν ναυαγήσαντες, καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ κακοῦ παραφρονοῦσιν εἶναι.* Some heretics, forsaking the ecclesiastical doctrine, and making shipwreck of the faith, have in like manner falsely attributed a real nature and essence to evil.—Of which heretics, there were several sects before the Manicheans, sometime taken notice of and censured by Pagan philosophers themselves; as by Celsus,[2] where he charges Christians with holding this opinion, that there is *ἐναντίος τῷ μεγάλῳ θεῷ θεὸς κατηραμένος*, an execrable god contrary to the great God;—and by Plotinus, writing a whole book against such Christians (the ninth of his second Ennead,) which, by Porphyrius, was inscribed, *πρὸς τοὺς Γνωστικούς*, Against the Gnostics.—

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[1] Tom. i. p. 6. oper.

[2] Apud Origen. contra Celsum, lib. vi. p. 303.

But if, notwithstanding all that we have hitherto said to the contrary, that which Plutarch so much contends for should be granted to be true, that the Pagan theologers generally asserted two self-existent principles (a good God, and an evil soul or demon,) and no more, it would unavoidably follow from thence, that all those other gods, which they worshipped, were not looked upon by them as so many unmade self-existent beings, because then they should have acknowledged so many first principles. However, it is certain that if Plutarch believed his own writings, he must of necessity take it for granted, that none of the Pagan gods (those two principles of good and evil only excepted) were by their theologers accounted unmade or self-existent beings. And as to Plutarch himself, it is unquestionably manifest, that though he were a Pagan, and a worshipper of all those many gods of theirs, but especially amongst the rest, of the Delian Apollo (whose priest he declares himself to have been,) yet he supposed them all (except only one good God, and another evil soul of the world) to be no self-existent deities, but *θεοὶ γεννητοὶ*,[1] generated or created gods only. And the same is to be affirmed of all his Pagan followers, as also of the Manicheans, forasmuch as they, besides their good and evil god (the only unmade, self-existent beings acknowledged by them,) worshipped also innumerable other deities.

Hitherto we have not been able to find amongst the Pagans, any who asserted a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities: but, on the contrary, we shall now find one, who took notice of this opinion of *πολλαὶ ἀρχαὶ*, many principles, so far forth as to confute it; and that is Aristotle, who was not occasioned to do that neither, because it was a doctrine then generally received, but only because he had a mind odiously to impute such a thing to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, they making ideas (sometimes called also numbers) in a certain sense, the principles of things. Nevertheless, the opinion itself is well confuted by that philosopher from the phenomena, after this manner:[2] *Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἄριθμον πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικόν, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν·* etc. They who say that mathematical number is the first, and suppose one principle of one thing, and another of another, would make the whole world to be like an incoherent and disagreeing poem, where things do not all mutually contribute to one another, nor conspire together to make up one sense and harmony: but the contrary (saith he) is most evident in the world; and, therefore, there cannot

[1] Vide Rualdum in Vita Plutarchi, cap. ix.

[2] Arist. Met. l. 14. c. 10. p. 486. tom. iv. oper.

be many principles, but only one.—From whence it is manifest, that though Aristotle were a worshipper of many gods, as well as the other Pagans (he somewhere representing it as very absurd to sacrifice to none but Jupiter,) yet he was no Polytheist, in the sense before declared, of many unmade, self-existent deities, nor indeed any Ditheist neither, no assertor of two understanding principles, a good and evil god (as Plutarch pretended him to be ;) he not only here exploded that opinion of πολλαὶ ἀρχαὶ, many principles, but also expressly deriving all from one ; and in that very chapter affirming, that good is a principle, but not evil. But as for the Platonists and Pythagoreans there perstringed by him, though it be true, that they made ideas in some sense principles, as the paradigms of things; yet, according to Aristotle's own confession, even in that same chapter, they declared also, that there was ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα, another principle more excellent or superior ; which is indeed that, that was called by them the τὸ ἕν, or μονὰς, unity itself, or a monad, that is, one most simple deity.

Though we did before demonstrate, that the Pagan gods were not all supposed by them to be unmade, self-existent beings, because they acknowledged a theogonia, a generation and temporary production of gods ; yet, forasmuch as it might be suspected, that they held notwithstanding a multitude of unmade deities, we have now made the best inquiry that we could concerning this : and the utmost that we have been able yet to discover is, that some few of the professed Pagans, as well as of pretended Christians, have indeed asserted a duplicity of such gods (viz. understanding beings unmade,) one good, and the other evil, but no more. Whereas, on the contrary, we have found, that Aristotle did, professedly oppose this opinion of many principles, or unmade gods, which certainly he durst never have done, had it then been the generally-received opinion of the Pagans. And though it be true, that several of the ancient Christians, in their disputes with Pagans, do confute that opinion of many unmade deities ; yet we do not find, for all that, that any of them seriously charge the Pagans with it, they only doing it occasionally and *ex abundanti.* But we should be the better enabled to make a clear judgment concerning this controversy, whether there were not amongst the Pagan deities a multitude of supposed unmade beings, if we did but take a short survey of their religion, and consider all the several kinds of gods worshipped by them ; which may, as we conceive, be reduced to these following heads :—In the first place, therefore, it is certain, that many of the Pagan gods were nothing else but dead men (or the souls of men deceased,) called by the Greeks Heroes, and the Latins Manes ; such as

Hercules, Liber, Æsculapius, Castor, Pollux, Quirinus, and the like. Neither was this only true of the Greeks and Romans, but also of the Egyptians, Syrians, and Babylonians. For which cause the Pagan sacrifices are, by way of contempt, in the Scripture,[1] called the sacrifices of the dead ; that is, not of dead or lifeless statues, as some would put it off, but of dead men : which was the reason why many of the religious rites and solemnities, observed by the Pagan priests, were mournful and funeral ; accordingly as it is expressed in Baruch[2] concerning the Babylonians :—" Their priests sit in their temples, having their clothes rent, and their heads and beards shaven, and nothing upon their heads ; they roar and cry before their gods, as men do at the feast, when one is dead." Some of which rites are therefore thought to have been interdicted to the Israelitish priests. And the same thing is noted likewise by the poet[3] concerning the Egyptians :

Et quem tu plangens, hominem testaris, Osirin :

and intimated by Xenophanes the Colophonian,[4] when he reprehensively admonished the Egyptians after this manner : *εἰ θεοὺς νομίζουσι μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δὲ θρηνοῦσι μὴ θεοὺς νομίζειν,* That if they thought those to be gods, they should not so lament them ; but if they would lament them, they should no longer think them gods.—Moreover, it is well known, that this humor of deifying men was afterwards carried on further, and that living men (as emperors) had also temples and altars erected to them ; nay, human polities and cities were also sometimes deified by the Pagans, Rome itself being made a goddess. Now, no man can imagine, that those men-gods and city-gods were looked upon by them as so many unmade, self-existent deities, they being not indeed so much as *φύσει γεννητοὶ θεοὶ,* gods made or generated by nature, but rather artificially made by human will and pleasure. Again, another sort of the Pagan deities were all the greater parts of the visible mundane system, or corporeal world, as supposed to be animated—the sun, the moon, and the stars, and even the earth itself, under the names of Vesta and Cybele, the mother of the gods, and the like. Now it is certain, also, that none of these could be taken for unmade, self-existent deities neither, by those who supposed the whole world itself to have been generated, or had a beginning, which, as Aristotle[5] tells us,

1 Psalm. cvi. 28. 2 Chap. vi. ver. 31.

3 Lucan. Pharsal. lib. viii. vers. 133.

4 Vide Plutarch. de Superstit. p. 171. tom. ii. oper. et Aristot. Rhetoric. lib. ii. cap. xxiii. p. 789. tom. iii. oper.

5 Lib. i. de Cœlo, cap. x. p. 632. tom. i. oper.

was the generally-received opinion before his time. There was also a third sort of Pagan deities, ethereal and aerial animals invisible, called demons, genii, and lares, superior indeed to men, but inferior to the celestial or mundane gods before-mentioned. Wherefore, these must needs be looked upon also by them but as γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, generated or created gods, they being but certain inferior parts of the whole generated world.

Besides all these, the Pagans had yet another sort of gods, that were nothing but mere accidents or affections of substances, which therefore could not be supposed by them to be self-existent deities, because they could not so much as subsist by themselves. Such as were virtue, piety, felicity, truth, faith, hope, justice, clemency, love, desire, health, peace, honor, fame, liberty, memory, sleep, night, and the like; all which had their temples or altars erected to them. Now this kind of Pagan gods cannot well be conceived to have been any thing else, but the several and various manifestations of that one Divine force, power, and providence, that runs through the whole world (as respecting the good and evil of men,) fictitiously personated, and so represented as so many gods and goddesses.

Lastly, there is still another kind of Pagan gods behind, having substantial and personal names, which yet cannot be conceived neither to be so many understanding beings, unmade and independent upon any supreme, were it for no other reason but only this, because they have all of them their particular places and provinces, offices and functions severally, as it were, assigned to them, and to which they are confined; so as not to interfere and clash with one another, but agreeably to make up one orderly and harmonious system of the whole; one of those gods ruling only in the heavens, another in the air, another in the sea, and another in the earth and hell; one being the god or goddess of learning and wisdom, another of speech and eloquence, another of justice and political order; one the god of war, another the god of pleasure; one the god of corn, and another the god of wine, and the like. For how can it be conceived, that a multitude of understanding beings, self-existent and independent, could thus of themselves have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony; and, without any clashing, peaceably and quietly sharing the government of the whole world amongst them, should carry it on with such a constant regularity? For which cause, we conclude also, that neither those *dii majorum gentium*, whether the twenty *Selecti*, or the twelve *Consentes*, nor yet that triumvirate of gods, amongst whom Homer shares the government of the whole world, according to that of Maximus Tyrius,

[1] τριχθὰ Ὁμήρῳ δέδασται τὰ πάντα, Ποσειδῶν μὲν ἔλαχε, πολιὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν αἰεὶ, Ἅιδης δὲ ἔλαχε ζόφον ἠερόεντα, Ζεὺς δὲ οὐρανόν· The sea being assigned to Neptune, the dark and subterraneous parts to Pluto, but the heaven to Jupiter: which three are sometimes called also the celestial, marine, and terrestrial Jupiter; nor lastly, that other Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, worshipped altogether in the capitol, Jupiter, Minerva and Juno; I say, that none of all these could reasonably be thought by the Pagans themselves, to be so many really distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.

Wherefore the truth of this whole business seems to be this, that the ancient Pagans did physiologize in their theology; and whether looking upon the whole world animated, as the supreme God, and consequently the several parts of it as his living members; or else apprehending it at least to be a mirror, or visible image of the invisible Deity, and consequently all its several parts, and things of nature, but so many several manifestations of the Divine power and providence, they pretended, that all their devotion towards the Deity ought not to be huddled up in one general and confused acknowledgement of a supreme invisible Being, the creator and governor of all: but that all the several manifestations of the Deity in the world, considered singly and apart by themselves, should be made so many distinct objects of their devout veneration. And, therefore, in order hereunto, did they προσωποποιεῖν, speak of the things in nature, and the parts of the world, as persons,—and consequently as so many gods and goddesses; yet so, as the intelligent might easily understand the meaning, that these were all really nothing else but so many several names and notions of that one Numen, divine force and power, which runs through the whole world, multiformly displaying itself therein. To this purpose, Balbus in Cicero;[2] "Videtisne ut a physicis rebus tracta ratio sit at commentitios et fictos deos?" See you not, how from the things of nature fictitious gods have been made?—And Origen seems to insist upon this very thing (where Celsus upbraids the Jews and Christians for worshipping one only God,) showing, that all seeming multiplicity of Pagan gods could not be understood of so many distinct, substantial, independent deities: [3] δεικνύτω τοίνυν, πῶς αὐτὸς δύναται παραστῆσαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν καθ' Ἕλληνας θεῶν, ἢ τοὺς λοίπους βαρβάρους· Δεικνύτω ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν Μνημοσύνης γεννώσης ἀπὸ Διὸς τὰς Μούσας, ἢ Θέμιδος τὰς Ὥρας, ἢ τὰς Χάριτας αἰεὶ

[1] Diss. 16.

[2] De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2995. tom. ix. oper.

[3] Lib. i. p. 18. edit. Cantab.

γυμνὰς παραστησάτο δύνασθαι κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ὑφεστηκέναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ Ἑλλένων ἀναπλάσματα (σωματοποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων) δεικνύναι Θεούς. To this sense: Let Celsus, therefore, himself show, how he is able to make out a multiplicity of gods (substantial and self-existent) according to the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans; let him declare the essence and substantial personality of that memory, which by Jupiter generated the Muses, or of that Themis, which brought forth the hours; or let him show how the Graces, always naked, do subsist by themselves. But he will never be able to do this, nor to make it appear, that those figments of the Greeks (which seem to be really nothing else but the things of nature turned into persons) are so many distinct (self-existent) deities.—Where the latter words are thus rendered in a late edition; "Sed nunquam poterit (Celsus) Græcorum figmenta, quæ validiora fieri videntur, ex rebus ipsius deos esse arguere;"—which we confess we cannot understand; but we conceive the word σωματοποιεῖσθαι, there turned *validiora fieri*, is here used by Origen in the same sense with προσωπόποιεῖσθαι: so that his meaning is as we have declared, that those figments of the Greeks and other barbarian Pagans (which are the same with Balbus's *commentitii et ficti Dii*), are really nothing else but the things of nature, figuratively and fictitiously personated, and consequently not so many distinct substantial deities, but only several notions and considerations of one God, or supreme Numen, in the world.

Now this fictitious personating, and deifying of things, by the Pagan Theologers, was done two manner of ways; one, when those things in nature were themselves without any more ado, or change of names, spoken of as persons, and so made gods and goddesses, as in the many instances before proposed: another, when there were distinct proper and personal names accommodated severally to those things, as of Minerva to wisdom, of Neptune to the sea, of Ceres to corn, and of Bacchus to wine. In which latter case, those personal names properly signify the invisible Divine powers, supposed to preside over those several things in nature; and these are therefore properly those gods and goddesses, which are δωτῆρες ἐάων,[1] the givers and dispensers of the good things, and the removers of the contrary; but they are used improperly also for the things of nature themselves, which, therefore, as manifestations of the Divine power, goodness, and providence personated, are sometimes also abusively called gods and goddesses. This mystery of the Pagan Polytheism, is thus fully declared by Moschopulus: [2] Ἰστέον ὅτι πάντα οἱ Ἕλληνες ἃ δύναμιν ἔχοντα ἐώρουν, οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπι-

[1] Hesiod. in Theogon. vers. 111. [2] In Hesiod. p. 1.

στασίας θεῶν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἐνεργεῖν ἐνόμιζον, ἑνὶ δὲ ὀνόματι τό τε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τοῦτῳ θεὸν ὠνόμαζον· ὅθεν Ἥφαιστον ἐκαλουν τότε διακονικὸν τοῦτο πῦρ, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα ταῖς διὰ τούτου ἐνεργουμέναις τέχναις, καὶ Δήμητραν τὸν σῖτον καὶ τοὺς καρπούς, καὶ τὴν δωρουμένην τούτους θεὸν, καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσαν αὐτοῖς, καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ τὴν ἔφορον τῆς φρονήσεως θεόν· καὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὸν διδόντα τοῦτον θεὸν· ὃν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διδόναι τὸν οἶνον ὁ Πλάτων παράγει, καὶ Διδοίνυσον τοῦτον ποιεῖ εἶτα καὶ Διόνυσον· καὶ Εἰλειθυίας τοὺς τόκους, καὶ τὰς ἐφορώσας τοὺς τόκους θεάς· καὶ Ἀφροδιτην τὴν συνουσίαν καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ θεόν· κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ Μούσας ἔλεγον τάστε λογικὰς τέχνας, οἷον ῥητορικὴν, ἀστρονομίαν, κωμωδίαν, τραγωδίαν, καὶ τὰς ἐφόρους καὶ παρόχους τούτων θεάς. We must know, that whatsoever the Greeks (or Pagans) saw to have any power, virtue, or ability in it, they looked upon it as not acting according to such power, without the providence, presidency, or influence of the gods; and they called both the thing itself, which hath the power, and the deity presiding over it, by one and the same name: whence the ministerial fire used in mechanic arts, and the god presiding over those arts that work by fire, were both alike called Hephæstus, or Vulcan; so the name Demetra, or Ceres, was given as well to corn and fruits, as to that goddess which bestows them; Athena, or Minerva, did alike signify wisdom, and the goddess which is the dispenser of it; Dionysius, or Bacchus, wine, and the god that giveth wine; (whence Plato etymologizes the name from giving of wine.) In like manner, they called both the child-bearing of women, and the goddessess that superintend over the same, Eilithya, or Lucina; Coitus, or copulation, and the deity presiding over it, Aphrodite or Venus. And, lastly, in the same manner, by the Muses they signified both those rational arts, rhetoric, astronomy, poetry, and the goddesses, which assist therein or promote the same.—Now, as the several things in nature and parts of the corporeal world are thus metonymically and catachrystically called gods and goddesses, it is evident, that such deities as these could not be supposed to be unmade or self-existent, by those, who acknowledged the whole world to have been generated and had a beginning. But as these names were used more properly, to signify invisible and understanding powers, presiding over the things in nature, and dispensing of them, however they have an appearance of so many several distinct deities; yet they seem to have been all really nothing else, but as Balbus in Cicero[1] expresses it, "Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei," God passing through, and acting in the na-

[1] De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2996. tom. ix. oper.

ture of every thing ;—and consequently, but several names, or so many different notions and considerations of that one supreme Numen, that Divine force, power, and providence, which runs through the whole world, as variously manifesting itself therein.

Wherefore, since there were no other kinds of Gods amongst the Pagans, besides these already enumerated, unless their images, statues, and symbols, should be accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called gods) which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or without a beginning, they being the workmanship of men's own hands ; we conclude universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods, which makes so great a show and noise, was really either nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity according to its different manifestations, gifts, and effects in the world, personated ; or else many inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one Supreme : so that one unmade, self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged by the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans (for of the sottish vulgar, no man can pretend to give an account, in any religion), and, consequently, the Pagan Polytheism (or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmade minds, deities, and creators, self-existent from eternity, and independent upon one Supreme ; but in mingling and blending some way or other, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator.

And that the ancient Pagan Theists thus acknowledged one supreme God, who was the only *Θεός ἀγέννητος*, unmade or unproduced Deity, (I say, Theists, because those amongst the Pagans, who admitted of many gods, but none at all unmade, were absolute Atheists) this may be undeniably concluded from what was before proved, that they acknowledged omnipotence or infinite power to be a Divine attribute. Because upon the hypothesis of many unmade self-existent deities, it is plain, that there could be none omnipotent, and consequently no such thing as omnipotence *in rerum natura :* and therefore omnipotence was rightly and properly styled by Macrobius,[1] *summi Dei omnipotentia*, it being an attribute essentially peculiar to one supreme and sole self-existent Deity. And Simplicius, likewise a Pagan, confuted the Manichian hypothesis of two self-existent deities from hence also, because it destroyed omnipotence : [2] *ἀναγκάζονται δυό λέγοντες τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὰς (τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς λεγόμενον Θεὸν, μηκέτι πάντων αἴτιον λέγειν, μηδὲ ὡς παντοκράτορα δικαίως ἀνυμνεῖν, μηδὲ δύναμιν*

[1] In Somn. Scipion. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 87.

[2] In Epict. cap. iv. Potius in cap. xxxiv, p. 164. edit. Salmas.

αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ ὅλην ἀνατιθέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡμισὺ τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο· For they, who assert two principles of the universe (one good, the other evil) are necessitated to grant, that the good principle, called by them God, is not the cause of all things, neither can they praise it as omnipotent, nor ascribe a perfect and whole entire power to it, but only the half of a whole power at most, if so much.—Over and besides all which, it hath been also proved already, that the ancient Atheists under Paganism directed themselves principally against the opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme Deity ruling over all; from whence it plainly appears, that it was then asserted by the Pagan Theists.

And we think it here observable, that this was a thing so generally confessed and acknowledged, that Faustus the Manichean took up this conceit, that both the Christians and Jews paganized in the opinion of monarchy, that is, derived this doctrine of one Deity, the sole principle of all things, only by tradition from the Pagans, and, by consequence, were no other than schisms or subdivided sects of Paganism. [1] "Vos desciscentes a gentibus (saith he) monarchiæ opinionem primo vobiscum divulsistis, id est, ut omnia credatis ex deo. Estis sane schisma, necnon et priores vestri Judæi. De opinione monarchiæ, in nullo etiam ipsi dissentiunt a paganis. Quare constat vos atque Judæos schisma esse gentilitatis. Sectas autem si quæras, non plures erunt quam duæ, Gentium et nostra." You revolting from the Gentiles, broke off their opinion of monarchy, and carried it along with you, so as to believe all things to come from God. Wherefore, you are really nothing but a schism of Paganism, or a subdivided branch of it, and so are your predecessors the Jews; who differ nothing from Pagans neither in this opinion of monarchy. Whence it is manifest, that both Christians and Jews are but schisms of Gentilism. But as for sects of religion, really differing from one another, there are but these two, that of the Pagans, and that of ours, who altogether dissent from them.—Now though this be false and foolish, as to the Christians and Jews deriving that opinion of monarchy, only by way of tradition, from the Pagans, which is a thing founded in the principles of nature; yet it sufficiently shows this to have been the general sense of the Pagans, that all their gods were derived from one sole, self-existent Deity; so that they neither acknowledged a multitude of unmade deities, nor yet that duplicity of them, which Plutarch contended for (one good, and the other evil), who accordingly denied God to be the cause of all things,

[1] S. Aug. contra Faust. lib. xx. cap. iv. p. 237. tom. viii. oper.

writing thus in his Defect of Oracles,[1] *οἱ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἁπλῶς τὸν Θεὸν, οἱ δὲ ὁμοῦ τι πάντων αἴτιον ποιοῦντες, ἀστοχοῦσι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ πρέποντος,* They are guilty of one extreme, who make God the cause of nothing, and they of another who make him the cause of all things.—But this paradox was both late started amongst the Greeks, and quickly cried down by the succession of their philosophers, and therefore prejudiceth not the truth of Faustus's general assertion concerning the Pagans. Which is again fully confirmed by St. Austin in his reply: [2]"Siquis ita dividat, ut dicat eorum quæ aliqua religione detinentur, aliis placere unum Deum colendum, aliis multos; per hanc differentiam et pagani a nobis remoti sunt, et Manichæi cum paganis deputantur, nos autem cum Judæis. Hic forte dicatis, quod multos deos vestros ex una substantia perhibetis; quasi pagani multos suos, non ex una asserant, quamvis diversa illis officia, et opera, et potestates illis attribuant: sicut etiam apud vos alius deus expugnat gentem tenebrarum, alius ex ea capta fabricat mundum," etc. If one should make another distribution of religionists, into such as worship either one God, or many gods; according to this division, the Pagans will be removed from us Christians, and joined with you Manicheans. But, perhaps, you will here say, that all your many gods are derived from one substance; as if the Pagans did not also derive all their gods from one, though attributing several offices, works, and powers to them; in like manner as amongst you, one god expugns the nation of darkness, another god makes a world out of it, etc.—And again, afterwards, he writes further to the same purpose: "Discat ergo Faustus monarchiæ opinionem non ex gentibus nos habere, sed gentes non usque adeo ad falsos deos esse dilapsas, ut opinionem admitterent unius veri dei, ex quo est omnis qualiscunque natura." Let Faustus therefore, know, that we Christians have not derived the opinion of monarchy from the Pagans, but that the Pagans have not so far degenerated, sinking down into the worship of false gods, as to have lost the opinion of one true God, from whom is all whatsoever nature.—

XIV. It follows, from what we have declared, that the Pagan Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, is not to be understood in the sense before expressed, of many *θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι καὶ αὐθυπόστατοι,* many unproduced and self-existent deities, but according to some other notion or equivocation of the word gods. For God is *τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων,* one of those words, that hath been used in many different senses,—the

[1] Tom. ii. oper. p. 414. [2] Lib. xx. cap. x. p. 241. tom. viii. oper.
[3] S. Ang. contra Faust. iib. xx. cap. xix. p. 246.

Atheists themselves acknowledging a God and gods, according to some private senses of their own (which yet they do not all agree in neither,) and Theists not always having the same notion of that word; forasmuch as angels in Scripture are called gods in one sense, that is, as understanding beings superior to men, immortal, holy, and happy; and the word is again sometimes carried down lower to princes and magistrates; and not only so, but also to good men as such, when they are said to be made partakers of the divine nature.[1] And thus that learned philosopher and Christian, Boethius,[2] "Omnis beatus deus; sed natura quidem unus, participatione vero nihil prohibet esse quamplurimos:" Every good and happy man is a god, and though there be only one god in nature, yet nothing hinders but that there may be many by participation.—But then again, all men and angels are alike denied to be gods in other respects, and particularly as to religious worship: "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." Now this is that, which seems to be essentially included in the Pagan notion of the word God or gods, when taken in general—namely, a respect to religious worship. Wherefore, a God in general, according to the sense of the Pagan Theists, may be thus defined, An understanding Being superior to men, not originally derived from senseless matter, and looked upon as an object for men's religious worship. But this general notion of the word God is again restrained and limited by differences, in the division of it. For such a God as this may be either *ἀγέννητος*, ingenerate or unproduced, and consequently self-existent; or else *γεννητὸς*, generated or produced, and dependent on some higher Being as its cause. In the former sense, the intelligent Pagans, as we have declared, acknowledged only one God, who was therefore called by them *ὁ θεὸς κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, according to that of Thales in Laertius, *πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγέννητον γάρ·* God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade or unproduced, and the only thing is so;—but in the latter, they admitted of many gods, many understanding beings, which, though generated or produced, yet were superior to men, and looked upon as objects for their religious worship. And thus the Pagan Theists were both Polytheists and Monotheists in different senses, they acknowledged both many gods, and one God; that is, many inferior deities, subordinate to one Supreme. Thus Onatus the Pythagorean, in Stobæus, declares himself:[4] *δοκεῖ δέ μοι, καὶ μὴ εἷς εἶ μέν ὁ θεὸς, ἀλλ' εἷς μέν ὁ μέγιστος, καὶ καθ' ὑπέρτερος, καὶ ὁ*

[1] 2 Pet. i. 4. [2] De Consolat. Philos. lib. iii. p. 72. s.

[3] Lib. i. segm. 35. p. 21. s.

[4] Ecl. Phys. l. i. p. 4. edit. Plantin.

κρατέων τῶ παντός· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πολλοὶ διαφέροντες κατὰ δύναμιν, βασιλεύει δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν ὁ καὶ κράτει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετᾷ μείζων· οὗτος δὲ καὶ εἴη ὁ περιέχων τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι οἱ θέοντες εἰσι κατ' οὐρανὸν σύν τε τῶ παντὸς περιαγήσει, κατὰ λόγον ὑποθέοντες τῷ πρώτῷ καὶ νοητῷ. It seemeth to me, that there is not only one God, but that there is one the greatest and highest God, that governeth the whole world, and that there are many other gods besides him differing as to power, that one God reigning over them all, who surmounts them all in power, greatness, and virtue. That is that God, who contains and comprehends the whole world; but the other gods are those, who, together with the revolution of the universe, orderly follow that first and intelligible God.—Where it is evident, that Onatus's πολλοὶ θεοὶ, or many gods, were only the heavenly bodies, or animated stars. And partly from those words cited, but chiefly others, which follow after in the same place (that will be produced elsewhere,) it plainly appears, that in Onatus's time, there were some who acknowledged one only God, denying all those other gods, then commonly worshipped. And indeed Anaxagoras seems to have been such an one; forasmuch as asserting one perfect mind ruling over all (which is the true Deity,) he effectually degraded all those other Pagan gods, the sun, moon, and stars from their godships, by making the sun nothing but a globe of fire, and the moon earth and stones, and the like of the other stars and planets. And some such there were also amongst the ancient Egyptians, as shall be declared in due place. Moreover, Proclus, upon Plato's Timæus,[1] tells us, that there hath been always less doubt and controversy in the world concerning the one God, than concerning the many gods. Wherefore Onatus here declares his own sense, as to this particular, viz. that besides the one supreme God, there were also many other inferior deities, that is, understanding beings, that ought to be religiously worshipped.

But because it is not impossible, but that there might be imagined one supreme Deity, though there were many other θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι, unmade and self-existent gods besides, as Plutarch supposed before, one supreme God, together with a ψυχὴ ἄνους, an irrational soul or demon unmade, inferior in power to it; therefore, we add, in the next place, that the more intelligent Pagans did not only assert one God, that was supreme and κράτιστος πάντων, the most powerful of all the gods, but also, who, being omnipotent, was the principle and cause of all the rest, and therefore the only θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ αὐθυπόστατος, the only

[1] P. 206.

unproduced and self-existent Deity.—Maximus Tyrius[1] affirms this to have been the general sense of all the Pagans, that there was *θεὸς εἷς πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ, θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῷ*, one God the king and father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, reigning together with God.—Neither did the poets imply any thing less, when *Ζεύς* was so often called by the Greeks, and Jupiter by the Latins, *πατὴρ ἀνδρῶντε θεῶντε*, and *hominum pater atque deorum*, or *hominum factorque deorum*, and the like. And, indeed, the theogonia of the ancient Pagans before-mentioned, was commonly thus declared by them universally, *γεννητοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι*, that the gods were generated, or, as Herodotus[2] expresseth it, *ὅτι ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν ἐγένετο*, that every one of the gods was generated or produced ;—which yet is not so to be understood, as if they had therefore supposed no God at all unmade or self-existent (which is absolute Atheism,) but that the *οἱ θεοὶ*, the gods, as distinguished from the *ὁ θεὸς*, or *τὸ θεῖον*, from God, or the supreme Deity, were all of them universally made or generated.

But to the end, that we may now render this business yet something more easy to be believed, that the intelligent Pagans did thus suppose all their gods save one to have been made or generated, and consequently acknowledged only one *θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον*, one unproduced and self-existent Deity,—we shall in this place further observe, that the theogonia of those ancient Pagans, their genesis and generation of gods, was really one and the same thing with the cosmogonia, the genesis and generation of the world, and indeed both of them understood of a temporary production both of these gods and the world. And this we shall first prove from Plato, in his Timæus ; where he, being to treat of the cosmogonia, premiseth this distinction concerning two heads of being—that some were eternal and never made, and some again made or generated ; the former whereof he calls *οὐσία*, or essence, the latter *γένεσις*, or generation ; adding also this difference betwixt them, that the eternal and immutable things were the proper objects of science and demonstration, but the other generated things of faith and opinion only ;[3] *ὅ, τι γὰρ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια*, for what essence is to generation, the same is certainty of truth or knowledge to faith.—And thereupon he declares, that his reader was not to expect the same evidence and certainty of truth from him, where he was now to treat of things generated (namely, the gods, and the visible world,) as if he had been to discourse about things immutable and eternal, in these words :[4] *ἐὰν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ*

[1] Diss. i. p. 5. edit. Lugd. 1631. in 8vo.

[2] Histor. lib. ii. cap. liii. p. 109. [3] P. 29. [4] P. 29.

πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, etc. If, therefore, O Socrates, many things having been spoken by many men, concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us; but, on the contrary, to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities.—Where the gods are by Plato plainly referred to γένεσις, and not to οὐσία; to generation, and not to eternal or immutable essence, as they are also joined with the generation of the world, as being but a part thereof. Neither is this at all to be wondered at in Plato, since first the whole visible world was no less to him than it was to the other Pagans, a God; he calling it θεὸν εὐδαίμονα, a happy God, and before it was yet made, θεὸν ἐσόμενον, a God about to be made.—Not as if Plato accounted the senseless matter of this corporeal world, whether as perfectly dead and stupid, or as endued with a plastic nature only, to be a God (for no inanimate thing was a God to Plato, but because he supposed the world to be an animal, endued with an intellectual soul, and indeed the best of all animals compounded of soul and body:[1] οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν. Wherefore we are thus, according to probability, to conclude, that this world was really made by the providence of God an intellectual animal;—whence from an animal forthwith it became a God. So that here we are to take notice of two gods in Plato, very different from one another: one a generated god, this world animated; and another that God, by whose providence this world was generated, and thus made an animal and a god; which latter must needs be an unmade, self-existent Deity, and not belong to γένεσις, but to οὐσία, not to generation, but to immutable essence. Again, those greater parts of the world, the sun, the moon, and the stars (as supposed also to be animated with particular souls of their own) were as well accounted by Plato, as by the other Pagans, gods, he plainly calling them there ὁρατοὶ καὶ γεννητοὶ θεοί, visible and generated gods.—Besides which celestial gods, the earth itself also is supposed by him to be either a god or goddess, according to those ancient copies of the Timæus used both by Cicero and Proclus: Γῆν δὲ, τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἰλουμένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, ἐμηχανήσατο, πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασι· God fabricated the earth also, which is our nurse, turning round upon the axis of the world, and thereby causing and maintaining the succession of day and night, the

[1] P. 30.

first and oldest of all the gods generated within the heavens.—Where, since that philosopher seems the rather to make the earth an animal and a God, because of its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, we may conclude, that afterwards, when in his old age (as Plutarch[1] records from Theophrastus,) he gave entertainment also to that other part of the Pythagoric hypothesis, and attributed to the earth a planetary annual motion likewise about the sun (from whence it would follow, that, as Plotinus[2] expresseth it, the earth was ἓν τῶν ἄστρων, one of the stars,) he was therefore still so much the more inclined to think the earth to be a god as well as the other planets, or at least as the moon ; that having been formerly represented in the Orphic tradition but as another habitable earth. For these verses of Orpheus are recorded by Proclus,[3] to that purpose :

Μήσατο δ' ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπείρατον, ἣν τε Σελήνην
Ἀθάνατοι κλήζουσιν, ἐπιχθόνιοι δέ τε Μήνην,
Ἣ πόλλ' οὔρε' ἔχει, πόλλ' ἄστεα, πολλὰ μέλαθρα.

The sense whereof is this : That God in the cosmogonia, or cosmopœia, besides this earth of ours, fabricated also another vast earth, which the immortal gods called Selene, but mortal men Mene, or the moon ; that hath many hills and valleys, many cities and houses in it. From whence Proclus,[4] though as it seems a stranger to the Pythagoric system, yet being much addicted to these Orphic traditions, concluded the moon to be, γῆν αἰθερίαν, an ethereal earth.—

After all this, Plato, that he might be thought to omit nothing in his Timæan cosmogonia, speaks also of the *genesis ortus*, or generation of the poetic gods, under the name of demons, such as Tethys and Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter and Juno, and the like ; which seem to be really nothing else but the other inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, θεοποιηθέντα, that is, fictitiously personated and deified (as is elsewhere declared.) Which whole business was a thing set off by those poets with much fiction and physiological allegory. And though Plato, out of a seeming compliance with the laws of his city, pretends here to give credit to this poetic theogonia, as tradition delivered down from the sons of the gods, who must not be sup-

[1] In Quæstion. Platonic. p. 1006. oper. vide etiam eundem in Vita Numæ, tom. i. oper. p. 312.

[2] Lib. ii. de Dub. Animæ, Ennead iv. lib. iv. cap. xxii. p. 414.

[3] Comment. in Timæum Platonis, lib. iv. p. 283. vide etiam lib. v. p. 292.

[4] See Macrob. Som. Scip. l. 1. c. 11. p. 58.

posed to have been ignorant of their parents; yet, as Eusebius[1] well observeth, he doth but all the while slily jeer it, plainly insinuating the fabulosity thereof, when he affirmeth it to have been introduced not only *ἄνευ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων*,[2] without necessary demonstrations, but also *ἄνευ εἰκότων*, without so much as probabilities. Nevertheless, Proclus,[3] suspecting no such matter, but taking Plato in all this to have been in very good earnest, interprets these poetic gods or demons mentioned by him, to be the gods below the moon (notwithstanding that the earth was mentioned before by Plato,) calling them *γενεσιούργους θεούς*, the gods that cause generation, and seeming to understand thereby the animated elements; Jupiter being here not taken, as he is often elsewhere, for the supreme God, but only for the animated ether, as Juno for the animated air. And upon this occasion he runs out into a long dispute, to prove, that not only the stars were animated, but also all the other sublunary bodies or elements: *εἰ γὰρ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεὸς εὐδαίμων, ἐστι οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν συμπληρούντων αὐτὸν μορίων ἄθεον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον, εἰ δὲ καὶ θεοῦ πάντα μετέχει καὶ προνοίας, θείαν ἔλαχε φύσιν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ οἰκεῖαι τάξεις θεῶν ἐφεστήκασιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς διὰ μέσων ψυχῶν καὶ νόων μετέχει τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς, καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς νοῦ, τί χρὴ περὶ τούτων οἴεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων· πῶς οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ταῦτα δια δή τινων μέσων θείων τάξεων μετείληχε τῆς μιᾶς τοῦ κόσμου θεότητος.* For if the whole world be a happy God, then none of the parts of it are godless, or devoid of providence; but if all things partake of God and Providence, then are they not unfurnished of the Divine nature; and if so, there must be some peculiar orders of gods presiding over them. For if the heavens by reason of particular souls and minds partake of that one soul and one mind; why should we not conclude the same concerning the elements, that they also, by certain intermedious orders of gods, partake of that one Divinity of the whole world?—Wherefore, a little before, the same Proclus highly condemns certain ancient physiologers whom he supposeth Aristotle to have followed:[4] *πολλοῖς τῶν φυσιολόγων ἄψυχα εἰκῇ φερόμενα, καὶ ἀπρονόητα ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα νενόμισται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐρανία διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τάξιν, νοῦν καὶ θεῶν μετέχειν ὡμολόγουν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν, ὡς πολυμετάβολον, καὶ ἀόριστον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον ἀπέλιπον, οἷα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὕστερον ἐδόξασε, ταῖς οὐρανίαις περιφοραῖς μόνως ἐπιστήσας, τὰς ἀκινήτους αἰτίας· εἴτε ὀκτὼ εἶεν, εἴτε πλείους· ἄψυχα δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα καταλείπων·* The elements were thought by most of the ancient physiologers to be inanimate, and to be moved for-

[1] Preparat. Evangelic. lib. ii. cap. vii. p. 75, 76.

[2] Plat. in Timæo, cap. xxvi. p. 249.

[3] In Timæus Platon. lib. iv. p. 287. [4] P. 285.

tuitously without providence. For though they acknowledged the heavenly bodies, by reason of that order that appears in them, to partake of mind and gods; yet they left this sublunary world (or genesis) to float up and down without providence. And these Aristotle afterwards followed, appointing immovable intelligences to preside over the celestial spheres only (whether eight or more) but leaving all the lower elements dead and inanimate.

Lastly, besides all those other mundane gods before-mentioned, as generated together with the world, though Proclus seems to be of another opinion, yet it is manifest, that Plato doth not there in his Timæus altogether forget those properly called demons (elsewhere so much insisted upon by him), but in the very next following words he plainly insinuates them, after this manner; [1] *ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ*, the gods, which appear visibly to us as often as they please, or which can appear and disappear at pleasure—speaking also of their genesis or generation as part of the cosmogonia; and then again afterwards calling them *νέοι θεοὶ*, junior gods, he describes them as those whose particular office it was to superintend and preside over human affairs, [2] *καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾷν ζῶον, ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον*, and to govern this mortal animal, man, after the best manner possible, so that he should no otherwise fail of doing well or being happy, than as he became a cause of evil and misery to himself, by the abuse of his own liberty.—

And thus much out of Plato's Timæus; but the same thing might be proved also out of his other writings, as particularly from that passage in his tenth book of Laws,[3] where he takes notice again of the theogonia of the ancients, and that as it has been depraved and corrupted by a great mixture of impious and immoral fables. *Εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γράμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι. Οἱ μὲν ἔν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων· λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐρανοῦ τῶν τε ἄλλων· προϊόντες δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολὺ θεογονίαν διεξέρχοντοι, γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλοις ὡμίλησαν.* There are (saith he) extant among us Athenians, certain stories and traditions, very ancient, concerning the gods, written partly in metre, and partly in prose, declaring how the heaven, and the other gods were at first made, or generated, and then, carrying on their fabulous theogonia further, how these generated gods afterward conversed with one another, and ingendering after the manner of men, begat other gods.—Where that philosopher, taking off his

[1] In Timæo, cap. xxvi. p. 248. [2] In Timæo, cap. xxix. p. 252.
[3] Page 664.

vizard, plainly discovers his great dislike of that whole fabalous theogonia (however he acknowledges elsewhere; that it did contain ὑπονοίας,[1] that is, physiological allegories under it), as a thing that was destructive of all piety and virtue, by reason of its attributing all human passions and vices to the gods. However, it plainly appears from hence, that the theogonia and the cosmogonia were one and the same thing, the generation of the gods being here the generation of the heaven, and of the sun, moon, and stars, and the like.

Moreover, this same thing is sufficiently manifest also even from Hesiod's own theogonia, which doubtless was that which Plato principally aimed at; and if it were not absolutely the first, yet it is the most ancient writing now extant, in that kind. For there, in the beginning of that poem, Hesiod[2] invokes his muses after this manner:—

Χαίρετε, τέκνα Διός, δότε δὲ ἱμερόεσσαν ἀοιδήν·
Κλείετε δ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
Οἳ Γῆς ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος,
Νυκτὸς δὲ δνοφερῆς, οὓς θ' ἁλμυρὸς ἔτρεφε Πόντος.
Εἰπατε δ', ὡς τὰ πρῶτα Θεοὶ καὶ Γαῖα γενοντο,
Καὶ Ποταμοί, καὶ Πόντος ἀπείριτος οἴδματι θύων,
Ἄστρά τε λαμπετόωντα, καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν,
Οἵ τ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων.

Salvete natæ Jovis, date vero amabilem cantilenam:
Celebrate quoque immortalium divinum genus semper existentium,
Qui tellure prognati sunt, cœlo stellato,
Nocteque caliginosa, quos item salsus nutrivit pontus.
Dicite insuper, ut primum dii et terra facti fuerint,
Et flumina, et pontus immensus æstu fervens,
Astraque fulgentia, et cœlum latum superne,
Et qui ex his nati sunt, dii, datores bonorum.

Where we see plainly, that the generation of the gods is the generation of the earth, heaven, stars, seas, rivers, and other things begotten from them (as probably amongst the rest demons and nymphs, which the same Hesiod speaks of elsewhere). But immediately after this invocation of the Muses, the poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love, as the first principles, and then proceeds to the production of the earth and of night out of chaos; of the ether and of day from night; of the starry heavens, mountains, and seas, etc. All which

[1] Vide Platon. de Republ. lib. ii. p. 430. [2] Theogon. vers. 104.

genesis or generation of gods is really nothing but a poetical description of the cosmogonia; as throughout the sequel of the whole poem all seems to be physiology, veiled under fiction and allegories. And thus the ancient scholia upon that book begin, *ἰστέον ὅτι ὁ περὶ τῆς Θεογονίας λόγος φυσικὴν διήγησιν τῶν ὄντων ὑπαγορεύει*, We must know, that the whole doctrine of the theogonia contains under it, in way of allegory, a physiological declaration of things;—Hesiod's gods being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature, fictitiously personated and deified, or abusively called gods and goddesses.

Neither was this the only doctrine of the Greeks, that the world was thus made or generated, and that the generation of the world was a theogonia, or a generation of gods (the world itself and its several parts being accounted such by them), but also in like manner of the other Barbarian Pagans. For Diogenes Laertius[1] hath recorded concerning the Persian Magi, *ἀποφαίνεσθαι περί τε οὐσίας θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως, οὓς καὶ πῦρ εἶναι καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ.*[2] That they did both assert the being and generation of gods, and also that these gods were fire and earth, and water;—that is, that the animated elements were gods (as Proclus also before declared), and that these, together with the world, were generated, or had a beginning. And both Laertius and Diodorus represent it as the opinion of the ancient Egyptians,[3] that the world was generated, or had a temporary production; as also, that the sun and moon, and other parts of the world, were gods. But whereas the same Diodorus writes of certain Egyptian gods, *οἱ γένεσιν ἀΐδιον ἐσχηκότες*, which had an eternal generation;—he seems to mean thereby only the celestial gods, the sun, moon, and stars, as distinct from those other heroes and men-gods, which are again thus described by him: *οἱ θνητοὶ ὑπάρξαντες, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν, τετυχηκότες τῆς ἀθανασίας*: Who, though naturally mortal, yet, by reason of their wisdom, virtue, and beneficence toward mankind, had been advanced to immortality.—

And by this time we think it doth sufficiently appear, that the theogonia of the ancients is not to be understood merely of their heroes and men-gods, or of all their gods, as supposed to have been nothing else

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[1] In Proœm. p. 2.

[2] Vide etiam Herodot. Hist. lib. i. cap. cxxxi. p. 55.

[3] In the Persian sacrifices, *μάγος ἀνὴρ παρεστεὼς ἐπαείδει θεογονίην*, one of the Magi standing by sung the Theogonia, (i. e. the Cosmogonia), Herod. in Clio. n. 132. lib. i. p. 55.

but mortal men, (*Dii mortalibus nati matribus*, as Cotta in Cicero[1] speaks) who, according to the more vulgar signification of the word, had been generated (*humano more*,) as some, otherwise learned men, have seemed to suppose; but that it extends to all the inferior Pagan gods, some whereof were parts of the visible world animated, as the sun, moon, stars, and earth: so that their theogonia was the very same thing with the cosmogonia, or at least a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that there was also, in the paganic fables of the gods, a certain mixture of history and herology interserted, and complicated all along together with physiology.

We are, in the next place, to observe, that both this theogonia and cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans, their generation of the world and gods, is to be understood of a temporary production of them, whereby they were made *ἐκ μὴ ὄντων*, or from an antecedent non-existence brought into being. For this was the general tradition amongst the Pagans, that the world was made out of an antecedent chaos, as shall be afterwards further declared. And Aristotle[2] affirmeth, that before his time, this genesis and temporary production of the world had been universally entertained by all, and particularly, that Plato was an assertor of the same. Nevertheless, the generality of the latter Platonists[3] endeavor, with all their might, to force a contrary sense upon his Timæus: which is a thing, that Plutarch long since observed after this manner: [4]*οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν χρωμένων Πλάτωνι, φοβούμενοι, καὶ παραλυπούμενοι, πάντα μηχανῶνται, καὶ παραβιάζονται καὶ στρέφουσιν, ὥς τι δεινὸν καὶ ἄῤῥητον οἰόμενοι δεῖν περικαλύπτειν καὶ ἀρνεῖσθαι, τήν τε τοῦ κόσμου τήν τε τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ γένεσιν καὶ σύστασιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀϊδίου συνεστώτων οὐδε τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον οὕτως ἐχόντων·* The most of Plato's followers, being infinitely troubled and perplexed in their minds, turn themselves every way, using all manner of arts, and offering all kind of violence to his text, as conceiving, that they ought, by all means possible, to hide and conceal that opinion (as infand and detestable) of the generation of the world, and of the soul of it, so as not to have continued from eternity, or through a succession of infinite time.—Notwithstanding which, we conceive it to be undeniably evident, that Plato, in his Timæus, doth assert the genesis of the world in this sense; to wit, of a temporary production of it, and as not having existed from eternity, or

[1] De Natur. Deor. lib. iii. cap. xviii. p. 3075. tom. ix. oper.

[2] De Cœlo, lib. i. cap. x. p. 632. tom. i. oper.

[3] Vide Proclum in Timæum Platon. [4] De Psychog. Plat. p. 1013

without beginning. First, because in the entrance of that discourse,[1] he opposeth these two things to one another, *τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν*, that which always is,—and *τὸ γέννεσιν ἔχον*, that which is generated or made :—and therefore, in affirming the world to have been generated, he must needs deny the eternity thereof. Again, the question is so punctually stated by him afterwards, as that there is no possibility of any subterfuge left, *πότηρον ἦν ἀεὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος ;* Whether the world always were, having no beginning or generation, or whether it was made or generated, having commenced from a certain epocha.—To which the answer is, *γέγονεν*, that it was made, or had a beginning.—Moreover, this philosopher there plainly affirms also,[2] that time itself was made, or had a beginning, *χρόνος δ᾽ οὖν μετ᾽ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες, ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τὶς αὐτῶν γένηται.* Time was made together with the heaven, that, being both generated together, they might be both dissolved together likewise, if at least there should ever be any dissolution of them. —Besides which, he plainly declares, that before this orderly world was produced, the matter of it did move disorderly ; [3] *πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν, παραλαβὼν, οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας·* God taking all that matter, which was, (not then resting, but moving confusedly and disorderly) he brought it into order out of confusion.—Which is no more than if he should have said, God made this world out of an antecedent chaos ; which, as we said before, was the constant tradition of the ancient Pagans. Now, as to authority, we may well conclude, that Aristotle was better able to understand both Plato's philosophy and Greek, than any of those junior Platonists, who lived hundreds of years after. And yet we are not quite destitute of other suffrages besides Aristotle's neither; not only Philo, the Jew,[4] but also Plutarch,[5] and Atticus,[6] who were both of them Platonic Pagans, voting on this side, besides Alexander Aphrodisius, a judicious Peripatetic. The only objection considerable is from what Plato himself writes in his third and sixth book of Laws ; in the former whereof, Clinias and the Athenian Hospes discourse together after this manner, concerning the original or first beginning of com-

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[1] Cap. xii. p. 235. [2] Cap. xx. p. 245. [3] Timæi, cap. xiv. p. 237.

[4] In Libro, quod mundus sit incorruptibilis, p. 941. oper.

[5] In Libro de Animæ Procreat. p. 1013, 1014. tom. ii. oper.

[6] Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. vi. p. 801.

[7] Comment. in Libros Metaphys. Aristot. p. 181. ed. Latin. Paris 1506. fol.

monwealths: [1] *Πολιτείας δ' ἀρχὴν τίνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι; ΚΛ. Λέγεις δὲ πόθεν; ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας, καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΑΘ. Φερε, ἀφ' οὗ πόλεις τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε κατανοῆσαι χρόνου πλῆθος ὅσον γέγονεν; ΚΛ. Οὔκουν ῥᾷόν γε οὐδαμῶς. ΑΘ. Τὸ δὲ γε ὡς ἄπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴε. ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε. ΑΘ. Μῶν γε οὖν οὐ μυρίαι μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγον, οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμέναι δ' αἱ πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκασταχοῦ; καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων, μείζους, τοτὲ δὲ ἐκ μειζόνων, ἐλάττους· καὶ χείρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γεγόνασι, καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων.* Ath. What beginning shall we say there was of commonwealths? Cl. Whence would yourself derive them? Ath. I suppose from a great length and infinity of time, through successive changes. Cl. I understand not well what you mean. Ath. Thus therefore, do you think, that you are able to determine what length or quantity of time there hath been since cities and polities of men first began? Cl. This is by no means easy to be done. Ath. Wherefore, there is a kind of infinity and inestimability of this time. Cl. It is very true. Ath. Have there not then been innumerable cities constituted within this time, and as many again destroyed, of all several forms; they being changed from greater to lesser, and from lesser to greater, from better to worser, and from worser to better?—Now, we say, that if Plato intended here to assert an absolute infinity of time past, then it must needs be granted, that in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, he changed his opinion from what it was before when he wrote his Timæus; and if so, he ought in all reason to have retracted the same, which he does not here do; but in very truth, the meaning of this philosopher in those words cited, seems to be this: not that there was an absolute infinity of time past, (as Proclus contends, taking advantage of that word *ἀπειρία*) but only that the world had lasted such a length of time, as was in a manner inestimable to us, or uncomputable by us; there having happened, as he addeth, in the mean time, several successive destructions and consumptions of mankind, by means of various accidents, as particularly one most remarkable deluge and inundation of waters. The latter place, in his sixth book of laws, runs thus: [2] *ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεσις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν ἔληχεν, οὐδ' ἕξει ποτέ γε τελευτήν· ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πάντως· ἢ μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν, ἀμήχανον ἂν χρόνον ὅσον γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη.* Either the generation of men had no beginning at all, and will have no end, but always was

[1] Page 676. Steph. [2] Page 781.

and always will be; or else there has been an inestimable length of time from the beginning of it.—Which place affordeth still more light to the former; for we may well conclude, that by ἄπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον, there was not meant an absolute infinity of time, but only such as had a very remote or distant beginning, because ἀμήχανον here is plainly taken in that sense. We conceive, therefore, that this was Plato's opinion in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, that though the world had a beginning, yet it had continued a very long time not computable by us; or at least he thought fit to declare himself after that manner, perhaps by reason of the clamors of Aristotle, or some others against his Timæus, that so he might thereby somewhat mollify that opinion of the novity of the world, by removing the epocha and date thereof to so great a distance.

Now, it is very true, what we have several times before suggested, that there have been amongst the Pagans, both Theogonists and Cosmogonists too, that were Atheists; they abusing the word gods several ways; some of them, as Anaximander, understanding thereby inanimate worlds successively generated out of senseless matter, and corrupted again into it; others, as Anaximenes and Democritus, allowing, that there were certain animals and understanding beings superior to men, but such only as were native and mortal, in like manner as men, and calling these by the name of gods. Of the former of which two philosophers, St. Austin[1] gives us this account: "Anaximenes omnes rerum causas infinito aëri dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit, non tamen ab ipsis aërem factum, sed ipsos ex aëre ortos credidit:" Anaximenes made infinite air to be the first original and cause of all things; and yet was he not therefore silent concerning the gods, much less did he deny them; nevertheless, he did not believe the air to have been made by the gods, but the gods to have been all generated out of the air.—These were therefore such Theogonists, as supposed all the gods without exception to be generable and corruptible, and acknowledged no θεὸν ἀγέννητον at all, no understanding being unmade and self-existent; but concluded senseless matter to be the only ἀγέννητον and original of all things, which is absolute Atheism. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that all the Pagan Theogonists were not Atheists, (no more than all their Cosmogonists Theists) but that there was another sort of Theogonists amongst them, who supposed indeed all the inferior mundane gods to have been made or generated in one sense or other; but asserted one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον, one supreme unmade

[1] De Civitate Dei. lib. viii. cap. ii. p. 147. tom. vii. oper.

self-existent Deity, who was the cause of them all: which Theogonists, for distinction sake from those other Atheistic ones, may be called Divine.

And that Plato was such a Divine Theogonist, is a thing, as we conceive, out of question; but if there had been any doubt concerning it, it would have been sufficiently removed from those passages before cited out of his Timæus. To which, nevertheless, for fuller satisfaction sake, may be added these two following: the first, page 34: *οὗτος δὴ πᾶς ὄντος ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ, περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθείς·* For thus it ought to be read *ὄντος*, as it is also in Aldus's edition; and not *ὄντως*, as in Stephens, following an error in that of Ficinus. And accordingly the words are thus rendered by Cicero: "Hæc Deus is, qui semper erat, de aliquando futuro deo cogitans, lævem eum effecit, et undique æquabilem," etc. This was the ratiocination or resolution of that God, which always is, concerning that god, which was sometime about to be made, that he should be smooth and spherical, etc.—Where again, it presently follows in Cicero's version, "Sic Deus ille æternus hunc perfecte beatum deum procreavit:" thus that eternal God procreated this perfectly happy god, the world.—Where there is plainly mention made of two gods, one a generated god, the animated world, called elsewhere in Plato *θεῖον γεννητὸν;* and another eternal and unmade God, *innatus et infectus Deus*, who was the cause of the world's generation or production; or, to keep close to Plato's own language, one God who belonged to genesis, or that head of being, which he calls generation, and therefore must needs have an antecedent cause of his existence, since nothing can be made without a cause; and another God, that was truly and properly *οὐσία*, immutable essence, who was the cause of that generated god the universe, and therefore of all things. The other passage of Plato's is, (page 41, of his Timæus,) *ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς, καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ, γένεσιν ἔσχον, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, τάδε, Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς, πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα·* When therefore all the gods, both those which move visibly about the heavens, and those which appear to us as often as they please (that is, both the stars and demons,) were generated or created, that God, which made this whole universe, bespake these generated gods after this manner: Ye gods of gods (whom I myself am the maker and father of) attend.—Where the words *θεοὶ θεῶν*, notwithstanding Proclus's other differing conjectures, seem to have been very well rendered by Cicero: *Dii, qui deorum satu orti estis*, Ye gods, which are the progeny or offspring of the gods.—And the gods, whose offspring these

generated gods (the animated stars and demons) are said to be, must needs be those *ἀΐδιοι θεοὶ*, those eternal gods, elsewhere mentioned in the same Timæus, as where the philosopher calls the world,[1] *τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα*, a generated or created image of the eternal gods; —as Cicero also is to be understood of these, when he speaks of the world's being made by the gods, and by the counsel of the gods. Now, these eternal gods of Plato, called by his followers *θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμοι*, the supramundane gods,—though, according to that stricter notion of the word *γένεσις*, as it is used both in Plato and Aristotle, for a temporary production of things, *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, they were indeed all *ἀγέννητοι*, because they never were not, and had no beginning of their existence; yet, notwithstanding were they not therefore supposed by that philosopher to be all *αὐτόγονοι* and *αὐθυπόστατοι*, so many self-originated and self-subsistent beings, or first principles, but only one of them such, and the rest derived from that one: it being very true, as we conceive, what Proclus[2] affirms, *ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐπὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἀνάγει πάντα*, that Plato reduces all things to one principle,—even matter itself; but unquestionable, that he deriveth all his gods from one. Wherefore, all those eternal gods of Plato (one only excepted,) though they were not *γέννητοι*, or generated in one sense, that is, *κατὰ χρόνον*, as to a temporary beginning, yet were they, notwithstanding, as Proclus distinguisheth, *γέννητοι ἀπ' αἰτίας*, generated in another sense, as produced from a superior cause, there being only one such *ἀγέννητος*, one ingenerate or unproduced Deity. Thus, according to Plato, there were two sorts of secondary or inferior and derivative gods; first, the *θεοὶ ἐγκόσμιοι*, or mundane gods, such as had all of them a temporary generation with the world, and of whom Plato's theogonia and *γενέσεις θεῶν* is properly to be understood; and secondly, the *ὑπερκόσμιοι* and *ἀΐδιοι θεοί*, the supramundane and eternal gods, which were all of them also, save only one, produced from that one, and dependent on it as their cause. But of these inferior eternal gods of the Platonists and Pythagoreans we are to speak again afterwards. In the mean time it is evident, that in that passage of Plato's before cited, there is plain mention made both of *θεοὶ γένεσιν ἔχοντες*, of *dii orti*, gods who were made or generated with the world, and of *ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας*, of one God, who was the maker of them, and of the whole universe, who therefore is himself every way *ἀγέννητος*, unmade or unproduced.—And accordingly, he afterwards subjoins, *καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα πάντα διατάξας, ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει· μένοντος δὲ νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν, ἐπείθοντο αὐτῇ·* which Cicero thus renders: "Atque is quidem (Deus) qui

[1] Timæi, cap. xxi. p. 245. s. [2] In Timæ. p. 116.

cuncta composuit, constanter in suo manebat statu ; qui autem erant ab eo creati (dii) cum parentis ordinem cognovissent, hunc sequebantur," etc. Then that god, who framed all things, remained constantly in his former state: and his sons, or the gods that were created by him, observed his order and appointment.—

Neither was Plato singular in this ; but the generality of the other Pagan Theists, who were more intelligent, all along agreed with him herein, as to the generation of the mundane gods ; as so were both Theists and Theogonists, they indeed understanding nothing else by their theogonia, or generation of gods, than a Divine cosmogonia, or creation of the world by God ; forasmuch as they supposed the world itself as animated, and its several parts to be gods. So that they asserted these three things : first, a cosmogonia, the generation of the world, that it was not from eternity, but had a novity or beginning; secondly, that this cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a theogonia, or generation of gods, the world itself and several of its parts animated being esteemed such ; and lastly, that both these gods and the world were made and produced by one θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ αὐτογενής, one unproduced and self-originated Deity.—All which particulars we may here briefly exemplify in *P. Ovidius Naso*, whose paganity sufficiently appears from his *Fastorum* and all his other writings, and who also went off the stage before Christianity appeared on it, and may well be presumed to represent the then generally received doctrine of the Pagans. First, therefore, as for the generation and novity of the world, and its first production out of a chaos, we have it fully acknowledged by him in these following verses :

[1] Ante mare et terras, et, quod tegit omnia, cœlum,
Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,
Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigestaque moles,
Nec quicquam nisi pondus iners, congestaque eodem
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum.
Nullus adhuc mundo præbebat lumina Titan,
Nec nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phœbe,
Nec circumfuso pendebat in aëre tellus,
Ponderibus librata suis ; nec brachia longo
Margine terrarum porrexerat Amphitrite.
Quaque erat et tellus, etc.

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[1] Metam. l. 1. [vers. 5.]

Which, in Mr. Sandys's English, with some little alteration, speaks thus :

> Before that sea, and earth, and heaven was fram'd,
> One face had nature, which they chaos nam'd.
> No Titan yet the world with light adorns,
> Nor waxing Phebe fills her wained horns ;
> Nor hung the self-poiz'd earth in thin air plac'd,
> Nor Amphitrite the vast shore embrac'd ;
> Earth, air, and sea confounded, etc.

In the next place, when there was a world made out of this chaos, that this cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a theogonia, or generation of gods, is plainly intimated in these verses :

> Neu regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba,
> Astra tenent cœleste solum, formæque deorum.

To this sense,

> That nought of animals might unfurnish'd lie,
> The gods, in form of stars, possess the sky.

And that all this was effected, and this orderly mundane system produced out of a disorderly confused chaos, not by a fortuitous motion of matter, or the jumbling of atoms, but by the providence and command of one unmade Deity, which was also that, that furnished all the several parts of the world with respective animals, the sea with fishes, the earth with men, and the heaven with gods ; is thus declared also by the poet :—

> Hanc Deus et melior litem natura diremit,
> Nam cœlo terras, et terris abscidit undas :
> Et liquidum spisso secrevit ab aëre cœlum, etc.
> Sic ubi dispositam, quisquis fuit ille deorum,
> Congeriem secuit, sectamque in membra redegit ;
> Principium terram, ne non æqualis ab omni
> Parte foret, magni speciem glomeravit in orbis :
> Tum freta diffudit, rapidisque tumescere ventis
> Jussit, etc.
> Sic onus inclusum numero distinxit eodem
> Cura Dei, etc.

This strife (with better nature) God decides,
He earth from heaven, the sea from earth divides :
He ether pure extracts from grosser air.
All which unfolded by his prudent care,
From that blind mass ; the happily disjoin'd
With strifeless peace, he to their seats confin'd, etc.
What God soever this division wrought,
And every part to due proportion brought,
First, lest the earth unequal should appear,
He turn'd it round in figure of a sphere.
Then seas diffus'd, commanding them to roar
With ruffling winds, and give the land a shore.
To those he added springs, ponds, lakes immense,
And rivers whom their winding borders fence.

Where, though that learned paraphrast supposed (and not without some probability neither) that *Deus et melior natura*, God and the better nature,—were one and the self-same thing, yet we rather conceived them to be distinct, but one of them subordinate to the other as its instrument, God and the plastic nature ; accordingly as Aristotle writes in his Physics, *Νοῦς καὶ Φύσις αἴτιον τοῦδε τοῦ παντός*, That mind and nature were both together the cause of this universe.—

Nevertheless, we cannot but observe in this place, that though that poet speaks more than once of God singularly, as also calls him *mundi fabricator*, and *ille opifex rerum*, and *mundi melioris origo ;* yet notwithstanding, where he writes of the making of man, Pagan-like, he affirms him, though to have been made by God, yet according to the image or likeness of the gods, which govern all things.

Sanctius his animal, mentisque capacius altæ,
Deerat adhuc, et quod dominari in cætera posset ;
Natus homo est : sive hunc divino semine fecit,
Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo :
Sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat semina cœli.
Quam satus Iapeto, mistam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantûm cuncta deorum.

The nobler being, with a mind possest,
Was wanting yet, that should command the rest.
That Maker, the best world's original,
Either him fram'd of seed celestial ;

Or earth, which late he did from heaven divide,
Some sacred seeds retain'd to heaven allied :
Which with the living stream Prometheus mixt,
And in that artificial structure fixt
The form of all the all-ruling deities.

And because some may probably be puzzled with this seeming contradiction, that one God should be said to be the maker of the whole world and of man, and yet the government of all should be attributed to gods plurally, and man said to be made in the image and likeness of the gods ; we shall therefore add here, that according to the tenor of the Pagan theology, the inferior and minor gods were supposed also to have all of them their several share in the government of things below them : for which cause they are called not only by Maximus Tyrius,[1] *συνάρχοντες θεῷ*, co-rulers with God, but also by Plato himself, *τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονι συνάρχοντες*, the co-governors and co-reigners with the supreme God. So that the government of this inferior world was by the Pagans often attributed to them jointly, the supreme and inferior gods both together, under that one general name of gods. But the chief of those inferior deities, in whose image man is also said to have been made, as well as in the likeness of the supreme, were either those celestial gods and animated stars before mentioned by the poet, or else the eternal gods of Plato, which were looked upon likewise as comakers of the world subordinate.

Besides Ovid, we might instance here in many more of the Pagan Theogonists clearly acknowledging in like manner one unmade Deity, which generated both the world and all the other gods in it ; as, for example, Strabo, who, affirming that the world was *τῆς φύσεως ἅμα καὶ τῆς προνοίας ἔργον*, the joint work both of nature and providence,—as it was before ascribed by Ovid[2] to *Deus et melior natura*, adds concerning Providence or the Deity in this manner : *Τὸ δὲ τῆς προνοίας, ὅτι βεβούληται καὶ αὐτὴ ποικιλοτέρα τις οὖσα, καὶ μυρίων ἔργων δημιουργός, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ζῶα γεννᾷν, ὡς πολὺ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τούτων τὰ κράτιστα Θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὧν ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστηκε. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν Θεοῖς ἀπέδειξε τὸν οὐρανόν, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις τὴν γῆν.* That having a multiform fecundity in it, and delighting in variety of works, it designed principally to make animals as the most excellent things, and amongst them chiefly those two noblest kinds of animals, gods and men ; for whose sakes the other things were made ; and then assigned heaven to the gods, and earth to men, the two extreme parts of the world for their

[1] Dissertat. i. p. 5. edit. Lugd. 1631. 8vo. [2] L. 17. p. 809.

respective habitations.—Thus also Seneca in Lactantius,[1] speaking concerning God : "Hic cum prima fundamenta molis pulcherrimæ jaceret, et hoc ordiretur, quo neque majus quicquam novit natura nec melius ; ut omnia sub ducibus irent, quamvis ipse per totum se corpus intenderat, tamen ministros regni sui deos genuit." God, when he laid the foundations of this most beautiful fabric, and began to erect that structure, than which nature knows nothing greater or more excellent ; to the end that all things might be carried on under their respective governors orderly, though he intended himself through the whole, as to preside in chief over all, yet did he generate gods also, as subordinate ministers of his kingdom under him.—We shall forbear to mention the testimonies of others here, because they may be more opportunely inserted elsewhere ; only we shall add, as to Hesiod and Homer, that though they seem to have been sometimes suspected, both by Plato and Aristotle, for Atheistic Theogonists, yet, as Aristotle did, upon maturer thoughts, afterwards change his opinion concerning both of them, so it is most probable, that they were no Atheists, but Divine Theogonists ; such as supposed indeed many generated gods, but one supreme unmade Deity, the maker both of the world and them. And this not only for the grounds before alleged concerning Hesiod, and because both of them do every where affirm even their generated gods to be immortal (which no Atheists did,) but also for sundry other reasons, some of which may be more conveniently inserted elsewhere. Moreover, it hath been already intimated, that the generated gods of Hesiod and Homer extend further than those of Plato's ; they being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature fictitiously personated, and improperly or abusively called gods and goddesses ; whereof a further account will be afterwards given.

Neither ought it at all to be wondered at, if these Divine Theogonists amongst the Pagans did many times, as well as those other atheistic ones, make Chaos and the Ocean senior to the gods, and Night the mother of them. The former of these being not only done by Hesiod and Homer, but also by the generality of the ancient Pagan Theists in Epicharmus ;[2] and the latter by Orpheus,[3] an undoubted Theist, in his hymn of the Night :

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[1] Divin. Institut. lib. i. cap. v. p. 40.

[2] Apud Diog. Laert. lib. iii. segm. 10. p. 170.

[3] P. 99. oper. Vide etiam eundem in Argonautic. vers. 339. p. 24. et Proclum in Timæum Platonis, lib. ii. p. 63.

Νύκτα θεῶν γενέτειραν, ἀείσομαι, ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν·

Noctem concelebro genetricem hominum deûmque.

They not understanding this absolutely and universally of all the gods without exception, as the other Atheistic Theogonists did, as if there had been no unmade Deity at all, but Chaos and Night (that is, senseless matter blindly and fortuitously moved,) had been the sole original of all things, but only of the *οἱ Θεοί*, the gods, so called by way of distinction from God, or the supreme Deity: that is, the inferior mundane gods generated together with the world. The reason whereof was, because it was a most ancient, and in a manner universally received tradition amongst the Pagans, as hath been often intimated, that the cosmogonia, or generation of the world, took its first beginning from a chaos (the Divine Cosmogonists agreeing herein with the Atheistic ones;) this tradition having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus (amongst the Greeks,) by Hesiod and Homer, and others; acknowledged by Epicharmus; and embraced by Thales, Anaxagoras, Plato, and other philosophers, who were Theists; the antiquity whereof was thus declared by Euripides:[1]

Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα,
Ὡς οὐρανός τε γαῖα τ' ἦν μορφὴ μία,
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐχωρίσθησαν ἀλλήλων δίχα,
Τίκτουσι πάντα, κἀνέδωκαν εἰς φάος,
Τὰ δένδρα, πτηνά, θῆρας, οὓς θ' ἅλμη τρέφει,
Γένος τε θνητῶν·

Non hic meus, sed matris est sermo meæ,
Figura ut una fuerit et cœli et soli,
Secreta quæ mox ut receperunt statum,
Cuncta ediderunt hæc in oras luminis;
Feras, volucres, arbores, ponti gregem,
Homines quoque ipsos.

Neither can it reasonably be doubted, but that it was originally Mosaical, and indeed at first a Divine revelation, since no man could otherwise pretend to know what was done before mankind had any being. Wherefore those Pagan Cosmogonists, who were Theists, being Polytheists and Theogonists also, and asserting, besides the one supreme unmade Deity, other inferior mundane gods, generated to-

[1] In Menalippe apud Diodor. Sicul. lib. i. cap. iv. et Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. lib. i. cap. v. p. 20.

gether with the world (the chief whereof were the animated stars,) they must needs, according to the tenor of that tradition, suppose them, as to their corporeal parts at least, to have been juniors to Night and Chaos, and the offspring of them, because they were all made out of an antecedent dark chaos. *Τὴν μυγαλὴν ἐκτεθειάσθαι λέγουσιν* (saith Plutarch,)[1] *ὑπὸ Αἰγυπτίων τυφλὴν οὖσαν, ὅτι τὸ σκότος τοῦ φώτος ἡγοῦντο πρεσβύτερον·* The *mus araneus* being blind, is said to have been deified by the Egyptians, because they thought, that darkness was older than light.—And the case was the same concerning their demons likewise, they being conceived to have their corporeal vehicula also ; for which cause, as Porphyrius[2] from Numenius writeth, the ancient Egyptians pictured them in ships or boats floating upon the water : *τοὺς δὲ Αἰγυπτίους διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δαίμονας ἅπαντας οὐκ ἑστάναι ἐπὶ στερεοῦ, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐπὶ πλοίου.* The Egyptians therefore represented all their demons, as not standing upon firm land, but in ships upon the water.—But as for the incorporeal part or souls of those inferior gods, though these Divine Theogonists could not derive their original from Chaos or matter, but rather from that other principle called Love, as being divinely created, and so having God for their father, yet might they, notwithstanding, in another sense, fancy Night to have been their mother too, inasmuch as they were all made *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, from an antecedent non-existence or nothing, brought forth into being. For which cause there seems to have been in Orpheus a dialogue betwixt the maker of the world and Night.[3] For that this ancient cabala, which derived the cosmogonia from Chaos and Love, was at first religious and not atheistical, and Love understood in it not to be the offspring of Chaos, may be concluded from hence, because this Love as well as Chaos was of a Mosaical extraction also and plainly derived from that Spirit of God, which is said in Scripture to have moved upon the waters, that is, upon the chaos ; whether by this Spirit be to be meant God himself, as acting immediately upon the matter, or some other active principle derived from God and not from matter (as a mundane soul or plastic nature.) From whence also it came, that, as Porphyrius testifieth, the ancient Pagans thought the water to be divinely inspired : [4]*ἡγοῦντο γὰρ προσιζάνειν τῷ ὕδατι τὰς ψυχὰς θεοπνόῳ ὄντι ὥς φησιν ὁ Νούμηνιος διὰ τοῦτο λέγων καὶ τὸν προφήτην εἰρηκέναι, ἐμφέρεσθαι ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος θεοῦ πνεῦμα·* They thought, that souls attended upon the water, or resorted thereunto, as being divinely inspired, as Numenius writeth, adding the pro-

[1] Sympos. l. 4. Qu. 5. [p. 670. tom. ii. oper.]

[2] De Antro Nymphar. p. 56. edit. Cantab.

[3] Apud Proclum et alios.

[4] De Ant. Nymph. p. 256.

phet also therefore to have said, that the spirit of God moved upon the water.—

And that this cabala was thus understood by some of the ancient Pagan Cosmogonists themselves, appears plainly, not only from Simmias Rhodius and Parmenides, but also from these following verses of Orpheus, or whoever was the writer of those Argonautics, undoubtedly ancient, where Chaos and Love are thus brought in together :—

> [1]*Πρῶτα μὲν ἀρχαίου Χάεος μελιήφατον ὕμνον,*
> *Ὡς ἐπάμειψε φύσεις, ὡς τ᾽ οὐρανὸς εἰς πέρας ἦλθε,*
> *Γῆς τ᾽ εὐρυστέρνου γένεσιν, πυθμενά τε θαλάσσης,*
> *Πρεσβύτατόν τε καὶ αὐτοτελῆ πολύμητιν Ἔρωτα,*
> *Ὅσσα τ᾽ ἔφυκεν ἅπαντα, διέκρινε δ᾽ ἄλλον ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου·*

To this sense: We will first sing a pleasant and delightful song concerning the ancient Chaos, how heaven, earth, and seas were framed out of it; as also concerning that much-wise and sagacious Love, the oldest of all, and self-perfect, which actively produced all these things, separating one thing from another.—Where this Love is not only called *πολύμητις*, of much counsel or sagaciousness, which implies it to have been a substantial and intellectual thing, but also *πρεσβύτατος*, the oldest of all, and therefore senior to Chaos, as, likewise, *αὐτοτελὴς*, self-perfect or self-originated.—From whence it is manifest, that, according to the Orphic tradition, this Love, which the cosmogonia was derived from, was no other than the eternal unmade Deity (or an active principle depending on it) which produced this whole orderly world, and all the generated gods in it, as to their material part, out of Chaos and Night. Accordingly, as Aristotle determines in his Metaphysics, not only in the place before cited, but also afterward: [2]*Ἕτεροι δέ τινες, ὅθεν ἡ ὀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ὅσοι ἢ Νοῦν ἢ Ἔρωτα ποιοῦσιν ἀρχήν.* Others, besides the material cause of the world, assign an efficient, or cause of motion; namely, whosoever make either Mind (and intellect) or Love a principle.—Wherefore we conclude, that that other Atheistic cabala, or Aristophanic tradition before-mentioned, which accordingly, as Aristotle also elsewhere declareth concerning it, did *ἐν νυκτὸς πάντα γεννᾷν*, generate all things whatsoever, even the gods themselves universally, out of Night and Chaos, making Love itself likewise to have been produced from an egg of the Night; I say, that this was nothing else but a mere depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala, as also an absolutely impossible hypothesis, it deriving all things whatsoever in the universe,

[1] P. 17. ed. Steph. [2] L. 1. c. 6. p. 849.

besides the bare substance of senseless matter, in another sense than that before-mentioned, out of nonentity or nothing; as shall be also further manifested afterwards.

We have now represented the sense and generally received doctrine of the ancient Pagan theologers, that there was indeed a multiplicity of gods, but yet so that one of them only was ἀγέννητος, ingenerate or unmade, by whom all the other gods, together with the world, were made, so as to have had a novity of being, or a temporary beginning of their existence; Plato and the Pythagoreans here only differing from the rest in this, that though they acknowledged the world and all the mundane gods to have been generated together in time, yet they supposed certain other intelligible and supramundane gods also, which however, produced from one original Deity, were nevertheless eternal or without beginning. But now we must acknowledge, that there were amongst the Pagan Theists some of a different persuasion from the rest, who therefore did not admit of any theogonia in the sense before declared, that is, any temporary generation of gods, because they acknowledged no cosmogonia, no temporary production of the world, but concluded it to have been from eternity.

That Aristotle was one of these is sufficiently known; whose inferior gods, therefore, the sun, moon, and stars, must needs be ἀγέννητοι, or ingenerate, in this sense, so as to have had no temporary production, because the whole world to him was such. And if that philosopher[1] be to be believed himself was the very first, at least of all the Greeks, who asserted this ingenerateness or eternity of the world; he affirming, that all before him did γεννᾷν τὸν κόσμον, and κοσμοποιεῖν, generate or make the world; that is, attribute a temporary production to it, and consequently to all those gods also, which were a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum*,[2] and Stobæus,[3] impute this dogma of the world's eternity to certain others of the Greek philosophers before Aristotle (besides Ocellus Lucanus,[4] who is also acknowledged by Philo to have been an assertor thereof.) And indeed Epicharmus, though a Theist, seems plainly to have been of this persuasion, that the world was unmade, as also that there was no theogonia, nor temporary production of the inferior gods, from these verses of his,[5] according to Grotius's correction:—

[1] De Cœlo, lib. i. cap. x. p. 623. tom. i. oper.

[2] Lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 886.

[3] Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xxiv. p. 44.

[4] De Mundi Æternitate, inter Scriptor. Mytholog. a Tho. Gale editos.

[5] Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. iii. segm. x. p. 170.

[1] *Ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τοὶ θεοὶ παρῆσαν, ὑπέλιπον δ᾽ οὐ πάποκα·*
Τάδε δ᾽ ἀεὶ πάρεσθ᾽ ὅμοια, διὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεί.
Ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὲν χάος πρᾶτον γένεσθαι τῶν θεῶν·
Πῶς δὲ ; ἀμάχανον γ᾽ ἀπὸ μηδέ τινος ὅ, τι πρᾶτον μόλοι·
Οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἔμολε πρᾶτον ουδὲν, οὐδὲ μὰ Δία δεύτερον,
Τῶν δὲ γ᾽ ὧν ἄμμες νῦν λέγομεν ὧδ᾽ εἶναι μέλλει τάδε.

Nempe Di semper fuerunt, atque nunquam intercident:
Hæc quæ dico semper nobis rebus in iisdem se exhibent.
Extitisse sed deorum primum perhibetur chaos:
Quinam vero? nam de nihilo nil pote primum existere.
Ergo nec primum profecto quicquam, nec fuit alterum:
Sed quæ nunc sic appellantur, alia fient postmodum.

Where, though he acknowledges this to have been the general tradition of the ancient Theists, that Chaos was before the gods, and that the inferior mundane gods had a temporary generation, or production with the world; yet, notwithstanding, does he conclude against it, from this ground of reason—because nothing could proceed from nothing; and, therefore, both the gods, and indeed whatsoever else is substantial in the world, was from eternity unmade, only the fashion of things having been altered.

Moreover, Diodorus Siculus affirms the Chaldeans likewise to have asserted this dogma of the world's eternity, [2]*οἱ δ᾽ οὖν Χαλδαῖοι τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἀΐδιόν φυσιν εἶναι, καὶ μήτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι, μήθ᾽ ὕστερον φθορὰν ἐπιδέξεσθαι.* The Chaldeans affirm the nature of the world to be eternal, and that it was neither generated from any beginning, will nor ever admit corruption.—Who, that they were not Atheists for all that (no more than Aristotle,) appears from those following words of that historiographer: *τήν τε τῶν ὅλων τάξιν τε καὶ διακόσμησιν, θείᾳ τινι προνοίᾳ γεγονέναι, καὶ νῦν ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ γινομένων, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν, οὐδ᾽ αὐτομάτως, ἀλλ᾽ ὡρισμένῃ τινι καὶ βεβαίως κεκυρωμένῃ θεῶν κρίσει, συντελεῖσθαι·* They believe also, that the order and disposition of the world is by a certain Divine Providence, and that every one of those things, which come to pass in the heavens, happens not by chance, but by a certain determinate and firmly ratified judgment of the gods.—However, it is a thing known to all, that the generality of the later Platonists stiffly adhered to Aristotle in this; neither did they only assert the corporeal world, with all the inferior mundane gods in it, to be *ἀγεννήτους*, or ingenerate, and to have existed from eternity, but also

[1] Excerp. p. 478. [2] L. 2. p. 82.

maintained the same concerning the souls of men, and all other animals (they concluding that no souls were younger than body or the world ;) and because they would not seem to depart from their master, Plato, therefore did they endeavor violently to force this same sense upon Plato's words also.

Notwithstanding which, concerning these later Platonists, it is here observable, that though they thus asserted the world, and all inferior gods and souls, to have been *ἀγεννήτους*, according to that stricter sense of the word declared, that is, to have had no temporary generation or beginning, but to have existed from eternity ; yet by no means did they therefore conceive them to be *αὐτογενεῖς καὶ αὐθυποστάτους*, self-originated, and self-existing, but concluded them to have been all derived from one sole self-existent Deity[1] as their cause ; which, therefore, though not in order of time, yet of nature was before them. To this purpose, Plotinus · *νοῦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς χρόνῳ πρότερον αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι παρὰ νοῦ ἐστι καὶ φύσει πρότερος ἐκεῖνος, καὶ αἴτιον τούτου, ἀρχέτυπον οἷον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνος· καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάντος ἀεὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον.* Mind or God was before the world, not as if it existed before it in time, but because the world proceeded from it, and that was in order of nature first as the cause thereof, and its archetype or paradigm ; the world also always subsisting by it and from it.—[2]And again elsewhere to the same purpose, *οὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐγίνετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γενητὰ λέγεται, οὐ δὲ φθαρήσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσα ἔχει εἰς ἅ.* The things, which are said to have been made or generated, were not so made, as that they ever had a beginning of their existence, but yet they were made, and will be always made (in another sense ;) nor will they ever be destroyed otherwise than as being dissolved into those simple principles, out of which some of them were compounded.—Where, though the world be said never to have been made as to a temporary beginning, yet, in another sense, it is said to be always made, as depending upon God[3] perpetually as the emanative cause thereof. Agreeably whereunto, the manner of the world's production from God is thus declared by that philosopher : *οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἱ φθείρουσι καὶ γεννῶσιν αὐτὸν, ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ποιήσεως ταύτης, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συνιέναι, ουδ' ἴσασιν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐκεῖνα ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήποτε τὰ ἄλλα ἐλλείπει.* They do not rightly, who corrupt and generate the world, for they will not understand what manner of making or production the world had, to wit, by way of effulgency or eradiation from the Deity. From whence it follows, that the world must needs have been so long as there was a God, as the light

[1] En. 3. l. 2. c. 1. [2] En. 2. l. 9. c. 3. [3] En. 5. l. 8. c. 12.

was coeve with the sun.—So likewise Proclus[1] concludes, that the world was ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, always generated or eradiated from God—and therefore must needs be eternal, God being so. Wherefore these latter Platonists supposed the same thing concerning the corporeal world, and the lower mundane gods, which their master Plato did concerning his higher eternal gods; that though they had no temporary production, yet they all depended no less upon one supreme Deity, than if they had been made out of nothing by him. From whence it is manifest, that none of these philosophers apprehended any repugnancy at all betwixt these two things; existence from eternity, and being caused or produced by another. Nor can we make any great doubt, but that if the latter Platonists had been fully convinced of any contradictious inconsistency here, they would readily have disclaimed that their so beloved hypothesis of the world's eternity; it being so far from truth what some have supposed, that the assertors of the world's eternity were all Atheists, that these latter Platonists were led into this opinion no otherwise than from the sole consideration of the Deity; to wit, its ἀγαθοειδὴς βούλησις, καὶ γόνιμος δύναμις, its essential goodness, and generative power, or emanative fecundity[2]—as Proclus plainly declares upon the Timæus.

Now, though Aristotle were not acted with any such divine enthusiasm as these Platonists seem to have been, yet did he notwithstanding, after his sober manner, really maintain the same thing; that though the world, and inferior mundane gods, had no temporary generation, yet were they nevertheless all produced from one supreme Deity as their cause. Thus Simplicius represents that philosopher's sense: Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῖ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὸ Θεοῦ παράγεσθαι· [3]Aristotle would not have the world to have been made (so as to have had a beginning,) but yet nevertheless to have been produced from God after some other manner.—And again afterward; Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀϊδίου κινήσεως αὐτοῦ θεὸν λέγων, ὅμως ἀγένητον αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσι. Aristotle, though making God the cause of the heaven and its eternal motion, yet concludes it notwithstanding to have been ingenerate or unmade;—that is, without beginning. However, we think fit here to observe, that though Aristotle do for the most part express a great deal of zeal and confidence for that

[1] There are still extant eighteen arguments of his, wherein he attacks the Christian doctrine of the world's being created by God in time; in answer to which, John Philoponus wrote the same number of books against the eternity of the world. Vide Jo. Alberti Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. lib. v. c. xxvi. § xiii. p. 522.

[2] P. 116. [3] In Arist. Phys. l. 8. p. 320. b. edit. Aldi.

opinion of the world's eternity, yet doth he sometimes for all that seem to flag a little, and speak more languidly and skeptically about it; as, for example, in his book de Partibus Animalium, where he treats concerning an artificial nature :[1] *μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι, ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶα τὰ θνητὰ* · It is more likely, that the heaven was made by such a cause as this (if it were made,) and that it is maintained by such a cause, than that mortal animals should be so; which yet is a thing more generally acknowledged.—Now it was before declared, that Aristotle's artificial nature was nothing but the mere executioner or opificer of a perfect mind, that is, of the Deity; which two therefore he sometimes joins together in the Cosmopœia, affirming that Mind and nature, that is, God and nature, were the cause of this universe.

And now we see plainly, that though there was a real controversy amongst the Pagan theologers (especially from Aristotle's time downward,) concerning the Cosmogonia and Theogonia, according to the stricter notion of those words, the temporary generation or production of the world and inferior gods, or whether they had any beginning or no; yet was there no controversy at all concerning the self-existency of them, but it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that the world, and the inferior gods, however supposed by some to have existed from eternity, yet were nevertheless all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause; *ὑπὸ θεοῦ παραγόμενοι ἢ ἐλλαμπόμενοι*, being either eradiated or produced from God.—Wherefore it is observable, that these Pagan Theists, who asserted the world's eternity, did themselves distinguish concerning the word *γενητὸν*, *ortum*, *natum*, *et factum*, as that which was equivocal: and though in one sense of it, they denied, that the world and inferior gods were *γενητοὶ*, yet notwithstanding did they in another sense clearly affirm the same. For the word *γενητὸν* (say they)[2] strictly and properly taken, is *τὸ ἐν μέρει χρόνου τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδον λαχόν*, that which in respect of time passed out of non-existence into being—or *ὃ τὸ πρότερον μὴ ὂν, ὕστερον δὲ ὄν*, that which being not before, afterwards was.—Nevertheless they acknowledge, that in a larger sense this word *γενητὸν* may be taken also for *τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ἀπ' αἰτίας ὑφιστάμενον*, that which doth any way depend upon a superior being as its cause.—And there must needs be the same equivocation in the word *ἀγένητον*, so that this in like manner may be taken also, either *χρονικῶς*, for that which is ingenerate in respect of time, as having no temporary beginning; or else for that which is *ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀγένη-*

[1] L. i. c. 1. [p. 474. tom. 2. oper.]

[2] Simplic. in Arist. Phys. fol. 265.

τον, ingenerate or unproduced from any cause :—in which latter sense, that word ἀγένητον, or unmade, is of equal force and extent with αὐθυπόστατον or αὐτογενὲς, that which is self-subsistent or self-originated ;—and accordingly it was used by those Pagan Theists, who concluded ὅτι ὕλη ἀγένητος, i. e. that matter was unmade—that is, not only existed from eternity without beginning, but also was self-existent, and independent upon any superior cause. Now, as to the former of these two senses of those words, γεννητὸν and ἀγένητον, the generality of the ancient Pagans, and together with them Plato, affirmed the world, and all the inferior gods, to be γεννητοὺς, to have been made in time—or to have had a beginning ; (for whatever the latter Platonists pretend, this was undoubtedly Plato's notion of that word, and no other, when he concluded the world to be γεννητὸν, forasmuch as himself expressly opposes it to ἀΐδιον, that which is eternal.) But, on the contrary, Aristotle, and the latter Platonists, determined the world, and all the inferior gods, to be in this sense ἀγενήτους, such as had no temporary beginning—but were from eternity. However, according to the latter sense of those words, all the Pagan theologers agreed together, that the world, and all the inferior gods, whether having a beginning, or existing from eternity, were notwithstanding γεννητοὶ ἀπ᾽ αἰτίας, produced or derived from a superior cause ;—and that thus there was only one θεὸς ἀγένητος, one unproduced and self-existent Deity—who is said by them to be αἰτίας κρείττων καὶ πρεσβύτερος, superior to a cause, and older than any cause, he being the cause of all things besides himself. Thus Crantor, and his followers in Proclus,[1] zealous assertors of the world's eternity, determined, γεννητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἀπ᾽ αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ὄντα αὐτόγονον οὐδὲ αὐθυπόστατον· that the world (with all the inferior mundane gods in it,) notwithstanding their being from eternity, might be said to be γεννητοὶ, that is *orti*, or made, as being produced from another cause, and not self-originated or self-existing. In like manner Proclus himself, that grand champion for the world's eternity, plainly acknowledged, notwithstanding, the generation of the gods and world in this sense, as being produced from a superior cause : λέγομεν θεῶν γενήσεις, τὴν ἄῤῥητον αὐτῶν πρόσοδον ἐνδεικνύμενοι, καὶ τὴν τῶν δευτέρων ἑτερότητα, πρὸς τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν· We call it the generations of the gods, meaning thereby, not any temporary production of them, but their ineffable procession from a superior first cause.—Thus also Salustius, in his book

[1] In Timæ, p. 25. [Vide etiam eundem in Introductione in Theologiam Platonicam ; lib. 1. c. xxviii. p. 66, and p. 68, et lib. vi. c. 2. p. 341.

de Diis et Mundo,[1] where he contends the world to have been from eternity, or without beginning, yet concludes both it, and the other inferior gods, to have been made by one supreme Deity, who is called by him, *ὁ πρῶτος Θεὸς*, the first God.—For, saith he, *μεγίστης τῆς δυνάμεως οὔσης, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἔδει καὶ ζῶα μόνα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ θεούς τε καὶ δαίμονας.* God, or the first cause, having the greatest power, or being omnipotent, ought therefore to make not only men, and other animals, but also gods and demons. And accordingly this is the title of his 13th chapter: *πῶς τὰ ἀΐδια λέγεται γίγνεσθαι,* how eternal things may be said to be made or generated.—It is true, indeed (as we have often declared,) that some of the Pagan Theists asserted God not to be the only *ἀγένητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον,* the only unmade and self-existent being—but that matter also was such; nevertheless, this opinion was not so generally received amongst them, as is commonly supposed: and though some of the ancient fathers confidently impute it to Plato, yet there seems to be no sufficient ground for their so doing; and Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, and other Platonists, do not only professedly oppose the same as false, but also as that which was dissonant from Plato's principles. Wherefore, according to that larger notion of the word *ἀγένητον,* as taken synonymously with *αὐτογενὲς* and *αὐθυπόστατον*, there were many of the Pagan theologers, who agreed with Christians in this, *ὅτι αὐτὸ ἀγένητον ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις ἡ ἀγεννησία,* that God is the only ingenerate or unmade being, and that his very essence is ingenerability or innascibility;—all other things, even matter itself, being made by him. But all the rest of them (only a few Ditheists excepted,) though they supposed matter to be self-existent, yet did they conclude, that there was only *εἷς Θεὸς ἀγένητος,* only one unmade or unproduced God—and that all their other gods were *γενητοὶ,* in one sense or other, if not as made in time, yet at least as produced from a superior cause.

Nothing now remaineth, but only that we show, how the Pagans did distinguish, and put a difference, betwixt the one supreme unmade Deity, and all their other inferior generated gods. Which we are the rather concerned to do, because it is notorious, that they did many times also confound them together, attributing the government of the whole world to the gods promiscuously, and without putting any due discrimination betwixt the supreme and inferior (the true reason whereof seems to have been this, because they supposed the supreme God, not to do all immediately, in the government of the world, but to permit much to his inferior ministers;) one instance of which we had before in Ovid, and innumerable such others might be cited out of their most sober

[1] Cap. xiii. p. 269. inter Scriptor. Mythologic. à Tho. Gale editos.

writers. As, for example, Cicero, in his first book of Laws,[1] "Deorum immortalium vi, ratione, potestate, mente, numine, natura omnis regitur;" the whole nature, or universe, is governed by the force, reason, power, mind, and divinity of the immortal gods.—And again in his second book,[2] "Deos esse dominos ac moderatores omnium rerum, eaque quæ geruntur, eorum geri judicio atque numine; eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate religiones colat, intueri; priorumque et impiorum habere rationem; a principio civibus suasum esse debet:" the minds of citizens ought to be first of all embued with a firm persuasion, that the gods are the lords and moderators of all things, and that the conduct and management of the whole world is directed and overruled by their judgment and divine power; that they deserve the best of mankind, that they behold and consider what every man is, what he doth and takes upon himself, with what mind, piety, and sincerity, he observes the duties of religion; and, lastly, that these gods have a very different regard to the pious and the impious.—Now such passages as these abounding every where in Pagan writings, it is no wonder, if many, considering their theology but slightly and superficially, have been led into an error, and occasioned thereby to conclude the Pagans not to have asserted a Divine monarchy, but to have imputed both the making and governing of the world to an aristocracy or democracy of co-ordinate gods, not only all eternal, but also self-existent and unmade. The contrary whereunto, though it be already sufficiently proved, yet it will not be amiss for us here in the close, to show how the Pagans, who sometimes jumble and confound the supreme and inferior gods all together, do notwithstanding at other times many ways distinguish between the one supreme God, and their other many inferior gods.

First, therefore, as the Pagans had many proper names for one and the same supreme God, according to several particular considerations of him, in respect of his several different manifestations and effects in the world; which are oftentimes mistaken for so many distinct deities (some supposing them independent, others subordinate;) so had they also, besides these, other proper names of God, according to that more full and comprehensive notion of him, as the Maker of the whole world, and its supreme Governor, or the sole Monarch of the universe. For thus the Greeks called him Ζεὺς and Ζῆν, etc. the Latins Jupiter and Jovis, the Babylonians Belus and Bel, the Persians Mithras and Oromasdes, the Egyptians and Scythians (according to Herodotus) Am-

[1] Lib. i. cap. vii. p. 3303. oper. tom. ix.

[2] Lib. ii. cap. vii. p. 3343.

moun and Pappæus. And Celsus in Origen concludes it to be a matter of pure indifferency, to call the supreme God by any of all these names, either Ζεὺς, or Ammoun, or Pappæus, or the like : [1] *Κέλσος οἴεται μηδὲν διαφέρειν, Δία Ὕψιστον, καλεῖν ἢ Ζῆνα, ἢ Ἀδωναῖον, ἢ Σαβαὼθ, ἢ (ὡς Αἰγύπτιοι) Ἄμμουν, ἢ (ὡς Σκύθαι) Παππαῖον.* Celsus thinks it to be a matter of no moment, whether we call the highest and supreme God, Adonai and Sabaoth, as the Jews do; or Dia and Zena, as the Greeks; or, as the Egyptians, Ammoun; or, as the Scythians, Pappæus.—Notwithstanding which, that pious and jealous father expresseth a great deal of zeal against Christians then using any of those Pagan names. "But we will rather endure any torment (saith he) than confess Zeus (or Jupiter) to be God; being well assured that the Greeks often really worship, under that name, an evil demon, who is an enemy both to God and men. And we will rather suffer death, than call the supreme God Ammoun, whom the Egyptian enchanters thus invoke : *λεγέτωσαν δὲ καὶ Σκύθαι τὸν Παππαῖον Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ πεισόμεθα, τιθέντες μὲν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, ὡς δὲ φίλον τῷ λαχόντι τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν, καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν καὶ διάλεκτον, οὐκ ὀνομάζοντες τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς κυρίῳ ὀνόματι τῷ Παππαῖον. Σκυθιστὶ γὰρ τὸ προσηγορικὸν τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ Αἰγυπτιστὶ, καὶ πόσῃ διαλέκτῳ ἕκαστος ἐντέθραπται, ὀνομάζων, οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται.* And though the Scythians call the supreme God Pappæus, yet we, acknowledging a supreme God, will never be persuaded to call him by that name, which it pleased that demon (who ruled over the Scythian desert, people, and language) to impose. Nevertheless, he that shall use the appellative name for God, either in the Scythian, Egyptian, or any other language which he hath been brought up in, will not offend." Where Origen plainly affirms the Scythians to have acknowledged one Supreme God, called by them Pappæus, and intimates that the Egyptians did the like, calling him Ammoun. Neither could it possibly be his intent to deny the same of the Greeks and their Zeus, however his great jealousy made him to call him here a demon; it being true in a certain sense, which shall be declared afterward, that the Pagans did oftentimes really worship an evil demon, under those very names of Zeus and Jupiter, as they did likewise under those of Hammoun and Pappæus.

In the mean time we deny not, but that both the Greeks used that word Zeus, and the Latins Jupiter, sometimes *φυσικῶς*, for the ether, fire, or air, some accordingly etymologizing *Ζεὺς* from *Ζέω*, others *Δεὺς*

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[1] Lib. v. c. Celsum. p. 261.

from *Δεύω*: whence came those forms of speech, *sub Jove* and *sub Dio*. And thus Cicero,[1] "Jovem Ennius nuncupat ita dicens.

Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Hunc etiam augures nostri cum dicunt, Jove fulgente, Jove tonante; dicunt enim in cœlo fulgente, tonante," etc. The reason of which speeches seems to have been this, because in ancient times some had supposed the animated heaven, ether and air, to be the supreme Deity. We grant, moreover, that the same words have been sometimes used *ἱστορικῶς* also, for a hero or deified man, said by some to have been born in Crete, by others in Arcadia. And Callimachus,[2] though he were very angry with the Cretians for affirming Jupiter's sepulchral monument to have been made with them in Crete, as thereby making him mortal:

Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο
Κρῆτες ἐτεκτήναντο· σὺ δ' οὐ θάνες, ἐσσὶ γὰρ αἰεί·

Cretes semper mendaces, tuum enim, rex sepulchrum
Extruxerunt: tu vero non es mortuus, semper enim es.

Himself nevertheless (as Athenagoras[3] and Origen[4] observe) attributed the beginning of death to him, when he affirmed him to have been born in Arcadia; *ἀρχὴ γὰρ θανάτου ἡ ἐπὶ γῆς γένεσις*, because a terrene nativity is the beginning of death.—Wherefore this may pass for a general observation here: that the Pagan theology was all along confounded with a certain mixture of physiology and herology or history blended together. Nevertheless it is unquestionable, that the more intelligent of the Greekish Pagans did frequently understand by Zeus that supreme unmade Deity, who was the maker of the world, and of all the inferior gods. Porphyrius in Eusebius thus declares their sense,[5] *τὸν Δία, τὸν Νοῦν κόσμου ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὃς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδημιούργησεν, ἔχων τὸν κόσμον.* By Zeus the Greeks understand that Mind of the world, which framed all things in it, and containeth the whole world.—Agreeable whereunto is that of Maximus Tyrius,[6] *Κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία, νοῦν πρεσβύτατον, καὶ ἀρχικώτατον, ᾧ πάντα ἕπεται καὶ πειθαρχεῖ·* By Jupiter

[1] De Nat. D. lib. ii. 223. Lamb. [cap. xxv. p. 2992. tom. 9. oper.]
[2] Hymno in Jovem, vers. 8, 9.
[3] In Legation. pro Christianis, cap. xxvi. p. 121.
[4] Contra Celsum, lib. iii. p. 137.
[5] Præp. Ev. lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 100. [6] Dissert. 29. p. 290.

you are to understand that most ancient and princely Mind, which all things follow and obey.—And Eusebius himself, though not forward to grant any more than needs he must to Pagans, concludes with this acknowledgement hereof: [1] *ἔστω ὁ Ζεὺς μηκέθ᾽ ἡ πυρώδης καὶ αἰθέριος οὐσία, ὥσπερ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐνομίζετο, κατὰ τὸν Πλούταρχον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνωτάτω Νοῦς, ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός·* Let Jupiter therefore be no longer that fiery and ethereal substance, which the ancient Pagans according to Plutarch, supposed him to be; but that highest Mind, which was the maker of all things.—But Phornutus[2] by Jupiter understands the Soul of the world, he writing thus concerning him; *ὥσπερ δέ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὸν, καὶ αὐτὴ καλεῖται Ζεὺς, αἰτία, οὖσα τοῖς ζῶσι τοῦ ζῆν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βασιλεύειν ὁ Ζεὺς λέγεται τῶν ὅλων.* As we ourselves are governed by a soul, so hath the world in like manner a Soul, that containeth it; and this is called Zeus, being the cause of life to all things that live; and therefore Zeus or Jupiter is said to reign over all things.—However, though these were two different conceptions amongst the Pagans concerning God, some apprehending him to be an abstract mind separate from the world and matter, but others to be a soul of the world only; yet nevertheless they all agreed in this, that *Ζεὺς* or Jupiter was the supreme moderator or governor of all. And accordingly Plato, in his Cratylus,[3] taking these two words, *Ζῆνα* and *Δία*, both together, etymologizeth them as one, after this manner: *συντιθέμενα εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων· συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεθαι οὕτως, τῷ Θεὸς εἶναι δὶ ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει, διείληπται δὲ δίχα (ὥσπερ λέγω) ἓν ὂν το ὄνομα, τῷ Διὶ καὶ Ζηνί.* These two words compounded together declare the nature of God; for there is nothing, which is more the cause of life, both to ourselves and all other animals, than he, who is the Prince and King of all things; so that God is rightly thus called, he being that by whom all things live. And these are really but one name of God, though divided into two words.—But because it was very obvious then to object against this position of Plato's, that Zeus or Jupiter could not be the Prince of all things, and first Original of life, from the Theogonia of Hesiod and other ancient Pagans, in which himself was made to have been the son of *Κρόνος*, or Saturn; therefore this objec-

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[1] Præp. Ev. lib. iii. c. xiii. [p. 119.]

[2] Libro de Natura Deor. cap. ii. inter Scriptores Mythologicos a Tho. Gale editos.

[3] Page 396. edit. Steph.

tion is thus preoccupated by Plato, *τοῦτον δὲ, Κρόνον υἱὸν, ὑβριστικὸν μὲν ἄν τινι δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ξαίφνης·* Whosoever shall hear this (saith he), will presently conclude it to be contumelious to this Zeus or Jupiter (as he hath been described by us), to be accounted the son of Chronos or Saturn.—And in answer hereunto, that philosopher stretcheth his wits to salve that poetic Theogonia, and reconcile it with his own theological hypothesis; and thereupon he interprets that Hesiodian *Ζεὺς* or Jupiter into a compliance with the third hypostasis of his Divine triad so as properly to signify the superior Soul of the world; *εὔλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία. Κρόνος γὰρ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ Νοῦ· ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Οὐρανοῦ υἱὸς, ὡς λόγος·* Nevertheless it is reasonable to suppose Zeus or Jupiter to be the offspring of some great mind; and Chronos or Saturn signifieth a pure and perfect mind eternal; who again is said to have been the son of Uranus and Cœlius.—Where it is manifest, that Plato endeavors to accommodate this poetic trinity of gods, Uranus, Chronos, and Zeus, or Cœlius, Saturn, and Jupiter, to his own trinity of Divine hypostases, *τ' ἀγαθὸν, νοῦς* and *ψυχὴ*, the first good, a perfect intellect, and the highest soul.—Which accommodation is accordingly further pursued by Plotinus in several places, as Enn. 5. l. 1. c. 4. and Enn. 5. l. 8. c. 13. Nevertheless, these three archichal hypostases of the Platonic trinity, though looked upon as substances distinct from each other, and subordinate, yet are they frequently taken altogether by them for the whole supreme Deity. However, the word *Ζεὺς* is by Plato severally attributed to each of them; which Proclus thus observed upon the Timæus: [1]*λέγωμεν ὅτι πολλαὶ μὲν εἰσὶ τάξεις καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι τοῦ Διός· Ἄλλος γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς, ὡς ἐν Κρατύλῳ γέγραπται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Πρῶτος τῆς Κρονίας τριάδος, ὡς ἐν Γοργίᾳ λέγεται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ ἀπόλυτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ παραδίδοται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ οὐράνιος, εἴτε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλανοῦς εἴτε ὁ ἐν τῇ θατέρου περιόδῳ.* We say, therefore, that there are several orders, ranks or degrees of Zeus or Jupiter in Plato; for sometimes he is taken for the Demiurgus or opificer of the world, as in Cratylus; sometimes for the first of the Saturnian triad, as in Gorgias; sometimes for the superior Soul of the world, as in Phædrus; and, lastly, sometimes for the lower soul of the heaven.—Though, by Proclus's leave, that Zeus or Jupiter which is mentioned in Plato's Cratylus (being plainly the superior Psyche or Soul of the world) is not properly the Demiurgus or opificer, according to him; that title rather belonging to *νοῦς* or intellect, which is the second hypostasis in his trinity.

[1] Page 298.

As for the vulgar of the Greekish Pagans, whether they apprehended God to be *νοῦν ἐξῃρημένον τοῦ κόσμου*, a mind or intellect separate from the world, or else to be a soul of the world only;—it cannot be doubted, but that by the word Zeus they commonly understood the supreme Deity in one or other of those senses, the father and king of gods; he being frequently thus styled in their solemn nuncupations of vows, *Ζεῦ πάτηρ, Ζεῦ ἄνα*, O Jupiter father, and O Jupiter king. As he was invoked also *Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ* in that excellent prayer of an ancient poet, not without cause commended in Plato's Alcibiades;[1]

Ζεῦ Βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις
Ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν·

O Jupiter king, give us good things, whether we pray or pray not for them; but withhold evil things from us, though we should pray never so earnestly for them.—But the instances of this kind being innumerable, we shall forbear to mention any more of them: only we shall observe, that Zeus Sabazius was a name for the supreme God, sometime introduced amongst the Greeks, and derived in all probability from the Hebrew Sabaoth, or Adonai Tsebaoth, the Lord of hosts (that is, of the heavenly hosts) or the supreme governor of the world. Which therefore Aristophanes took notice of as a strange and foreign god, lately crept in amongst them, that ought to be banished out of Greece: these several names of God being then vulgarly spoken of as so many distinct deities, as shall be more fully declared afterward. We shall likewise elsewhere show, that besides *Ζεὺς, Πὰν* also was used by the Greeks as a name for that God, who is the supreme moderator and governor of the whole world.

That the Latins did in like manner by Jupiter and Jovis, frequently denote the supreme Deity, and Monarch of the universe, is a thing unquestionable; and which does sufficiently appear from those epithets that were commonly given to him, of *optimus* and *maximus*, the best and the greatest; and also of *omnipotens*, frequently bestowed upon him by Virgil and others. Which word Jupiter or Jovis, though Cicero[2] etymologize it *a juvando*, or from *juvans pater*, as not knowing how to do it otherwise; yet we may rather conclude it to have been of an Hebraical extraction, and derived from that Tetragrammaton, or name of God, consisting of four consonants; whose vowels (which is to be pronounced with) though they be not now certainly known, yet

[1] In Alcibiad. secundo, sive de Precatione, p. 40.

[2] De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxv. p. 2902. tom. ix. oper.

must it needs have some such sound as this, either Jovah or Javah, or Ἰεύω, or Ἰάω, or the like; and the abbreviation of this name was Jah. For as the Pagan nations had, besides appellatives, their several proper names for God, so also had the Hebrews theirs, and such as being given by God himself, was most expressive of his nature, it signifying eternal and necessary existence.

But, in the next place, we shall suggest, that the Pagans did not only signify the supreme God, by these proper names, but also frequently by the appellatives themselves, when used not for a god in general, but for the God, or God κατ' ἐξοχὴν, and by way of eminency. And thus ὁ θεὸς and θεὸς, are often taken by the Greeks, not for θεῶν τις, a God, or one of the gods, but for God, or the supreme Deity. We have several examples hereof in passages before cited occasionally in this very chapter, as in that of Aristotle's, τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης πλὴν ὁ θεός; what is there, therefore, that can be better than knowledge, but only God?—As also that other of his, that happiness consisteth principally in virtue, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, it is a thing, that ought to be acknowledged by us from the nature of God. —So likewise in that of Thales, πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγένητον γάρ· God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade;—and that of Maximus Tyrius, πολλοὶ θεοὶ παῖδες θεοῦ καὶ συνάρχοντες θεῷ, many gods, the sons of God, and co-reigners together with God.—Besides which, there have been others also mentioned, which we shall not here repeat. And innumerable more instances of this kind might be added; as that of Antiphanes,[1] θεὸς οὐδενὶ ἔοικεν, διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται, God is like to nothing, for which cause he cannot be learnt by any from an image:—this of Socrates,[2] εἰ ταύτη φίλον τῷ θεῷ ταύτη γινέσθω, if God will have it so, let it be so.—And that of Epictetus,[2] σὺ μόνον μέμνησο τῶν καθολικῶν, τί ἐμὸν, τί οὐκ ἐμόν; τί θέλει με ποιεῖν ὁ Θεὸς νῦν; do thou only remember these catholic and universal principles, what is mine, and what is not mine? what would God have me now to do? and what would he have me not to do?—But we shall mention no more of these, because they occur so frequently in all manner of Greek writers, both metrical and prosaical.

Wherefore we shall here only add, that as the singular θεὸς was thus often used by the Greeks for God κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or in way of eminency, that is, for the supreme Deity; so was likewise the plural θεοὶ

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[1] Apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. veter. Tragic. et Comicor. p. 632.

[2] Apud Platon. in Critone, p. 370.

[3] Apud Arrian. in Epictet. lib. iv. p. 385. edit. Cantabrig.

frequently used by them for the inferior gods, by way of distinction from the supreme. As in that usual form of prayer and exclamation, *ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Θεοὶ*, O Jupiter and the gods;—and that form of obtestation, *πρὸς Διὸς καὶ Θεῶν*, by Jupiter and the gods.—So in this of Euripedes:[1]—

Ἀλλ' ἐστὶν, ἔστι· κἂν τις ἐγγελᾷ λόγῳ,
Ζεὺς καὶ Θεοὶ, βρότεια λεύσαντες πάθη·

Est, (sint licet qui rideant) est Jupiter,
Superique, casus qui vident mortalium.

In which passages, as Jupiter is put for the supreme God, so is *Θεοὶ* likewise put for the inferior gods, in way of distinction from him. Thus also, *Θεὸς*, and *Θεοὶ*, are taken both together in Plato's Phædo, *Θεὸς* for the supreme unmade and incorruptible Deity, and *Θεοὶ* for the inferior gods only,[2] *ὁ δὲ γε Θεὸς (οἶμαι) ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείη, μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δι' (ἔφη) ἀνθρώπων γε, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, παρὰ Θεῶν.* I suppose, said Socrates,[3] that God, and the very species, essence or idea, of life will be granted by all to be incorruptible. Doubtless by all men (said Cebes) but much more, as I conceive by the gods.—But a further instance will be propounded afterward of the word *Θεοὶ*, thus used by way of distinction, for the inferior gods only; as it was before declared, that the theogonia, or generation of gods was accordingly understood by the Greeks universally of the *οἱ θεοὶ*, that is, the inferior gods.

Moreover as the word *Θεὸς* was taken *κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, or by way of eminency, for the supreme God, so was *Δαίμων* likewise. As for example, in this passage of Callimachus, before cited imperfectly:[4]

——————Εἰ Θεὸν οἶσθα,
Ἴσθ' ὅτι καὶ ῥέξαι Δαίμονι πᾶν δυνατόν·

——————Si Deus est tibi notus,
Hoc etiam noris, omnia posse Deum.

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[1] Vide Grotii Excerpta veter. Tragicor. et Comicor. p. 417.

[2] Page 106.

[3] Plato de Rep. *οὐχ ὑπὸ θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν, εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι Θεῷ·* He will never be neglected of the gods, who endeavors as much as it is possible for a man, to be like to God, p. 613.

[4] Vide Fragmenta Callimichi a Rich. Bentleio collecta, p. 372.

Where *Θεὸς* and *Δαίμων* are used both alike *signanter*, for the supreme God. And thus also in that famous passage of another poet:

——————Τοῖς γὰρ ἀλίτροις,
Εἰν ἀλὶ καὶ γαίᾳ, κακὰ μύρια θήκατο Δαίμων.

Homer, likewise, in one and the same place,[1] seems to use *Θεὸς* and *Δαίμων* both together, after the same manner, for the supreme God:

Ὅπποτ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλει πρὸς δαίμονα φωτὶ μάχεσθαι,
Ὅν κε θεὸς τιμᾷ, τάχα οἱ μέγα πῆμα κυλίσθη.

Quoties homo vult, adverso numine, cum viro pugnare,
Quem Deus honorat, mox in eum magna clades devolvitur.

Again we conceive, that Jupiter, or the supreme God, was sometimes signified amongst the Pagans by that expression, *θεὸς αὐτὸς*, *Deus ipse*, as in that of Homer's ninth Iliad:[2]

——Οὐδ' εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίη Θεὸς αὐτὸς,
Γῆρας ἀποξύσας θήσειν νέον ἡβώοντα.

——Neque si mihi promitteret Deus ipse,
Senectutem abradens, effecturum me juvenem pubescentem.

And thus St. Cyril of Alexandria interprets Homer here,[3] *οὐ γάρ που φησὶν, εἰ καὶ θεῶν τις ὑπόσχοιτό μοι τοῦ μὲν γήρως ἀπεμπολὴν, παλινάργετον δὲ τὴν νεότητα, τετήρηκε δὲ τὸ χρῆμα μόνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ πάντας θεῷ*, etc. *τὸ γάρ τοι Θεὸς αὐτὸς, οὐκ ἐφ' ἕνα τῶν ἐν μύθοις πεπλασμένων τινὰ, αὐτὸν δὲ δὴ μόνον κατασημήνιεν ἂν τὸν ἀληθῶς ὄντα Θεόν·* Homer doth not say, if any of the gods would promise me freedom from old age, and restitution of youth, but he reserves the matter only to the supreme God; neither doth he refer it to any of the fictitious poetic gods, but to the true God alone.—The same language was also spoken in the laws of the twelve tables:[4] "Deos adeunto caste, opes amovento: si secus faxint, Deus ipse vindex erit." Let the gods be worshipped chastely, superfluity of riches and pomp being removed: if men do otherwise, God himself will be the avenger.—Where, though the word *gods* be used generally, so as to comprehend both the supreme and inferior gods under it, yet

[1] Iliad. lib. i. ver. 98. [2] Ver. 448.

[3] Contra Jul. lib. i. [p. 27. edit. Spanh.] So Justin. Mart. ad Græ. coh. p. 22. [ed. Colon.]

[4] Vide Ciceron. de Legibus, lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 3345. tom. ix. oper.

Deus ipse, God himself, denotes the supreme God only. In like manner, ὁ *δαίμων αὐτὸς* also seems to be taken for the supreme God, in that of Euripides :[1]

Λύσει με ὁ Δαίμων αὐτὸς, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω,

which was thus rendered by Horace :

——— Ipse Deus, simulatque volet, me solvet.

Notwithstanding which, *Δαίμων* and *Δαίμονες* are often distinguished from *Θεὸς* and *Θεοὶ*, they being put for an inferior rank of beings below the gods vulgarly called demons ; which word in a large sense comprehends also heroes under it. For though these demons be sometimes called gods too, yet were they rather accounted *Ἡμίθεοι* demi-gods, than gods. And thus *Θεοὶ καὶ Δαίμονες*, gods and demons, are frequently joined together, as things distinct from one another ; which notion of the word Plato refers to, when he concludes Love not to be a god, but a demon only. But of these demons we are to speak more afterward.

Furthermore, the Pagan writers frequently understand the supreme God by the *τὸ Θεῖον*, when the word is used substantively. As, for example, in this of Epicharmus ;[2]

Οὐδὲν διαφεύγει τὸ θεῖον· τοῦτο γινώσκειν σε δεῖ·
Αὐτὸς ἐσθ' ἡμῶν ἐπόπτης· ἀδυνατεῖ δ' οὐδὲν Θεῷ.

Res nulla est Deum quæ lateat, scire quod te convenit :
Ipse est noster introspector, tum Deus nil non potest.

So likewise in this of Plato's,[3] *πόρρω ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον*, God is far removed both from pleasure and grief.—And Plotinus calls the supreme God, *τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον*, the Divinity that is in the universe.—But because the instances hereof are also innumerable, we shall decline the mentioning of any more, and instead of them, only set down the judgment of that diligent and impartial observer of the force of words, Henricus Stephanus,[4] concerning it : " Redditur etiam *τὸ θεῖον* sæpe Deus, sed ita tamen, ut intelligendum sit, non de quolibet Deo ab ipsis etiam profanis scriptoribus dici, verum de eo quem intelligerent,

[1] In Bacchis, ver. 497.

[2] Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. p. 708. The translation is by Grotius in Excerpt. veter Tragicor. et Comicor. p. 481.

[3] Epist. iii. p. 708.

[4] In Thesauro Græcæ Linguæ, tom. i. p. 1534.

cum *θεὸν* dicebant quasi *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* ad differentiam eorum, qui multi appellatione *θεῶν* includebantur, summum videlicet supremumque Numen, et quasi dicas *θεὸν θεῶν ὕπατον καὶ ἄριστον*, ut loquitur de Jove Homerus."

Lastly, as *τὸ θεῖον*, so likewise was *τὸ δαιμόνιον* used by the Greeks for the supreme Numen, or that Divinity, which governs the whole world. Thus, whereas it was commonly said, according to Herodotus[1]) *ὅτι τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν*, that God was envious;—the meaning whereof was, that he did not commonly suffer any great human prosperity to continue long, without some check or counterbuff; the same proverbial speech is expressed in Aristotle, *φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον*. And in this sense the word seems to be used in Isocrates ad Demonicum, *τίμα τὸ δαιμόνιον ἀεὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ μετὰ τῆς πόλεως*, worship God always, but especially with the city, in her public sacrifices.—And doubtless it was thus taken by Epictetus,[2] in this passage of his, *μία ὁδὸς ἐπὶ εὔροιαν, τοῦτο καὶ ὄρθρου, καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, ἔστω πρόχειρον, ἀπόστατος τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ παραδοῦναι πάντα τῷ δαιμονίῳ, καὶ τῇ τύχῃ*. There is but one way to tranquillity of mind and happiness: let this therefore be always ready at hand with thee, both when thou wakest early in the morning, and all the day long, and when thou goest late to sleep; to account no external things thine own, but to commit all these to God and fortune.—And there is a very remarkable passage in Demosthenes[3] (observed by Budæus) that must not be here omitted; in which we have *οἱ θεοί* plainly for the inferior or minor gods only, and *τὸ δαιμόνιον* for the supreme God, both together; *εἴσονται οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸν μὴ τὰ δίκαια ψηφισάμενον*. The gods and the Deity will know or take notice of him that gives not a righteous sentence;—that is, both the inferior gods and the supreme God himself. Wherefore we see, that the word *δαιμόνιον*, as to its grammatical form, is not a diminutive, as some have conceived, but an adjective substantived; as well as *τὸ θεῖον* is. Nevertheless in Pagan writings, *δαιμόνιον* also, as well as *δαίμων*, from whence it is derived, is often used for an inferior rank of beings below the gods, though sometimes called gods too; and such was Socrates' *δαιμόνιον*, so commonly known. But the grammar of this word, and its proper signification in Pagan writers, cannot better be manifested, than by citing that passage of

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[1] Lib. iii. cap. xli. p. 176. He cites this from an Epistle of Amasis to the tyrant Polycrates.

[2] Arr. lib. iv. c. iv. p. 387. [edit. Cantab.]

[3] Orat. *περὶ παραπρεσβείας*, p. 266. edit. Græc. Basil. 1532. fol.

Socrates'[1] own, in his Apology, as written by Plato; who though generally supposed to have had a demon, was notwithstanding by Melitus accused of atheism; *ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλιτε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἢ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα*, etc. *οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀπόκριναι, ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ καὶ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ναμίζειν με ἐστίν. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα εἶναι, ἢ θεῶν παῖδας*, etc. Is there any one, O Melitus, who acknowledging, that there are human things, can yet deny, that there are any men? or confessing that there are equine things, can nevertheless deny, that there are any horses? If this cannot be, then no man, who acknowledges demonial things, can deny demons. Wherefore I being confessed to assert *δαιμόνια*, must needs be granted to hold *δαίμονας* also. Now do we not all think, that demons are either gods, or at least sons of the gods? Wherefore for any one to conceive, that there are demons, and yet no gods, is altogether as absurd, as if any should think, that there are mules, but yet neither horses nor asses.—However, in the New Testament, according to the judgments of Origen, Eusebius, and others of the ancient fathers, both those words *δαίμονας* and *δαιμόνια* are alike taken, always in a worser sense, for evil and impure spirits only.

But over and besides all this, the Pagans do often characterize the supreme God by such titles, epithets, and descriptions, as are incommunicably proper to him; thereby plainly distinguishing him from all other inferior gods. He being sometimes called by them *ὁ Δημιουργὸς*, the opifex, architect, or maker of the world; *ὁ Ἡγεμὼν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ Ἀρχηγέτης*, the prince and chief ruler of the universe; *ὁ Πρῶτος* and *ὁ Πρώτιστος θεὸς* (by the Greeks) and (by the Latins) ***Primus Deus***, the first God; *ὁ Πρῶτος, Νοῦς*, the first Mind; *ὁ μέγας Θεὸς*, the great God; *ὁ μέγιστος δαίμων*, and *ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν*, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods; *ὁ Ὕψιστος*, the Highest; and *ὁ ὕπατος θεῶν*, the Supreme of the gods; *ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεὸς*, the uppermost, or most transcendent God; ***Princeps ille Deus***, that chief or principal God; *Θεὸς θεῶν*, the God of gods; and *Ἀρχὴ Ἀρχῶν*, the Principle of principles; *Τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον*, the First Cause; *Ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας*, he that generated or created this whole universe; *ὁ κρατέων τοῦ παντὸς*, he that ruleth over the whole world; ***Summus Rector et Dominus***, the supreme Governor and Lord of all; *ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς*, the God over all; *ὁ θεὸς ἀγένη-*

[1] P. 27. Steph. [There are several omissions in this quotation from Plato and some alterations.]

τος, αὐτογενὴς, αὐτοφυὴς, αὐθυπόστατος, the ingenerate or unmade, self-originated and self-subsisting Deity ; *Μονὰς,* a Monad ; *Τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν,* Unity and Goodness itself ; *Τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας,* and *τὸ ὑπερούσιον,* that which is above essence or super-essential ; *Τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ,* that which is above mind and understanding ; "Summum ille et æternum, neque mutabile neque interiturum,"—that supreme and eternal Being, which is immutable and can never perish ; *Ἀρχὴ, καὶ τέλος, καὶ μέσον ἁπάντων,* the beginning, and end and middle of all things ; *Ἓν καὶ πάντα,* one and all things ; Deus unus et omnes, one God and all gods : and, lastly, to name no more, *ἡ Πρόνοια,* or Providence, as distinguished from *Φύσις,* Nature, is often used by them also as a name for the supreme God, which, because it is of the feminine gender, the impious and atheistical Epicureans therefore took occasion to call God, ridiculously and jeeringly, "Anum fatidicam Pronœam."[1] Now all these, and other such-like expressions, being found in the writings of professed Pagans (as we are able to show) and some of them very frequently, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did put a manifest difference betwixt the supreme God, and all other inferior gods.

XV. What hath been now declared, might, as we conceive, be judged sufficient, in order to our present undertaking ; which is to prove, that the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, notwithstanding that multiplicity of gods worshipped by them, did generally acknowledge one supreme, omnipotent, and only unmade Deity. Nevertheless, since men are commonly so much prepossessed with a contrary persuasion, (the reason whereof seems to be no other than this, that because the notion of the word god, which is now generally received amongst us Christians, is such as does essentially include self-existence in it, they are therefore apt to conceit, that it must needs do so likewise amongst the Pagans) ; we shall endeavor to produce yet some further evidence for the truth of our assertion. And, first, we conceive this to be no confirmation thereof, because after the publication of Christianity, and all along during that tugging and contest, which was betwixt it and Paganism, none of the professed champions for Paganism and antagonists of Christianity, (when occasion was now offered them) did ever assert any such thing as a multiplicity of understanding deities unmade (or creators) but on the contrary, they all generally disclaimed it, professing to acknowledge one supreme self-existent Deity, the maker of the whole universe.

It is a thing highly probable, if not unquestionable, that Apollonius

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[1] Vide Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2890. tom. ix. oper.

Tyanæus, shortly after the publication of the gospel to the world, was a person made choice of by the policy, and assisted by the powers, of the kingdom of darkness, for the doing of some things extraordinary, merely out of design to derogate from the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to enable Paganism the better to bear up against the assaults of Christianity. For amongst the many writers of this philosopher's life, some, and particularly Philostratus, seem to have had no other aim in this their whole undertaking, than only to dress up Apollonius in such a garb and manner, as might make him best seem to be a fit corrival with our Saviour Christ, both in respect of sanctity and miracles. Eunapius[1] therefore telling us, that he mistitled his book, and that instead of Ἀπολλωνίου βίος, the life of Apollonius, he should have called it Θεοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίαν, the coming down, and converse of God with men; forasmuch as this Apollonius (saith he) was not a bare philosopher or man, ἀλλά τι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπου μέσον, but a certain middle thing betwixt the gods and men.—And that this was the use commonly made by the Pagans of this history of Apollonius, namely to set him up in way of opposition and rivalry to our Saviour Christ, appears sundry ways. Marcellinus, in an Epistle of his to St. Austin,[2] declares this as the grand objection of the Pagans against Christianity, (therefore desiring St. Austin's answer to the same;) "Nihil aliud Dominum, quam alii homines facere potuerunt, fecisse vel egisse mentiuntur; Apollonium siquidem suum nobis, et Apuleium, aliosque magicæ artis homines, in medium proferunt, quorum majora contendunt extitisse miracula." The Pagans pretend, that our Saviour Christ did no more than what other men have been able to do, they producing their Apollonius and Apuleius, and other magicians, whom they contend to have done greater miracles.—And it is well known, that Hierocles, to whom Eusebius gives the commendation of a very learned man, wrote a book against the Christians (entitled, Φιλαλήθης, or Λόγοι φιλαλήθεις) the chief design whereof was to compare this Apollonius Tyanæus with, and prefer him before, our Saviour Christ: Ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλλοῦσι, σεμνύνοντες τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ὡς τυφλοῖς ἀναβλέψαι τε παρασχόντα, καί τινα τοιαῦτα δράσαντα θαυμάσια· They are Hierocles' own words in Eusebius: "The Christians (saith he) keep a great deal of stir, crying up of one Jesus, for restoring sight to the blind, and doing some such other wonders." And then mentioning the thaumaturgi or wonder-workers amongst the Pagans, but especially Apollonius Tyanæus, and insisting largely upon

[1] In Vitis Sophistarum, Prœm. p. 6, 7. edit. Plantin.

[2] Inter Epistol. Augustin. Epist. cxxxvi. tom. ii. oper. p. 304. edit. Benedict.

his miracles, he adds in the close of all, *τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα τούτων ἐμνήσθην; ἵνα ἐξῇ συγκρίνειν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀκριβῆ καὶ βεβαίαν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ κρίσιν, καὶ τὴν τῶν Χριστιανῶν κουφότητα· εἴπερ ἡμεῖς μὲν τὸν τοιαῦτα πεποιηκότα, οὐ θεὸν, ἀλλὰ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένον ἄνδρα ἡγοῦμεθα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὀλίγας τερατείας τινας τὸν Ἰησοῦν Θεὸν ἀναγορεύουσι.* To what purpose now have we mentioned all these things? but only that the solid judgment of us [Pagans] might be compared with the levity of the Christians; forasmuch as we do not account him a god who did all these miracles, but only a person beloved of the gods; whilst they declare Jesus to be a God, merely for doing a few wonders.—Where, because Eusebius is silent, we cannot but subjoin an answer out of Lactantius (which indeed he seems to have directed against those very words of Hierocles, though not naming of him) it being both pertinent and full; [1] "Apparet nos sapientiores esse, qui mirabilibus factis non statim fidem divinitatis adjunximus, quam vos, qui ob exigua portenta Deum credidisti——Disce igitur, si quid tibi cordis est, non solum idcirco a nobis Deum creditum Christum, quia mirabilia fecit, sed quia vidimus in eo facta esse omnia, quæ nobis annunciata sunt, vaticinia prophetarum. Fecit mirabilia; magum putassemus, ut et vos nuncupatis; et Judæi tunc putaverunt: si non illa ipsa facturum Christum, prophetæ omnes uno spiritu prædicassent. Itaque Deum credimus, non magis ex factis, operibusque mirandis; quam ex illa ipsa cruce, quam vos sicut canes lambitis: quoniam simul et illa prædicta est. Non igitur suo testimonio, (cui enim de se dicenti potest credi?) sed prophetarum testimonio, qui omnia quæ fecit ac passus est, multo ante cecinerunt: fidem divinitatis accepit; quod neque Apollonio neque Apuleio neque cuiquam magorum potest aliquando contingere." It is manifest, that we Christians are wiser than you Pagans, in that we do not presently attribute divinity to a person merely because of his wonders; whereas a few portentous things, or extraordinary actions, will be enough with you to make you deify the doer of them (and so indeed did some of them, however Hierocles denies it, deify Apollonius.) Let this writer against Christianity therefore learn (if he have any understanding or sense in him) that Christ was not therefore believed to be a God by us Christians, merely because of his miracles, but because we saw all those things done by and accomplished in him, which were long before predicted to us by the prophets. He did miracles, and we should therefore have suspected him for a magician (as you now call him, and as the Jews then supposed him to be) had not all the prophets with one voice foretold, that he should do such things. We believe him therefore to be God, no more for his miracles than from

[1] De. Justi. l. v. c. v.

that very cross of his, which you so much quarrel with, because that was likewise foretold. So that our belief of Christ's divinity is not founded upon his own testimony (for who can be believed concerning himself?) but upon the testimony of the prophets, who sang long before of all those things, which he both did and suffered. Which is such a peculiar advantage and privilege of his, as that neither Apollonius nor Apuleius, nor any other magician, could ever share therein.—Now, as for the life and morals of this Apollonius Tyanæus, as it was a thing absolutely necessary for the carrying on of such a diabolical design, that the person made use of for an instrument should have some colorable and plausible pretence to virtue; so did Apollonius accordingly take upon him the profession of a Pythagorean; and indeed act that part externally so well, that even Sidonius Apollinaris,[1] though a Christian was so dazzled with the glittering show and lustre of his counterfeit virtues, as if he had been enchanted by this magician so long after his death. Nevertheless, whosoever is not very dim-sighted in such matters as these, or partially affected, may easily perceive, that this Apollonius was so far from having any thing of that Divine Spirit which manifested itself in our Saviour Christ, (transcending all the philosophers that ever were) that he fell short of the better moralized Pagans; as for example Socrates, there being a plain appearance of much pride and vain-glory (besides other foolery) discoverable both in his words and actions. And this Eusebius[2] undertakes to evince from Philostratus's own history (though containing many falsehoods in it) *οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἐπιεικέσι καὶ μετρίος ἀνδράσιν ἄξιον ἐγκρίνειν, οὐχ᾽ ὅπως τῷ σωτῆρι ἡμῶν Χριστῷ παρατιθέναι τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον,* that Apollonius was so far from deserving to be compared with our Saviour Christ, that he was not fit to be ranked amongst the moderately and indifferently honest men.—Wherefore, as to his reputed miracle, if credit be to be given to those relations, and such things were really done by him, it must for this reason also be concluded, that they were done no otherwise than by magic and necromancy; and that this Apollonius was but an archimago or grand magician. Neither ought this to be suspected for a mere slander cast upon him by partially affected Christians only, since, during his lifetime, he was generally reputed, even amongst the Pagans themselves, or no other than a *γόης*,[3] or infamous enchanter, and accused of that

[1] Epistolar. lib. viii. Epist. iii. p. 462, 463.

[2] Advers. Hieroclem, cap. iv. p. 431.

[3] This is related by Philostratus in Vita Apollonii, lib. ii. cap. xviii. p. 156.

very crime before Domitian the emperor :[1] as he was also represented such by one of the Pagan writers of his life, Mœragenes,[2] senior to Philostratus, as we learn from Origen : *περὶ μαγείας φαμέν, ὅτι ὁ βουλόμενος ἐξετάσαι, πότερόν ποτε καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἅλωτοί εἰσιν αὐτῇ, εἰ μὴ, ἀναγνώτω τὰ γεγραμμένα Μοιραγένει τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως μόγου καὶ φιλοσόφου ἀπομνημονευνάτων· ἐν οἷς ὁ μὴ Χριστιανὸς, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφος, ἔφησεν ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν Ἀπολλωνίῳ μαγείας, οὐκ ἀγενεῖς τινας φιλοσόφους, ὡς πρὸς γόητα αὐτὸν εἰςελθόντας· ἐν οἷς, οἶμαι, καὶ περὶ Ἐυφράτου πάνυ διηγήσατο, καί τινος Ἐπικουρείου.* As concerning the infamous and diabolical magic, he that would know whether or no a philosopher be temptable by it, or illaqueable into it, let him read the writings of Mœragenes concerning the memorable things of Apollonius Tyanæus the magician and philosopher ; in which he that was no Christian, but a Pagan philosopher himself, affirmeth some not ignoble philosophers to have been taken with Apollonius's magic, including (as I suppose) in that number Euphrates and a certain Epicurean.—And no doubt but this was the reason, why Philostratus[3] derogates so much from the authority of this Mœragenes, affirming him to have been ignorant of many things concerning Apollonius (*οὐ γὰρ Μοιραγένει τε προςεκτέον*, etc.) Because Mœragenes had thus represented Apollonius in his true colors as a magician ; whereas Philostratus's whole business and design was, on the contrary, to vindicate him from that imputation : the truth whereof, notwithstanding, may be sufficiently evinced, even from those very things that are recorded by Philostratus himself.

And here by the way we shall observe, that it is reported by good historians, that miracles were also done by Vespasian at Alexandria, [2]"Per eos menses (they are the words of Tacitus) multa miracula evenere, quis cœlestis favor, et quædam in Vespasianum inclinatio numinum ostenderetur. Ex plebe Alexandrina quidam, oculorum tabe notus, genua ejus advolvitur, remedium cæcitatis exposcens gemitu ; monitu Serapidis dei, quem dedita superstitionibus gens ante alios colit ; precabaturque principem, ut genas et oculorum orbes dignaretur respergere oris excremento. Alius manu æger, eodem deo auctore, ut pede ac vestigio Cæsaris calcaretur orabat." At that time many miracles happened at Alexandria, by which was manifested the heavenly favor and inclination of the Divine powers towards Vespasian. A plebeian Alexandrian, that had been known to be blind, cast himself at the feet of Vespasian, begging with tears from him a remedy for his

[1] Philostrat. ubi supra, lib. viii. cap. vii. p. 327.

[2] Con. Cel. l. 6. p. 302.

[3] Ibid. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 5, 6.

[4] Hist. l. iv. p. 111.

sight (and that according to the suggestion of the god Serapis) that he would deign but to spit upon his eyes and face. Another having a lame hand (directed by the same oracle) beseeches him but to tread upon it with his foot.—And after some debate concerning this business, both these things being done by Vespasian, statim conversa ad usum manus, et cæco reluxit dies; the lame hand presently was restored to its former usefulness, and the blind man recovered his sight: both which things (saith the historian) some who were eye-witnesses do to this very day testify, when it can be no advantage to any one to lie concerning it.—And that there seems to be some reason to suspect, that our archimago Apollonius Tyanæus might have some finger in this business also, because he was not only familiarly and intimately acquainted with Vespasian, but also at that very time (as Philostratus,[1] informeth us) present with him at Alexandria, where he also did many miracles himself. However, we may here take notice of another stratagem and policy of the devil in this, both to obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to weaken men's faith in the Messiah, and baffle the notion of it; that whereas a fame of prophecies had gone abroad every where that a king was to come out of Judea and rule over the whole world, (by which was understood no other than the Messiah) by reason of these miracles done by Vespasian, this oracle or prediction might the rather seem to have its accomplishment in him, who was first proclaimed emperor in Judea, and to whom Josephus[2] himself basely and flatteringly had applied it. And since this business was started and suggested by the god Serapis, that is, by the devil (of whose counsel probably Apollonius also was;) this makes it still more strongly suspicable, that it was really a design or policy of the devil, by imitating the miracles of our Saviour Christ, both in Apollonius and Vespasian, to counterwork God Almighty in the plot of Christianity, and to keep up or conserve his own usurped tyranny in the Pagan world still. Nevertheless, we shall here show Apollonius all the favor we can, and therefore suppose him not to have been one of those more foul and black magicians, of the common sort, such as are not only grossly sunk and debauched in their lives, but also knowingly do homage to evil spirits as such, for the gratification of their lusts; but rather one of those more refined ones, who have been called by themselves Theurgists, such as being in some measure freed from the grosser vices, and thinking to have to do only with good spirits; nevertheless, being proud and vain-glorious, and affecting wonders, and to transcend the generality of mankind, are, by

[1] Ubi supra, lib. v. cap. xxvii. p. 209. et. lib. viii. cap. vii. sect. ii. p. 329.
[2] De Bello Judaico, lib. v. cap. v. sect. iv. p. 390. tom. ii. oper.

a Divine nemesis, justly exposed to the illusions of the devil or evil spirits, cunningly insinuating here, and aptly accommodating themselves to them. However, concerning this Apollonius, it is undeniable, that he was a zealous upholder of the Pagan Polytheism, and a stout champion for the gods, he professing to have been taught by the Samian Pythagoras's ghost, how to worship these gods, invisible as well as visible,[1] and to have converse with them. For which cause he is styled by Vopiscus,[2] *amicus verus deorum*, a true friend of the gods;—that is, a hearty and sincere friend to that old Pagan religion, now assaulted by Christianity, in which not one only true God, but a multiplicity of gods, were worshipped. But notwithstanding all this, Apollonius himself was a clear and undoubted assertor of one supreme Deity; as is evident from his apologetic oration in Philostratus,[3] prepared for Domitian; in which he calls him, *τὸν τῶν ὅλων*, and *τὸν πάντων δημιουργόν θεόν*, that God, who is the maker of the whole universe, and of all things.—And, as he elsewhere in Philostratus declares both the Indians and Egyptians to have agreed in this theology, insomuch that though the Egyptians condemned the Indians for many other of their opinions, yet did they highly applaud this doctrine of theirs, *τῆς μὲν ὅλων γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας θεὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τοῦδε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ταῦτα, αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν*, that God was the maker both of the generation and essence of all things, and that the cause of his making them was his essential goodness:—so doth he himself very much commend this philosophy of Jarchas,[4] the Indian brahmin, viz. that the whole world was but one great animal, and might be resembled to a vast ship, wherein there are many inferior subordinate governors, under one supreme, the oldest and wisest; as also expert mariners of several sorts, some to attend upon the deck, and others to climb the masts and order the sails, *ἐν ᾗ τὴν μὲν πρώτην καὶ τελεωτάτην ἕδραν ἀποδοτέον θεῷ γενέτορι τοῦδε τοῦ ζώου, τὴν δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνῃ, θεοῖς οἱ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ κυβερνῶσι καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ πολλοὶς μὲν φάσκωσιν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεοὺς εἶναι, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν πήγαις τε καὶ νάμασι, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ περὶ γῆν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν τινας.* In which the first and highest seat is to be given to that God, who is the generator or creator of this great animal; and the next under it to those gods, that govern the several parts of it respectively: so that the poets were to be approved of here, when they affirm, that there are many gods in the heavens, many in the seas, many in the rivers and fountains, many

[1] Vide Philostrat. ubi supra, lib. i. cap. xxxii. p. 40.

[2] In Vita Aurel. cap. xxiv. p. 578. edit. Obrechti.

[3] Ubi supra, lib. viii. cap. vii. sect. vii. p. 337.

[4] Philos. p. 142. [lib. iii. cap. xxxv.]

also upon the earth, and some under the earth.—Wherein we have a true representation of the old Paganic theology, which both Indians, and Egyptians, and European poets, (Greek and Latin) all agree in; that there is one supreme God, the maker of the universe, and under him many inferior generated gods, or understanding beings (superior to men) appointed to govern and preside over the several parts thereof, who were also to be religiously honored and worshipped by men. And thus much for Apollonius Tyanæus.

The first Pagan writer against Christianity was Celsus, who lived in the times of Adrian, and was so professed a Polytheist, that he taxes the Jews for having been seduced by the frauds of Moses into this opinion of one God; [1]*ὅτι τῷ ἡγησαμένῳ σφῶν ἑπόμενοι Μωϋσῇ αἰπόλοι καὶ ποίμενες, ἀγροίκοις ἀπάταις ψυχαγωγηθέντες, ἕνα ἐνόμισαν εἶναι Θεόν.* Those silly shepherds and herdsmen, following Moses their leader, and being seduced by his rustic frauds, came to entertain this belief, that there was but one only God.—Nevertheless, this Celsus himself plainly acknowledged, amongst his many gods, one supreme, whom he sometimes calls *τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν*, the first God;—sometimes *τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν*, the greatest God;—and sometimes *τὸν ὑπερουράνιον θεὸν*, the supercelestial God,—and the like: and he doth so zealously assert the Divine omnipotence, that he casts an imputation upon the Christians of derogating from the same, in that their hypothesis of an adversary power; [2]*σφάλλονται δὲ ἀσεβέστατα ἄττα, καὶ περὶ τήνδε τὴν μεγίστην ἄγνοιαν ὁμοίως ἀπὸ θείων αἰνιγμάτων πεπλανημένην, ποιοῦντες τῷ θεῷ ἐναντίον τινὰ διάβολόν τε καὶ γλώττῃ Ἑβραΐᾳ Σατανᾶν ὀνομάζοντες τὸν αὐτόν. ἄλλως μὲν οὖν παντελῶς θνητὰ ταῦτα καὶ οὐδ' ὅσια λέγειν, ὅτι δὲ ὁ μέγιστος Θεὸς, βουλόμενός τι ἀνθρώποις ὠφελῆσαι, τὸν ἀντιπράσσοντα ἔχει, καὶ ἀδυνατεῖ.* The Christians are erroneously led into most wicked opinions concerning God, by reason of their great ignorance of the Divine enigms; whilst they make a certain adversary to God, whom they call the devil, and in the Hebrew language Satan; and affirm, contrary to all piety, that the greatest God,[3] having a mind to do good to men, is disabled or withstood by an adversary resisting him.—Lastly, where he pleads most for the worship of demons, he concludes thus concerning the supreme God: *Θεοῦ δὲ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀπολειπτέον, οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν, οὔτε νύκτωρ, οὔτ' ἐς κοινὸν, οὔτ' ἰδίᾳ, λόγῳ τε ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἔργῳ διηεκῶς, ἀλλά γε καὶ μετὰ τῶνδε, καὶ χωρὶς, ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τετάσθω πρὸς τὸν Θεόν.* But God is by no means any where to be laid aside, or left out; neither by day nor by night, neither in public nor in private, either in our words or actions; but in every

[1] Orig. p. 17, 18. [2] Orig. l. vi. p. 303. [3] Orig. con. Cels. l. viii. p. 419.

thing our mind ought constantly to be directed towards God.—A saying, that might very well become a Christian.

The next and greatest champion for the Pagan cause in books and writings, was that famous Tyrian philosopher Malchus, called by the Greeks Porphyrius; who published a voluminous and elaborate treatise (containing fifteen books) against the Christians; and yet he notwithstanding was plainly as zealous an assertor of one supreme Deity, and one only ἀγένητον, unmade or self-existent principle of all things, as any of the Christians themselves could be; he strenuously opposing that forementioned doctrine of Plutarch and Atticus concerning three unmade principles, a good God, an evil soul or demon, and the matter, and endeavoring to demonstrate, that all things whatsoever, even matter itself, was derived from one perfect understanding Being, or self-originated Deity. The sum of whose argumentation to which purpose we have represented by Proclus upon the Timæus, (vol. i. 216.)

After Porphyrius, the next eminent antagonist of Christianity and champion for Paganism, was Hierocles, the writer of that book, entitled in Eusebius, φιλαλήθης, or a lover of the truth;—which is noted to have been a modester inscription than that of Celsus's ἀληθὴς λόγος, or true oration.—For if Eusebius Pamphili were the writer of that answer to this Philalethes now extant, as we both read in our copies and as Photius also read; then must it needs be granted, that Hierocles, the author of it, was either contemporary with Porphyrius, or else but little his junior. Moreover, this Hierocles seems plainly to be the person intended by Lactantius in these following words: [1] "Alius eandem materiam mordacius scripsit; qui erat tum e numero judicum, et qui auctor in primis faciendæ persecutionis fuit: quo scelere non contentus, etiam scriptis eos, quos afflixerat, insecutus est. Composuit enim libellos duos, non contra Christianos, ne inimice insectari videretur, sed ad Christianos, ut humane ac benigne consulere videretur. In quibus ita falsitatem scripturæ sacræ arguere conatus est, tanquam sibi esset tota contraria.—Præcipue tamen Paulum Petrumque laceravit, cæterosque discipulos, tanquam fallaciæ seminatores; quos eosdem tamen rudes et indoctus fuisse testatus est."—Another hath handled the same matter more smartly, who was first himself one of the judges, and a chief author of the persecution; but, being not contented with that wickedness, he added this afterwards, to persecute the Christians with his pen; he composing two books, not inscribed against the Christians, (lest he should seem plainly to act the part of an enemy) but to the

[1] De Just. lib. iii. c. ii. [p. 358.]

Christians, (that he might be thought to counsel them humanely and benignly :) in which he so charges the holy Scripture with falsehood, as if it were all nothing else but contradictions : but he chiefly lashes Paul and Peter, as divulgers of lies and deceits, whom notwithstanding he declares to have been rude and illiterate persons.—I say, though Hierocles, for some cause or other, be not named here by Lactantius in these cited words, or that which follows, yet it cannot be doubted, but that he was the person intended by him, for these two reasons : First, because he tells us afterward, that the main business of that Christiano-mastix was to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ. "Cum facta Christi mirabilia destrueret, nec tamen negaret, voluit ostendere, Apollonium vel paria, vel etiam majora fecisse. Mirum quod Apuleium prætermiserit, cujus solent et multa et mira memorari. Et ex hoc insolentiam Christi voluit arguere, quod deum se constituerit : ut ille verecundior fuisse videretur, qui cum majora faceret (ut hic putat) tamen id sibi non arrogaverit." That he might obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, which he could not deny, he would undertake to show, that equal or greater miracles were done by Apollonius. And it was a wonder he did not mention Apuleius too, of whose many and wonderful things the Pagans used to brag likewise. Moreover he condemns our Saviour Christ of insolency, for making himself a god, affirming Apollonius to have been the modester person, who, though he did (as he supposes) greater miracles, yet arrogated no such thing to himself.—The second reason is, because Lactantius also expressly mentions the very title of Hierocles' book, viz. Philalethes. "Cum talia ignorantiæ suæ deliramenta fudisset cumque veritatem penitus excidere connixus est, ausus est libros suos nefarios, ac Dei hostes, φιλαλήθεις annotare :" Though pouring out so much folly and madness, professedly fighting against the truth, yet he presumed to call these his wicked books and enemies of God, Philaletheis, or friends to truth.—From which words of Lactantius, and those foregoing, where he affirms this Christiano-mastix to have written two books, the learned prefacer[1] to the late edition of Hierocles, probably concludes that the whole title of Hierocles' book was this, λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς Χριστιανούς· And I conceive, that the first of those two books of Hierocles insisted upon such things as Porphyrius had before urged against the Christians ; but then in the second, he added this *de novo* of his own, to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ ; which Eusebius only takes notice of.

[1] Dr. Pearson, bishop of Chester.

Wherefore Epiphanius telling us,[1] that there was one Hierocles, a prefect or governor of Alexandria, in those persecuting times of Diocletian we may probably conclude, that this was the very person described in Lactantius, who is said to have been first of the number of the judges, and a principal actor in the persecution; and then afterwards to have written this Philalethes against the Christians, wherein, besides other things, he ventured to compare Apollonius Tyanæus with our Saviour Christ. Now, if this Hierocles, who wrote the Philalethes in defence of the Pagan gods against the Christians, were the author of those two other philosophic books, the Commentary upon the Golden Verses, and that De Fato et Providentia, it might be easily evinced from both of them, that he was notwithstanding an assertor of one supreme Deity. But Photius tells us,[2] that that Hierocles, who wrote the book concerning Fate and Providence, did therein make mention of Jamblichus, and his junior Plutarchus Atheniensis: from whence Jonsius taking it for granted, that it was one and the same Hierocles, who wrote against the Christians, and De Fato, infers, that it could not be Eusebius Pamphili, who answered the Philalethes, but that it must needs be some other Eusebius much junior. But we finding Hierocles' Philalethes in Lactantius, must needs conclude, on the contrary, that Hierocles, the famous Christiano-mastix, was not the same with that Hierocles, who wrote De Fato. Which is further evident from Æneas Gazeus in his Theophrastus;[3] where he first mentions one Hierocles, an Alexandrian, that had been his master, whom he highly extols, *ἀλλ᾽ εἰπέ μοι, ἔτι παρ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας δεικνύντες τὰς τελετάς, οἷος ἦν Ἱεροκλῆς ὁ διδάσκαλος*; but tell me, I pray you, are there yet left amongst you in Egypt any such expounders of the arcane mysteries of philosophy, as Hierocles our master was?—And this we suppose to be that Hierocles, who wrote concerning Fate and Providence, (if not also upon the Golden Verses.) But afterward, upon occasion of Apollonius the Cappadocian, or Tyanæan, he mentions another Hierocles distinct from the former; namely him, who had so boasted of Apollonius's miracles, in these words: [4]*ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος τὰ ψευδῆ λέγων ἐλέγχεται. Ἱεροκλῆς δὲ οὐκ ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ προβαλλόμενος τὰ θαυμάσια, ἄπιστον καὶ τοῦτο προσέθηκεν·* Thus Apollonius is convinced of falsehood; but Hierocles (not our master) but he that boasts of the miracles (of Apollonius) adds another incredible thing.—And though it be probable, that one of these

[1] Hæres. lxviii. Meletian. § ii. tom. i. oper. p. 717.

[2] Biblioth. Cod. cciv. p. 554.

[3] Page 7. [edit. Barth.] [4] Page 24.

was the author of that commentary upon the Golden Verses, (for that it should be written by a Christian is but a dream) yet we cannot certainly determine, which of them it was. However, that this Hierocles, who was the mastix of Christianity, and champion for the gods, was notwithstanding a professed assertor of one supreme Deity, is clearly manifest also from Lactantius, in these following words: "Quam tandem nobis attulisti veritatem? nisi quod assertor deorum eos ipsos ad ultimam prodidisti: prosecutus enim summi dei laudes, quem regem, quem maximum, quem opificem rerum, quem fontem bonorum, quem parentem omnium, quem factorem altoremque viventium confesses es, ademisti Jovi tuo regnum; eumque summa potestate depulsum in ministrorum numerum redigisti. Epilogus ergo te tuus arguit stultitiæ, vanitatis, erroris. Affirmas deos esse; et illos tamen subjicis et mancipas ei deo, cujus religionem conaris evertere."

Though you have entitled your book Philalethes, yet what truth have you brought us therein, unless only this, that being an assertor of the gods, (contradicting yourself) you have at last betrayed those very gods? For in the close of your book, prosecuting the praises of the supreme God, and confessing him to be the king, the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, the maker and conserver of all living beings, you have by this means dethroned your Jupiter, and degrading him from his sovereign power, reduced him to the rank of inferior ministers. Wherefore your epilogue argues you guilty of folly, vanity and error, in that you both assert gods, and yet subject and mancipate them under that one God, whose religion you endeavor to overthrow.—Where we must confess we understand not well Lactantius's logic; forasmuch as Hierocles' Zeus, or Jupiter, was one and the same with his supreme God (as is also here intimated;) and though he acknowledged all the other gods to be but his inferior ministers, yet nevertheless did he contend, that these ought to be religiously worshipped, which was the thing that Lactantius should have confuted. But that which we here take notice of, is this; that Hierocles, a grand persecutor of the Christians, and the author of that bitter invective against them, called Philalethes, though he were so strenuous an assertor of Polytheism, and champion for the gods, yet did he nevertheless at the same time clearly acknowledge one supreme Deity, calling him the king, (that is, the monarch of the universe) the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, and the maker and conserver of all life.

But the greatest opposer of Christianity every way was Julian the emperor, who cannot reasonably be suspected to have disguised or

blanched Paganism, because he was an emperor, and had so great an animosity against Christianity, and was so superstitiously or bigotically zealous for the worship of the gods; and yet this very Julian notwithstanding, was an unquestionable assertor of one supreme Deity. In his book[1] written against the Christians, he declares the general sense of the Pagans after this manner: *οἱ γὰρ ἡμέτεροι φασὶν, τὸν δημιουργὸν ἁπάντων μὲν εἶναι κοινὸν πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα, νενεμῆσθαι δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἐθνάρχαις καὶ πολιούχοις θεοῖς, ὧν ἕκαστος ἐπιτροπεύει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λῆξεν οἰκείως αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ πατρὶ πάντα τέλεια, καὶ ἓν πάντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μεριστοῖς, ἄλλη παρ᾽ ἄλλῳ κρατεῖ δύναμις*, etc.—Our theologers affirm the Maker of all to be a common father and king; but that the nations, as to particular things, are distributed by him to other inferior gods, that are appointed to be governors over countries and cities, every one of which administers in his own province agreeably to himself. For whereas in the common father all things are perfect, and one is all, in the particular or partial deities one excels in one power, and another in another. Afterward, in the same book he contends, that the Pagans did entertain righter opinions concerning the supreme God than the Jews themselves: [2] *ὡς εἰ μὲν ὁ προσηχὴς εἴη τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργὶς ὁ κηρυττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Μωσέως, ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ βελτίους ἔχομεν δόξας, οἱ κοινὸν μὲν ἐκεῖνον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἁπάντων δεσπότην, ἐθνάρχας δὲ ἄλλους, οἳ τυγχάνουσι μὲν ὑπ᾽ εκεῖνον, εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ ὕπαρχοι βασιλέως, ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διαφερόντως ἐπανορθούμενος φροντίδα, καὶ οὐ καθίσταμεν αὐτὸν, οὐδὲ ἀντιμερίτην τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν θεῶν καθισταμένων·* If that God, who is so much spoken of by Moses, be the immediate opificer of the whole world, we Pagans entertain better opinions of him, who suppose him to be the common Lord of all; but that there are other governors of nations and countries under him, as prefects or presidents appointed by a king; we not ranking him amongst those partial governors of particular countries and cities as the Jews do.—From both which places it is evident that, according to Julian's theology, all those other gods, whose worship he contended so much for, were but the subordinate ministers of one supreme God, the maker of all.

The same thing might be further manifested from Julian's oration made in praise of the sun, as a great God in this visible world; he therein plainly acknowledging another far more glorious Deity, which was the cause of all things;[3] *εἷς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ*

[1] Cyril. cont. Jul. 4. p. 115. [edit. Spanhem.]

[2] Page 146. [p. 148. edit. Spanhem.]

[3] P. 262. [Edit. Petav. Spanhemii ve. p. 140.]

κατ' οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντες δημιουργικοὶ θεοί. There is one God, the maker of all things; but besides him there are many other demiurgical gods moving round the heavens—in the midst of which is the sun. Where we have a clear acknowledgment of one supreme God, and of many inferior deities, both together. Moreover, in the same oration,[1] he declareth, that the ancient poets, making the sun to have been the offspring of Hyperion, did by this Hyperion understand nothing else but the supreme Deity: *τὸν πάντων ὑπερέχοντα, πάντων ἐπέκεινα, περὶ ὃν πάντα, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα ἐστὶν*, him who is above all things, and about whom, and for whose sake, are all things.—Which supreme Deity is thus more largely described by him in the same oration, (where he calls him the king of all things):[2] *οὗτος τοίνυν, εἴτε τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ καλεῖν αὐτὸν θέμις· εἴτε ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ὃ δὴ φημὶ τὸ νοητὸν σύμπαν· εἴτε ἕν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τὸ ἕν δοκεῖ ὡς πρεσβύτατον· εἴτε ὃ Πλάτων εἴωθεν ὀνομάζειν τὸ ἀγαθόν· αὕτη δὲ οὖν ἡ μονοειδὴς τῶν ὅλων αἰτία, πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐξηγουμένη κάλλους τε, καὶ τελειότητος, ἑνώσεώς τε, καὶ δυνάμεως ἀμηχάνου· κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ μένουσαν πρωτουργὸν οὐσίαν, ἥλιον θεὸν μέγιστον ἀνέφηνεν*, etc. This God, whether he ought to be called that, which is above mind and understanding, or the idea of all things, or the one (since unity seems to be the oldest of all things) or else, as Plato was wont to call him, the good: I say, this uniform cause of all things, which is the original of all pulchritude and perfection, unity and power, produced from himself a certain intelligible sun, every way like himself, of which the sensible sun is but an image.—For thus Dionysius Petavius rightly declares the sense of Julian[3] in this oration; "Vanissimæ hujus et loquacissimæ disputationis mysterium est; a principe ac primario Deo, *νοητὸν* quendam et archetypum solem editum fuisse; qui eandem prorsus *σχέσιν* et *τάξιν* in genere *τῶν νοητῶν* habeat, quam in *αἰσθητοῖς* ille, quem videmus, solaris globus obtinet. Tria itaque discernenda sunt, princeps ille Deus, qui *τἀγαθὸν* a Platone dicitur, *ὁ νοητὸς ἥλιος, ὁ φαινόμενος δίσκος.* The mystery of this most vain and loquacious disputation is this, that from the first and chief Deity was produced a certain intelligible and archetypal sun, which hath the same place or order in the rank of intelligible things, that the sensible sun hath in the rank of sensibles. So that here are three things to be distinguished from one another; first, the supreme Deity, which Plato calls the good; secondly, the intelligible sun, or eternal intellect; and lastly, the corporeal or sensible sun (animated).—Where, notwithstanding, we may take

[1] P. 136. edit. Spanhem.
[2] P. 248. [p. 132. edit. Spanhem.]
[3] P. 274.

notice, how near this Pagan philosopher and emperor, Julian, approached to Christianity, though so much opposed by him, in that he also supposed an eternal mind or intellect, as the immediate offspring of the first fountain of all things; which seems to differ but a little from the Christian λόγος. However, it is plain, that this devout restorer of Paganism, and zealous contender for the worship of the gods, asserted no multiplicity of independent self-existent deities, but derived all his gods from one.

As for those other philosophers and learned men, who, in those latter times of the declining of Paganism, after Constantine, still stood out in opposition against Christianity; such as Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius, and many others, it is unquestionably evident concerning them all, that they clearly acknowledged one supreme Deity as the original of all things. Maximus Madaurensis, a confident and resolved Pagan in St. Austin's time, expressed both his own and the general sense of Pagans after this manner:[1] "Equidem unus esse Deum summum, sine initio, naturæ ceu patrem magnum atque magnificum, quis tam demens, tam mente captus neget esse certissimum? Hujus nos virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus cuncti proprium videlicet ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profecto videamur." Truly that there is one supreme God, without beginning, as the great and magnificent father of nature; who is so mad or devoid of sense as not to acknowledge it to be most certain? His virtues diffused throughout the whole world (because we know not what his proper name is) we invoke under many different names. Whence it comes to pass, that whilst we prosecute, with our supplications, his, as it were, divided members severally, we must needs be judged to worship the whole Deity.—And then he concludes his epistle thus: "Dii te servent, per quos et eorum, atque cunctorum mortalium, communem patrem, universi mortales, quos terra sustinet, mille modis, concordi discordia venerantur." The gods keep thee, by and through whom, we Pagans, dispersed over the whole world, do worship the common father, both of those gods, and all mortals, after a thousand different manners, nevertheless with an agreeing discord.—Longianus,[2] likewise, another more modest Pagan philosopher, upon the request of the same St. Austin, declares his sense concerning the way of worshipping God, and arriving to happiness, to this

[1] Ep. 43. [inter August. Epistol. epist. 16. p. 15. tom. ii. oper. edit. Benedict.]

[2] Ep. 21. [Inter Epist. Augustin. epist. 234. p. 647.]

purpose : "Per minores deos perveniri ad summum Deum non sine sacris purificatoriis ;"[1] that we are to come to the supreme God by the minor or inferior gods, and that not without purifying rites and expiations :—he supposing, that besides a virtuous and holy life, certain religious rites and purifications were necessary to be observed in order to that end. In which epistle, the supreme God is also styled by him "unus, universus, incomprehensibilis, ineffabilis et infatigabilis Creator."

Moreover, that the Pagans generally disclaimed this opinion of many unmade self-existent deities, appeareth plainly from Arnobius, where he brings them in complaining, that they were falsely and maliciously accused by some Christians as guilty thereof, after this manner :[2] "Frustra nos falso at calumnioso incessitis et appetitis crimine, tanquam inficias eamus Deum esse majorem ; cum a nobis et Jupiter nominetur, et optimus habeatur et maximus : cumque illi augustissimas sedes, et capitolia constituerimus immania." In vain do you Christians calumniate us Pagans, and accuse us, as if we denied one supreme omnipotent God ; though we both call him Jupiter, and account him the best and the greatest, having dedicated the most august seats to him, the vast capitols. — Where Arnobius, in way of opposition, shows first, how perplexed and entangled a thing the Pagans' theology was, their poetic fables of the gods nonsensically confounding herology together with theology ; and that it was impossible, that that Jupiter of theirs, which had a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother, should be the omnipotent God. "Nam Deus omnipotens, mente una omnium, et communi mortalitatis assensu, neque genitus scitur, neque novam in lucem aliquando esse prolatus; nec ex aliquo tempore cœpisse esse, vel sæculo. Ipse enim est fons rerum, sator sæculorum ac temporum. Non enim ipsa per se sunt, sed ex ejus perpetuitate perpetua, et infinita semper continuatione procedunt. At vero Jupiter (ut vos fertis) et patrem habet et matrem, avos et avias, nunc nuper in utero matris suæ formatus," etc. You Pagans confound yourselves with contradictions ; for the omnipotent God, according to the natural sense of all mankind, was neither begotten nor made, nor ever had a beginning in time, he being the fountain and original of all things. But Jupiter (as you say) had both father and mother, grandfathers and grandmothers, and was but lately formed in the womb; and therefore he cannot be the eternal omnipotent God.—Nevertheless, Arnobius afterward considering (as we suppose) that these poetic fables

[1] These words are not Longinianus's, but the argument of the epistle prefixed to it.

[2] Lib. i. p. 19.

were by the wiser Pagans either totally rejected, or else some way or other allegorized, he candidly dismisseth this advantage, which he had against them, and grants their Jupiter to be the true omnipotent Deity, and consequently that same God, which the Christians worshipped; but from thence infers, that the Pagans therefore must needs be highly guilty, whilst worshipping the same God with the Christians, they did hate and persecute them after that manner. "Sed sint, ut vultis, unum, nec in aliquo, vi numinis, et majestate distantes; ecquid ergo injustis persequimini nos odiis? Quid, ut ominis pessimi, nostri nominis inhorrescitis mentione, si, quem Deum colitis, eum et nos? aut quid in eadem causa vobis esse contenditis familiares Deos, inimicos atque infestissimos nobis? etenim, si una religio est nobis vobisque communis, cessat ira cœlestium.' But let it be granted, that (as you affirm) your Jupiter, and the eternal omnipotent God are one and the same; why then do you prosecute us with unjust hatreds, abominating the very mention of our names, if the same God that you worship be worshipped by us? Or if your religion and ours be the same, why do you pretend, that the gods are propitious to you, but most highly provoked and incensed against us?—Where the Pagan defence and reply is, "Sed non idcirco Dii vobis infesti sunt, quod omnipotentem colatis Deum; sed quod hominem natum, et quod personis infame est vilibus, crucis supplicio interemptum, et Deum fuisse contenditis, et superesse adhuc creditis, et quotidianis supplicationibus adoratis:" But we do not say, that the gods are therefore displeased with you Christians, because you worship the omnipotent God; but because you contend him to be a god, who was not only born a mortal man, but also died an ignominious death, suffering as a malefactor; believing him still to survive, and adoring him with your daily prayers.—To which Arnobius retorts in this manner: "Tell us now, I pray you, who these gods are, who take it as so great an injury and indignity done to themselves, that Christ should be worshipped? Are they not Janus and Saturn, Æsculapius and Liber, Mercurius the son of Maia and the Theban or Tyrian Hercules, Castor and Pollux, and the like?" "Hice ergo Christum coli, et a nobis accipi, et existimari pro numine, vulneratis accipiunt auribus? et obliti paulo ante sortis et conditionis suæ, sid, quod sibi concessum est, impertiri alteri nolunt? hæc et justitia cœlitum? hoc deorum judicium sanctum? Nonne istud livoris est et avaritiæ genus? non obtrectatio quædam sordens, suas eminere solummodo velle fortunas, aliorum res premi et in contempta humilitate calcari? natum hominem colimus; quid enim, vos hominem nullum colitis natum? non unum et alium? non innumeros alios? quinimo non

omnes quos jam templis habetis vestris, mortalium sustulistis ex numero, et cœlo sideribusque donastis? Concedamus interdum manum vestris opinationibus dantes, unum Christum fuisse de nobis, mentis, animæ, corporis, fragilitatis et conditionis unius; nonne dignus a nobis est tantorum obmunerum gratiam, Deus dici, Deusque sentiri? Si enim vos Liberum, quod reperit usum vini; si quod panis, Cererem; si Æsculapium, quod herbarum si Minervam, quod oleæ; si Triptolemum, quod aratri; si denique Herculem, quod feras, quod fures, quod multiplicium capitum superavit compescuitque natrices, divorum retulistis in cœlum: honoribus quantis afficiendus est nobis, qui ab erroribus nos magnis in sinuata veritate traduxit?" etc. Are these the gods, who are so much offended with Christ's being worshipped, and accounted a god by us? they, who being forgetful of their former condition, would not have the same bestowed upon another, which hath been granted to themselves? Is this the justice of the heavenly powers? this the righteous judgment of gods? or is it not rather base envy and covetousness, for them thus to engross all to themselves? We worship indeed one, that was born a man: what then? do you worship no such? not one, and another, and innumerable? and are not almost all your gods such as were taken from out of the rank of men, and placed among the stars? and will you account that damnable in us, which yourselves practice? Let us for the present yield thus much to your infidelity, and grant, that Christ was but an ordinary man, of the same rank and condition with other mortals: yet might we not for all that (according to your principles) think him worthy, by reason of the great benefits we received from him, to be accounted a god? For if you have advanced into the number of your Divi, Bacchus or Liber for inventing the use of wine, Ceres of corn, Æsculapius of herbs, Minerva of the olive, Triptolemus of the plough, and Hercules for subduing beasts, thieves, and monsters; with how great honors ought he to be affected by us, who by the insinuation of Divine truth hath delivered us from such great errors of mind? etc.—Which argumentation of Arnobius, though it were good enough *ad homines*, to stop the mouths of the Pagans, there being more reason, that Christ should be made a god, for the benefits that mankind receive from him, than that Bacchus, or Ceres, or Hercules should be so; yet as the same Arnobius himself seems to intimate, it is not sufficient without something else superadded to it, for the justification of Christianity. Neither indeed was that the chief quarrel, which the Pagans had with the Christians, that they had deified one, who was crucified, (though the cross of Christ was also a great offence to them) but that they condemning the Pagans, for worshipping others besides the supreme om-

nipotent God, and decrying all those gods of theirs, did themselves notwithstanding worship one mortal man for a god. This Celsus urges in Origen, [1] *εἰ μὲν δὴ μηδένα ἄλλον ἐθεράπευον οὗτοι πλὴν ἕνα Θεὸν, ἣν ἄν τις αὐτοῖς ἴσως πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτενὴς λόγος· νυνὶ δὲ τὸν ἔναγχος φανέντα τουτον ὑπερθρησκεύουσι, καὶ ὅμως οὐδὲν πλημμελεῖν νομίζουσα περὶ τὸν Θεὸν, εἰ καὶ ὑπηρέτης αὐτοῦ θεραπευφήσεται·* If these Christians themselves worshipped no other but one God, or the pure Divinity, then might they perhaps seem to have some just pretence of censuring us; but now they themselves give Divine honor to one that lately rose up, and yet they persuade themselves, that they do not at all offend God in worshipping that supposed minister of his.—Which, as Origen makes there a reply to it, so shall it be further considered by us afterwards.

As for the judgment of the fathers in this particular, Clemens Alexandrinus was not only of this opinion, that the Pagans (at least the Greekish) did worship the true God, and the same God with the Christians (though not after a right manner) but also endeavors to confirm it from the authority of St. Peter: [2] "That the Greeks knew God, Peter intimates in his predication. There is one God, saith he, who made the beginning of all things, and hath power over their end, etc. Worship this God, not as the Greeks do. Wherein he seemeth to suppose the Greeks to worship the same God with us, though not according to the right tradition received by his Son. He does not enjoin us not to worship that God, which the Greeks worship, but to worship him otherwise than they do; altering only the manner of the worship, but not the object, or preaching another God. And what that is, not to worship God as the Greeks do, the same Peter intimated in those words: They worship him in images of wood and stone, brass and iron, gold and silver, and sacrifice to the dead also, as to gods." Where he adds further out of St. Peter's predication, "Neither worship God as the Jews do," etc. "The one and only God (saith Clemens) is worshipped by the Greeks Paganically, by the Jews Judaically, but by us newly and spiritually. For the same God, who gave the two testaments to the Jews and Christians, gave philosophy to the Greeks, *δι' ἧς ὁ παντοκράτωρ παρ' Ἕλλησι δοξάζεται*, by which the omnipotent God is glorified amongst the Greeks.

Lactantius Firmianus also, in many places, affirms the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity; [3] "Summum Deum et philoso-

[1] Lib. viii. p. 385.

[2] Strom. 6. p. 635. [c. v. p. 759. edit. Potteri.]

[3] De Ira Dei. p. 727. [cap. ix. p. 934.]

phi et poetæ, et ipsi denique, qui deos colunt, sæpe fatentur:" That there is one supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves, frequently acknowledge.—From whence he concludes, that all the other Pagan gods were nothing but the ministers of this one supreme, and creatures made by him, (he then only blaming them for calling them gods, and giving them religious worship)—lib. i. When he had declared, that it was altogether as absurd to suppose the world to be governed by many independent gods, as to suppose the body of a man to be governed by many minds or souls independent; he adds: [2] "Quod quia intelligunt isti assertores deorum, ita eos præesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tantum unus sit rector eximius. Jam ergo cæteri non dii erunt, sed satellites ac ministri, quos ille unus, maximus et potens omnium, officiis his præfecit, ut ipsi ejus imperio et nutibus serviant. Si universi pares non sunt, non igitur dii omnes sunt. Nec enim potest hoc idem esse, quod servit et quod dominatur. Nam si Deus est nomen summæ potestatis. incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus, impassibilis, nulli rei subjectus. Ergo dii non sunt, quos parere uni maximo Deo necessitas cogit." Which because the assertors of gods well understand, they affirm these gods of theirs so to preside over the several parts of the world, as that there is only one chief rector or governor. Whence it follows, that all their other gods can be no other thing than ministers and officers, which one greatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed and constituted, so as to serve his command and beck. Now, if all the Pagan gods be not equal, then can they not be all gods; since that which ruleth, and that which serveth, cannot be the same. God is a name of absolute power, and implies incorruptibility, perfection, impassibility, and subjection to nothing. [2]Wherefore these ought not to be called gods, whom necessity compels to obey one greatest God.—Again, in the same book, "Nunc satis est demonstrare, summo ingenio viros attigisse veritatem ac prope tenuisse; nisi eos retrorsum infatuata pravis opinionibus consuetudo rapuisset, qua et deos alios esse opinabantur, et ea, quæ in usum hominis Deus fecit, tanquam sensu prædita essent, pro diis habenda et colenda credebant." It is now sufficient to have shown, that the more ingenious and intelligent Pagans came very near to the truth, and would have fully reached it, had not a certain customary infatuation of evil opinions snatched them away to an acknowledgment of other gods, and to a belief, that those things, which God made for the use of men, as endued with sense (or animated)

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[1] Lib. i. p. 16. [cap. iii. p. 25.] [2] P. 28. [cap. v. p. 40.]

ought to be accounted gods and worshipped; namely, the stars.—And afterward, [1] "Quod si cultores deorum eos ipsos se colere putant, quos summi Dei ministros appellamus, nihil est quod nobis faciant invidiam, qui unum Deum dicamus, multos negemus." If the worshippers of the gods think, that they worship no other than the ministers of the one supreme God, then there is no cause, why they should render us as hateful, who say, that there is one God, and deny many gods.—

Eusebius Cæsariensis likewise gives us this account of the Pagans' creed or the tenor of their theology, as it was then held forth by them; [2] *ἕνα γὰρ ὄντα θεὸν παντοίαις δυνάμεσι, τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα· καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φασί·* The Pagans declare themselves in this manner, that there is one God, who with his various powers filleth all things, and passeth through all things, and presideth over all things; but being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading them, he is reasonably worshipped by or in those things that are manifest and visible.—Which passage of Eusebius will be further considered afterward, when we come to give a more particular account of Paganism.

What St. Austin's sense was[3] concerning the theology of the Pagans, hath been already declared; namely, "That they had not so far degenerated as to have lost the knowledge of one supreme God, from whom is all whatsoever nature; and that they derived all their gods from one." We shall now, in the last place, conclude with the judgment of Paulus Orosius, who was his contemporary: [4] "Philosophi dum intento mentis studio quærunt scrutanturque omnia, unum Deum authorem omnium repererunt, ad quem unum omnia referrentur; unde etiam nunc Pagani, quos jam declarata veritas de contumacia magis quam de ignoranti convincit, cum a nobis discutiuntur, non se plures sequi, sed sub uno Deo magno, plures ministros venerari fatentur. Restat igitur de intelligentia veri Dei, per multas intelligendi suspiciones, confusa dissensio quia de uno Deo omnium pene una est opinion." The philosophers of the Gentiles, whilst with intent study of mind they inquired and searched after things found, that there was one God, the author of all things, and to which one all things should be referred. Whence also the Pagans at this very day, whom the declared truth rather convinceth of contumacy than of ignorance, when they are urged by us, confess themselves not to follow many gods, but only under

[1] P. 39. [c. vii. p. 51.] [2] Præp. Evang. lib. iii. c. xiii. [p. 121.]

[3] Lib. xx. contra Faustum Manich. cap. xix. p. 246. tom. vi. oper.

[4] His. l. vi. c. i. [p. 461. edit. Fabricii.]

one God to worship many ministers. So that there remaineth only a confused dissension concerning the manner of understanding the true God, because about one God there is almost one and the same opinion of all.

And by this time we think it sufficiently evident, that the Pagans, (at least after Christianity) though they asserted many gods, they calling all understanding beings superior to men by that name, (according to that of St. Jerome, "Deum quicquid supra se esset, Gentiles putabant;") yet they acknowledged one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

XVI. But because it is very possible, that some may still suspect all this to have been nothing else but a refinement and interpolation of Paganism, after that Christianity had appeared upon the stage; or a kind of mangonization of it, to render it more vendible and plausible, the better able to defend itself, and bear up against the assaults of Christianity; whilst in the mean time the genuine doctrine of the ancient Pagans was far otherwise: although the contrary hereunto might sufficiently appear from what hath been already declared, yet however for the fuller satisfaction of the more strongly prejudiced, we shall, by an historical deduction made from the most ancient times all along downwards, demonstrate, that the doctrine of the greatest Pagan Polytheists, as well before Christianity as after it, was always the same; that, besides their many gods, there was one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

And this we shall perform, not as some[1] have done, by laying the chief stress upon the Sibylline oracles, and those reputed writings of Hermes Trismegist, the authority of which hath been of late so much decried by learned men; nor yet upon such oracles of the Pagan deities,[2] as may be suspected to have been counterfeited by Christians; but upon such monuments of Pagan antiquity, as are altogether unsuspected and indubitate. As for the Sibylline oracles, there may (as we conceive) be two extremes concerning them; one, in swallowing down all that is now extant under that title as genuine and sincere, whereas nothing can be more manifest, than that there is much counterfeit and supposititious stuff in this Sibylline farrago, which now we have. From whence, besides other instances of the like kind, it appears too evidently to be denied, that some pretended Christians of former times have

1 Augustinus Eugubinus, Mutius Pansa, and others.

2 These oracles are produced by Justin Martyr, in Orat. ad Græcos et Eusebius in Prepar. Evang. and others.

been for pious and religious frauds, and endeavored to uphold the truth of Christianity by figments and forgeries of their own devising. Which as it was a thing ignoble and unworthy in itself, and argued that those very defenders of Christianity did themselves distrust their own cause; so may it well be thought, that there was a policy of the devil in it also, there being no other more effectual way than this, to render all Christianity (at least in after-ages) to be suspected. Insomuch that it might perhaps be questioned whether the truth and divinity of Christianity appear more in having prevailed against the open force and opposition of its professed enemies, or in not being at last smothered and oppressed by these frauds and forgeries of its seeming friends and defenders. The other extreme may be, in concluding the whole business of the Sibylline oracles (as any ways relating to Christianity) to have been a mere cheat and figment; and that there never was any thing in those Sibylline books, which were under the custody of the Quindecimviri, that did in the least predict our Saviour Christ, or the times of Christianity. For notwithstanding all that the learned Blondel[1] hath written, it seems to be undeniably evident from Virgil's fourth Idyllium, that the Cumean Sibyl was then supposed to have predicted a new flourishing kingdom or monarchy, together with a happy state of justice or righteousness to succeed in the latter age of the world:

> Ultima Cumæi venit jam carminis ætas,
> Magnus ab integro seclorum nascitur ordo.
> Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,
> Jam nova progenies cœlo delabitur alto, etc.

Moreover, it is certain, that in Cicero's time the Sibylline prophecies were interpreted by some in favor of Cæsar, as predicting a monarchy; [2]"Sibyllæ versus observamus, quos illa furens fudisse dicitur. Quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in senatu putabatur, eum, quem revera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus." We take notice of the verses of the Sibyl, which she is said to have poured out in her fury or prophetic frenzy, the interpreter[3] whereof was lately thought to have been about to declare in the senate-house, that if we would be safe, we should acknowledge him for a king, who really was so.—Which interpretation

[1] In his Treatise of the Sibyls, printed in French at Paris, 1649, in 4to.

[2] Cic. Div. lib. ii. [cap. liv. p. 3238. tom. ix. oper.]

[3] L. Cotta Quindecimvir.

of the Sibylline oracles (after Cæsar's death) Cicero was so much offended with, (he also looking upon a Roman monarchy as a thing no less impossible than undesirable,) that upon this occasion he quarrels with those very Sibylline oracles themselves, as well as the readers and expounders of them, after this manner: [1]"Hoc si est in libris, in quem hominem, et in quod tempus est? Callide enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcunque accidisset, prædictum videretur, hominum et temporum definitione sublata. Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut iidem versus alias in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur. Non esse autem illud carmen furentis, tum ipsum poema declarat, (est enim magis artis et diligentiæ quam incitationis et motus) tum vero ea quæ ἀκροστιχὶς dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versuum literis aliquid connectitur. Quamobrem Sibyllam quidem sepositam et conditam habeamus, ut, id, quod proditum est a majoribus, injussu senatus ne legantur quidem libri." If there be any such thing contained in the Sibylline books, then we demand, concerning what man is it spoken, and of what time? For whoever framed those Sibylline verses, he craftily contrived, that whatsoever should come to pass, might seem to have been predicted in them, by taking away all distinction of persons and times. He also purposely affected obscurity, that the same verses might be accommodated sometime to one thing, and sometime to another. But that they proceeded not from fury and prophetic rage, but rather from art and contrivance, doth no less appear otherwise, than from the acrostic in them. Wherefore let us shut up the Sibyl, and keep her close, that, according to the decree of our ancestors, her verses may not be read without the express command of the senate.—And lastly, he addeth, "Cum antistibus agamus, ut quidvis potius ex illis libris quam regem proferant, quem Romæ posthac nec dii nec homines esse patientur." Let us also deal with the quindecimviri and interpreters of the Sibylline books, that they would rather produce any thing out of them, than a king; whom neither gods nor men will hereafter suffer at Rome.—Where, though Cicero were mistaken as to the event of the Roman government, and there were doubtless some predictions in these Sibylline books of a new kingdom or monarchy to be set up in the world; yet that the Roman empire was not the thing intended in them, doth manifestly appear from that description in Virgil's forementioned eclogue; wherein there is another completion of them expected, though flatteringly applied to Saloninus. Wherefore we conclude, that the kingdom, and happy state, or golden age, predicted

[1] De Div. lib. ii. [ubi supra.]

in the Sibylline oracles, was no other than that of the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. Lastly, in that other passage of Cicero's concerning the Sibylline oracles: "Valeant ad deponendas potius quam ad suscipiendas religiones;" let them be made use of rather for the extinguishing than the begetting of religions and superstitions; there seems to be an intimation, as if, of themselves, they rather tended to the lessening than increasing of the Pagan superstitions; and therefore may probably be thought to have predicted a change of that Pagan religion, by the worship of one sole Deity to be introduced. Neither ought it to seem a jot more strange, that our Saviour Christ should be foretold by the Pagan Sibyl, than that he was so clearly predicted by Balaam the Aramitic sorcerer. However, those things in the Sibylline verses might have been derived, some way or other, from the Scripture prophecies; which there is indeed the more probability of, because that Sibylline prophet made use of those very same figures and allegories in describing the future happy state, that are found in the Scripture. As for example:

[1]———Nec magnos metuent armenta leones;
Occidet et serpens, etc.

Now, as Cicero seems to complain, that in his time these Sibylline oracles were too much exposed to view, so it is very probable, that notwithstanding they were to be kept up under the guard of the quindecimviri, yet many of them might be copied out and get abroad; and thereby an occasion might be offered to the ignorantly-zealous Christians, who were for officious lies and pious frauds, to add a great deal more of their own forging to them. Neither indeed is it imaginable, how any such cheat as this should either at first have been attempted, or afterward have proved successful, had there not been some foundation of truth to support and countenance it. Besides which it is observable, that Celsus, who would have had the Christians rather to have made the Sibyl than our Saviour Christ a God; taking notice of their using of those Sibylline testimonies against the Pagans, did not tax them for counterfeiting the whole business of these Sibylline oracles, but only for inserting many things of their own into them; [2]*ὑμεῖς δὲ κἂν Σίβυλλαν, ἤ χρῶνταί τινες ὑμῶν, εἰκοτως ἂν μᾶλλον προεστήσασθε, ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ παῖδα, νῦν δὲ παρεγγράφειν μὲν εἰς τὰ ἐκείνης, πολλὰ καὶ βλάσφημα εἰκῇ δύνασθε·* You Christians might much rather have acknowledged even the Sibyl for the offspring of God; but now you can boldly insert

[1] Virgil. Eclog. iv. ver. 22, 24. [2] Orig. c. Cels. lib. vii. p. 368.

into her verses many, and those maledicent things of your own.—Where Origen, that he might vindicate, as well as he could, the honor of Christians, pleads in their defence, that Celsus, for all that, could not show what they had foisted into those Sibylline verses; because, if he had been able to have produced more ancient and incorrupt copies, in which such things were not found, he would certainly have done it. Notwithstanding which, it is likely, that there were other ancient copies then to be found, and that Celsus might have met with them too, and that from thence he took occasion to write as he did. However, this would not justify the present Sibylline books, in which there are forgeries plainly discoverable without copies. Nevertheless it seems, that all the ancient Christians did not agree in making use of these Sibylline testimonies, thus much being intimated by Celsus himself, in the forecited words, ἢ χρῶνταί τινες ὑμῶν, which some of you make use of;—as they did not all acknowledge the Sibyl to have been a prophetess neither: since upon Celsus[1] mentioning a sect of Christians called Sibyllists, Origen tells us, that these were such as using the Sibylline testimonies were called so in way of disgrace by other Christians, who would not allow the Sibyl to have been a prophetess: they perhaps conceiving it derogatory to the Scriptures. But though there may be some of the ancient Sibylline verses still left in that farrago which we now have, yet it being impossible for us to prove which are such, we shall not insist upon any testimonies at all from thence, to evince, that the ancient Pagans acknowledged one supreme Deity. Notwithstanding which, we shall not omit one Sibylline passage, which we find recorded in Pausanias[2] (from whence, by the way, it appears also, that the Sibylline verses were not kept up so close, but that some of them got abroad,) he telling us, that the defeat of the Athenians at Ægos Potamos was predicted by the Sibyl in these words (amongst others):

> *Καὶ τότ᾽ Ἀθηναίοισι βαρύστονα κήδεα θήσει*
> *Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, οὗπερ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον*, etc.
>
> Ac tum Cecropidis luctum gemitusque ciebit
> Jupiter altitonans, rerum cui summa potestas, etc.

Whereto might be added also that of another ancient Peliadean prophetess, in the same writer,[3] wherein the Divine eternity and immutability is plainly declared:

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[1] Orig. contra Celsum, lib. v. p. 272.

[2] In Phocicis, lib. x. cap. ix. p. 820. edit. Kuhnii.

[3] Ibid. cap. xii. p. 828.

Ζεὺς ἦν, Ζεὺς ἐστὶ, Ζεὺς ἔσσεται, ὦ μεγάλε Ζεῦ.

Jupiter est, fuit, atque erit: O bone Jupiter alme.

Besides these Sibylline prophecies, there are also other oracles of the Pagan deities themselves, in which there was a clear acknowledgment of one supreme and greatest God. But as for such of them, as are said to have been delivered since the times of Christianity, when the Pagan oracles began to fail, and such as are now extant only in Christian writings, however divers of them are cited out of Porphyrius's book of oracles; because they may be suspected, we shall not here mention any of them. Nevertheless, we shall take notice of one oracle of the Clarian Apollo, that is recorded by Macrobius,[1] in which one supreme Deity is not only asserted, but is also called by that Hebrew name (or Tetragrammaton) Jao:

Φράζεο τὸν πάντων ὕπατον θεὸν ἔμμεν Ἰάω.

You are to call the highest and supreme of all the gods, Jao—though it be very true, that that Clarian devil there cunningly endeavored to divert this to the sun, as if that were the only supreme Deity and true Jao. To which might be added another ancient oracle (that now occurs) of the Dodonean Jupiter,[2] together with the interpretation of Themistocles, to whom it was delivered; wherein he was commanded *πρὸς τὸν ὁμώνυμον τοῦ θεοῦ βαδίζειν*, to repair to him, who was called by the same name with God; which Themistocles apprehended to be the king of Persia, *μεγάλους γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναί τε καὶ λέγεσθαι βασιλέας*, because both he and God were alike called (though in different repects and degrees) the great king or monarch.

But as for those writings, commonly imputed to Hermes Trismegist, that have been generally condemned by the learned of this latter age, as wholly counterfeit and supposititious, and yet on the contrary are asserted by Athanasius Kircherus[3] for sincere and genuine; we shall have occasion to declare our sense concerning them more opportunely afterward.

The most ancient theologers, and most eminent assertors of Polytheism amongst the Pagans, were Zoroaster in the eastern parts, and Orpheus amongst the Greeks. The former of which was of so great antiquity, that writers cannot well agree about his age. But that he

[1] Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 290.

[2] Apud Plutarch. in Vita Themistocl. tom. i. oper. p. 225.

[3] In Œdipo Ægyptiaco et Obelisco Pamphilio, p. 35.

was a Polytheist is acknowledged by all, some affirming it to be signified in his very name, as given him after his death; it being interpreted by them a worshipper of the stars.[1] Neither is it to be doubted, but that *ster* or *ester*, in the Persian language, did signify a star, as it hath been observed also by learned men concerning sundry other words, now familiar in these European languages, that they derived their original from the Persian. Notwithstanding which, it may be suspected, that this was here but a Greek termination: the word being not only in the oriental languages written *zertoost* and *zaradust*, but also in Agathias, *zarades*. However, Zoroaster's Polytheism is intimated by Plato;[2] where his magic is defined to have been nothing else but *θεῶν θεραπεία*, the worship of the gods.—Whence by the way we learn also, that the word *μαγεία*, or magic, was first taken in a good sense, which is confirmed by Porphyrius,[3] *παράγε μὴν τοῖς Πέρσαις, οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον σοφοὶ καὶ τούτου θεράποντες, Μάγοι μὲν προσαγορεύονται·* Amongst the Persians, those who were skilful in the knowledge of the Deity, and religious worshippers of the same were called magi.—And as magic is commonly conceived to be founded in a certain vital sympathy that is in the universe, so did these ancient Persian magi and Chaldeans (as Psellus tells us[4]) suppose *συμπαθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἄνω τοῖς κάτω*, that there was a sympathy betwixt the superior and inferior beings;—but it seems the only way at first by them approved, of attracting the influence and assistance of those superior invisible powers, was by piety, devotion, and religious rites. Nevertheless, their devotion was not carried out only to one omnipotent God, but also to many gods; neither is it to be questioned but that this Divine magic of Zoroaster shortly after degenerated in many of his followers into the theurgical magic, and at length into *γοητεία*, downright sorcery and witchcraft; the only thing which is now vulgarly called magic. But how many gods soever this Zoroaster worshipped, that he acknowledged notwithstanding one supreme Deity, appeareth from the testimony of Eubulus, cited by Porphyrius in his De Antro Nympharum,[5] *πρῶτα μέν, ὥς ἔφη Εὔβουλος, Ζωροάστρου αὐτοφυὲς σπήλαιον ἐν τοῖς πλησίον ὄρεσι τῆς Περσίδος, ἀνθηρὸν καὶ πηγὰς*

[1] Thus it was explained by Dinon and Hermodorus, as we are informed by Laertius in his proem. segm. 8. p. 6. of which opinion is likewise Scaliger, with others of the moderns.

[2] In Alcibiade i. oper. p. 32. [3] De Abst. lib. iv. p. 165.

[4] In brevi dogmat. Chaldaicorum declaratione, published at the end of Servatius Gallæus's edition of the Sibylline Oracles, Amst. 1689. in 4to.

[5] P. 254.

ἔχον, ἀνιερώσαντος εἰς τιμην τοῦ πάντων ποιητοῦ καὶ πατρὸς Μίθρου, εἰκόνα φέροντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σπηλαίου τοῦ κόσμου, ὃν ὁ Μίθρας ἐδημιούργησε· Zoroaster, first of all, as Eubulus testifieth, in the mountains adjoining to Persis, consecrated a native orbicular cave, adorned with flowers, and watered with fountains, to the honor of Mithras, the maker and father of all things: this cave being an image or symbol to him of the whole world, which was made by Mithras.—Which testimony of Eubulus is the more to be valued, because, as Porphyrius elsewhere[1] informeth us, he wrote the history of Mithras at large in many books; from whence it may be presumed, that he had thoroughly furnished himself with the knowledge of what belonged to the Persian religion. Wherefore, from the authority of Eubulus we may well conclude, also, that notwithstanding the sun was generally worshipped by the Persians as a god, yet Zoroaster, and the ancient magi, who were best initiated in the Mithraic mysteries, asserted[2] another Deity, superior to the sun, for the true Mithras, such as was πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ, the maker and father of all things, or of the whole world—whereof the sun is a part. However, these also looked upon the sun as the most lively image of this Deity, in which it was worshipped by them; as they likewise worshipped the same Deity symbolically in fire, as Maximus Tyrius informeth us;[3] agreeable to which is that in the magic oracles:[4]

———πάντα πυρὸς ἑνὸς ἐκγεγαῶτα.

All things are the offspring of one fire; that is, of one supreme Deity.—And Julian the emperor was such a devout sun-worshipper as this, who acknowledged, besides the sun, another incorporeal Deity, transcendent to it. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that others amongst the Persians, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, might, as well as Heraclitus, Hippocrates, and the Stoics amongst the Greeks, look upon the fiery substance of the whole world (and especially the sun) as animated and intellectual, to be the supreme Deity, and the only Mithras, according to that inscription,[5] Deo Soli Invicto Mithræ. — However, Mithras, whether supposed to be corporeal or incorporeal, was unquestionably taken by the Persians for the supreme Deity, according

[1] De Abstin. lib. iv. sect. xvi. p. 165.

[2] That Mithras, which was called ὁ κρύφιος θεὸς, the hidden God—was not the visible sun.

[3] Vide Dissertat. xxxviii. p. 371.

[4] Commonly ascribed to Zoroaster, sect. ii. vers. 29. in Stanley's History of Philosophy.

[5] Vide Anton. Van Dale Dissert. ix. ad Antiquit. et Marmora, p. 16.

to that of Hesychius, *Μίθρας, ὁ πρῶτος ἐν Πέρσαις θεὸς*, Mithras, the first god among the Persians—who was therefore called in the inscription[1] Omnipotent, Omnipotenti Deo Mithræ. Which first, supreme and omnipotent God was acknowledged by Artabanus, the Persian, in his conference with Themistocles, in these words :[2] *ἡμῖν δὲ πολλῶν νόμων καὶ καλῶν ὄντων, κάλλιστος οὗτός ἐστι τὸ τιμᾷν βασιλέα, καὶ προσκυνεῖν εἰκόνα θεοῦ τοῦ τὰ πάντα σώζοντος·* Amongst those many excellent laws of ours, the most excellent is this, that the king is to be honored and worshipped religiously, as the image of that God, which conserveth all things.—Scaliger[3] with some others (though we know not upon what certain grounds) affirm, that *mither*, in the Persian language, signified *great*, and *mithra*, *greater* or *greatest ;* according to which, Mithras would be all one with *Deus major* or *maximus*,[4] the greatest God. Wherefore we conclude, that either Herodotus was mistaken, in making the Persian Mithras the same with Mylitta or Venus, (and perhaps such a mistake might be occasioned from hence, because the word ܡܐܕܪ *mader* or *mether* in the Persian language signified *mother*, as *mylitta* in the Syrian did) ; or else, rather, that this Venus[5] of his is to be understood of the *Ἀφροδίτη οὐρανία*, the heavenly Venus or Love ; and thus indeed is she there called in Herodotus, Urania ; by which, though some would understand nothing else but the moon, yet we conceive the supreme Deity, true heavenly Love (the mother and nurse of all things) to have been primarily signified therein.

But Zoroaster and the ancient magi are said to have called the supreme God also by another name, viz. Oromasdes or Ormisdas ; however Oromasdes, according to Plato,[6] seems to have been the father of Zoroaster. Thus, besides Plutarch and others, Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras,[7] *παρῄνει μάλιστα δ' ἀληθεύειν, τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῷ παραπλησίους, ἐπεὶ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τῶν Μάγων ἐπυνθάνετο, ὃν Ὠρομάζην καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι, ἐοικέναι τὸ μὲν σῶμα φωτί· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀληθείᾳ.* Which we would understand thus : Pythagoras exhorted men chiefly to the love of truth, as being that alone which could make them resemble God, he having learned from the magi, that God, whom they call Oromasdes, was as to corporeals most like to light, and as to incorporeals to truth.—Though perhaps some

[1] Apud Gruter. Thesaur. Inscrip. p. 34. n. 5. [2] Plut. Themist.
[3] De Emendat. Temporum, lib. vi. cap. de Hebdom. Daniel, p. 588.
[4] Hist. lib. i. cap. cxxxi. p. 55. [5] Genitrix.
[6] In Alcibiade, tom. i. oper. p. 32.
[7] P. 191. [p. 41. edit. Kuster.]

would interpret these words otherwise, so as to signify Oromasdes to have been really compounded of soul and body, and therefore nothing else but the animated sun, as Mithras is commonly supposed also to have been. But the contrary hereunto is plainly implied in those Zoroastrian traditions or fables concerning Oromasdes, recorded in Plutarch,[1] ὅτι ὑπέστησε τοῦ ἡλίου τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς ἀφέστηκε, that Oromasdes was as far removed from the sun, as the sun was from the earth.—Wherefore Oromasdes was, according to the Persians, a deity superior to the sun; God properly as the fountain of light and original of good, and the same with Plato's τἀγαθὸν, or first good.—From whom the Persians, as Scaliger informs us, called the first day of every month Ormasda, probably because he was the beginning of all things. And thus Zoroaster and the ancient magi acknowledged one and the same supreme Deity, under the different names of Mithras and Oromasdes.

But it is here observable, that the Persian Mithras was commonly called Τριπλάσιος, threefold or treble.—Thus Dionysius,[2] the Pseudo-Areopagite, καὶ εἰσέτι Μάγοι τὰ μνημόσυνα τοῦ τριπλασίου Μίθρου τελοῦσιν· The Persian magi to this very day celebrate a festival solemnity in honor of the triplasian (that is, the threefold or triplicated) Mithras. And something very like to this is recorded in Plutarch[3] concerning Oromasdes also, ὁ μὲν Ὠρομάζης τρὶς ἑαυτὸν αὐξήσας, Oromasdes thrice augmented or triplicated himself;—from whence it further appears, that Mithras and Oromasdes were really one and the same Numen. Now the scholiasts upon Dionysius pretend to give a reason of this denomination of the Persian Mithras, Triplasios, or threefold, from the miracle done in Hezekiah's time, when the day was increased, and almost triplicated; as if the magi then observing the same had thereupon given the name of Τριπλάσιος, or threefold, to their god Mithras, that is, the sun, and appointed an anniversary solemnity for a memorial thereof. But learned men have already shown the foolery of this conceit; and therefore it cannot well be otherwise concluded, but that here is a manifest indication of a higher mystery, viz. a trinity in the Persian theology; which Gerardus I. Vossius[4] would willingly understand, according to the Christian hypothesis, of a Divine triunity, or three hypostases in one and the same Deity, whose distinctive characters are goodness,

[1] De Iside et Osir. p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Epistol. vii. ad Polycarpum, p. 91. tom. ii. oper.

[3] De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

[4] De Orig. et Progressu Idololat. lib. ii. cap. ix. p. 131.

wisdom, and power. But the magical or Zoroastrian oracles seem to represent this Persian trinity more agreeably to that Pythagoric or Platonic hypothesis, of three distinct substances subordinate one to another, the two first whereof are thus expressed in the following verses :[1]

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλησε πατὴρ, καὶ νῷ ῳαρέδωκε
Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κληΐζεται ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν.

To this sense: The Father, or first Deity, perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, who is that, whom the nations of men commonly take for the first.—Which oracle Psellus[2] thus glosseth upon; *τὴν πᾶσαν κτίσιν δημιουργήσας ὁ τῆς τριάδος πρῶτος πατὴρ, παρέδωκε ταύτην τῷ νῷ· ὅντινα νοῦν τὸ ξύμπαν γένος τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν πατρικὴν ὑπεροχὴν πατὴρ, Θεὸν πρῶτον καλοῦσι·* The first Father of the Trinity having produced this whole creation, delivered to it Mind or Intellect; which Mind, the whole generation of mankind, being ignorant of the paternal transcendency, commonly call the first God.—After which, Psellus takes notice of the difference here betwixt this magical or Chaldaic theology, and that of Christians: *Πλὴν τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν δόγμα ἐναντίως ἔχει, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ μεγάλου πατρὸς, τὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν ἐδημιούργησεν,* etc. But our Christian doctrine is contrary hereunto, namely thus: that the first Mind or Intellect, being the Son of the great Father, made the whole creation. For the Father, in the Mosaic writings, speaks to his Son the idea of the creation; but the Son is the immediate opifex thereof.—His meaning is, that according to this Persian or Chaldaic theology, the first hypostasis of the Divine Triad was the *δημιουργὸς*, or immediate architect of the world—whereas, according to the Christian as well as Platonic doctrine, he is the second. For which cause, Pletho framed another interpretation of that magic oracle, to render it more conformable both to the Christian and Platonic doctrine; *ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ ἅπαντα ἐξετέλεσε, τὰ νοητὰ δηλαδὴ εἴδη (ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐκτετελεσμένα τε καὶ τέλεια) καὶ τῷ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέρῳ θεῷ παρέδωκεν, ἄρχειν δηλαδὴ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτῶν,* etc. The Father perfected all things, that is, the intelligible ideas (for these are those things which are complete and perfect,) and delivered them to the second God, to rule over them. Wherefore whatsoever is produced by this God, according to its own exemplar and the intelligible essence, must needs owe its original also to the highest Father. Which second God, the generations of men commonly take for the first, they looking up no high-

[1] In Oraculis Zoroastri adscriptis, sect. ii. ver. 27, 28. apud Stanley, ubi supra.

[2] He and Pletho wrote commentaries on the oracles of Zoroaster.

er than to the immediate architect of the world.—According to which interpretation of Pletho's (the more probable of the two) the second hypostasis in the magic (or Persian) trinity, as well as in the Platonic and Christian, is the immediate opifex or architect of the world; and this seems to be properly that which was called Mithras in Eubulus.

But, besides these two hypostases, there is also a third mentioned in a certain other magic or Chaldaic oracle, cited by Proclus, under the name of Psyche, or the mundane soul;

——————*Μετὰ δὲ Πατρικὰς Διανοίας,*
Ψυχὴ ἐγὼ ναίω.

After (or next below) the paternal Mind, I Psyche dwell.—Now the paternal Mind, as Psellus informs us, is the second hypostasis before mentioned: *ὁ πατρικὸς νοῦς, ὁ δεύτερος δηλαδὴ Θεὸς, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς προσεχὴς δημιουργός·* The paternal Mind is the second God, and the immediate demiurgus or opifex of the soul. Wherefore though both these names, Oromasdes and Mithras, were frequently used by the magi for the *τὸ θεῖον*, or whole Deity in general, yet this being triplasian, or threefold, according to their theology, as containing three hypostases in it; the first of those three seems to have been that which was most properly called Oromasdes, and the second Mithras. And this is not only confirmed by Pletho, but also with this further superaddition to it that the third hypostasis of that Persian trinity was that which they called Arimanius; he gathering as much even from Plutarch[1] himself: *φασὶ περὶ Ζωροάστρου, ὡς τριχῇ τὰ ὄντα διέλοι· καὶ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ αὐτῶν μοίρᾳ, Ὠρομάζην ἐφιστῴη· τοῦτον δ' εἶναι, τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων πατέρα καλούμενον· τῇδε ἐσχάτῃ Ἀρειμάνην· Μίθραν δὲ τῇ μέσῃ, καὶ τοῦτον δ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν Δεύτερον Νοῦν καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων.* They say, that, Zoroaster made a threefold distribution of things, and that he assigned the first and highest rank of them to Oromasdes, who in the oracles is called the Father; the lowest to Arimanes; and the middle to Mithras, who in the same oracles is likewise called the second Mind.—Whereupon he observes, how great an agreement there was betwixt the Zoroastrian and the Platonic trinity, they differing in a manner only in words. And the middle of these, namely, the eternal Intellect, that contains the ideas of all things, being, according to the Platonic hypothesis, the immediate *δημιουργὸς* and architect of the world, this probably was that Mithras, as we have already intimated, who is called in Eubulus, the demiurgus of the world, and the maker and father of all things. Now, if that third hypostasis of the magic or Chaldaic oracles

[1] De Iside et Osir. p. 370.

be the same with that which the Persians call Arimanius, them must it be upon such an account as this, because this lower world (wherein are souls vitally united to bodies, and lapsable) is the region, where all manner of evils, wickedness, pains, corruption and mortality reign. And herewith Hesychius seemeth to agree: *Ἀρειμάνης* (saith he) *ὁ Ἀΐδης παρὰ Πέρσαις*, Arimanius among the Persians is Hades—that is, either Orcus or Pluto; wherein he did but follow Theopompus, who in Plutarch calls Arimanius likewise Hades or Pluto: which it seems was as well the third in the Persian trinity (or triplasian Deity) as it was in the Homerican. And this was that Arimanius, whom the Persian king in Plutarch, upon Themistocles's flight, addressed his devotion to; [1]*κατευξάμενος ἀεὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις τοιαύτας φρένας διδόναι τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον, ὅπως ἐλαύνωσι τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἑαυτῶν*, he prayed, that Arimanius would always give such a mind to his enemies, as thus to banish and drive away their best men from them.—And indeed from that which Plutarch affirms, *διὸ καὶ Μίθρην Πέρσαι τὸν Μεσίτην ὀνομάζουσι*, that the Persians from their god Mithras, called any mediator, or middle betwixt two, Mithras; it may be more reasonably concluded, that Mithras according to the Persian theology, was properly the middle hypostasis of that triplasian or triplicated Deity of theirs, than that he should be a middle self-existent god or mediator betwixt two adversary gods unmade, one good and the other evil, as Plutarch would suppose.

Notwithstanding which, if that, which the same Plutarch and others do so confidently affirm, should be true, that Zoroaster and the ancient magi made good and evil, light and darkness, the two substantial principles of the universe; that is, asserted an evil demon co-eternal with God, and independent on him, in the very same manner that Plutarch himself and the Manicheans afterward did: yet however it is plain, that in this way also Zoroaster and the magi acknowledged one only fountain and original of all good, and nothing to be independent upon that one good principle or God, but only that which is so contrary to his nature and perfection, as that it could not proceed from him, namely, evil. But we have already discovered a suspicion, that the meaning of those ancient magi might possibly be otherwise; they philosophizing only concerning a certain mixture of evil and darkness, together with good and light, that was in the composition of this lower world, and personating the same; as also perhaps taking notice especially therein of evil demons (who are acknowledged likewise in the magic oracles, and called *θῆρες χθονὸς*, beasts of the earth—and *χθόνι-*

In. Vit. Them. [p. 326.]

οι κύνες, terrestrial dogs;) the head of which might be sometimes called also emphatically ὁ πονηρὸς δαίμων Περσῶν, the evil demon of the Persians—as being the very same with the devil: all which was under the immediate presidency or government of that God, called by them Arimanius, Hades, or Pluto, the third hypostasis in the triplasian Deity of the Persians. Which suspicion may be yet further confirmed from hence, because the Persian theologers, as appears by the inscriptions, expressly acknowledged the Divine omnipotence, which they could not possibly have done, had they admitted of a Manichean substantial evil principle, co-eternal with God, and independent on him. Besides which, it is observable, that whereas the Gnostics in Plotinus's time asserted this world to have been made, not so much from a principle essentially evil and eternal, as from a lapsed soul, to weigh down the authority of Plato, that was against them, did put Zoroaster in the other scale, producing a book entitled ἀποκαλύψεις Ζωροάστρου, or the Revelations of Zoroaster—Porphyrius tells us,[1] that himself wrote purposely to disprove those Zoroastrian revelations, as new and counterfeit, and forged by those Gnostics themselves; therein implying also the doctrine of the ancient Zoroaster no way to have countenanced or favored that Gnostic heresy. Moreover, the tenets of these ancient magi, concerning that duplicity of principles, are by writers represented with great variety and uncertainty. That account, which Theodorus in Photius[2] (treating of the Persian magic) gives thereof, as also that other of Eudemus in Damascius[3], are both of them so nonsensical, that we shall not here trouble the reader with them: however, neither of them supposed the Persian Arimanius, or Satanas, to be an unmade self-existing demon. But the Arabians, writing of this Alianawiah, or Persian duplicity of good and evil principles, affirm, that according to the most approved magi, light was Kadiman, the most ancient and first God, and that darkness was but a created God; they expressly denying the principle of evil and darkness to be coeval with God, or the principle of good and light. And Abulfeda represents the Zoroastrian doctrine (as the doctrine of the magi reformed) after this manner: [4]"That God was older than darkness and light, and the creator of them, so that he was a solitary being without companion or corrival; and that good and evil, virtue and vice, did arise from a certain com-

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[1] In vita Plotini, cap. xvi. p. 119. edit. Fabricii.

[2] Biblioth. Cod. lxxxi. p. 199.

[3] περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν, a work never yet printed.

[4] Pocock Spec. Hist. Ar. p. 146, 147, 148.

mixture of light and darkness together, without which this lower world could never have been produced; which mixture was still to continue in it, till at length light should overcome darkness: and then light and darkness shall each of them have their separate and distinct worlds, apart from one another."

If it were now needful, we might still make it further evident, that Zoroaster, notwithstanding the multiplicity of gods worshipped by him was an assertor of one supreme, from his own description of God, extant in Eusebius. [1]*Θεός ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος ἄφθαρτος, ἀΐδιος, ἀγένητος, ἀμερής, ἀνομοιότατος, ἡνίοχος παντὸς καλοῦ, ἀδωροδόκητος, ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθώτατος, φρονίμων φρονιμώτατος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ πατὴρ εὐνομίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, αὐτοδίδακτος, τέλειος, καὶ ἱεροῦ φυσικοῦ μόνος εὑρετής·* God is the first incorruptible, eternal, unmade, indivisible, most unlike to every thing, the head or leader of all good, unbribable, the best of the good, the wisest of the wise; he is also the father of law and justice; self-taught, perfect, and the only inventor of the natural holy.—Which Eusebius tells us, that this Zoroastrian description of God was contained *verbatim* in a book entitled, A holy Collection of the Persian Monuments; as also that Ostanes (himself a famous magician and admirer of Zoroaster) had recorded the very same of him in his Octateuchon.

Now we having, in this discourse concerning Zoroaster and the magi, cited the oracles, called by some magical, and imputed to Zoroaster, but by others Chaldaical; we conceive it not improper to give some account of them here. And indeed if there could be any assurance of the antiquity and sincerity of those reputed oracles, there would then need no other testimony to prove, that either Zoroaster and the Persian magi, or else at least the Chaldeans, asserted not only a Divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity the original of all things, but also a trinity consistently with the same.

And it is certain, that those oracles are not such novel things as some would suspect, they being cited by Synesius,[2] as then venerable, and of great authority, under the name of *ἱερὰ λόγια*, holy oracles;—and there being, of this number, some produced by him, that are not to be found in the copies of Psellus and Pletho; from whence it may be concluded, that we have only some fragments of these oracles now left.—And that they were not forged by Christians, as some of the Sibylline oracles undoubtedly were, seems probable from hence, because so many Pagan philosophers make use of their testimonies, laying no small stress upon them; as for example Damascius, out of whom Patri-

[1] Præp. Ev. lib. i. [cap. x. p. 42.] [2] De Insomniis, passim.

tius hath made a considerable collection of such of these oracles as are wanting in Psellus and Pletho's copies. And we learn from Photius,[1] that whereas Hierocles' book of Fate and Providence was divided into seven parts, the drift of the fourth of them was this, *τὰ λεγόμενα λόγια, εἰς συμφωνίαν συνάγειν, οἷς Πλάτων ἐδογμάτισε*, to reconcile the reputed oracles with Plato's doctrines.—Where it is not to be doubted, but that those reputed oracles of Hierocles were the same with these magic or Chaldaic oracles; because these are frequently cited by philosophers under that name of *λόγια* or oracles. Proclus upon the Timæus, [2]*ὑπό τε Πλάτωνος, καὶ Ὀρφέως, καὶ Λογίων, ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ ὑμνεῖται τοῦ παντὸς, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· γεννῶν μὲν τὰ πλήθη τῶν θεῶν, ψυχὰς δὲ πέμπων εἰς γενέσεις ἀνδρῶν·* The maker of the universe is celebrated both by Plato and Orpheus and the oracles, as the father of gods and men, who both produceth multitudes of gods and sends down souls for the generations of men.—And as there are other fragments of these cited by Proclus elsewhere under the name of *λόγια* or oracles, so doth he sometimes give them that higher title of *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, and *μυσταγωγία*, the theology that was of Divine tradition or revelation.—Which magnificent encomium was bestowed in like manner upon Pythagoras's philosophy by Jamblichus,[3] that being thought to have been derived in great part from the Chaldeans and the magi; *ἐκ θεῶν αὐτῆς παραδοθείσης τὸ κατ' ἀρχάς·* This philosophy of Pythagoras having been first divinely delivered, or revealed by the gods, ought not to be handled by us without a religious invocation of them.—And that Porphyrius was not unacquainted with these oracles neither, may be concluded from that book of his, entitled *περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας*, concerning the philosophy from oracles;—which consisting of more parts, one of them was called, *τὰ τῶν Χαλδαίων λόγια*, the oracles of the Chaldeans:—which, that they were the very same with those we now speak of, shall be further proved afterward. Now, though Psellus affirms, that the Chaldean dogmata contained in those oracles were some of them admitted both by Aristotle and Plato; yet does he not pretend these very Greek verses themselves to have been so ancient. But it seems probable from Suidas, that Julian, a Chaldean and Theurgist, the son of Julian a philosopher (who wrote concerning Demons and Telesiurgics), was the first, that turned those Chaldee or magic oracles into Greek verse; *Ἰουλιανὸς, ἐπὶ Μάρκου Ἀντονίνου τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔγραψε θεουργικὰ, τελεστικὰ, λόγια δι' ἐπῶν·* Julian, in the time of Marcus Antoninus the emperor, wrote the Theurgic and telestic oracles in verse.

[1] Biblioth. Cod. ccxiv. p. 553. [2] P. 95.

[3] In Vita Pythag. cap. i. p. 1, 2. ed. Kusteri.

—For that there is something of the Theurgical magic mixed together with mystical theology in these oracles, is a thing so manifest from that operation about the Hecatine circle, and other passages in them, that it cannot be denied; which renders it still more unlikely that they should have been forged by Christians. Nevertheless, they carry along with them (as hath been already observed) a clear acknowledgment of a Divine Monarch, or one supreme Deity, the original of all things; which is called in them the Father, and the paternal Principle, and that Intelligible, [1]*ὃ χρή σε νοιεῖν νόου ἄνθει*, that cannot be apprehended otherwise than by the flower of the mind;—as also that [2]one fire, from whence all things spring: Psellus thus glossing upon that oracle, "all things were the offspring of one fire," *πάντα τὰ ὄντα τάτε νοητὰ, καὶ αἰσθητὰ, ἀπὸ μόνου θεοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλαβον, καὶ πρὸς μόνον θεὸν ἐπέστραπται*, etc. *ἄπταιστον οὖν τὸ λόγιον, καὶ πλῆρες τοῦ ἡμετέρου δόγματος·* All things, whether intelligible or sensible, receive their essence from God alone, and return back again only to him; so that this oracle is irreprehensible, and full of our doctrine.—And it is very observable, that these very same oracles expressly determined also that matter was not *ἀγένητος*, unmade or self-existent—but derived in like manner from the Deity. Which we learn from Proclus upon Plato's Timæus, where, when he had positively asserted, that there is *ἓν πάντων αἴτιον*, one thing the cause of all things;—and *τἀγαθὸν πάντων αἴτιον ὄν, εἶναι καὶ ὕλης αἴτιον*, that the supreme good, being the cause of all things, is also the cause of matter—he confirms this assertion of his from the authority of the oracles, [3]*ἀπὸ ταύτης καὶ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τὰ λόγια παράγει τὴν πολυποίκιλον ὕλην, ἔνθεν ἄρδην θρώσκει γένεσις πολυποίκιλου ὕλης·* From this order also do the oracles deduce the generation of the matter, in these words; from thence (that is, from one supreme Deity) altogether proceeds the genesis of the multifarious matter.—Which unquestionably was one of those very magic or Chaldee oracles;[4] and it may be further proved from hence, because it was by Porphyrius set down amongst them, as appears from Æneas Gazeus in his Theophrastus:[5] *οὐ γὰρ ἀγέννητος οὐδὲ ἄναρχος ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτό σε καὶ Χαλδαῖοι διδάσκουσι, καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος· ἐπιγράφει δὲ καθόλου τὸ βιβλίον ὃ εἰς μέσον προάγει, τῶν Χαλδαίων τὰ λόγια, ἐν εἷς γεγονέναι τὴν ὕλην ἰσχυρίζεται·* Neither was matter void of generation or beginning, which the Chaldeans and Porphyrius teach thee; he making this the title of a whole book published by him, The Oracles of the Chaldeans; in which it is confirmed that matter was made.—

[1] Oraculor. sect. iii. vers. 58. [2] Sect. ii. ver. 59.
[3] P. 118. [4] Sect. i. ver. 20. [5] P. 56.

Moreover, that there was also in these magic or Chaldee oracles a clear signification of a Divine triad, hath been already declared. But we shall here produce Proclus's[1] testimony for it too; *οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, φησὶ συμπεπληρῶσθαι τὸν κόσμον, ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν Τριῶν· λέγει γοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς ἐπέκεινα τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος τὸ πᾶν·* Thus the divinely delivered (or inspired) theology affirmeth the whole world to have been completed from these three; Psyche, or the mundane soul, therein speaking concerning that Zeus or Jupiter, who was above the maker of the world, in this manner, etc.—For we have already declared, that Proclus's *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, his theology of Divine tradition or revelation—is one and the same thing with the *λόγια*, or oracles. To which testimony of Proclus we might also superadd that oracle cited out of Damascius by Patritius;

παντὶ γὰρ ἐν κόσμῳ λάμπει Τριὰς, ἧς Μόνας ἄρχει.

In the whole world shineth forth a triad or trinity, the head whereof is a monad or perfect unity—than which nothing can be plainer.

XVII. And now we pass out of Asia into Europe,[2] from Zoroaster to Orpheus. It is the opinion of some eminent philologers of latter times, that there never was any such man as Orpheus, but only in Fairy-land; and that the whole history of Orpheus was nothing but a mere romantic allegory, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. But there is nothing alleged for this opinion from antiquity, save only this one passage of Cicero's[3] concerning Aristotle: "Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles nunquam fuisse;" Aristotle teacheth, that there never was any such man as Orpheus the poet — in which notwithstanding Aristotle seems to have meant no more than this, that there was no such poet as Orpheus senior to Homer, or that the verses vulgarly called Orphical were not written by Orpheus. However, if it should be granted, that Aristotle had denied the existence of such a man, there seems to be no reason at all, why his single testimony should here preponderate against that universal consent of all antiquity, which is for one Orpheus, the son of Oeager, by birth a Thracian, the father or chief founder of the mythical and allegorical theology amongst the Greeks, and of all their most arcane religious rites and mysteries; who is commonly supposed to have lived before the Trojan war (that is, in the time of the Israelitish judges), or at least to have been senior both to Hesiod and Homer; and also to have died a violent death, most

[1] Comment. in Timæum, Plat. p. 116.

[2] G. I. Vossius D. Ar. Po. c. xiii.

[3] De Nat. D. l. i. p. 211.

affirming him to have been torn in pieces by women. For which cause, in that vision of Herus Pamphylius in Plato,[1] Orpheus's soul being come down again into another body, is said to have chosen rather that of a swan (a reputed musical animal) than to be born again of a woman, by reason of that great hatred which he had conceived of all womankind, for his suffering such a violent death from them. And the historic truth of Orpheus was not only acknowledged by Plato, but also by Isocrates, senior to Aristotle likewise (in his oration in the praise of Busiris);[2] and confirmed by that sober historiographer Diodorus Siculus,[3] he giving this account of Orpheus, That he was a man, who diligently applied himself to literature, and having learned *τὰ μυθολογούμενα*, or the mythical part of theology, travelled into Egypt, where he attained to further knowledge, and became the greatest of all the Greeks in the mysterious rites of religion, theological skill, and poetry. To which Pausanias[4] addeth, that he gained great authority, *οἷα πιστευόμενος εὑρηκέναι ἔργων ἀνοσίων καθαρμοὺς, νόσων τε ἰάματα, καὶ τροπὰς μηνιμάτων θείων·* as being believed to have found out expiations for wicked actions, remedies for diseases, and appeasements of the Divine displeasure.—Neither was this history of Orpheus contradicted by Origen,[5] when Celsus gave him so fit an occasion, and so strong a provocation to do it, by his preferring Orpheus before our Saviour Christ. To all which may be added, in the last place, that it being commonly concluded from the Greek word *θρησκεία,* that the Greeks derived their Teletæ and mysteries of religion from the Thracians, it is not so reasonable to think with the learned Vossius,[6] that Xamolxis was the founder of them (and not Orpheus), this Xamolxis being by most reported to have been Pythagoras's servant, and consequently too much a junior; and though Herodotus[7] attribute more antiquity to him, yet did he conceive him to have been no other than a demon, who appearing to the Thracians, was worshipped by them; whereas in the meantime, the general tradition of the Greeks derived the Thracian religious rites and mysteries from Orpheus and no other, according to this of Suidas; *λέγεται ὡς Ὀρφεὺς Θρᾴξ, πρῶτος ἐτεχνολόγησε τὰ Ἑλλήνων μυστήρια, καὶ τὸ τιμᾷν θεὸν θρησκεύειν ἐκάλησεν, ὡς Θρᾳκίας οὔσης τῆς εὑρέσεως.* It is commonly said, that Orpheus the Thracian was the first inventor of the religious mysteries of the Greeks, and that religion was

[1] De Rep. l. x. lib. iv. p. 162.

[2] P. 452. [3] Lib. iv. cap. xv. p. 221. [4] Lib. ix. p. 586.

[5] Advers. Cels. lib. vii. p. 368.

[6] De Artis Poetic. Natur. cap. xiii.

[7] Hist. lib. iv. cap. xcvi. p. 252, 253.

from thence called Threskeia, as being a Thracian invention.—Wherefore though it may well be granted, that by reason of Orpheus's great antiquity, there have been many fabulous and romantic things intermingled with this history; yet there appears no reason at all, why we should disbelieve the existence of such a man.

But though there were such a man as Orpheus, yet it may very well be questioned for all that, whether any of those poems, commonly entitled to him, and called Orphical, were so ancient, and indeed written by him. And this the rather, because Herodotus declares it as his own opinion, that Hesiod and Homer were the ancientest of all the Greek poets, [1]*οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι ὕστερον ἐγένοντο*, and that those other poets, said to have been before them, were indeed juniors to them;—meaning hereby, in all probability, Orpheus, Musæus and Linus. As also because Aristotle seems plainly to have followed Herodotus in this, he mentioning the Orphic poems (in his book of the soul) after this manner, *τὰ Ὀρφικὰ καλούμενα ἔπη*,[2] the verses that are called Orphical.—Besides which Cicero[3] tells us, that some imputed all the Orphic poems to Cercops, a Pythagorean; and it is well known, that many have attributed the same to another of that school, Onomacritus, who lived in the times of the Pisistratidæ: wherefore we read more than once in Sextus Empiricus of *Ὀνομάκριτος ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς*, Onomacritus in the Orphics.—Suidas also reports, that some of the Orphic poems were anciently ascribed to Theognetus, others to Timocles, others to Zopyrus, etc. From all which Grotius[4] seems to have made up this conclusion: That the Pythagorics entitled their own books to Orpheus and Linus, just in the same manner as ancient Christians entitled theirs, some to the Sibyls, and others to Hermes Trismegist.—Implying therein, that both the Orphic poems and doctrine owed their very being and first original only to the Pythagoreans. But on the other side Clemens Alexandrinus,[5] affirmeth, that Heraclitus the philosopher borrowed many things from the Orphic poems. And it is certain, that Plato[6] does not only very much commend the Orphic hymns for their suavity and deliciousness, but also produce some verses out of them, without making any scruple concerning their author. Cicero himself, notwithstanding what he cites out of Aristotle[7] to the contrary, seems to acknowledge Orpheus for the most

[1] L. ii. p. 53. [cap. liii. p. 109.]
[2] Lib. i. c. vii. § 7.
[3] De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xxxviii. p. 2940. tom. ix. oper.
[4] Proleg. in Flor. Stob.
[5] Stromat. lib. vi. cap. ii. p. 752.
[6] Vide Plat. de Legib. l. viii. p. 623, et Cratylum, p. 265. Io, p. 144. et in Convivio, p. 318.
[7] De N. De L. p. 201. Lamb.

ancient poet, he writing thus of Cleanthes: "In secundo libro de natura deorum, vult Orphei, Musæi, Hesiodi, Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea, quæ ipse de diis immortalibus scripserat, ut etiam veterrimi poetæ, qui hæc ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videantur." Cleanthes, in his second book of the nature of the gods, endeavors to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer, to those very things, which himself had written concerning them; so that the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of any such matter, are made by him to have been Stoics.—Diodorus Siculus[1] affirmeth Orpheus to have been the author of a most excellent poem: and Justin Martyr,[2] Clemens Alexandrinus,[3] Athenagoras,[4] and others, take it for granted, that Homer borrowed many passages of his poems from the Orphic verses, and particularly that very beginning of his Iliad—

Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεὰ———

Lastly, Jamblichus testifieth, that by most writers Orpheus was represented as the ancientest of all the poets; adding, moreover, what dialect he wrote in, *κεχρῆσθαι τῇ Δωρικῇ διαλέκτῳ καὶ τὸν Ὀρφέα, πρεσβύτερον ὄντα τῶν ποιητῶν·* Most of the historiographers declare, that Orpheus, who was the ancientest of all the poets, wrote in the Doric dialect.—Which, if it be true, then those Orphic fragments, that now we have, (preserved in the writings of such as did not Dorize) must have been transformed by them out of their native idiom.

Now as concerning Herodotus, who supposing Homer and Hesiod to have been the ancientest of all the Greek poets, seemed therefore to conclude the Orphic poems to have been pseudepigraphous; himself intimates, that this was but a singular opinion, and as it were paradox of his own, the contrary thereunto being then generally received. However Aristotle probably might therefore be the more inclinable to follow Herodotus in this, because he had no great kindness for the Pythagoric or Orphic philosophy. But it is altogether irrational and absurd to think, that the Pythagorics would entitle their books to Orpheus, as designing to gain credit and authority to them thereby, had there been no such doctrine before, either contained in some ancient monument of Orpheus, or at least transmitted down by oral tradition from him. Wherefore the Pythagorics themselves constantly maintain, that before

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[1] Lib. iv. cap. xxv. p. 221. [2] Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 17. oper.

[3] Stromat. lib. vi. cap. ii. p. 738. 751.

[4] Legat. pro Christianis, cap. xv. p. 64, 65.

[5] De. V. Pyth. c. xxxiv. [p. 195, 196.]

Pythagoras's time, there was not only an Orphic cabala extant, but also Orphic poems. The former was declared in that ancient book called Ἱερὸς λόγος, or The holy Oration—if we may believe Proclus upon the Timæus: [1]Πυθαγόρειος ὢν ὁ Τιμαῖος, ἕπεται ταῖς Πυθαγορείων ἀρχαῖς· αὕται δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ Ὀρφικαὶ παραδόσεις· Ἃ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς δι' ἀποῤῥήτων λόγων μυστικῶς παραδέδωκε, ταῦτα Πυθαγόρας ἐξέμαθεν ὀργιασθεὶς ἐν Λεβήθροις τοῖς Θρᾳκίοις, Ἀγλαοφήμῳ τελεστικὰ μεταδιδόντος· Ταῦτα γάρ φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐν τῷ Ἱερῷ λόγῳ. Timæus being a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagoric principles, and these are the Orphic traditions; for what things Orpheus delivered mystically, (or in arcane allegories,) these Pythagoras learned when he was initiated by Aglaophemus in the Orphic mysteries, Pythagoras himself affirming as much in his book, called The holy Oration.—Where Proclus, without any doubt or scruple, entitles the book inscribed Ἱερὸς λόγος, or The holy Oration, to Pythagoras himself. Indeed, several of the ancients have resolved Pythagoras to have written nothing at all; as Fla. Josephus, Plutarch, Lucian, and Porphyrius; and Epigenes in Clemens Alex. affirms, that the Ἱερὸς λόγος, or holy Oration, was written by Cercops, a Pythagorean. Nevertheless, Diogenes Laertius thinks them not to be in good earnest, who deny Pythagoras to have written any thing; and he tells us, that Heraclides acknowledged this Ἱερὸς λόγος, or holy Oration, for a genuine and indubitate fœtus of Pythagoras. Jamblichus is also of the same opinion, as the most received; though confessing some to have attributed that book to Telauges, Pythagoras's son. But whoever was the writer of this Hieros Logos, whether Pythagoras himself, or Telauges, or Cercops, it must needs be granted to be of great antiquity, according to the testimony whereof, Pythagoras derived much of his theology from the Orphic traditions.[2] Moreover, Ion Chius in his Trigrammi testified, as Clemens Alexandrinus informeth us, that Pythagoras himself referred some poems to Orpheus as their author; which is also the general sense of Platonists as well as Pythagoreans. Wherefore upon all accounts it seems most probable, that either Orpheus himself wrote some philosophic or theologic poems, though certain other poems might be also fathered on him, because written in the same strain of mystical and allegorical theology, and as it were in the same spirit, with which this Thracian prophet was inspired; or, at least, that the Orphic doctrine was first conveyed down by oral cabala or tradition from him, and afterwards, for its better preservation, expressed in verses, that were imputed to Orpheus, after the same manner as the Golden Verses

[1] P. 291. [2] Strom. l. i. p. 333. [p. 397. edit. Potteri.]

written by Lysis were to Pythagoras. And Philoponus[1] intimates this latter to have been Aristotle's opinion concerning the Orphic verses; he glossing thus upon those words of Aristotle before cited: *καλουμένοις εἶπε, ὅτι μὴ δοκεῖ Ὀρφέως τὰ ἔπη, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγει. Αὐτοῦ γὰρ εἰσὶ, τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δή φασιν Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεσι καταθεῖναι.* Aristotle calls them the reputed Orphic verses, because they seem not to have been written by Orpheus himself, as the same Aristotle affirmeth in his book of philosophy. The doctrine and opinions of them indeed were his, but Onomacritus is said to have put them into verse.—However, there can be no doubt at all made, but that the Orphic verses, by whomsoever written, were some of them of great antiquity (they being much older than either Aristotle, Plato, or Herodotus) as they were also had in great esteem amongst the Pagans; and therefore we may very well make a judgment of the theology of the ancient Pagans from them.

Now that Orpheus, the Orphic doctrine, and poems, were Polytheistical, is a thing acknowledged by all. Justin Martyr[2] affirms, that Orpheus asserted three hundred and sixty gods; he also bestows upon him this honorable title (if it may be so accounted) of *πολυθεότητος πατὴρ καὶ πρῶτος διδάσκαλος*, the father and first teacher of Polytheism amongst the Greeks—he supposing,[3] that Homer derived his Polytheism from him; *Ὅμηρος τῆς πολυθεότητος Ὀρφέως ζηλώσας δόξαν, μυθωδῶς μὲν πλειόνων θεῶν μέμνηται, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ τῆς Ὀρφέως ἀπᾴδειν ποιήσεως.* Homer emulating Orpheus's Polytheism, did himself therefore fabulously write of many gods, that he might not seem to dissent from his poems, whom he had so great a veneration for.—With which also agreeth the testimony of Athenagoras:[4] *Ὀρφεὺς καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα θεῶν πρῶτος ἔξευρεν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις διεξῆλθε, καὶ ὅσα ἑκάστοις πέπρακται εἶπε, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ θεῶν μάλιστα ἕπεται·* Orpheus first invented the very names of the gods, declaring their generations, and what was done by each of them; and Homer for the most part follows him therein.—Indeed, the whole mythical theology, or fables of the gods, together with the religious rites amongst the Greeks, are commonly supposed to have owed their first original to no other but Orpheus. In which Orphic fables, not only the things of nature, and parts of the world, were all theologized, but also all manner of human passions, imperfections, and vices (according to the literal sense) attributed to the gods. Insomuch

[1] Comment. in Aristot. lib. iii. de Anima, fol. 2. edit. Græcæ, Venet. 1553. fol.

[2] Apolog. ii. pro Christianis, p. 104.

[3] Cohort. ad Græcor. p. 17. [4] Apolog. pro Christian. cap. xv. p. 64.

that divers of the Pagans themselves took great offence at them; as for example Isocrates,[1] who concludes that a divine Nemesis or vengeance was inflicted upon Orpheus for this impiety, Ὀρφεὺς ὁ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἀψάμενος, διασπασθεὶς τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησε, Orpheus, who was the most guilty of all in this kind, died a violent death.—Also Diog. Laertius for this cause made a question, whether he should reckon Orpheus amongst the philosophers or no: and others have concluded, that Plato ought to have banished Orpheus likewise out of his commonwealth, for the same reason that he did Homer;[2] which is thus expressed—for not lying well concerning the gods.—And here we may take notice of the monstrosity and extravagancy of Orpheus's fancy, from what Damascius[3] and others tell us, that he made one of his principles to be δράκοντα κεφαλὰς ἔχοντα προσπεφυκνίας ταύρου καὶ λέοντος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἐπὶ ὤμων πτερά, a dragon, having the heads both of a bull and a lion, and in the midst the face of a god, with golden wings upon his shoulders—which forsooth must be an incorporeal deity and Hercules, with which nature (called Ananche and Adrastea) was associated. Nevertheless the generality of the Greekish Pagans, looking upon this Orpheus, not as a mere fanciful poet and fabulator, but as a serious and profound philosopher, or mystical theologer, a person transcendently holy and wise; they supposed all his fables of the gods to be deep mysteries and allegories, which had some arcane and recondite sense under them; and therefore had a high veneration for him, as one who did ἀληθέστερον θεολογεῖν (as Athenagoras writes[4]) more truly theologise than the rest—and was indeed divinely inspired. Insomuch, that Celsus would rather have had the Christians to have taken Orpheus for a god, than our Saviour Christ,[5] ἄνδρα ὁμολογουμένως ὁσίῳ χρησάμενον πνεύματι, καὶ αὐτὸν βιαίως ἀποθανόντα, as being a man unquestionably endued with a holy spirit, and one, who also (as well as the Christians' Jesus) died a violent death.

But that Orpheus, notwithstanding all his Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, acknowledged one supreme unmade Deity, as the original of all things, may be first presumed from hence, because these two most religious philosophic sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists, not only had Orpheus in great esteem, he being commonly called by them ὁ Θεολόγος, the theologer, but were also thought in great measure to have owed their theology and philosophy to him, as deriving the same from his principles and traditions. This hath been already intimated, and

[1] In Lau. Busir. [p. 452.] [2] De Legibus, lib. ii. p. 429.

[3] περὶ πρώτων ἀρχῶν, a MS. cited above.

[4] Apol. pro Christian. cap. xv. p. 64. [5] C. Cels. l. vii. p. 367.

might be further proved. Pythagoras, as we are informed by Porphyrius and Jamblichus[1] learned something from all these four, from the Egyptians, from the Persian magi, from the Chaldeans, and from Orpheus, or his followers.[2] Accordingly, Syrianus makes *Ὀρφικαὶ καὶ Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀρχαὶ*, the Orphic and Pythagoric principles to be one and the same. —And as we understand from Suidas,[3] the same Syrianus wrote a book entitled, *Συμφωνία Ὀρφέως, Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος*, the Harmony of Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato.—Proclus, besides the place before cited, frequently insists upon this elsewhere, in his commentary upon the Timæus, as p. 63. *Πυθαγόρειον δὲ καὶ τὸ ταῖς Ὀρφικαῖς ἕπεσθαι γενεαλογίαις. Ἄνωθεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀρφικῆς παραδόπεως διὰ Πυθαγόρου καὶ εἰς Ἕλληνας ἡ περὶ θεῶν ἐπιστήμη προῆλθεν·* It is Pythagorical to follow the Orphic genealogies. For from the Orphic tradition downward by Pythagoras was the knowledge of the gods derived to the Greeks.—And that the Orphic philosophy did really agree and symbolize with that which afterward was called Pythagoric and Platonic, and was of the same strain with it, may be gathered from that of Plato in his Cratylus, where he speaks concerning the etymology of the Greek word *σῶμα· δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον*[4] *ἔχειν ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμοτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τὸ σῶμα·* Orpheus and his followers seem to me to have given the best etymology of this word *σῶμα* (from *σώζεσθαι*) that the soul is here in a state of punishment, its body being a prison to it, wherein it is kept in custody till its debts or faults be expiated, and is therefore called *σῶμα*.—Now these three philosophies, the Platonic, Pythagoric, and Orphic, symbolizing so much together, it is probable, that as the Platonic and Pythagoric, so the Orphic likewise derived all their gods from one self-existent Deity.

Which may be further manifested from that epitome of the Orphic doctrine made long since by Timotheus the chronographer in his Cosmopœia, still extant in Cedrenus[5] and Eusebii Chronica, and imperfectly set down by Suidas (upon the word Orpheus) as his own, or without mentioning the author's name:—*Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνεδείχθη τῷ κόσμῳ ὁ αἰθὴρ, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργηθείς.* First of all, the ether was made by God, and after the ether a chaos; a dark and dreadful night then

1 De Vita Pythag. cap. xxviii. p. 122.

2 MS. Coll. Caj. Cant. p. 14. [in Comment. ad lib. iii. xiii. xiv. Metaph s. Aristot. fol. 59.]

3 Voce *Συριανὸς* tom. iii. Lexici p. 410. edit. Kusteri.

4 P. 400. teph.

5 In Chronograph. fol. 46.

covering all under the whole ether. *Σημαίνων τὴν νύκτα προτερεύειν*, Orpheus hereby signifying (saith Timotheus) that night was senior to day, or that the world had a beginning; *Εἰρηκὼς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐκαθέσει, ἀκατάληπτόν τινα καὶ πάντων ὑπέρτατον εἶναι, προγενέστερόν τε καὶ δημιουργὸν ἁπάντων, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰθέρος, καὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν αἰθέρα.* He having declared also in his explication, that there was a certain incomprehensible Being, which was the highest and oldest of all things, and the maker of every thing, even of the ether itself, and all things under the ether. But the earth being then invisible by reason of the darkness, a light breaking out through the ether illuminated the whole creation; this light being said by him to be that highest of all beings, (before mentioned) which is called also counsel and life.—*Ταῦτα τὰ τρία ὀνόματα* (to use Suidas's words here) *μίαν δύναμιν ἀπεφήνατο, καὶ ἓν κράτος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πάντων θεοῦ, τοῦ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγαγόντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι·* These three names in Orpheus (light, counsel and life) declaring one and the same force and power of the God, who is the maker of all, and who produceth all out of nothing into being, whether visible or invisible.—To conclude with Timotheus: *Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς, Ὀρφεὺς, ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ βίβλῳ συνέταξεν, ὅτι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὀνομάτων μίας θεότητος, τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο καὶ αὐτός ἐστι τὰ πάντα·* And the same Orpheus in his book declared, that all things were made by one Godhead in three names, and that this God is all things.

But that Orpheus asserted one supreme Deity, as the original of all things, is unquestionably evident from the Orphic verses themselves; of which notwithstanding, before we mention any in way of proof, we shall premise this observation, or rather suspicion of our own, that there seem to be some Orphic verses supposititious, as well as there were Sibylline; they being counterfeited either by Christians or Jews. For we must freely profess, for our own part, that we cannot believe all that to be genuine, which is produced by ancient fathers as Orphical; that is, either to have been written by Orpheus himself, or else by Onomacritus, or any other Pagan of that antiquity, according to the Orphic cabala or tradition.

As, for example, this concerning Moses;[1]

Ὡς λόγος ἀρχαίων, ὡς ὑδρογενὴς διέταξεν,
Ἐκ θεόθεν γνώμαισι λαβὼν κατὰ δίπλακα θεσμόν.

Ut habet sermo antiquorum, ut ex-aqua-ortus descripsit,
Accepta divinitus lege, quæ duplicia præcepta continet.

[1] Apud Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. lib. xiii. cap. xii. p. 664, 665.

And this is commonly understood of Abraham,

Οὐ γὰρ κέν τις ἴδοι θνητῶν, μερόπων κραίνοντα,
Εἰ μὴ μουνογενής τις ἀποῤῥώξ φύλου ἄνωθεν
Χαλδαίων, ἴδρις γὰρ ἔην ἄστροιο πορείης,

Non enim quispiam mortalium videre posset eum, qui hominibus imperat,
Nisi Unigenitus quidam profectus ab antiqua origine gentis
Chaldæorum ; sciebat enim astri cursum.

The manifest forgery of which might make one suspect also some other passages, such as this concerning the Divine Logos ;

Εἰς δὲ λόγον θεῖον βλέψας, τοῦτῳ προσέδευε,
Ἰθύνων κραδίης νοερὸν κύτος.

Wherefore it being not ingenuous to lay stress upon that for the proof of any thing, which ourselves believe not to be sincere and genuine; we shall here cite no Orphic verses for the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, but only such as we find attested in Pagan writings. As first of all[1] that copy produced by Proclus upon the Timæus :

Τοὔνεκα σὺν τῷ παντὶ Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη
Αἰθέρος εὐρείης ἠδ᾽ οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαὸν ὕψος,
Πόντου τ᾽ ἀτρυγέτου, γαίης τ᾽ ἐρικυδέος εὔρη,
Ὠκεανός τε μέγας, καὶ νείατα τάρταρα γαίης,
Καὶ ποταμοὶ, καὶ πόντος ἀπείριτος, ἄλλα τε πάντα·
Ἤντες τ᾽ ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ, ἠδὲ θέαιναι,
Ὅσσα δ᾽ ἔην γεγαῶτα, καὶ ὕστερον ὁππόσ᾽ ἔμελλεν,
Ἐγένετο· Ζηνὸς δ᾽ ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύῤῥα πεφύκει.

To this sense: Wherefore, together with the universe, were made within Jupiter the height of the ethereal heaven, the breadth of the earth and sea, the great ocean, the profound Tartara, the rivers and fountains, and all the other things, all the immortal gods and goddesses. Whatsoever hath been, or shall be, was at once contained in the womb of Jupiter.—

Proclus understands this of the ideas of all things being in God, before the world was produced, that is, in order of nature only, he supposing them in time coeve. However, it is plain, that all things are said to be contained in the womb and fecundity of one self-originated Deity, not only all the other gods and goddesses, but every thing else whatsoever.

Again Proclus, in the same place, ushers in another copy of Orphic

[1] P. 95.

verses (which are also found in the writer De Mundo) after this manner : *τῶν δὲ Ἰδεῶν πλήρης ὢν, διὰ τούτων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιείληφε, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ θεολόγος ἐπήγαγε·* The demiurgus, or maker of the world, being full of ideas, did by these comprehend all things within himself, as that theologer also declareth in these following verses :

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέραυνος·
Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα· Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται·
Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη·
Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος·
Ζεὺς πνοιὴ πάντων· Ζεὺς ἀκαμάτου πυρὸς ὁρμή·
Ζεὺς πόντου ῥίζα· Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη·
Ζεὺς βασιλεύς· Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἁπάντων ἀρχιγένεθλος·
Ἓν κράτος, εἷς Δαίμων γένετο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων.

Which likewise in plain prose is this :—The high thundering Jove is both the first and the last ; Jove is both the head and middle of all things ; all things were made out of Jupiter ; Jove is both a man and an immortal maid ; Jove is the profundity of the earth and starry heaven ; Jove is the breath of all things ; Jove is the force of the untameable fire ; Jove the bottom of the sea ; Jove is sun, moon, and stars ; Jove is both the original and king of all things : there is one power, and one God, and one great ruler over all.—

Where though there be many strange expressions, yet this seems to be the strangest of them all, that Jupiter should be said to be both a man and immortal maid. But this is nothing but a poetic description of *ἀῤῥενόθηλυς*, male and female together.—And it was a thing very familiar with all the mystical theologers amongst the Pagans, to call God *ἀῤῥενόθηλυν*, male and female together ;—they signifying thereby emphatically—the divine fecundity, or the generative and creative power of the Deity ;—that God was able from himself alone to produce all things. Thus Damascius, the philosopher,[1] writing of this very Orphic theology, expounds it, *ἀρσενόθηλυν αὐτὴν ὑπεστήσατο, πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς πάντων γεννητικῆς οὐσίας·* the Orphic theology calls the first principle hermaphroditic, or male and female together ; thereby denoting that essence, that is generative or productive of all things. — And that learned and pious Christian bishop, Synesius, it seems, thought the expression so harmless, that he scrupled not himself to make use of it, in those elegant and devout hymns of his to God Almighty :

[1] Vide Wolfii Excerpta ex Damascio *περὶ πρῶτων ἀρχῶν* in Anecdotis Græcis tom. iii. p. 254.

Σὺ πατὴρ, Σὺ δ' ἐσσὶ μάτηρ
Σὺ δ' ἄῤῥην, Σὺ δὲ θῆλυς,

Tu Pater, Tu es Mater,
Tu Mas, Tu Fœmina.

Besides these, there are also certain other Orphic verses, scattered up and down in Proclus, but cited altogether in Eusebius out of Porphyrius, in which the whole world is represented as one great animal, God being the soul thereof

Ἓν δὲ δέμας βασίλειον, ἐν ᾧ τάδε πάντα κυκλεῖται,
Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ γαῖα, καὶ αἰθὴρ, νύξ τε καὶ ἦμαρ·
Καὶ Μῆτις, πρῶτος γενέτωρ, καὶ Ἔρως πολυτερπής·
Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τάδε σώματι κεῖται·
Τοῦ δήτοι κεφαλὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, καὶ καλὰ πρόσωπα,
Οὐρανὸς αἰγλήεις, ὃν χρύσεαι ἀμφὶς ἔθειραι
Ἄστρων μαρμαρέων περικαλλέες ἠερέθονται, etc.

Omnia regali sunt hæc in corpore clausa,
Ignis, et unda, et terra, æther cum nocte dieque ;
(Consilium, primus genitor, cum numine amoris :)
Juppiter immenso sub corpore cuncta coërcet :
En hujus caput eximium, vultusque decoros
Undique resplendens cœlum, cui pendula circum
Aurea Cæsaries astrorum lumina fundit :
Sunt oculi Phœbus, Phœboque adversa recurrens
Cynthia, etc.

Where probably that one verse,

Καὶ Μῆτις, πρῶτος γενέτωρ, ἠ Ἔρως πολυτερπης,

though truly Orphical, and indeed divine, it (signifying, that Mind and Love were the first begetters and original of all things) was notwithstanding clapped in unduly out of some other place. But from all these citations it plainly appears, that, according to the Orphic theology, though there were many gods and goddesses too admitted, yet there was one original and king of them all, one supreme Deity acknowledged. We are not ignorant, that some of the ancient and learned fathers,[1] conceiving it contradictious, for Orpheus at the same time to

[1] Justin. Martyr in Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 15. et Apol. ii. pro Christian. p. 104. Clemens Alexandr. in Protreptico, cap. vii. p. 63. et Cyrillus Alexandr. lib. i. advers. Julian. p. 25.

assert both many gods and one God, apprehended this to be a convenient salvo for this difficulty, to suppose, that Orpheus had by fits and turns been of different humors and persuasions; first a rank Polytheist, asserting three hundred gods and more; and then afterwards a converted Monotheist, they being the rather led into this opinion, by reason of certain counterfeit Orphic verses in Aristobulus, made probably by some ignorant Jew; wherein Orpheus is made to sing a palinodia or recantation, for his former error and Polytheism. But we must crave leave, with all due respect, to dissent from reverend antiquity in this; it plainly appearing from that first Orphic excerption in Proclus, that Orpheus at the same time acknowledged both one unmade Deity (the original of all things) and many generated gods and goddesses, that were all contained in it.

Having now made it sufficiently evident from such Orphic fragments, as have been acknowledged by Pagan writers, and by them cited out of Orpheus's hymns and rhapsodies, that the opinion of monarchy, or one self-existent Deity, the original of all things, was an essential part of the Orphic theology or cabala; we shall here further observe, that besides this opinion of monarchy, (but consistently with the same) a trinity also of Divine hypostases subordinate was another part of this Orphic cabala. Proclus upon Plato's Timæus,[1] making an inquiry into Plato's demiurgus, or opifex of the world, gives us an account, amongst other Platonists, of the doctrine of Amelius (who was contemporary with Plotinus, and who is said to have taken notice of what St. John the evangelist had written concerning the Logos, as agreeing with the Platonic and Pythagoric hypothesis[2]) after this manner: *Ἀμέλιος δὲ τρίτον ποιεῖ τὸν Δημιουργόν, καὶ Νοῦς τρεῖς, Βασιλεῖς τρεῖς, τὸν Ὄντα, τὸν Ἔχοντα, τὸν Ὁρῶντα· διαφέρουσι δὲ οἵτοι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Νοῦς ὄντως ἐστὶν ὃ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δεύτερος, ἔτι μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ νοητόν, ἔχει δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ μετέχει πάντως ἐκείνου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεύτερος· Ὁ δὲ τρίτος, ἔστι μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οὗτος νοητόν· (πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς τῷ συζυγοῦντι νοητῷ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν) ἔχει δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ· καὶ ὁρᾷ τὸ πρῶτον. ὅσῳ γαρ πλείω ἡ ἀπόστασις, τοσοῦτῳ τὸ ἔχον ἀμοδρότερον·* This passage being very remarkable, we thought fit to set it down at large, and shall here translate it.—Amelius makes a threefold demiurgus or opifex of the world, three minds and three kings; him that is, him that hath, and him that beholds. Which three minds differ thus, in that the first is essentially that, which he is (or all perfection:) the second is its own intelligible, but hath the first (as something distinct from it) and indeed

[1] P. 93.

[2] Vide Euseb. Præparat. Evang. lib. xi. cap. xviii. xix. p. 540.

partakes thereof, and therefore is second. The third is also that intelligible of its own, (for every mind is the same thing with its correspondent and intelligible) but hath that which is in the second, and beholds the first. For how much soever every being departs from the first, so much the obscurer is it.—After which Proclus immediately subjoins, *τούτους οὖν τοὺς τρεῖς νόους καὶ δημιουργοὺς ὑποτίθεται, καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι, τρεῖς βασιλέας, καὶ τοὺς παρ᾽ Ὀρφεῖ τρεῖς, Φάνητα, καὶ Οὐρανὸν, καὶ Κρόνον, καὶ ὁ μάλιστα παρ᾽ αὐτῷ δημιουργὸς ὁ Φάνας ἐστίν·* Amelius therefore supposeth these three minds and demiurgic principles of his to be both the same with Plato's three kings and with Orpheus's trinity of Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; but Phanes is supposed by him to be principally the demiurgus. Where though Proclus (who had some peculiar fancies and whimsies of his own, and was indeed a confounder of the Platonic theology, and a mingler of much unintelligible stuff with it) does himself assert a monad or unity, superior to this whole trinity; yet does he seem nevertheless rightly to contend against Amelius, that it was not the first hypostasis neither in the Platonic nor Orphic trinity, that was chiefly and properly the demiurgus or opifex of the world, but the second. And thus Proclus's master Syrianus[1] had before determined, that in the Orphic theology, the title of Opifex did properly belong to Orpheus's *πρωτόγονος θεὸς*, or first begotten God, which was the same with Plato's *Νοῦς* or Divine Intellect.—Agreeably whereunto Proclus's conclusion is, *τίς μὲν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι Νοῦς θεῖος τῆς ὅλης ποιήσεως αἴτιος, εἰρήσθω διὰ τούτων· καὶ ὅπως ὑπότε Ὀρφέως καὶ Πλάτωνος, ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνυμνεῖται δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς, ἀπὸ τούτων ὑπεμνήσθω·* Thus much may suffice to have declared, who is the demiurgus of the world, namely, that it is the Divine Intellect, which is the proper and immediate cause of the whole creation; and that it is one and the same demiurgical Jupiter, that is praised both by Orpheus and Plato.—Now, besides this, it is observable, that Damascius in his book *περὶ ἀρχῶν*,[2] or concerning the principles (not yet published) giving an account of the Orphic theology, tells us, amongst other things, that Orpheus introduced *τρίμορφον θεὸν*, a triform deity.—To all which may be added what was before cited of Timotheus the chronographer, that God had three names, light—counsel and life; and that all things were made by one Deity under these three several names. Where Cedrenus, the preserver of that excellent fragment of antiquity, concludes in this manner: *ταῦτα Τιμόθεος συνεγράψατο ὁ χρονογράφος, λέγων τον Ὀρ-*

[1] Comment. in Libr. aliquot Metaphys. Aristot. p. 33.

[2] Vide Wolfii Excerpta ex hoc Opere Damascii, § xiii. in Anecdot. Græcis, tom. iii. p. 252, 253.

φέα πρὸ τοσούτων χρόνων εἰπόντα, Τριάδα ὁμοούσιον δημιουργῆσαι τὰ πάντα· These things Timotheus the chronographer wrote, affirming Orpheus, so long ago, to have declared, that all things were made by a coessential or consubstantial Trinity.—Which, though otherwise it might be looked upon suspiciously, because that Timotheus was a Christian (especially in regard of that word *ὁμοούσιον*) yet by comparing it with what we have before alleged out of Pagan writers, it appears, that so far as concerns an Orphic trinity, it was not altogether vainly written, or without ground by him.

But we have not yet done with Orpheus and the Orphic theology, before we have made one further reflection upon it, so as to take notice of that strong and rank haut-goust, which was in it, of making God to be all. As for example, if we may repeat the forecited passages, and put in the name of God, instead of *Ζεὺς*, or Jupiter; *Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη*, this universe, and all things belonging to it, were made within God.—*Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύῤῥα πεθύκει*, all things were contained together in the womb of God:—*Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα*, God is the head and middle of all things:—*Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης*, etc. God is the basis of the earth and heaven; God is the depth of the sea; God is the breath of all (or the air that we breathe;) God is the force of the untameable fire; God is sun, moon, and stars.—*Ἓν δὲ δέμας βασίλειον*, there is one kingly (or divine) body—and

Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τάδε σώματι κεῖται,

for all these things lie in the great body of God. And thus was the Orphic theology before represented also by Timotheus[1] the chronographer, *διὰ τῆς θεότητος πάντα ἐγένετο, καὶ αὐτός ἐστι πάντα*, all things were made by God, and himself is all things.

But further to prove, that the ancient Greekish Pagans were indeed of such a religious humor as this, to resolve all things into God and to make God all, we shall here cite a remarkable testimony of Plutarch's out of his Defect of Oracles: *δύο πάσης γενέσεως αἰτίας ἐχούσης, οἱ μὲν σφόδρα παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι καὶ ποιηταὶ τῇ κρείττονι μόνῃ τὸν νοῦν*[2] *προσέχειν εἵλοντο τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι πᾶσι πράγμασι,*

Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα πέλονται.

ταῖς δ' ἀναγκαῖαις καὶ φυσικαῖς οὐκ ἔτι προσῄεσαν αἰτίαις· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τούτων καὶ φυσικοὶ προσαγορευόμεναι τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις, τῆς καλῆς καὶ θείας ἀποπλανηθέντες ἀρχῆς, ἐν σώμασι καὶ πάθεσι σωμάτων, πληγαῖς τε καὶ

[1] Apud. Cedren. et Malalam, in Histor. Chron. tom. i. p. 92. [2] P. 436.

μεταβολαῖς καὶ κράσεσι τίθενται τὸ σύμπαν. Whereas there are two causes of all generation (the Divine and the natural) the most ancient theologers and poets attended only to the more excellent of these two (the Divine cause) resolving all things into God, and pronouncing this of them universally, that God was both the beginning and middle, and that all things were out of God. Insomuch that these had no regard at all to the other natural and necessary causes of things. But on the contrary their juniors, who were called Physici (or naturalists) straying from this most excellent and Divine principle, placed all in bodies, their passions, collisions, mutations and commixtures together.—Where by the most ancient theologers and poets, Plutarch plainly meant Orpheus and his followers, it being an Orphic verse that is here cited by him, whereby he gives also an acknowledgment of their antiquity. But by their juniors, who are called Physici, he could understand no other than those first Ionic philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Hippo, and the rest, whom those degenerate Italics afterward followed, atomizing atheistically, Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. So that here we have another confirmation also of what was before asserted by us, that the Ionic philosophers after Thales, and before Anaxagoras, were generally atheistical. And indeed from them, the word φυσικοὶ or Naturalists, came to be often used as synonymous with ἄθεοι, or Atheists. Now these two are here condemned by Plutarch for two contrary extremes; the one, who resolved all into natural and necessary causes, that is, into matter, motion, and qualities of bodies, leaving out the Divine Cause, as guilty of Atheism; the other, who altogether neglecting the natural and necessary causes of things, resolved all into the Divine Cause, as it were swallowing up all into God, as guilty of a kind of fanaticism. And thus we see plainly, that this was one grand arcanum of the Orphic cabala, and the ancient Greekish theology, that God is all things.

Some fanatics of latter times[1] have made God to be all, in a gross sense, so as to take away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, and indeed to allow no other being besides God; they supposing the substance of every thing, and even of all inanimate bodies, to be the very substance of God himself, and all the variety of things, that is in the world, to be nothing but God under several forms, appearances and disguises. The Stoics anciently made God to be all, and all to be God, in somewhat a different way; they conceiving God properly to be the

[1] Rob. Fludd. M. D. in the Preface to his Philosophia Mosaica; and Jacob Behmen.

active principle of the whole corporeal universe, which yet (because they admitted of no incorporeal substance) they supposed, together with the passive or the matter, to make up but one and the same complete substance. And others, who acknowledged God to be an incorporeal substance, distinct from the matter, have notwithstanding made all to be God also, in a certain sense; they supposing God to be nothing but a soul of the world, which, together with the matter, made up all into one entire Divine animal. Now the Orphic theologers cannot be charged with making God all, in that first and grossly fanatic sense; as if they took away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, they so asserting God to be all, as that notwithstanding they allowed other things to have distinct beings of their own. Thus much appearing from that riddle, which in the Orphic verses was proposed by the maker of the world to Night;

[1] *Πῶς δὲμοι ἕν τι τὰ πάντ᾽ ἔσται, καὶ χῶρις ἕκαστον;*

How can all things be one, and yet every thing have a distinct being of its own?—Where *Ἕν τι τὰ πάντα*, all things one, or one all things—seems to be the supreme Deity, or Divine Intellect, as Proclus also interprets it, *τὰ ὅλα περιέχων ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ πάντα μοναδικῶς καὶ νοερῶς, κατὰ τούτους χρησμοὺς, μετὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ὑφίστησι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐγκόσμια θεῶν, καὶ τὰς μοίρας τοῦ παντός·* Jupiter, who containeth the universe, and all things within himself unitively and intellectually, according to these Orphic oracles, gives a particular subsistence of their own also to all the mundane gods, and other parts of the universe.—And this is *χῶρις ἕκαστον*, in that fore-cited Orphic verse, Every thing apart by itself—the whole produced or created universe, with all its variety of things in it; which yet are Orphically said to be God also in a certain other sense, that shall be declared afterward. Nor can the Orphic theologers be charged with making God all in the second Stoical sense, as if they denied all incorporeal substance, they plainly asserting, as Damascius and others particularly note, *θεὸν ἀσώματον*, an incorporeal Deity.—But as for the third way, it is very true, that the Orphic theologers did frequently call the world, the body of God, and its several parts his members, making the whole universe to be one Divine animal; notwithstanding which, they supposed not this animated world to be the first and highest God, but either *δεύτερον θεὸν*, as the Hermaic or Trismegistic writers call it, the second God—or else, as Numenius and others of the Platonists speak, *τρίτον θεὸν*, the third God;—the soul thereof

[1] Proclus in [lib. ii. p. 112.]

being as well in the Orphic as it was in the Pythagoric and Platonic trinity, but the third hypostasis; they supposing two other Divine hypostases superior thereunto, which were perfectly secret from matter. Wherefore, as to the supreme Deity, these Orphic theologers made him to be all things, chiefly upon the two following accounts: first, because all things coming from God, they inferred, that therefore they were all contained in him, and consequently were in a certain sense himself; thus much being declared in those Orphic verses cited by Proclus[1] and others,

Πάντα τάδε κρύψας, αὖθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθὲς,
Μέλλεν ἀπὸ κραδίης προφέρειν, πολυθέσκελα ῥέζων.

Which Apuleius[2] thus renders,

Namque sinu occultans, dulces in luminis oras
Cuncta tulit, sacro versans sub pectore curas.

The sense whereof is plainly this: That God at first hiding or occultly containing all things within himself, did from thence display them, and bring them forth into light, or distinct beings of their own, and so make the world.—The second is, because the world produced by God, and really existing without him, is not therefore quite cut off from him, nor subsists alone by itself as a dead thing, but is still livingly united to him, essentially dependent on him, always supported and upheld, quickened and enlivened, acted and pervaded by him; according to that Orphic passage,[3] *Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περινίσσεται*, God passes through and intimately pervades all things.

Now it is very true, that some Christian theologers also have made God to be all, according to these latter senses; as when they affirm the whole world to be nothing else but *Deum explicatum*, God expanded or unfolded—and when they call the creatures, as St. Jerome and others often do, *radios Deitatis*, the rays of the Deity.—Nay, the Scripture itself may seem to give some countenance also hereunto, when it tells us, that [4]"of him, and through him, and to him are all things;" which in the Orphic theology was thus expressed; God is the beginning, and middle, and end of all things; that *ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα*, all things were made in him, as in the Orphic verses, —*Διὸς ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη*; that

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[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon, lib. ii. p. 95.

[2] Libro de Mundo, p. 25.

[3] Apud Justin. Martyr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, et in Apol. ii, et apud Clement. Alexandrin. Euseb. etc.

[4] Col. 1: 16.

τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε,[1] "all things consist in him;" that, "in him we live, and move, and have our being;" that God doth ζωοποιεῖν πάντα,[2] "quicken all things," and that he ought to be made πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν,[3] "all in all;" which supposeth him in some sense to be so. Notwithstanding which, this is a very ticklish point, and easily liable to mistake and abuse: and, as we conceive it was the mistake and abuse of this one thing, which was the chief ground and original of the both seeming and real Polytheism, not only of the Greekish and European, but also of the Egyptian and other Pagans, as will be more particularly declared afterwards; they concluding, that because God was all things, and consequently all things God, that therefore God ought to be worshipped in all things, that is, in all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, but especially in those animated intellectual beings, which are superior to men. Consentaneously whereunto, they did both θεολογεῖν ἅπαντα, theologize or deify all things—looking upon every thing as having ὑπερφύσικόν τι, something supernatural—or a kind of divinity in it; and also bestow several names upon God, according to all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, calling him in the starry heaven and ether, Jupiter; in the air, Juno; in the winds, Æolus; in the sea, Neptune; in the earth and subterraneous parts, Pluto; in learning, knowledge and invention, Minerva and the Muses; in war, Mars; in pleasure, Venus; in corn, Ceres; in wine, Bacchus; and the like.

However, it is unquestionably evident from hence, that Orpheus with his followers, that is, the generality of the Greekish Pagans, acknowledged one universal and all-comprehending Deity, one that was all; consequently could not admit of many self-existent and independent deities.

XVIII. Having treated largely concerning the two most eminent Polytheists amongst the ancient Pagans, Zoroaster and Orpheus, and clearly proved, that they asserted one supreme Deity; we shall in the next place observe, that the Egyptians themselves also, notwithstanding their multifarious Polytheism and idolatry, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen.

There hath been some controversy amongst learned men, whether Polytheism and idolatry had their first rise from the Egyptians, or the Chaldeans, because the Pagan writers for the most part give the precedency here to the Egyptians; Lucian[4] himself, who was by birth a

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[1] Col. 1: 17. [2] 1 Tim. 4: 13. [3] 1 Cor. 15: 28.

[4] Dea Syria, p. 1059. [tom. ii. oper. p. 656, 657.]

Syrian, and a diligent inquirer into the antiquities of his own country, affirming that the Syrians and Assyrians received their religion and gods first from the Egyptians: and before Lucian, Herodotus,[1] the father of history, reporting likewise, that the Egyptians were the first that erected temples and statues to the gods. But whether the Egyptians or Chaldeans were the first Polytheists and idolaters, there is no question to be made, but that the Greeks and Europeans generally derived their Polytheism and idolatry from the Egyptians. Herodotus affirms in one place,[2] that the Greeks received their twelve gods from thence; and in another,[3] that *σχέδον καὶ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν θεῶν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα*, almost all the names of the gods came first out of Egypt into Greece.—In what sense this might be true of *Ζεὺς* itself, though the word be originally Greekish, shall be declared afterwards: but it is probable, that Herodotus had here a further meaning, that the very names of many of the Greekish gods were originally Egyptian. In order to the confirmation of which, we shall here propound a conjecture concerning one of them, viz. *Ἀθηνᾶ*, called otherwise by the Greeks Pallas, and by the Latins Minerva. For, first, the Greek etymologies of this word seem to be all of them either trifling and frivolous, or violent and forced. Plato in his Cratylus[4] having observed, that according to the ancient allegorical interpreters of Homer, *Ἀθηνᾶ* was nothing else but *νοῦς*, or *διάνοια*, mind or understanding, personated and deified, conceived, that the first imposers of that name, intending to signify thereby Divine wisdom, called it *Ἀθηνᾶ*, as *θεοῦ νόησιν*, the understanding of God, or the knowledge of Divine things—as if the word had been at first *Θεονόη*, and thence afterward transformed into *Ἀθηνᾶ*.—But being not fully satisfied himself with this etymology, he afterward attempts another, deriving the word from *νόησις ἐν τῷ ἤθει*, knowledge concerning manners, or practical knowledge—as if it had been at first *Ἠθονόη*, and from thence changed into *Ἀθηνᾶ*.—Others of the Greeks have deduced this word *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀθροῖν*, because it is the property of wisdom, to collect all into one, supposing that it was at first *Ἀθρηνᾶ*.—Others would fetch it from *θῆλυς* and alpha privative, because Minerva, or wisdom, though she be a goddess, yet hath nothing of feminine imperfection in her. Others again would etymologize it, *ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ πεφυκέναι θήνεσθαι καὶ ὑποτάττεσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν*, because virtue or wisdom is of such a noble and generous temper, as that it scorns to subject itself to any base and unworthy servitude. Lastly,

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[1] Lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 90.
[2] Ibid. et lib. iv. cap. l. p. 108.
[3] Lib. iv. cap. l. p. 108.
[4] P. 267.

others would derive it, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος, affirming it to have been at first Αἰθερονεία.[1] From all which uncertainty of the Greeks concerning the etymon of this word Ἀθηνᾶ, and from the frivolousness or forcedness of these conjectures, we may rather conclude that it was not originally Greekish, but exotical, and probably, according to Herodotus, Egyptian. Wherefore let us try, whether or no we can find any Egyptian word, from whence this Ἀθηνᾶ, might be derived. Plato in his Timæus,[2] making mention of Sais, a city in Egypt, where Solon sometimes sojourned, tells us, οἳ τῆς πόλεως θεὸς ἀρχηγός ἐστιν, Αἰγυπτιστὶ μὲν τοὔνομα Νηΐθ, Ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ, ὡς ὁ ἐκείνων λόγος, Ἀθηνᾶ, that the president or tutelar God of that city was called in the Egyptian language Neith, but in the Greeks, as the same Egyptians affirm, Ἀθηνᾶ. — Now, why might not this very Egyptian word Neith, by an easy inversion, have been at first turned into Thien, or Θὴν, (men commonly pronouncing exotic words ill-favoredly) and then by additional alphas at the beginning and end, transformed into Ἀθηνᾶ? This seems much more probable than either Plato's Θηονόη, or Ἠθονόη, or any other of those Greek etymologies before mentioned. And as the Greeks thus derived the names of many of their gods from the Egyptians, so do the Latins seem to have done the like, from this one instance of the word Neptune; which though Varro[3] would deduce *a nubendo*, as if it had been *Neptunus*, because the sea covers and hides the land, and Scaliger with others, ἀπὸ τοῦ νίπτειν, from washing—this being the chief use of water; yet as the learned Bochart[4] hath observed, it may with greater probability be derived from the Egyptian word Nephthus, Plutarch telling us,[5] ὅτι Νέφθυν καλοῦσι τῆς γῆς τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ παρόρια καὶ ψαύοντα τῆς θαλάσσης, that the Egyptians called the maritime parts of land, or such as border upon the sea, Nephthus.—Which conjecture may be further confirmed from what the same Plutarch elsewhere[6] writes, that as Isis was the wife of Osiris, so the wife of Typhon was called Nephthus. From whence one might collect, that as Isis was taken sometimes for the earth, or the goddess presiding over it, so Nephthus was the goddess of the sea. To which may be further added out of the same writer, that Nephthus was sometimes called by the Egyytians Ἀφροδίτη, or Venus, probably because Venus is said to have risen out of the sea. But what-

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[1] Vide Phornut. in Libro de Natur. Deor. Cap. xx. p. 185. inter Scriptor. Mytholog. à Tho. Gale editos.

[2] P. 524. Oper.

[3] Vide Vossium de Origine et Progressu Idolatriæ, lib. ii. cap. lxxvii. p. 259.

[4] In Phaleg. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 9, 10. et lib. iv. cap. xxx. p. 283.

[5] De Iside et Osiride, p. 366.

[6] Ibid. p. 355.

ever may be thought of these etymological conjectures, certain it is, that no nation in the world was ever accounted by the Pagans more devout, religious and superstitious, than the Egyptians, and consequently none was more polytheistical and idolatrous. Isocrates, in his praise of Busiris, gives them a high encomium for their sanctity; and Herodotus[1] affirmeth of them, that they were *θεοσεβέες περισσῶς ἐόντες μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων*, exceedingly more religious and more devout worshippers of the Deity than all other mortals.—Wherefore they were highly celebrated by Apollo's[2] oracle, (recorded by Porphyrius) and preferred before all other nations for teaching rightly *αἰπείνην ὁδὸν μακάρων*, that hard and difficult way, that leadeth to God and happiness.—But in the Scripture,[3] Egypt is famous for her idols, and for her spiritual whoredoms and fornications: to denote the uncleanness whereof she is sometimes joined with Sodom. For the Egyptians, besides all those other gods, that were worshipped by the Greeks and other barbarians; besides the stars, demons and heroes; and those artificial gods, which they boasted so much of their power of making, viz. animated statues; and this peculiar intoxication of their own, which rendered them infamous and ridiculous even amongst all the other Pagans, that they worshipped brute animals also, in one sense or other;

> [4] Quis nescit, Volusi Bithynice, qualia demens
> Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat
> Pars hæc, illa pavet saturam serpentibus Ibin.

Concerning which Origen against Celsus thus writeth;[5] *παρ' οἷς προσιόντι μέν ἐστι λαμπρὰ τεμένη, καὶ ἄλση, καὶ προπυλαίων μεγέθη τε καὶ κάλλη καὶ νεὼ θαυμάσιοι, καὶ σκηναὶ πέριξ ὑπερήφανοι, καὶ θρησκεῖαι μάλα δεισιδαίμονες καὶ μυστηριώτιδες· ἤδη δὲ εἰσιόντι, καὶ ἐνδοτέρῳ γενομένῳ, θεωρεῖται προσκυνούμενος αἴλουρος, ἢ πίθηκος, ἢ κροκόδειλος, ἢ τράγος, ἢ κύων·* To him, that cometh to be a spectator of the Egyptian worship, there first offer themselves to his view most splendid and stately temples, sumptuously adorned together with solemn groves, and many pompous rites and mystical ceremonies; but as soon as he enters in, he perceives, that it was either a cat, or an ape, a crocodile, or a goat, or a dog, that was the object of this religious worship.—

But notwithstanding this multifarious Polytheism and idolatry of

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[1] Lib. ii. cap. xxxvii. p. 102.

[2] Euseb. Pr. Ev. l. ix. c. x. p. 412.

[3] Revelat. 11: 8.

[4] Juv. Sat. 15.

[5] Lib. iii. p. 121. [These words are not Origen's, but Celsus's.]

these Egyptians, that they did nevertheless acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, may first be probably collected from that fame, which they had anciently over the whole world for their wisdom. The Egyptians are called by the Elei in Herodotus,[1] σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, the wisest of men ;—and it is a commendation, that is given to one[2] in the same writer, that he excelled the Egyptians in wisdom, who excelled all other mortals. Thus it is set down in the Scripture for Moses's encomium, that he was "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians ;"[3] and the transcendency of Solomon's wisdom is likewise thus expressed by the writer of the book of Kings,[4] that it excelled "the wisdom of all the children of the east country, and all the wisdom of Egypt." Where by the children of the east are chiefly meant the Persian magi, and the Chaldeans ; and there seems to be a climax here, that Solomon's wisdom did not only excel the wisdom of the magi, and of the Chaldeans, but also that of the Egyptians themselves. From whence it appears, that in Solomon's time Egypt was the chief school of literature in the whole world, and that the Greeks were then but little or not at all taken notice of, nor had any considerable fame for learning. For which cause, we can by no means give credit to that of Philo, in the life of Moses,[5] that besides the Egyptian priests, learned men were sent for by Pharaoh's daughter out of Greece to instruct Moses. Whereas it is manifest from the Greekish monuments themselves, that for many ages after Solomon's time, the most famous of the Greeks travelled into Egypt to receive culture and literature, as Lycurgus, Solon, Thales, and many others, amongst whom were Pythagoras and Plato. Concerning the former of which Isocrates writes,[6] that coming into Egypt, and being there instructed by the priests, he was the first that brought philosophy into Greece ; and the latter of them is perstringed by Xenphon,[7] because Αἰγύπτου ἠράσθη καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου τετρατώδους σοφίας, not contented with that simple philosophy of Socrates (which was little else besides morality) he was in love with Egypt, and that monstrous wisdom of Pythagoras.—Now, as it is not probable, that the Egyptians, who were so famous for wisdom and learning, should be ignorant of one supreme Deity, so is it no small argument to the contrary, that they

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[1] Lib. ii. cap. clx. p. 151.

[2] Ramsinitus, king of Egypt. Herod. lib. ii. cap. cxxi. p. 135.

[3] Acts 7: 22. [4] 1 Kings 4: 29.

[5] Lib. i. p. 605. [5] In Encomio Busiridis, p. 450.

[7] In fragmento Epistolæ ad Æchinem, apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xiv, cap. xii. p. 745.

werehad in so great esteem by those two divine philosopher, Pythagoras and Plato. We grant, indeed, that after the Greeks began to flourish in all manner of literature, the fame of the Egyptians was not only much eclipsed (so that we hear no more of Greeks travelling into Egypt upon the former account,) but also that their ardor towards the liberal sciences did by degrees languish and abate; so that Strabo[1] in his time could find little more in Egypt besides the empty houses and palaces, in which priests, formerly famous for astronomy and philosophy, had dwelt. Nevertheless, their arcane theology remained more or less amongst them unextinct to the last, as appears from what Origen Porphyrius, and Jamblichus have written concerning them.

The learning of the Egyptians was either historical, or philosophical, or theological. First the Egyptians were famous for their historic learning and knowledge of antiquity, they being confessed in Plato,[2] to have had so much ancienter records of time than the Greeks, that the Greeks were but children or infants compared with them. They pretended to a continued and uninterrupted series of history from the beginning of the world downward, and therefore seem to have had the clearest and strongest persuasions of the Cosmogonia. Indeed, it cannot be denied, but that this tradition of the world's beginning was at first in a manner universal among all nations. For concerning the Greeks and Persians we have already manifested the same; and as Sanchoniathon testifieth the like concerning the Phœnicians, so does Strabo likewise of the Indian Brahmins,[3] affirming, that they did agree with the Greeks in many things, and particularly in this, *ὅτι γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς*, that the world was both made and should be destroyed.—And though Diodorus[4] affirm the contrary of the Chaldeans, yet we ought in reason to assent[5] rather to Berosus,[6] in respect of his greater antiquity, who represents the sense of the ancient Chaldeans after this manner: *γενέσθαι χρόνον ἐν ᾧ τὸ πᾶν σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ——τὸν δὲ Βῆλον, ὃν Δία μεθερμηνεύουσι, μέσον τεμόντα τὸ σκότος, χωρίσαι γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ διατάξαι τὸν κόσμον—ἀποτελέσαι δὲ τὸ Βῆλον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς πέντε πλανήτας·* That there was a time, when all was darkness and water, but Bell (who is interpreted Jupiter) cutting the darkness in the middle, separated the earth and heaven from one another, and so framed the world; this Bell also producing the stars, the sun, and the moon, and the five planets.—From

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[1] Lib. xvii. p. 764. [2] In Timæo. p. 524. [3] L. xv. 715.
[4] Lib. ii. p. 83. edit. Hanov. 1604. [5] Euseb. Chron. p. 6.
[6] Apud. Georg. Syncell. in Chronico, p. 29.

which testimony of Berosus, according to the version of Alexander Polyhistor, by the way it appears also, that the ancient Chaldeans acknowledged one Supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world, as they are also celebrated for this in that oracle of Apollo, which is cited out of Porphyry by Eusebius,

[1]*Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοθίην λάχον, ἠδ' ἄρ' Ἑβραῖοι,*
Αὐτογένεθλον ἄνακτα σεβαζόμενοι θεὸν ἁγνῶς.

Where the Chaldeans are joined with the Hebrews, as worshipping likewise in a holy manner one self-existent Deity. Wherefore, if Diodorus were not altogether mistaken, it must be concluded, that in the latter times, the Chaldeans (then perhaps receiving the doctrine of Aristotle) did desert and abandon the tradition of their ancestors concerning the Cosmogonia. But the Egyptians, however they attributed more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet seem to have had a constant persuasion of the beginning of it, and the firmest of all other nations: they (as Kircher tells us[2]) therefore picturing Horus, or the world, as a young man beardless, not only to signify its constant youthful and flourishing vigor, but also the youngness and newness of its duration. Neither ought it to be suspected, that though the Egyptians held the world to have had a beginning, yet they conceived it to be made by chance without a God, as Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus afterward did; the contrary thereunto being so confessed a thing, that Simplicius, a zealous contender for the world's eternity, affirms the Mosaic history of its creation by God to have been nothing else but *μύθοι Αἰγύπτιοι*, Egyptian fables.—The place is so considerable, that I shall here set it down in the author's own language:[4] *Εἰ δὲ τὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων νομοθέτην ἐνδείκνυται λέγοντα, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν· ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος· καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος· εἶτα ποιήσαντος αὐτοῦ τὸ φῶς, καὶ διαχωρίσαντος ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους, ἐπήγαγε, καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, καὶ τὸ σκότος νύκτα· καὶ ἐγένετο ἑσπέρα καὶ ἐγένετο πρωὶ ἡμέρα μία· εἰ οὖν ταύτην τοῖ χρόνου νομίζει γένεσιν τὴν ἀπὸ χρόνου, ἐννοείτω ὅτι μυθικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἡ παράδοσις, καὶ ἀπὸ μύθων Αἰγυπτίων εἴλκυσμένη·* If Grammaticus here mean the lawgiver of the Jews, writing thus, [In the beginning God made heaven and earth, and the earth was invisible and unadorned, and

[1] Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. ix. c. x.

[2] In Oedipo Ægyptiaco.

[3] Simpl. in Arist. Phys. l. viii. fol. 268. col. l.

darkness was upon the deep, and the Spirit of God moved upon the water;] and then afterward when he had made light, and separated the light from the darkness, adding, [And God called the light day, and the darkness night, and the evening and the morning were the first day:] I say, if Grammaticus think this to have been the first generation and beginning of time; I would have him to know, that all this is but a fabulous tradition, and wholly drawn from Egyptian fables.—

As for the philosophy of the Egyptians, that besides their physiology, and the pure and mixed mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy,) they had another higher kind of philosophy also concerning incorporeal substances, appears from hence, because they were the first assertors of the immortality of souls, their pre-existence and transmigration from whence their incorporeity is necessarily inferred. Thus Herodotus: [1]*πρῶτοι τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι· τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος, ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐισδύεται*, etc. The Egyptians were the first assertors of the soul's immortality, and of its transmigration, after the death and corruption of this body, into the bodies of other animals successively, viz. until it have run round through the whole circuit of terrestrial, marine, and volatile animals, after which, they say, it is to return again into a human body; they supposing this revolution or apocatastasis of souls to be made in no less space than that of three thousand years.—But whether Herodotus were rightly catechised and instructed in the Egyptian doctrine as to this particular or no, may very well be questioned; because the Pythagoreans, whom he there tacitly reprehends for arrogating the first invention of this to themselves, when they had borrowed it from the Egyptians, did represent it otherwise; namely, that the descent of human souls into these earthly bodies was first in way of punishment, and that their sinking lower afterward into the bodies of brutes, was only to some a further punishment for their future degeneracy; but the virtuous and pious souls should after this life enjoy a state of happiness in celestial or spiritual bodies. And the Egyptian doctrine is represented after the same manner by Porphyrius in Stobæus,[2] as also in the Hermetic or Trismegistic writings. Moreover, Chalcidus reports, that Hermes Trismegist, when he was about to die, made an oration to this purpose: That he had here lived in this earthly body but an exile and stranger, and was now returning home to his own country; so that his death ought not to be lamented, this life being rather to be accounted death. — Which persuasion the Indian Brahmins also were embued

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[1] Euterp. 123. [2] Eclog. Phys. lib. ii. cap. vii. p. 200.

withal, whether they received it from the Egyptians (as they did some other things) or no; *τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον*, that this life here is but the life of embryos, and that death [to good men] is a generation or birth into true life.[1]—And this may be the better be believed to have been the Egyptian doctrine, because Diodorus himself hath some passages sounding that way; as that the Egyptians lamented not the death of good men, but applauded their happiness, *ὡς τὸν αἰῶνα διατρίβειν μέλλοντες καθ' ᾅδου μετὰ τῶν εὐσεβῶν*, as being to live ever in the other world with the pious.[2]—However, it being certain from this Egyptian doctrine of preexistence and transmigration, that the Egyptians did assert the soul's incorporeity, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that they acknowledged also an incorporeal Deity. The objection against which, from what Porphyrius writeth concerning Chæremon, will be answered afterward.

We come in the last place to the theology of the Egyptians. Now it is certain, that the Egyptians besides their vulgar and fabulous theology (which is for the most part that which Diodorus Siculus[3] describes) had another *ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία*, arcane and recondite theology—that was concealed from the vulgar, and communicated only to the kings, and such priests and others, as were thought capable thereof; these two theologies of theirs differing, as Aristotle's Exoterics and Acroamatics. Thus much is plainly declared by Origen, whose very name was Egyptian, it being interpreted Horo-genitus (which Horus was an Egyptian God,[4]) upon occasion of Celsus's boasting that he thoroughly understood all that belonged to Christianity: "Celsus (saith he) seemeth here to me to do just as if a man travelling into Egypt, where the wise men of the Egyptians, according to their country-learning, philosophize much about those things, that are accounted by them Divine, whilst the idiots in the mean time hearing only certain fables, which they know not the meaning of, are very much pleased therewith: Celsus, I say, doth as if such a sojourner in Egypt, who had conversed only with those idiots, and not been at all instructed by any of the priests in their arcane and recondite mysteries, should boast, that he knew all that belonged to the Egyptian theology." Where the same Origen also adds, that this was not a thing proper neither to the Egyptians only to have such an arcane true theology, distinct from their vulgar and fabulous one, but common with them to the Persians, Syrians,

[1] Strabo, i. xv. p. 715.

[2] Domicilia Viventium Diversoria appellant. Diod.

[3] Lib. i. p. 33.

[4] Lib. i. p. 11.

and other Barbarian Pagans; *ἃ δὲ εἶπον περὶ Αἰγυπτίων σοφῶν τε καὶ ἰδιωτῶν δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ Περσῶν*, etc. What we have now affirmed (saith he) concerning the difference betwixt the wise men and the idiots amongst the Egyptians, the same may be said also of the Persians, amongst whom the religious rites are performed rationally by those, that are ingenious, whilst the superficial vulgar look no further in the observation of them, than the external symbol or ceremony. And the same is true likewise concerning the Syrians and Indians, and all those other nations, who have, besides their religious fables, a learning and doctrine.—Neither can it be dissembled, that Origen in this place plainly intimates the same also concerning Christianity itself; namely, that besides the outside and exterior cortex of it (in which notwithstanding there is nothing fabulous) communicated to all, there was a more arcane and recondite doctrine belonging thereunto, which all were not alike capable of; he elsewhere observing this to be that wisdom, that St. Paul spake amongst the perfect. From whence he concludes, that Celsus vainly boasted, *πάντα γὰρ οἶδα*, for I know all things belonging to Christianity—when he was acquainted only with the exterior surface of it. But concerning the Egyptians, this was a thing most notorious and observed by sundry other writers; as, for example, Clemens of Alexandria, a man also well acquainted with the affairs of Egypt;[1] *Αἰγύπτιοι οὐ τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσι τὰ παρὰ σφισιν ἀνετίθεντο μυστήρια, οὐδὲ μὴν βεβήλοις τὴν τῶν θείων εἴδησιν ἐξέφερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μόνοις γε τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐπὶ νὴν βασιλείαν προιέναι, καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τοῖς κριθεῖσιν εἶναι δοκιμωτάτους, ἀπό τε τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ τῆς παιδείας, καὶ τοῦ γένους.* The Egyptians do not reveal their religious mysteries promiscuously to all, nor communicate the knowledge of Divine things to the profane, but only to those, who are to succeed in the kingdom, and to such of the priests, as are judged most fitly qualified for the same, upon account both of their birth and education.—With which agreeth also the testimony of Plutarch, he adding a further confirmation thereof from the Egyptian sphinges:[3] *ὁ ἐκ μαχίμων ἀποδεδειγμένος [βασιλεὺς] εὐθὺς ἐγίνετο τῶν ἱερέων, καὶ μετεῖχε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις, ἀμυδρὰς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφάσεις ἔχουσιν· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ παραδηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἐπιεικῶς ἱστάντες, ὡς αἰνιγματώδη σοφίαν τῆς θεολογίας αὐτῶν ἐχούσης.* When amongst the Egyptians there is any king chosen out of the military order, he is forthwith brought to the priests, and by them instructed in that arcane theology, which conceals mysterious truths under obscure fables and allegories.

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[1] Strom. .l v. p. 508. [2] De Is. et. Os. 354.

Wherefore they place sphinges before their temples, to signify, that their theology contained a certain arcane and enigmatical wisdom in it. —And this meaning of the sphinges in the Egyptian temples is confirmed likewise by Clemens Alexandrinus,[1] *διὰ τοῦτό τοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἱδρύονται, ὡς αἰνιγματώδους τοῦ περὶ θεοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἀσαφοῦς ὄντος·* Therefore do the Egyptians place sphinges before their temples, to declare thereby, that the doctrine concerning God is enigmatical and obscure.—Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that the same Clemens gives another interpretation also of these sphinges, or conjecture concerning them, which may not be unworthy to be here read ; *τάχα δὲ καὶ ὅτι φιλεῖν τε δεῖ καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ θεῖον. ἀγαπᾷν μὲν ὡς προσηνὲς καὶ εὐμενὲς τοῖς ὁσίοις, δεδιέναι δὲ ὡς ἀπαραιτήτως δίκαιον τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, θηρίου γὰρ ὅμου καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἡ σφὶγξ αἰνίσσεται τὴν εἰκόνα·* But perhaps the meaning of those Egyptian sphinges might be also to signify, that the Deity ought both to be loved and feared ; to be loved as benign and propitious to the holy, but to be feared as inexorably just to the impious, the sphinx being made up of the image both of a man and a lion.—Moreover, besides these sphinges, the Egyptians had also Harpocrates and Sigalionsin their temples, which are thus described by the poet ;[2]

Quique premunt vocem, digitoque silentia suadent :

they being the statues of young men pressing their lips with their finger. The meaning of which Harpocrates is thus expressed by Plutarch :[3] *τὸν δὲ Ἁρποκράτην, οὐ θεὸν ἀτελῆ καὶ νήπιον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις λόγου νεαροῦ καὶ ἀτηλοῦς καὶ ἀδιαρθρώτου προστάτην καὶ σωφρονίστην, διὸ τῷ στόματι τὸν δάκτυλον ἔχει προσκείμενον, ἐχεμυθίας καὶ σιωπῆς σύμβολον.* The Harpocrates of the Egyptians is not to be taken for an imperfect and infant God, but for the president of men's speech concerning the gods, that is but imperfect, balbutient and inarticulate, and the regulator or corrector of the same ; his finger upon his mouth being a symbol of silence and taciturnity.—It is very true, that some Christians have made another interpretation of this Egyptian Harpocrates, as if the meaning of it had been this : that the gods of the Egyptians had been all of them really nothing else but mortal men, but that this was a secret, that was to be concealed from the vulgar. Which conceit, however it be witty, yet it is devoid of truth ; and doubtless the meaning of those Egyptian Harpocrates was no other than this,

[1] Stromat. lib. v. cap. iv. p. 664.

[2] Ovid. Metam. lib. ix.

[3] De Is. et Osir.

that either the supreme and incomprehensible Deity was to be adored with silence, or not spoken of without much caution and circumspection ; or else that the arcane mysteries of theology were not to be promiscuously communicated, but concealed from the profane vulgar. Which same thing seems to have been also signified by that yearly feast kept by the Egyptians in honor of Thoth or Hermes, when the priests eating honey and figs pronounced those words, *γλυκὺ ἡ ἀλήθεια*, truth is sweet—as also by that amulet, which Isis was fabled to have worn about her, the interpretation whereof was *φώνη ἀληθὴς*,[1] true speech.

This *ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία*, this arcane and recondite theology of the Egyptians, was concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by fables or allegories, and by symbols or hieroglyphics. Eusebius informs us, that Porphyrius wrote a book *Περὶ τῆς ἀλληγορουμένης Ἑλλήνων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων θεολογίας*, concerning the allegorical theology both of the Greeks and Egyptians.—And here by the way we may observe, that this business of allegorizing in matters of religion had not its first and only rise amongst the Christians, but was a thing very much in use among the Pagan theologers also : and therefore Celsus in Origen[2] commends some of the Christians for this, that they could allegorize ingeniously and handsomely. It is well known, how both Plutarch[3] and Synesius[4] allegorized those Egyptian fables of Isis and Osiris, the one to a philosophical, the other to a political sense. And the Egyptian hieroglyphics, which were figures not answering to sounds or words, but immediately representing the objects and conceptions of the mind, were chiefly made use of by them to this purpose, to express the mysteries of their religion and theology, so as that they might be concealed from the profane vulgar. For which cause the hieroglyphic learning of the Egyptians is commonly taken for one and the same thing with their arcane theology, or metaphysics. And this the author of the questions and answers ad Orthodoxos[5] tells us was anciently had in much greater esteem amongst the Egyptians, than all their other learning ; and that therefore Moses was as well instructed in this hieroglyphic learning and metaphysical theology of theirs, as in their mathematics. And, for our parts, we doubt not, but that the Mensa Isiaca lately published, containing so many strange and uncouth hieroglyphics

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[1] De Iside et Osiride, p. 378.

[2] Lib. i. p. 14. edit. Cantab.

[3] De Iside et Osiride.

[4] De Providentia, p. 89. oper.

[5] Inter Justini Martyris Opera, Quæstion. et Respon. xxv. p. 406.

in it, was something of this *ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία*, this arcane theology of the Egyptians, and not mere history, as some imagine; though the late confident Oedipus seems to arrogate too much to himself, in pretending to such a certain and exact interpretation of it. Now as it is reasonable to think, that in all those Pagan nations, where there was another theology besides the vulgar, the principal part thereof was the doctrine of one supreme and universal Deity, the Maker of the whole world; so can it not well be conceived, what this *ἄῤῥητος* and *ἀπόῤῥητος* and *αἰνιγματώδης θεολογία*, this arcane, and mysterious, and enigmatic theology of the Egyptians, so much talked of, should be other than a kind of metaphysics concerning God, as one perfect incorporeal Being, the original of all things.

We know nothing of any moment, that can be objected against this, save only that, which Porphyrius,[1] in his Epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest, writeth concerning Chæremon:[2] *Χαιρήμων μὲν γάρ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐδ' ἄλλο τὶ πρὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων κόσμων ἡγοῦνται, ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγων τιθέμενοι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων, οὐδ' ἄλλους θεοὺς, πλὴν τῶν πλανητῶν λεγομένων, καὶ τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸν ζωδιακὸν*, etc. Chæremon and others acknowledge nothing before this visible and corporeal world, alleging for the countenance of their opinion such of the Egyptians, as talk of no other gods but the planets, and those stars, that fill up the zodiac, or rise together with them, their decans, and horoscopes, and robust princes, as they call them; whose names are also inserted into their almanacs or ephemerides, together with the times of their risings and settings, and the prognostics or significations of future events for them. For he observed, that those Egyptians, who made the sun the demiurgus or architect of the world, interpreted the stories of Isis and Osiris, and all those other religious fables, into nothing but stars, and planets, and the river Nile, *καὶ ὅλως πάντα εἰς τὰ φυσικὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ ξώσας οὐσίας ἑρμηνεύειν*, and referred all things universally into natural or inanimate, nothing into incorporeal and living substances.—Which passage of Porphyrius concerning Chæremon, we confess, Eusebius lays great stress upon, endeavoring to make advantage of it, first against the Egyptians, and then against the Greeks and other Pagans, as deriving their religion and theology from them: "It is manifest from hence, (saith he) that the very arcane theology of the Egyptians deified nothing but stars and planets, and acknowledged no incorporeal princi-

[1] Pr. Ev. lib. iii. c. iv.

[2] This Epistle is prefixed to Jamblichus de Mysteriis Ægyptior. published at Oxford by Dr. T. Gale.

ple or demiurgic reason as the cause of this universe, but only the visible sun." And then he concludes in this manner: "See now what is become of this arcane theology of the Egyptians, that deifies nothing but senseless matter or dead inanimate bodies." But it is well known, that Eusebius took all advantages possible, to represent the Pagans to the worst, and render their theology ridiculous and absurd; nevertheless what he here urgeth against the Egyptians, is the less valuable, because himself plainly contradicts it elsewhere, declaring, that the Egyptians acknowledged a demiurgic reason and intellectual architect of the world, which consequently was the maker of the sun; and confessing the same of the other Pagans also. Now to affirm, that the Egyptians acknowledged no other deity than inanimate matter and the senseless corporeal world, is not only to deny that they had any *ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία,* any arcane theology at all (which yet hath been sufficiently proved) but also to render them absolute Atheists. For if this be not Atheism, to acknowledge no other deity besides dead and senseless matter, then the word hath no signification. Chæremon indeed seems to impute this opinion (not to all the Egyptians) but to some of them; and it is very possible, that there might be some Atheists amongst the Egyptians also, as well as amongst the Greeks and their philosophers. And doubtless this Chæremon himself was a kind of astrological Atheist; for which cause we conclude, that it was not Chæremon the Stoic, from whom notwithstanding Porphyrius in his book of Abstinence citeth certain other things concerning the Egyptians; but either that Chæremon, whom Strabo made use of in Egypt, or else some other of that name. But that there ever was or can be any such religious Atheists, as Eusebius with some others imagine, who though acknowledging no Deity, besides dead and senseless matter, notwithstanding devoutly court and worship the same, constantly invoking it and imploring its assistance, as expecting great benefit to themselves thereby; this we confess is such a thing, as we have not faith enough to believe, it being a sottishness and contradictious nonsense, that is not incident to human nature. Neither can we doubt, but that all the devout Pagans acknowledged some living and understanding deities or other; nor easily believe, that they ever worshipped any inanimate or senseless bodies, otherwise than as some way referring to the same, or as images and symbols of them. But as for that passage in Porphyrius's Epistle concerning Chæremon, where he only propounds doubts to Anebo, the Egyptian priest, as desiring further information from him concerning them, Jamblichus hath given us a full answer to it, under the person of Abammo, another Egyptian priest, which not-

withstanding hath not hitherto been at all taken notice of, because Ficinus and Scutellius, not understanding the word Chæremon to be a proper name, ridiculously turned it in their translations, *optarem* and *gauderem*, thereby also perverting the whole sense. The words in the Greek MS. (now in the hands of my learned friend Mr. Gale) run thus :[1] *Χαιρήμων δὲ καὶ οἵτινες ἄλλοι τῶν περὶ τὸν κόσμον ἅπτονται πρώτων αἰτίων, τὰς τελευταίας ἀρχὰς ἐξηγοῦνται, ὅσοι τε τοὺς πλανήτας, καὶ τὸν Ζωδιακὸν, τοὺς δὲ δεκανοὺς, καὶ ὡροσκόπους, καὶ τοὺς λεγομένους κραταιοὺς ἡγεμόνας παραδιδοῦσι, τὰς μεριστὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν διανομὰς ἀναφαίνουσι· τάτε ἐν τοῖς ἀλμενικιακοῖς μέρος τι βραχύτατον περιέχει τῶν Ἑρμαϊκῶν διατάξεων, καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀστέρων ἢ φάσεων, ἢ κρύψεων, ἢ σελήνης αὐξήσεων, ἢ μειώσεων ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις εἶχε τὴν ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις αἰτιολογίαν· φυσικά τε οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι πάντα Αἰγύπτιοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν νοερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως διακρίνουσιν· οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν, νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον προστησάμενοι καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ὄντας, οὕτως δημιουργεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα·* But Chæremon and those others, who pretend to write of the first causes of the world, declare only the last and lowest principles, as likewise they who treat of the planets, the zodiac, the decans, the horoscopes, and the robust princes. And those things, that are in the Egyptian almanack (or ephemerides) contain the least part of the Hermaical institutions, namely the phases and occultations of the stars, the increase and decrease of the moon, and the like astrological matters ; which things have the lowest place in the Egyptian ætiology. Nor do the Egyptians resolve all things into (senseless) nature, but they distinguish both the life of the soul and the intellectual life from that of nature, and that not only in ourselves, but also in the universe ; they determining mind and reason first to have existed in themselves, and so this whole world to have been made. Wherefore they acknowledge before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living Power, and place pure mind above the world, as the Demiurgus and architect thereof.—From which testimony of Jamblichus, who was but little junior to Porphyrius, and contemporary with Eusebius, and who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, it plainly appears, that the Egyptians did not generally suppose (as Chæremon pretended concerning some of them) a senseless inanimate nature to be the first original of all things, but that as well in the world as in ourselves, they acknowledged soul superior to nature, and mind or intellect superior to soul, this being the Demiurgus of the world. But we shall have afterward occasion more opportunely to cite other

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[1] Jamblich. de Myster. Ægyptior. sect. viii. cap. iv. p. 160.

passages out of this Jamblichus's Egyptian mysteries to the same purpose.

Wherefore there is no pretence at all to suspect, that the Egyptians were universally Atheists and Anarchists, such as supposed no living understanding Deity, but resolved all into senseless matter, as the first and highest principle; but all the question is, whether they were not Polyarchists, such as asserted a multitude of understanding deities, self-existent or unmade. Now, that monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians, A. Steuchus Eugubinus and many other learned men, have thought to be unquestionably evident from the Heremetic or Trismegistic writings, they taking it for granted that these are all genuine and sincere. Whereas there is too much cause to suspect, that there have been some pious frauds practised upon these Trismegistic writings, as well as there were upon the Sibylline; and that either whole books of them have been counterfeited by pretended Christians, or at least several spurious and supposititious passages here and there inserted into some of them. Isaac Casaubon,[1] who was the first discoverer, has taken notice of many such in that first Hermetic book, entitled, Pœmander; some also in the fourth book, inscribed Crater, and some in the thirteenth called the Sermon in the Mount concerning Regeneration; which may justly render those three whole books, or at least the first and last of them, to be suspected. We shall here repeat none of Casaubon's condemned passages, but add one more to them out of the thirteenth book, or Sermon in the Mount, which, however omitted by him, seems to be more rankly Christian than any other; *λέγε μοὶ τοῦτο, τίς ἐστι γενεσιουργὸς τῆς παλιγγενεσίας; ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς, ἄνθρωπος εἷς, θελήματι θεοῦ.* Tell me this also, who is the cause or worker of regeneration? The Son of God, one man by the will of God.—Wherefore, though Ath. Kircherus[2] contend with much zeal for the sincerity of all these Trismegistic books; yet we must needs pronounce of the three forementioned, at least Pœmander properly so called, and the Sermon in the Mount, that they are either wholly forged and counterfeited by some pretended Christians, or else had many spurious passages inserted into them. Wherefore, it cannot be solidly proved from the Trismegistic books after this manner, as supposed to be all alike genuine and sincere, that the Egyptian Pagans acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen: much less can the

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[1] Exercitat. i. in Baron. Num. xviii. p. 54.

[2] In Obelisco Pamphylio, p. 35, and in Œdipo Ægyptiaco Class. xii. cap. iii.

same be evinced from that pretended Aristotelic book, De secretiore parte divinæ sapientiæ secundum Ægyptios—greedily swallowed down also by Kircherus, but unquestionably pseudepigraphous.

Notwithstanding which, we conceive that though all the Trismegistic books, that now are or have been formerly extant, had been forged by some pretended Christians, as that book of the arcane Egyptian wisdom was by some philosopher, and imputed to Aristotle; yet would they, for all that, upon another account, afford no inconsiderable argument to prove, that the Egyptian Pagans asserted one supreme Deity, viz. because every cheat and imposture must needs have some basis or foundation of truth to stand upon; there must have been something truly Egyptian in such counterfeit Egyptian writings, (and therefore this at least of one supreme Deity) or else they could never have obtained credit at first, or afterwards have maintained the same. The rather, because these Trismegistic books were dispersed in those ancient times, before the Egyptian Paganism and their succession of priests were yet extinct; and therefore had that, which is so much insisted upon in them, been dissonant from the Egyptian theology, they must needs have been exploded as mere lies and forgeries. Wherefore we say again, that if all the Hermaic or Trismegistic books, that are now extant, and those to boot, which being mentioned in the ancient fathers have been lost, as the τὰ γενικὰ, and the τὰ διεξοδικὰ, and the like, had been nothing but the pious frauds and cheats of Christians, yet must there needs have been some truth at the bottom to give subsistence to them; this, at least, that Hermes Trismegist, or the Egyptian priests, in their arcane and true theology, really acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen.

But it does not follow, that, because some of these Hermaic or Trismegistic books now extant were counterfeit and supposititious, that therefore all of them must needs be such; and not only so, but those also, that are mentioned in the writings of the ancient fathers, which are now lost. Wherefore, the learned Casaubon seems not to have reckoned or concluded well, when from the detection of forgery in two or three of those Trismegistic books at most, he pronounces of them all universally, that they were nothing but Christian cheats and impostures. And probably he was led into this mistake, by reason of his too securely following that vulgar error, (which yet had been confuted by Patricius) that all that was published by Ficinus, under the name of Hermes Trismegist, was but one and the same book, Pœmander, consisting of several chapters; whereas they are all indeed so many distinct and independent books, whereof Pœmander is only placed first. However,

there was no shadow of reason, why the Asclepius should have fallen under the same condemnation, nor several other books superadded by Patricius, they being unquestionably distinct from the Pœmander, and no signs of spuriousness or bastardy discovered in them. Much less ought those Trismegistic books cited by the fathers, and now lost, have been condemned also unseen. Wherefore, notwithstanding all that Casaubon has written, there may very well be some Hermetic or Trismegistic books genuine, though all of them be not such; that is, according to our after-declaration, there may be such books, as were really Egyptian, and not counterfeited by any Christian, though perhaps not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, nor in the Egyptian language. And as it cannot well be conceived, how there should have been any counterfeit Egyptian books, had there been none at all real; so that there were some real and genuine, will perhaps be rendered probable by these following considerations.

That there was anciently, amongst the Egyptians such a man as Thoth, Theuth, or Taut, who, together with letters, was the first inventor of arts and sciences, as arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and of the hieroglyphic learning, (therefore called by the Greeks Hermes, and by the Latins Mercurius) cannot reasonably be denied; it being a thing confirmed by general fame in all ages, and by the testimonies not only of Sanchoniathon[1] a Phœnician historiographer, who lived about the times of the Trojan war, and wrote a book concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and Manetho's Sebennyta,[2] an Egyptian priest, contemporary with Ptolemy Philadelphus; but also of that grave philosopher Plato, who is said to have sojourned thirteen years in Egypt, that in his Philebus[3] speaks of him as the first inventor of letters, (who distinguished betwixt vowels and consonants determining their several numbers) there calling him either a god or divine man; but in his Phædrus[4] attributeth to him also the invention of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, together with some ludicrous recreations, making him either a god or demon: *ἤκουσα περὶ Ναύκρατιν τὴν Αἰγύπτου, γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον τὸ ἱερὸν ὃ καὶ καλοῦσιν Ἶβιν, αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεῦθ·* I have heard (saith he) that about Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of the ancient Egyptian gods, to whom the bird Ibis was sacred, as his symbol or hieroglyphic; the name of which demon was Theuth.—In which

[1] Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 31, 32.

[2] Apud Georg. Syncellum in Chron. p. 40.

[3] Page 75. [4] Page 356.

place the philosopher subjoins also an ingenious dispute betwixt this Theth and Thamus, then king of Egypt, concerning the convenience and the inconvenience of letters; the former boasting of that invention ὡς μνήμης καὶ σοφίας φαρμακὸν, as a remedy for memory, and great help to wisdom—but the latter contending, that it would rather beget oblivion, by the neglect of memory, and therefore was not so properly μνήμης as ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον, a remedy for memory, as reminiscence, or the recovery of things forgotten—adding, that it would also weaken and enervate men's natural faculties by slugging them, and rather beget δόξαν σοφίας, than ἀλήθειαν, a puffy conceit and opinion of knowledge —by a multifarious rabble of indigested notions, than the truth thereof. Moreover, since it is certain, that the Egyptians were famous for literature before the Greeks, they must of necessity have some one or more founders of learning amongst them, as the Greeks had: and Thoth is the only or first person celebrated amongst them on this account, in remembrance of whom the first month of the year was called by that name. Which Thoth is generally supposed to have lived in the times of the patriarchs, or considerably before Moses; Moses himself being said to have been instructed in that learning, which owed its original to him.

Again, besides this Thoth, or Theuth, who was called the first Hermes, the Egyptians had also another eminent advancer or restorer of learning, who was called δεύτερος Ἑρμῆς, the second Hermes—they perhaps supposing the soul of Thoth, or the first Hermes, to have come into him by transmigration; but his proper Egyptian name was Siphoas, as Syncellus[1] out of Manetho informs us: Σιφωὰς, ὁ καὶ Ἑρμῆς, υἱὸς Ἡφαίστου, Siphoas, (who is also Hermes) the son of Vulcan.—That is he, who is said to have been the father of Tat, and to have been surnamed Τρισμέγιστος, Ter Maximus, (he being so styled by Manetho, Jamblichus, and others.) And he is placed by Eusebius[2] in the fiftieth year after the Israelitish Exitus, though probably somewhat too early. The former of these two Hermes was the inventor of arts and sciences; the latter, the restorer and advancer of them: the first wrote in hieroglyphics upon pillars, ἐν τῇ συριγικῇ γῇ, (as the learned Valesius[3] conjectures it should be read, instead of Σηριαδεκῇ·) which Syringes what they were, Am. Marcellinus[4] will instruct us. The second interpreted and translated those hieroglyphics, composing many books in several

[1] In Chron. p. 124. [2] In Chronico, p. 556.

[3] Not. ad Ammian. Marcellin. lib. xxii. p. 339.

[4] Hist. lib. xxii. cap. xv. p. 339.

arts and sciences; the number whereof set down by Jamblichus[1] must needs be fabulous, unless it be understood of paragraphs or verses. Which Trismegistic or Hermetic books were said to be carefully preserved by the priests in the interior recesses of their temples.

But besides the hieroglyphics written by the first Hermes, and the books composed by the second, (who was called also Trismegist) it cannot be doubted, but that there were many other books written by the Egyptian priests successively in several ages. And Jamblichus informs us, in the beginning of his mysteries—That Hermes, the God of eloquence, and president or patron of all true knowledge concerning the gods, was formerly accounted common to all the priests, insomuch, that *τὰ αὐτῶν τῆς σοφίας εὑρήματα αὐτῷ ἀνετίθεσαν, Ἑρμοῦ πάντα τὰ οἰκεῖα συγγράμματα ἐπονομάζοντες*, they dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to him, entitling their own books to Hermes Trismegist.—Now though one reason hereof might probably have been thought to have been this, because those books were supposed to have been written according to the tenor of the old Hermetic or Trismegistic doctrine; yet Jamblichus here acquaints us with the chief ground of it, namely this: that though Hermes was once a mortal man, yet he was afterwards deified by the Egyptians, (which is testified also by Plato) and made to be the tutelar god, and fautor of all arts and sciences, but especially theology; by whose inspiration therefore all such books were conceived to have been written. Nay, further, we may observe, that in some of the Hermaic or Trismegistic books now extant, Hermes is sometimes put for the Divine wisdom or understanding itself. And now we see the true reason, why there have been many books called Hermetical and Trismegistical; some of which, notwithstanding, cannot possibly be conceived to have been of such great antiquity, nor written by Hermes Trismegist himself, viz. because it was customary with the Egyptian priest to entitle their own philosophic and theologic books to Hermes. Moreover, it is very probable, that several of the books of the Egyptian priest of latter times were not originally written in the Egyptian language, but the Greek; because, at least from the Ptolemaic king downward, Greek was become very familiar to all the learned Egyptians, and in a manner vulgarly spoken, as may appear from those very words, Hermes, Trismegist, and the like, so commonly used by them, together with the proper names of places; and because the Coptic language to this very day hath more of Greek than Egyptian words in it; nay, Plutarch ventures to etymologize those old Egyptian names,

[1] De Myster. Ægyptior. sect. viii. cap. i. p. 157.

Isis, Osiris, Horus and Typhon, from the Greek, as if the Egyptians had been anciently well acquainted with that language.

Now, that some of those ancient Hermaic books, written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or believed to be such by the Egyptians, and kept in the custody of their priests, were still in being and extant amongst them, after the times of Christianity, seems to be unquestionable from the testimony of that pious and learned father, Clemens Alexandrinus, he giving this particular account of them, after the mentioning of their opinion concerning the transmigration of souls: [1] "The Egyptians follow a certain peculiar philosophy of their own, which may be best declared by setting down the order of their religious procession. First, therefore, goes the precentor, carrying two of Hermes's books along with him; the one which contains the hymns of the gods, the other directions for the kingly office. After him follows the horoscopus, who is particularly instructed in Hermes's astrological books, which are four. Then succeeds the hierogrammateus, or sacred scribe, with feathers upon his head, and a book and rule in his hands, to whom it belongeth to be thoroughly acquainted with the hieroglyphics, as also with cosmography, geography, the order of the sun and moon and five planets, the chorography of Egypt, and description of Nile. In the next place cometh the Stolistes, who is to be thoroughly instructed in those ten books, which treat concerning the honor of the gods, the Egyptian worship, sacrifices, first-fruits, prayers, pomps, and festivals. And last of all marcheth the prophet, who is the president of the temple and sacred things, and ought to be thoroughly versed in those other ten books called sacerdotal, concerning laws, the gods, and the whole discipline of the priests. Wherefore, amongst the books of Hermes, there are forty-two accounted most necessary; of which thirty-six, containing all the Egyptian philosophy, were to be learned by those particular orders beforementioned; but the other six, treating of medicinal things, by the pastophori.—From which place we understand, that at least forty-two books of the ancient Hermes Trismegist, or such reputed by the Egyptians, were still extant in the times of Clemens Alexandrinus, about two hundred years after the Christian epocha.

Furthermore, that there were certain books really Egyptian, and called Hermaical or Trismegistical, (whether written by the ancient Hermes Trismegist himself, or by other Egyptian priests of latter times according to the tenor of his doctrine, and only entitled to him) which, after the times of Christianity, began to be taken notice of by other na-

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[1] Strom. vi. p. 633. [cap. iv. p. 757. edit. Potteri.]

tions, the Greeks and Latins, seems probable from hence, because such books are not only mentioned and acknowledged by Christian writers and fathers, but also by Pagans and philosophers. In Plutarch's discourse De Iside et Osiride, we read thus of them: [1] *Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἑρμοῦ λεγομέναις βίβλοις, ἱστοροῦσι γεγρράφθαι, περὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου περιφορᾶς τεταγμένην δύναμιν, Ὧρον, Ἕλληνες δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα καλοῦσι, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, οἱ μὲν Ὄσιριν, οἱ δὲ Σάραπιν, οἱ δὲ Σωθὶ Αἰγυπτιστί·* In the books called Hermes's, or Hermaical, it is reported to have been written concerning sacred names, that the power appointed to preside over the motion of the sun is called by the Egyptians Horus (as by the Greeks Apollo) and that, which presides over the air and wind, is called by some Osiris) by others Serapis, and by others Sothi in the Egyptian language.—Now these sacred names in Plutarch seem to be several names of God; and therefore whether these Hermaic books of his were the same with those in Clemens Alexandrinus, such as were supposed by the Egyptians to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or other books written by Egyptian priests, according to the tenor of this doctrine; we may by the way observe, that, according to the Hermaical or Trismegistic doctrine, one and the same Deity was worshipped under several names and notions, according to its several powers and virtues, manifested in the world; which is a thing afterwards more to be insisted on. Moreover, it hath been generally believed, that L. Apuleius Madaurensis, an eminent Platonic philosopher, and zealous assertor of Paganism, was the translator of the Asclepian dialogue of Hermes Trismegist out of Greek into Latin; which therefore hath been accordingly published with Apuleius's works. And Barthius affirms, that St. Austin does somewhere expressly impute this version to Apuleius; but we confess we have not yet met with the place. However, there seems to be no sufficient reason, why Colvius should call this into question from the style and Latin. Again, it is certain, that Jamblichus doth not only mention these Hermaic books, under the name of *τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ,* the books that are carried up and down as Hermes's, or vulgarly imputed to him; but also vindicate them from the imputation of imposture. Not as if there were any suspicion at all of that, which Casaubon is so confident of, that these Hermaic books were all forged by Christians; but because some might then possibly imagine them to have been counterfeited by philosophers; wherefore it will be convenient here to set down the whole passage of Jamblichus[2] concerning it, as it is in the Greek MS. *δευκρινηθέντων*

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[1] Page 374. [p. 375.]

[2] Sect. viii. cap. iv. p. 160. edit. Gale.

οὖν τούτων οὕτως, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν οἷς λέγει ἐπιτετυχηκέναι, σαφής ἐστιν ἡ διάλυσις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενα, ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχει δόξας, εἰ καὶ τῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων γλώττῃ πολλάκις χρῆται· μεταγέγραπται γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίας γλώττης ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἀπείρως ἐχόντων. Χαιρήμων δὲ, etc. These things being thus discussed and determined, the solution of that difficulty, from those books which Porphyrius saith he met withal, (namely the Hermaics, and those writings of Chæremon) will be clear and easy. For the books vulgarly imputed to Hermes do really contain the Hermaic opinions and doctrines in them, although they often speak the language of philosophers; the reason whereof is, because they were translated out of the Egyptian tongue by men not unacquainted with philosophy. But Chæremon and those others, etc. —Where it is first observable, that Jamblichus doth not affirm these Hermaic books to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, he calling them only *τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ*, the books that were carried about as Hermes's.—But that which he affirmeth of them is this, that they did really contain the Hermaical opinions, and derive their original from Egypt.—Again, whereas some might then possibly suspect, that these Hermaic books had been counterfeited by Greek philosophers, and contained nothing but the Greek learning in them, because they speak so much the philosophic language; Jamblichus gives an account of this also, that the reason hereof was because they were translated out of the Egyptian language by men skilled in the Greek philosophy—who therefore added something of their own phrase and notion to them. It is true, indeed, that most of these Hermaic books, which now we have, seem to have been written originally in Greek; notwithstanding which, others of them, and particularly those that are now lost, as *τὰ Γενικά*, and the like, might, as Jamblichus here affirmeth, have been translated out of the Egyptian tongue, but by their translators disguised with philosophic language, and other Grecanic things intermixed with them. Moreover from the forecited passage of Jamblichus we may clearly collect, that Porphyrius in his Epistle to Anebo, the Egyptian priest (of which Epistle there are only some small fragments left[1]) did also make mention of these Hermaic writings; and whereas he found the writings of Chæremon to be contradictious to them, therefore desired to be resolved by that Egyptian priest, whether the doctrine of those Hermaic books were genuine and truly Egyptian or no. Now, Jamblichus in his answer here affirmeth, that the doctrine of the ancient Hermes, or the Egyptian theology, was as to the

[1] These fragments are prefixed to Dr. Gale's edition of Jamblichus de Myst. Ægyptior.

substance truly represented in those books, (vulgarly imputed to Hermes) but not so by Chæremon. Lastly, St. Cyril of Alexandria informs us,[1] that there was an edition of these Hermaic or Trismegistic books (compiled together) formerly made at Athens under this title, *Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία*, fifteen hermaic books.—Which Hermaics, Casaubon conceiving them to have been published before Jamblichus's time, took them for those Salaminiaca, which he found in the Latin translations of Jamblichus, made by Ficinus and Scutellius; whereas indeed, he was here abused by those translators, there being no such thing to be found in the Greek copy. But the word *ἀλμηνικιακὰ*, (not understood by them) being turned into Salaminiaca, Casaubon therefore conjectured them to have been those Hermaic books published at Athens, because Salamin was not far distant from thence. Now, it cannot be doubted, but that this edition of Hermaic books at Athens was made by some philosopher or Pagans, and not by Christians; this appearing also from the words of St. Cyril himself, where, having spoken of Moses and the agreement of Hermes with him, he adds, *πεποίηται δὲ καὶ τούτου μνήμην, ἐν ἰδίαις συγγραφαῖς, ὃ συντεθεικὼς Ἀθήνησι τὰ ἐπίκλην Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία.* Of which Moses also, who compiled and published the fifteen Hermaic books at Athens, makes mention in his own discourse—(annexed thereunto.) For thus we conceive that place is to be understood, that the Pagan publisher of the Hermaic books himself took notice of some agreement, that was betwixt Moses and Hermes. But here it is to be noted, that because Hermes and the Hermaic books were in such great credit, not only among the Christians, but also the Greek and Latin Pagans, therefore were there some counterfeit writings obtruded also under that specious title; such as that ancient botanic book mentioned by Galen, and those Christian forgeries of later times, the Pæmander and the Sermon on the Mount; which being not cited by any ancient father or writer, were both of them doubtless later than Jamblichus, who discovers no suspicion of any Christian forgeries in this kind.

But Casaubon, who contends, that all the theologic books imputed to Hermes Trismegist were counterfeited by Christians, affirms all the philosophy, doctrine and learning of them (excepting what only is Christian in them) to be merely Platonical and Grecanical, but not at all Egyptian: thence concluding, that these books were forged by such Christians, as were skilled in the Platonic or Grecanic learning. But

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[1] Contra Julian, lib. i. [p. 31. edit. Spanhem.]

[2] Exercitat. I. in Baronii Annal. p. 55.

first, it is here considerable, that since Pythagorism, Platonism and the Greek learning in general was in great part derived from the Egyptians, it cannot be concluded, that whatsoever is Platonical or Grecanical, therefore was not Egyptian. The only instance, that Casaubon insists upon, is this dogma in the Trismegistic books, that nothing in the world perisheth, and that death is not the destruction, but change and translation of things only—which, because he finds amongst some of the Greek philosophers, he resolves to be peculiar to them only, and not common with the Egyptians. But since the chief design and tendency of that dogma was plainly to maintain the immortality, pre-existence and transmigration of souls, which doctrine was unquestionably derived from the Egyptians; there is little reason to doubt but that this dogma was itself Egyptian also. And Pythagoras, who was the chief propagator of this doctrine amongst the Greeks, *οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων*, that no real entity (in generations and corruptions) was made or destroyed—according to those Ovidian verses before cited,

> Nec perit in toto quicquam, mihi credite, mundo,
> Sed variat faciemque novat. Nascique vocatur
> Incipere esse aliud, etc.

did in all probability derive it, together with its superstructure, (the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, at once from the Egyptians. But it is observable, that the Egyptians had also a peculiar ground of their own for this dogma (which we do not find insisted upon by the Greek philosophers) and it is thus expressed in the eighth of Ficinus's Hermetic books or chapters; *εἰ δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος, καὶ ζῶον ἀθάνατον, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀθανάτου ζῶου μέρος τι ἀποθανεῖν· πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μέρη ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου, μάλιστα δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον·* If the world be a second god and an immortal animal, then is it impossible, that any part of this immortal animal should perish or come to nothing; but all things in the world are parts of this great mundane animal, and chiefly man, who is a rational animal.—Which same notion we find also insisted on in the Asclepian dialogue; "Secundum deum hunc crede, o Asclepi, omnia gubernantem, omniaque mundana illustrantem animalia. Si enim animal, mundus, vivens, semper et fuit et est et erit, nihil in mundo mortale est: viventis enim uniuscujusque partis, quæ in ipso mundo, sicut in uno eodemque animale semper vivente, nullus est mortalitatis locus." Where though the Latin be a little imperfect, yet the sense is this: You are to believe the world, O Asclepius, to be a second god governing all things, and illustrating all

mundane animals. Now if the world be a living animal, and immortal, then there is nothing mortal in it, there being no place for mortality as to any living part or member of that mundane animal, that always liveth.—Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that though Pythagoras first derived this notion from the Egyptians, yet he and his followers might probably improve the same further (as Plato tells us, that the Greeks generally did what they received from the Barbarians) namely, to the taking away the qualities and forms of bodies, and resolving all corporeal things into magnitude, figure and motion. But that there is indeed some of the old Egyptian learning contained in these Trismegistic books now extant, shall be clearly proved afterwards, when we come to speak of that grand mystery of the Egyptian theology (derived by Orpheus from them) that God is all. To conclude Jamblichus's judgment in this case ought without controversy to be far preferred before Casaubon's, both by reason of his great antiquity, and his being much better skilled not only in the Greek, but also the Egyptian learning; that the books imputed to Hermes Trismegist did *Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχειν δόξας*, really contain the Hermaic opinions, though they spake sometimes the language of the Greek philosophers.

Wherefore, upon all these considerations, we conceive it reasonable to conclude, that though there have been some Hermaic books counterfeited by Christians, since Jamblichus's time, as namely the Pœmander and the Sermon on the Mount concerning Regeneration, neither of which is found cited by any ancient father; yet there were other Hermaic books, which though not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, nor all of them in the Egyptian language, but some of them in Greek, were truly Egyptian, and did, for the substance of them, contain the Hermaic doctrine. Such probably were those mentioned by the ancient fathers, but since lost, as the *τὰ γενικά*, which seems to have been a discourse concerning the cosmogonia, and the *τὰ διεξοδικά*, and the like. And such also may some of these Hermaic books be, that are still extant; as to instance particularly, the Asclepian dialogue, entitled in the Greek *ὁ τέλειος λόγος*, the perfect oration—and in all probability translated into Latin by Apuleius. For it can hardly be imagined, that he who was so devout a Pagan, so learned a philosopher, and so witty a man, should be so far imposed upon by a counterfeit Trismegistic book, and mere Christian cheat, as to bestow translating upon it, and recommend it to the world, as that which was genuinely Pagan. But, however, whether Apuleius were the translator of this Asclepian dialogue or no, it is evident, that the spirit of it is not at all Christian, but rankly Pagan; one instance whereof we have, in its

glorying of a power, that men have of making gods; upon which account St. Austin[1] thought fit to concern himself in the confutation of it. Moreover, it being extant and vulgarly known before Jamblichus's time, it must needs be included in his τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, and consequently receive this attestation from him, that it did contain not merely the Greekish, but the Hermaical and Egyptian doctrine.

There are indeed some objections made against this, as first, from what we read in this dialogue,[2] concerning the purgation of the world, partly by water and partly by fire: "Tunc ille Dominus et pater Deus, primipotens, et unus gubernator mundi, intuens in mores factaque hominum, voluntate sua (quæ est dei benignitas) vitiis resistens, et corruptelæ errorem revocans, malignitatem omnem vel alluvione diluens, vel igne consumens, ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit." When the world becomes thus degenerate, then that Lord and Father, the supreme God, and the only governor of the world, beholding the manners and deeds of men, by his will (which is his benignity) always resisting vice, and restoring things from their degeneracy, will either wash away the malignity of the world by water, or else consume it by fire, and restore it to its ancient form again.—But since we find in Julius Firmicus,[3] that there was a tradition amongst the Egyptians, concerning the apoctastasis of the world, partim per κατακλυσμὸν, partim per ἐκπύρωσιν, partly by inundation and partly by conflagration—this objection can signify nothing. Wherefore there is another objection, that hath some more plausibility from that prophecy, which we find in this Asclepius, concerning the overthrow of the Egyptian Paganism (ushered in with much lamentation) in these words; "Tunc terra ista, sanctissima sedes delubrorum, sepulchrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima:" then this land of Egypt, formerly the most holy seat of the religious temples of the gods, shall be every where full of the sepulchres of dead men. The sense whereof is thus expressed by St. Austin:[4] "Hoc videtur dolere, quod memoriæ martyrum nostrorum templis eorum delubrisque succederent; ut ii, qui hæc legunt, animo a nobis averso atque perverso, putent a Paganis deos cultos fuisse in templis, a nobis autem coli mortuos in sepulchris:" He seems to lament this, that the memorials of our martyrs should succeed in the place of their temples; that so they, who read this with a perverse mind, might think, that by the Pagans the gods were worshipped in temples, but by us (Christians) dead

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[1] De Civitate Dei, lib. viii. cap. xxiii. p. 162. tom. vii. oper.

[2] P. 607. Col. [3] Matheseos, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 34.

[4] Civ. D. l. viii. c. xxvi. [p. 166. tom. vii. oper.]

men in sepulchres.—Notwithstanding which, this very thing seems to have had its accomplishment too soon after, as may be gathered from these passages of Theodoret :[1] *καὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν καλουμένων θεῶν τὴν μνήμην, ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξήλειψαν (οἱ μάρτυρες) διανοίας·* Now the martyrs have utterly abolished and blotted out of the minds of men the memory of those, who were formerly called gods.—And again, *τοὺς γὰρ οἰκείους νεκροὺς ὁ δεσπότης ἀντεισῆξε τοῖς ὑμετέροις θεοῖς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν φρούδους ἀπέφηνε, τούτοις δὲ τὸ ἐκείνων ἀπένειμε γέρας*, etc. Our Lord hath now brought his dead (that is, his martyrs) into the room and place (that is, the temples) of the gods ; whom he hath sent away empty, and bestowed their honor upon these his martyrs. For now instead of the festivals of Jupiter and Bacchus, are celebrated those of Peter and Paul, Thomas and Sergius, and other holy martyrs.—Wherefore this being so shrewd and plain a description in the Asclepian Dialogue of what really happened in the Christian world, it may seem suspicious, that it was rather a history, written after the event, than a prophecy before it, as it pretends to be : it very much resembling that complaint of Eunapius Sardianus in the life of Ædesius,[2] when the Christians had demolished the temple of Serapis in Egypt, seizing upon its riches and treasure, that instead of the gods, the monks then gave Divine honor to certain vile and flagitious persons deceased, called by the name of martyrs. Now if this be granted, this book must needs be counterfeit and supposititious. Nevertheless, St. Austin entertained no such suspicion concerning this Asclepian passage, as if it had been a history written after the fact, that is, after the sepulchres and memorials of the martyrs came to be so frequented ; he supposing this book to be unquestionably of greater antiquity. Wherefore he concludes it to be a prophecy or prediction made *instinctu fallacis spiritus*, by the instinct or suggestion of some evil spirit ;—they sadly then presaging the ruin of their own empire. Neither was this Asclepian Dialogue only ancienter than St. Austin, but it is cited by Lactantius Firmianus[3] also under the name of *ὁ τέλειος λόγος*, the perfect oration—as was said before, and that as a thing then reputed of great antiquity. Wherefore, in all probability, this Asclepian passage was written before that described event had its accomplishment. And indeed if Antonius the philosopher (as the fore-mentioned Eunapius[4] writes) did predict the very same thing, that after his decease, that magnificent temple of

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[1] De Cur. G. A. l. viii. [p. 544. tom. ii. oper.]

[2] In Vitis Sophistarum, p. 84, 85. edit. Plantin.

[3] Divinar. Instit. lib. iv. cap. vi. p. 418.

[4] Ubi supra, p. 76.

Serapis in Egypt, together with the rest, should be demolished, *καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τάφους γενήσεσθαι*, and the temples of the gods turned into sepulchres—why might not this Egyptian or Trismegistic writer receive the like inspiration or tradition; or at least make the same conjecture?

But there is yet another objection made against the sincerity of this Asclepian dialogue,[1] from Lactantius's citing a passage out of it for the second person in the Trinity, the Son of God; Hermes in eo libro (saith Lactantius) qui *ὁ τέλειος λόγος* inscribitur, his usus est verbis, *ὁ κύριος καὶ ὁ πάντων ποιητής, ὃν θεὸν καλεῖν νενομίκαμεν, ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε θεὸν, ὁρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν (αἰσθητὸν δέ φημι οὐ διὰ τὸ αἰσθέσθαι αὐτὸν, περὶ γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἔστι πότερον αὐτὸς αἴσθοιτο, ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰς αἴσθησιν ὑποπέμπει, καὶ εἰς νοῦν) ἐπεὶ τοῦτον ἐποίησε, πρῶτον, καὶ μόνον, καὶ ἕνα, καλὸς δὲ ἐφάνη αὐτῷ, καὶ πληρήστατος πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἠγίασέ τε καὶ πάνυ ἐφίνησεν ὡς ἴδιον τόκον·* Which we find in Apuleius's Latin translation thus rendered;[2] "Dominus et omnium conformator, quem recte Deum dicimus, a se secundum deum fecit, qui videri et sentiri possit; quem secundum [deum] sensibilem ita dixerim, non ideo quod ipse sentiat (de hoc enim an ipse sentiat annon alio dicemus tempore) sed eo quod videntium sensus incurrit:) quoniam ergo hunc fecit ex se primum, et a se secundum, visusque est ei pulcher, utpote qui est omnium bonitate plenissimus, amavit eum ut divinitatis suæ prolem" (for so it ought to be read, and not *patrem*, it being *τόκον* in the Greek.) The Lord and Maker of all, whom we rightly call God, when he had made a second God, visible and sensible (I say, sensible, not actively, because himself hath sense: for concerning this, whether he have sense or no, we shall speak elsewhere but passively, because he incurs into our senses,) this being his first and only production, seemed both beautiful to him, and most full of all good, and therefore he loved him dearly as his own offspring. Which Lactantius, and after him St. Austin,[3] understanding of the perfect Word of God, or eternal *Λόγος*, made use of it as a testimony against the Pagans for the confirmation of Christianity; they taking it for granted, that this Hermaic book was genuinely Egyptian, and did represent the doctrine of the ancient Hermes Trismegist. But Dionysius Petavius,[4] and other later writers, understanding this place in the same sense with Lactantius and St. Austin, have made a quite different

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[1] Lib. iv. cap. vi. [Divin. Instit. p. 419. [2] Colv. p. 588.

[3] Vide Librum contra quinque Hæreses, cap. iii. p. 3. tom. viii. oper. Append.

[4] Dogmat. Theol. tom. ii. lib. ii. de Trinit. cap. ii. § 5. p. 20.

use of it, namely, to infer from thence, that this book was spurious and counterfeited by some Christian. To which we reply, first, that if this Hermaic writer had acknowledged an eternal *Λόγος*, or Word of God, and called it a second God and the Son of God, he had done no more in this than Philo the Jew did, who speaking of this same *Λόγος* expressly calls it *δεύτερον θεὸν* and *πρωτόγονον υἱὸν θεοῦ*, the second God and the first-begotten Son of God. Notwithstanding which, those writings of Philo's are not at all suspected. And Origen[1] affirms, that some of the ancient philosophers did the like: "Multi philosophorum veterum, unum esse deum, qui cuncta crearit, dixerunt; atque in hoc consentiunt legi. Aliquanti autem hoc adjiciunt, quod deus cuncta per verbum suum fecerit et regat, et verbum Dei sit, quo cuncta moderentur; in hoc non solum legi, sed et evangelio quoque consona scribunt." Many of the old philosophers (that is, all besides a few atheistic ones) have said, that there is one God who created all things, and these agree with the law: but some add further, that God made all things by his Word, and that it is the Word of God, by which all things are governed; and these write consonantly not only to the law, but also to the gospel.—But whether Philo[2] derived this doctrine from the Greek philosophers, or from Egyptians and Hermes Trismegist, he being an Alexandrian, may well be a question.[3] For St. Cyril doth indeed cite several passages out of Hermaic writings then extant to this very purpose. We shall only set down one of them here; *ὁ κόσμος ἔχει ἄρχοντα ἐπικείμενον δημιουργὸν λόγον τοῦ πάντων δεσπότου, ὃς μετ' ἐκεῖνον πρώτη δύναμις, ἀγένητος, ἀπέραντος, ἐξ ἐκείνου προκύψασα, καὶ ἐπίκειται, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργηθέντων· ἔστι δὲ τοῦ παντελείου πρόγονος καὶ τέλειος καὶ γόνιμος υἱός.* The world hath a governor set over it, that Word of the Lord of all which was the maker of it; this is the first power after himself, uncreated, infinite, looking out from him, and ruling over all things that were made by him; this is the perfect and genuine Son of the first omniperfect Being.—Nevertheless the author of the *τέλειος λόγος*, or Asclepian Dialogue, in that forecited passage of his, by his second God, the son of the first, meant no such thing at all as the Christian Logos, or second person of the Trinity, but only the visible world. Which is so plain from the words themselves, that it is a wonder how Lactantius and St. Austin could interpret them otherwise, he making therein a question, whether this second God were [actively] sensible or no. But the same is further manifested from other places of that Dia-

[1] In Gen. Hom. 14.

[2] Vide Joan. Clerici Comment in xviii. priora Commata Evangel. Joannis in Hammondi Nov. Test. tom. i. p. 396. et Epist. Critic. viii. p. 223.

[3] Con. Jul. lib. i. p. 33.

logue, as this for example: "Æternitatis Dominus Deus primus est, secundus est mundus:" The Lord of eternity is the first God, but the second God is the world.—And again, "Summus qui dicitur Deus rector gubernatorque sensibilis Dei, ejus qui in se complectitur omnem locum, omnemque rerum substantiam;" The supreme God is the governor of that sensible god, which contains in it all place and all the substance of things.—And that this was indeed a part of the Hermaic or Egyptian theology, that the visible world animated was a second god, and the son of the first God, appears also from those Hermaic books published by Ficinus, and vulgarly called Pœmander, though that be only the first of them. There hath been one passage already cited out of the eighth book, *δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος*, the world is a second God.—After which followeth more to the same purpose; *πρῶτος γὰρ πάντων ὄντως, ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀγένητος, καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων θεός. δεύτερος δὲ ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενος καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συνεχόμενος καὶ τριφόμενος καὶ ἀθανατιζόμενος ὡς ὑπ' ἰδίου πατρός·* The first God is that eternal unmade maker of all things; the second is he that is made according to the image of the first, which is contained, cherished, or nourished and immortalized by him, as by his own parent, by whom it is made an immortal animal.—So again in the ninth book, *πατὴρ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ὁ μὲν κόσμος υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*, God is the father of the world, and the world is the son of God.—And in the twelfth, *ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος οὗτος ὁ μέγας θεὸς καὶ τοῦ μείζονος εἰκών*, this whole world is a great god, and the image of a greater.—

As for the other Hermetic or Trismegistic books, published partly by Ficinus and partly by Patricius, we cannot confidently condemn any of them for Christian cheats or impostures, save only the Pœmander, and the Sermon in the Mount concerning Regeneration, the first and thirteenth of Ficinus's chapters or books. Neither of which books is cited by any of the ancient fathers, and therefore may be presumed not to have been extant in Jamblichus's time, but more lately forged; and that probably by one and the self-same hand, since the writer of the latter (the Sermon in the Mount) makes mention of the former (that is, the Pœmander) in the close of it. For that, which Casaubon objects against the fourth of Ficinus's books or chapters (entitled the Crater,) seems not very considerable, it being questionable, whether by the Crater any such thing were there meant as the Christian Baptisterion. Wherefore, as for all the rest of those Hermaic books, especially such of them as being cited by ancient fathers, may be presumed to have been extant before Jamblichus's time; we know no reason why we should not concur with that learned philosopher in his judgment con-

cerning them, that though they often speak the language of philosophers, and were not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, yet they do really contain δόξας Ἑρμαϊκάς, Hermaical opinions, or the Egyptian doctrine. The ninth of Ficinus's books mentions the Asclepian Dialogue, under the Greek title of ὁ τέλειος λόγος, pretending to have been written by the same hand; χθὲς ὦ Ἀσκλήπιε, τὸν τέλειον ἀποδέδωκα Λόγον, νῦν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμαι ἀκόλουθον ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸν περὶ αἰσθήσεως λόγον διεξελθεῖν. The meaning of which place (not understood by the translator) is this: I lately published (O Asclepius) the book entitled ὁ Τέλειος λόγος (or the perfect oration) and now I judge it necessary, in pursuit of the same, to discourse concerning sense.—Which book, as well as the perfect oration, is cited by Lactantius.[1] As is also the tenth of Ficinus, called the Clavis, which does not only pretend to be of kin to the ninth, and consequently to the Asclepius likewise, but also to contain in it an epitome of that Hermaic book called τὰ γενικά, mentioned in Eusebius's Chronicon,[2] τὸν χθὲς λόγον, ὦ Ἀσκλήπιέ, σοι ἀνέθηκα, τὸν δὲ σήμερον δικαιόν ἐστι τῷ Τάτ. ἀναθεῖναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν Γενικῶν Λόγων, τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν λελαλημένων ἐστὶν ἐπιτομή. My former discourse was dedicated to thee, O Asclepius, but this to Tatius, it being an epitome of those Genica that were delivered to him. Which Γενικὰ are thus again afterward mentioned in the same book, οὐκ ἤκουσας ἐν τοῖς Γενικοῖς, ὅτι ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντὸς πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαί εἰσιν; Have you not heard in the Genica, that all souls are derived from one soul of the universe?—Neither of which two places were understood by Ficinus. But doubtless this latter Hermaic book had something foisted into it, because there is a manifest contradiction found therein; forasmuch as that transmigration of human souls into brutes, which in the former part thereof is asserted after the Egyptian way, ὡς καταδίκη ψυχῆς κακῆς, as the just punishment of the wicked—is afterwards cried down and condemned in it, as the greatest error. And the eleventh and twelfth following books seem to us to be as Egyptian as any of the rest; as also does that long book entitled κόρη κόσμου, the thirteenth in Patricius. Nay, it is observable, that even those very books themselves, that are so justly suspected and condemned for Christian forgeries, have something of the Hermaical or Egyptian philosophy, here and there interspersed in them. As, for example, when in the Pœmander God is twice called ἀῤῥενόθελυς, male and female together:—this seems to have been Egyptian (and derived from thence by Orpheus) according to that ele-

[1] Vide Divin. Instit. lib. ii. cap. xv. p. 254.

[2] Vide Scalig. ad Græca Eusebii, p. 409.

gant passage in the Asclepian Dialogue concerning God: "Hic ergo, qui solus est omnia, utriusque sexus fœcunditate plenissimus, semper voluntatis suæ pregnans, parit semper quicquid voluerit procreare:" he therefore, who alone is all things, and most full of the fecundity of both sexes, being always pregnant of his own will, always produceth whatsoever he pleaseth.—Again, when death is thus described in it, *παραδιδόναι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ εἶχες, εἰς ἀφανὲς γίνεσθαι*, to be nothing else but the change of the body, and the form or life's passing into the invisible.—This agreeth with that in the eleventh book or chapter: *τὴν μεταβολὴν θάνατον εἶναι, διὰ τὸ μὲν σῶμα διαλύεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν εἰς τὸ ἀφανὲς χωρεῖν*: That death is nothing but a change, it being only the dissolution of the body, and the life or soul's passing into the invisible or inconspicuous.—In which book it is also affirmed of the world, *γίνεσθαι μέρος αὐτοῦ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ*, that every day some part or other of it goes into the invisible, or into Hades;—that is, does not utterly perish, but only disappears to our sight, it being either translated into some other place, or changed into another form.—And accordingly it is said of animals, in the twelfth book, *διαλύεται, οὐχ ἵνα ἀπόληται, ἀλλ' ἵνα νέα γένηται*, that they are dissolved by death, not that they might be destroyed, but made again anew.—As it is also there affirmed of the world, that it doth *πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν*, make all things out of itself, and again unmake them into itself; *καὶ διαλύων πάντα ἀνανεοῖ*, and that dissolving all things it doth perpetually renew them.—For that nothing in the whole world utterly perisheth, as it is often declared elsewhere in these Trismegistic writings, so particularly in his twelfth book of Ficinus, *σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἀμετάβλητος, τὰ δὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ πάντα μεταβλητά, οὐδὲν δὲ φθαρτον ἢ ἀπολλύμενον.* The whole world is unchangeable, only the parts of it being alterable; and this so, as that none of these neither utterly perisheth, or is absolutely destroyed;—*πῶς μέρος τι δύναται φθαρῆναι τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι τι τοῦ θεοῦ;* for how can any part of that be corrupted, which is incorruptible, or any thing of God perish or go to nothing?—all which by Casaubon's leave, we take to have been originally Egyptian doctrine, and thence in part afterward transplanted into Greece. Moreover, when in the Pœmander God is styled more than once *φῶς καὶ ζωή*, light and life—this seems to have been Egyptian also, because it was Orphical. In like manner the appendix to the Sermon in the Mount, called *ὑμνωδία κρυπτή*, or the occult cantion, hath some strains of the Egyptian theology in it, which will be afterward mentioned.

The result of our present discourse is this; that though some of the Trismegistic books were either wholly counterfeited, or else had certain

supposititious passages inserted into them by some Christian hand, yet there being others of them originally Egyptian, or which, as to the substance of them, do contain Hermaical or Egyptian doctrines (in all which one supreme Deity is every where asserted) we may well conclude from hence, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. And herein several of the ancient fathers have gone before us; as first of all Justin Martyr,[1] *Ἄμμων πάγκρυφον τὸν θεὸν ὀνομάζει, Ἑρμῆς δὲ σαφῶς καὶ φανερῶς λέγει, θεὸν νοῆσαι μέν ἐστι χαλεπὸν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον·* Ammon in his books calleth God most hidden; and Hermes plainly declareth, that it is hard to conceive God, but impossible to express him.—Neither doth it follow that this latter passage is counterfeit, as Casaubon concludes, because there is something like it in Plato's Timæus, there being doubtless a very great agreement betwixt Platonism and the ancient Egyptian doctrine.—Thus again St. Cyprian:[2] "Hermes quoque Trismegistus unum Deum loquitur, eumque ineffabilem et inæstimabilem confitetur;" Hermes Trismegist also acknowledgeth one God, confessing him to be ineffable and inestimable;—which passage is also cited by St. Austin.[3] Lactantius likewise;[4] "Thoth antiquissimus et instructissimus omni genere doctrinæ, adeo ei in multarum rerum et artium scientia Trismegisti cognomen imponeret; hic scripsit libros et quidem multos, ad cognitionem divinarum rerum pertinentes, in quibus majestatem summi et singularis Dei asserit, iisdemque nominibus appellat, quibus nos, Deum et patrem. Ac ne quis nomen ejus requireret; *ἀνώνυμον* esse dixit." Thoth (that is Hermes) the most ancient and most instructed in all kind of learning (for which he was called Trismegist) wrote books, and those many belonging to the knowledge of Divine things, wherein he asserts the majesty of one supreme Deity, calling him by the same names that we do, God and Father; but (lest any one should require a proper name of him) affirming him to be anonymous—Lastly, St. Cyril[5] hath much more to the same purpose also: and we must confess, that we have the rather here insisted so much upon these Hermaic or Trismegistic writings, that in this particular we might vindicate these ancient fathers from the imputation either of fraud and imposture, or of simplicity and folly.

[1] Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 37. oper.

[2] De Idol. van. [p. 226. oper.]

[3] De Baptismo contra Donatistas, lib. vi. §. lxxxvii. p. 126. tom. ix. oper.

[4] Lib. i. p. 30. [Divin. Instit. cap. vi. p. 42.]

[5] Contra Julianum, lib. i. p. 31.

But that the Egyptians acknowledge, besides their many gods, one supreme and all-comprehending Deity, needs not be proved from these Trismegistic writings (concerning which we leave others to judge as they find cause) it otherwise appearing, not only because Orpheus (who was an undoubted assertor of monarchy, or one first principle of all things) is generally affirmed to have derived his doctrine from the Egyptians; but also from plain and express testimonies. For besides Apollonius Tyanæus's affirmation[1] concerning both Indians and Egyptians before cited, Plutarch throughout his whole book De Iside et Osiride, supposes the Egyptians thus to have asserted one supreme Deity, they commonly calling him *τὸν πρῶτον θεόν*, the first God.—Thus in the beginning of that book he tells us, that the end of all the religious rites and mysteries of that Egyptian goddess Isis, was *ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ κυρίου, καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις, ὃν ἡ θεὸς παρακαλεῖ ζητεῖν, παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα·* the knowledge of that first God, who is the Lord of all things, and only intelligible by the mind, whom this goddess exhorteth men to seek, in her communion.—After which he declareth, that this first God of the Egyptians was accounted by them an obscure and hidden Deity, and accordingly he gives the reason, why they made the crocodile to be a symbol of him: *μόνου δέ φασιν ἐν ὑγρῷ διαιτουμένου, τὰς ὄψεις ὑμένα λεῖον καὶ διαφανῆ παρακαλίπτειν, ἐκ τοῦ μετώπου κατερχόμενον, ὥστε βλέπειν μὴ βλεπόμενον· ὃ τῷ πρώτῳ θεῷ συμβέβηκεν·* Because they say the crocodile is the only animal, which, living in the water, hath his eyes covered by a thin transparent membrane, falling down over them, by reason whereof it sees and is not seen; which is a thing that belongs to the first God, to see all things, himself being not seen.—Though Plutarch in that place gives also another reason why the Egytians made the crocodile a symbol of the Deity;[2] *οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος αἰτίας πιθανῆς ἀμοιροῦσαν ἔσχηκε τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ μίμημα θεοῦ λέγεται γεγονέναι μόνος μὲν ἄγλωσσος ὤν, φωνῆς γὰρ ὁ θεῖος λόγος ἀπροσδεής ἐστι, καὶ δι' ἀψόφου βαίνων κελεύθου καὶ δίκης τὰ θνητὰ ἄγει κατὰ δίκην·* Neither were the Egyptians without a plausible reason for worshipping God symbolically in the crocodile, that being said to be an imitation of God, in that it is the only animal without a tongue. For the Divine *λόγος*, or reason, standing not in need of speech, and going on through a silent path of justice in the world, does without noise righteously govern and dispense all human affairs.—In like manner, Horus Apollo in his Hieroglyphics,[3] tells us, that the Egyptians acknowledging a *παν-*

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[1] Vol. ii. p. 22.

[2] P. 381.

[3] Lib. i. cap. lxi. p. 75.

τοκράτωρ and κοσμοκράτωρ, an omnipotent Being, that was the governor of the whole world,—did symbolically represent him by a serpent, ἐν μέσῳ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν δεικνύοντες, ὁ γὰρ βασίλειος οἶκος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμω, they picturing also a great house or palace within its circumference. because the world is the royal palace of the Deity.—Which writer also gives us another reason, why the serpent was made to be the hieroglyphic of the Deity;[1] τὸ ὡς τροφῇ χρῆσθαι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι, σημαίνει, το πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν.—Because the serpent feeding as it were upon its own body, doth aptly signify, that all things generated in the world by Divine Providence are again resolved into him.—And Philo Byblius,[2] from Sanchoniathon, gives the same reason why the serpent was deified by Taut, or the Egyptian Hermes, ὅτι ἀθάνατον καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλύεται, because it is immortal, and resolved into itself.—Though sometimes the Egyptians added to the serpent also a hawk, thus complicating the hieroglyphic of the Deity; according to that of a famous Egyptian priest in Eusebius,[3] τὸ πρῶτον ὂν θειότατον, ὄφις ἐστι ἵρακος ἔχων μορφὴν, that the first and divinest being of all is symbolically represented by a serpent having the head of a hawk.—And that a hawk was also sometimes used alone for a hieroglyphic of the Deity, appeareth from that of Plutarch,[4] that in the porch of an Egyptian temple at Sais, were engraven these three hieroglyphics; a young man, an old man, and a hawk; to make up this sentence, that both the beginning and end of human life dependeth upon God, or Providence. But we have two more remarkable passages in the forementioned Horus Apollo,[5] concerning the Egyptian theology, which must not be permitted; the first this, παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα, that according to them, there is a spirit passing through the whole world, to wit, God.—And again, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δίχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι, it seemeth to the Egyptians, that nothing at all consists without God.—In the next place, Jamblichus was a person, who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and who undertakes to give an account thereof, in his answer to Porphyrius's epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest; whose testimony therefore may well seem to deserve credit. And he first gives us a summary

[1] Lib. i. c. ii. [p. 5.]

[2] Apud. Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. i. cap. x. p. 41.

[3] Præpar. Evang. lib. i. cap. x. p. 41.

[4] De Iside et Osiride, p. 363.

[5] Lib. i. cap. lxiv. p. 77. and lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27.

account, of their theology after this manner:[1] *χωριστὸς, ἐξῃρημένος, μετέωρος, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑπερηπλωσμένος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ δυνάμεών τε καὶ στοιχείων, ὁ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φύσεως ὕλης, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς στοιχείοις δυνάμεων πασῶν, αἴτιος θεός· ἅτε δὴ ὑπερέχων τούτου, ἄϋλος, καὶ ἀσώματος καὶ ὑπερφυὴς, ἀγένητός τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, ὅλος ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀναφανεὶς, προηγεῖσαι πάντων τούτων, καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιέχει, καὶ διότι μὲν συνείληφε πάντα, καὶ μεταδίδωσιν·* That God, who is the cause of generation and the whole nature, and of all the powers in the elements themselves, is separate, exempt, elevated above, and expanded over, all the powers and elements in the world. For being above the world, and transcending the same, immaterial, and incorporeal, supernatural, unmade, indivisible, manifested wholly from himself, and in himself, he ruleth over all things, and in himself containeth all things. And because he virtually comprehends all things, therefore does he impart and display the same from himself.—According to which excellent description of the Deity, it is plain, that the Egyptians asserting one God that comprehends all things, could not possibly suppose a multitude of self-existent deities. In which place, also, the Jamblichus[2] tells us, that as the Egyptian hieroglyphic for material and corporeal things was mud or floating water, so they pictured God "in loto arbore sedentem super lutum;" sitting upon the lote-tree above the watery mud.—"Quod innuit Dei eminentiam altissimam, qua fit ut nullo modo attingat lutum ipsum. Demonstratque Dei imperium intellectuale, quia loti arboris omnia sunt rotunda tam frondes quam fructus," etc. Which signifies the transcendent eminency of the Deity above the matter, and its intellectual empire over the world; because both the leaves and fruit of that tree are round, representing the motion of intellect.—Again, he there adds also, that the Egyptians sometimes pictured God sitting at the helm of a ship. But afterward, in the same book,[3] he sums up the queries, which Porphyrius had propounded to the Egyptian priest, to be resolved concerning them, in this manner: *βούλει σοι δηλωθῆναι, τί τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἡγοῦνται εἶναι Αἰγύπτιοι; πότερον νοῦν ἢ ὑπὲρ νοῦν; καὶ μόνον ἢ μετ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλων; καὶ πότερον ἀσώματον ἢ σωματικὸν, καὶ εἰ τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ; καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν: καὶ εἰ ὕλην ἴσασιν ἢ σώματα ποιὰ πρῶτον; καὶ εἰ ἀγένητον ὕλην ἢ γενητὴν;* You desire to be resolved, what the Egyptians think to be the first cause of all; whether intellect or something above intellect? and that whether alone or with some other? whether incorporeal or corporeal? whether the

[1] Jamblich. de Myster. Ægyptior. sect. vii. cap. ii. p. 151.

[2] Ibid. p. 151. [3] Seg. viii. c. i.

first principle be the same with the Demiurgus and architect of the world, or before him? whether all things proceed from one or many? whether they suppose matter, or qualified bodies, to be the first? and if they admit a first matter, whether they assert it to be unmade or made?—In answer to which Porphyrian queries, Jamblichus thus begins: *καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ πρῶτον ἠρώτησας, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε· πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν, ἐστι θεὸς εἷς· πρῶτος, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως, ἀκίνητος· ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἑνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἄλλό τι·* I shall first reply to that you first demanded, that, according to the Egyptians, before all entities and principles there is one God, who is in order of nature before (him that is commonly called) the first God and King; immoveable; and always remaining in the solitariety of his own unity, there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else complicated with him, etc.—In which words Jamblichus, and those others that follow after, though there be some obscurity (and we may perhaps have occasion further to consider the meaning of them elsewhere,) yet he plainly declares that according to the Egyptians, the first Original of all things was a perfect unity above intellect; but intimating withal, that besides this first unity, they did admit of certain other Divine hypostases (as a perfect intellect, and mundane soul) subordinate thereunto, and dependent on it, concerning which he thus writeth afterward:[1] *τὴν πρὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ζωτικὴν δύναμιν γινώσκουσι, καθαρόν τε νοῦν ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον προτιθέασι·* The Egyptians acknowledge, before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living power (or soul) and again they place a pure mind or intellect above the world.—But that they did not acknowledge a plurality of coordinate and independent principles is further declared by him after this manner;[2] *καὶ οὕτως ἄνωθεν ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν Αἰγυπτίοις πραγματεία, ἀφ᾽ ἑνὸς ἄρχεται, καὶ πρόεισιν εἰς πλῆθος, τῶν πολλῶν αὖθις ἀφ᾽ ἑνὸς διακυβερνωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσεως ἐπικρατουμένης ὑπὸ τινὸς ὡρισμένου μέτρου, καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω ἑνιαίας πάντων αἰτίας·* And thus the Egyptian philosophy, from first to last, begins from unity; and thence descends to multitude; the many being always governed by the one; and the infinite or undeterminate nature every where mastered and conquered by some finite and determined measure; and all ultimately by that highest Unity, that is the first cause of all things.—Moreover, in answer to the last Porphyrian question concerning matter, whether the Egyptians thought it to be unmade and self-existent or made, Jamblichus thus replies: *ὕλην δὲ παρήγαγεν ὁ θεὸς*

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[1] Cap. iv. p. 160. [2] Sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 159.

ἀπὸ οὐσιότητος ὑποσχισθείσης ὑλότητος· That according to Hermes and the Egyptians, matter was also made or produced by God : "ab essentialitate succisa ac subscissa materialitate," as Scutellius turns it. Which passage of Jamblichus,[1] Proclus upon the Timæus (where he asserts that God was ἄῤῥητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, the ineffable cause of matter) takes notice of in this manner : καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων παράδοσις τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ αὐτῆς φησιν· ὁ γέ τοι θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἱστόρησεν, ὅτι καὶ Ἑρμῆς ἐκ τῆς οὐσιότητος τὴν ὑλότητα παράγεσθαι βούλεται, καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰκὸς κἀκ τούτου τὸν Πλάτωνα τὴν τοιαύτην περὶ τῆς ὕλης δόξαν ἔχειν· And the tradition of the Egyptians agreeth herewith, that matter was not unmade or self-existent, but produced by the Deity : for the divine Jamblichus has recorded, that Hermes would have materiality to have been produced from essentiality, (that is, the passive principle of matter from that active principle of the Deity :) and it is very probable from hence, that Plato was also of the same opinion concerning matter; viz. because he is supposed to have followed Hermes and the Egyptians. Which indeed is the more likely, if that be true, which the same Proclus affirmeth concerning Orpheus, ὥς τε καὶ Ὀρφεὺς κατὰ τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτίστης τῶν νοητῶν ὑποστάσεως παράγει τὴν ὕλην, that Orpheus also did, after the same manner, deduce or derive matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles, that is, from the supreme Deity. We shall conclude here in the last place with the testimony of Damascius, in his book of Principles,[2] writing after this manner concerning the Egyptians : Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὔδημος οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην, εὑρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις δή τισι λόγοις· ὡς εἴη κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνουμένη, καὶ τοῦτο τρὶς ἀναφωνούμενον οὕτως· Eudemus hath given us no exact account of the Egyptians ; but the Egyptian philosophers, that have been in our times, have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in certain Egyptian writings, that there was, according to them, one Principle of all things, praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and that thrice repeated :—which unknown darkness is a description of that supreme Deity, that is incomprehensible.

But that the Egyptians amongst their many gods did acknowledge one supreme, may sufficiently appear also, even from their vulgar religion and theology ; in which they had first a peculiar and proper name for him as such. For as the Greeks called the supreme God Ζεύς, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians call him Hammon or Am-

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[1] P. 117. [2] Vide Wolfii Anecdot. Græc. tom. iii. p. 260.

mon, according to Herodotus,[1] whose testimony to this purpose hath been already cited, and confirmed by Origen,[2] who was an Egyptian born. Thus also Plutarch in his book De Iside,[3] *τῶν πολλῶν νομιζόντων, ἴδιον παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις ὄνομα τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι, τὸν Ἄμοῦν, ὃ παράγοντες ἡμεῖς Ἄμμονα λέγομεν·* It is supposed by most, that the proper name of Zeus, or Jupiter (that is, the supreme Deity) amongst the Egyptians is Amous, which the Greeks pronounce Hammon. To the same purpose Hesychius, *Ἄμμοῦς ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἀριστοτέλης,* Ammous, according to Aristotle, is the same with Zeus. Whence it came to pass, that by the Latin writers Hammon was vulgarly called Jupiter Hammon. Which Hammon was not only used as a proper name for the supreme Deity by the Egyptians, but also by the Arabians and all the Africans, according to that of Lucan,[4]

> Quamvis Æthiopum populis Arabumque beatis
> Gentibus, atque Indis, unus sit Jupiter Ammon.

Wherefore not only Marmarica (which is a part of Africa, wherein was that most famous temple of this Ammon) was from thence denominated Ammonia, but even all Africa, as Stephanus informs us, was sometimes called Ammonis from this god Ammon, who hath been therefore styled *Ζεὺς Λιβυκὸς,* the Lybian Jupiter.[5]

Indeed it is very probable,[6] that this word Hammon or Ammon was first derived from Ham or Cham, the son of Noah, whose posterity was chiefly seated in these African parts, and from whom Egypt was called, not only in the Scripture, "the land of Ham," but also by the Egyptians themselves, as Plutarch testifieth, *Χήμεια,* or Chemia, and as St. Jerome, Ham: and the Coptites also to this very day call it Chemi. Nevertheless this will not hinder, but that the word Hammon, for all that might be used afterwards by the Egyptians, as a name for the supreme God, because, amongst the Greeks *Ζεὺς* in like manner was supposed to have been at first the name of a man or hero, but yet afterwards applied to signify the supreme God. And there might be such

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[1] Lib. ii. cap. xlii. p. 105.

[2] Or rather Celsus in Origen *contra* Celsum, lib. v. p. 261.

[3] Tom. ii. oper. p. 354.

[4] Lib. ix. ver. 517, 518.

[5] Vide Voss. de Idolatr. lib. ii. c. xi. p. 134, 135, et Sam. Bochart. in Phaleg. lib. i. cap. i. p. 6, 7.

[6] Vide Bochart. ubi supra lib. iv. cap. i. p. 204, 205. et lib. i. cap. i. p. 6, 7, et Marsham. in Canon. Chron. Sæcul. i. p. 30.

a mixture of herology or history, together with theology, as well amongst the Egyptians as there was amongst the Greeks. Nay, some learned men[1] conjecture, and not without probability, that the Zeus of the Greeks also was really the very same with that Ham or Cham, the son of Noah, whom the Egyptians first worshipped as an hero or deified man; there being several considerable agreements and correspondences between the poetic fables of Saturn and Jupiter, and the true Scripture story of Noah and Cham; as there is likewise a great affinity betwixt the words themselves; for as Cham signifies heat or fervor, so is *Ζεὺς* derived by the Greek grammarians from *ζέω*. And thus will that forementioned testimony of Herodotus in some sense be verified, that the Greeks received the names of most of their gods, even of *Ζεὺς* himself, from the Egyptians.

Perhaps it may be granted also, that the sun was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under the name of Hammon; it having been in like manner sometimes worshipped by the Greeks under the name of Zeus. And the word very well agreeth herewith, חמה in the Hebrew language signifying not only heat, but the sun; from whence חמנים Chamanim, also was derived. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that therefore the visible sun was generally accounted by the Egyptians the supreme Deity, no more than he was amongst the the Greeks: but, as we have often occasion to observe, there was in the Pagan religion a confused jumble of herology, physiology, and theology all together. And that the notion of this Egyptian god Ammon was neither confined by them to the sun, nor yet the whole corporeal world or nature of the universe (as some have conceived), is evident from hence, because the Egyptians themselves interpreted it, according to their own language, to signify that which was hidden and obscure, as both Manetho, an ancient Egyptian priest and Hecatæus (who wrote concerning the philosophy of the Egyptians) in Plutarch agree:[2] *Μανεθὼς μὲν ὁ Σεβεννίτης τὸ κεκρυμμένον οἴεται καὶ τὴν κρύψιν ὑπὸ ταύτης δηλοῦσθαι τῆς φωνῆς· Ἑκταῖος δὲ Ἀβδερίτης φησὶ τούτῳ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ ῥήματι χρῆσθαι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, ὅταν τινὰ προσκαλοῦνται, προσκλητικὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φωνήν· διὸ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν ὡς ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον ὄντα, προσκαλούμενοι καὶ παρακαλοῦντες, ἐμφανῆ γενέσθαι καὶ δῆλον αὐτοῖς, Ἀμοῦν λέγουσι·* Manetho Sebennites conceives the word Amoun to signify that which is hidden; and Hecatæus affirmeth, that the Egyptians use this word, when they call any one to them that was distant or absent

[1] Vide Bochart. ubi supra, lib. i. cap.. i. p. 7, 8.

[2] De Iside et Osiride, p. 354. tom. ii. oper.

from them: wherefore the first God, because he is invisible and hidden, they as it were inviting him to approach near, and to make himself manifest and conspicuous to them, call him Amoun.—And, agreeably hereunto, Jamblichus[1] gives us this account of the true notion of this Egyptian god Amoun: *ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐρχόμενος μὲν ἐπὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλώσσαν λέγεται·* The demiurgical Intellect, and President of Truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and produceth into light the secret and invisible powers of the hidden reasons, is, according to the Egyptian language called Hammon.—Wherefore we may conclude that Hammon, amongst the Egyptians, was not only the name of the supreme Deity, but also of such a one as was hidden, invisible and incorporeal.

And here it may be worth our observing, that this Egyptian Hammon was in all probability taken notice of in Scripture, though vulgar interpreters have not been aware thereof. For thus we understand that of Jeremy 46: 25. "The Lord of hosts, the God of Israel saith, behold I will אמון מנא (that is, not the multitude of Noe, but) Ammon (the God) of Noe, and Pharaoh and Egypt with her (other) gods and kings, and all that trust in him; I will deliver them into the hands of those that seek their lives, and into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon." For the understanding of which place, we must observe, that according to the language of those ancient Pagans, when every country or city had their peculiar and proper names, for the gods presiding over them or worshipped by them, the several nations and places were themselves commonly denoted and signified by the names of those respective gods. With which kind of language the Scripture itself also complieth; as when the Moabites are called in it—the people of Chemosh, (Numbers xxi.) and when the gods of Damascus are said to have smitten Ahaz, because the Syrians smote him. (2 Chron. xxviii.) Accordingly whereunto also, whatsoever was done or attempted against the several nations or countries, is said to have been done or attempted against their gods. Thus Moab's captivity is described, Jeremy xlviii. "Thou shalt be taken, and Chemosh shall go into captivity." And the overthrow of Babylon is predicted after the same manner, in the prophecy of Isaiah, chap. xlvi. "Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth, themselves are gone into captivity." And also the same is threatened in that of Jeremy, chap. li. "I will visit Bel in Babylon, and will bring out of his mouth that which he hath swallowed

[1] De Myster. Ægypt. sect. viii. c. iii. p. 159.

up, and the nations shall not flow unto him any more, for the wall of Babylon shall be broken down." Now Bel, according to Herodotus,[1] was a name for the supreme God amongst the Babylonians; as well as Ammon was amongst the Egyptians; who notwithstanding by both of them was worshipped after an idolatrous manner. And therefore, as in these latter places, by the visiting and punishment of the Babylonians, so in that former place of Jeremy, by the visiting of Ammon, and the gods of Egypt, is understood the visiting of the Egyptians themselves; accordingly as it is there also expressed. No was, it seems, the metropolis of all Egypt; and therefore Ammon, the chief god of those ancient Egyptians, and of that city, was called Ammon of No. As likewise the city No is denominated from this god Ammon in the Scripture, and called both No-Ammon and Ammon-No. The former in the prophecy of Nahum, chap. iii. "Art thou better than No-Ammon?" or that No in which the god Ammon is worshipped? Which is not to be understood of the oracle of Ammon in Marmarica, as some have imagined[2] (they taking No for an appellative, and so to signify habitation;) it being unquestionably the proper name of a city in Egypt. The latter in that of Ezekiel, chap. xxx. "I will pour out my fury upon Sin, the strength of Egypt, and will cut of Hammon-No." In which place as by Sin is meant Pelusium, so Hammon-No, by the Seventy, is interpreted Diospolis, the city of Jupiter; that is, the Egyptian Jupiter, Hammon. Which Diospolis was otherwise called the Egyptian Thebes, (anciently the metropolis of all Egypt) but whose proper name, in the Egyptian language, seems to have been No; which from the chief god there worshipped was called both No-Ammon and Hammon-No; as that god himself was also denominated from the city, Ammon of No. And this is the rather probable, because Plato[3] tells us expressly, that Ammon was anciently the proper or chief god of the Egyptian Thebes or Diospolis, where he speaks of Theuth or Thoth, the Egyptian Hermes, in these words: *βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ, περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ὃν οἱ Ἕλλῆνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἄμμωνα·* Thamus was then king over all Egypt, reigning in that great city (the metropolis thereof) which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and whose God was Ammon. But whereas the prophet Nahum (who seems to have written af-

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1 This seems to be a mistake for Diodorus Siculus, who mentions it, lib. ii. p. 69.

2 Voss. de Idol, lib. i. cap. xxxii. p. 89.

3 In Phædro, [p. 356. oper.]

ter the completion of that judgment upon No, predicted both by Jeremy and Ezekiel) describes the place, as situate among the rivers, and having the sea for its wall and rampart; whence many learned men[1] have concluded, that this was rather to be understood of Alexandria than Diospolis (notwithstanding that Alexandria was not then in being, nor built till a long while after, in Alexander the Great's time:) this may very well, as we conceive, be understood of Egypt in general, whose metropolis this No was; that it was situate amongst the rivers, and had the seas for its wall and rampart, the Red and Mediterranean. And thus much for the Egyptian Jupiter, or their supreme Deity, called by them Hammon.

There is an excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity preserved by Plutarch[2] and others, from whence it may be made yet further evident, that the Egyptians did not suppose a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities, but acknowledged one supreme, universal, and all-comprehending Numen. And it is that inscription upon the temple at Sais; *Ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονὸς, καὶ ὂν, καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδείς πω θνητὸς ἀπεκάλυψεν*, I am all that hath been, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered.—Which though perhaps some would understand thus, as if that Deity therein described were nothing but the senseless matter of the whole corporeal universe, according to that opinion of Chæremon beforementioned and confuted; yet it is plain, that this could not be the meaning of this inscription: first, because the God here described is not a mere congeries of disunited matter, or aggregation of divided atoms, but it is some one thing, which was all: according to that other inscription upon an altar dedicated to the goddess Isis, which we shall also afterward make use of, "Tibi, una, quæ es omnia;" To thee, who being one, art all things.—Again, in the Deity here described,[3] there is both a veil or outside, and also something hidden and recondite; the sense seeming to be this; I am all that was, is, and shall be; and the whole world is nothing but myself veiled; but my naked and unveiled brightness no mortal could ever yet behold or comprehend. Which is just as if the sun should say, I am all the colors of the rainbow (whose mild and gentle light may be easily beheld) and they are nothing but my simple

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[1] The Chaldean Interpreter, St. Jerome, Drusius, and many others, Vid. Voss. ubi supra.

[2] De Iside et Osir. p. 354. tom. ii. oper.

[3] *Ἀφανὴς ἅμα καὶ ἐμφανής·* Proclus of this Egyptian God, that it was both invisible and manifest. In Timæ. p. 30.

and uniform lustre, variously refracted and abated; but my immediate splendor and the brightness of my face no mortal can contemplate, without either being blinded or dazzled by it. Wherefore this description of the Deity may seem not a little to resemble that description, which God makes of himself to Moses, "Thou shalt see my back parts, but my face shall not be seen." Where there is also something exterior and visible in the Deity, and something hidden and recondite, invisible and incomprehensible to mortals. And Philo thus glosseth upon those words: [1]*αὔταρκές ἐστι σοφῷ, τὰ ἀκόλουθα καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τὸν Θεον γνῶναι, τὴν δὲ ἡγεμονικὴν οὐσίαν ὃ βουλόμενος καταθεάσασθαι, τῷ περιαυγεῖ τῶν ἀκτίνων πρὶν ἰδεῖν πηρὸς ἔσται·* It is sufficient for a wise man to know God *a posteriori*, or from his effects; but whosoever will needs behold the naked essence of the Deity, will be blinded with the transcendent radiancy and splendor of his beams.—Whereas, according to Philo, the works of God, as manifesting the attributes of his power, goodness, and wisdom, are called the back parts of the Deity; so are they here in this inscription called the peplum, the veil and exterior garment of it, or else God himself veiled. Wherefore it is plain, that the Deity here described cannot be the mere visible and corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, that being all outside and exposed to the view of sense and having nothing hidden or veiled in it. But, thirdly, this will yet be more evident, if we do but take notice of the name of this God, which was here described, and to whom that temple was dedicated, and that was in the Egyptian language Neith,[2] the same with *Ἀθηνᾶ* amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins: by which is meant wisdom or understanding: from whence it is plain, that the inscription is to be understood not of such a god as was merely senseless matter (which is the god of the Atheists) but a mind. Athenagoras[3] tells us, that the Pagan theologers interpreted *τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν*, or Minerva, to be *τὴν φρόνησιν διὰ πάντων διήκουσαν*, wisdom or mind passing and diffusing itself through all things—than which there cannot be a better commentary on this inscription. Wherefore it may be here observed, that those Pagans, who acknowledged God to be a mind, and incorporeal being secrete from matter, did notwithstanding frequently consider him, not abstractly by himself alone, but concretely together with the result of his whole fecundity, or as displaying the world from himself and diffusing himself through all things, and being in a manner all

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[1] Page 474. [libro de Profugis.]

[2] *Νηϊθὰς*, in Procl. upon Plato's Tim. p. 30.

[3] Legat. pro Christianis, cap. xix. p. 86.

things. Accordingly, we learned before from Horus Apollo, that the Egyptians by God meant a spirit diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things; and that they supposed that nothing at all could consist without God. And after this manner, Jamblichus in his Mysteries[1] interprets the meaning of this Egyptian inscription: for when he had declared that the Egyptians did, both in their doctrine and their priestly hierurgies, exhort men to ascend above matter, to an incorporeal Deity, the maker of all, he adds, *ὑφηγήσατο δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ὁ Ἑρμῆς, ἡρμήνευσε δὲ Βίθυς προφήτης Ἄμμωνι βασιλεῖ, ἐν ἀδύτοις εὑρὼν ἀναγεγραμμένην, ἐν ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασι κατὰ Σάϊν τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, τότε τοῦ Θεοῦ ὄνομα παρέδωκε τὸ διῆκου δὶ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου·* Hermes also propounded this method, and Bythis, the prophet, interpreted the same to King Ammon, having found it written in hieroglyphic letters in the temple of Sais in Egypt; as he also there declared the name of that God, who extends or diffuses himself through the whole world.—And this was Neith, or Athena,[2] that God thus described, "I am all that was, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil, no mortal could ever uncover."—Where we cannot but take notice also that whereas the Athena of the Greeks was derived from the Egyptian Neith, that she also was famous for her peplum too, as well as the Egyptian goddess. "Peplum (saith Servius) est proprie palla picta fœminea, Minervæ consecrata;" Peplum is properly a womanish pall or veil, embroidered all over and consecrated to Minerva.—Which rite was performed at Athens, in the great Panathenaics, with much solemnity, when the statue of this goddess was also by those noble virgins of the city, who embroidered this veil, clothed all over therewith. From whence we may probably conclude, that the statue of the Egyptian Neith also, in the temple of Sais, had likewise, agreeably to its inscription, such a peplum or veil cast over it, as Minerva or Arthemis at Athens had; this hieroglyphically to signify, that the Deity was invisible and incomprehensible to mortals, but had veiled itself in this visible corporeal world, which is, as it were, the peplum, the exterior variegated or embroidered vestment of the Deity. To all which considerations may be added, in the last place, what Proclus[3] hath recorded, that there was

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[1] De Myster. Ægypt. sect. viii. cap. v. p. 164.

[2] *Μία τῶν δύο πόλεων ἔφορος τῆς τε Σάεως καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν·* Sais and Athens had one and the same tutelar god. Procl. in Tim. p. 30. Where also Theopompus affirmeth the Athenians to have been a colony of the Saites.

[3] In Timæus, p. 30.

something more belonging to this Egyptian inscription, than what is mentioned by Plutarch; namely these words: *καὶ ὃν ἔτεκον κάρπον, ἥλιος ἐγένετο*, and the sun was the fruit or offspring which I produced:—from whence it is manifest, that, according to the Egyptians, the sun was not the supreme Deity, and that the God here described, was as Proclus also observeth, *δημιουργικὴ θεός*, a demiurgical Deity, the creator of the whole world, and of the sun. Which supreme incorporeal Deity was, notwithstanding, in their theology said to be all things, because it diffused itself through all.

Wherefore, whereas Plutarch[1] cites this passage out of Hecatæus, concerning the Egyptians, *τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τῷ Παντὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νομίζουσιν*, that they take the first God, and the universe, for one and the same thing;—the meaning of it cannot be, as if the first or supreme God of the Egyptians were the senseless corporeal world, Plutarch himself in the very next words declaring him to be *ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον*, invisible and hidden—whom therefore the Egyptians, as inviting him to manifest himself to them, called Hammon; as he elsewhere affirmeth, That the Egyptians' first God, or supreme Deity, did see all things, himself being not seen.—But the forementioned passage must needs be understood thus, that according to the Egyptians, the first God, and *τὸ Πᾶν*, or the universe, were synonymous expressions, often used to signify the very same thing; because the first supreme Deity is that, which contains all things, and diffuseth itself through all things. And this doctrine was from the Egyptians derived to the Greeks, Orpheus declaring, *ἕν τι τὰ πάντα*, that all things were one—and after him Parmenides and other philosophers, *ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν*, that one was the universe or all—and that *τὸ πᾶν* was *ἀκίνητον*, that the universe was immoveable—they meaning nothing else hereby, but that the first supreme Deity was both one and all things, and immovable. And thus much is plainly intimated by Aristotle in these words: [2]*εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς ἂν μιᾶς οὔσης φύσεως ἀπεφήναντο·* There are some, who pronounced concerning the whole universe, as being but one nature—that is, who called the supreme Deity *τὸ πᾶν*, or the universe—because that virtually contained all things in it.

Nevertheless *τὸ πᾶν*, or the universe, was frequently taken by the Pagan theologers also, as we have already intimated, in a more comprehensive sense, for the Deity, together with all the extent of its fecundity, God as displaying himself in the world; or, for God and the

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[1] De Iside et Osir. p. 354. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Metaph. lib. i. [cap. v. p. 270. tom. iv. oper.]

world both together; the latter being looked upon as nothing but an emanation or efflux from the former. And thus was the word taken by Empedocles in Plutarch,[1] when he affirmed, *οὐ τὸ πᾶν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγον τι τοῦ παντὸς μέρος*, that the world was not the universe, but only a small part thereof.—And according to this sense was the god Pan understood both by the Arcadians and other Greeks, not for the mere corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, nor as endued with a plastic nature only (though this was partly included in the notion of Pan also) but as proceeding from a rational and intellectual principle, diffusing itself through all: or for the whole system of things, God and the world together, as one Deity. For that the Arcadic Pan was not the corporeal world alone, but chiefly the intellectual ruler and governor of the same, appears from this testimony of Macrobius;[2] "Hunc Deum Arcades colunt, appelantes *τὸν τῆς ὕλης κύριον*, non sylvarum dominum, sed universæ substantiæ materialis dominatorem:" the Arcadians worship this god Pan (as their most ancient and honorable god) calling him the Lord of Hyle, that is, not the Lord of the woods, but the Lord or dominator over all material substance. And thus does Phornutus[3] likewise describe the Pan of the other Greeks, not as the mere corporeal world, senseless and inanimate; but as having a rational and intellectual principle for the head of it, and presiding over it; that is, for God and the world both together, as one system; the world being but the efflux and emanation of their Deity. The lower parts of Pan (saith he) were rough and goatish, because of the asperity of the earth; but his upper parts of a human form, because the ether being rational and intellectual, is the Hegemonic of the world:" adding hereunto, that "Pan was feigned to be lustful or lascivious, because of the multitude of spermatic reasons contained in the world, and the continual mixtures and generations of things; to be clothed with the skin of a libbard, because of the bespangled heavens, and the beautiful variety of things in the world; to live in a desert, because of the singularity of the world; and lastly, to be a good demon, by reason of the *προεστὼς αὐτοῦ λόγος*, that supreme mind, reason, and understanding, that governs all in it." Pan therefore was not the mere corporeal world senseless and inanimate, but the Deity as displaying itself therein, and pervading all things. Agreeable to which, Diodorus

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[1] De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. v. p. 879.

[2] Saturnal, lib. i. cap. xxii. p. 307.

[3] Libro de Natura Deor. cap. xxvii. p. 203. inter Scriptor. Mythol. a Tho. Gale editos.

Siculus[1] determines, that *Πὰν* and *Ζεὺς* were but two several names for one and the same Deity (as it is well known, that the whole universe was frequently called by the Pagans Jupiter, as well as Pan). And Socrates himself in Plato[2] directs his prayer in a most devout and serious manner, to this Pan; that is, not the corporeal world or senseless matter, but an intellectual principle ruling over all, or the supreme Deity diffusing itself through all; he therefore distinguishing him from the inferior gods: *Ὦ φίλε Πὰν, καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοὶ, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν· τἄξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια.* O good (or gracious) Pan, and ye other gods who preside over this place, grant that I may be beautiful or fair within, and that those external things which I have, may be such as may best agree with a right internal disposition of mind, and that I may account him to be rich, that is wise and just.—The matter of which prayer, though it be excellent, yet it is paganically directed to Pan (that is, the supreme god) and the inferior gods both together. Thus we see, that as well according to the Greeks, as the Egyptians, the first or supreme God, and *τὸ πᾶν*, or the universe, were really the same thing.

And here we cannot but by the way take notice of that famous and remarkable story of Plutarch's in his Defect of Oracles, concerning demons lamenting the death of the great Pan.—In the time of Tiberius (saith he) certain persons embarking from Asia for Italy, towards the evening sailed by the Echinades, where being becalmed, they heard from thence a loud voice calling one Thamous, an Egyptian mariner amongst them, and after the third time commanding him, when he came to the Palodes, to declare, that the great Pan was dead. He with the advice of his company resolved, that if they had a quick gale, when they came to the Palodes, he would pass by silently; but if they should find themselves there becalmed, he would then perform what the voice had commanded: but when the ship arrived thither, there neither was any gale of wind nor agitation of water. Whereupon Thamous looking out of the hinder deck towards the Palodes, pronounced these words with a loud voice, *ὁ μέγας Πὰν τέθνηκε*, the great Pan is dead—which he had no sooner done, but he was answered with a choir of many voices, making a great howling and lamentation, not without a certain mixture of admiration. Plutarch, who gives much credit to this relation, adds, how solicitous Tiberius the emperor was, first, concerning the truth thereof; and afterwards, when he had satisfied himself therein, concerning the interpretation; he making great inquiry

[1] Lib. i. p. 7. [2] In Phædro, p. 358. oper.

amongst his learned men, who this Pan should be. But the only use, which that philosopher makes of this story, is this, to prove that demons, having bodies as well as men, (though of a different kind from them, and much more longeve) yet were notwithstanding mortal; he endeavoring from thence to solve that phenomenon of the defect of oracles, because the demons, who had formerly haunted those places, were now dead. But this being an idle fancy of Plutarch's, it is much more probably concluded by Christian writers, that this thing coming to pass in the reign of Tiberius, when our Saviour Christ was crucified, was no other than a lamentation of evil demons (not without a mixture of admiration) upon account of our Saviour's death happening at that very time; they not mourning out of love for him that was dead, but as sadly presaging evil to themselves from thence, as that which would threaten danger to their kingdom of darkness, and a period to that tyranny and domination which they had so long exercised over mankind; according to such passages of scripture as these: "Now is the prince of this world judged; and having spoiled principalities and powers (by his death upon the cross) he triumphed over them in it." Now our Saviour Christ could not be called Pan, according to that notion of the word, as taken for nothing but the corporeal world devoid of all manner of life, or else as endued only with a plastic nature; but this appellation might very well agree to him, as Pan was taken for the λόγος προεστὼς τοῦ κόσμου, that reason and understanding, by which all things were made, and by which they are all governed, or for φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, that Divine wisdom, which diffuseth itself through all things.—Moreover, Pan being used not so much for the naked and abstract Deity, as the Deity as it were embodied in this visible corporeal world, might therefore the better signify God manifested in the flesh, and clothed with a particular human body (in which respect alone he was capable of dying.) Neither indeed was there any other name, in all the theology of the Pagans, that could so well befit our Saviour Christ as this.

We have now made it manifest, that according to the ancient Egyptian theology, (from whence the Greekish and European were derived) there was one intellectual Deity, one mind or wisdom, which as it did produce all things from itself, so doth περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον, contain and comprehend the whole—and is itself in a manner all things. We think fit in the next place to observe, how this point of the old Egyptian theology, viz. God's being all things, is every where insisted upon throughout the Hermaic or Trismegistic writings. We shall begin with the Asclepian Dialogue or the τέλειος λόγος, translated into Latin

by Apuleius; in the entrance of which, the writer having declared, "Omnia unius esse, et unum esse omnia," that all things were of one, and that one was all things, he afterwards adds this explication thereof; "Nonne hoc dixi, Omnia unum esse, et unum omnia, utpote quia in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia? Nec immerito unus est dictus omnia, cujus membra sunt omnia. Hujus itaque, qui est unus omnia, vel ipse est Creator omnium, in tota hac disputatione curato meminisse." Have we not already declared, that all things are one, and one all things? forasmuch as all things existed in the Creator, before they were made; neither is he improperly said to be all things, whose members all things are. Be thou therefore mindful in this whole disputation of him, who is one and all things, or was the creator of all. — And thus afterwards does he declare, that all created things were in the Deity before they were made; "Idcirco non erant quando nata non erant, sed in eo jam tunc erant unde nasci habuerunt:" they did not properly then exist before they were made, and yet at that very time were they in him, from whom they were afterwards produced. Again, he writes thus concerning God, "Non spero totius majestatis effectorem, omnium rerum patrem vel dominum, uno posse quamvis e multis composito nomine nuncupari. Hunc voca potius omni nomine, siquidem sit unus et omnia; ut necesse sit aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari. Hic ergo solus omnia," etc. I cannot hope sufficiently to express the author of majesty, and the father and lord of all things, by any one name, though compounded of never so many names. Call him therefore by every name, forasmuch as he is one and all things; so that of necessity, either all things must be called by his name, or he by the names of all things. — And when he had spoken of the mutability of created things, he adds, [1]"Solus deus ipse in se, et a se, et circum se, totus est plenus atque perfectus, isque sua firma stabilitas est; nec alicujus impulsu, nec loco moveri potest, cum in eo sint omnia, et in omnibus ipse est solus." God alone, in himself, and from himself, and about himself, is altogether perfect; and himself is his own stability. Neither can he be moved or changed, by the impulse of any thing, since all things are in him, and he alone is in all things.—Lastly, to omit other places,[2] "Hic sensibilis mundus receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum, qualitatum, vel corporum; quæ omnia sine Deo vegetari non possunt: Omnia enim Deus, et a Deo omnia, et sine hoc, nec fuit aliquid, nec est, nec erit; omnia enim ab eo, et in ipso, et per ipsum——Si totum animadvertes,

[1] P. 612. Colv. [2] P. 617.

vera ratione perdisces, mundum ipsum sensibilem, et quæ in eo sunt omnia, a superiore illo mundo, quasi vestimento, esse contecta." This sensible world is the receptacle of all forms, qualities, and bodies, all which cannot be vegetated and quickened without God: for God is all things, and all things are from God, and all things the effect of his will; and without God there neither was any thing, nor is nor shall be; but all things are from him, and in him, and by him———and if you will consider things after a right manner, you shall learn, that this sensible world, and all the things therein, are covered all over with that superior world (or Deity) as it were with a garment.—As for the other Trismegistic books of Ficinus's edition, the third of them, called *ἱερὸς λόγος*, is thus concluded; *τὸ γὰρ θεῖον ἡ πᾶσα κοσμικὴ σύγκρασις, φύσει ἀναθεωρουμένη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ θείῳ καὶ ἡ φύσις συγκαθέστηκεν·* The Divinity is the whole mundane compages, or constitution; for nature is also placed in the Deity.—In the fifth book, written upon this argument, *ὅτι ἀφανὴς θεὸς φανερώτατός ἐστι*, that the invisible God is most manifest—we read thus: *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ἐν παντὶ ἐκείνῳ, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸς, ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα αὐτὸς ἐφανέρωσε· τάδε μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ·* For there is nothing in the whole world, which he is not; he is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are, he hath manifested; but the things that are not, he contains within himself.—And again, *οὗτος ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ ὁ πολυσώματος· μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς σώματος οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ὃ οὗτος οὐκ ἔστι· πάντα γὰρ ἅ ἐστι, καὶ οὗτός ἐστι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς ὀνόματα ἔχει πάντα, ὅτι ἑνός ἐστι πατρός· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ.* He is both incorporeal and omnicorporeal, for there is nothing of any body, which he is not; he is all things that are, and therefore he hath all names, because all things are from one father; and therefore he hath no name, because he is the Father of all things.—And in the close of the same book: *ὑπὲρ τίνος σε ὑμνήσω, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐποίησας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἐποίησας; ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐφανέρωσας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἔκρυψας; διὰ τί δὲ καὶ ὑμνήσω σε; ὡς ἐμαυτοῦ ὤν; ὡς ἔχων τι ἴδιον; ὡς ἄλλος ὤν; σὺ εἶ γὰρ ὃ ἐὰν ὦ· σὺ εἶ ὃ ποιῶ· σὺ εἶ ὃ ἂν λέγω· σὺ γὰρ πάντα εἶ, τὸ ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ μὴ εἶ· σὺ πᾶν το γενόμενον, σὺ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον·* For what shall I praise thee? for those things which thou hast made, or for those things which thou hast not made? for those things which thou hast manifested, or for those things which thou hast hidden and concealed within thyself? And for what cause shall I praise thee? because I am my own, as having something proper, and distinct from thee? thou art whatsoever I am; thou art whatsoever I do, or say, for thou art all things, and there is nothing which thou art not; thou art that which is made, and thou art that

which is unmade. — Where it is observable, that before things were made, God is said *κρύπτειν*, to hide them within himself :—but when they are made, *φανεροῦν*, to manifest and reveal them from himself.—Book the eighth, *νόησον ὅτι ὁ μὲν κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ περιοχὴ καὶ σύστασις πάντων ὁ θεός·* Understand that the whole world is from God, and in God ; for God is the beginning, comprehension and constitution of all things.—Book the ninth, *μᾶλλον δὲ λέγω ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαίνομαι, αὐτὸς ἅπαντά ἐστιν· οὐκ ἔξωθεν αὐτὰ προσλαμβάνων, ἔξω δὲ ἐπιδιδούς·* I would not say, that God hath all things, but rather declare the truth, and say that he is all things ; not as receiving them from without, but as sending them forth from himself.—Again, afterward in the same book, *καὶ οὐκ ἔσται πότε χρόνος, ὅτε ἀπολειφθήσεταί τι τῶν ὄντων· ὅταν δὲ λέγω τῶν ὄντων, λέγω τοῦ θεοῦ· τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει, καὶ οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς, οὔτε αὐτὸς οὐδενός·* There shall never be a time, when any thing that is shall cease to be ; for when I say any thing that is, I say any thing of God ; for God hath all things in him, and there is neither any thing without God, nor God without any thing.—Book the tenth, *τί γάρ ἐστι θεὸς καὶ πατήρ, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἢ τὸ τῶν πάντων εἶναι οὐκ ἔτι ὄντων· ἀλλὰ ὕπαρξις αὐτὴ τῶν ὄντων;* What is God, but the very being of all things that yet are not, and the subsistence of things that are ?—And again, *ὁ θεὸς, καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τῷ εἶναι τὰ πάντα,* God is both the father and good, because he is all things.—Book the eleventh, *αὐτουργος γὰρ ὢν ἀεὶ ἐστιν ἐν οᾧ ἔργῳ, αὐτὸς ὢν ὃ ποιεῖ· εἰ γὰρ χωρισθείη αὐτοῦ, πάντα μὲν συμπεσεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ τεθνήξεσθαι ἀνάγκη·* God acting immediately from himself is always in his own work, himself being that which he makes ; for if that were never so little separated from him, all would of necessity fall to nothing and die.—Again, *πάντά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ κείμενα,* all things are in God, but not as lying in a place.—And further, since our own soul can by cogitation and fancy become what it will, and where it will, any thing, or in any place, *τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον νόησον τὸν θεὸν, ὥσπερ νοήματα πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν, τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν ὅλον·* You may consider God in the same manner, as containing the whole world within himself, as his own conceptions and cogitations.—And in the close of that chapter, that, which is also thence cited by St. Cyril,[1] is to the same purpose ; *ἀόρατος ὁ θεός ; εὐφήμησον καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ φανερώτερως· δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάντα ἐποίησεν, ἵνα διὰ πάντων αὐτὸν βλέπῃς· τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ θεοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀρετὴ, τὸ αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι διὰ πάντων·* Is God invisible ? speak worthily of him, for who is more manifest than

[1] Advers. Julian. lib. ii. p. 52. edit. Spanhem.

he? for this very reason did he make all things, that thou mightest see him through all things. The mind is seen in thinking, but God in working or making.—Book the twelfth, ἤκουσα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος λέγοντος (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μόνος, ὦ τέκνον, ἀληθῶς ὡς πρωτόγονος θεὸς, τὰ πάντα κατιδὼν, θείους λόγους ἐφθέγξατο) ἤκουσα γοῦν αὐτοῦ πότε λέγοντος, ὅτι ἕν ἐστι τὰ πάντα· I have heard the good demon (for he alone, as the first-begotten God, beholding all things, spake divine words); I have heard him sometimes saying, that one is all things.—Again, in the same chapter, ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος οὗτος ἡνωμένος ἐκείνῳ, καὶ συσσώζων τὴν τάξιν, καὶ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρὸν, πλήρωμά ἐστι τῆς ζωῆς· καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν τουτῷ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος, οὔτε τοῦ παντὸς, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὃ οὐχὶ ζῇ, νεκρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἕν, οὔτε γέγονεν, οὔτε ἐστὶν, οὔτε ἔσται ἐν κόσμῳ· This whole world is intimately united to him, and observing the order and will of its father, hath the fulness of life in it; and there is nothing in it through eternity (neither whole nor part) which does not live; for there neither is, nor hath been, nor shall be, any thing dead in the world.—The meaning is, that all things vitally depend upon the Deity, who is said in Scripture to quicken and enliven all things· τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς, τὸ πᾶν· ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ, οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅθεν οὔτε μέγεθος, οὔτε τόπος, οὔτε ποιότης, οὔτε σχῆμα, οὔτε χρόνος περὶ τὸν θεόν ἐστι· πᾶν γάρ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ πᾶν διὰ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντα· This is God, the universe or all. And in this universe there is nothing which he is not: wherefore there is neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor figure, nor time about God, for he is all or the whole (but those things belong to parts).—And the arcane Cantion, though that thirteenth book, to which it is subjoined, be supposititious, yet harps much upon this point of the Egyptian theology, that God is all: ὑμνεῖν μέλλω τὸν τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸ ἕν. I am about to praise the Lord of the creation, the all and the one.—And again, All the powers that are in me praise the one and the all.—Book the fifteenth, ἐάν τις ἐπιχειρήσῃ τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἓν χορίσαι, τὸ πᾶν τοῦ ἑνὸς λύσας, ἀπολέσει τὸ πᾶν, πάντα γὰρ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ· If any one go about to separate the all from the one, he will destroy the all, or the universe, for all ought to be one.—Book the sixteenth, ἄρξομαι τοῦ λόγου ἔνθεν, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλεσάμενος, τὸν τῶν ὅλων δεσπότην, καὶ ποιητὴν, καὶ πατέρα, καὶ περίβολον, καὶ πάντα ὄντα τὸν ἑνά, καὶ ἑνὰ ὄντα τὰ πάντα· τὸ πάντων γὰρ τὸ πλήρωμα ἕν ἐστι, καὶ ἐν ἑνί· I will begin with a prayer to him, who is the Lord and maker and father and bound of all things; and who being all things, is one; and being one, is all things; for the fulness of all things, is one and in one.—And again, μόρια τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ πάντα μόρια, πάντα ἄρα ὁ θεός· πάντα οὖν ποιῶν, ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖ· All things are parts of God, but

if all things be parts of God, then God is all things; wherefore he making all things, doth, as it were, make himself.—

Now by all this we see, how well these Trismegistic books agree with that ancient Egyptian inscription in the temple of Sais, That God is all that was, is, and shall be.—Wherefore the Egyptian theology thus undoubtedly asserting one God that was all things; it is altogether impossible, that it should acknowledge a multitude of self-existent and independent deities.

Hitherto we have taken notice of two several Egyptian names for one and the same supreme Deity; Hammon and Neith: but we shall find, that, besides these, the supreme God was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under other names and notions also; as of Isis, Osiris, and Serapis. For, first, though Isis have been taken by some for the moon, by others for the whole earth, by others for Ceres or Corn, by others for the land of Egypt (which things, in what sense they were deified by the Egyptians, will be elsewhere declared,) yet was she undoubtedly taken also sometimes for an universal and all-comprehending Numen. For Plutarch[1] affirms, that Isis and Neith were really one and the same god among the Egyptians, and therefore the temple of Neith or Minerva at Sais, where the forementioned inscription was found, is called by him the temple of Isis; so that Isis, as well as Neith or Minerva among the Egyptians, was there described, as that God, who is all that was, is, and shall be, and whose veil no mortal hath ever uncovered; that is, not a particular God, but an universal and all-comprehending Numen. And this may be yet further confirmed from that ancient inscription and dedication to the goddess Isis, still extant at Capua:

TIBI.
VNA. QVÆ.
ES. OMNIA.
DEA. ISIS.

Where the goddess Isis is plainly declared to be ἓν καὶ πάντα, one and all things,—that is, an universal and all-comprehending Deity. And with this agreeth also that oration of this goddess Isis in Apuleius;[2] "En adsum tuis commota, Luci, precibus, rerum natura parens, elementorum omnium domina, seculorum progenies initialis: summa numinum, regina marium, prima cœlitum, deorum dearumque facies

[1] De Iside et Osir. p. 354, tom. ii. oper.

[2] Metam. l. xii. [Lib. xi. p. 243.]

uniformis; quæ cœli luminosa culmina, maris salubria flamina, inferorum deplorata silentia, nutibus meis dispenso. Cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis." Behold, here am I, moved by thy prayers, Lucius, that nature, which was the parent of things; the mistress of all the elements; the beginning and original of ages; the sum of all the divine powers; the queen of the seas; the first of the celestial inhabitants; the uniform face of gods and goddesses; which with my becks dispense the luminous heights of the heavens, the wholesome blasts of the sea, and the deplorable silences of hell; whose only divine power the whole world worships and adores, in a multiform manner, and under different rites and names.—From which words it is plain, that this goddess Isis was not the mere animated moon (which was rather a symbol of her) but that she was an universal Deity, comprehensive of the whole nature of things; the one supreme God, worshipped by the Pagans under several names, and with different rites. And this is the plain meaning of those last words, *Numen unicum*, etc. that the whole world worshippeth one and the same supreme God, in a multiform manner, with various rites and under many different names.—For, besides the several names of the other Pagans there mentioned, the Egyptians worshipped it under the names of Hammon, Neith, and others that shall be afterwards declared. And thus was Isis again worshipped and invoked, as the *unicum numen*, or only divine power, by Apuleius himself, in these following words:[1] "Tu sancta humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, dulcem matris affectionem miseris tribuis, fatorum inextricabiliter contorta retractas litia, fortunæ tempestates mitigas, et stellarum noxios meatus cohibes: Te superi colunt, observant inferi. Tu rotas orbem, luminas solem, regis mundum, calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondent sydera, gaudent numina, serviunt elementa: tuo nutu spirant flamina," etc. Thou holy and perpetual saviour of mankind, that art always bountiful in cherishing mortals, and dost manifest the dear affections of a mother to them in their calamities, thou extricatest the involved threads of fate, mitigatest the tempests of fortune, and restrainest the noxious influences of the stars; the celestial gods worship thee, the infernal powers obey thee; thou rollest round the heavens, enlightenest the sun, governest the world, treadest upon Tartarus, or hell; the stars obey thee, the elements serve thee, at thy beck the winds blow, etc.—Where Isis is plainly supposed to be an universal Numen and supreme monarch of the world. Neither may this hinder, that she was called a goddess, as Neith also was; these Pagans making their deities to be indifferently

[1] Lib. xi. p. 254.

of either sex, male or female. But much more was Osiris taken for the supreme Deity, whose name was sometimes said to have signified in the Egyptian language, πολυόφθαλμος, that which had many eyes—sometimes κράτος ἐνεργοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοποιὸν, an active and beneficent force —(and whose hieroglyphic was an eye and a sceptre;) the former signifying providence and wisdom, and the latter power and majesty (as Plutarch tells us,)[1] who also is thus described in Apuleius: "Deus deorum magnorum potior, et majorum summus, et summorum maximus, et maximorum regnator, Osiris:" That God who is the chiefest of the greater gods, and the greatest of the chiefest, and which reigneth over the greatest.—Wherefore the same Apuleius[2] also tells us, that Isis and Osiris were really one and the same supreme Numen, though considered under different notions, and worshipped with different rites, in these words; [3] "Quanquam connexa, imo vero unica, ratio Numinis, religionisque esset, tamen teletæ discrimen esse maximum:" Though Isis and Osiris be really one and the same Divine power, yet are their rites and ceremonies very different.—The proper notion of Osiris being thus declared by Plutarch,[4] τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυριώτατον πάντων, ὃ τ' αγαθῷ ταὐτόν ἐστι, that first and highest of all beings, which is the same with good.—Agreeably whereunto, Jamblichus[5] affirmeth, ἀγαθῶν ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, that God, as the cause of all good, is called Osiris by the Egyptians.—Lastly, as for Serapis, though Origen[6] tells us, that this was a new upstart deity, set up by Ptolemy in Alexandria, yet this god in his oracle[7] to Nicocrion, the king of Cyprus, declares himself also to be an universal Numen, comprehending the whole world, in these words: οὐράνιος κόσμος κεφαλὴ, etc. to this sense: The starry heaven is my head, the sea my belly, my ears are in the ether, and the bright light of the sun is my clear piercing eye." And doubtless he was worshipped by many under this notion. For as Philarchus[8] wrote thus concerning him, Σαράπις ὄνομα τοῦ τὸ πᾶν κοσμοῦντος, That Serapis was the name of that God, which orders and governs the whole world; —so doth Plutarch[9] himself conclude, that Osiris and Serapis were ἄμφω ἑνὸς θεοῦ καὶ μιᾶς δυνάμεως, both of them names of one God, and

[1] De Iside et Osiride, p. 354, et p. 371. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Metamorphos. lib. xi. p. 258. [3] Ibid. p. 256.

[4] De Iside et Osir. p. 372.

[5] De Myster. Ægypt. sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 159.

[6] Advers. Cels. lib. v. p. 257. ed. Cantabr.

[7] Apud. Macrobium Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xx. p. 299.

[8] De Iside et Osir. p. 362. [9] Ibid. p. 361, 362.

the same Divine power.—Accordingly whereunto Diodorus Siculus[1] determines, that these three, Hammon, Osiris, and Serapis, were but different names for one and the same Deity, or supreme God. Notwithstanding which, Porphyrius,[2] it seems, had a very ill conceit of that power which manifested itself in the temple of this god Serapis, above all the other Pagan gods, he suspecting it to be no other than the very prince of evil demons or devils: *Τοὺς δὴ πονηροὺς δαίμονας οὐκ εἰκῇ ὑπὸ τὸν Σαράπιν ὑποπτεύομεν· οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν συμβολῶν μόνον ἀναπεισθέντες*, etc. We do not vainly or without ground suspect and conjecture, that the evil demons are under Serapis as their prince and head: this appearing (saith he) not only from those rites of appeasement used in the worship of this god, but also from the symbol of him, which was a three-headed dog, signifying that evil demon which ruleth in those three elements, water, earth, and air.—Neither indeed can it be doubted, but that it was an evil demon or devil, that delivered oracles in this temple of Serapis as well as elsewhere among the Pagans, however he affected to be worshipped as the supreme God.

Besides all this, Eusebius himself from Porphyrius informs us, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or maker of the world, under the name of Cneph, whom they worshipped in a statue of human form, and a blackish sky-colored complexion; holding in his hand a girdle and a sceptre, and wearing upon his head a princely plume, and thrusting forth an egg out of his mouth. The reason of which hieroglyphic is thus given,[3] *ὅτι λόγος δυσεύρετος καὶ κεκρυμμένος, καὶ οὐ φανός, καὶ ὅτι ζωοποιός, καὶ ὅτι βασιλεύς, καὶ ὅτι νοερῶς κινεῖται· διὸ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ κεῖται·* Because that wisdom and reason, by which the world was made, is not easy to be found out, but hidden and obscure. And because this is the fountain of life and king of all things; and because it is intellectually moved, signified by the feathers upon his head. Moreover, by the egg thrust out of the mouth of this God, was meant the world, created by the eternal *λόγος*, and from this Cneph was said to be generated or produced another God, whom the Egyptians called Phtha, and the Greeks Vulcan—of which Phtha more afterward. That the Egyptians were the most eminent assertors of the cosmogonia, or temporary beginning of the world, hath been already declared; for which cause the scholiast upon Ptolemy thus perstringeth

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[1] Vide lib. i. cap. xxv. p. 21.

[2] Libro de Philosophia et Oraculis apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. iv. cap. xxiii. p. 175.

[3] Præp. l. iii. c. xi. p. 115.

them, περιττῶς εἰώθασι λέγειν γένεσιν Αἰγύπτιοι κόσμου, the Egyptians were wont to talk perpetually of the genesis or creation of the world.—And Asclepius, an ancient Egyptian writer, in his Myriogenesis,[1] affirms, that according to the Egyptian tradition, the sun was made in Libra. But, that the Egyptians did not suppose the world to have been made by chance, as Epicurus and other atheistical philosophers did, but by an intellectual Demiurgus called by them Cneph, is evident from this testimony of Porphyrius. Which Cneph was looked upon by them as an unmade and eternal Deity, and for this very cause the inhabitants of Thebais refused to worship any other god besides him, as Plutarch informs us in these words:[2] εἰς δὲ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν τιμωμένων ζώων, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους συντεταγμένα τελεῖν, μόνους δέ μὴ διδόναι τοὺς Θηβαΐδα κατοικοῦντας, ὡς θνητὸν θεὸν οὐδένα νομίζοντες, ἀλλὰ ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ Κνήφ, ἀγένητον ὄντα καὶ ἀθάνατον· Whilst the other Egyptians paid their proportion of tax imposed upon them, for the nourishment of those sacred animals, worshipped by them, the inhabitants of Thebais only refused, because they would acknowledge no mortal god, and worshipped him only, whom they call Cneph, an unmade and eternal Deity.—

Having now made it undeniably manifest, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme universal and unmade Deity, we shall conclude this whole discourse with the two following observations: First, That a great part of the Egyptian Polytheism was really nothing else but the worshipping of one and the same supreme God, under many different names and notions, as of Hammon, Neith, Isis, Osiris, Serapis, Cneph, to which may be added Phtha, and those other names in Jamblichus, of Eicton and Emeph. And that the Pagans universally over the whole world did the like, was affirmed also by Apuleius, in that forecited passage of his: "Numen unicum, multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo, totus veneratur orbis," the whole world worshippeth one only supreme Numen in a multiform manner, under different names, and with different rites.—Which different names for one and the same supreme God might therefore be mistaken by some of the sottish vulgar amongst the Pagans, as well as they have been by learned men of these later times, for so many distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.

Nevertheless, here may well be a question started, whether amongst those several Egyptian names of God, some might not signify distinct Divine hypostases subordinate; and particularly, whether there were

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1 Scal. Emend. Temp. l. v. de condit. mundi.

2 De Is. et Osir. [p. 357.]

not some footsteps of a trinity to be found in the old Egyptian theology? For since Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, who all of them asserted a trinity of Divine hypostases, unquestionably derived much of their doctrine from the Egyptians, it may reasonably be suspected, that these Egyptians did the like before them. And indeed Athanasius Kircherus makes no doubt at all hereof, but tells us that, in the Pamphylian obelisk, that first hieroglyphic of a winged globe, with a serpent coming out of it, was the Egyptian hieroglyphic of a triform Deity, or trinity of Divine hypostases; he confirming the same, from the testimony of Abenephius, an Arabian writer, and a Chaldaic fragment imputed to Sanchoniathon; the globe being said to signify the first incomprehensible Deity, without beginning or end, self-existent; the serpent the Divine wisdom and creative virtue; and lastly, the wings that active spirit, that cherisheth, quickeneth, and enliveneth all things. How far credit is to be given to this, we leave others to judge; but the clearest footsteps that we can find any where of an Egyptian trinity is in Jamblichus's book, written concerning their mysteries; which whole place therefore is worth the setting down: *Κατ' ἄλλην δὲ τάξιν προστάττει [Ἑρμῆς] θεὸν τὸν Ἤμηφ, τῶν ἐπουρανίων θεῶν ἡγούμενον, ὅν φησὶν νοῦν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν νοοῦντα, καὶ τὰς νοήσεις εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφοντα· Τούτου δὲ ἓν ἄμερες, καὶ ὅ φησι τὸ πρῶτον μάγευμα, προτάττει, ὃν καὶ Εἰκτὼν ἐπονομάζει, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρῶτόν ἐστι νοοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον νοητόν, ὃ δὴ καὶ διὰ σιγῆς μόνης θεραπεύεται. Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις———ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐρχόμενος μὲν εἰς γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλώσσαν λέγεται, συντελῶν δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς μετ' ἀληθείας Φθά, Ἕλληνες δὲ εἰς Ἥφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθά, τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι' ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας ἐπωνυμίας ἔκει.* According to another order or method, Hermes places the god Emeph,[1] as the prince and ruler over all the celestial gods, whom he affirmeth to be a mind understanding himself, and converting his cogitations or intellections into himself. Before which Emeph,[2] he placeth one indivisible, whom he called Eicton, in which is the first intelligible, and which is worshipped only by silence. After which two, Eicton and Emeph,[3] the demiurgic mind and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generations, and bringeth forth the hidden powers of the occult reasons into light, is called in the Egytian language Ammon; as it artificially affects all things with truth, Phtha (which Phtha, the Greeks, attending only to

[1] Or Cneph. [2] Or Cneph. [3] Or Cneph.

the artificialness thereof, call Hephestus or Vulcan ;) as it is productive of good, Osiris, besides other names that it hath, according to its other powers and energies.—In which passage of Jamblichus[1] we have plainly three Divine hypostases, or universal principles subordinate, according to the Hermaic theology ; first, an indivisible unity called Eicton ; secondly, a perfect mind, converting its intellections into itself, called Emeph or Hemphta ; and thirdly, the immediate principle of generation, called by several names, according to its several powers, as Phtha, Ammon, Osiris, and the like : so that these three names with others, according to Jamblichus, did in the Egyptian theology signify, one and the same third Divine hypostasis. How well these three Divine hypostases of the Egyptians agree with the Pythagoric or Platonic trinity, of, first, *τὸ ἓν* or *τἀγαθὸν*, unity and goodness itself—secondly, *νοῦς*, mind—and thirdly, *ψυχή*, soul—I need not here declare. Only we shall call to mind what hath been already intimated, that that reason or wisdom, which was the Demiurgus of the world, and is properly the second of the forementioned hypostases, was called also among the Egyptians, by another name, Cneph ; from whom was said to have been produced or begotten the god Phtha, the third hypostasis of the Egyptian trinity ; so that Cneph and Emeph are all one. Wherefore we have here plainly an Egyptian trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate, Eicton, Emeph (or Cneph,) and Phtha. We know not what to add more to this of Jamblichus concerning an Egyptian trinity, unless we should insist upon those passages, which have been cited by some of the fathers to this purpose out of Hermaic or Trismegistic books, whereof there was one before set down of St. Cyril ; or unless we should again call to mind that citation out of Damascius,[2] *μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνουμένη καὶ τοῦτο τρὶς ἀναφωνούμενον οὕτως*, that, according to the Egyptians, there is one principle of all things praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated.—Agreeably to which, Augustinus Steuchus produces another passage out of the same philosophic writer ; that the Egyptians made *πρώτην ἀρχὴν σκότος ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν νόησιν, σκότος ἄγνωστον, τρὶς τοῦτο ἐπιφημίζοντες*, the first principle of all to be darkness above all knowledge and understanding (or unknown darkness,) they thrice repeated the same.—Which the forementioned Steuchus takes to be a clear acknowledgment of a trinity of Divine hypostases in the Egyptian theology.

Our second observation is this ; That the Egyptian theology as well

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[1] De Myster. Ægypt. sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 158, 159.

[2] Vide Wolfii Anecdot. Græca, p. 260.

as the Orphic (which was derived from it) asserting one incorporeal Deity, that is, all things; as it is evident, that it could not admit a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, so did the seeming Polytheism of these Egyptians proceed also in a great measure from this principle of theirs not rightly understood; they being led thereby, in a certain sense, *θεοποιεῖν*, to personate and deify the several parts of the world, and things of nature, bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Not that they therefore worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as such, much less things not substantial, but mere accidents, for so many real, distinct, personal deities; but because, conceiving that God, who was all things, ought to be worshipped in all things (such especially as were most beneficial to mankind), they did, according to that Asclepian and Trismegistic doctrine beforementioned, call God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. And that the wiser of them very well understood, that it was really one and the same simple Deity, that was thus worshipped amongst them by piecemeal, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and under different names and notions, with different ceremonies, is thus declared by Plutarch; [1] *Ἑλληνικὸν ἡ Ἰσίς ἐστι, καὶ ὁ Τυφὼν πολέμιος τῇ θεῷ, καὶ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπάτην τετυφωμένος, καὶ διασπῶν καὶ ἀφανίζων τὸν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἡ θεὸς συνάγει καὶ συντίθησι, καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς τελουμένοις θειώσεως·* Isis is a Greek word, which signifies knowledge; and Typhon is the enemy to this goddess; who being puffed up by ignorance and error, doth distract and discerp the holy doctrine (of the simple Deity), which Isis collects together again, and makes up into one, and thus delivers it to those who are initiated into her sacred mysteries, in order to deification.—In which words Plutarch intimates, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the discerption and distraction of the simple Deity, by reason of the weakness and ignorance of vulgar minds (not able to comprehend it altogether at once), into several names and partial notions, which yet true knowledge and understanding, that is, Isis, makes up whole again and unites into one.

XIX. It is well known that the poets, though they were the prophets of the Pagans, and, pretending to a kind of Divine inspiration, did otherwise embue the minds of the vulgar with a certain sense of religion, and the notions of morality, yet these notwithstanding were the grand depravers and adulterators of the Pagan theology. For this they were guilty of upon several accounts. As, first, their attributing to the

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[1] De Is. et Os. 351.

gods, in their fables concerning them, all manner of human imperfections, passions, and vices. Which abuse of theirs the wiser of the Pagans were in all ages highly sensible of and offended with, as partly appears from these free passages vented upon the stage;

[1]————*Καὶ γὰρ, ὅστις ἂν βροτῶν*
Κακὸς πεφύκῃ, ζημιοῦσιν οἱ θεοί·
Πῶς οὖν δίκαιον τοὺς νόμους ὑμᾶς βροτοῖς
Γράψαντας αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ὀφλισκάνειν;

————Si quis est mortalium
Qui scelera patrat, exigunt pœnam dei:
At nonne iniquum est, vos, suas leges quibus
Gens debet hominum, jure nullo vivere?

To this sense: Since mortal men are punished by the gods for transgressing their laws, is it not unjust, that ye, gods, who write these laws, should yourselves live without law?—And again:

———*οὐκέτ' ἀνθρώπους κακῶς*
Λέγειν δίκαιον, εἰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν κακὰ
Μιμούμεθ' ἀλλὰ τοὺς διδάσκοντας τάδε·

———Nulla nos posthac notet
Censura, siquando ista, quæ superos decent,
Imitamur homines. Culpa ad auctores redit.

Let men no longer be blamed for imitating the evil actions of the gods; for they can only be justly blamed, who teach men to do such things by their examples.—

Secondly, The poets were further guilty of depraving the religion and theology of the Pagans, by their so frequently personating and deifying all the things of nature and parts of the world, and calling them by the names of those gods, that were supposed to preside over them; that is of the several divine powers manifested in them. This Plutarch[2] taxes the poets with, where giving directions for young men's reading of their writings, he thus seasonably cautions against the danger of it; *τοῦτο δὲ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ χρήσιμον, εἰ μέλλοιμεν ἐκ τῶν ποιημάτων ὠφεληθήσεσθαι καὶ μὴ βλαβήσεσθαι, τὸ γινώσκειν πῶς τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ χρῶνται.—χρῶνται δὲ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι οἱ ποιηταὶ, ποτὲ*

[1] Eurip. in Ione. [Ex Florilegio Stobœi apud Hugon. Grotium in Excerpt. veterum Comicor. et Tragicor. p. 334.

[2] De audiendis Poetis, p. 22. tom. ii. oper.

μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐφαπτόμενοι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ δυνάμεις τινὰς, ὧν οἱ θεοὶ δωτῆρές εἰσι καὶ καθηγεμόνες, ὁμωνύμως προσαγορεύοντες· It is very profitable and necessary if we would receive good from the writings of the poets, and not hurt, that we should understand how they use the names of the gods in different senses. Wherefore the poets sometimes use the names of the gods properly, as intending to signify thereby the gods themselves, and sometimes again they use them improperly and equivocally, for those powers which the gods are the givers and dispensers of, or the things which they preside over.—As for example, Vulcan is sometimes used by the poets for that god or divine power which presides over fire and the arts that operate by fire, and sometimes again the word is taken by them for fire itself. So Mars, in like manner, is sometimes used for the god which presides over military affairs, and sometimes again it signifies nothing else but war. An instance whereof is there given by Plutarch out of Sophocles:

Τυφλὸς γὰρ, ὦ γυναῖκες, οὐδ' ὁρῶν Ἄρης
Συὸς προσώπῳ πάντα τυρβάζει κακά·

Mars (O Mulieres) cæcus hirsuto suis
Velut ore frendens, cuncta commiscet mala.

And we might give this other instance of the same from Virgil,

———Furit toto Mars impius orbe.

For the God of war, that is, the divine providence that presides over military affairs, could not be called impious or wicked, but it is war itself that is there so styled.

Indeed, we shall afterward make it appear, that the first original of this business proceeded from a certain philosophic opinion amongst the Pagans, that God was diffused throughout the whole world, and was himself in a manner all things, and therefore ought to be worshipped in all things: but the poets were principally the men, who carried it on thus far, by personating the several inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, to make such a multitude of distinct gods and goddesses of them. Which humor, though it were chiefly indulged by them, *ψυχαγωγίας ἕνεκεν*, only for the delight and pleasure of the reader—besides gratifying their own poetic fancies; yet was it a matter of dangerous consequence, as the same Plutarch gravely and soberly advises, in his book De Iside, it begetting in some gross and irrational superstition, (that is, in our Christian language, idolatry), and carrying others on to

downright impiety and Atheism. But this will be afterward also again insisted on.

Wherefore, in the next place, we shall observe, that the poets did also otherwise deprave the theology of the Pagans, so as to make it look somewhat more aristocratically, and this principally two manner of ways; first, by their speaking so much of the gods in general and without distinction, and attributing the government of the whole world to them in common, so as if it were managed and carried on, *communi consilio deorum*, by a common council and republic of gods,—wherein all things were determined by a majority of votes, and as if their Jupiter or supreme god, were no more amongst them, than a speaker of a house of lords or commons, or the chairman of a committee. In which they did indeed attribute more to their inferior deities, than, according to their own principles, they ought.

And secondly (which is the last depravation of Pagan theology by these poets), by their making those, that were really nothing else but several names and notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to its several powers manifested in the world, or the different effects produced by it, to be so many really distinct persons and gods; insomuch as sometimes to be at odds and variance with one another, and even with Jupiter himself. This St. Basil seems to take notice of, in his oration, How young men may be profited by the writings of the Greeks;[1] *πάντων δὲ ἥκιστα περὶ Θεῶν τι διαλεγομένοις (ποιηταῖς) προσέξομεν, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅταν ὡς περὶ πολλῶν τε αὐτῶν διεξίωσι, καὶ τούτων οὐδὲ ὁμονοούντων·* But least of all will we give credit to the poets, where they discourse concerning the gods, and speak of them as many (distinct and independent) persons, and that not agreeing amongst themselves neither, but siding several ways, and perpetually quarrelling with one another.—

Notwithstanding all which extravagances and miscarriages of the poets, we shall now make it plainly to appear, that they really asserted, not a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, but one only unmade Deity, and all the other, generated or created Gods. This hath been already proved concerning Orpheus, from such fragments of the Orphic poems, as have been owned and attested by Pagan writers: but it would be further evident, might we give credit to any of those other Orphic verses, that are found cited by Christians and Jews only

[1] Page 16. Edit. Oxon. Joh. Potteri.

(and we cannot reasonably conclude all these to be counterfeit and supposititious), amongst which we have this for one,[1]

Εἷς ἐστ' αὐτογενὴς, ἑνὸς ἔκγονα πάντα τέτυκται,

There is one only unmade God, and all other gods and things are the offspring of this one.—Moreover, when God, in the some Orphic fragments, is styled *Μητρο-πάτωρ*, both father and mother of all things—(accordingly as it was observed before) that both the Orphic and Egyptian theology made the supreme Deity especially to be *ἀῤῥηνόθηλυν*, hermaphroditical, or male and female together; this as Clemens Alexandrinus[2] rightly interprets the meaning of it, was to signify *τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γένεσιν*, the production of things out of nothing,—or from the Deity alone, without any pre-existent or self-existent matter.

But we shall pass from Orpheus to Homer. Now it is certain, that Homer's gods were not all eternal, unmade, and self-existent, he plainly declaring the contrary concerning the gods in general; that they had a genesis, that is, a temporary production, as in that forecited verse of his,[3]

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, etc.

The ocean from whence the gods were generated;—where, by gods are meant all the animated parts of the world superior to men, but principally (as Eustathius observes) the stars, *θεῶν ἀντὶ ἀστέρων*, gods (saith he) are here put for stars.—And, as the same philologer further adds, the gods or stars do by a synechdoche signify all things, or the whole world, *ἀντὶ τοῦ πάντων ὡς ἀπὸ μέρους*, a part being put for the whole;—accordingly as the same poet elsewhere[4] declares his sense, speaking likewise of the ocean,

————— *Ὃς γένεσις πάντεσσε τέτυκται,*

Which was the original of all things—or from whence (not only the gods, but also) all other things were generated. Wherefore the full meaning of Homer was this: that the gods or stars, together with this whole visible world, had a temporary production, and were at first made out of the ocean, that is, out of the watery chaos. So that Homer's

[1] Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. vii. p. 64. Vide etiam Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xiii. cap. xii. et Theodoret. de curandis Græcorum affect. serm. i. tom. ii. oper. p. 475.

[2] Stromatum, lib. v. p. 724. [3] Ibid. Ξ. ver. 201, 202.

[4] Ibid. ver. 246.

theogonia, as well as Hesiod's, was one and the same thing with the cosmogonia ; his generation of gods the same with the generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in all probability, derived it from the Mosaic cabala, or tradition. And Eustathius tells us, that, according to the ancients, Homer's *ἀσποδοποιΐα,* described Il. *σ.* was *αἴνιγμα τῆς κοσμογενείας*, an obscure signification of the cosmogenia,— or cosmogonia.

Nevertheless, though *οἱ θεοὶ* or the gods in general be by Homer thus generated from the ocean or watery chaos, yet this is to be understood only of the inferior gods, and he is supposed to be distinguished from them, who in the same poet is frequently called, *ὁ θεὸς κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, God, by way of eminency (to whom he plainly ascribes omnipotence), and *Ζεὺς*, or Jupiter, whom he styleth *κάρτιστον ἁπάντων*, the most powerful of all, and *πρῶτα θεῶν*, the first and chiefest of the gods, and *ὕπατον θεῶν* and *κρειόντων*, the highest of gods and governors, and whom he affirmeth infinitely to transcend the gods, Il. *θ.*[1]

Τόσσον ἐγὼ περὶ τ' εἰμὶ θεῶν, περί τ' εἴμ' ἀνθρώπων.

And to reign as well over gods as men, Il. *α.*[2]

———*ὅς τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει.*

Lastly, whom he maketh to be *πατέρα θεῶν*, the father of the gods as well as men — that is, nothing less than the creator of them and the whole world. He, therefore, who thus produced the gods and stars out of the ocean or watery chaos, must needs be excluded out of that number of gods, so as not to have been himself generated or made out of it. Thus have we before observed, that *οἱ θεοὶ*, or the gods in general, are frequently taken, both by Homer and other Greek writers, in way of distinction from *ὁ θεὸς*, or Jupiter, that is, for the inferior gods only.

It is true, indeed, that other of the Pagan gods, besides Jupiter, were by the Latins in their solemn rites and prayers styled *patres*, fathers ; and as Jupiter is nothing else but Jovis pater, contracted into one word, so was Mars called by them Marspiter, and Saturnus, Janus, Neptunus, and Liber had the like addition also made to their names, Saturnuspater, Januspater, Neptunuspater, Liberpater : and not only so, but even their very heroes also (as for example, Quirinus) had this honorable title of father bestowed on them ; all which appeareth from those verses of Lucilius,[3]

[1] Ver. 27. [2] Ver. 281.

[3] Apud Lactant. Divin. Instit. lib. iv. cap. iii. p. 408.

Ut nemo sit nostrum, quin aut pater optimus divum,
Aut Neptunus pater, Liber, Saturnus pater, Mars,
Janus, Quirinus pater nomen dicatur ad unum.

Notwithstanding which, here is a great difference to be observed, that though those other gods were called fathers, yet none of them was ever called, either by the Greeks *πατὴρ θεῶν*, or by the Latins, *pater optimus divum*, save only *Ζεὺς* or Jupiter, the supreme Deity.

And that Homer was thus generally understood by the Pagans themselves to have asserted a Divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity ruling over all, may further appear from these following citations. Plutarch, in his Platonic questions,[1] *καὶ Ξενοκράτης Δία Ὕπατον καλεῖ, πρότερον δὲ Ὅμηρος τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντα θεὸν, ὕπατον κρειόντων προσεῖπε·* Cenocrates called Jupiter, Hypaton, or the highest; but before him Homer styled that God, who is the prince of all princes, *ὕπατον κρειόντων*, the highest of rulers or governors.—Again, the same Plutarch, de Iside et Osiride,[2] *Τὸν δὲ Ὄρισιν αὖ πάλιν ὀφθαλμῷ καὶ σκήπτρῳ γράφουσι, ὧν τὸ μὲν τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐμφαίνει, τὸ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν· ὡς Ὅμηρος τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλεύοντα πάντων Ζῆν ὕπατον καὶ μήστωρα καλῶν, ἔοικε τῷ μὲν ὑπάτῳ τὸ κρατὸς αὐτοῦ, τῷ δὲ μήστωρι τὴν εὐβουλίαν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν σημαίνειν.* The Egyptians, when they described Osiris by those hieroglyphics of an eye and a sceptre, did by the former of them signify providence, and by the latter power; as Homer, when he calls that *Ζεὺς*, or Jupiter, who ruleth and reigneth over all things *ὕπατον* and *μήστωρα*, seems by the word *ὕπατον* to denote his power and sovereignty, but by *μήστωρα* his wisdom and knowledge.—To Plutarch may be added Proclus,[3] who, upon Plato's Timæus, having proved that, according to that philosopher, there was *τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς εἷς καὶ ὅλας δημιουργὸς*, one only maker of the whole world—affirms the same likewise of that divine poet Homer (as he there styles him), *ὃς καὶ διὰ πάσης ποιήσεως ὕπατον κρειόντων καὶ πατέρα ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν αὐτὸν ἀνυμνεῖ, καὶ πᾶσιν εὐφημεῖ τοῖς δημιουργικοῖς νοήμασιν·* That he also throughout all his poesy praises Jupiter as the highest of all rulers, and the father both of gods and men, and attributes all demiurgical notions to him.—Whereupon he concludes in this manner: *οὕτω τοίνυν σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν ἀπεφήναμεν, τῷ Διὶ τὴν ὅλην δημιουργίαν ἀπονέμουσιν·* And thus we have made it manifest, that all the Greekish theology universally ascribes to *Ζεὺς*, or Jupiter, the maker of all things.—Lastly, Aristotle himself confirmeth the same with his testimony, where he writes of the

[1] P. 1007. tom. ii. oper. [2] P. 371.
[3] P. 96. [lib. ii. in Timæum Platon.]

paternal authority after this manner : ἡ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλικὴ· διο καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν,[1]

——— Πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε,

τὸν βασιλέα τούτων· φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον, καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον· The paternal power or authority over children is a kingly authority : wherefore Homer, when he intended to set forth Jupiter's kingly power over all, very well called him the father of men and gods. For he, that is king by nature, ought both to differ from those that he reigneth over, and also to be of the same kind with them ; as the senior is to the junior, and he that begetteth to his offspring.—Where Aristotle's sense seems to be this, that Jupiter had therefore a natural and not acquired kingly power over all the gods, because they were all his offspring and begotten by him, as well as men. In which passage therefore Aristotle plainly acquits and frees Homer from all suspicion of Atheism.

As for Hesiod, if we had not already sufficiently proved from his Theogonia, that all his gods (that is, his inferior deities) were generated and made, as well as men, it might be made unquestionably evident from this verse of his in his Opera,[2]

Ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοί τ' ἄνθρωποι.

When the gods and mortal men, were both together, alike made or generated.—Where the word ὁμόθεν is thus interpreted by the Greek scholiasts, ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ῥίζης and ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, i. e. the gods and men were both alike made from the same root or stock.—And though it followeth immediately after,

Χρύσεον μὲν πρώτιστα γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες,

That first of all a golden age of men was made by the immortal gods ; yet Moschopulus there notes, Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, ὁ Ζεὺς μόνος ἐποίησεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φανερὸν γίνεται· λέγει δὲ πάντας τοὺς θεοὺς, τὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔργου ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ὁμοειδεῖς ἀναφέρων· The immortal gods made ; the true meaning (saith he) is, that Jupiter alone made this first golden age of men ; as may be proved from other places in the same poet ; and though he speak of the gods in general, yet doth he but transfer that,

[1] De Rep. l. i. c. xii. [p. 412. tom. iii. oper.]

[2] Ver. 108, 109, 110.

which was the work of one upon all of the like kind. And there are several other instances of this poet's using θεοὶ for θεὸς, gods for god. —But it is possible, that Hesiod's meaning might be the same with Plato's,[1] that though the inferior mundane gods were all made at first by the supreme God, as well as men, yet they being made something sooner than men, did afterward contribute also to the making of men.

But Hesiod's Theogonia, or generation of gods, is not to be understood universally neither, but only of the inferior gods, that Ζεὺς or Jupiter being to be expected out of the number of them, whom the same Hesiod, as well as Homer, makes to be the father of gods, as also the king of them, in these words :[2]

> Αὐτὸς γὰρ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ κοίρανος ἐστίν
> Ἀθανάτων.

And attributes the creation of all things to him, as Proclus writeth upon this place,

> [3] Ὅν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὅμως, etc.

By whom all mortal men are, δὶ ὃν πάντα, καὶ οὐκ αὐτομάτως· πάντα τῷ Διῖ προσαναπλάττει, by whom all things are, and not by chance ; the poet, by a synecdoche, here ascribing the making of all to Jupiter.— Wherefore Hesiod's Theogonia is to be understood of the inferior gods only, and not of Ζεὺς or Jupiter, who was the father and maker of them (though out of a watery chaos) and himself therefore αὐτοφυὴς, self-existent or unmade.

In like manner, that Pindar's gods were not eternal, but made or generated, is plainly declared by him in these words ;[4]

> Ἓν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ
> Μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν
> Ματρος ἀμφότεροι.

> Unum Hominum, unum Deorum genus,
> Et ex una spiramus
> Matre utrique.

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[1] In Timæo, p. 530, oper.

[2] Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. vii. p. 63. tom. i. edit. Potteri.

[3] Hesiodi Opera et Dies, ver. 3.

[4] Nem. Od. vi. [p. 120. edit. Schmidii.]

There is one kind both of gods and men, and we both breathe from the same mother, or spring from the same original.—Where by the common mother both of gods and men, the scholiast understands the earth and chaos, taking the gods here for the inferior deities only, and principally the stars.[1]

This of Pindar's therefore is to be understood of all the other gods, that they were made as well as men out of the earth or chaos, but not of that supreme Deity, whom the same Pindar elsewhere calls *θεῶν κράτιστον*, the most powerful of the gods—and *τὸν πάντων κύριον*, the Lord of all things—and *παντὶ αἴτιον*, the Cause of every thing—and *ἀριστοτέχνην θεὸν*, that God who is the best artificer, or was the framer of the whole world—and as Clemens Alexandrinus tells us,[2] *τὸ πᾶν*, or the universe.—Which God also, according to Pindar, Chiron instructed Achilles to worship principally, above all the other gods.

[3] ———*μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν,*
Βαρυόπαν στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν,
Θεῶν σέβεσται·

The sense of which words is thus declared by the scholiast, *ἐξαιρέτως τὸν μεγαλόφωνον καὶ ἀστραπῶν καὶ κεραυνῶν δεσπότην Δία παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς τιμᾷν καὶ σέβεσθαι·* That he should honor and worship the loud-sounding Jupiter, the lord of thunder and lightning, transcendently above all the other gods.—Which by the way confutes the opinion of those, who contend, that the supreme God, as such, was not at all worshipped by the Pagans.

However, this is certain concerning these three, Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar, that they must of necessity either have been all absolute Atheists, in acknowledging no eternal Deity at all, but making senseless Chaos, Night and the Ocean, the original of all their gods without exception, and therefore of Jupiter himself too, that king and father of them; or else assert one only eternal unmade self-existent Deity, so as that all the other gods were generated or created by that one. Which latter doubtless was their genuine sense; and the only reason, why Aristotle and Plato might possibly sometime have a suspicion of the contrary, seems to have been this—their not understanding that Mosaic cabala, which both Hesiod and Homer followed, of the world's, that is both heaven and earth's, being made at first out of a watery chaos; for thus is the tradition declared by St. Peter, Ep. ii. ch. iii.

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[1] Vide Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 710.

[2] Ibid. p. 726. [3] Pyth. Od. vi. [p. 260.]

There might be several remarkable passages to the same purpose, produced out of those two tragic poets, Æschylus and Sophocles; which yet, because they have been already cited by Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others; to avoid unnecessary tediousness, we shall here pass by. Only we think fit to observe concerning that one famous passage of Sophocles,

Εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἷς ἐστιν Θεὸς,
Ὃς οὐρανόν τ' ἔτευξε καὶ γαῖαν μακρὰν,
Πόντου τε χάροπον οἶδμα, κἀνέμων βίαν, etc.

Unus profecto, unus est tantum Deus,
Cœli solique machinam qui condidit,
Vadumque ponti cœrulum, et vim spiritus, etc.

There is in truth one only God, who made heaven and earth, the sea, air, and winds, etc.—After which followeth also something against image worship; that though this be such as might well become a Christian, and be no wherenow to be found in those extant tragedies of this poet (many whereof have been lost) yet the sincerity thereof cannot reasonably be at all suspected by us, it having been cited by so many of the ancient fathers in their writings against the Pagans, as particularly Athenagoras, Clemens Alexandrinus, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Cyril and Theodoret; of which number Clemens tells us,[2] that it was attested likewise by that ancient Pagan historiographer Hecatæus. But there are so many places to our purpose in Euripides, that we cannot omit them all in his Supplices we have this, wherein all men's absolute dependence upon Jupiter, or one supreme Deity, is fully acknowledged.[3]

Ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους Βροτοὺς
Φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα,
Δρῶμεν τε τοιαῦθ', ἂν σὺ τυγχάνῃς θέλων.

Miseros quid homines, O deum rex et pater,
Sapere arbitramur? Pendet e nutu tuo
Res nostra, facimus illa quæ visum tibi.

We have also this excellent prayer to the supreme Governor of heaven and earth, cited out of the same tragedian:[4]

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[1] Ex Stobœi Eclog. apud Hugon. Grot. in Excerpt. veter. Comicor. et Tragic, p. 148.

[2] Stromat. lib. v. p. 717.

[3] Ver. 734, 735, 736.

[4] Apud Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 688. Vide Hug. Grotii Excerpta, p. 431.

Σοὶ, τῷ πάντων μεδέοντι, χοὴν
Πελανόν τε φέρω Ζεὺς ἔιτ' Ἀίδης
Ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις·——
Σὺ γὰρ ἔν τε θεοῖς τοῖς οὐρανίδαις,
Σκῆπτρον τὸ Διὸς μεταχειρίζων,
Χθονίων θ' Αἴδῃ μετέχεις ἀρχῆς·
Πέμψον μὲν φῶς ψυχαῖς, ἀνέρων
Τοῖς βουλομένοις ἄθλους προμαθεῖν,
Πόθεν ἔβλαστον, τίς ῥίζα κακῶν,
Τίνα δεῖ μακάρων εὖ θυσαμένους
Εὑρεῖν μόχθων ἀνάπαυλαν.

Tibi (cunctorum domino) vinum,
Salsamque molam fero, seu Ditis,
Tu sive Jovis nomine gaudes:
Tu namque deos superos inter
Sceptrum tractas sublime Jovis;
Idem regnum terrestre tenes.
Te lucem animis infunde virum,
Qui scire volunt, quo sata mentis
Lucta sit ortu, quæ causa mali;
Cui cœlicolum rite litando
Requiem sit habere laborum.

Where we may observe that *Ζεὺς* and *Ἅδης*, Jupiter and Pluto, are both of them supposed to be names equally belonging to one and the same supreme God. And the sum of the prayer is this, That God would infuse light into the souls of men, whereby they might be enabled to know, what is the root, from whence all their evils spring, and by what means they may avoid them.—

Lastly, There is another devotional passage, cited out of Euripides,[1] which contains also a clear acknowledgment of one self-existent Being that comprehends and governs the whole world:

Σὲ τὸν Αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ
Ῥόμβῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξαν θ',
Ον περὶ μὲν φῶς, περὶ δ' ὀρφναία
Νὺξ αἰολόχρως, ἄκριτός τ' ἄστρων
Ὄχλος ἐνδελεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει.

[1] Apud Clement. Alexand. ubi supra, p. 717.

Thou self-sprung Being, that dost all enfold,
And in thine arms heaven's whirling fabric hold!
Who art encircled with resplendent light,
And yet li'st mantled o'er in shady night!
About whom, the exultant starry fires
Dance nimbly round in everlasting gyres.

For this sense of the third and fourth verses, which we think the words will bear, and which agrees with that Orphic passage,

———————*Περὶ γὰρ νέφος ἐστήρικται,*

That God being in himself a most bright and dazzling light, is respectively to us, and, by reason of the weakness of our understanding, covered over with a thick cloud; as also with that in the Scripture, "clouds and darkness are round about him:" I say, this sense we chose rather to follow, as more rich and august, than that other vulgar one, though grammatically and poetically good also: That successive day and night, together with a numberless multitude of stars, perpetually dance round about the Deity.

Aristophanes in the very beginning of his Plutus distinguisheth betwixt *Ζεὺς* and *θεοὶ*, Jupiter and the gods;

Ὡς ἀργαλέον πρᾶγμ' ἐστι ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ, etc.

And we have this clear testimony of Terpander, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus,[1] *Ζεῦ πάντων ἀρχά, Ζεῦ πάντων ἀγήτωρ*, Thou Jupiter, who art the original of all things; thou Jupiter, who art the governor of all.—And these following verses are attributed to Menander:[2]

Τὸν ὄντα πάντων κύριον γενικώτατον
Καὶ πατέρα, τοῦτον διατέλει τιμᾶν μόνον,
Ἀγαθῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴν καὶ κτίστορα.

Rerum universarum imperatorem et patrem,
Solum perpetuo colere suppliciter decet,
Artificem tantæ et largitorem copiæ.

Where men are exhorted to worship the supreme God only, as the sole author of all good, or at least transcendently above all the other gods. There are also two remarkable testimonies, one of Hermesianax, an

[1] Stromat. lib. vi. p. 784.

[2] Apud Euseb. Justinum Martyr. et Clement. Alexan. Which last ascribes them to Diphilus.

ancient Greek poet, and another of Aratus, to the same purpose; which shall both be reserved for other places.

Wherefore we pass from the Greek to the Latin poets, where Ennius first appears, deriving the gods in general (who were all the inferior deities) from Erebus and Night, as supposing them all to have been made or generated out of Chaos, nevertheless acknowledging one, who was

———Divumque hominumque pater, rex,

both Father and King of gods and men—that is, the maker or creator of the whole world, who therefore made those gods together with the world out of chaos, himself being unmade.

Plautus in like manner sometimes distinguisheth betwixt Jupiter and the gods, and plainly acknowledgeth one omniscient Deity,[1]

Est profecto Deus, qui quæ nos gerimus, auditque et videt.

Which passage very much resembles that of Manlius Torquatus in Livy, "Est cœleste numen, es magne Jupiter;" a strong asseveration of one supreme and universal Deity. And the same Plautus in his Rudens clearly asserts one supreme Monarch and Emperor over all, whom the inferior gods are subservient to;

Qui gentes omnes mariaque et terras movet,
Ejus sum civis civitate cœlitum;
Qui est imperator divum atque hominum Jupiter,
Is nos per gentes alium alia disparat,
Hominum qui facta, mores, pietatem et fidem
Noscamus.——
Qui falsas lites falsis testimoniis
Petunt, quique in jure abjurant pecuniam,
Eorum referimus nomina exscripta ad Jovem.
Cotidie Ille scit, quis hic quærat malum.
Iterum Ille eam rem judicatam judicat.
Bonos in aliis tabulis exscriptos habet.
Atque hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum
Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis;
Sed operam et sumptum perdunt, quia
Nihil Ei acceptum est a perjuris supplicii.

Where Jupiter, the supreme monarch of gods and men, is said to ap-

[1] Cap. Act. ii. Sc. 2.

point other inferior gods under him, over all the parts of the earth, to observe the actions, manners and behaviors of men every where; and to return the names both of bad and good to him. Which Jupiter judges over again all unjust judgments, rendering a righteous retribution to all. And though wicked men conceit, that he may be bribed with sacrifices, yet no worship is acceptable to him from the perjurious.—Notwithstanding which, this poet afterward jumbles the supreme and inferior gods all together, after the usual manner, under that one general name of gods, because they are all supposed to be co-governors of the world;

> Facilius siqui pius est, a Diis supplicans,
> Quam qui scelestus est, inveniet veniam sibi.

Again the same poet elsewhere brings in Hanno the Carthaginian with this form of prayer addressing himself to Jupiter or the supreme God;[1]

> Jupiter qui genus colis alisque hominum, per quem vivimus
> Vitale ævum; quem penes spes vitæque sunt hominum omnium,
> Da diem hunc sospitem, quæso, rebus meis agundis.

In the next place, we have these verses of Valerius Soranus, an ancient and eminent poet, full to the purpose recorded by Varro:[2]

> Jupiter omnipotens, regum rex ipse deumque,
> Progenitor genitrixque deum, Deus UNUS et OMNIS.

To this sense: Omnipotent Jupiter, the King of kings and gods, and the progenitor and genetrix, the both father and mother of those gods; one God and all gods.—Where the supreme and omnipotent Deity is styled "progenitor et genitrix deorum," after the same manner as he was called in the Orphic theology μητροπάτωρ and ἀῤῥενόθηλυς, that expression denoting the gods and all other things to have been produced from him alone, and without any pre-existent matter. Moreover, according to the tenor of this Ethnic theology, that one God was all gods and every god, the Pagans supposed, that whenever any inferior deity was worshipped by them, the supreme was therein also at once worshipped and honored.

Though the sense of Ovid hath been sufficiently declared before, yet we cannot well omit some other passages of his, as that grateful and sensible acknowledgment,

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[1] Pœn. Act. v. Sec. 4.

[2] De Lingua Latina, p. 71. edit. 1581, in 8vo.

Quod loquor et spiro, cœlumque et lumina solis
Aspicio (possumne ingratus et immemor esse ?)
Ipse dedit.[1]

And this in the third of his Metamorph.

Ille pater rectorque deum, cui dextra trisculcis
Ignibus armata est, qui nutu concutit orbem.

Virgil's theology also may sufficiently appear from his frequent acknowledgement of an omnipotent Deity, and from those verses of his before cited out of Æn. 6. wherein he plainly asserts one God to be the original of all things, at least as a soul of the world ; Servius Honoratus there paraphrasing thus : " Deus est quidam divinus spiritus, qui per quatuor fusus elementa gignit universa ;" God is a certain spirit, which infused through the four elements, begetteth all things.—Nevertheless, we shall add from him this also of Venus's prayer to Jupiter, Æn. 1.

———O qui res hominumque deumque
Æternis regis imperiis, et fulmine terres ?

Which Venus again, Æn. 10. bespeaks the same Jupiter after this manner :

O pater, O hominum divumque æterna potestas !

Where we have this annotation of Servius : " divumque æterna potestas, propter aliorum numinum discretionem ;" Jupiter is here called the eternal power of the gods, to distinguish him from all the other gods—that were not eternal, but made or generated from him.

Neither ought Horace to be left out, in whom we read to the same purpose, lib. i. od. xii.

Quid prius dicam solitis parentis
Laudibus ? qui res hominum et deorum,
Qui mare et terras, variisque mundum
Temperat horis.

Unde nil majus generatur ipso,
Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum :
Proximos ille tamen occupavit
Pallas honores.

[1] Metamorph. lib. xiv. ver. 172.

And again, lib. iii. od. iv.

Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat
Ventosum, et urbes, regnaque tristia;
Divosque, mortalesque turmas,
Imperio regit UNUS æquo.

Where from those words of Horace, "solitis parentis laudibus," it appears, that the one supreme Deity, the parent and maker of all things, was then wont to be celebrated by the Pagans as such above all the other gods. And whereas those Pagans vulgarly ascribed the government of the seas particularly to Neptune, of the earth and Hades or Inferi (which are here called tristia Regna) to Pluto, these being here attributed by Horace to one and the same supreme and universal Deity: it may well be concluded from thence, that Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, were but three several names or notions of one supreme Numen, whose sovereignty notwithstanding was chiefly signified by Jupiter. Which same is to be said of Pallas or Minerva too, that signifying the eternal Wisdom, that it was but another name of God also, though looked upon as inferior to that of Jupiter, and next in dignity to it; unless we should conclude it to be a second Divine hypostasis, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (probably not unknown to Horace) as also to that Scripture cabala, "I was set up from everlasting, or ever the earth was; when there were no depths, I was brought forth," etc. But of this more afterward.

Lastly, we shall conclude with Manilius, who lived in the same Augustean age, and was a zealous opposer of that Atheistical hypothesis of Epicurus and Lucretius, as appears from these verses of his;

[1] Quis credat tantas operum sine numine moles,
Ex minimis cæcoque creatum fœdere mundum?

Wherefore he also plainly asserts one supreme Deity, the framer and governor of the whole world, in this manner, lib. ii.

[2] Namque canam tacita naturam mente potentam
Infusumque Deum cœlo, terrisque, fretoque,
Ingentem æquali moderantem fœdere molem,
Totemque alterno consensu vivere mundum,
Et rationis agi motu; quum SPIRITUS UNUS

[1] Lib. i. ver. 492, 493. [2] Ver. 61, etc.

Per cunctas habitet partes, atque irriget orbem,
Omnia pervolitans, corpusque animale figuret, etc.

And again,

Hoc opus immensi constructum corpore mundi
Vis animæ divina regit, sacroque meatu
Conspirat Deus et tacita ratione gubernat.

And lib. iv.[1]

———Faciem cœli non invidet orbi
Ipse Deus, vultusque suos, corpusque recludit,
Semper volvendo, seque ipsum inculcat et offert;
Ut bene cognosci possit, monstretque videndo,
Qualis eat, doceatque suas attendere leges.
Ipse vocat nostros animos ad sydera mundus,
Nec patitur, quia non condit, sua jura latere.

Where notwithstanding we confess, that the whole animated world, or rather the Soul thereof, is, according to the Stoical doctrine, made by Manilius to be the supreme Numen.

XX. We now pass from the poets of the Pagans to their philosophers. A modern writer[2] concerning the religion of the Gentiles, affirmeth this to have been the opinion of very eminent philosophers, That even all the minor gods of the Pagans did exist of themselves from eternity unmade, they giving many reasons for the same. But how far from truth this is, will (as we conceive) appear sufficiently from the sequel of this discourse. And we cannot conclude otherwise, but that this learned writer did mistake that opinion of Aristotle and the latter Platonists, concerning the eternity of the world and gods, as if they had therefore asserted the self-existence of them; the contrary whereunto hath been already manifested. Wherefore we shall now make it unquestionably evident, by a particular enumeration, that the generality of the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, however they acknowledged a multiplicity of gods, yet asserted one only self-existent Deity, or a universal Numen, by whom the world and all those other gods were made. There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted (such as Plutarch and Atticus,) who, out of a certain softness and ten-

[1] Ver. 915.

[2] Sir Edward Herbert, De Religione Gentilium, cap. xiv. p. 228.

derness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputation of evils, would needs set up, besides him, an evil soul or demon also in the world self-existent, to bear all the blame of them.

And indeed Epicurus is the only person that we can find amongst the reputed philosophers, who though pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, self-existent deities; but such as had nothing at all to do, either with the making or governing of the world. The reason whereof was, because he would by no means admit the world to have been made by any mind or understanding. Wherefore he concluded,

[1] Naturam rerum haud divina mente coortam;

That there was no God the *δημιουργὸς*, or framer of the world.—But nevertheless, that he might decline the odium of being accounted an Atheist, he pretended to assert a multitude of gods unmade and incorruptible, such as were unconcerned in the fabric of the world. Wherein first it is evident, that he was not serious and sincere, because he really admitting no other principles of things in his philosophy, besides atoms and vacuum, agreeably thereunto could acknowledge no other gods than such as were compounded out of atoms, and therefore corruptible. And thus does Origen declare the doctrine of Epicurus, not indeed as he pretended to hold it, but as, according to the tenor of his principles, he must have held it, had he really asserted any gods at all, [2]*οἱ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου θεοὶ, σύνθετοι ἐξ ἀτόμων τυγχάνοντες, καὶ τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ συστάσει ἀναλυτοὶ, πραγματεύονται τὰς φθοροποιοὺς ἀτόμους ἀποσείεσθαι;* Epicurus's gods being compounded of atoms, and therefore by their very constitution corruptible, are in continual labor and toil, struggling with their corruptive principles.—Nevertheless if Epicurus had in good earnest asserted such a commonwealth of gods, as were neither made out of atoms, nor yet corruptible: so long as he denied the world to have been made by any mind or wisdom (as we have already declared) he ought not to be reckoned amongst the Theists, but Atheists.

Thales the Milesian was one of the most ancient Greek philosophers, and that he admitted a plurality of gods in some sense, is evident from that saying of his cited by Aristotle,[3] *πάντα θεῶν πλήρη*, all things are full of gods. But that notwithstanding he asserted one supreme

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[1] Lucret. lib. iii. [ver. 150.] [2] Lib. iv. contra Celsus, p. 169.

[3] De Anima, lib. i. cap. viii. p. 17. tom. ii. oper.

and only unmade or self-existent Deity, is also manifest from that other apothegm of his in Laertius,[1] *πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγέννητον γάρ·* God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade. From whence it may be concluded, that all Thales's other gods were generated, and the offspring of one sole unmade Deity.

Pherecydes Syrus was Thales's contemporary of whom Aristotle in his Metaphysics[2] hath recorded, that he affirmed *τὸ γεννήσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον,* that the first principle, from whence all other things were generated, was the best or an absolutely perfect being; so as that in the scale of nature, things did not ascend upwards from the most imperfect to the more perfect beings, but, on the contrary, descend downwards from the most perfect to the less perfect. Moreover, Laertius informs us,[3] that this was the beginning of one of Pherecydes's books, *Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἷς ἀεὶ, καὶ χθὼν ἦν·* Jupiter, and time, and the earth always were.—Where, notwithstanding, in the following words, he makes the earth to be dependent upon Jupiter; though some reading *κρόνος* here instead of *χρόνος,* seem to understand him thus, that Jupiter and Saturn, really one and the same Numen, was always from eternity. However, there is in these words an acknowledgement of one single and eternal Deity.

Pythagoras was the most eminent of all the ancient philosophers, who, that he was a Polytheist as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from the beginning of the Golden Verses (though not written by him,)

> *Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς νόμῳ, ὡς διάκεινται,*
> *Τίμα, καὶ σέβου ὅρκον· ἔπειθ᾽ ἥρωας ἀγαυούς·*
> *Τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥέζων.*

Wherein men are exhorted in the first to worship the immortal gods, and that accordingly as they were appointed by law; after them the heroes, and last of all the terrestrial demons. And accordingly Laertius[4] gives this account of Pythagoras's piety; *τιμὰς θεοῖς δεῖν νομίζειν καὶ ἥρωσιν, μὴ τὰς ἴσας.* That he conceived men ought to worship both the gods and the heroes, though not with equal honor.—And who these gods of Pythagoras were, the same writer also declareth,[5]

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[1] Lib. i. segm. xxxv. p. 21.

[2] Lib. xii. cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv. oper. [3] Lib. i. segm. cxix. p. 76.

[4] Lib. viii. segm. xxxiii. p. 514. Vide etiam segm. xxiii. p. 506.

[5] Segm. xxvii. p. 509.

ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας εἶναι θεούς· That they were in part, at least, the sun, and moon, and stars.

Notwithstanding which, that Pythagoras acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, which therefore was the original of all those other gods, may partly appear from that prayer in the Golden Verses, which, whether written by Philolaus or Lysis, or some other follower of Pythagoras, were undoubtedly ancient and agreeable to his doctrine.

[1] Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἢ πολλῶν τε κακῶν λύσειας ἅπαντας·
Εἰ πᾶσιν δείξαις οἵῳ τῷ δαίμονι χρῶνται·

Jupiter alme, malis jubeas vel solvier omnes:
Omnibus utantur vel quonam dæmone monstra.

Upon which Hierocles[2] thus writeth: τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις τῷ τοῦ Διὸς, καὶ Ζηνὸς, ὀνόματι σεμνύνειν· δι᾽ ὃν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζῆν, τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, τοῦτον δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὀνομάζεσθαι· It was the manner of the Pythagoreans to honor the Maker and Father of this whole universe with the name of Dis and Zen, it being just, that he, who giveth being and life to all, should be denominated from thence.—And again afterward: τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα σύμβολόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰκὼν ἐν φωνῇ δημιουργικῆς οὐσίας, τῷ τοὺς πρώτους θεμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα διὰ σοφίας ὑπερβολὴν, ὥσπέρ τινας ἀγαλματοποιοὺς ἀρίστους, διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὡς δι᾽ εἰκόνων, ἐμφανίσαι αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις· This very name Zeus is a convenient symbol or image of the demiurgical nature. And they, who first gave names to things, were by reason of a certain wonderful wisdom of theirs a kind of excellent statuaries; they by those several names, as images, lively representing the natures of things. Moreover, that this Pythagoric prayer was directed to the supreme Numen and King of gods, Jamblichus thus declares in his Protreptics,[3] ἐν δὴ τούτοις μία μὲν ἀρίστη παράκλησις εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡ μεμιγμένη ταῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀνακλήσεσι τῶν θεῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῶν Διός· Here is an excellent exhortation of these Golden Verses to the pursuit of Divine felicity, mingled together with prayers and the invocation of the gods, but especially of that Jupiter who is the king of them.—Moreover the same might further appear

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[1] Salmas. Præf. in Tab. Ceb. Arab.

[2] Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythag. p. 200. edit. Needhami.

[3] Cap. iii. p. 10. edit. Arcerii.

from those Pythagoric fragments,[1] that are still extant; as that of Ocellus Lucanus, and others, who were moralists, in which as gods are sometimes spoken of plurally, so also is God often singularly used for that supreme Deity, which containeth the whole.

But this will be most of all manifest from what hath been recorded concerning the Pythagoric philosophy, and its making a monad the first principle. It is true, indeed, that the writer De Placitis Philosophorum doth affirm Pythagoras to have asserted two substantial principles self-exisent, a monad and a dyad; by the former of which, as God is confessed to have been meant, so the latter of them is declared with some uncertainty, it being in one place interpreted to be a demon, or a principle of evil;[2] *Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεὸν, καὶ τἀγαθὸν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα δαίμονα, καὶ τὸ κακὸν*, etc. Pythagoras's first principle is God and Good, which is the nature of unity, and a perfect mind; but his other principle of duality is a demon or evil.—But in another place expounded to be matter: [3] *πάλιν τὴν μονάδα καὶ ἀόριστον δυάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς· σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδικὸν, (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς) ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος·)* Pythagoras's principles were a monad and infinite quality: the former of them an active principle, Mind or God; the latter passive and matter. And Plutarch in some other writings of his, declares that the first matter did not exist alone by itself dead and inanimate, but acted with an irrational soul; and that both these together made up the wicked demon of his. And, doubtless, this book De Placitis Philosophorum was either written by Plutarch himself, or else by some disciple and follower of his according to his principles. Wherefore this account which is therein given of the Pythagoric doctrine, was probably infected with that private conceit of Plutarch's, that God and a wicked demon, or else matter, together with an irrational soul, self-existent, were the first principles of the universe. Though we do acknowledge that others also, besides Plutarch, have supposed Pythagoras to have made two self-existent principles, God and matter, but not animate, nor informed, as Plutarch supposed, with any irrational or wicked soul.

Notwithstanding which, it may well be made a question, whether

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[1] These are published by Dr. Thomas Gale in his Opuscula Veter. Moral et Mytholog. Amsterd. 1638. in 8vo.

[2] De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.

[3] Lib. i. cap. iii. [p. 876. tom. ii. oper.]

Pythagoras by his dyad meant matter or no ; because Malchus or Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, thus interprets those two Pythagoric principles of unity and duality ;[1] *τὸ αἴτιον τῆς συμπνοίας καὶ τῆς συμπαθείας, καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν ὅλων τοῦ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος, ἓν προσηγόρευσαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἓν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἓν τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει, ἡνωμένου τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ συμπνοῦν, κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου· τὸν δὲ τῆς ἑτερότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος καὶ παντὸς τοῦ μεριστοῦ καὶ ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντος δυοειδῆ λόγον καὶ δυάδα προσηγόρευσον·* The cause of that sympathy, harmony, and agreement, which is in things, and of the conservation of the whole, which is always the same and like itself, was by Pythagoras called unity or a monad (that unity, which is in the things themselves, being but a participation of the first cause) : but the reason of alterity, inequality and unconstant irregularity in things, was by him called a dyad.—Thus, according to Porphyrius, by the Pythagoric dyad is not so much meant matter, as the infinite and indeterminate nature, and the passive capability of things. So that the monad and dyad of Pythagoras seem to have been the same with Plato's *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*, his finite and infinite in his Philebus ; the former of which two only is substantial, that first most simple being, the cause of all unity, and the measure of all things.

However, if Pythagoras's dyad be to be understood of a substantial matter, it will not therefore follow, that he supposed matter to be self-existent and independent upon the Deity, since, according to the best and most ancient writers, his dyad was no primary but a secondary thing only, and derived from his Monad, the sole original of all things. Thus Diogenes Laertius tells us,[2] that Alexander, who wrote the successions of philosophers, affirmed he had found in the Pythagoric Commentaries, *ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν ἁπάντων, μονάδα· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος, ἀόριστον δυάδα, ὡς ἂν ὕλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποστῆναι·* that a Monad was the principle of all things, but that from this Monad was derived infinite duality, as matter for the Monad to work upon, as the active cause.—With which agreeth Hermias,[3] affirming this to be one of the greatest of all the Pythagoric mysteries, that a Monad was the sole principle of all things. Accordingly whereunto, Clemens Alexandrinus cites this passage[4] out of Thearidas, an ancient Pythagorean, in his book concerning nature, *Ἁ ἀρχὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἀρχὰ μὲν ὄντως ἀληθινὰ, μία· Κείνα γὰρ ἐν*

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[1] Pl. 203. [2] Lib. viii. segm. xxv, p. 507.

[3] Irrisione Philos. Gentilis, sec. xvi. p. 225.

[4] Dr. Cudworth does not cite this passage as it is in Clemens Alexandr. but as it is given by Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. lib. v. cap. xxiv.

ἀρχᾷ τέ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ μόνον,[1] the true principle of all things was only one; for this was in the beginning one alone.—Which words also seem to imply the world to have had a novity of existence or beginning of duration. And, indeed, however Ocellus Lucanus writes, yet that Pythagoras himself did not hold the eternity of the world, may be concluded from what Porphyrius[2] records of him, where he gives an account of that his superstitious abstinence from beans; ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς καὶ γενέσεως ταραττομένης, καὶ πολλῶν ἅμα συνηνεγμένων καὶ συσπειρομένων καὶ συσσηπομένων ἐν τῇ γῇ, κατ᾽ ὀλίγον γένεσις καὶ διάκρισις συνέστη, ζώων τε ὁμοῦ γενομένων, καὶ φυτῶν ἀναδιδομένων, τότε δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς σηπεδόνος, ἀνθρώπους συστῆναι καὶ κυάμους βλαστῆναι· That at the beginning things being confounded and mingled together, the generation and secretion of them afterward proceeded by degrees, animals and plants appearing; at which time, also, from the same putrefied matter, sprung up both men and beans.—

Pythagoras is generally reported to have held a trinity of Divine hypostases: and, therefore, when St. Cyril[3] affirmeth Pythagoras to have called God ψύχωσιν τῶν ὅλων κύκλων, καὶ πάντων κίνησιν, the animation of the whole heavens, and the motion of all things—adding, that God was not, as some supposed, ἐκτὸς τῆς διακοσμήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ, without the fabric of the world, but whole in the whole—this seems properly to be understood of that third Divine hypostasis of the Pythagoric trinity, namely, the eternal Psyche. Again, when God is called in Plutarch,[4] according to Pythagoras, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς, mind itself—this seems to be meant properly of his second hypostasis; the supreme Deity, according to him, being something above mind or intellect. In like manner, when in Cicero,[5] Pythagoras's opinion concerning the Deity is thus represented: "Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum et commeantem, ex quo animi nostri carperentur;" that God was a mind passing through the whole nature of things, from whom our souls were, as it were, decerped or cut out—and again, "ex universa mente divina delibato esse animos nostros;" this in all probability was to be understood also either of the third or second Divine hypostasis, and not of the first, which was properly called by him τὸ ἓν and μόνας, a unity and monad;[6] and also, as Plu-

[1] Strom. v. p. 611. [p. 728. edit. Potteri.]

[2] In vita Pythag. p. 43. edit. Kusteri.

[3] Contra Julian. lib. i. p. 30.

[4] De Placit. Philosoph. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.

[5] De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xi. p. 2895. tom. ix. oper.

[6] Met. l. i. c. vi. [p. 262. tom. iv. oper.]

tarch[1] tells us, τὸ ἀγαθὸν, goodness itself.—Aristotle plainly affirmeth, that some of the ancient theologers amongst the Pagans made ἔρωτα, or Love, to be the first principle of all things, that is, the supreme Deity; and we have already showed, that Orpheus was one of these. For when ἔρως πολυτερπὴς and πολύμητις, delightful Love, and that, which is not blind, but full of wisdom and counsel—is made by him to be αὐτοτελὲς and πρεσβύτατον, self-perfect and the oldest of all things—it is plain, that he supposed it to be nothing less than the supreme Deity. Wherefore, since Pythagoras is generally affirmed to have followed the Orphic principles, we may from hence presume, that he did it in this also. Though it be very true, that Plato, who called the supreme Deity τἀγαθὸν, as well as Pythagoras, did dissent from the Orphic theology in this, and would not acknowledge Love for a name of the supreme Deity; as when in his Symposion in the person of Agatho he speaks thus: Φαίδρῳ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν, τοῦτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερος ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ φημὶ νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ νέον· Though I should readily grant to Phædrus many other things, yet I cannot consent to him in this, that Love was older than Saturn and Iapet; but, on the contrary, I do affirm him to be the youngest of the gods, as he is always youthful. They, who made Love older than Saturn as well as Iapet, supposed it to be the supreme Deity: wherefore Plato here, on the contrary, affirms Love not to be the supreme Deity or Creator of all, but a creature; a certain junior god; or, indeed, as he afterward adds, not so much a god as a demon, it being a thing which plainly implies imperfection in it. "Love (saith he) is a philosopher, whereas θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι ἔστι γάρ, no god philosophizeth, nor desires to be made wise, because he is so already."—Agreeably with which doctrine of his, Plotinus[2] determines, that Love is peculiar to that middle rank of beings called souls; πᾶσα ψυχὴ, ἀφροδίτη· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεται καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀφροδίτης γενέθλια, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος· ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ, ἐνωθῆναι θέλουσα, ὥσπερ παρθένος καλὴ πρὸς καλὸν ἄνδρα. ὅταν δὲ εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθοῦσα, οἷον μνηστείαις ἀπατηθῇ, ἄλλον ἀρξαμένη θνητὸν ἔρωτα, ἐρημίᾳ πατρὸς ὑβρίζεται, etc. Every soul is a Venus, which is also intimated by Venus's nativity, and Love's being begotten with her: wherefore the soul being in its right natural state loves God, desiring to be united with him, which is a pure, heavenly and virgin love; but when it descends to generation, being courted with these amorous

[1] De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.

[2] Libro de Bono vel Uno, Ennead. vi. lib. ix. cap. xii. p. 768.

allurements here below, and deceived by them, it changeth that its Divine and heavenly love for another mortal one : but if it again shake off these lascivious and wanton loves, and keep itself chaste from them, returning back to its own father and original, it will be rightly affected as it ought.—But the reason of this difference betwixt the Orpheists and Plato, that the former made Love to be the oldest of all the gods, but the latter to be a junior god or demon, proceeded only from an equivocation in the word love. For Plato's Love was the daughter of Penia, that is, poverty and indigency, together with a mixture of *Πόρος*, or riches ; and being so as it were compounded of plenty and poverty, was in plain language no other than the love of desire, which, as Aristotle affirmeth, is *μετὰ λύπης*, accompanied with grief and pain. But that Orphic and Pythagoric love was nothing else but *πόρος* and *εὐπορία*, infinite riches and plenty, a love of redundancy and overflowing fulness, delighting to communicate itself, which was therefore said to be the oldest of all things and the most perfect, that is, the supreme Deity ; according to which notion also, in the Scripture itself, God seems to be called love, though the word be not there *ἔρως*, but *ἀγάπη*. But, to say the truth, Parmenides's love (however made a principle somewhere by Aristotle[1]) seems to be neither exactly the same with the Orphic, nor yet with the Platonic love, it being not the supreme Deity, and yet the first of the created gods ; which appears from Simplicius's[2] connecting these two verses of his together in this manner :

Ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων ὅς πάντα κυβερνᾷ,

ταύτην καὶ θεῶν αἰτίαν εἶναί φησι, λέγων,

Πρώτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσσατο πάντων·

In the midst of these elements is that God, which governeth all things, and whom Parmenides, affirmeth to be the cause of gods, writing thus : God first of all created Love, before the other gods.—Wherefore by this Love of Parmenides is understood nothing else, but the lower soul of the world, together with a plastic nature, which though it be the original of motion and activity in this corporeal world, yet is it but a secondary or created god ; before whose production, necessity is said by those Ethnic theologers to have reigned : the true meaning whereof seems to be this, that before that Divine Spirit moved upon the waters,

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[1] Physicor. lib. i. cap. ii. iii. p. 446. tom. i. oper. Adde Metaph. lib. i. cap. v. p. 269.

[2] Commentar. in Aristot. Phys. p 152. edit. Græc. Aldin.

and brought things into an orderly system, there was nothing but the necessity of material motions, unguided by any orderly wisdom or method for good (that is, by Love) in that confused and floating chaos.

But Pythagoras, it seemeth, did not only call the supreme Deity a monad, but also a tetrad or tetractys; for, it is generally affirmed, that Pythagoras himself was wont to swear hereby: though Porphyrius and Jamblichus and others write, that the disciples of Pythagoras swore by Pythagoras, who had delivered to them the doctrine or cabala of this Tetractys. Which Tetractys also in the Golden Verses is called *πηγὴ ἀεννάου φύσέως*, the fountain of the eternal nature, an expression, that cannot properly belong to any thing but the supreme Deity. And thus Hierocles,[1] *οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς τετρακτύος, ὡς ῥίζης, καὶ ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται· ἔστι γὰρ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων, καὶ αἰτία ἡ Τέτρας, Θεὸς νοητὸς, αἴτιος τοῦ οὐρανίου, καὶ αἰσθητοῦ Θεοῦ.* There is nothing in the whole world, which doth not depend upon the Tetractys, as its root and principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already said, the Maker of all things; the intelligible God, the cause of the heavenly and sensible god, that is, of the animated world or heaven.—Now the latter Pythagoreans and Platonists endeavor to give reasons, why God should be called Tetras or Tetractys, from certain mysteries in that number four, as for example; first, because the tetrad is *δύναμις δεκάδος*, the power of the decad—it virtually containing the whole decad in it, which is all numbers or beings; but the bottom of this mystery is no more than this, that one, two, three, four, added all together, make up ten. Again, because the tetrad is an arithmetical mediety betwixt the monad and the hebdomad; which monad and hebdomad are said to agree in this, that as the monad is ingenit or unmade, it being the original and fountain of all numbers, so is the hebdomad said to be, not only *παρθένος*, but *ἀμήτωρ*, a motherless, as well as virgin number.—Wherefore the tetrad lying in the middle betwixt the ingenit monad, and the motherless virgin hebdomad; and it being both begotten and begetting, say they, must needs be a very mysterious number, and fitly represent the Deity. Whereas, indeed, it was therefore unfit to represent the Deity, because it is begotten by the multiplication of another number; as the hebdomad therefore doth not very fitly symbolize with it neither, because it is barren or begets nothing at all within the decad, for which cause it is called a virgin. Again, it is further added, that the tetrad fitly resembles that, which is solid, because, as a point answers to a monad, and a line to a dyad, and a superficies to a triad, (the first and most simple figure being a triangle;) so the tetrad properly represents

[1] Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythag. p. 170, 171.

the solid, the first pyramid being found in it. But, upon this consideration, the tetrad could not be so fit a symbol of the incorporeal Deity, neither as of the corporeal world. Wherefore these things being all so trifling, slight and fantastical, and it being really absurd for Pythagoras to call his Monad a Tetrad; the late conjecture of some learned men amongst us[1] seems to be much more probable, that Pythagoras's Tetractys was really nothing else but the Tetragrammaton, or that proper name of the supreme God amongst the Hebrews, consisting of four letters or consonants. Neither ought it to be wondered at, that Pythagoras (who besides his travelling into Egypt, Persia, and Chaldea, and his sojourning at Sidon, is affirmed by Josephus, Porphyrius and others, to have conversed with the Hebrews also) should be so well acquainted with the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, since it was not unknown to the Heturians and Latins, their Jove being certainly nothing else. And indeed, it is the opinion of some philologers, that even in the Golden Verses themselves, notwithstanding the seeming repugnancy of the syntax, it is not Pythagoras, that is sworn by, but this Tetractys or Tetragrammaton; that is, Jova or Jehovah, the name of God, being put for God himself, according to that received doctrine of the Hebrews הוא שמו ושמו הוא that God and his name were all one—as if the meaning of those words,

Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα Τετρακτὺν
Παγὰν ἀεννάου φύσεως.———

were this: By the Tetragrammaton or Jovah, who hath communicated [himself or] the fountain of the eternal nature to our human souls; for these, according to the Pythagoric doctrine, were said to be[1] *ex mente divina carptæ et delibatæ*, i. e. nothing but derivative streams from that first fountain of the Divine mind.

Wherefore we shall now sum up all concerning Pythagoras in this conclusion of St. Cyril's:[3] *ἰδοὺ δὴ σαφῶς, ἕνα τε εἶναι λέγει τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεὸν, καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν ἐργάτην τε τῶν αὐτοῦ δυνάμεων, φωστῆρα καὶ ψύχωσιν, ἤτοι ζωοποίησιν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κύκλων πάντων κίνησιν· παρῆκται δὲ τὰ πάντα παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κίνησιν λαχόντα φαίνεται·* Behold we see clearly, that Pythagoras held there was one

[1] Selden de Diis Syris Syntagm. ii. cap. i. p. 209, 210. et Theophilus Gale in his Court of the Gentiles, part ii. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 147. edit. Oxon. 1672. in quarto.

[2] Cicer. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xi. p. 2895. oper.

[3] Con. Jul. l. i. [p. 30.]

God of the whole universe, the principle and cause of all things, the illuminator, animator, and quickener of the whole, and original of motion; from whom all things were derived, and brought out of non-entity into being.

Next to Pythagoras, in order of time, was Xenophanes the Colophonian, the head of the Eleatic sect of philosophers, who, that he was an assertor both of many gods and one God, sufficiently appears from that verse of his before cited, and attested both by Clemens Alexandrinus,[1] and Sextus the philosopher:

Εἷς Θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος·

Thereisone God, the greatest both amongst gods and men.—Concerning which greatest God, this other verse of Xenophanes is also vouched;

Καὶ ἀπάνευθε πονοῖο νόου, φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει·

That he moveth the whole world without any labor or toil, merely by mind.—Besides which, Cicero[2] and others tell us, that this Xenophanes philosophizing concerning the supreme Deity, was wont to call it *ἓν καὶ πᾶν*, one and all—as being one most simple being, that virtually containeth all things. But Xenophanes's Theosophy, or Divine philosophy, is most fully declared by Simplicius out of Theophrastus in this manner:[3] *Μίαν δε τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἤτοι· ἓν τὸ ὂν καὶ πᾶν, καὶ οὔτε πεπερασμένον οὔτε ἄπειρον, οὔτε κινούμενον οὔτε ἠρεμοῦν, Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον τον Παρμενίδου διδάσκαλον ὑποτίθεσθαί φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος. ὁμολογῶν ἑτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας, τὴν μνήμην τῆς τούτου δόξης. τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ πᾶν τὸν Θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξενοφάνης· ὂν ἕνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι· πλειόνων γάρ φησιν ὄντων, ὁμοίως ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον· Θεός· ἀγένητον δὲ ἐδείκνυεν———καὶ οὔτε δὴ ἄπειρον οὔτε πεπερασμένον εἶναι· διότι ἄπειρον μὲν τὸ μὴ ὂν, ὡς οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μήτε μέσον μήτε τέλος. περαίνειν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πλείω· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἠρεμίαν· ἀκίνητον μὲν*, etc. Theophrastus affirmeth, that Xenophanes the Colophonian, Parmenides's master, made one principle of all things, he calling it one and all, and determining it to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense) and neither moving nor resting. Which Theophrastus also declares, that Xenophanes in this did not

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1 Stromat. lib. v. p. 714.

2 In Acad. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xxxvii. p. 2315. tom. viii. oper.

3 In Aristot. Phys. p. 5, 6.

write as a natural philosopher or physiologer, but as a metaphysician or theologer only; Xenophanes's one and all being nothing else but God. Whom he proved to be one solitary being from hence, because God is the best and most powerful of all things; and there being many degrees of entity, there must needs be something supreme to rule over all. Which best and most powerful Being can be but one. He also did demonstrate it to be unmade, as likewise to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense;) as he removed both motion and rest from God. Wherefore, when he saith, that God always remaineth or resteth the same, he understands not this of that rest which is opposite to motion, and which belongs to such things as may be moved; but of a certain other rest, which is both above that motion and its contrary.—From whence it is evident, that Xenophanes supposed (as Sextus the philosopher also affirmeth) God to be incorporeal, a being unlike to all other things, and therefore of which no image could be made. And now we understand, that Aristotle[1] dealt not ingenuously with Xenophanes, when from that expression of his, that God was σφαιροειδὴς, or sphery-form—he would infer that Xenophanes made God to be a body, and nothing else but the round corporeal world animated; which yet was repugnant also to another physical hypothesis of this same Xenophanes, ἀπείρους ἡλίους εἶναι καὶ σελήνας, that there were infinite suns and moons; —by which moons he understood planets, affirming them to be all habitable earths, as Cicero tells us.[2] Wherefore, as Simplicius resolves, God was said to be σφαιροειδὴς, or sphery-form—by Xenophanes only in this sense, as being πανταχόθεν ὅμοιος, every way like and uniform.—However, it is plain, that Xenophanes asserting one God, who was all, or the universe, could not acknowledge a multitude of partial, self-existent deities.

Heraclitus was no clear, but a confounded philosopher (he being neither a good naturalist nor metaphysician) and therefore it is very hard, or rather impossible, to reconcile his several opinions with one another. Which is a thing the less to be wondered at, because, amongst the rest of his opinions, this also is said to have been one, that contradictories may be true: and his writings were accordingly, as Plato intimates, stuffed with unintelligible, mysterious nonsense.[3] For, first, he is affirmed to have acknowledged no other substance besides body, and to have maintained,[4] that all things did flow, and nothing

[1] Vid. libr. de Xenophane, Zenno et Gorgia, cap. iv. p. 843, 844.

[2] Vid. Acad. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xxxix. p. 2319. tom. viii. oper.

[3] Vide sext. Empiric. Hypotypos. lib. i. cap. xxix. p. 53.

[4] Vide Platon. in Convivio, p. 321.

stand or remain the same; and yet in his epistles (according to the common opinion of philosophers at that time) doth he suppose the pre- and post-existence of human souls in these words;[1] *τάχα καὶ ψυχὴ μαντεύεται ἀπόλυσιν ἑαυτῆς ἤδη ποτὲ ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου τούτου· και σειομένου τοῦ σώματος ἐκκύπτουσα, ἀναμιμνήσκεται τὰ πάτρια χωρία, ἔνθεν κατελθοῦσα περιεβάλλετο ῥέον σῶμα τεθνειὸς τοῦτο, ὃ δοκεῖ*, etc. My soul seemeth to vaticinate and presage its approaching dismission and freedom from this its prison; and looking out, as it were, through the cracks and crannies of this body, to remember those its native regions or countries, from whence descending it was clothed with this flowing mortal body; which is made up and constipated of phlegm, choler, serum, blood, nerves, bones and flesh.—And, not only so, but he also there acknowledgeth the soul's immortality, which Stoics, allowing its permanency after death, for some time at least, and to the next conflagration, did deny; *δύσεται τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὸ εἱμαρμένον, ἀλλὰ οὐ ψυχὴ δύσεται· ἀλλὰ ἀθάνατον οὖσα χρῆμα, εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσεται μετάρσιος· δέξονται δέ με αἰθέριοι δόμοι, καὶ πολιτεύσομαι οὐκ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλ' ἐν θεοῖς.* This body shall be fatally changed to something else; but my soul shall not die or perish, but, being an immortal thing, shall fly away mounting upwards to heaven; those etherial houses shall receive me, and I shall no longer converse with men, but gods.—Again, though Heraclitus asserted the fatal necessity of all things, yet notwithstanding was he a strict moralist, and upon this account highly esteemed by the Stoics, who followed him in this and other things; and he makes no small pretence to it himself in his epistle to Hermodorus,[2] *καὶ ἔμοιγε πολλοὶ καὶ δυσχερέστατοι ἆθλοι κατώρθωνται· νενίκηκα ἡδονὰς, νενίκηκα χρήματα, νενίκηκα φιλοτιμίαν, κατεπάλαισα δειλίαν, κατεπάλαισα κολακείαν· οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι μέθη· φοβεῖταί με λύπη, φοβεῖταί με ὀργή· κατὰ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστεφάνωμαι, ἐμαυτῷ ἐπιτάττων, οὐχ ὑπὸ Εὐρυσθέως·* I have also had my difficult labors and conflicts as well as Hercules; I have conquered ambition; I have subdued cowardice and flattery; neither fear nor intemperance can control me; grief and anger are afraid of me, and fly away from me. These are the victories, for which I am crowned, not by Eurystheus, but as being made master of myself.—Lastly, though Heraclitus made fire to be the first principle of all things, and had some odd passages imputed to him, yet notwithstanding was he a devout religionist, he supposing, that fiery matter of the whole universe *animan-*

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[1] Vide Epistol. Græcas ab Eihardo Lubino editas. Heidelberg. 1601. in octavo. p. 54, 55.

[2] Apud Lubinum, ubi supra, p. 50.

tem esse et Deum, to be an animal and God.—And as he acknowledged many gods, according to that which Asistotle[1] recordeth of him, that when some passing by had espied him sitting in a smoky cottage, he bespake them after this manner, *Introite, nam et hic dii sunt*, Come in, I pray, for here there are gods also;—he supposing all places to be full of gods, demons and souls: so was he an undoubted assertor of one supreme Numen, that governs all things, and that such as could neither be represented by images, nor confined to temples. For after he had been accused of impiety by Euthycles, he writes to Hermodorus in this manner:[2] *ἀλλ', ὦ ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι, διδάξατε πρῶτον ἡμᾶς τί ἐστιν ὁ θεός; ποῦ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; ἐν τοῖς ναοῖς ἀποκεκλεισμένος; εὐσεβεῖς γε, οἳ ἐν σκότει τὸν θεὸν ἱδρύετε———ἄπαίδευτοι, οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι θεὸς χειρόκμητος· οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάσιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἔχει ἕνα περίβολον· ἀλλ' ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ναός ἐστι, ζώοις καὶ πυτοῖς καὶ ἄστροις πεποικιλμένος·* But O you unwise and unlearned! teach us first what God is, that so you may be believed in accusing me of impiety: tell us where God is. Is he shut up within the walls of temples? is this your piety to place God in the dark, or to make him a stony God? O you unskilful! know ye not, that God is not made with hands, and hath no basis or fulcrum to stand upon, nor can be inclosed within the walls of any temple; the whole world, variegated with plants, animals and stars being his temple?—And again, *ἆρ' οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβής, Εὐθύκλεις, ὅς μόνος οἶδα θεόν; ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἱδρυθῇ θεοῦ βωμός, οὐκ ἔστι θεός; ἐὰν δὲ ἱδρυθῇ μὴ θεοῦ, θεός ἐστιν; ὥστε λίθοι θεῶν, μάρτυρες· ἔργα δεῖ μαρτυρεῖν, οἷα ἡλίου· νὺξ αυτῷ καὶ ἡμέρα μαρτυροῦσιν· ὧραι αὐτῶ μάρτυρες, γῆ ὅλη καρποφοροῦσα, μάρτυς· σελήνης ὁ κύκλος, ἐκείνου ἔργον, οὐράνιος μαρτυρία.* Am I impious, O Euthycles, who alone know what God is? is there no God without altars? or are stones the only witnesses of him? No, his own works give testimony to him, and principally the sun; night and day bear witness of him; the earth bringing forth fruits, declares him; the circle of the moon, that was made by him, is a heavenly testimony of him.

In the next place, Anaxagoras, the Clazomenian philosopher, comes to be considered, whose predecessors of the Ionic order (after Thales) as Anaximander, Anaximenes and Hippo, were (as hath been already observed) Materialists and Atheists; they acknowledging no other substance besides body, and resolving all things into the motions, passions, and affections of it. Whence was that cautious advice given

[1] De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. v. p. 481. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Apud Lubin. ubi supra, p. 50.

by Jamblichus,[1] *προτίμα τὴν Ἰταλικὴν φιλοσοφίαν τὴν τὰ ἀσώματα καθ' αὑτὰ θεωροῦσαν, τῆς Ἰονικῆς τῆς τὰ σώματα προηγουμένως ἐπισκοπουμένης·* Prefer the Italic philosophy, which contemplates incorporeal substances by themselves, before the Ionic, which principally considers bodies.—And Anaxagoras was the first of these Ionics, who went out of that road; for seeing a necessity of some other cause, besides the material (matter being not able so much as to move itself, and much less if it could, by fortuitous motion, to bring itself into an orderly system and compages;) he therefore introduced mind into the Cosmopœia, as the principal cause of the universe; which mind is the same with God. Thus Themistius,[2] speaking of Anaxagoras, *νοῦν καὶ θεὸν πρῶτος ἐπαγαγόμενος τῇ κοσμοποιΐα, καὶ οὐ πάντα ἀναψας τῆς φύσεως τῶν σωμάτων·* He was the first (that is, amongst the Ionic philosophers) who brought in mind and God to the Cosmopœia, and did not derive all things from senseless bodies. And to the same purpose Plutarch, in the life of Pericles,[3] *τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος οὐ τύχην οὐδ' ἀνάγκην, διακοσμήσεως ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστησε καθαρὸν καὶ ἄκρατον·* The other Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras made fortune and blind necessity, that is, the fortuitous and necessary motions of the matter, to be the only Original of the world; but Anaxagoras was the first, who affirmed a pure and sincere mind to preside over all. Anaxagoras therefore supposed two substantial self-existent principles of the universe, one an infinite Mind or God, the other an infinite Homoiomery of matter, or infinite atoms; not unqualified, such as those of Empedocles and Democritus, which was the most ancient and genuine atomology; but similar, such as were severally endued with all manner of qualities and forms, which physiology of his therefore was a spurious kind of Atomism. Anaxagoras indeed did not suppose God to have created matter out of nothing, but that he was *κινήσεως ἀρχὴ*, the principle of its motion, and also *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτία*, the regulator of this motion for good—and consequently the cause of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony of the world: for which reason this Divine principle was called also by him, not only mind, but good; it being that, which acts for the sake of good. Wherefore according to Anaxagoras, first, the world was not eternal, but had a beginning in time; and before the world was made, there was from eternity an infinite congeries of similar and qualified atoms, self-existent, without either order or motion: secondly, the world was not afterward

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[1] Symb. xxxvi. p. 159. [potius in Orat. protrept. ad philosph. p. 159. edit. Arcerii.]

[2] Orat. xv. [p. 317. edit. Harduini.] [3] Page 154. tom. i. oper.

made by chance, but by Mind or God, first moving the matter, and then directing the motion of it so as to bring it into this orderly system and compages. So that *νοῦς* was *κοσμοποιὸς*, Mind, the first maker of the world, and *νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς*, Mind, that which still governs the same, the king and sovereign monarch of heaven and earth. Thirdly, Anaxagoras's Mind and God was purely incorporeal: to which purpose his words recorded by Simplicius[1] are very remarkable; *Νοῦς μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι· ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τέῳ ἐμέμικτο ἄλλῳ, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἁπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμικτο τέῳ· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν· ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐμοὶ λέλεκται· καὶ ἀνεκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεγιγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ· ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων, καὶ καθαρώτατον· καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει· καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον·* Mind is mingled with nothing, but is alone by itself and separate; for if it were not by itself secrete from matter, but mingled therewith, it would then partake of all things, because there is something of all in every thing; which things mingled together with it would hinder it, so that it could not master or conquer any thing, as if alone by itself: for mind is the most subtile of all things, and the most pure, and has the knowledge of all things, together with an absolute power over all.—Lastly, Anaxagoras did not suppose a multitude of unmade minds, co-existent from eternity, as so many partial causes and governors of the world, but only one infinite Mind or God, ruling over all.

Indeed, it may well be made a question, whether or no, besides this supreme and universal Deity, Anaxagoras did acknowledge any of those other inferior gods, then worshipped by the Pagans? because it is certain, that though he asserted Infinite mind to be the maker and governor of the whole world, yet he was accused by the Athenians for Atheism, and besides a mulct imposed upon him, banished for the same; the true ground whereof was no other than this, because he affirmed the sun to be nothing but a mass of fire, and the moon and earth, having mountains and valleys, cities and houses in it; and probably concluded the same of all the other stars and planets, that they were either fires, as the sun, or habitable earths as the moon; wherein, supposing them not to be animated, he did consequently deny them to be gods. Which his ungodding of the sun, moon and stars, was then looked upon by the vulgar as nothing less than absolute Atheism; they being very prone to think, that if there were not many understanding beings

[1] In Arist. Phys. lib. i. fol. 33. cap. ii.

superior to men, and if the sun, moon, and stars were not such, and therefore in their language gods, there was no God at all. Neither was it the vulgar only, who condemned Anaxagoras for this, but even those two grave philosophers, Socrates and Plato, did the like; the first[1] in his apology made to the Athenians, where he calls this opinion of Anaxagoras absurd; the second in his book of Laws, where he complains of this doctrine as a great inlet into Atheism, in this manner: [2] *ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ ὅταν τεκμήρια λέγωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, ταῦτα αὐτὰ προσφέροντες, ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆν, ὡς θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἂν λέγοιεν, ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτά, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα·* When you and I, endeavoring by arguments to prove, that there are gods, speak of the sun and moon, stars and earth, as gods and Divine things, our young men presently, being principled by these new philosophers, will reply; That these are nothing but earth and stones (senseless and inanimate bodies) which therefore cannot mind nor take notice of any human affairs.—Where we may observe these two things; first, that nothing was accounted truly and properly a god amongst the Pagans, but only what was endued with life and understanding. Secondly, that the taking away of those inferior gods of the Pagans, the sun, moon, and stars, by denying them to be animated, or to have life and understanding in them, was, according to Plato's judgment, then the most ready and effectual way to introduce absolute Atheism.

Moreover, it is true, that though this Anaxagoras were a professed Theist, he asserting an infinite self-existent Mind to be the maker of the whole world, yet he was severely taxed also by Aristotle and Plato, as one not thorough-paced in Theism, and who did not so fully, as he ought, adhere to his own principles. For whereas, to assert mind to be the maker of the world, is really all one as to assert final causality for things in nature, as also that they were made after the best manner; Anaxagoras, when he was to give his particular account of the phenomena, did commonly betake himself to material causes only, and hardly ever make use of the mental or final cause, but when he was to seek and at a loss; then only bringing in God upon the stage. Socrates's discourse concerning this in Plato's Phædo[3] is very well worth our taking notice of: "Hearing one sometime read (saith he) out of a book of Anaxagoras, *ὡς νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος*, that Mind was the order and cause of all things, I was exceedingly pleased

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[1] Or rather Plato, p. 362. [2] De Leg. lib. x. p. 886.

[3] Page 97. Steph.

herewith, concluding that it must needs follow from thence, that all things were ordered and disposed of as they should, and after the best manner possible: and therefore the causes even of the things in nature (or at least the grand strokes of them) ought to be fetched from the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, that which is absolutely the best. But when afterward I took Anaxagoras's book into my hand, greedily reading it over, I was exceedingly disappointed of my expectation, finding therein no other causes assigned, but only from airs, and ethers, and waters, and such like physical and material things. And he seemed to me to deal, just as if one having affirmed, that Socrates did all by mind, reason and understanding, afterward undertaking to declare the causes of all my actions, as particularly of my sitting here at this time, should render it after this manner; because, forsooth, my body is compounded of bones and nerves, which bones, being solid, have joints in them at certain distances, and nerves of such a nature, as that they are capable of being both intended and remitted: wherefore my bones being lifted up in the joints, and my nerves some of them intended and some remitted, was the cause of the bending of my body, and of my sitting down in this place. He in the meantime neglecting the true and proper cause hereof, which was no other than this; because it seemed good to the Athenians to condemn me to die, as also to myself most just, rather to submit to their censure, and undergo their punishment, than by flight to escape it; for certainly otherwise these nerves and bones of mine would not have been here now in this posture, but amongst the Megarensians and Bœotians, carried thither *ὑπὸ δόξης τοῦ βελτίστου*, by the opinion of the best; had I not thought it better to submit to the sentence of the city, than to escape the same by flight. Which kind of philosophers (saith he) do not seem to me, to distinguish betwixt the true and proper cause of things, and the cause *sine qua non*, that without which they could not have been effected. And such are they, who devise many odd physical reasons for the firm settlement of the earth, without any regard to that Power which orders all things for the best, (as having *δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν*, a Divine force in it); but thinking to find out an Atlas far more strong and immortal, and which can better hold all things together: *τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δέον, οὐδὲν ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν·* Good and fit, being not able, in their opinions, to hold, or bind any thing."

From which passage of Plato's we may conclude, that though Anaxagoras was so far convinced of Theism, as in profession to make one infinite Mind the cause of all things, matter only excepted; yet he had notwithstanding too great a tang of that old material and atheistical philosophy of his predecessors, still hanging about him, who resolved

all the phenomena of nature into physical, and nothing into mental or final causes. And we have the rather told this long story of him, because it is so exact a parallel with the philosophic humor of some in this present age, who pretending to assert a God, do notwithstanding discard all mental and final causality from having any thing to do with the fabric of the world ; and resolve all into material necessity and mechanism, into vortices, globuli and striate particles, and the like. Of which Christian philosophers we must needs pronounce, that they are not near so good Theists as Anaxagoras himself was, though so much condemned by Plato and Aristotle ; forasmuch as he did not only assert God to be the cause of motion, but also the governor, regulator and methodizer of the same, for the production of this harmonious system of the world, and therefore *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν*, the cause of well and fit.—Whereas these utterly reject the latter, and only admitting the former, will needs suppose heaven and earth, plants and animals, and all things whatsoever in this orderly compages of the world, to have resulted merely from a certain quantity of motion, or agitation, at first impressed upon the matter, and determined to vortex.

XXXI. The chronology of the old philosophers having some uncertainty in it, we shall not scrupulously concern ourselves therein, but in the next place consider Parmenides, Xenophanes's auditor, and a philosophic poet likewise, but who, conversing much with two Pythagoreans, Amenias and Diochœtes, was therefore looked upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the Pythagoric sect. That this Parmenides acknowledged many gods, is evident from what has been already cited out of him ; notwithstanding which, he plainly asserted also one Supreme, making him, as Simplicius tells us, *αἰτίαν θεῶν*, the cause of all those other gods—of which Love is said to have been first produced. Which supreme Deity Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, called *ἓν τὸ πᾶν*, one that was all—or the universe ; but adding thereunto of his own, that it was also *ἀκίνητον*, immoveable.

Now, though it be true, that Parmenides's writings being not without obscurity, some of the ancients, who were less acquainted with metaphysical speculations, understood him physically, as if he had asserted the whole corporeal universe to be all but one thing, and that immoveable, thereby destroying, together with the diversity of things, all motion, mutation and action ; which was plainly to make Parmenides not to have been a philosopher, but a madman : yet Simplicius, a man well acquainted with the opinions of ancient philosophers, and who had by him a copy of Parmenides's poems, (then scarce, but since lost) assures us, that Parmenides dreamt of no such matter, and that

he wrote *οὐ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ στοιχείου, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος*, or *περὶ τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς*, not concerning a physical element or principle, but concerning the true Ens, or the Divine transcendency—adding, that though some of those ancient philosophers did not distinguish *τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν*, natural things from supernatural—yet the Pythagoreans, and Xenophanes, and Parmenides, and Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, did all *διακρίνειν*, handle these two distinctly—*καίπερ τῇ ἀσαφείᾳ λανθάνοντες τοὺς πολλοὺς*, however, by reason of their obscurity, it was not perceived by many—for which cause they have been most of them misrepresented, not only by Pagans, but also by Christian writers. For, as the same Simplicius informs us, Parmenides propounded two several doctrines, one after another; the first concerning theological and metaphysical things, called by him *ἀλήθειαν*, truth;—the second concerning physical and corporeal things, which he called *δόξαν*, opinion.—The transition betwixt which was contained in these verses of his;

> *Ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα*
> *Ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείους*
> *Μάνθανε· κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.*

In the former of which doctrines, Parmenides asserted one immoveable principle; but in the latter, two moveable ones, fire and earth. He speaking of souls also as a certain middle or vinculum betwixt the incorporeal and the corporeal world, and affirming, that God did *τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν*, sometimes send and translate souls from the visible to the invisible regions, and sometimes again, on the contrary, from the invisible to the visible. —From whence it is plain, that when Parmenides asserted his one and all immoveable, he spake not as a physiologer, but as a metaphysician and theologer only. Which indeed was a thing so evident, that Aristotle[1] himself, though he had a mind to obscure Parmenides's sense, that he might have a fling at him in his Physics, yet could not altogether dissemble it. For when he thus begins, "There must of necessity be either one principle or many; and if there be but one, then must it either be immoveable, as Parmenides and Melissus affirm, or else moveable, *ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί*, as the naturalists or physiologers;" he therein intimates, that when Parmenides and Melissus made one immoveable the principle of all things, they did not write this as physiologers. And afterward he confesses, that this controversy, whether there

[1] Physicæ Auscultat. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 446. tom. i. oper.

were one immoveable principle, does not belong to natural philosophy, but to some other science. But this is more plainly declared by him elsewhere,[1] writing concerning Parmenides and Melissus after this manner: *εἰ καὶ τ' ἄλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίζειν λέγειν, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄττα τῶν ὄντων ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα, μᾶλλον ἐστιν ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας, ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς ἐπισκέψεως·* Though it be granted, that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise said well, yet we must not imagine them to have spoken physically. For this, that there is something unmade and immoveable, does not so properly belong to physics, as to a certain other science, which is before it.

Wherefore Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes's master, by his one and all, meant nothing else but the supreme Deity, he calling it also immoveable. For the supreme Deity was by these ancient philosophers styled, first *τὸ ἕν* and *μονάς*, a unity and monad—because they conceived, that the first and most perfect being, and the beginning of all things, must needs be the most simple. Thus Eudorus in Simplicius[2] declares their sense; *ἀρχὴν ἔφασιν εἶναι τῶν πάντων τὸ ἕν, ὡς καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ὄντων πάντων, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὸν ὑπεράνω θεόν·* These ancients affirmed, that the one, or unity, was the first Principle of all; matter itself, as well as other things, being derived from it; they meaning by this one that highest or supreme God, who is over all.—And Syrianus[3] to the same purpose, *οἱ θεῖοι ἐκεῖνοι ἄνδρες, τὸ ἓν θεὸν ἔλεγον, ὡς ἑνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἴτιαν, καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πάσης ζωῆς·* Those Divine men called God the One, as being the cause of unity to all things, as likewise he was of being and life. And Simplicius concludes, that Parmenides's *ἓν ὄν*, one Ens, was a certain Divine principle, superior to mind or intellect, and more simple. [4]*λείπεται οὖν τὸ νοητὸν πάντων αἴτιον, δι' ὃ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντα κατὰ μίαν ἕνωσιν συνῃρημένως κατείληπται, καὶ ἡνωμένως, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ Παρμενίδειον ἓν ὄν.* It remaineth, therefore, that that Intelligible, which is the cause of all things, and therefore of mind and understanding too, in which all things are contained and comprehended compendiously, and in a way of unity; I say, that this was Parmenides' one Ens or Being.

In the next place, Parmenides, with the others of those ancients, called also his *ἓν ὄν, τὸ πᾶν*, his one Ens or first most simple Being, all, of the universe—because it virtually contained all things, and, as Sim-

[1] De Cœlo, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 668.

[2] Comment. in Physic. Aristot. p. 39. edit. Græc. Aldin.

[3] Ex MS. Commen. in libr. aliquot. Metaphysic. Aristotel.

[4] F. 31. Gr. [Comment. in Physic. Aristotel.

plicius writes, *πάντα διακεκριμένως ἐμφαίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*, all things are from this one, distinctly displayed.—For which cause, in Plato's Parmenides, this one is said to be *ἐπὶ πάντα πολλὰ ὄντα νενεμημένον*, distributed into all things, that are many.—But that Parmenides by his *ἓν τὸ πᾶν*, one and all—or the universe, did not understand the corporeal world, is evident from hence, because he called it *ἀδιαίρετον*, or indivisible—and, as Simplicius[1] observes, supposed it to have no magnitude; because that, which is perfectly one, can have no parts.

Wherefore it may be here observed, that this expression of *ἓν τὸ πᾶν*, one being all—hath been used in very different senses: for as Parmenides and Xenophanes understood it of the supreme Deity that one most perfect and most simple Being was the original of all things; so others of them meant it atheistically, concerning the most imperfect and lowest of all beings, matter or body, they affirming all things to be nothing but one and the same matter diversely modified. Thus much we learn from that place of Aristotle in his Metaphysics:[2] *ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἕν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι·* They who affirm one to be all in this sense, as if all things were nothing but one and the same matter, and that corporeal and endued with magnitude, it is manifest, that they err sundry ways.—But here is a great difference betwixt these two to be observed, in that the atheistical assertors of one and all (whether they meant water or air by it, or something else) did none of them suppose their one and all to be immoveable, but moveable; but they, whose principle was one and all immoveable (as Parmenides, Melissus and Zeno) could not possibly mean any thing else thereby, but the Deity; that there was one most simple, perfect and immutable Being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things, and from which all things were derived. But Heraclitus, who is one of those, who are said to have affirmed *ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν*, that one was all, or that the universe was but one thing—might possibly have taken both those senses together (which will also agree in the Stoical hypothesis) that all things were both from one God, and from one fire; they being both alike corporeal Theists, who supposed an intellectual fire to be the first Principle of all things.

And though Aristotle in his Physics quarrels very much with Parmenides and Melissus, for making one immoveable Principle; yet in his Metaphysics himself doth plainly close with it, and own it as very good divinity, that there is one incorporeal and immoveable Principle

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[1] In Phys. f. 17. 2. [2] Libi. c. vii. [p. 274. tom. iv. oper.]

of all things, and that the supreme Deity is an immovable nature : [1]εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ὅπερ πειράσομαι δεικνύναι, ἐνταῦθα ἂν εἴη που καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριοτάτη ἀρχή· If there be any such substance as this, that is separate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immovable (as we shall afterwards endeavor to show that there is), then the Divinity ought to be placed here, and this must be acknowledged to be the first and most proper principle of all.—But lest any should suspect, that Aristotle, if not Parmenides also, might, for all that, hold many such immovable principles, or many eternal, uncreated and self-existent beings, as so many partial causes of the world ;[2] Simplicius assures us, μὴ γεγονέναι δόξαν πολλὰς καὶ ἀκινήτους τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσαν, i. e. that though divers of the ancient philosophers asserted a plurality of moveable principles (and some indeed an infinity), yet there never was any opinion entertained amongst philosophers, of many, or more than one, immovable principles.—From whence it may be concluded, that no philosopher ever asserted a multitude of unmade, self-existent minds, or independent deities, as co-ordinate principles of the world.

Indeed, Plotinus seems to think, that Parmenides in his writings, by his τὸ ὄν, or Ens, did frequently mean a perfect mind or intellect, there being no true entity (according to him) below that which understands; (which mind, though incorporeal, was likened by him to a sphere, because it comprehends all within itself, and because intellection is not from without, but from within): but that when again he called his On or Ens one, he gave occasion thereby to some to quarrel with him, as making the same both one and many ; intellect being that, which contains the ideas of all things in it. Wherefore Parmenides's whole philosophy (saith he) was better digested and more exactly and distinctly set down in Plato's Parmenides, where he acknowledgeth three unities subordinate, or a trinity of Divine hypostases : ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρμενίδης, ἀκριβέστερον λέγων, διαιρεῖ ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, τὸ πρῶτον ἕν, ὃ κυριώτερον ἕν· καὶ δεύτερον ἓν πολλὰ λέγων· καὶ τρίτον ἓν καὶ πολλά· καὶ σύμφωνος οὗτος καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστι ταῖς Τρισίν· Parmenides, in Plato, speaking more exactly, distinguishes three Divine unities subordinate ; the first of that which is perfectly and most properly one ; the second of that, which was called by him one-many ; the third of that, which is thus expressed, one and many. So that Parmenides did also agree in this acknowledgment of a trinity of Divine or archical hypostases.—Which observation of Plotinus is, by the way, the best key, that we

[1] Lib. vi. cap. i. and lib. xiii. cap. vii. [2] In Phys. Aristotel. fol. xvii.

know of, for that obscure book of Plato's Parmenides. Wherefore Parmenides thus asserting a trinity of Divine hypostases, it was the first of those hypostases that was properly called by him ἓν τὸ πᾶν, one the universe or all; that is, one most simple Being, the fountain or original of all. And the second of them (which is a perfect intellect) was, it seems, by him called, in way of distinction, ἓν πολλὰ or πάντα, one-many or one all things—by which all things are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect Mind. And of those was Parmenides to be understood also, when he affirmed that all things did stand, and nothing flow; not of singular and sensible things, which, as the Heraclitics rightly affirmed, do indeed all flow; but of the immediate objects of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: Aristotle himself acknowledging, that no generation nor corruption belongeth to them, since there could be no immutable and certain science, unless there were some immutable, necessary and eternal objects of it. Wherefore, as the same Aristotle[1] also declares, the true meaning of that controversy betwixt the Heraclitics and Parmenideans, Whether all things did flow, or some things stand? was the same with this, Whether there were any other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles, that were immutable? and, consequently, whether there were any such thing as science or knowledge which had a firmitude and stability in it? For those Heraclitics, who contended, that the only objects of the mind were singular and sensible things, did with good reason consequently thereupon deny, that there was any certain and constant knowledge, since there can neither be any definition of singular sensibles, (as Aristotle[2] writes) nor any demonstration concerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintained the firmitude and stability of science, did as reasonably conclude thereupon, that besides singular sensibles, there were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds and souls. But it must be here acknowledged, that Parmenides and the Pythagoreans went yet a step further, and did not only suppose those intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutable objects of all science, but also, as they are contained in the Divine intellect, to be the principles and causes of all other things. For thus Aristotle declares their sense; [3]αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλ-

[1] Met. lib. iv. cap. v. [p. 298. tom. iv. oper.]

[2] Metaph. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 272. tom. iv. oper.

[3] Met. lib. i. cap. vi. [p. 273. tom. iv. oper.]

λοις; and again, *τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη παρέχονται, τοῖς δὲ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν·* The ideas are the causes of all other things: and the essence of all other things below is imparted to them from the ideas, as the ideas themselves derive their essence from the first unity: those ideas in the Divine understanding being looked upon by these philosophers, as the paradigms and patterns of all created things. Now these ideas being frequently called by the Pythagoreans Numbers, we may from hence clearly understand the meaning of that seemingly monstrous paradox or puzzling Griphus of theirs, that[1] Numbers were the causes and principles of all things, or that all things were made out of Numbers; it signifying indeed no more than this, that all things were made from the ideas of the Divine intellect, called Numbers; which themselves also were derived from a monad or unity: Aristotle somewhere[2] intimating this very account of that assertion, *τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς οὐσίας,* that Numbers were the causes of the essence of other things—namely, because *τὰ εἴδη ἀριθμοὶ,* the ideas were numbers. Though we are not ignorant, how the Pythagoreans made also all the numbers within the decad, to be symbols of things. But besides these two divine hypostases already mentioned, Parmenides seems to have asserted also a third, which, because it had yet more alterity, for distinction's sake was called by him, neither *ἓν τὸ πᾶν,* one the universe or all—nor *ἓν πάντα,* one-all things—but *ἓν καὶ πάντα,* one and all things:—and this is taken by Plotinus to be the eternal Psyche, that actively produceth all things in this lower world, according to those Divine ideas.

But that Parmenides,[3] by his one-all immovable, really understood nothing else but the supreme Deity, is further unquestionably evident from those verses of his cited by Simplicius, but not taken notice of by Stephanus in his Poesis Philosophica, of which we shall only set down some few here.

——Ὃς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
Οὐδέποτ᾽ ἦν, οὐδ᾽ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν·
Ἓν συνεχές· Τίνα γὰρ γέννην διζήσαι αὐτοῦ;
Αὐτάρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλον ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν,
Ταυτόν τ᾽ ἐν ταυτῷ τε μένον, καθ᾽ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται· etc.

In which, together with those that follow, the supreme Deity is plainly described as one single, solitary, and most simple being, unmade or

1 Aristot. Metaphys. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 272. 2 Ibid.

3 In Arist. Phys. fol. vii. xvii. xxxi.

self-existent, and necessarily existing, incorporeal and devoid of magnitude, altogether immutable or unchangeable, whose duration therefore was very different from that of ours, and not in a way of flux or temporary succession, but a constant eternity without either past or future. From whence it may be observed, that this opinion of a standing eternity, different from that flowing succession of time, is not so novel a thing as some would persuade, nor was first excogitated by Christian writers, schoolmen or fathers, it being at least as old as Parmenides; from whom it was also afterward received and entertained by the best of the other Pagan philosophers; however it hath been of late so much decried, not only by atheistical writers, but other precocious and conceited wits also, as nonsense and impossibility. It is well known, that Melissus held forth the very same doctrine with Parmenides, of one Immovable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewise, as Parmenides did; *καὶ ὁ Μέλισσος ἓν ἐόν φησι, δεῖν αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ ἔχει πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια·* Melissus also declared [1]that his one Ens must needs be devoid of body, because if it had any crassities in it, it would have parts.—But the only difference that was between them was this, that Parmenides called this one immovable that was all *πεπερασμένον*, finite or determined,—but that Melissus *ἄπειρον*, infinite—which difference notwithstanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their sense: whilst each of them endeavored, in a different way, to set forth the greatest perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in those words finite and infinite, and both of them signifying in one sense perfection, but in another imperfection. And the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers with one another, Parmenides and Melissus, as also of Xenophanes with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by Simplicius after this manner:[2] *οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως χεῖρον ὀλίγον παρεκβάντα, τοῖς φιλομαθεστέροις ἐπιδεῖξαι, πῶς καίτοι διαφέρειν δοκοῦντες οἱ παλαιοὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δόξας, ἐναρμονίως ὅμως συμφέρονται· Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς διελέχθησαν, ὡς Ξενοφάνης καὶ Παρμένιδης καὶ Μέλισσος· ὁ μὲν Παρμενίδης ἓν λέγων καὶ πεπερασμένον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἓν τοῦ πλήθους προϋπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ πᾶσιν ὅρου καὶ πέρατος αἴτιον, κατὰ τὸ πέρας μᾶλλον ἤπερ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ὡφορίζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ πάντη τε τέλειον τὸ τέλος τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπειληφός, πεπερασμένον εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ τέλος τῶν πάντων ὡς ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἐνδεὲς ὂν, οὔπω πέρας ἀπείληφε· Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλητον ὁμοίως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεάσατο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτον τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τῆς δυνάμεως, ἄπειρον αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀγένητον· πλὴν*

[1] Simplic. Ar. Phys. f. 19. [2] Ar. Phys. f. 7.

ὁ μὲν Ξενοφάνης ὡς πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ πάντων ὑπερανέχον, καὶ κινήσεως αὐτὸ καὶ ἠρεμίας καὶ πάσης ἀντιστοιχείας ἐπέκεινα τίθησιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ὑποθέσει· ὁ δὲ Παρμενίδης, τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον αὐτοῦ, καὶ πᾶσης μεταβολῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπέχεινα, θεασάμενος, ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνεῖ· Perhaps it will not be improper for us to digress a little here, and to gratify the inquisitive and studious reader, by showing how those ancient philosophers, though seeming to dissent in their opinions concerning the principles, did notwithstanding harmoniously agree together. As, first of all, they who discoursed concerning the intelligible and first principle of all, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus; of whom Parmenides called it one finite and determined; because as unity must needs exist before multitude, so that, which is to all things the cause of measure, bound and determination, ought rather to be described by measure and finitude than infinity; as also that which is every way perfect, and hath attained its own end, or rather is the end of all things (as it was the beginning) must needs be of a determinate nature; for that which is imperfect and therefore indigent, hath not yet attained its term or measure. But Melissus, though considering the immutability of the Deity, likewise yet, attending to the inexhaustible perfection of its essence, the unlimitedness and unboundedness of its power, declareth it to be infinite, as well as ingenit or unmade. Moreover, Xenophanes looking upon the Deity, as the cause of all things, and above all things, placed above motion and rest, and all those antitheses of inferior beings, as Plato likewise doth in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides; whereas Parmenides and Melissus, attending to its stability and constant immutability, and its being perhaps above energy and power, praised it as immovable.—From which of Simplicius it is plain, that Parmenides, when he called God πεπρασμένον, finite and determined—was far from meaning any such thing thereby, as if he were a corporeal being of finite dimensions, as some have ignorantly supposed; or as if he were any way limited as to power and perfection; but he understood it in that sense, in which πέρας is taken by Plato, as opposite to ἀπειρία, and for the greatest perfection: and as God is said to be πέρας καὶ μέτρον πάντων, the term and measure of all things.—But Melissus calling God ἄπειρον, infinite—in the sense before declared, as thereby to signify his inexhaustible power and perfection, his eternity and incorruptibility, doth therein more agree with our present theology, and the now received manner of speaking. We have the rather produced all this, to show how curious the ancient philosophers were in their inquiries after God, and how exact in their descriptions of him. Wherefore however Anaximander's Infinite were

nothing but eternal senseless matter (though called by him the τὸ θεῖον, the divinest of all) yet Melissus's ἄπειρον, or Infinite, was the true Deity.

With Parmenides and Melissus fully agreed Zeno Eleates also, Parmenides's scholar, that one immovable was all, or the original of all things; he meaning thereby nothing else but the supreme Deity. For though it be true, that this Zeno did excogitate certain arguments against the local motion of bodies, proceeding upon the hypothesis of the infinite divisibility of body, one of which was famously known by that name of Achilles, because it pretended to prove, that it was impossible (upon the hypothesis) for the swift-footed Achilles ever to overtake the creeping snail; (which arguments of his, whether or no they are well answered by Aristotle,[1] is not here to our purpose to inquire) yet all this was nothing else but *lusus ingenii*, a sportful exercise of Zeno's wit, he being a subtile logician and disputant, or perhaps an endeavor also to show, how puzzling and perplexing to human understanding, the conception even of the most vulgar and confessed phenomena of nature may be. For that Zeno Eleates, by his one Immovable that was all, meant not the corporeal world, no more than Melissus, Parmenides and Xenophanes, is evident from Aristotle writing thus concerning him; τὸ τοιοῦτον ἓν ὂν τὸν θεὸν λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κινητὸν εἶναι, Zeno by his one Ens, which neither was moved, nor moveable, meaneth God. Moreover the same Aristotle informs us, that this Zeno endeavored to demonstrate, that there was but one God, from that idea, which all men have of him, as that which is the best, the supreme and most powerful of all, or as an absolutely perfect being:[2] εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς ἁπάντων κράτιστον, ἕνα φησὶ προσήκειν αὐτόν· If God be the best of all things, that he must needs be one.—Which argument was thus pursued by him; τοῦτο θεὸς καὶ θεοῦ δύναμις κρατεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι· ὥστε καθὸ μὴ κρεῖττον, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκ εἶναι θεόν· πλειόνων οὖν ὄντων, εἰ μὲν εἶεν τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων κρείττους, τὰ δὲ ἥττους, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι θεούς· πεφυκέναι γὰρ θεὸν μὴ κρατεῖσθαι· ἴσων δὲ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν θεὸν φύσιν δεῖν εἶναι κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ ἴσον, οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ ἴσου· ὥστ' εἰπερ εἴη τε, καὶ τοιοῦτον εἴη θεός, ἕνα μόνον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ πάντα δύνασθαι ἃ ἂν βούλοιτο. This is God, and the power of God, to prevail, conquer, and rule over all. Wherefore, by how much any thing falls short of the best, by so much does it fall short of being God. Now if there be supposed more such beings, whereof

[1] Physic. lib. vi. cap. xiv. p. 359. tom. i. oper.

[2] De Zenoph. Ze. et Gor. [cap. iii. p. 840. tom. i. oper.]

some are better, some worse, those could not be all gods, because it is essential to God not to be transcended by any; but if they be conceived to be so many equal gods, then would it not be the nature of God to be the best, one, equal being, neither better nor worse than another: wherefore if there be a God, and this be the nature of him, then there can be but one. And indeed otherwise he could not be able to do whatever he would.

Empedocles is said to have been an emulator of Parmenides also, which must be understood of his metaphysics, because in his physiology (which was atomical) he seems to have transcended him. Now that Empedocles acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and that incorporeal too, may be concluded from what hath been already cited out of his philosophic poems.[1] Besides which the writer De Mundo[2] (who though not Aristotle, yet was a Pagan of good antiquity) clearly affirmeth, that Empedocles derived all things whatsoever from one supreme Deity; *τὰ γὰρ δι᾽ ἀέρος ἅπαντα, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν ὄντως ἔργα εἶναι, τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος· ἐξ οὗ κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα,*

Πάνθ᾽ ὅσα τ᾽ ἦν, ὅσα τ᾽ ἐστὶν, ἰδ᾽ ὅσσα τε ἔσται ὀπίσσω, etc.

All the things, that are upon the earth, and in the air and water, may truly be called the works of God, who ruleth over the world. Out of whom, according to the physical Empedocles, proceed all things that were, are, and shall be, viz. plants, men, beasts and gods. Which notwithstanding we conceive to be rather true as to Empedocles' sense than his words; he affirming, as it seems, in that cited place, that all these things were made, not immediately out of God, but out of contention and friendship; because Simplicius, who was furnished with a copy of Empedocles's poems, twice brings in that cited passage of his in this connexion:

Ἐν δὲ κότῳ διάμορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται,
Σὺν δ᾽ ἔβη ἐν φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται,
Ἐκ τῶν γὰρ πάνθ᾽ ὅσσ᾽ ἦν, ὅσσα τέ ἐστι, καὶ ἔσται,
Δένδρα τε βεβλάστηκε, καὶ ἄνερες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,
Θῆρές τ᾽, οἰωνοί τε, καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθῦς,
Καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέρεστοι.

Things are divided and segregated by contention, but joined together

[1] P. 26. [2] Cap. vi. p. 863. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

by friendship; from which two (contention and friendship) all that was, is, and shall be, proceeds; as trees, men and women, beasts, birds and fishes; and, last of all, the long-lived and honorable gods.—Wherefore the sense of Empedocles's words here was this: that the whole created world, together with all things belonging to it, viz. plants, beasts, men and gods, was made from contention and friendship. Nevertheless, since, according to Empedocles, contention and friendship did themselves depend also upon one supreme Deity, which he with Parmenides and Xenophanes called *Τὸ ἕν*, or the very one—the writer, De Mundo, might well conclude, that, according to Empedocles, all things whatsoever, and not only men, but gods, were derived from one supreme Deity. And that this was indeed Empedocles's sense, appears plainly from Aristotle in his Metaphysics, *Τίθησι μὲν γὰρ [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς] ἀρχήν τινα τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ νεῖκος, δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾷν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἑνός·*[1] *Ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου τ' ἄλλα ἐστὶ πλὴν ὁ Θεός· λέγει γοῦν,*

Ἐξ ὧν πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, ὅσα τ' ἐσθ', ὅσα τ' ἔσται ὀπίσσω, etc.

Empedocles makes contention to be a certain principle of corruption and generation: nevertheless, he seems to generate this contention itself also from the very one (that is, from the supreme Deity.) For all things, according to him, are from this contention, God only excepted; he writing after this manner, from which (that is, contention and friendship) all the things that have been, are, and shall be (plants, beasts, men and gods) derived their original.—For Empedocles it seems supposed, that were it not for *νεῖκος*, discord or contention, all things would be one: so that, according to him, all things whatsoever proceeded from contention or discord, together with a mixture of friendship, save only the supreme God, who hath therefore no contention at all in him, because he is essentially *τὸ ἕν*, unity itself and friendship.—From whence Aristotle takes occasion to quarrel with Empedocles, as if it would follow from his principles, that the supreme and most happy God was the least wise of all, as being not able to know any thing besides himself, or in the world without him;[2] *διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ, τὸν ἐνδαιμονέστατον θεὸν ἧττον φρόνιμον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ γὰρ γνωρίζει τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα, τὸ γὰρ νεῖκος οὐκ ἔχει· ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ,*

Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ (φησὶ) γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδως, etc.

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1 L. iii. c. iv. [p. 295. tom. iv. oper.]

2 Met. l. iii. c. iv. [p. 295. tom. iv. oper.]

This therefore happens to Empedocles, that, according to his principles, the most happy God is the least wise of all other things, for he cannot know the elements, because he hath no contention in him; all knowledge being by that, which is like; himself writing thus: We know earth by earth, water by water, air by air, and fire by fire; friendship by friendship, and contention by contention.—But to let this pass; Empedocles here making the gods themselves to be derived from contention and friendship, the supreme Deity, or most happy God, only excepted, (who hath no contention in him, and from whom contention and friendship themselves were derived) plainly acknowledged both one unmade Deity, the original of all things under the name of τὸ ἕν, the very one—and many other inferior gods, generated or produced by him; they being juniors to contention, or discord, as this was also junior to unity, the first and supreme Deity. Which gods of Empedocles, that they were begotten from contention (as well as men and other things) were doubtless the stars and demons.

Moreover, we may here observe, that, according to Empedocles's doctrine, the true original of all the evil, both of human souls and demons (which he supposed alike lapsable) was derived from that νεῖκος, discord and contention,[1] that is necessarily contained in the nature of them, together with the ill use of their liberty, both in this present and their pre-existent state. So that Empedocles here trod in the footsteps of Pythagoras, whose praises he thus loudly sang forth in his poems;

[2] Ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς,
Ὅς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,
Παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων, etc.

Horum de numero quidam præstantia norat
Plurima, mentis opes amplas sub pectore servans,
Omnia vestigans sapientum docta reperta, etc.

XXII. Before we come to Socrates and Plato, we shall here take notice of some other Pythagoreans, and eminent philosophers, who clearly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, though doubtless acknowledging withal other inferior gods. Philo in his book De Mundi Opificio, writing of the hebdomad[3] or septenary number, and observing, that, according to the Pythagoreans, it was called both a motherless and

[1] According to that Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος· p. 23.

[2] Porphyr. de Vit. Pyth. p. 194. [ed. Cantab. p. 35. ed. Kusteri.]

[3] P. 23. [p. 22. oper.]

a virgin number, because it was the only number within the decad, which was neither generated, nor did itself generate, tells us, that therefore it was made by them a symbol of the supreme Deity, *οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον ἐξομοιοῦσι τῷ ἡγεμόνι τῶν συμπάντων·* The Pythagoreans likened this number to the Prince and Governor of all things, or the supreme Monarch of the universe—as thinking it to bear a resemblance of his immutability: which fancy of theirs was taken notice of by us. However, Philo hereupon occasionally cites this remarkable testimony of Philolaus the Pythagorean; *Ἐστὶ γάρ, φησὶν, ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων ἁπάντων ὁ Θεὸς, εἷς ἀεὶ ὤν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων.* God (saith he) is the Prince and Ruler over all, always one, stable, immoveable, like to himself, but unlike to every thing else.—To which may be added what in Stobæus is further recorded out of the same Philolaus; *ἦν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος, καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἷς ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τῶ συγγενέω καὶ κρατίστω κυβερνώμενος·*[1] This world was from eternity, and will remain to eternity, one governed by one, which is cognate and the best.—Where notwithstanding he seemeth, with Ocellus, to maintain the world's pre-eternity. And again, *διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἔλεγε, κόσμον ἦμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀΐδιον θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιον·* Wherefore, said Philolaus, the world might well be called the eternal energy or effect of God, and of successive generation.

Jamblichus, in his Protreptics, cites a passage out of Archytas, another Pythagorean, to the same purpose; [2]*ὅστις ἀναλύσαι οἷός τέ ἐστι πάντα τὰ γένεα ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ αὐτὰν ἀρχὰν, οὗτος δοκεῖ μοι καλὰν σκοπιὰν εὑρηκέναι, ἀφ᾽ οὗ δυνατὸς ἐσσεῖται τόν Θεὸν κατοψεῖσθαι,* etc. Whosoever is able to reduce all kinds of things under one and the same principle, this man seems to me to have found out an excellent specula, or high station, from whence he may be able to take a large view and prospect of God, and of all other things; and he shall clearly perceive, that God is the beginning and end, and middle of all things, that are performed according to justice and right reason.—Upon which words of Archytas, Jamblichus thus glosseth: "Archytas here declares the end of all theological speculation to be this, not to rest in many principles, but to reduce all things under one and the same head." Adding, *τοιαύτη ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἑνὸς, τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης θεωρίας,* that this knowledge of the first Unity, the Original of all things, is the end of all contemplation.—Moreover, Stobæus cites this out of Archytas's book of principles, viz. That besides matter and form, [3]*ἀναγκαιοτέραν τινὰ εἶμεν αἰτίαν, τὰν κινάσοισαν ἐνεστώτων πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφώ, ταῦτα δὲ τὰν πράταν δυνάμει, καὶ καθυπερτάταν εἶμεν, ὀνομάζεσθαι δὲ Θεὸν,* etc. There is another more

[1] Eccl. Phys. p. 4. [2] C. iv. p. 20. [3] Eccl. Ph. p. 82.

necessary cause, which moving, brings the form to the matter; and that this is the first and most powerful cause, which is fitly called God. So that there are three principles, God, matter, and form; God the artificer and mover, and matter that which is moved, and form the art introduced into the matter.—In which same Stobean excerption it also follows afterward, *δεῖ νόῳ τι κρέσσον εἶναι, νόῳ δὲ κρέσσον ἐστὶ ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν Θεόν·* That there must be something better than mind; and that this thing better than mind is that which we (properly) call God.

Ocellus also in the same Stobæus thus writeth: [1]*συνέχει τὰ μὲν σκάνεα ζωά, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον ψυχά· τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἁρμονία, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον ὁ Θεός· τοὺς δ' οἴκως καὶ τὰς πόλιας ὁμονοια, ταύτας δ' αἴτιος νόμος.* Life contains the bodies of animals, the cause of which life is the soul; concord contains houses and cities, the cause of which concord is law; and harmony contains the whole world, the cause of which mundane harmony is God.—And to the same purpose Aristæus,[2] *ὡς ὁ τεχνίτας ποτὶ τὰν τέχναν, οὕτως Θεὸς ποθ' ἁρμονίαν*, as the artificer is to art, so is God to the harmony of the world.—There is also this passage in the same Stobæus cited out of an anonymous Pythagorean: [3]*Θεὸς μέν ἐστιν ἀρχὰ καὶ πρῶτον, θεῖος δὲ ὁ κόσμος*, God is the principle, and the first thing; and the world (though it be not the supreme God) yet is it Divine.

Timæus Locrus, a Pythagorean senior to Plato, in his book concerning Nature, or the Soul of the world (upon which Plato's Timæus was but a kind of commentary), plainly acknowledgeth both one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, and also many other gods, his creatures and subordinate ministers; in the close thereof,[4] writing thus concerning the punishment of wicked men after this life: *ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἃ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε, σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οἷς ὁ πάντων ἁγεμὼν Θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμω συμπεπληρωμένω ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα δεδαμιούργηται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἀρίστων εἴδεος ἀγενάτω καὶ αἰωνίω·* All these things hath Nemesis decreed to be executed in the second circuit by the ministry of vindictive terrestrial demons, that are overseers of human affairs: to which demons that supreme God, the ruler over all, hath committed the government and administration of the world. Which world is completed and made up of gods, men, and other animals, all created according to the best pattern of the eternal and unmade idea.—In which words of Timæus there are

[1] P. 32. [lib. i. cap. xvi.] [2] P. 45. [3] P. 8.

[4] Timæus de Anima Mundi, p. 566. inter Scriptor. mythologic. a Tho. Gale editos.

these three several points of the Pagan theology contained ; first, that there is one supreme God, eternal and unmade, the creator and governor of the whole world, and who made it according to the best pattern or exemplar of his own ideas and eternal wisdom. Secondly, that this world created by God is compounded and made up of other inferior gods, men, and brute animals. Thirdly, that the supreme God hath committed the administration of our human affairs to demons and inferior gods, who are constant inspectors over us, some of which he also makes use of for the punishment of wicked men after this life. Moreover, in this book of Timæus Locrus the supreme God is often called *ὁ Θεὸς*, and sometimes *ὁ δαίμων*, God in way of eminency ;—sometimes *Νόος* mind—sometimes *τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν*, the very Good—sometimes *ἀρχὰ τῶν ἀρίστων*, the Principle of the best things—sometimes *δαμιουργὸς τοῦ βελτίονος*, the Maker of the better—(evil being supposed not to proceed from him) ; sometimes *κράτιστον αἴτιον*, the best and most powerful Cause—sometimes *ἀρχαγὸς καὶ γενέτωρ ἁπάντων*, the Prince and Parent of all things.—Which God, according to him, is not the soul of the world neither, but the creator thereof, he having made the world an animal, and a secondary generated god ;[1] *δηλούμενος ὧν ἄριστον γέναμα ποιεῖν, τοῦτον ἐποίει θεὸν γενατὸν, οὔποκα φθαρσόμενον ὑπ᾽ ἄλλω αἰτίω, ἔξω τῶ αὐτὸν συντεταγμένω θεῶ, εἴποκα δήλετο αὐτὸν διαλύειν·* God willing to make the world the best that it was capable of, made it a generated god, such as should never be destroyed by any other cause, but only by that God himself, who framed it, if he should ever will to dissolve it. But since it is not the part of that which is good to destroy the best of works, the world will doubtless ever remain incorruptible and happy, the best of all generated things, made by the best cause, looking not at patterns artificially framed without him, but the idea and intelligible essence, as the paradigms, which whatsoever is made conformable to, must needs be the best, and such as shall never need to be mended. — Moreover, he plainly declares, that this generated god of his, the world, was produced in time, so as to have a beginning, *πρὶν ὠρανὸν γενέσθαι, λόγῳ ἤστην ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς δαμιουργὸς τοῦ βελτίονος*, before the heaven was made, existed the idea, matter, and God the opifex of the best.—Wherefore, whatever Ocellus and Philolaus might do, yet this Timæus held not the world's eternity ; wherein he followed not only Pythagoras himself (as we have already showed) but also the generality of the first Pythagoreans, of whom Aristotle[2] pronounces without exception, *γενῶσι γὰρ τὸν κόσμον*, that they generated the world. — Timæus indeed in this book seems to assert the pre-eternity of the matter, as if

[1] P. 546. [2] Met. l. i. c. vii. [p. 276. tom. iv. oper.]

it were a self-existent principle together with God; and yet Clemens Alexandrinus cites a passage out of him looking another way, [1]*ἀλλ' ἀντικρὺς καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἀκοῦσαι ποθεῖς; Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ συγγράμματι κατὰ λέξιν ὧδέ μοι μαρτυρήσει. Μία ἀρχὰ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγένητος, εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔτι ἀρχά, ἀλλ' ἐκείνα ἀρχὰ ἐξ ἃς ἐγένετο·* Would you hear of one only principle of all things amongst the Greeks? Timæus Locrus, in his book of Nature, will bear no witness thereof; he there in express words writing thus: There is one principle of all things unmade; for if it were made, it would not be a principle, but that would be the principle, from whence it was made. —Thus we see, that Timæus Locrus asserted one eternal and unmade God, the maker of the whole world, and besides this, another generated god, the world itself animated, with its several parts; the difference betwixt both which gods is thus declared by him;[2] *Θεὸν δέ, τὸν μὲν αἰώνιον νόος ὁρῇ μόνος, τῶν ἁπάντων ἀρχαγὸν καὶ γενέτορα τουτέων, τὸν δὲ γενατὸν ὄψει ὁρέομες, κόσμον δὲ τόνδε, καὶ τὰ μέρα αὐτῷ ὁκόσα ὠράνια ἐντί.* That eternal God, who is the prince, original, and parent of all these things, is seen only by the mind; but the other generated god is visible to our eyes, viz. this world, and those parts of it which are heavenly; —that is, the stars, as so many particular gods contained in it. But here it is to be observed, that the eternal God is not only so called by Timæus, as being without beginning, but also as having a distinct kind of duration from that of time, which is properly called Æon, or Eternity, he therein following Parmenides, *εἰκὼν δέ ἐστι τῷ ἀγενάτῳ χρόνῳ, ὃν αἰῶνα ποταγορεύομες· ὡς γὰρ ποτ' ἀΐδιον παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδάνικον κόσμον ὅδε ὠρανὸς ἐγενάθη, οὕτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὅδε χρόνος σὺν κόσμῳ ἐδαμιουργήθη·* Time is but an image of that unmade duration, which we call eternity; wherefore, as this sensible world was made according to that exemplar or pattern of the intelligible world, so was time made together with the world, as an imitation of eternity.

It hath been already observed, that Onatus,[3] another Pythagorean, took notice of an opinion of some in his time, that there was one only God, who comprehended the whole world, and no other gods besides, or at least, none such as was to be religiously worshipped; himself in the mean time asserting, that there was both one God and many gods; or, besides one supreme and universal Numen, many other inferior and particular deities, to whom also men ought to pay religious worship. Now his further account of both these assertions is contained in these following words: [4]*τοὶ δὲ λέγοντες ἕνα θεὸν εἶμεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλῶς ἁμαρτά·*

[1] Strom. v. p. 604. p. 718. edit. Potteri. [2] P. 549. [3] P. 233.
[4] Stob. Eccl. Phys. p. 5.

νοντι· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἀζίωμα τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς οὐ συνθεοροῦντι. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ καθηγέεσθαι τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ κράτιστον καὶ καθυπέρτερον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι θεοὶ ποτὶ τὸν πρωτὸν καὶ νοητὸν οὕτως ἔχοντι ὥσπερ χορευτὰ ποτὶ κορυφαῖον, καὶ στρατίωτα ποτὶ στραταγὸν, καὶ λοχίτα, καὶ ἐντεταγμένοι ποτὶ ταξιάρχαν καὶ λοχαγέταν, ἔχοντε φύσιν, ἕπεσθαι καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν τῷ καλῶς καθηγεομένῳ· κοινὸν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ, καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι, καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι δύναντο συντετάχθαι τοὶ ἀρχόμενοι ποτὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χορευταὶ ποτὶ συναϊδίαν, οὐδὲ στρατιῶται ποτὶ στρατηγίαν, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος, τοὶ μὲν στραταγῶ, τοὶ δὲ κορυφαίω· They who maintain, that there is only one God, and not many gods, are very much mistaken, as not considering aright, what the dignity and majesty of the Divine transcendency chiefly consisteth in, namely, in ruling and governing those which are like to it (that is, gods) and in excelling or surmounting others, and being superior to them. But all those other gods which we contend for, are to that first and intelligible God but as the dancers to the Coryphæus or Choragus, and as the inferior common soldiers to the captain or general; to whom it properly belongeth, to follow and comply with their leader and commander. The work indeed is common, or the same to them both, to the ruler, and them that are ruled; but they that are ruled could not orderly conspire and agree together into one work, were they destitute of a leader; as the singers and dancers could not conspire together into one dance and harmony, were they destitute of a Coryphæus; nor soldiers make up one orderly army, were they without a captain or commander.

And as the supreme God is here called by Onatus the Coryphæus of the gods, so is he in like manner by the writer De Mundo[1] styled the Coryphæus of the world, or the Præcentor and Præsultor of it, in these words: καθάπερ ἐν χορῷ, κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος, συνεπηχεῖ πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἔσθ' ὅτι καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς ὀξυτέραις καὶ βαρυτέραις, μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἐμμελῆ κεραννύντων· οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος θεοῦ· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος, κινεῖται μὲν τα ἄστρα ἀεὶ καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός· As in a chorus, when the Coryphæus or Præcentor hath begun, the whole choir compounded of men, and sometimes of women too, followeth, singing every one their part, some in higher and some in lower notes, but all mingling together into one complete harmony; so in the world God, as the Coryphæus, the Præcentor and Præsultor, beginning the dance and music, the stars and heavens move round after him, ac-

[1] Cap. vi. p. 861, 862. tom. i. oper. Aristotel.

cording to those numbers and measures which he prescribes them, altogether making up one most excellent harmony.

It was also before[1] observed that Ecphantus the Pythagorean, and Archelaus the successor of Anaxagoras[2] (who were both of them Atomists in their physiology) did assert the world to have been made at first, and still to be governed by one Divine mind; which is more than some Atomists of ours in this present age, who notwithstanding pretend to be very good Theists, will acknowledge. We shall, in the next place, mention Euclides Megarensis, the head of that sect called Megaric, and who is said to have been Plato's master for some time after Socrates's death; whose doctrine is thus set down by Laertius:[3] *οὗτος ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ Φρόνησιν, ὁτὲ δὲ Θεὸν, καὶ ἄλλοτε Νοῦν, καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ Ἀγαθῷ ἀνῄρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων·* Which we understand thus: That Euclides (who followed Xenophanes and Parmenides) made the first principle of all things to be one the very Good, called sometimes Wisdom, sometimes God, sometimes Mind, and sometimes by other names; but that he took away all that is opposite to good, denying it to have any real entity—that is, he maintained, that there was no positive nature of evil, or that evil was no principle. And thus do we also understand that of Cicero,[4] when he represents the doctrine of the Megarics after this manner: "Id bonum solum esse, quod esset Unum, et Simile, et Idem, et Semper;" to wit, that they spake this concerning God, That good or goodness itself is a name properly belonging to him, who is also one, and like, and the same, and always; and that the true good of man consisteth in a participation of, and conformity with this first Good. Which doctrine Plato seems to have derived from him, he in like manner calling the supreme Deity by those two names, *τὸ ἓν* and *τ' ἀγαθὸν*, the One and the Good, and concluding true human felicity to consist in a participation of the first Good, or of the Divine nature.

In the next place we shall take notice of Antisthenes, who was the founder also of another sect, to wit, the Cynic; for he, in a certain physiological treatise, is said to have affirmed,[5] "Esse populares deos multos, sed naturalem unum;" That though there were many popular gods, yet there was but one natural God—or, as it is expressed in Lactantius,[6] "Unum esse naturalem Deum, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares;" That there was but one natural God, though nations and cities had their several popular ones.—Wherefore Velleius

1 Cap. i. § xxvi. 2 P. 26. 3 Lib. ii. segm. cvi. p. 142.
4 Academ. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xlii. p. 2325. tom. viii. oper.
5 Cic. De N. D. l. i. [cap. xiii.] 6 De Ira D. c. xi.

the Epicurean in Cicero[1] quarrels with this Antisthenes, as one, who destroyed the nature of the gods, because he denied a multitude of independent deities, such as Epicurus pretended to assert. For this of Antisthenes is not so to be understood, as if he had therein designed to take away all the inferior gods of the Pagans, which had he at all attempted, he would doubtless have been accounted an Atheist, as well as Anaxagoras was; but his meaning was, only to interpret the theology of the Pagans concerning those other gods of theirs, that were or might be looked upon as absolute and independent; that these, though many popular gods, yet indeed were but one and the same natural God, called by several names. As for example, when the Greeks worshipped Zeus, the Latins Jovis, the Egyptians Hammon, the Babylonians Bel, the Scythians Pappæus; these were indeed many popular gods, and yet nevertheless all but one and the same natural God. So again, when in the self-same Pagan cities and countries, the respective laws thereof made mention of several gods, as supreme and absolute in their several territories, as Jupiter in the heavens, Juno in the air, Neptune in the sea; or as being chief in several kind of functions, as Minerva for learning, Bellona for war, etc. (for this Aristotle takes notice of in his book against Zeno,[2] *κατὰ τὸν νόμον, πολλὰ κρείττους ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ*, That according to the laws of cities and countries, one god was best for one thing, and another for another)—Antisthenes here declared concerning these also, that they were indeed many popular, or civil gods, but all really one and the same natural God.

To Antisthenes might be added Diogenes Sinopensis, of whom it is recorded by Laertius,[3] that observing a woman too superstitiously worshipping the statue or image of a god, endeavoring to abate her superstition, he thus bespake her: *οὐκ εὐλαβῇ, ὦ γύναι, μή ποτε Θεοῦ ὄπισθεν ἑστῶτος (πάντα γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πλήρη) ἀσχημονήσῃς;* Take you not care, O woman, of not behaving yourself unseemly in the sight of that God who stands behind you; for all things are full of him—thereby giving her occasion, more to mind and regard that supreme and universal Numen, that filleth the whole world and is every where.

XXIII. It hath been frequently affirmed, that Socrates died a martyr for one only God, in opposition to those many gods of the Pagans: and Tertullian,[4] for one, writeth thus of him, "Propterea damnatus est

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[3] De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 2898. tom. ix. oper

[4] Cap. iv. p. 782. tom. ii. oper.

[5] Lib. vi. segm. xxxvii. p. 333.

[6] In Apologet. cap. xiv. p. 144. edit. Havercamp.

Socrates, quia deos destruebat;" Socrates was therefore condemned to die, because he destroyeth the gods.—And, indeed, that Socrates asserted one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, is a thing not at all to be doubted. In his discourse with Aristodemus, in Xenophon's first book of Memoirs,[1] he convinced him, that the things of this world were not made by chance, but by mind and counsel; *οὕτω γε σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ, καὶ φιλοζώου τεχνήματι,* I am now convinced from what you say, that the things of this world were the workmanship of some wise artificer, who also was a lover of animals.—And so he endeavored to persuade him, that that mind and understanding, which is in us, was derived from some mind and understanding in the universe, as well as that earth and water, which is in us, from the earth and water of the universe:[2] *σὺ δὲ σεαυτὸν φρόνιμόν τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν φρόνιμον εἶναι, εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις, καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ, πολλοῦ ὄντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ συνήρμοσταί σοι; νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι;* Do you think that you only have wisdom in yourself, and that there is none any where else in the whole world without you? though you know that you have but a small part in your body of that vast quantity of earth which is without you; and but little of that water and fire, and so of every other thing, that your body is compounded of in respect of that great mass and magazine of them, which is in the world. Is mind and understanding therefore the only thing, which you fancy you have, some way or other, luckily got and snatched unto yourself, whilst there is no such thing any where in the world without you; all those infinite things thereof being thus orderly disposed by chance?—And when Aristodemus afterward objected, that he could not see any artificer that made the world, as he could those artificers which made all other human things, Socrates thus replies; *οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σεαυτοῦ σύγε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἣ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατά γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲ γνώμῃ ἀλλὰ τύχῃ πάντα πράττεις·* Neither do you see your own soul, which rules over your body; so that you might for the same reason conclude yourself to do nothing by mind and understanding neither, but all by chance, as well as that all things in the world are done by chance.—Again, when he further disputed in this manner against the necessity of worshipping the Deity; *οὐχ ὑπερορῶ τὸ*

[1] P. 573. oper. These words are not Socrates's to Aristodemus, but Aristodemus's to Socrates.

[2] P. 574.

δαιμόνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς Θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι· I despise not the Deity, O Socrates, but think him to be a more magnificent Being than that he should stand in need of my worship of him:—Socrates again answers, *ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἀξιοῖ σε Θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτό·* How much the more magnificent and illustrious that Being is, which takes care of you, so much the more, in all reason, ought it to be honored by you.—Lastly, Aristodemus discovering his disbelief of Providence, as a thing, which seemed to him incredible, if not impossible, that one and the same Deity should be able to mind all things at once, Socrates endeavors to cure this disbelief of his in this manner: [1] *ὦ ἀγαθὲ, κατάμαθε, ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται· οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ οὕτω τίθεσθαι· καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι, ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ φθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾷν.* Consider, friend, I pray you, if that mind, which is in our body, does order and dispose it every way as it pleases; why should not that wisdom, which is in the universe, be able to order all things therein also, as seemeth best to it? And if your eye can discern things several miles distant from it, why should it be thought impossible for the eye of God to behold all things at once? Lastly, if your soul can mind things both here and in Egypt, and in Sicily; why may not the great mind or wisdom of God be able to take care of all things, in all places?—And then he concludes, that if Aristodemus would diligently apply himself to the worship of God, he should at length be convinced, *ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, ὥσθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾷν, καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν, καὶ παντιχοῦ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι·* That God is such and so great a Being, as that he can, at once, see all things, and hear all things, and be present everywhere, and take care of all affairs.—Moreover, Socrates, in his discourse with Euthydemus, in Xenophon's fourth book, speaks thus concerning that invisible Deity, which governs the whole world; [2] *οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἡμῖν τὰ ὀγαθὰ διδόντες, οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόασιν, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι,* etc. *οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τόδε οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστιν. ἐννόει δὲ καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ὀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾷν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῇ θεᾶσθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφοιρεῖται·* The other gods giving us good things, do it without visibly appearing to us; and that God, who framed and containeth the whole world (in which are all good and excellent things) and who continually

[1] P. 575. [2] P. 633.

supplieth us with them, he, though he be seen to do the greatest things of all, yet notwithstanding is himself invisible and unseen. Which ought the less to be wondered at by us, because the sun, who seemeth manifest to all, yet will not suffer himself to be exactly and distinctly viewed, but if any one boldly and impudently gaze upon him, will deprive him of his sight: as also because the soul of man, which most of all things in him partaketh of the Deity, though it be that which manifestly rules and reigns in us, yet is it never seen: ἃ χρὴ κατονοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γινομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ καταμανθάνοντα, τιμᾷν τὸ δαιμόνιον· Which particulars he that considers, ought not to despise invisible things, but to honor the supreme Deity, taking notice of his power from his effects. Where we have τὸ δαιμόνιον, as also before τὸ Θεῖον, plainly put for the supreme Deity. And we did the rather set down these passages of Socrates here, concerning God and Providence, that we might shame those, who, in these latter days of ours, are so atheistically inclined, if at least they have any pudor or shame left in them.

But, notwithstanding Socrates's thus clear acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, it doth not therefore follow, that he rejected all those other inferior gods of the Pagans, as is commonly conceived. But the contrary thereunto appeareth from these very passages of his now cited, wherein there is mention made of other gods besides the supreme. And how conformable Socrates was to the Pagan religion and worship, may appear from those last dying words of his, (when he should be most serious), after he had drunk the poison, wherein he required his friends to offer a votive cock for him to Æsculapius: for which Origen[1] thus superstringeth him καὶ τηλικαῦτα φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν τῆς καλῶς βεβιωκυίας διεξελθόντες καταλιπόντες τὸ μέγεθος ὧν αὐτοῖς ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανέρωσεν, εὐτελῆ φρονοῦσικια, σμικρά, ἀλεκτρυόνα τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ἀποδιδόντες· And they who had philsophized so excellently concerning the soul, and discoursed concerning the happiness of the future state to those who live well, do afterward sink down from those great, high, and noble things, to a superstitious regard of little, small, and trifling matters, such as the paying of a cock to Æsculapius. — Where, notwithstanding, Origen doth not charge Socrates with such gross and downright idolatry, as he does elsewhere,[2] for his sacrificing to the Pythian Apollo, who was but an inferior demon. And perhaps some may excuse Socrates here, as thinking, that

[1] Cont. Cels. l. ix. p. 277.

[2] Vide Orig. advers. Celsum, lib. vii. p. 335.

he looked upon Æsculapius no otherwise than as the supreme Deity, called by that name, as exercising his providence over the sickness and health or recovery of men, and that therefore he would have an eucharistic sacrifice offered to him in his behalf, as having now cured him, at once, of all diseases by death. However Plato[1] informs us, that Socrates, immediately before he drunk his poison, did *εὔχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ εἶναι·* prayer (not to God, but to the gods, that is, to the supreme and inferior gods both together, as in Plato's Phædrus he did to Pan, and the other tutelar gods of that place) that his translation from hence into the other world might be happy to him. And Xenophon, in his Memoirs,[2] informs us, that Socrates did, both in his words and practice, approve of that doctrine of the Pythian Apollo, That the rule of piety and religion ought to be the law of every particular city and country, he affirming it to be a vanity for any man to be singular herein. Lastly, in his own apology, as written by Plato, he professes to acknowledge the sun, moon and stars for gods; condemning the contrary doctrine of Anaxagoras, as irrational and absurd. Wherefore we may well conclude this opinion, of Socrates's being condemned for denying the many gods of the Pagans, or of his being a martyr for one only God, to be nothing but a vulgar error.

But if you therefore demand, what that accusation of impiety really was, which he was charged with, Socrates himself, in Plato's Euthyphro, will inform you, that it was for his free and open condemning those traditions concerning the gods, wherein wicked, dishonest and unjust actions were imputed to them. For when Euthyphro, having accused his own father as guilty of murder (merely for committing a homicide into prison, who happened to die there) would justify himself from the examples of the gods, namely Jupiter and Saturn, because Jupiter, the best and justest of the gods, had committed his father Saturn to prison for devouring his sons, as Saturn himself also had castrated his father Cælius for some miscarriages of his, Socrates thus bespeaks him;[3] *Ἀράγε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ' ἔστιν οὗ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πῶς ὑποδέχομαι,* etc. Is not this the very thing, O Euthyphro, for which I am accused? namely, because when I hear any one affirming such matters as these concerning the gods, I am very loath to believe them, and stick not publicly to declare my dislike of them? And can you, O Euthyphro, in good earnest think, that there are indeed wars and contentions among

[1] In Phædone, p. 402. oper. Lib. iv. p. 634. oper.

[3] P. 49. [4] P. 49.

the gods, and that those other things were also done by them, which poets and painters commonly impute to them? such as the peplum or veil of Minerva, which in the Panathenaics is with great pomp and ceremony brought into the acropolis, is embroidered all over with?—Thus we see, that Socrates, though he asserted one supreme Deity, yet he acknowledged, notwithstanding, other inferior created gods, together with the rest of the Pagans, honoring and worshipping them; only he disliked those poetic fables concerning them (believed at that time by the vulgar,) in which all manner of unjust and immoral actions were fathered on them; which, together with the envy of many, was the only true reason, why he was then accused of impiety and Atheism.

It hath been also affirmed by many, that Plato really asserted one only God and no more, and that therefore, whensoever he speaks of gods plurally, he must be understood to have done this, not according to his own judgment, but only in a way of politic compliance with the Athenians, and for fear of being made to drink poison in like manner as Socrates was. In confirmation of which opinion, there is also a passage cited out of that thirteenth epistle of Plato's to Dionysius, wherein he gives this as a mark, whereby his serious epistles, and such as were written according to the true sense of his own mind, might by his friends be distinguished from those which were otherwise; *τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπουδαίας ἐπιστολῆς Θεὸς ἄρχει, Θεοὶ δὲ τῆς ἧττον·* When I begin my epistles with God, then may you conclude I write seriously; but not so when I begin with gods.[1]—And this place seems to be therefore the more authentic, because it was long since produced by Eusebius to this very purpose, namely, to prove, that Plato acknowledged one only God; *δῆλος δέ ἐστιν ἕνα Θεὸν εἰδὼς, εἰ καὶ συνήθως Ἕλλησι, τῇ τῶν πλειόνων εἴωσθε χρῆσθαι προσηγορίᾳ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, ἐν ᾗ σύμβολα διδοὺς τῶν τε διὰ σπουδῆς αὐτῷ γραφομένων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλως ἀπερῤῥιμμένων·* It is manifest, that Plato really acknowledged one only God, however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often spake of gods plurally, from that epistle of his to Dionysius, wherein he gives this symbol or mark, whereby he might be known to write seriously, namely, when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods.

Notwithstanding which, we have already manifested, out of Plato's Timæus, that he did in good earnest assert a plurality of gods; by which gods of his are to be understood animated or intellectual beings superior to men, to whom there is an honor and worship from men due;

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[1] Præp. Ev. l. xi. c. xiii. [p. 530.]

he therein declaring,[1] not only the sun and stars, but also the earth itself (as animated) to be a god or goddess. For though it be now read in our copies *πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων*, that the earth was the oldest of all the bodies within the heavens ;—yet it is certain, that anciently it was read otherwise, *πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν*, the oldest of the gods—not only from Proclus and Cicero, but also from Laertius[2] writing thus : *γῆν δὲ πρεσβυτάτην μὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεῶν, γενέσθαι δὲ δημιούργημα, ὡς νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν, οὖσαν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον·* Though Plato's gods were for the most part fiery, yet did he suppose the earth to be a god or goddess too, affirming it to be the oldest of all the gods within the heavens, made or created to distinguish day and night, by its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, in the middle or centre of the world.—For Plato, when he wrote his Timæus, acknowledging only the diurnal motion of the earth, though afterwards he is said to have admitted its annual too. And the same might be further evinced from all his other writings, but especially his book of Laws (together with his Epinomis) said to have been written by him in his old age, in which he much insists upon the godships of the sun, moon and stars ; and complains, that the young gentlemen of Athens were then so much infected with that Anaxagorean doctrine, which made them to be nothing but inanimate stones and earth ; as also he approves of that then vulgarly-received custom of worshipping the rising and setting sun and moon, as gods, to which, in all probability, he conformed himself : [3]*Ἀνατέλλοντος τε ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, καὶ πρὸς δυσμὰς ἰόντων, προσκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ Βαρβάρων πάντων, ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν εἰπραγίαις, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὄντων, καὶ οὐδαμῆ ὑποφίαν ἐνδιδόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοί.* The prostrations and adorations, that are used both by the Greeks and all Barbarians, towards the rising and setting sun and moon (as well in their prosperities as adversities), declare them to be unquestionably esteemed gods.—Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude, but that this thirteenth epistle of Plato to Dionysius, though extant, it seems, before Eusebius's time, yet was supposititious and counterfeit by some zealous but ignorant Christian : as there is accordingly a *Νοθεύεται*, or brand of bastardy, prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato's works.

However, though Plato acknowledged and worshipped many gods, yet it is undeniably evident, that he was no Polyarchist, but a Monarchist, an assertor of one supreme God, the only *αὐτοφυὴς*, or self-originated Being—the maker of the heaven and earth, and of all those

[1] P. 40. Ser. [2] III. segm. 75. p. 211.

[3] De Leg. x. [p. 446. op.]

other gods. For, first, it is plain, that, according to Plato, the soul of the whole world was not itself eternal, much less self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, though indeed before its body, the world, from these words of his; [1]*τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ Θεὸς νεωτέραν, ὃ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου συνεστήσατο·* God did not fabricate or make the soul of the world, in the same order that we now treat concerning it, that is, after it, as junior to it; but that, which was to rule over the world, as its body, being more excellent, he made it first, and senior to the same.—Upon which account, Aristotle quarrels with Plato as contradicting himself, in that he affirmed the soul to be a principle, and yet supposed it not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven: [2]*ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν, ἣν οἴεται ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἐνίοτε αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν, ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή·* Neither is it possible for Plato here to extricate himself, who sometimes declares the soul to be a principle, as that which moves itself, and yet affirms it again not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven.—For which cause some Platonists conclude, that Plato asserted a double Psyche, one the third hypostasis of his trinity, and eternal; the other created in time, together with the world, which seems to be a probable opinion. Wherefore, since, according to Plato, the soul of the world, which is the chief of all his inferior gods, was not self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, all those other gods of his, which were but parts of the world, as the sun, moon, stars and demons, must needs be so too. But, lest any should suspect, that Plato might, for all that, suppose the world and its gods not to have been made by one only unmade God, but by a multitude of co-ordinate, self-existent principles, or deities conspiring; we shall oberve, that the contrary hereunto is plainly declared by him, in way of answer to that query, whether or no there were many and infinite worlds, (as some philosophers had maintained), or only one? he resolving it thus, [3]*πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; ἕνα, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῶα, μεθ' ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη*, etc. *ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν, ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ, διὰ ταῦτα οὔτε δύο, οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονώς, ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσεται.* Whether have

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[1] Plat. Tim. p. 34. [p. 528. oper.]

[2] Arist. Met. l. xiv. c. vi. [p. 478. tom. iv. oper.]

[3] Tim. p. 31. [p. 527. edit. Ficini.]

we rightly affirmed, that there is only one heaven, (or world) or is it more agreeable to reason, to hold many or infinite? We say there is but one, if it be made agreeable to its intellectual paradigm, containing the ideas of all animals and other things in it; for there can be but one archetypal animal, which is the paradigm of all created beings: wherefore, that the world may agree with its paradigms in this respect of solitude or oneliness, therefore is it not two, nor infinite, but one only begotten.—His meaning is, that there is but one archetypal Mind, the Demiurgus, or maker of all things that were produced, and therefore but one world.

And this one God, which, according to Plato, was the maker of the whole world, is frequently called by him, in his Timæus and elsewhere, ὁ *Θεὸς*, God, or the God—by way of excellency; sometimes ὁ *Δημιουργὸς*, the Architect or Artificer of the world;—sometimes ὁ *Ποιητὴς καὶ Πατὴρ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς*, the Maker and Father of this universe—whom it is hard to find out, but impossible to declare to the vulgar: again, ὁ *ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸς*, the God over all:—*τῆς Φύσεως κριστὴς*, the Creator of nature—*τοῖ παντὸς Ἀρχὴ*, the sole Principle of the universe—*πάντων Αἴτιον*, the Cause of all things—*Νοῦς πάντων βασιλεὺς*, Mind, the King of all things—*Νοῦς αὐτοκράτωρ, πάντα κοσμῶν, διὰ πάντων ἰὼν*, that sovereign Mind, which orders all things, and passes through all things—*τοῦ παντὸς Κυβερνήτης*, the Governor of the whole—*τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον*, that which always is, and was never made—ὁ *πρῶτος Θεὸς*, the first God—ὁ *μέγιστος Δαίμων*, and ὁ *μέγιστος θεῶν*, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods—ὁ *ἥλιον γεννήσας*, he that generated or produced the sun—[1]ὁ *γῆν, οὐρανὸν, καὶ θεοὺς, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν ᾅδου, καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται*, he that makes earth, and heaven, and the gods; and doth all things, both in heaven and hell, and under the earth—again, he by whose efficiency the things of the world *ὕστερον ἐγένετο, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα*,[2] were afterwards made when they were not before; or from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being. —This philosopher somewhere intimating, that it was as easy for God to produce those real things, the sun, moon, stars and earth, etc. from himself, as it is for us to produce the images of ourselves and whatsoever else we please, only by interposing a looking-glass. Lastly, he is called [3]ὃς *πάντα τά τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτὸν*, he that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself—the meaning whereof is this: he, that is *αὐτοφυής*; (as the same Plato also calls him), a self-originated Being, and from no other cause besides himself, but the

[1] De Rep. l. x. [p. 511.]
[2] In Sophist. [p. 168.]
[3] D. Rep. l. x. [p. 561.]

cause of all other things.—Neither doth Lactantius Firmianus[1] himself refuse to speak of God after this very manner ; *se ipsum fecit*, and that he was "ex se ipso procreatus, et propterea talis, qualem se esse voluit ;" that he made himself—and that being procreated from himself, he therefore was every way such as he willed himself to be. Which unusual and bold strain of theology is very much insisted upon by Plotinus,[2] in his book *Περὶ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνὸς*, concerning the will of the first One, or Unity ; he there writing thus of the supreme God, *αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸν αὐτός* ; He is the cause of himself, and he is from himself, and himself is for himself.—And again, *αὐτός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ κύριος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ οὐχ ὥς τις ἕτερος ἐθέλησε γενόμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς θέλει αὐτός·* This is he, who is the maker of himself, and is lord over himself ; (in a certain sense) for he was not made that, which another willed him to be, but he is that, which he willeth himself to be.—Moreover,[3] *αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο ὅσπερ ἠγάπησε, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὑποστήσας αὐτὸν, εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτὸς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν οἰδενὸς, ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτὸς, οὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκεν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτὸς καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ἐθέλει*, etc. The Supreme Deity loving himself as a pure light, is himself what he loved ; thus, as it were, begetting and giving subsistence to himself, he being a standing energy. Wherefore, since God is a work or energy, and yet he is not the work or energy of any other being, he must needs be (in some sense) his own work or energy ; so that God is not that, which he happened to be, but that which he willeth himself to be. Thus also a little before, [4]*ἀνακτέον εἰς ἓν τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν· τὸ δὲ θέλειν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ εἶναι παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὐτὸν, ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταυτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτὸν, ὥστε οὐχ ὥσπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός.* We must of necessity make will and essence the same in the first Being. Wherefore, since his willing is from himself, his being must needs be from himself too ; the consequence of which ratiocination is this, that He made himself. For if his volition be from himself, and his own work, and this be the same with his hypostasis or substance ; he may be then said to have given subsistence to himself. Wherefore he is not what he happened to be, but what he willed himself to be. But, because this is so unusual a notion, we shall here set down yet one or two passages more of this philosopher's concerning it : [5]*οὐκ ἔξω τῆς βουλήσεως αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, ἀλλὰ*

[1] Instit. Divin. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 53. et lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 214.

[2] En. vi. l. viii. p. 749, [cap. xiv. p. 750.]

[3] P. 751.

[4] P. 748.

[5] P. 747.

σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἷον οὐσίᾳ ἡ θέλησις· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν, ἄνευ τοῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ, ὅπερ ἐστι· καὶ σύνδρομος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ὧν ὅπερ θέλει· καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτὸς ἕν· καὶ τούτῳ οὐχ ἧττον, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτὸς ὥσπερ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἄν· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἠθέλησε, ἢ τοῦτο ὅ ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὑποθοίμεθα ἐλέσθαι αὐτῷ ὅτι θέλοι γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν εἰς ἄλλο, μήτε ἂν ἄλλο τι γενέσθαι βουληθῆναι, μήτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ τι μέμψασθαι, ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ὂν ὅ ἐστι, τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἠθέλησε καὶ θέλει· ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις, θέλησις αὐτοῦ· The essence of the supreme God is not without his will, but his will and essence are the same; so that God concurreth with himself, himself being willing to be as he is, and being that which he willeth; and his will and himself being one and the same. For himself is not one thing (as happening to be that which he is) and that he would will to be another: for what could God will to be, but that which he is? And if we should suppose, that it were in his own choice to be what he would, and that he had liberty to change his nature into whatsoever else he pleased, it is certain that he would neither will to be any thing else besides what he is, nor complain of himself as being now that which he is out of necessity, he being indeed no other but that, which himself hath willed, and doth always will to be. For his will is his essential goodness; so that his will doth not follow his nature, but concur with it; in the very essence of this good there being contained his choice, and willing of himself to be such. Lastly, [1]*Πᾶν ἄρα βούλησις, καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως ἄρα· πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βούλησις αὐτός, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβούλετο ἄρα καὶ οἷον ἐβούλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βουλήσει ἑπόμενον ὅ ἡ τοιαύτη βούλησις ἐγέννα· ἐγέννα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν αὐτῷ·* God is all will, nor is there any thing in him which he doth not will, nor is his being before his will, but his will is himself, or he himself the first will. So that he is as he would himself, and such as he would, and yet his will did not generate or produce any thing that was not before.—And now we may in all probability conclude, that Lactantius derived this doctrine from Plato and Plotinus; which, how far it is to be either allowed of or excused, we leave others to judge; only we shall observe, that, as the word *αὐτογενής*, frequently attributed to God by Christians as well as Pagans,[2] seems to imply as much; so the scope and drift of Plotinus, in all this, was plainly no other, than partly to set forth the self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively manner, and partly to confute that

[1] P. 755.

[2] Vide Dionys. Patav. Dogmat. Theolog. de Trinitate, lib. v. cap. v. § xiv. p. 294. tom. ii.

odd conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happened, by chance, to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of nature, and had his being imposed upon him: whereas, he is as much every way what he would will and choose to be, as if he had made himself by his own will and choice. Neither have we set down all this, only to give an account of that one expression of Plato's, that God causeth himself and all things—but also to show how punctually precise, curious and accurate some of these Pagans were in their speculations concerning the Deity.

To return therefore to Plato: though some have suspected that trinity, which is commonly called Platonic, to have been nothing but a mere figment and invention of some later Platonists; yet the contrary hereunto seems to be unquestionably evident, that Plato himself really asserted such a trinity of universal and Divine hypostases, which have the nature of principles. For, first, whereas, in his tenth book of Laws, he professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a Deity, he does notwithstanding there ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or universal mundane soul, as a self-moving principle, and the immediate or proper cause of all that motion, which is in the world. And this is all the god that there he undertakes to prove. But in other places of his writings he frequently asserts, above the self-moving Psyche, an immoveable and standing Nous or intellect, which was properly the Demiurgus, or architectonic framer of the whole world. And, lastly, above this multiform Intellect, he plainly asserts yet a higher hypostasis, one most simple and most absolutely perfect Being; which he calls τὸ ἕν, in opposition to that multiplicity, which speaks something of imperfection in it, and τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν, goodness itself, as being above mind and understanding; the first intelligible, and an infinite fecundity together with overflowing benignity. And accordingly in his second epistle to Dionysius does he mention a trinity of Divine hypostases all together. Now the words ὁ θεὸς and τὸ θεῖον, God and the Divinity—in Plato, seem sometimes to comprehend this whole trinity of Divine hypostases, as they are again sometimes severally applied to each of them, accordingly as we have already observed, that Zeus or Jupiter in Plato is not always taken for the first and highest hypostasis in his trinity, but sometimes the second hypostasis of mind or intellect is meant thereby, and sometimes again his third hypostasis of the universal and eternal Psyche; nevertheless the first of these three hypostases is that, which is properly called by the Platonists πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, the fountain of the Godhead, and by Plato himself[1] ὁ πάντων

[1] Epist. ii. ad. Dionys. p. 707. oper.

βασιλευς, περὶ ὃν πάντα ἐστὶ, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὃ αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν The King of all things, about whom are all things, and for whose sake are all things, and the cause of all good and excellent things.

And this first Divine hypostasis, which in Plato's theology is properly *αὐτόθεος*, the original Deity—is largely insisted upon by that philsopher in the sixth of his Politics, under the name and title of *τ' ἀγαθὸν*, the Good—but principally there illustrated by that resemblance of the sun, called by that philosopher also, a heavenly god, and said to be the offspring of this highest Good, and something analogous to it in the corporeal world, *ὅ, τί περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ, πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα·* This is the same in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the sun is in the sensible world to sight and visibles. For, as the sun is not sight, but only the cause of it; nor is that light by which we see, the same with the sun itself, but only *ἡλιοειδὲς*, a sun-like thing; so neither is the supreme and highest Good (properly) knowledge, but the cause of knowledge; nor is intellect (precisely considered as such) the best and most perfect being, but only *ἀγαθοειδὲς*, a boniform thing. Again, As the sun gives to things not only their visibility, but also their generation; so does that highest Good, not only cause the cognoscibility of things, but also their very essences and beings.—*Οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος*, this highest God being not itself properly essence, but above essence, transcending the same, both in respect of dignity and power.—Which language and conceit of Plato's some of the Greek fathers seem to have entertained, yet so as to apply it to the whole Trinity, when they call God *ὑπερούσιον*, or superessential.—But the meaning of that philosopher was, as we conceive, no other than this, that this highest Good hath no particular characteristic upon it, limiting and determining of it, it being the hidden and incomprehensible source of all things. In the last place, we shall observe, that this first Divine hypostasis of the Platonic trinity is by that philosopher called *τοῦτε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πάντων πατὴρ*, the Father of the prince, and cause of all things.—Wherein we cannot but take notice of an admirable correspondency betwixt the Platonic philosophy and Christianity, in that the second hypostasis of both their trinities (called also sometimes *Λόγος* by the Platonists as well as *Νοῦς*) is said to be the immediate cause of all things; and the Demiurgus, the architect, maker or artificer of the whole world.

Now to Plato we might here join Xenophon, because he was his equal, and a Socratic too, (though it seems there was not so good

correspondence betwixt them ;) which Xenophon, however in sundry places of his writings he acknowledge a plurality of gods, yet doth he give plain testimony also of one supreme and universal Numen ; as this particularly,[1] *ὁ πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τίς, καὶ δυνατὸς φανερὸς ὁποῖος δ' ἐστὶ μορφὴν ἀφανής·* He that both agitates all things, and establisheth the frame of the whole world, though he be manifest to be great and powerful, yet is he, as to his form, inconspicuous.

XXIV. In the next place we come to Aristotle : who, that he acknowledged more gods than one (as well as the other Pagans) appears from his using the word so often plurally. As particularly in this passage of his Nicomachian Ethics ; [2]*ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία, ὅτι θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη· τοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας ; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους ; ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν· ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους ; τίνι δὲ δώσουσι ; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον· εἰ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν ; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας· διεξιοῖσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρά καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτούς· καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθεύδειν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα· τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τὸ πράττειν ἀφῃρημένῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας·* That perfect happiness is a speculative or contemplative energy, may be made manifest from hence, because we account the gods most of all happy. Now what moral actions can we attribute to them ? Whether those of justice amongst one another ; as if it were not ridiculous to suppose the gods to make contracts and bargains among themselves and the like. Or else those of fortitude and magnanimity ; as if the gods had their fears, dangers and difficulties to encounter withal. Or those of liberality ; as if the gods had some such thing as money too, and there were among them indigent to receive alms. Or, lastly, shall we attribute to them the actions of temperance ? But would not this be a reproachful commendation of the gods, to say, that they conquer and master their vicious lusts and appetites ? Thus running through all the actions of moral virtue, we find them to be small, and mean, and unworthy of the gods. And yet we all believe the gods to live, and consequently to act ; unless we should suppose

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[1] Vide Clement. Alexandrin. in Cohort. ad Gentes, cap. vi. p. 61, et Stromat. lib. v. p. 417.

[2] L. x. c. viii. [p. 183. tom. iii. oper.]

them perpetually to sleep, as Endymion did. Wherefore if all moral actions, and therefore much more mechanical operations, be taken away from that which lives and understands, what is there left to it besides contemplation? To which he there adds a further argument also of the same thing: Because other animals, who are deprived of contemplation, partake not of happiness. For to the gods all their life is happy; to men so far forth, as it approacheth to contemplation; but brute animals, that do not at all contemplate, partake not at all of happiness.—Where Aristotle plainly acknowledges a plurality of gods, and that there is a certain higher rank of beings above men. And by the way we may here observe, how from those words of his, *ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασι θεοὺς*, all men suppose the gods to live—and from what follows in him, that opinion of some late writers may be confuted, that the Pagans generally worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as true and proper gods: Aristotle here telling us, that they universally agreed in this, that the gods were animals, living and understanding beings, and such as are therefore capable of contemplation. Moreover, Aristotle in his Politics, writing of the means to conserve a tyranny, as he calls it, sets down this for one amongst the rest; [1]*ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἧττόν τε γὰρ φοβοῦνται, τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν· καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεούς·* For a prince or monarch to seem to be always more than ordinarily sedulous about the worship of the gods; because men are less afraid of suffering any injustice from such kings or princes, as they think to be religiously disposed, and devoutly affected towards the gods. Neither will they be so apt to make conspiracies against such, they supposing, that the gods will be their abettors and assistants. —Where the word *δεισιδαίμων* seems to be taken in a good sense, and in way of commendation for a religious person; though we must confess, that Aristotle himself does not here write so much like a *δεισιδαίμων*, as a mere politician. Likewise in his first book De Cœlo, he writeth thus; [2]*πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν, καὶ πάντες τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀποδιδόασι, καὶ Βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες, ὡς τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ ἀθάνατον συνηρτημένον, εἴπερ οὖν ἐστί τι θεῖον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔστι,* etc. All men have an opinion or persuasion that there are gods. And they, who think so, as well barbarians as Greeks, attribute the highest place to that which is Divine, as supposing the immortal heavens to be most accommodate to immortal gods. Wherefore, if there be any Di-

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1 L. v. c. xi. 2 C. iii. [p. 615. tom. i. oper.]

vinity, as unquestionably there is, the body of the heavens must be acknowledged to be of a different kind from that of the elements.—And in the following book he tells us again, That it is most agreeable *τῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν*, to that vaticination, which all men have in their minds concerning the gods, to suppose the heaven to be a quintessence distinct from the elements, and therefore incorruptible.—Where Aristotle affirmeth, that men have generally *μαντείαν*, a vaticination in their minds concerning gods; to wit, that themselves are not the highest beings, but that there is a rank of intellectual beings, superior to men; the chief of which is the supreme Deity; concerning whom there is indeed the greatest *μαντεία*, or vaticination of all.

We acknowledge it to be very true, that Aristotle does not so much insist upon demons, as Plato and the generality of Pagans in that age did; and probably he had not so great a belief of their existence; though he doth make mention of them also, as when in his Metaphysics,[1] speaking of bodies compounded of the elements, he instanceth in *ζῶά τε καὶ δαιμόνια*, animals and demons—and elsewhere he insinuates them to have airy bodies, in these words; *ἐπιζητήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις, καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν, ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ, τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις βελτίων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα*, some perhaps would demand a reason, why the soul that is in the air,[2] is better and more immortal than that in animals.—However, whether Aristotle believed these lower demon gods or no, it is certain, that he acknowledged a higher kind of gods, namely, the intelligences of all the several spheres, if not also the souls of them and the stars; which spheres being, according to the astronomy then received, forty seven in number, he must needs acknowledge at least so many gods. Besides which, Aristotle seems also to suppose another sort of incorporeal gods, without the heavens, where, according to him, there is neither body, nor place, nor vacuum, nor time; in these words; [3]*οὐτ' ἐν τόπῳ τ' ακεῖ πέφυκεν, οὔτε χρόνος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ γηράσκειν, οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς οὐδεμία μεταβολὴ, τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων φορὰν, ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ, τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ αὐταρκεστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα·* They, who exist there, are such as are neither apt to be in a place, nor to wax old with time, nor is there any change at all in those things above the highest sphere; but they being impassible and unalterable, lead the best and most self-sufficient life, throughout all eternity.—But this passage is not without suspicion of being supposititious.

Notwithstanding all which, that Aristotle did assert one supreme

[1] Lib. v. cap. viii. p. 329. tom. vi. oper.
[2] De An. l. i. [cap. viii. p. 17. tom. ii. oper.]
[3] De Cœl. l. i. c. ix. [p. 631. tom. i. oper.]

and universal Numen, is a thing also unquestionable. For though it be granted, that he useth the singular *θεὸς*, as likewise *τὸ θεῖον* and *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, many times indefinitely, for a god in general, or any Divine being; and that such places as these have been oftentimes mistaken by Christian writers, as if Aristotle had meant the supreme God in them; yet it is nevertheless certain, that he often useth those words also emphatically, for one only supreme God. As in that of his Metaphysics, [1]*ὅ, τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις.* God seemeth to be a cause and certain principle to all things. And also in this De Anima, where he speaks of the soul of the heavens, and its circular motion: *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεταί γ' ἐχρῆν τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦτο κίκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅτι βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κίνεσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως·* Neither is that a good cause of the circular motion of the heavens, which they (that is, the Platonists) call the *τὸ βέλτιον*, because it is better that it should be so than otherwise; as if God therefore ought to have made the soul of the world such, as to move the heaven circularly, because it was better for it to move so than otherwise: but this being a speculation that properly belongs to some other science, we shall no further pursue it in this place.—Thus afterwards again, in the same book,[2] *συμβαίνει δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γε καὶ ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἓν οὐ γνωριεῖ, τὸ Νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα, ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον·* It follows from Empedocles's principles, that God must needs be the most unwise of all, he alone being ignorant of that (out of which all other things are compounded) *νεῖκος*, or contention—(because himself is nothing but *φιλία*, unity and friendship)—whereas mortal animals may know or conceive all things, they being compounded of all. Which same passage we have again also, in his Metaphysics,[3] from whence it was before cited to another purpose. To these might be added another place out of his book of Generation and Corruption[4] *τὸ ὅλον συνεπλήρωσεν ὁ θεὸς, ἐντελεχῆ ποιήσας γένεσιν.* God hath filled up the whole, or universe, and constantly supplies the same, having made a continual successive generation.—Lastly, *τὸ δαιμόνιον* is sometimes plainly used by Aristotle also, not for the Divinity in general, or any thing that is Divine, but for that one supreme Deity, the governor of the whole world. Thus in that passage of his Rhetoric to Alexander, [5]*τοῦτό ἐστιν ᾧ διαφέρομεν τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων,*

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[1] L. i. [cap. ii. p. 263. tom. iv. oper.] l. i. c. iii. [p. 10. tom. ii. oper.]
[2] Lib. i. cap. vii. p. 16. tom. ii. oper.
[3] Lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 295. tom. iv. oper.
[4] Lib. ii. cap. x. p. 741. tom. i. oper.
[5] Cap. i. p. 609. [p. 833. tom. iii. oper.]

ἡμεῖς οἱ μεγίστης τιμῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τετυχηκότες· This is that, wherein we men differ from other animals, having received the greatest honor from God, that though they be endued with appetite and anger and other passions, as well as we, yet we alone are furnished with speech and reason.

Over and besides which, Aristotle in his Metaphysics[1] (as hath been already observed) professedly opposeth that imaginary opinion of many independent principles, of the universe : that is, of many unmade self-existent deities ; he confuting the same from the phenomena, because ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται, all things are plainly co-ordered to one—the whole world conspiring into one agreeing harmony ; whereas if there were many principles or independent deities, the system of the world must needs have been ἐπεισοδιώδης, incoherent and inconspiring—like an ill-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent intersertions. Whereupon Aristotle concludes after this manner, τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται κακῶς πολιτεύεσθαι.

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν Πολυκοιρανίη, Εἷς Κοίρανος·

But things will not be ill administered—(which was then it seems a kind of proverbial speech) and according to Homer, the government of many is not good, (nor could the affairs of the world be evenly carried on under it) wherefore there is one prince or monarch over all. From which passage of Aristotle's it is evident, that though he asserted Πολυθεΐαν, a multiplicity of gods—in the vulgar sense, as hath been already declared, yet he absolutely denied Πολυκοιρανίην and Πολυαρχίαν, a polyarchy or mundane aristocracy—that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities. Wherefore though Aristotle doated much upon that whimsy of his, of as many intelligibles, or eternal and immovable minds (now commonly called intelligences) as there are moveable spheres of all kinds in the heavens (which he sticks not also sometimes to call principles) ; yet must he of necessity be interpreted to have derived all these from one supreme universal Deity, which, as Simplicius expresseth it, is Ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν, the principle of principles ;—and which comprehends and contains those inferior deities under it, after the same manner as the *primum mobile*, or highest sphere, contains all the lesser spheres within it : because otherwise there would not be εἷς Κοίρανος, one prince or monarch over the whole ; but the government of the world would be a polykœrany or aristocracy of gods, concluded to be an ill government. Moreover, as Plotinus represents

[1] Lib. xiv. c. x. Par. [p. 484. tom. iv. oper.]

Aristotle's[1] sense, it is not conceivable, that so many independent principles should thus constantly conspire, *πρὸς ἓν ἔργον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ συμφωνίαν*, into one work, that agreeable symphony and harmony of the whole heaven.—As there could not be any reason neither, why there should be just so many of these intelligences as there are spheres, and no more; and it is absurd to suppose, *κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι*, that the first principles of the universe happened by chance.

Now this highest principle, as it is *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, an immoveable essence—is by Aristotle in the first place supposed to be *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*, the principle of motion in the universe—or at least of that chiefest motion of the *primum mobile* or highest sphere (which according to the astronomy of those times seems to have been the sphere of fixed stars), by whose rapid circumgyration, all the other spheres and heavens were imagined to be carried round, from east to west. And accordingly the supreme Deity is by Aristotle called *τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*,[2] the first immoveable mover—or the mover of the *primum mobile*, and whole heaven. Which first mover being concluded by him to be but one, he doth from thence infer the singularity of the heaven or world, *ἓν μὲν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον ὄν· καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἓν μόνον. εἷς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος·* There is one numerically first immoveable mover and no more; and therefore there is but one moveable neither, that is, but one heaven or world.—In which doctrine of Aristotle's, there seems to be a great difference betwixt his philosophy and that of Plato's; in that Plato makes the principle of motion in the heavens and whole world to be a self-moving soul, but Aristotle supposeth it to be an immoveable mind or intellect. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle's explication of himself, the difference betwixt them is not great, if any at all; Aristotle's immoveable mover being understood by him, not to move the heavens efficiently, but only objectively and finally, *ὡς ἐρώμενον*, as being loved.—Which conceit of his Proclus upon Plato's Timæus perstringeth after this manner: [3]*τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν τὸν κόσμον ἐπιστρέψαντες ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἔρωτος, τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὀρεκτὸν, δόντες αὐτῷ τὴν κίνησιν, οὐδὲν ἔφασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καθήκειν εἰς αὐτὸν, ἐν ἴσῳ προστάξαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐρασμίοις μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μηδὲν δὲ γεννητικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει·* Some of the ancients converting the world to mind (or intellect) and making it move only by love of that first desirable, acknowledged nothing at all to descend down from Mind (or God) upon the world: but equalized

[1] Enn. 5. l. i. c. vii. [cap. ix. p. 490, 491.]

[2] Met. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1003. [p. 481. tom. iv. oper.] Met. l. xiv. c. viii. [p. 483. tom. iv. oper.]

[3] P. 167.

the same with other amiable things, amongst sensibles, that have nothing generative in their nature.—Where Proclus seems to suppose Aristotle to have attributed to God no efficiency at all upon the world; the contrary whereunto shall be evidently proved afterwards. In the mean time it is certain, that Aristotle, besides his immoveable mover of the heavens, which moveth only finally, or as being loved, must needs suppose another immediate mover of them, or efficient cause of that motion; which could be nothing but a soul, that, enamored with this supreme Mind, did, as it were in imitation of it, continually turn round the heavens. Which seems to be nothing but Plato's doctrine disguised; that philosopher affirming, likewise, the circular motions of the heavens, caused efficiently by a soul of the world in his Timæus,[1] to be *τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν*, a motion, that is most agreeable to that of mind or wisdom:—And again, in his Laws,[2] *τὴν τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν, οἰκειοτάτην καὶ ὁμοίαν*, that which of all corporeal motions only resembles the circuit of intellect.—Which Platonic conceit found entertainment with Boetius,[3] who writing of the soul of the world, represents it thus;

> Quæ cum secta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,
> In semet reditura meat, mentemque profundam
> Circuit, et simili convertit imagine cœlum.

Wherefore, as well according to Plato's hypothesis, as Aristotle's, it may be affirmed of the supreme Deity in the same Boetius's, language, that,

> ——— Stabilisque manens dat cuncta moveri.

Being itself immoveable, it causeth all other things to move.—The immediate efficient cause of which motion also, no less according to Aristotle than Plato, seems to have been a mundane soul; however, Aristotle thought not so fit to make this soul a principle; in all probability, because he was not so well assured of the incorporeity of souls, as of minds or intellects.

Nevertheless this is not the only thing, which Aristotle imputed to his first and highest immoveable principle, or the supreme Deity, its turning round of the *primum mobile*, and that no otherwise than as being loved, or as the final cause thereof, as Proclus supposed; but he, as well as Anaxagoras,[4] asserted it to be also *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν*, the

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[1] Cap. xvii. p. 241. edit. Fabricii.
[2] Lib. x. p. 669.
[3] De Consol. l. iii. Met. 9.
[4] Met. l. xiv. c. vii. p.

cause of well and fit—or τὸ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, that without which there could be no such thing as well—that is, no order, no aptitude, proportion and harmony in the universe: he declaring excellently, that εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὴ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, unless there were something else in the world besides sensibles, there could be neither beginning nor order in it, but one thing would be the principle of another infinitely, or without end.—And again, in another place already cited,[1] τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, ἴσως οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε γῆν, etc. οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει, it is not at all likely, that either fire or earth, or any such body, should be the cause of that well and fit that is in the world; nor can so noble an effect as this be reasonably imputed to chance or fortune.—Wherefore himself, agreeably with Anaxagoras, concludes, that it is Νοῦς or Mind, which is properly αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς, the cause of well and right—and accordingly does he frequently call the supreme Deity by that name. He affirming,[2] likewise, that the order, pulchritude and harmony of the whole world dependeth upon that one highest and supreme Being in it, after the same manner as the order of an army dependeth upon the general or emperor, who is not for the order, but the order for him. Which highest Being of the universe is therefore called by him also, conformably to Plato, τὸ ἀγαθὸν κεχωρισμένον, the separate good of the world—in way of distinction from that intrinsic or inherent good of it, which is the order and harmony itself: [3]Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι, καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό; ἢ τὴν τάξιν; ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος, οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν· πάντα γὰρ συντέτακταί πως· It is to be considered also, what is the good and best of the universe; whether its own order only? or something separate and existing by itself? or rather both of them together? As the good of an army consisteth both in its order, and likewise in its general or emperor, but principally in this latter, because the emperor is not for the order of the army, but the order of the army is for him; for all things are co ordered together with God, and respectively to him.—Wherefore since Aristotle's supreme Deity, by what name soever called, whether mind or good, is the proper efficient cause of all that well and fit, that is in the universe, of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony thereof; it must needs be granted, that besides its being the final cause of motion, or

[1] Ibid. lib. vii. cap. iii. p. 266. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Ibid. lib. xiv. cap. x. p. 484, 485. tom. vi. oper.

[3] Met. l. xiv. cap. x. [P. 484. tom. iv. oper.]

its turning round the heavens by being loved, it was also the efficient cause of the whole frame of nature and system of the world. And thus does he plainly declare his sense, where he applauds Anaxagoras[1] for maintaining *Νοῦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης αἴτιον*, that mind is the cause not only of all order, but also of the whole world :—and when himself positively affirms,[2] *ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις*, that from such a principle as this depends the heaven, and nature.—Where by heaven is meant the whole world, and by nature that artificial nature of his before insisted on, which doth nothing in vain, but always acteth for ends regularly, and is the instrument of the Divine mind. He also somewhere[3] affirmeth, that if the heavens or world were generated, that is, made in time, so as to have had a beginning, then it was certainly made, not by chance and fortune, but by such an artificial nature as is the instrument of a perfect mind. And in his Physics, where he contends for the world's ante-eternity, he concludes, nevertheless, [4]*ἀνάγκη νοῦν αἴτιον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι τοῦδε παντὸς*, that mind together with nature must of necessity be the cause of this whole universe.—For though the world were never so much coeternal with mind, yet was it in order of nature after it, and junior to it as the effect thereof, himself thus generously resolving, [5]*εὐλογώτατόν εἶναι νοῦν προγενέστατον, καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν· τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι*, that though some (that is, the Atheists) affirm the elements to have been the first beings, yet it was the most reasonable thing of all to conclude, that mind was the oldest of all things, and senior to the world and elements; and that, according to nature, it had a princely and sovereign dominion over all.—Wherefore, we think it now sufficiently evident, that Aristotle's supreme Deity does not only move the heavens as being loved, or is the final cause of motion, but also was the efficient cause of this whole mundane system, framed according to the best wisdom, and after the best manner possible.

For perhaps it may not be amiss here to observe, that God was not called Mind by Aristotle, and those other ancient philosophers, according to that vulgar sense of many in these days of ours ; as if he were indeed an understanding or perceptive Being, and that perfectly omniscient, but yet nevertheless such, as acted all things arbitrarily, being not determined by any rule or nature of goodness, but only by his own fortuitous will. For, according to those ancient philosophers, that,

[1] Met. l. i. c. iii. [p. 266. tom. iv. oper.]

[2] Met. l. xiv. c. vii. [p. 479. tom. iv. oper.]

[3] De Part. An. l. i.

[4] Lib. ii. c. vi. [p. 474. tom. i. oper.]

[5] Ar. de An. l. i. c. vii. [p. 16. tom. ii. oper.]

which acts without respect to good, would not be so much accounted *mens* as *dementia*, mind, as madness or folly; and to impute the frame of nature or system of the world, together with the government of the same, to such a principle as this, would have been judged by them all one, as to impute them to chance or fortune. But Aristotle and those other philosophers who called the supreme God Νοῦς or Mind, understand thereby that, which of all things in the whole world is most opposite to chance, fortune, and temerity; that which is regulated by the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the well and fit—of every thing, if it be not rather the very rule, measure and essence of fitness itself; that which acteth all for ends and good, and doth every thing after the best manner, in order to the whole. Thus Socrates in that place before cited out of Plato's Phædo, interprets the meaning of that opinion, That mind made the world, and was the cause of all things: ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν νοῦν πάντα κοσμεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ. That therefore every thing might be concluded to have been disposed of after the best manner possible. — And accordingly Theophrastus, Aristotle's scholar and successor, describeth God after this manner, τὸ πρῶτον καὶ θειότατον, πάντα τὰ ἄριστα βουλόμενος, that first and divinest Being of all, which willeth all the best things.—Whether of these two hypotheses concerning God, one of the ancient Pagan philosophers, that God is as essentially goodness as wisdom, or, as Plotinus after Plato calls him, decency and fitness itself; the other, of some late professors of Christianity, that he is nothing but arbitrary will, omnipotent and omniscient; I say, whether of these two is more agreeable to piety and true Christianity, we shall leave it to be considered.

Lastly, it is not without probability, that Aristotle did, besides the frame of nature, and fabric of the world, impute even the very substance of things themselves also to the Divine efficiency (nor indeed can there well be any doubt of any thing, save only the matter); partly from his affirming God to be a cause and principle to all things, and partly from his commending this doctrine of Anaxagoras, [1]ἅμα τῷ καλῶς, αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων νοῦν, that mind was, together with well and fit, the cause and principle of things themselves.—However, that Aristotle's inferior gods, at least, and therefore his intelligences of the lesser spheres, which were incorporeal substances, were all of them produced or created by one Supreme, may be further confirmed from this definition of his in his rhetoric, [2]τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ θεός, ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον, the Divinity is nothing but either God or the work of God.

[1] Met. l. i. c. iii. [p. 266. tom. iv. oper.]

[2] L. ii. c. xxiii. [p. 785. tom. iii. oper.]

— Where θεὸς is unquestionably used in way of eminency for the supreme Deity, as in those other places of Aristotle's before cited, to which sundry more might be added ; as, πάντα ἔχει τ᾽ ἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτάρκης,[1] God possesseth all good things, and is self-sufficient :— and again where he speaks of things, that are more than praise-worthy, [2]τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθὸν, πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τ᾽ἄλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι, such are God and Good, for to these are all other things referred.—But here Aristotle affirming, That there is nothing Divine, but either God himself, or the work and effect of God, plainly implies, that there was no multitude of self-existent deities, and that those intelligences of the lesser stars or spheres, however eternal, were themselves also produced or caused by one supreme Deity.

Furthermore, Aristotle[3] declares, that this speculation concerning the Deity does constitute a particular science by itself, distinct from those other speculative sciences of physiology, and the pure mathematics ; so that there are in all three speculative sciences, distinguished by their several objects, physiology, the pure mathematics, and theology, or metaphysics : the former of these, that is, physiology, being conversant περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀκίνητα, about things both insepara ble from matter, and moveable ;—the second (viz. geometry, or the pure mathematics) περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χωριστὰ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ, about things immoveable, indeed, but not really separable from matter, so as to exist alone by themselves ;—but the third and last, περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα, concerning things both immoveable and separable from matter —that is, incorporeal substances immoveable : this philosopher there adding, εἰ μή ἐστί τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δέ ἐστί τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα, καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη· that if there were no other substance besides these natural things, which are material and moveable, then would physiology be the first science ; but if there be any immoveable substance, the philosophy thereof must needs in order of nature be before the other.—Lastly, he concludes, that as the speculative sciences in general are more noble and excellent than the other, so is theology or metaphysics the most honorable of all the speculatives. Now the chief points of the Aristotelic theology, or metaphysical doctrine concerning God, seem to be these four following. First, that though all things be not ingenit or made, according to that in his book against Xenophanes,[4] ἆρ᾽ ἀνάγκη

[1] Mag. Mor. l. ii. c. xv. [p. 255. tom. iii. oper.]

[2] Eth. Nic. l. i. c. xii. [p. 18. tom. iii. oper.]

[3] Met. l. vi. c. i. [p. 346. tom. iv. oper.]

[4] De Xenophane, Zenone, et Georgia, cap. ii. p. 836. tom. ii. oper.

ἀγένητα πάντα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει γεγονέναι ἕτερα ἐξ ἑτέρων·[1] there is no necessity, that all things should be unmade, for what hinders but that some things may be generated from other things?—Yet there must needs be something eternal and unmade, as likewise incorruptible, because εἰ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι φθαρταὶ, πάντα φθαρτά· If all substances were corruptible, then all might come to nothing.—Which eternal, unmade (or self-existent) and incorruptible substance, according to Aristotle, is not senseless matter, but a perfect mind. Secondly, that God is also an incorporeal substance, [2]κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, separate from sensibles—and not only so, but, according to Aristotle's judgment likewise, ἀδιαίρετος, and ἀμερὴς, and ἀμεγέθης, indivisible, and devoid of parts, and magnitude.—Nor can it be denied, but that besides Aristotle, the generality of those other ancients, who asserted incorporeal substance, did suppose it likewise to be unextended, they dividing substances (as we learn from Philo) into διαστηματικαὶ καὶ ἀδιάστατοι οὐσίαι, distant and indistant, or extended and unextended substances.—Which doctrine, whether true or no, is not here to be discussed. Thirdly, ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν,[3] that in God intellect is really the same thing with the intelligibles.—Because the Divine Mind being (at least in order of nature) senior to all things, and architectonal of the world, could not look abroad for its objects, or find them any where without itself, and therefore must needs contain them all within itself. Which determination of Aristotle's is no less agreeable to Theism than to Platonism; whereas, on the contrary, the Atheists, who assert mind and understanding as such, to be in order of nature junior to matter and the world, do therefore, agreeably to their own hypothesis, suppose all intellection to be by way of passion from corporeal things without, and no mind or intellect to contain its intelligibles, or immediate objects within itself. Lastly, that God being an immoveable substance, his [4]οὐσία is ἐνέργεια, his essence and act or operation the same; δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι οὐσία τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, there must therefore needs be some such principle as this, whose essence is act or energy.—From which theorem Aristotle indeed endeavors to establish the eternity of the world, that it was not made ἐκ νυκτὸς, καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων, καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, from night, and a confused chaos of things, and from nothing;—that is, from an antecedent non-existence, brought forth into being; because God, who is an immoveable nature, and whose essence is act or energy, cannot be supposed to have rested or slept from eternity,

[1] Met. l. xiv. c. vi. [p. 477. tom. iv. oper.]

[2] Met. l. xiv. c. vii. [p. 180. tom. iv. oper.]

[3] Met. lib. xiv. c. vii. and c. ix.

[4] Met. lib. xiv. c. vi.

doing nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the matter, or make the world. Which argumentation of Aristotle's, perhaps, would not be inconsiderable, were the world, motion, and time, capable of existing from eternity, or without beginning. Of which more elsewhere. However, from hence it is undeniably evident, that Aristotle, though asserting the world's eternity, nevertheless derived the same from God, because he would prove this eternity of the world from the essential energy and immutability of the Deity.

We shall now conclude all concerning Aristotle with this short summary, which himself gives us of his own creed and religion, agreeably to the tradition of his Pagan ancestors: [1]*παραδέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαιων καὶ παλαιῶν, ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσήχθαι πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια·* It hath been delivered down to us from very ancient times, that the stars are gods also; besides that supreme Deity, which contains the whole nature. But all the other things were fabulously added hereunto, for the better persuasion of the multitude, and for utility of human life and political ends, to keep men in obedience to civil laws. As, for example, that these gods are of human form, or like to other animals; with such other things as are consequent hereupon.—In which words of Aristotle these three things may be taken notice of. First, that this was the general persuasion of the civilized Pagans from all known antiquity downwards, that there is one *τὸ θεῖον*, which comprehends the whole nature. Where *τὸ θεῖον*, is by Aristotle plainly taken for the supreme Deity. And his own sense concerning this particular is elsewhere thus declared after the same manner, where he speaks of order, harmony, and proportion; [2]*θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῖτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν*, this is the work of Divine power, which also contains this universe.—Which Divinity containing and comprehending the whole nature and universe, must needs be a single and solitary Being, according to that expression of Horace before cited:

Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum,

That, which hath nothing like it, nor second to it.—The next thing is, that, according to the Pagan tradition, besides this universal Numen, there were certain other particular and inferior deities also, that is, understanding beings superior to men; namely, the animated stars or

[1] Met. lib. xiv. c. viii. [p. 483.]

[2] In Polit.

spheres, according to the vulgar apprehension, though Aristotle's philosophy would interpret this chiefly of their immoveable minds or intelligences. Lastly, that all the rest of the Pagan religion and theology, those two things only excepted, were fabulous and fictitious, invented for the better persuasion of the vulgar to piety, and the conserving of them in obedience to civil laws; amongst which this may be reckoned for one, that those gods are all like men or other animals; and therefore to be worshipped in images and statues of those several forms; with all that other fabulous farrago, which dependeth hereupon. Which being separated from the rest, the *πάτριος δόξα*, or ancient tradition of their Pagan progenitors—would remain comprised within those two particulars above mentioned; namely, that there is one supreme Deity, that contains the whole universe, and that, besides it, the animated stars or their minds are certain inferior gods also.

To Aristotle may be here subjoined Speusippus and Xenocrates, his equals and corrivals, they being Plato's successors; together with Theophrastus, his own scholar and successor. Concerning the former of which it is recorded in Cicero, that agreeably with Plato, he asserted [1]"vim quandam, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem," one animal and intellectual force, by which all things are governed;—by reason whereof, Velleius the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endeavoring "evellere ex animis cognitionem deorum," to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods;—as indeed both he and Plato did destroy those Epicurean gods, which were all supposed to be independent, and to have no sway or influence at all upon the government of the world; whereas neither of them denied a plurality of subordinate and dependent deities, generated or created by one Supreme, and by him employed as his ministers in the economy of the universe: for had they done any such thing as this, they would certainly have been then condemned for Atheists. And Xenocrates's theology is thus represented in Stobæus: [2]*τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Δυάδα θεοὺς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄῤῥενα πατρὸς ἔχουσαν τάξιν, ἥντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα, καὶ Περιττὸν, καὶ Νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ θήλειαν μητρὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντὸς*, etc. That both a monad and dyad were gods, the one masculine, having the order of a father, which he calleth Zen and Mind, and which is also to him the first God; the other feminine, as it were the mother of the gods, which is to him the Soul of the universe:—besides which he ac-

[1] De N. D. lib. i. [cap. xiii. p. 2898, 2899, tom. ix. oper.]

[2] Ecl. Phys. lib. i. c. iii. [p. 17.]

knowledgeth the heaven to be Divine, that is, animated with a particular soul of its own, and the fiery stars to be celestial gods, as he asserted also certain sublunary gods, viz. the invisible demons. Where, instead of the Platonic trinity, Zenocrates seems to have acknowledged only a duality of Divine hypostases; the first called a Monad and Mind, the second a Dyad and Soul of the universe. And, lastly, we have this testimony of Theophrastus, besides others, cited out of his Metaphysics; *θεία γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴ, δὶ ἧς ἅπαντα καὶ ἔστι καὶ διαμένει*, there is one Divine Principle of all things, by or from which all things subsist and remain.

XXV. The Stoics and their chief doctors, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were no better naturalists and metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whose footsteps they trode; they in like manner admitting no other substance besides body, according to the true and proper notion thereof, as that which is not only *διαστατὸν*, distant and extended—but also *ἀντίτυπον*, resisting and impenetrable.—So that, according to these Stoics, the souls not only of other animals, but of men also, were properly corporeal, that is, substances impenetrably extended; and which differed from that other part of theirs, commonly called their body, no otherwise than that they were [1]*σῶμα ἀραιότερον καὶ λεπτομερέστερον*, a more thin and subtile body—and *πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον*, a hot and fiery spirit—it being supposed by these philosophers, that cogitation, reason, and understanding, are lodged only in the fiery matter of the universe. And though the generality of these Stoics acknowledged human souls to have a certain permanency after death, and some of them till the next conflagration, (unless perhaps they should be crushed and broken all to pieces, in their passage out of the body, by the downfall of some tower, steeple, or the like upon them) yet did they all conclude against their immortality, there being nothing at all immortal with them (as shall be afterwards declared) save only Jupiter, or the one supreme Deity. And as for the punishment of the wicked souls after death, though some of them seem to have utterly exploded the same, as a mere figment of poets, (insomuch, that Epictetus,[2] himself denies there was any Acheron, Cocytus, or Phlegethon) yet others granted, that as the better souls after death did mount up to the stars, their first original, so the wicked wandered up and down here in certain dark and miry subterraneous places, till at length they were quite extinct. Nevertheless, they seem

[1] These are the words of Chrysippus, preserved by Plutarch, Libro de Repugnantiis Stoicorum, p. 1052. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Arrian. in Epictet. lib. iii. cap. xiii. p. 293.

to have been all of this persuasion, that the frightening of men with punishments after death was no proper nor accommodate means to promote virtue, because that ought to be pursued after for its own sake, or the good of honesty, as vice to be avoided for that evil of turpitude which is in it, and not for any other external evil consequent thereupon. Wherefore Chrysippus reprehended Plato for subjoining to his republic such affrightful stories of punishments after death: [1]*φησὶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ, τῆς ἀδικίας, τὸν Κέφαλον· εὐδιάβλητόν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐξάγοντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας, τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσι·* Chrysippus affirmeth, that Plato (in the person of Cephalus) does not rightly deter men from injustice by the fear of Divine punishment and vengeance after death; since this opinion (of torments after death) is liable to much exception, and the contrary is not without probabilities; so that it seems to be but like to women's frighting of children from doing unhappy tricks, with those bugbears of Acco and Alphito.—But how fondly these Stoics doated upon that hypothesis, that all was body, may appear from hence, that they maintained even accidents and qualities themselves to be bodies; for voice and sound, night and day, evening and morning, summer and winter, nay, calends and nones, months and years, were bodies with them. And, not only so, but also the qualities of the mind itself, as virtue and vice, together with the motions and affections of it, as anger and envy, grief and joy; according to that passage in Seneca,[2] "Corporis bona sunt corpora; corpora ergo sunt et quæ animi, nam et hic corpus est:" The goods of a body are bodies; now the mind is a body, and therefore the goods of the mind are bodies too.—And with as good logic as this did they further infer, that all the actions, passions, and qualities of the mind, were not only bodies, but also animals likewise:[3] "Animam constat animal esse, cum ipsa efficiat, ut simus animalia; virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus taliter se habens, ergo animal est:" It is manifest, that the soul is an animal, because it is that, by which we are made animals; now virtue and vice are nothing else but the soul so and so affected or modified, and therefore these are animals too.—Thus we see what fine conclusions these doaters upon body (though accounted great masters

[1] Plut. de Stoic Rep. p. 1040.

[2] Epist. cvi. p. 399. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Seneca, Epist. cxiii. p. 422. tom. ii. oper.

of logic) made; and how they were befooled in their ratiocinations and philosophy.

Nevertheless, though these Stoics were such sottish Corporealists, yet they were not for all that Atheists; they resolving, that mind or understanding, though always lodged in corporeal substance, yet was not first of all begotten out of senseless matter, so or so modified, but was an eternal unmade thing, and the maker of the whole mundane system. And, therefore, as to that controversy so much agitated amongst the ancients, whether the world were made by chance, or by the necessity of material motions, or by mind, reason and understanding; they avowedly maintained, that it was neither by chance nor by material necessity, but *Divina Mente*, by a Divine and eternal Mind every way perfect. From which one eternal Mind they also affirmed human souls to have been derived, and not from senseless matter; "Prudentiam et mentem a diis ad homines pervenisse,"[1] that mind and wisdom descended down to men from the Deity.—And that "Ratio nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa;"[2] Reason is nothing else but part of the Divine spirit merged into a human body:—so that these human souls were to them no other than *μόρια θεοῦ καὶ ἀποσπάσματα*,[3] certain parts of God, or decerptions and avulsions from him.—Neither were the reasons, by which these Stoics would prove the world to have had a Divine original, at all contemptible, or much inferior to those which have been used in these latter days; they being such as these: first, that it is no more likely this orderly system of the world should have been made by chance, than that Ennius's Annals or Homer's Iliads might have resulted from the fortuitous projection or tumbling out of so many forms of letters, confounded all together; there being as much continued and coherent sense, and as many several combinations in this real poem of the world, as there is in any fantastic poem made by men. And since we see no houses or cities, no books or libraries any where made by the fortuitous motions of matter, it is a madness to think, that this admirable compages of the whole world should first have resulted from thence. Again, there could not possibly be such an agreeing and conspiring cognation of things, and such a universal harmony throughout the whole world, as now there is, "nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur," were they not at all contained by one and the same Divine spirit:—which is the most obvi-

[1] Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxxi. p. 3000. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Senec. Epist. lxvi. p. 168. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Arrian. in Epict. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 123.

ous argument for the unity or oneliness of the Deity. They reasoned also from the scale of nature, or the gradual perfection of things in the universe, one above another; that therefore there must be something absolutely perfect, and that either the world itself, or something presiding over it, was *a principio sapiens*,[1] wise from the beginning,—or rather without beginning, and from eternity. For as in the growth of plants and animals, "Natura suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenit," nature by a continual progress, and journeying forwards, arrives at length to the greatest perfection, which those things are respectively capable of;—and as those arts of picture and architecture aim at perfection; "ita in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid et perfici," so in the nature of the whole universe there must needs be something absolutely perfect reached unto.—"Necesse est præstantem aliquam esse naturam, qua nihil est melius;" since there is such a gradual ascent and scale of perfections in nature, one above another, there must needs be some most excellent and perfect Being, than which nothing can be better—at the top of all, as the head thereof. Moreover, they disputed Socratically, after this manner:[2] "Unde arripuit homo vitam, mentem et rationem?" Whence did man snatch life, reason, or understanding? Or from what was it kindled in him? For is it not plain, that we derive the moisture and fluidity of our bodies from the water that is in the universe, their consistency and solidity from the earth, their heat and activity from the fire, and their spirituosity from the air? "Illud autem, quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem, mentem et consilium, etc. ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus? An cætera mundus habebit omnia? Hoc unum quod plurimi est non habebit?" But that which far transcendeth all these things, our reason, mind and understanding, where did we find it? or from whence did we derive it? Hath the universe all those other things of ours in it, and in a far greater proportion? and hath it nothing at all of that, which is the most excellent thing in us? "Nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantes compotesque rationis, mundus autem generat animantes compotes rationis:" Nothing that is devoid of mind and reason, can generate things animant and rational; but the world generateth such, and therefore itself (or that which contains it, and presides over it) must needs be animant and rational, or intellectual.—Which argumentation is further set home by such similitudes as these; "Si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiæ nascerentur, non dubitares, quin esset in oliva

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[1] Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xiii. p. 2973. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Id. ibid. cap. vi. vii. viii. ix.

tibicinis quædam scientia. Quid si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes, idem scilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque judicetur, cum ex se procreet animantes atque sapientes?" If from the olive-tree should be produced pipes sounding harmoniously, or from the plane-tree fiddles, playing of their own accord musically, it would not at all be doubted, but that there was some musical, either skill or nature, in those trees themselves: why therefore should not the world be concluded to be both animant and wise (or to have something in it which is so) since it produceth such beings from itself?—And though perhaps some may think that of Cotta's here to have been a smart and witty repartee,[1] "Quærit Socrates, unde animam arripuerimus, si nulla fuerit in mundo? Et ego quæro, unde orationem? unde numeros? unde cantus? nisi vero loqui solem cum luna putemus, cum propius accesserit: aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras existimat." Socrates demandeth, whence we snatched soul, life, and reason, if there were none in the world? and I demand (saith he) whence did we snatch speech, music, and numbers? Unless perhaps you will suppose the sun to confabulate with the moon, when he approaches near her in the Syzygiæ; or the world to sound harmonically, as Pythagoras conceited.—Yet this, how smart soever it may seem, was really but an empty flash of academic wit, without any solidity at all in it, as shall be manifested afterward. Lastly, the Stoics endeavored to prove the existence of a God after this manner: "Ut nulla pars corporis nostri est, quæ non sit minor quam nosmetipsi sumus, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam universi:" As there is no part of our body, which is not inferior in perfection to ourselves, so must the whole universe needs be supposed to be better and more perfect than any of the parts thereof.—Wherefore since it is better to be endued with life and understanding, than to be devoid thereof, and these are pure perfections; they being in some measure in the parts, must needs be much more in the whole. "Nullius sensu carentis pars potest esse sentiens;" no part of that, which is utterly dead and stupid, can have life and understanding in it. —And it is a madness for any man to suppose "Nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se," that there is nothing in the whole world better than himself, or than mankind—which is but a part thereof. Now Cotta here again exercises his jeering academic wit after the same manner as before; "Hoc si placet, jam efficies, ut mundus optime librum legere videatur, etc. Isto modo etiam disertus, mathematicus,

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[1] Id. ibid. lib. iii. cap. xi. p. 3064. tom. ix. oper.

musicus, omni denique doctrina refertus, postremo philosophus erit mundus." By this same argument you might as well prove, that the world is also book-learned, an orator, a mathematician, a musician, and last of all a philosopher.—But neither this objection of his nor that former have any firmitude at all in them; because though an effect cannot be better or more perfect than its cause, nor a part than the whole; and, therefore, whatsoever there is of pure perfection in any effect, it must needs be more in the cause; yet as to those things there mentioned by Cotta (which have all a plain mixture of imperfection in them) as they could not therefore formally exist in that which is absolutely perfect, so is it sufficient, that they are all eminently and virtually contained therein.

By such argumentations as these (besides that taken from the topic of prescience and divination) did the ancient Stoics endeavor to demonstrate the existence of a God, or a universal Numen, the maker and governor of the whole world; and that such a one, as was not a mere plastic or methodical and senseless, but a conscious and perfectly intellectual nature. So that the world to them was neither a mere heap and congeries of dead and stupid matter fortuitously compacted together; nor yet a huge plant or vegetable, that is, endued with a spermatic principle only; but an animal informed and enlivened by an intellectual soul. And though, being Corporealists, they sometimes called the whole world itself or mundane animal, God; and sometimes the fiery principle in it, as intellectual, and the hegemonic of the mundane soul; yet was the God of the Stoics properly, not the very matter itself, but that great soul, mind and understanding, or in Seneca's language, that *ratio incorporalis*, that rules the matter of the whole world. Which stoical God was also called as well *Τἀγαθὸν* as *Νοῦς*, good as mind—as that which is a most moral, benign, and beneficent being; according to that excellent Cleanthean description of him, in Clemens Alexandrinus.[1]

Τἀγαθὸν ἐρωτᾷς μ' οἷόν ἐστ' ἄκουε δὲ,
Τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβὲς,
Κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλόν, δέον, etc.

But this maker and governor of the whole world was most commonly named by the Stoics Zeus and Zen, or Jupiter; some of them concluding, that therefore there was but one Zeus or independent Deity, because the whole world was but one animal governed by one soul;

[1] In Protreptico, cap. vi. p. 61. and Stromat. lib. v. p. 715.

and others of them endeavoring, on the contrary, to prove the unity and singularity of the world from the oneliness of this Zeus, or the supreme Deity, supposed and taken for granted, and because there is but one fate and providence. Which latter consequence Plutarch would by no means allow of, he writing thus concerning it, where he pleads for a plurality of worlds ; [1]*καὶ μὴν τάγε ὄλλα τῶν Στωϊκῶν τίς ἂν φοβηθείη, πυνθανομένων πῶς Εἱμαρμένη μία μένει καὶ Πρόνοια, καὶ οὐπολλοὶ Δίες καὶ Ζῆνες ἔσονται, πλειόνων ὄντων κόσμων ; τίς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πολλοὺς εἶναι Δίας, ἂν πλείονες ὦσι κόσμοι, καὶ μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρχοντα πρῶτον καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ ὅλου θεὸν, οἷος ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν κύριος ἁπάντων καὶ πατὴρ ἐπονομαζόμενος*, etc. Neither is it at all considerable, what the Stoics here object against a plurality of worlds, they demanding, how there could be but one Fate, and one Providence, and one Jove, (or independent Deity) were there many worlds ? For what necesssity is there, that there must be more Zens or Joves than one, if there were more worlds ? and why might not that one and the same God of this universe, called by us the Lord and Father of all, be the first prince, and highest governor in all those worlds ? Or what hinders, but that a multitude of worlds might be all subject to the fate and providence of one Jupiter, or supreme God, himself inspecting and ordering them every one ; and imparting principles and spermatic reasons to them, according to which all things in them might be governed and disposed ? For can many distinct persons in an army or chorus be reduced into one body or polity ? and could not ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds in the universe, be all governed by one reason, and be ordered together in reference to one principle ?—In which place these two things are plainly contained ; first, that the Stoics unquestionably asserted one supreme Deity, or universal monarch over the whole world ; and, secondly, that Plutarch was so far from giving any entertainment to the contrary opinion, that he concluded, though there were ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet they were all subject to one supreme, solitary, and independent Deity.

But, however, though these Stoics thus unquestionably asserted one sole independent and universal Numen, the monarch over the whole world ; yet did they, notwithstanding, together with the other Pagans, acknowledge a plurality of gods ; they concluding *πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων*, that all things were full of gods and demons.—And so far were they from falling short of the other Pagans, as to this polytheism or multiplicity of gods, that they seem rather to have surpassed and outstripped them therein. Plutarch[2] making mention of their *το-*

[1] D. Def. Or. p. 425.
[2] De Repugnant. Stoicor. p. 1075. tom. ii. oper.

σοῦτον πλῆθος θεῶν, their so great multitude of gods ;—and affirming them, *ἐμπεπληκέναι τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν*, to have filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods. —Nevertheless, they plainly declare, that all this their multiplicity of gods (one only excepted) was generated or created in time by that one, called Zeus or Jupiter, who was not only the spermatic reason, but also the soul and mind of the whole universe ; and who from himself produced the world, and those gods, out of non-existence into being. And, not only so, but that also in the successive conflagrations they are all again resolved and swallowed up into that one. Thus Plutarch, in his defect of oracles, writing of the mortality of demons, [1]*τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς γινώσκομεν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ διαιμόνων ἣν λέγω δόξαν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν, ὄντων τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος· ἑνὶ χρωμένους ἀΐδίῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ φθαρήσεσθαι νομίζοντας·* We know the Stoics to maintain this opinion, not only concerning demons, but also the gods themselves, that they are mortal. For though they own such a multitude of gods, yet do they acknowledge only one of them eternal and incorruptible ; affirming concerning all the rest, that as they were made in time, so they shall be again corrupted and destroyed.—Plutarch himself there defends the mortality of demons, but this only as to their corporeal part, that they die to their present bodies, and transmigrate into others, their souls in the mean time remaining immortal and incorruptible ; but the Stoics maintained the same as well concerning gods as demons ; and that in such a manner, as that their very souls, lives, and personalities, should be utterly extinguished and destroyed. To the same purpose Plutarch again writeth, in his book of Common Notions against the Stoics, [2]*Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν) τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν, τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον, οὐδὲ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι, πλὴν πόνου τοῦ Διός· εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους*, etc. *ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμενα ἔχει τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἕπεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν, καὶ προνοίας, εἱμαρμένης τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι, διαῤῥήδην λέγουσι, τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τηκτοὺς κατὰ αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττερίνους ὄντας·* Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, leave not one of these their so many gods incorruptible nor eternal, save Jupiter only, into whom they consume all the rest ; thereby making him to be a helluo and devourer of gods ; which is as bad as if they should affirm him to be corruptible,

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[1] P. 420. [2] P. 1075.

it arguing as much imperfection for one to be nourished and preserved by the consumption of other things into him, as for himself to die. Now this is not only gathered by way of consequence from the other principles of the Stoics, but it is a thing, which they expressly assert, and with a loud voice proclaim in all their writings concerning the gods, providence, fate and nature ; that all the gods were generated, (or made in time) and that they shall be all destroyed by fire ; they supposing them to be meltable, as if they were waxen or leaden things. —This indeed is essential to the stoical doctrine, and from their principles inseparable and unavoidable ; forasmuch as they held all to be body, and that in the successive conflagrations all corporeal systems and compages shall be dissolved by fire ; so that no other deity can then possibly remain safe and untouched, save Jupiter alone, the fiery principle of the universe, animated or intellectual. Here therefore there is a considerable difference to be observed betwixt these Stoics and other Pagan Theists ; that whereas the others for the most part acknowledged their gods to have made in time by one supreme universal Numen, but yet nevertheless to be immortal, and to continue to eternity ; the stoical Pagans maintained, that all their other gods, save Jupiter alone, were not only *γεγονότες*, but also *φθαρησόμενοι*, such as should be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this so also, as that their very personalities should be utterly abolished and annihilated ; all the stoical gods in the conflagration being as it were melted and confounded into one.

Wherefore during the intervals of the successive conflagrations, the Stoics all agreed, that there is no more than one God (Zeus or Jupiter) left alone, (there being then indeed nothing else besides himself) who afterwards produceth the whole mundane system, together with all the gods, out of himself again. Chrysippus in Plutarch affirmeth, [1]*ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν Πρόνοιαν, ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν, ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους, ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους*, that as Jupiter and the world may be resembled to a man, so may providence be to the soul : when therefore there shall be a conflagration, Jupiter of all the gods being alone incorruptible and then remaining, will retire and withdraw himself into providence ; and so both together remain in that same ethereal substance.—Where notwithstanding Jupiter and Providence are really but one and the same thing. And Seneca writeth thus concerning the life of a wise man

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[1] P. 1077. [De Repugn. Stoicor.]

in solitude : [1]" Qualis futura est vita sapientis, si sine amicis relinquatur, in custodiam conjectus, aut in desertum littus ejectus ? Qualis est Jovis, cum resoluto mundo, et DIIS IN UNUM CONFUSIS, paulisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus :" If you ask, What would be the life of a wise man either in a prison or desert ? I answer, the same with that of Jupiter, when the world being resolved, and the GODS all CONFOUNDED into ONE, and the course of nature ceasing, he resteth in himself, conversing with his own cogitations.—Arrianus's Epictetus, likewise, speaking of the same thing, ironically introduces Jupiter, bemoaning himself in the conflagration, as now left quite alone, after this manner : [2]*Τάλας ἐγώ, οὔτε τὴν Ἥραν ἔχω, οὔτε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, οὔτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, οὔτε ὅλως ἢ ἀδελφὸν, ἢ υἱὸν, ἢ συγγενῆ·* Alas ! I am now left all alone ; I have neither Juno, nor Minerva, nor Apollo with me ; neither brother nor son, nor nephew, nor kinsman (neither god nor goddess) to keep me company.—He adding also, according to the sense of the Stoics, that in all these successive conflagrations, *ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστι, καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν ἑαυτοῦ, οἵα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσαις ἑαυτῷ,* Jupiter, being left alone, converseth only with himself, and resteth in himself, considering his own government, and being entertained with thoughts becoming himself.—And thus have we made it unquestionably evident, that the Stoics acknowledged only one independent and self-existent Deity, one universal Numen, which was not only the creator of all the other gods, but also, in certain alternate vicissitudes of time, the decreator of them*; he then swallowing them up, and devouring them all into himself, as he had before produced them together with the world out of himself.

It is granted, that these Stoics as well as the other Pagans did religiously worship more gods than one, that is, more understanding beings superior to men. For it was Epictetus's[3] own exhortation, *εὔχου θεοῖς,* Pray to the gods.—And the same philosopher[4] thus describeth the disposition of a person rightly affected ; *θέλω εἰδέναι τί μοι καθῆκον πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς,* I would willingly know, what is my duty, first to the gods, and then to my parents, and other relations.—And they are M. Antoninus's precepts,[5] *Αἰδοῦ θεοὺς,* revere the gods, and[6] *ἐν ἅπασι θεοὺς ἐπικαλοῦ,* in every thing implore the aid and assistance of the gods.—And

[1] Ep. vi. [Epist. ix. p. 22. tom. ii. oper.]

[2] Arr. l. iii. c. xiii. [p. 291.]

[3] Apud Arrian. lib. i. Dissert. i. p. 84.

[4] Ibid. lib. iii. cap. xvii. p. 222.

[5] Lib. vi. § 30. p. 190.

[6] Lib. vi. § 23. p. 183.

accordingly in that close of his first book,[1] himself does thankfully ascribe many particular benefits to the gods in common ; *παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸ ἀγαθοὺς πάππους*, etc. I owe to the gods, that I had good progenitors and parents, etc.—Where, amongst the rest, he reckons up this for one, that he never was any great proficient, either in poetry or rhetoric ; because these would probably (had he succeeded in his pursuit of them) have hindered him from the attainment of far better things. And after all his enumeration, he concludeth thus : *πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δεῖται*, for all these things need the assistance of the gods and fortune, viz. because they are not in our own power.

Neither can it be denied, but that they did often derogate from the honor of the supreme God, by attributing such things to the gods in common, (as the donors of them), which plainly belong to the supreme God only. As when Epictetus makes reason in men to be a gift of the gods ; [2]*ἡμῖν οὖν λόγος ἐπὶ ἀτυχίᾳ καὶ κακοδαιμονίᾳ δέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ;* is reason therefore given us by the gods merely to make us miserable and unhappy ?—And when he again imputes virtue to them ; hast thou overcome thy lust, thine intemperance, thine anger ? [3]*πόσῳ μείζων αἰτία θυσίας, ἢ ὑποτεία ἢ ὑπαρχία, ταῦτα ἐκ σοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν*, how much greater cause then hast thou of offering sacrifice, than if thou hadst got a consulship or prætorship ? for those things come only from thyself and from the gods.—Though the reason of these speeches of theirs seems to have been no other than this, because they took it for granted, that those understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, were all of them the instruments and ministers of the supreme God in the government of the world ; and had therefore some kind of stroke or influence, more or less, upon all the concernments of mankind. Whence it came to pass also, that they often used those words God and gods promiscuously and indifferently : as one and the same celebrated speech of Socrates is sometimes expressed singularly, *εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον*, if God will have it so, let it be so, (Arr. Epict. l. i. c. xxix. l. iv. c. iv.) and sometimes again plurally, *εἰ ταύτῃ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς*, if the gods will have it so.

Wherefore, notwithstanding the many gods of those Stoics, they worshipped for all that one Supreme, that is, one universal Numen, that contains and comprehends the whole world, who was variously described by them, sometimes as the nature and reason of the whole world ; [4]*ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις πρεσβυτάτη θεῶν*, the nature of the whole, the

[1] Lib. i. § 17. p. 30.
[2] L. iii. c. xxiv. [apud Arrian. p. 329.]
[2] L. iv. c. iii. [p. 388.]
[4] Anton. l. ix. [§ 1. p. 262.]

oldest of all the gods—and ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις, that nature which governs all things—[1]ὁ τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν διοικῶν λόγος, that reason which governs the substance of all—[2]ὁ διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκων λόγος, καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομῶν τὸ πᾶν, that reason which passes through the substance of the universe, and through all eternity orders and dispenses all according to appointed periods.—Sometimes is he called [3]ἡ τῶν ὅλων αἰτία, the cause of all things—sometimes [4]τὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἡγεμονικόν, the hegemonic and ruling principle of the whole world—and ὁ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ κόσμου, the prince of the world.—Again, [5]ὁ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα, the governor of the whole—as in this of Epictetus; [6]ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχε τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα, καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως; a good man submits his mind to the Governor of the whole universe, as good citizens do theirs to the laws of the city.—Also ὁ διατάσσων, the orderer of all—in the other religious passage of the same philosophers, [7]τὸ παιδύεσθαι, τουτέστι; μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν ὡς γίνεται· πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων; to be instructed is to will things to be as they are made: and how are they made? as that great Disposer of all hath appointed.—Again, the supreme God is sometimes called by them τὸ περιέχον τὰ ὅλα νοερὸν, that intellectual principle, which contains the whole, as in this instruction of M. Antoninus; [8]μὴ μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοερῷ, that, as our bodies breath the common air, so should our souls suck and draw in vital breath from that great Mind, that comprehends the universe, becoming as it were one spirit with the same.—He is also called by them [9]ὁ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς καὶ διάνοια, the mind and understanding of the whole world, μία πάντων πηγὴ νοερὰ, one intellectual fountain of all things; and, lastly, to name no more, [10]θεὸς εἷς διὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐσία μία, καὶ νόμος εἷς, one God through all, one substance, and one law.—Which supreme God was commonly called also by the Stoics,[11] together with the generality of the other Pagans, ὁ Θεὸς, or God—emphatically, and in way of eminency, as in this of Epictetus,[12] μηδὲν ἄλλο

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1 Ant. l. vii. § 18. [p. 213.]
2 Ant. l. vi. § 1. [p. 170.]
3 Ant. l. v. § 24.
4 Anton. l. ix.
5 Ant. l. vii. § 47. [sect. 75. p. 236.]
6 L. i. c. xii. [apud Arrian. p. 118.]
7 Ep. p. 119. Cant.
8 L. viii. § 45. [sect. 54. p. 258.]
9 Anton. p. 125. [lib. v. § 30. p. 164.]
10 Ant. p. 257.
11 Anton. l. vii. § 7. [sect. 9. p. 210.]
12 Apud Arrian. lib. ii. cap. xxvii. p. 221.

θέλε, ἢ ἃ ὁ Θεὸς θέλει, καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει: will nothing but what God willeth, and then who can be able to hinder thee?—And, again, [1]*θέλησον καλὸς φανῆναι τῷ θεῷ, ἐπιθύμησον καθαρὸς μετὰ καθαροῦ σεαυτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ*, affect to seem fair to God, desire to be pure with thy pure self, and with God.—Also where[2] he speaks of the regular course of things in nature, *τεταγμένως, καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος Θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν βλαστάνει*· that it proceedeth orderly, every thing as it were obeying the command of God: when he bids the plants to blossom, they blossom; and when to bring forth fruit, they bring forth fruit.—To which innumerable other instances might be added. And Zeus or Jupiter was the proper name of this supreme God amongst the Stoics also;[3] whence the government of the whole world is called by them *Διὸς διοίκησις*, the government or economy of Jupiter.—Lastly, this supreme God is sometimes distinguished by them from the other gods, expressly and by name; as in this of Epictetus, [4]*ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω τίνι ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι, τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκεῖνον*, I have, whom I ought to be subject to, whom to obey, God and those, who are next after him—that is, the supreme and inferior gods. So, likewise, when he exhorteth not to desire things out of our own power: *ἀλλὰ τῷ Διὶ χάρισαι αὐτά, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκεῖνοι κυβερνάτωσαν*· Let Jupiter alone with these things,[5] and the other gods, deliver them up to be ordered and governed by them.—And so again, where he personates one, that places his happiness in those things without him: *κάθημαι καὶ στένω, καὶ ὃν δύναμαι λοιδορῶ, τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄλλους;* I then shall sit lamenting, and speaking evil of every one, even Jupiter himself and the other gods.

And it must in reason be supposed, that this Jupiter, or universal Numen of the world, was honored by these Stoics far above all their other particular gods; he being acknowledged by them to have been the maker or creator of them as well as the whole world, and the only eternal and immortal God: all those other gods, as hath been already declared, being as well corruptible, mortal, and annihilable, as they were generated or created.[6] For though Cicero's Lucilius Balbus, where he pretends to represent the doctrine of the Stoics, attributes the very first original of the world to a plurality of gods, in these words:

[1] L. ii. c. xviii. [p. 225.]

[2] Apud Arrian. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 122, 123.

[3] Epict. p. 251. [apud Arrian. lib. ii. c. xxiii.]

[4] L. iv. c. xii. [p. 426.]

[5] L. ii. c. xvii. [p. 221.]

[6] De. N. D. l. ii. p. 225. Lamb. [cap. xxx. p. 2999. tom. ix. oper.]

"Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes, et initio constitutas esse, et omni tempore administrari;" yet unquestionably Cicero forgat himself herein, and rather spake the language of some other Pagans, who, together with the generation of the world, held indeed a plurality of eternal (though not independent) deities, than of the Stoics, who asserted one only eternal God; and supposed, in the reiterated conflagrations, all the gods to be melted and confounded into one; so that Jupiter being then left alone, must needs make up the world again, as also all those other gods out of himself. And thus does Zeno in Laertius[1] describe the Cosmopœia, *τὸν θεὸν κατ' ἀρχὰς, καθ' αὑτὸν ὄντα*, that God at first being alone by himself, converted the fiery substance of the world by degrees into water, that is, into a crasser chaos; out of which water, himself afterwards, as the spermatic reason of the world, formed the elements and whole mundane system. And Cicero himself elsewhere, in his De Legibus,[2] attributes the first original of mankind cautiously, not to the gods in common, but to the supreme God only; "Hoc animal providum, etc. quem vocamus hominem, præclara quadam conditione generatum esse, a SUMMO DEO:" and this rather according to the sense of the Stoics, than of the Platonists, whose inferior generated gods also (being first made) were supposed to have had a stroke in the fabrefaction of mankind, and other animals. Thus Epictetus plainly ascribes the making of the whole world to God, or the one supreme Deity, where he mentions the Galileans, that is, the Christians, their contempt of death, though imputing it only to custom in them, and, not to right knowledge; (as M. Antoninus likewise ascribes the same to [3]*ψιλὴ παράταξις*, mere obstinacy of mind) *ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτω διατεθῆναι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι, ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκε τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον·* Can some be so affected out of madness,[4] and the Galileans out of custom? and can none attain thereunto by reason and true knowledge, namely, because God made all things in the world, and the whole world itself perfect and unhinderable; but the parts thereof for the use of the whole, so that the parts ought therefore to yield and give place to the whole. Thus does he again elsewhere demand, *τὸν ἥλιον τίς πεποίηκε, καρποὺς δὲ τίς*, etc. Who made the sun? Who the fruits of the earth? Who the seasons of the year? Who the agreeable fitness of things? Wherefore thou having received

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[1] Lib. vii. segm. 136. p. 450.

[2] Lib. i. cap. viii. p. 136. tom. ix. oper.

[3] L. xi. §. [p. 319.]

[4] L. iv. c. vii. [p. 500.]

all from another, even thy very self, dost thou murmur and complain against the donor of them, if he take away any one thing from thee? Did he not bring thee into the world? show thee the light? bestow sense and reason upon thee?—Now the sun was the chief of the inferior Stoical gods, and therefore he being made by another, all the rest of their gods must needs be so too. And thus is it plainly expressed in this following citation:[1] *εἴ τις τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθῆσαι κατ' ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲν ἀγενὲς, οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ·* If any one could be thoroughly sensible of this, that we are all made by God, and that as principal parts of the world, and that God is the father both of men and gods, he would never think meanly of himself, knowing that he is the son of Jupiter also.—Where *Θεὸς*, is plainly put for the supreme God, and *Θεοὶ*, for the inferior gods only. Again, he thus attributes the making of man and government of the whole world to God, or Jupiter only.[2] *Ὁ Θεὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐποίησε*, etc. *τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἄξιον τὸν κηδόμενον ἡμῶν, καὶ πατρικῶς προϊστάμενον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις·* God made also men to this end, that they might be happy, and as became him, who had a fatherly care of us, he placed our good and evil in those things, which are in our own power.[3] And *τῷ ὄντι κακῶς διοικεῖται τὰ ὅλα, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ἵν' ὦσιν ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ εὐδαίμονες*, things would not be well governed, if Jupiter took no care of his own citizens, that they also might be happy like himself.

And that these Stoics did indeed religiously worship and honor the supreme God above all their other gods, may appear from sundry instances. As first, from their acknowledging him to be the sovereign legislator, and professing subjection and obedience to his laws, accounting this to be their greatest liberty. Thus Epictetus,[4] *εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει, ἠλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολὰς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαί με δύναται·* No man hath power over me, I am made free by God, (by becoming his subject) I know his commandments, and no man can bring me under bondage to himself.—And again,[5] *ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὑρεθῆναι, ἵν' εἰπεῖν δύναμαι τῷ Θεῷ, μήτι παρέβην σοῦ τὰς ἐντολὰς*, etc. These things would I be found employing myself about, that I may be able to say to God, Have I transgressed

[1] L. i. c. iii. [p. 90. vide etiam lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 124.]

[2] L. iii. c. xxiv. (p. 328.)

[3] L. iii. c. xxiv. (p. 331.)

[4] L. iii. c. v.

[5] L. iii. c. v.

any of thy commandments? Have I used my faculties and anticipations (or common notions) otherwise than thou requirest?

Again, from their acknowledging him to be the supreme governor of the whole world, and the orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their professing to submit their wills to his will in every thing; Epictetus somewhere[1] thus bespeaks the supreme God: *μήτι ἐμεμψάμην σοῦ τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόσησα ὅτι ἠθέλησασι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἑκών· πένης ἐγενόμην σοῦ θέλοντος ἀλλὰ χαίρων, οὐκ ἦρξα, ὅτι σὺ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, οὐδέποτ' ἐπιθύμησα ἀρχῆς· μήτι με τούτου ἕνεκα στυγνότερον εἶδες; μὴ οὐ προσῆλθόν σοι φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἕτοιμος εἴτι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἴτι σημαίνεις; νῦν με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως; ἄπειμι· χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἠξίωσάς με συμπανηγυρίσαι σοι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔργα τὰ σά, καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σοῦ συμπαρακολουθῆσαι· ταῦτά με ἐνφυμούμενον, ταῦτα γράφοντα, ταῦτα ἀναγινώσκοντα καταλάβοι ἂν θάνατος·* Did I ever complain of thy government? I was sick when thou wouldest have me to be, and so are others, but I was so willingly. I was poor also at thy appointment, but rejoicing; I never bore any magistracy, or had any dignity, because thou wouldest not have me, and I never desired it. Didst thou ever see me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I appeared before thee at any time with a discontented countenance? Was I not always prepared and ready for whatsoever thou requirest? Wilt thou now have me to depart out of this festival solemnity? I am ready to go; and I render thee all thanks for that thou hast honored me so far as to let me keep the feast with thee, and behold thy works, and observe thy economy of the world. Let death seize upon me no otherwise employed, than thus thinking and writing of such things.—He likewise exhorts others after this manner:[2] *τόλμασον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς, ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἴσος εἰμὶ· οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοι δοκούντων, ὅπου θέλεις ἄγε, ἣν θέλῃς ἐσθῆτα περίθες, ἄρχειν με θέλεις, ἰδιωτεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πένεσθαι, πλουτεῖν; ἐγώ σοι ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπολογήσομαι, δείξω τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν οἵα ἐστιν·* Dare to lift up thine eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleaseth. I agree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things. I refuse nothing that shall seem good to thee. Lead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of a public or private person, of a rich man or a beggar. I will apologize for thee as to all these things before men. And I will also show the nature of every one of them.

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[1] Apud Arrian. lib. iii. cap. v. p. 274.

[2] L. ii. c. xvi. (p. 217.)

The same is likewise manifest from their pretensions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and assistance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus also Epictetus,[1] *Κἀγὼ μὲν ἔχω ταύτην ἐπιβολὴν ἀποτελεῖσαι ὑμᾶς ἐλευθέρους, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας, ἐν παντὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ.* My design is this, to render you free and undisturbed, always looking at God, as well in every small as greater matter.—Again the same Stoic concludes,[2] *οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκβαλεῖν λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν,* etc. *εἰ μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ προσπεπονθότα, τοῖς ἐκείνου προστάγμασι καθωσιωμένον.* A man will never be able otherwise to expel grief, fear, desire, envy, etc. than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him, and the observance of his commandments.—And he affirmeth of Hercules, that this great piece of piety was so long since observed by him, [3]*τὸν Δία αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκάλει, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν ἃ ἔπραττε·* that as he called Jupiter, or the supreme God, his father, so did he whatsoever he did, looking at him.—Thus M. Antoninus speaketh of a double relation that we all have; one *πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας,* to those that live with us; —and another, [4]*πρὸς τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν ἀφ᾽ ἧς συμβαίνει πᾶσιν πάντα,* to that Divine cause, from which all things happen to all.—As likewise he affirmeth, [5]*οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν τι ἄνευ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς εὐπράξεις,* that no human thing is well done without a reference to God.—And he excellently exhorteth men, [6]*ἑνὶ τέρπου, καὶ προσαναπαύου, τῷ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν κοινωνικὴν σὺν μνήμῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ.* To be delighted and satisfied with this one thing; in doing one action after another, tending to a common good, or the good of human society; together with the remembrance of God.—Lastly, he declareth his own confidence in the supreme Deity in these words; [7]*θαῤῥῶ τῷ διοικοῦντι,* I trust and rely upon the governor of the whole world.

This may be concluded also from their thanking one supreme God for all, as the author of all good, and delightfully celebrating his praises. Epictetus declares it to be the duty of a good man, *χάριν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ θεῷ* to thank God for all things.—And elsewhere he speaketh thus:[8] *εἰ νοῦν εἴχομεν, ἄλλό τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν, καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ εὐφημεῖν, καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χάριτας; οὐκ ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας, καὶ ἀροῦντας, καὶ ἐσθίοντας, ᾄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς θεόν; μέγας ὁ θεὸς*

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[1] L. ii. c. xix. (p. 231.)

[2] L. ii. c. xvi. (p. 218.)

[3] L. iii. c. xxiv. (p. 330.)

[4] L. viii. § 23. (sec. 27. p. 247.)

[5] L. iii. § 11. (sec. 13. p. 87.)

[6] L. vi. § 5. (sec. 7. p. 172.)

[7] L. vi. § 8. (sec. 10. p. 174.)

[8] L. iv. c. vii. (p. 401.) L. i. c zvi. (p. 127.)

ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέσχεν ὄργανα ταῦτα, δι' ὧν τὴν γῆν ἐργασόμεθα· μέγας ὁ θεὸς ὅτι χεῖρας ἔδωκεν, etc. *ὅτι αὔξεσθαι λεληθότως, ὅτι καθεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν· ταῦτα ἐφ' ἑκάστου εὐφημεῖν ἔδει, καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον ὕμνον ἐφυμνεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκε τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν τούτων· τί οὖν ;* etc. *εἰ γοῦν ἀηδὼν ἤμην, ἐποίουν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος, εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου, νῦν δὲ λογικός εἰμι, ὑμνεῖν με δεῖ τὸν θεόν.* Had we understanding, what should we do else, but both publicly and privately praise God, bless him, and return thanks to him? Ought not they, who dig, plough, and eat, continually sing such a hymn to God as this; Great is that God, who gave us these organs to cultivate the earth withal; great is that God, who gave us hands, etc. who enabled us to grow indiscernibly, to breathe in our sleep. But the greatest and divinest hymn of all is this, to praise God for the faculty of understanding all these things. When then if for the most part men be blinded, ought there not to be some one, who should perform this office, and sing a hymn to God for all? If I were a nightingale, I would perform the office of a nightingale; or a swan, that of a swan: but now, being a reasonable creature, I ought to celebrate and sing aloud the praises of God, that is, of the supreme Deity.

Lastly, the same is evident from their invoking the supreme God as such, addressing their devotions to him alone without the conjunction of any other gods; and particularly imploring his assistance against the assaults of temptations, called by them fancies. To this purpose is that of Epictetus, [1]*μέγας ὁ ἀγών ἐστι, θεῖον τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας, τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην, ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ πλέοντες.* This is a great conflict or contention, a Divine enterprise; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now remember the supreme God; call upon him as thy helper and assistant, as the mariners do upon Castor and Pollux in a tempest.—He commends also this form of devotional address, or Divine ejaculation, which was part of Cleanthes's litany, to be used frequently upon occasion,[2] *Ἄγου δή με, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὅποι ποθ' (ὑμῖν) εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, ὡς ἕψομαί γε ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.* Lead me, O Jupiter, and thou Fate, whithersoever I am by you destined; and I will readily and cheerfully follow; who, though I were never so reluctant, yet must needs follow.—Where Jupiter and Fate are really but one and the same supreme Deity, under two[3] seve-

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[1] L. ii. c. xviii. [apud Arrian. p. 226.]

[2] Vide Arrian. lib. iii. cap. xxvi. p. 366.

[3] Ep. 106. [cvii. tom. ii. oper. p. 402.]

ral names. And therefore the sense of this devotional ejaculation was no less truly and faithfully than elegantly thus rendered by Seneca :

> Duc me parens, celsique dominator poli,
> Quocunque placuit, nulla parendi est mora,
> Assum impiger : fac nolle, comitabor gemens,
> Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.

But because many are so extremely unwilling to believe, that the Pagans ever made any religious address to the supreme God as such, we shall here set down an excellent and devout hymn of the same Cleanthes to him ; and rather, because it hath been but little taken notice of. And, the more to gratify the reader, we shall subjoin an elegant translation thereof into Latin verse, which he must owe to the muse of my learned friend Dr. Duport.

[1] *Κύδιστ᾽ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατὲς αἰεὶ,*
Ζεὺς, φύσεως ἀρχηγὲ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν,
Χαῖρε·—Σὲ γὰρ πᾶσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν·
Ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν, ἤχου μίμημα λαχόντες
Μοῦνον, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ᾽ ἐπὶ γαῖαν·
Τῷ σὲ καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν ἀείσω.
Σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν
Πείθεται, ᾗ κεν ἄγῃς. καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖται.
Τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνικήτοις ὑπὸ χερσὶν
Ἀμφήκη, πυρόεντα, ἀειζώοντα κεραυνόν·
Τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πλήγης φύσεως πάντ᾽ ἐρρίγασι,
Ὅι σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
Φοιτᾷ μιγνύμενος·
Ὅς τόσσος γεγαὼς ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός·
Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαίμων,
Οὔτε κατ᾽ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ πόντῳ,
Πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις·
Καὶ κοσμεῖς τὰ ἄκοσμα καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν.
Ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὥσθ᾽ ἕνα γίνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντων.
Ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῶσιν ὅσοι θνητῶν καλοὶ εἰσίν;
Δύσμοροι, ὅτ᾽ ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες,
Οὔτ᾽ ἐσορῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον, οὔτε κλύουσιν·
Ὅι κεν πειθόμενοι σὺν νῷ βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιεν·

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[1] Steph. Poes. Philos. p. 49. [ex Stobœi Eclog. Physic.]

Αὐτοὶ δ' αὖ ὁρμῶσιν ἄνευ ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα
Οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδὴν δυσέριστον ἔχοντες,
Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ,
Ἄλλοι δ' εἰς ἄνεσιν, καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα,
Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάνδωρε, κελαινεφὲς, ἀρχικέραυνε,
Ἀνθρώπους ῥύου ἀπειροσύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς,
Ἣν σὺ πάτερ σκέδασον ψυχῆς ἄπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι
Γνώμης, ᾗ πίσυνος σὺ δίκης μετὰ πάντα κυβερνᾷς·
Ὄφρ' ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ,
Ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκὲς, ὡς ἐπέοικε
Θνητὸν ἐόντ'· ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλοτε μεῖζον,
Οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν·

Magne pater divum, cui nomina multa, sed una
Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter autor
Naturæ, certa qui singula lege gubernas !
Rex salve. Te nempe licet mortalibus ægris
Cunctis compellare ; omnes tua namque propago
Nos sumus, æternæ quasi imago vocis et echo
Tantum, quotquot humi spirantes repimus ; ergo
Te cantabo, tuum et robur sine fine celebrans.
Quippe tuo hic totus, terram qui circuit, orbis
Paret (quoquo agis) imperio, ac obtemperat ultro
Invictis telum manibus tibi tale ministrum,
Anceps, ignitum, haud moriturum denique fulmen.
Ictu etenim illius tota et natura tremiscit ;
Illo et communem rationem dirigis, et quæ
Mundi agitat molem, magno se corpore miscens :
Tantus tu rerum dominus, rectorque supremus.
Nec sine te factum in terris, Deus, aut opus ullum,
Æthere nec dio fit, nec per cærula ponti,
Errore acta suo, nisi quæ gens impia patrat.
Confusa in sese tu dirigis ordine certo ;
Auspice te ingratis et inest sua gratia rebus ;
Fœlice harmonia, tu scilicet, omnia in unum
Sic bono mixta malis compingis, ut una resurgat
Cunctorum ratio communis et usque perennans :
Quam refugit, spernitque hominum mens læva malorum.
Heu miseri ! bona qui quærunt sibi semper et optant,
Divinam tamen hanc communem et denique legem,
Nec spectare oculis, nec fando attendere curant :

Cui si parerent poterant traducere vitam
Cum ratione et mente bonam : nunc sponte feruntur
In mala præcipites, trahit et sua quemque voluptas.
Hunc agit ambitio, laudisque immensa cupido,
Illum et avarities, et amor vesanus habendi,
Blanda libido alium, venerisque licentia dulcis :
Sic alio tendunt alii in diversa ruentes.
At tu, Jupiter alme, tonans in nubibus atris,
Da sapere, et mentem miseris mortalibus aufer
Insanam, hanc tu pelle pater ; da apprendere posse
Consilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite gubernas :
Nos ut honorati pariter, tibi demus honorem,
Perpetuis tua facta hymnis præclara canentes,
Ut fas est homini ; nec enim mortalibus ullum,
Nec superis, majus poterit contingere donum,
Quam canere æterno communem carmine legem.

XXVI. It would be endless now to cite all the testimonies of other philosophers and Pagan writers of latter times, concerning one supreme and universal Numen. Wherefore we shall content ourselves to instance in some of the most remarkable, beginning with M. Tull. Cicero ; whom though some would suspect to have been a skeptic as to Theism, because in his De Natura Deorum he brings in Cotta the academic, as well opposing Q. Lucil. Balbus the Stoic, as C. Velleius the Epicurean ; yet from sundry other places of his writings, it sufficiently appears that he was a dogmatic and hearty Theist ; as for example, this in his second book De Divin. :[1] "Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri :" that there is some most excellent and eternal nature, which is to be admired and honored by mankind, the pulchritude of the world, and the order of the heavenly bodies compel us to confess.—And this in his oration De haruspicum responsis ;[2] "Quis est tam vecors, qui cum suspexerit in cœlum, Deos esse non sentiat, et ea quæ tante mente fiunt, ut vix quisquam arte ulla, ordinem rerum ac vicissitudinem persequi possit, casu fieri putet ?" Who is so mad or stupid, as when he looks up to heaven, is not presently convinced, that there are gods ? or can persuade himself, that those things, which are made with so much mind and wisdom, as that no human skill is able to reach and comprehend

[1] Cap. lxxii. p. 3255. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Cap. x. p. 2333. tom. v. oper.

the artifice and contrivance of them, did all happen by chance?—To which purpose more places will be afterwards cited. However, in his philosophic writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, set on foot by Carneades; that is, to write skeptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words: [1]"Qui requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est. Non enim tam authoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident:" they who would needs know, what we ourselves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason; and the authority of those, who profess to teach, is oftentimes a hinderance to the learners, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted, which is judged by another whom they value.—Nevertheless, Cicero in the close of this discourse De Natura Deorum (as St. Austin[2] also observeth) plainly declares himself to be more propense and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not assent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point (himself being rather a Platonist than a Stoic), yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureism of Velleius, but also the skepticism of Cotta. Wherefore Augustinus Steuchus, and other learned men, quarrel with sundry passages of Cicero's upon another account, not as Atheistical, but as seeming to favor a multitude of independent gods; he sometimes attributing not only the government of the world, and the making of mankind, but also the first constitution and fabric of the whole world, to gods plurally. As when he writeth thus:[3] "Ut perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura est a providentia deorum:" for the perpetual adorning of the world, great care hath been taken by the providence of the gods.—And "a diis immortalibus hominibus provisum esse," etc. that the immortal gods have provided for the very convenience of mankind, appears from the very fabric and figure of them. — And that place before cited, [4]"Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes initio constitutas esse;" I say, that the world and all its parts were at first constituted by the providence of the gods.—And, lastly, where he

[1] De N. D. l. i. [cap. v. p. 2886.]

[2] De Civitate Dei, lib. iv. cap. xxx. p. 86. tom. vii. oper.

[3] De Natur. Deor. lib. iii. [4] De N. D. 225.

states the controversy of that book De N. D. thus: [1]"Utrum dii nihil agant, nihil moliantur? An contra ab his et a principio omnia facta, et constituta sint, et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur?" Whether the gods do nothing at all, but are void of care and trouble? Or whether all things were at first made and constituted, and ever since are moved and governed, by them?—Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that this learned orator and philosopher plainly acknowledged the monarchy of the whole, or one supreme and universal Numen over all. And that first from his so often using the word God in the singular, emphatically and by way of eminency; as [2]"Ipsi Deo nihil minus gratum, quam non omnibus patere ad se placandum et colendum viam:" Nothing can be less grateful to God himself, than that there should not be a liberty open to all (by reason of the costliness of sacrifices) to worship and appease him;—and—"Nisi juvante Deo, tales non fuerunt Curius, Fabricius,"[3] etc. Curius and Fabricius had never been such men as they were, had it not been for the Divine assistance.—Again, [4]"Commoda, quibus utimur, lucemque qua fruimur, spiritumque quem ducimus, a Deo nobis dari atque impertiri videmus." We must needs acknowledge, that the benefits of this life, the light which we enjoy, and the spirit which we breathe are imparted to us from God.—And, to mention no more, in his version of Plato's Timæus,[5] "Deos alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquas mundi partes spargens Deus quasi serebat;" God distributing gods to all the parts of the world, did as it were sow some gods in the earth, some in the moon, etc.—Moreover, by his making such descriptions of God as plainly imply his oneness and singularity, as in his Orat. pro Milone:[6] "Est, est profecto illa vis; neque in his corporibus, atque in hac imbecilitate nostra, inest quiddam, quod vigeat et sentiat, et non inest in hoc tanto naturæ tamque præclara motu. Nisi forte idcirco esse non putant, quia non apparet nec cernitur: proinde quasi nostram ipsam mentem, qua sapimus, qua providemus, qua hæc ipsa agimus et dicimus, videre, aut plane qualis et ubi sit, sentire possumus." There is, there is certainly such a Divine force in the world; neither is it reasonable to think, that in these gross and frail bodies of ours

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[1] Page 195. Lamb.

[2] 2 Leg. p. 335. [cap. x. p. 3352. tom. ix. oper.]

[3] D. N. D. lib. ii. [cap. lxi. p. 3048.]

[4] Pro S. Ros. [cap. xlv. p. 449. tom. iii. oper.]

[5] Cap. xiii. p. 4034. tom. x. oper.

[6] Page 556. Lamb. [cap. xxxi. p. 2846. tom. iii. oper.]

there should be something which hath life, sense, and understanding, and yet no such thing in the whole universe; unless men will therefore conclude, that there is none, because they see it not: as if we could see our own mind (whereby we order and dispose all things, and whereby we reason and speak thus), and perceive what kind of thing it is, and where it is lodged.—Where, as there is a strong asseveration of the existence of a God, so is his singularity plainly implied, in that he supposes him to be one mind or soul acting and governing the whole world as our mind doth our body. Again, in his Tusculan Questions,[1] "Nec vero Deus ipse alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens:" Neither can God himself be understood by us otherwise than as a certain loose and free Mind, segregated from all moral concretion, which both perceives and moves all things.—So again in the same book,[2] "Hæc igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt ut Platoni videtur; vel si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris?" When we behôld these and other wonderful works of nature, can we at all doubt, but that there presideth over them, either one maker of all, if they had a beginning, as Plato conceiveth; or else, if they always were as Aristotle supposeth, one moderator and governor? And in the third De Legibus,[3] "Sine imperio nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam et hic deo paret, et huic obediunt maria terræque, et hominum vita jussis supremæ legis obtemperat:" Without government, neither any house nor city, nor nation, nor mankind in general, nor the whole nature of things, nor the world itself, could subsist. For this also obeyeth God, and the seas and earth are subject to him, and the life of man is disposed of by the commands of the supreme law.—Elsewhere he speaks of [4]"Dominans ille nobis Deus, qui nos vetat hinc injussu suo demigrare," that God, who rules over all mankind, and forbids them to depart hence without his leave; of "Deus, cujus numini parent omnia;" that God, whose Divine power all things obey.—We read also in Cicero[5] of "summus" or "supremus Deus," the supreme God—to whom the first mak-

[1] L. i. p. 126. [cap. xxvii. p. 2604. tom. vii. oper.]

[2] Tusc. Q. L. i. p. 126. [cap. xxiv. p. 2606.]

[3] P. 343. [cap. i. p. 3389. tom. ix. oper.]

[4] Tusc. Q. lib. i. [cap. xxx. p. 2609.]

[5] De Div. [lib. i. cap. l. iii. p. 3177. tom. ix. oper.]

ing of man is properly imputed by him ; of " summi rectoris et domini Numen," the Divine power of the supreme Lord and governor ;—of " Deus præpotens," and " rerum omnium præpotens Jupiter ;"[1] the most powerful God, and Jupiter who hath power over all things ; of [2]" Princeps ille Deus, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, sicut animus humanus id corpus cui præpositus est ;"[3] that chief or principal God, who governs the whole world in the same manner as a human soul governeth that body which it is set over.—Wherefore, as for those passages before objected, where the government of the world, as to the concernments of mankind at least, is ascribed by Cicero to gods plurally, this was done by him and other Pagans, upon no other account but only this ; because the supreme God was not supposed by them to do all things himself immediately in the government of the world, but to assign certain provinces to other inferior gods, as ministers under him ; which therefore sharing in the economy of the world, were looked upon as co-governors thereof with him. Thus when Balbus in Cicero, to excuse some seeming defect of Providence, in the prosperities of wicked and the adversities of good men, pretended, " non animadvertere omnia Deos, ne reges quidem ;" that the gods did not attend to all things, as neither do kings ;—Cotta amongst other things replied thus : [4]" Fac divinam mentem esse distentam, cœlum versantem, terram tuentem, maria moderantem, cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur ? Cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos præfecit, qui a te, Balbe, innumerabiles explicati sunt ?" Should it be granted, that the Divine Mind (or supreme Deity) were distracted with turning round the heavens, observing the earth, and governing the seas, yet why does he let so many other gods to do nothing at all ? Or why does he not appoint some of those idle gods over human affairs, which, according to Balbus and the Stoics, are innumerable ?—Again, when the immortal gods are said by Cicero to have provided for the convenience of mankind in their first constitution, this doubtless is to be understood according to the Platonic hypothesis, that the gods and demons being first made by the supreme God, were set at work and employed by him afterward in the making of man and other mortal animals. And, lastly, as to that, which hath the greatest difficulty of all in it, when the whole world is said by Cicero to have been made by the

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[1] De Divinat. lib. ii. cap. xviii. p. 3204. tom ix. oper.

[2] Vide Somnium Scipion. cap. iii. p. 3973. tom. x. oper.

[3] Somn. Scip. [cap. iv. p. 3977.] de Leg. [lib. i. cap. vii. p. 3304.]

[4] De N. D. lib. iii. [cap. xxxix. p. 3107. tom. ix. oper.]

providence of the gods, this must needs be understood also of those eternal gods of Plato's, according to whose likeness or image the world and man are said to have been made; that is, of the trinity of Divine hypostases called by Amelius Plato's three minds and three kings, and by others of the Platonists, the first and second and third god, and the τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, and τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, etc. the first and second cause, etc. And, it may be here observed, what we learn from St. Cyril, that some Pagans endeavored to justify this language and doctrine of theirs, even from the Mosaic writings themselves: [1] θεοῖς ἑτέροις ὑποτοπήσαντες τὸν τῶν ὅλων φᾶναι θεὸν, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, they suspecting that the God of the universe being about to make man, did there bespeak the other gods (τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέροις καὶ ἐν μείοσιν οὖσι, which were secondary and inferior to him), after this manner, "Let us make man according to our own image and likeness"—which St. Cyril and other Christian writers understand of the Trinity. Now those eternal gods of Plato, according to whose image the world and man are said by him to have been made, and which (though one of them was properly called the Demiurgus) yet had all an influence and causality upon the making of it, were (as hath been already observed) not so many independent and self-originated deities, but all derived from one first Principle. And therefore Cicero following Plato in this is not to be suspected, upon that account, to have been an assertor of many independent gods, or partial creators of the world; especially since, in so many other places of his writings, he plainly owns a Divine monarchy.

We pass from M. Tullius Cicero to M. Terentius Varro his equal, a man famous for Polymathy or multifarious knowledge, and reputed unquestionably (though not the most eloquent, yet) the most learned of all the Romans, at least as to antiquity. He wrote one-and-forty books concerning the antiquities of human and Divine things; wherein he transcended the Roman pontifices themselves, and discovered their ignorance as to many points of their religion. In which books he distinguishes three kinds of theology, the first mythical or fabulous, the second physical or natural, and the last civil or popular: the first being most accommodate to the theatre or stage; the second to the world, or the wiser men in it; the third to the cities or the generality of the civilized vulgar. Which was agreeable also to the doctrine of Scævola, that learned pontifex, concerning three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. As for the mythical and poetical theology, it was censured after this manner by Varro: [2] "In eo sunt multa contra

[1] Contra Jul. l. i. [2] Aug. de Civ. D. lib. vi. cap. v. [p. 116. tom. vii. oper.]

dignitatem et naturam immortalium ficta. In hoc enim est, ut deus alius ex capite, alius ex femore sit, alius ex guttis sanguinis natus. In hoc ut dii furati sint, ut adulteraverint, ut servierint homini. Denique, in hoc omnia diis attribuuntur, quæ non modo in hominem, sed etiam in contemptissimum hominem cadere possunt." That, according to the literal sense, it contained many things contrary to the dignity and nature of immortal beings; the genealogy of one god being derived from the head, of another from the thigh, of another from drops of blood: some being represented as thieves, others as adulterers, etc. and all things attributed to the gods therein, that are not only incident to men, but even to the most contemptible and flagitious of them.—And as for the second, the natural theology, which is the true, this Varro conceived to be above the capacity of vulgar citizens; and that therefore it was expedient, there should be another theology calculated, more accommodate for them, and of a middle kind betwixt the natural and the fabulous, which is that which is called civil. For he affirmed,[1] "multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile, et quædam, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat;" that there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; and again, some things, which, though false, yet it was expedient they should be believed by them.—As Scævola, the Roman pontifex, in like manner, would not have the vulgar to know, that the true God had neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members. "Expedire igitur existimat (saith St. Austin[2] of him) falli in religione civitates, quod dicere etiam in libris rerum divinarum ipse Varro non dubitat." Scævola therefore judgeth it expedient, that cities should be deceived in their religion; which also Varro himself doubteth not to affirm in his books of Divine Things. Wherefore this Varro, though disapproving the fabulous theology, yet out of a pious design, as he conceived, did he endeavor to assert, as much as he could, the civil theology then received amongst the Romans, and to vindicate the same from contempt: yet nevertheless so, as that [3]"si eam civitatem novam constitueret, ex naturæ potius formula, deos et deorum nomina se fuisse dedicaturum, non dubitet confiteri:" if he were to constitute a new Rome himself, he doubts not to confess, but that he would dedicate gods and the names of gods after another manner, more agreeably to the form of nature or natural theology.—Now what Varro's own sense was concerning God, he freely declared in those books of Divine Things; that he was

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[1] Aug. Civ. D. lib. iv. cap. xxxi. [p. 87.]

[2] Civ. D. lib. iv. cap. xxvii. [p. 84.] [3] Civ. D. l. iv. cap. xxxi. [p. 87.]

the great soul and mind of the whole world. Thus St. Austin,[1] "Hi soli Varroni videntur animadvertisse quid esset deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem:" These alone seem to Varro to have understood what God is, who believed him to be a soul, governing the whole world by motion and reason.—So that Varro plainly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, he erring only in this (as St. Austin conceives) that he called him a pure soul, and not the creator of soul, or a pure abstract mind. But as Varro acknowledged one universal Numen, the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, which he also affirmed to be called by several names, as in the earth, Tellus; in the sea, Neptune, and the like: so did he also admit (together with the rest of the Pagans) other particular gods, which were nothing to him but parts of the world animated with superior souls to men: [2]"A summo circuitu cœli, usque ad circulum lunæ, æthereas animas esse astra ac stellas, eosque cœlestes deos, non modo intelligi esse, sed etiam videri: inter lunæ vero gyrum et nimborum cacumina aëreas esse animas, sed eas animo non oculis videri; et vocari heroas, et lares, et genios:" That from the highest circuit of the heavens to the sphere of the moon there are ethereal souls or animals, the stars which are not only understood, but also seen to be celestial gods; and between the sphere of the moon and the middle region of the air, there are aëreal souls or animals, which though not seen by our eyes, yet are discovered by our mind, and called heroes, lares, and genii.—So that, according to Varro, the only true natural gods were, as himself also determined, "anima mundi, ac partes ejus;" first, the great Soul and Mind of the whole world, which comprehendeth all; and, secondly, the parts of the world animated superior to men. Which gods also he affirmed to be worshipped *castius*, more purely and chastely, without images, as they were by the Romans for one hundred and seventy years: he concluding [3]"qui primi simulacra deorum populi posuerunt, eos civitatibus suis et metum dempsisse et errorem addidisse; prudenter existimans (saith St. Austin) deos facile posse in simulachrorum stoliditate contemni;" that those nations, who first set up images of the gods, did both take away fear from their cities, and add error to them; he wisely judging, that the foppery of images would easily render their gods contemptible.

L. Annæus Seneca, the philosopher, was contemporary with our Saviour Christ and his apostles, who, though frequently acknowledging

[1] Civ. D. l. iv. c. ix. [cap. xxxii. p. 87.]

[2] Civ. D. l. vii. c. vii. [p. 129.]

[3] De Civ. D. l. iv. c. xxxi. [p. 87.]

a plurality of gods, did nevertheless plainly assert one Supreme, he not only speaking of him singularly, and by way of eminency, but also plainly describing him as such; as when he calls him [1]"Formatorem universi; rectorem et arbitrum et custodem mundi; ex quo suspensa sunt omnia; animum ac spiritum universi; mundani hujus operis dominum et artificem; cui nomen omne convenit; ex quo nata sunt omnia; cujus spiritu vivimus; totum suis partibus inditum, et se sustinentem sua vi; cujus consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inconcussus eat, et actus suos explicet; cujus decreto omnia fiunt; divinum spiritum per omnia maxima et minima æquali intentione diffusum; deum potentem omnium; [2]deum illum maximum potentissimumque, qui ipse vehit omnia; qui ubique et omnibus præsto est; cœli et deorum omnium deum; a quo ista numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, suspensa sunt:" and the like. The framer and former of the universe, the governor, disposer, and keeper thereof; him, upon whom all things depend; the mind and spirit of the world; the artificer and lord of this whole mundane fabric; to whom every name belongeth; from whom all things spring; by whose spirit we live; who is in all his parts, and sustaineth himself by his own force; by whose counsel the world is provided for, and carried on its course constantly and uninterruptedly; by whose decree all things are done; the Divine spirit, that is diffused through all things both great and small with equal intention; the God, whose power extends to all things; the greatest and most powerful God, who doth himself support and uphold all things; who is present every where to all things; the God of heaven, and of all the gods, upon whom are suspended all those other Divine powers, which we singly worship and adore.—Moreover, we may here observe from St. Austin, that this Seneca in a book[3] of his against superstitions (that is now lost) did not only highly extol the natural theology, but also plainly censure and condemn the civil theology then received amongst the Romans, and that with more freedom and vehemency than Varro had done the fabulous or theatrical and poetical theology. Concerning a great part whereof he pronounced, that a wise man would observe such things, "tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata;" only as commanded by the laws (he therein exercising civil obedience), but not at all as grateful to the gods.

M. Fabius Quintilianus, though no admirer of Seneca, yet fully agreed with him in the same natural theology, and sets down this as the generally-received notion or definition of God: [4]"Deum esse spir-

[1] Nat. Q. l. ii. c. xlv. [p. 537. tom. ii. oper.]
[2] P. 442. Lips.
[3] Civ. D. l. vi. c. x. [p. 122.]
[4] L. vii. c. iii.

itum omnibus partibus immistum," that God is a spirit mingled with and diffused through all the parts of the world ;—he from thence inferring Epicurus to be an Atheist, notwithstanding that he verbally asserted gods, because he denied a God according to this generally-received notion, he bestowing upon his gods a circumscribed human form, and placing them between the worlds. And the junior Pliny, though he were a persecutor of the Christians, he concluding, [1]"qualecunque esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri ;" that whatsoever their religion were, yet notwithstanding their stubbornness and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished ; —and who compelled many of them to worship the images of the emperor, and to sacrifice and pray to the statues of the Pagan gods, and lastly, to blaspheme Christ ; yet himself plainly acknowledged also one supreme universal Numen, as may sufficiently appear from his panegyric oration to Trajan where he is called " Deus ille, qui manifestus ac præsens cœlum ac sydera insidet ;" that God, who is present with, and inhabits the whole heaven and stars :[2]—himself making a solemn prayer and supplication to him, both in the beginning and close thereof, and sometimes speaking of him therein singularly and in way of eminency, as in these words : " Occultat utrorumque semina Deus, et plerumque bonorum malorumque causæ sub diversa specie latent :" God hideth the seeds of good and evil, so that the causes of each often appear disguised to men.—L. Apuleius also, whose pretended miracles the Pagans endeavored to confirm their religion by,[3] as well as they did by those of Apollonius, doth in sundry places of his writings plainly assert one supreme and universal Numen : we shall only here set down one : [4]"Cum summus deorum cuncta hæc non solum cogitationum ratione consideret ; sed prima, media, et ultima obeat ; compertaque intimæ providentiæ ordinationis universitate et constantia regat :" Since the highest of the gods does not only consider all these things in his mind and cogitation, but also pass through and comprehend within himself the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and constantly govern all by his occult providence. Lastly, Symmachus, who was a zealous stickler for the restitution of Paganism, declared the Pagans to worship one and the same God with the Christians, but in several ways ; he conceiving, that there was no necessity God should be worshipped by

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[1] Ep. 97. [lib. ix.]

[2] And Mundi parens, and Parens hominum deorumque.

[3] Vide Augustin. Epist. cxxxviii. p. 317. tom. ii. oper.

[4] De Philos. p. 278. Colo.

all after the same manner. "Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt, UNUM putari:[1] eadem spectamus astra; commune cœlum est; idem nos mundus involvit: quid interest, qua quisque prudentia verum requirat? Uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande secretum." We ought in reason to think, that it is one and the same thing, which all men worship; as we all behold the same stars, have the same common heaven, and are involved within the same world. Why may not men pursue one and the same thing in different ways? One path is not enough to lead men into so grand a secret.—The scene whereof is thus elegantly expressed by Prudentius:

> [2] Uno omnes sub sole siti, vegetamur eodem
> Aëre, communis cunctis viventibus aura.
> Sed quid sit qualisque deus, diversa secuti
> Quærimus, atque viis longe distantibus unum
> Imus ad occultum; suus est mos cuique genti,
> Per quod iter properans eat ad tam grande profundum.

And again afterward,[3]

> Secretum sed grande nequit rationis opertæ
> Quæri aliter, quam si sparsis via multiplicetur
> Tramitibus, et centenos terat orbita calles,
> Quæsitura deum variata indage latentem.

And the beginning of Prudentius's confutation is this,

> [4] Longe aliud verum est. Nam multa ambago viarum
> Anfractus dubios habet, et perplexius errat.
> Sola errore caret simplex via, nescia flecti
> In diverticulum, biviis nec pluribus anceps, etc.

We shall now instance also in some of the latter Greek writers. Though the author of the book De Mundo were not Aristotle, yet that he was a Pagan, plainly appears from some passages thereof; as where he approves of sacrificing to the gods, and of worshipping heroes and dead men: as also because Apuleius would not otherwise have translated so much of that book, and incorporated it into his De Mundo. He therefore does not only commend this of Heraclitus, ἐκ πάντων ἓν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα, that there is one harmonious system made out of all

[1] P. 306. (Epist. lib. x. epist. lxi. p. 442.

[2] P. 285. (Contra Symmachum lib. ii. ver. 85.)

[3] P. 308. (ver. 842.) [4] Ver. 846.

things, and that all things are derived from one;—but doth himself also write excellently concerning the supreme God, whom he calleth [1]*τὴν τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν*, the cause, which containeth all things—and *τὸ τοῦ κόσμου κυριώτατον*, the best and most excellent part of the world;—he beginning after this manner: *Ἀρχαῖος μὲν οὖν τις λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα, καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκε· οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις, αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτάρκης, ἐρημωθεῖσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας·* It is an ancient opinion or tradition, that hath been conveyed down to all men from their progenitors, that all things are from God, and consist by him; and that no nature is sufficient to preserve itself, if left alone, and devoid of the Divine assistance and influence.—Where we may observe, that the Apuleian Latin version, altering the sense, renders the words thus: "Vetus opinio est, atque in cogitationes omnium hominum penitus incidit, Deum esse: originis non habere auctorem; Deumque esse salutem et perseverantiam earum, quas effecerit, rerum." So that whereas, in the original Greek, this is said to be the general opinion of all mankind, That all things are from God, and subsist by him, and that nothing at all can conserve itself in being without him;—Apuleius, correcting the words, makes the general sense of mankind to run no higher than this; "That there is a God, who hath no author of his original, and who is the safety and preservation of all those things, that were made by himself. From whence it may be probably concluded, that Apuleius, who is said to have been of Plutarch's progeny, was infected also with those paradoxical opinions of Plutarch's, and consequently did suppose all things not to have been made by God, nor to have depended on him (as the writer De Mundo affirmeth,) but that there was something besides God, as namely the matter and an evil principle, uncreated and self-existent. Afterwards the same writer De Mundo elegantly illustrates, by similitudes, how God, by one simple motion and energy of his own, without any labor or toil, doth produce and govern all the variety of motions in the universe; and how he doth *συνέχειν τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἁρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν*, contain the harmony and safety of the whole.—And, lastly, he concludes,[2] *ὅπερ ἐν νηῒ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἅρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ κορυφαῖος, ἐν πόλει νόμος, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ ἡγεμών, τοῦτο Θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ*, that what a pilot is to a ship, a charioteer to a chariot, the Coryphæus to a choir, law to a city, and a general to an army; the same is God to the world:—there being only this difference, that whereas the government of some of them is toilsome and solicitous, the Divine government and steerage of the world is most easy and facile; for as this writer adds, "God, being

[1] C. vi. (p. 858. tom. i. oper. Aristot.) [2] (P. 864.)

himself immoveable, moveth all things; in the same manner as law, in itself immoveable, by moving the mind of the citizens, orders and disposes all things."

Plutarchus Chæronensis (as hath been already declared) was unluckily engaged in two false opinions, the first of matter's being ingenite or uncreated, upon this pretence, because nothing could be made out of nothing; the second of a positive substantial evil principle, or an irrational soul and demon self-existent, upon this ground, because,[1] *τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοπίας ὑπερβάλλει·* there is no greater absurdity imaginable, than that evil should proceed from the providence of God, as a bad epigram from the will of the poet.—In which respect he was before called by us a Ditheist. Plutarch was also a worshipper of the many Pagan gods, himself being a priest of the Pythian Apollo. Notwithstanding which, he unquestionably asserted one sole principle of all good, the cause of all things (evil and matter only excepted,) the framer of the whole world, and maker of all the gods in it; who is therefore often called by him, God, in way of eminency, as when he affirmeth[2] *ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν τὸν θεὸν*, that God doth always act the geometrician;—that is, do all things in measure and proportion: and again,[3] *πάντα καθ' ἁρμονίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κατασκευάζεσθαι*, that all things are made by God, according to harmony;—and that *ὁ θεὸς ἁρμονικὸς καλεῖται καὶ μουσικὸς*, God is called a harmonist and musician:—and he hath these epithets given him, *ὁ μέγας θεὸς*, the great God—and *ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεὸς* the highest and uppermost God,—and *ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς*, the first God—and *ὁ ἀγέννητος θεὸς*, the unmade self-existent God;—all the other Pagan gods, according to him, having been made in time, together with the world. He is likewise styled by Plutarch, *πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ*, the sea of pulchritude:—and his standing and permanent duration, without any flux of time, is excellently described by the same writer, in his book concerning the Delphic inscription. Lastly, Plutarch affirmeth, that men generally pray to this supreme God for whatsoever is not in their own power, *ὅσα μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, εὐχόμεθα τὸν θεὸν διδόναι.*

Dio Chrysostomus, a sophist, Plutarch's equal, though an acknowledger of many gods, yet nevertheless asserteth *βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ ὅλον*,[4] that

[1] De Fato, p. 572, tom. ii. oper.

[2] Vide Plutarch. Sympos. lib. viii. Quæst. ii. p. 718. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Vide eund. de Musica, p. 1147. tom. ii. oper.

[4] P. 199. (Ed. Morell.)

the whole world is under a kingly power or monarchy,—he calling the supreme God, sometime,[1] *τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν βασιλέα τε καὶ ἄρχοντα, καὶ πρύτανιν καὶ πατέρα*, the common King of gods and men, their governor and father; *τὸν πάντων κρατοῦντα θεὸν*, the God that rules over all;[2] *τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεὸν*, the first and greatest God; *τὸν κορυφαῖον προεστῶτα τῶν ὅλων, καὶ κατευθύνοντα τὸν ἅπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον*, etc. the chief President over all things, who orders and guides the whole heaven and world, as a wise pilot doth a ship;[3] *τὸν τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἡγεμόνα οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῆς ὅλης δεσπότην οὐσίας*, the Ruler of the whole heaven, and Lord of the whole essence—and the like. And he affirming that there is a natural prolepsis in the minds of men concerning him:[4] *Περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν πρώτοις δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινῇ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους· ὁμοίως μὲν Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, ἀναγκαία καὶ ἔμφυτος ἐν παντὶ τῷ λογικῷ γιγνομένη κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνευ θνητοῦ διδασκάλου καὶ μυσταγωγοῦ.* Concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially of that supreme Ruler over all, there is an opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians as Greeks, that is naturally implanted in them as rational beings, and not derived from any mortal teacher.—The meaning whereof is this; that men are naturally possessed with a persuasion, that there is one God, the supreme Governor of the whole world, and that there are also below him, but above men, many other intellectual beings, which these Pagans called gods.

That Galen was no Atheist, and what his religion was, may plainly appear from this one passage out of his third book De Usu Partium, to omit many others: [5]*Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως εἰ ἐπίπλεον τοιούτων μνημονεύοιμι βοσκημάτων, οἱ σωφρονοῦντες ὀρθῶς ἄν μοι μέμψοιντο, καὶ μιαίνειν φαῖεν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἐγὼ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς ὕμνον ἀληθινὸν συντίθημι, καὶ νομίζω τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὴν ὄντως εὐσέβειαν· οὐχὶ εἰ ταύρων ἑκατόμβας αὐτῷ παμπόλλους καταθύσαιμι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μυρία θυμάσαιμι καὶ κασίας, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ γνοίην μὲν αὐτὸς πρῶτος, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξηγησαίμην, οἷος μέν ἐστι τὴν σοφίαν, οἷος δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ὁποῖος δὲ τὴν χροστότητα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐθέλειν κοσμεῖν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐνδεχόμενον κόσμον καὶ μηδενὶ φθονεῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τῆς τελεωτάτης χρηστότητος ἐγὼ δεῖγμα τίθεμαι, ταύτῃ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθὸς ἡμῖν ὑμνείσθω· τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα κοσμηθείη, πᾶν ἐξευρεῖν, ἄκρας σοφίας· τὸ δὲ καὶ δρᾶσαι πάνθ᾽ ὅσα προείλετο, δυνάμεως ἀηττήτου.* Should I any longer insist upon such brutish persons as those, the wise and sober might justly condemn me, as defiling this holy oration, which I compose as a true

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[1] P. 210. [2] P. 203. [3] P. 446. [4] P. 201.

[5] P. 402. (cap. x. tom. ii. oper. edit. Basil.)

hymn to the praise of Him that made us; I conceiving true piety and religion towards God to consist in this, not that I should sacrifice many hecatombs, or burn much incense to him, but that I should myself first acknowledge, and then declare to others, how great his wisdom is, how great his power, and how great his goodness. For that he would adorn the whole world after this manner, envying to nothing that good, which it was capable of, I conclude to be a demonstration of most absolute goodness, and thus let him be praised by us as good. And that he was able to find out, how all things might be adorned after the best manner, is a sign of the greatest wisdom in him. And, lastly, to be able to effect and bring to pass all those things, which he had thus decreed, argues an insuperable power.

Maximus Tyrius, in the close of his first dissertation, gives us this short representation of his own Theology: *Βούλομαι δέ σοι δεῖξαι τὸ λεγόμενον σαφεστέρᾳ εἰκόνι. Ἐννόει μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλείαν ἐῤῥωμένην πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βασιλέως τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ πρεσβυτάτου συμπάντων νενευκότων ἑκόντων· ὅρον δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐχ Ἅλυν ποταμον, οὐδὲ Ἑλλήσποντον, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαιῶτιν, οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ ὠκεανῷ ἠϊόνας, ἀλλὰ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν τὸν μὲν ἄνω τὴν δ' ἔνερθεν· βασιλέα δὲ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν μέγαν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ὥσπερ νόμον παρέχοντα τοῖς πειθομένοις, σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶν, καὶ κοινονοὺς τῆς ἀρχῆς, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁρατοὺς θεούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀφανεῖς· τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ πρόθυρα αὐτὰ εἱλουμένους, οἷον εἰσαγγελέας τινὰς καὶ βασιλεῖς συγγενεστάτους, ὁμοτραπέζους αὐτοὺς καὶ συννεστίους· τοὺς δὲ τούτων ὑπηρέτας, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι τούτων καταδεεστέρους· διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι γῆς·* I will now more plainly declare my sense by this similitude: imagine in your mind a great and powerful kingdom or principality, in which all the rest freely and with one consent conspire to direct their actions, agreeably to the will and command of one supreme King, the oldest and the best: and then suppose the bounds and limits of this empire not to be the river Halys, nor the Hellespont, nor the Meotian lake, nor the shores of the ocean; but heaven above, and the earth beneath. Here then let that great king sit immoveable, prescribing laws to all his subjects, in which consists their safety and security: the consorts of his empire being many, both visible and invisible gods; some of which, that are nearest to him, and immediately attending on him, are in the highest royal dignity, feasting as it were at the same table with him: others again are their ministers and attendants; and a third sort inferior to them both. And thus you see, how the order and chain of this government descend down by steps and degrees, from the supreme God to the earth and men.—In which resemblance, we have a plain acknowledgment of one supreme God, the monarch of

the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, as his ministers, in the government of the world; whom that writer also calls *θεοὶς θεοῦ παῖδας καὶ φίλους*, gods, the sons and friends of God.

Aristides, the famous Adrianean sophist and orator, in his first oration or hymn vowed to Jupiter, after he had escaped a great tempest, is so full to the purpose, that nothing can be more: he, after his proem, beginning thus: *Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησε, καὶ Διός ἐστιν ἔργα ὅσα ἐστὶ πάντα, καὶ ποταμὸς, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλαττα, καὶ οὐρανός· καὶ ὅσα τούτων μεταξὺ ἄνω, καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ ταῦτα· καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, κτὶ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ ὅσα εἰς ὄψιν ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ὅσα δεῖ νόησει λαβεῖν· Ἐποίησε δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· οὐ Κρήτης ἐν εὐώδεσιν ἄντροις τραφείς· οὐδ' ἐμέλλησεν αὐτὸν Κρόνος καταπιεῖν· οὔτ' ἀντ' ἐκείνου λίθον κατέπιεν, οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσε Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ μήποτε κινδυνεύσει· οὐδ' ἔστι πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲν Διός· οὐ μᾶλλόν γε ἢ υἱεῖς τε πατέρων πρεσβύτεροι γένοιτ' ἄν, καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα τῶν ποιούντων. ἀλλ' ὅδε ἐστὶ πρῶτός τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος, καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων· αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ γενόμενος· ὁπότε δὲ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔσται εἰσαεὶ, αὐτοπάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου γεγονέναι. Καὶ ὥσπερ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἄρα ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔφυσε, καὶ γάμου οὐδὲν προσεδεήθη εἰς αὐτὴν, οὕτως ἔτι πρότερον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε, καὶ οὐδὲν προσεδεήθη ἑτέρου εἰς τὸ εἶναι· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον πάντα εἶναι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνον εἰπεῖν. Οὔτε γὰρ χρόνος ἦν πω τότε ὅτε μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν· δημιουργοῦ γὰρ ἔργον οὐδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον· οὕτω δὴ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἁπάντων Ζεὺς καὶ ἐκ Διός πάντα, ἅτε δὴ ὢν χρόνου τε κρείττων, καὶ οὐδένα ἔχων τὸν ἀντικόψοντα, αὐτός τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἦν, οὕτω ταχὺ πάντα ἐποίησε, ἐποίησε δὲ ὧδε*, etc. Jupiter made all things, and all things whatsoever exist are the works of Jupiter; rivers, and earth, and sea, and heaven, and what are between these, and gods and men and all animals, whatsoever is perceivable either by sense or by the mind. But Jupiter first of all made himself;[1] for he was not educated in the flowery and odoriferous caves of Crete, neither was Saturn ever about to devour him, nor instead of him did he swallow down a stone. For Jupiter was never in danger, nor will he be ever in danger of any thing. Neither is there any thing older than Jupiter, no more than there are sons older than their parent, or works than their opificers. But he is the first and the oldest, and the prince of all things, he being made from himself; nor can it be declared when he was made, for he was from the beginning, and ever will be his own father, and greater than to have been begotten from one another. As he produced Minerva from his brain, and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, so before this did he produce himself from himself, needing not the help of any other thing for his

[1] How God was said to be self-made. See p. 405 and 406.

being. But, on the contrary, all things began to be from him, and no man can tell the time; since there was not then any time when there was nothing else besides, and no work can be older than the maker of it. Thus was Jupiter the beginning of all things, and all things were from Jupiter, who is better than time, which had its beginning together with the world.—And again: *Ὡς δὲ καὶ θεῶν ὅσα φῦλα ἀποῤῥοὴν τῆς Διὸς τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἔχει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὴν Ὁμήρου σειρὰν, ἅπαντα εἰς αὐτὸν διήρτηται, καὶ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξῆπται· ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἀνάγκην δύο τούτω συναγωγοτάτω καὶ ἰσχυροτάτω ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγένησεν, ὅπως αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα συνέχοιεν*, etc. *ἐποίει θεοὺς μὲν, ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελητὰς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ θεῶν θεραπευτάς τε καὶ ὑπηρέτας*, etc. *πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ Διὸς μεστὰ, καὶ ἁπάντων θεῶν εὐεργεσίαι, Διός εἰσιν ἔργον*, etc. All the several kinds of gods are but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter; and, according to Homer's chain, all things are connected with him and depend upon him. He, amongst the first, produced love and necessity, two the most powerful holders of things together, that they might make all things firmly to cohere. He made gods to be the curators of men, and he made men to be the worshippers and servers of those gods. All things are every where full of Jupiter, and the benefits of all the other gods are his work, and to be attributed to him, they being done in compliance with that order, which he had prescribed them.

It is certain, that all the latter philosophers after Christianity, whether Platonists or Peripatetics, though for the most part they asserted the eternity of the world, yet universally agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, the cause of the whole world, and of all the other gods. And as Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyrius, Proclus, Damascius, and others, held also a trinity of Divine hypostases, so had some of those philosophers excellent speculations concerning the Deity, as particularly Plotinus; who, notwithstanding that he derived matter and all things from one Divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods. Thus in his book described against the Gnostics: [1]*Χρὴ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι, μὴ μόνον δὲ αὐτὸν νομίζειν ἄριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι, οὕτω γὰρ οὔπω ἄριστος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλους ἀρίστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεοὺς, τούς τε ἐν τῷδε ὄντας κακεῖ βλέποντας· πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοητοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεοὶς, ἑῷ ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη, τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἐκεῖ βασιλέα· καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν, τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένους. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστεῖλαι εἰς ἕν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι πολὺ τὸ θεῖον ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτὸς, τουτέστι δύνα-*

[1] En. ii. lib. ix. c. ix. [p. 207.]

μιν θεοῦ εἰδότων, ὅταν μένων ὅς ἐστι, πολλοὺς ποιῇ, πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνηρτημένους, καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὅδε δι' ἐκείνον ἐστὶ κἀκεῖ βλέπει, καὶ πᾶς, καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος. Every man ought to endeavor, with all his might, to become as good as may be, but yet not to think himself to be the only thing that is good, but that there are also other good men in the world, and good demons, but much more gods; who, though inhabiting this inferior world, yet look up to that superior; and, most of all, the prince of this universe, that most happy soul. From whence he ought to ascend yet higher, and to praise those intelligible gods, but above all that great King and Monarch; declaring his greatness and majesty by the multitude of gods which are under him. For this is not the part of them, who know the power of God, to contract all into one, but to show forth all that Divinity, which himself hath displayed, who, remaining one, makes many depending on him; which are by him and from him. For this whole world is by him, and looks up perpetually to him, as also doth every one of the gods in it. — And Themistius, the Peripatetic (who was so far from being a Christian, that, as Petavius probably conjectures, he perstringes our Saviour Christ under the name of Empedocles, for making himself a god), doth not only affirm, that one and the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, and the Christians, and all nations, though in different manners; but also, that God was delighted with this variety of religions: [1]*Ταύτῃ νόμιζε γάννυσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχηγέτην· ἄλλως Σύρους ἐθέλει πολιτεύεσθαι, ἄλλως Ἕλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίους, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὺς Σύρους ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἤδη κατακεκερμάτισται εἰς μικρά·* The author and prince of the universe seems to be delighted with this variety of worship; he would have the Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks another, and the Egyptians another; neither do the Syrians (or Christians) themselves all agree, they being subdivided into many sects.

We shall conclude, therefore, with this full testimony of St. Cyril, in his first book against Julian: [2]*Ἅπασιν ἐναργές, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τὰ Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφεῖν εἰωθόσιν, ἕνα μὲν ἐδόκει Θεὸν εἶναι συνωμολογεῖν, τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργόν, καὶ πάντων ἐπέκεινα κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοὶ, νοητούς τε καὶ αἰσθητούς·* It is manifest to all, that amongst those, who philosophize in the Greek way, it is universally acknowledged that there is one God, the maker of the universe, and who is by nature above all things; but that there have been made by him, and produced into generation, certain other gods (as they call them) both intelligible and sensible.

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[1] Orat. xii. [p. 156. edit. Harduini.] [2] P. 23.

XXVII. Neither was this the opinion of philosophers and learned men only, amongst the Pagans, but even of the vulgar also. Not that we pretend to give an account of all the most sottish vulgar amongst them, who as they little considered their religion, so probably did they not understand that mystery of the Pagan theology (hereafter to be declared), that many of their gods were nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its various manifestations and effects; but because, as we conceive, this tradition of one supreme God did run current amongst the generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans at least, whether learned or unlearned. For we cannot make a better judgment concerning the vulgar and generality of the ancient Pagans, than from the poets and mythologists, who were the chief instructors of them. Thus Aristotle in his Politics, writing of music, judgeth of mens' opinions concerning the gods from the poets: [1]*Σκοπεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς·* We may learn what opinion men have concerning the gods, from hence, because the poets never bring in Jupiter singing or playing upon an instrument.—Now we have already proved from sundry testimonies of the poets, that (however they were depravers of the Pagan religion, yet) they kept up this tradition of one supreme Deity, one king and father of gods: to which testimonies many more might have been added, as of Seneca the tragedian, Statius, Lucan, Silius Italicus, Persius and Martial, but that we then declined them, to avoid tediousness. Wherefore we shall here content ourselves only to set down this affirmation of Dio Chrysostomus, concerning the theology of the poets: [2]*Οὗτοι δ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα, τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεὸν πατέρα καλοῦσι συλλήβδην ἅπαντος τοῦ λογικοῦ γένους, καὶ δὴ καὶ βασιλέα· οἷς πειθόμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι Διὸς βασιλέως ἱδρύονται βωμούς· καὶ δὴ καὶ πατέρα αὐτὸν οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι προσαγορεύειν ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς·* All the poets call the first and greatest God, the father, universally, of all the rational kind; as also the king thereof. Agreeably with which of the poets, do men erect altars to Jupiter king, and stick not to call him father in their devotions.

Moreover, Aristotle himself hath recorded this in his Politics,[3] *πάντες λέγουσι θεοὺς βασιλεύεσθαι*, that all men affirmed the gods to be under a kingly power; or, that there is one supreme King and Monarch over the gods.—And Maximus Tyrius declareth, that as well the unlearned as the learned, throughout the whole Pagan world, universally agreed in this, that there was one supreme God, the father of all the other

[1] L. viii. c. v. [p. 607.] tom. iii. oper. [2] Orat. xxxvi. p. 447.

[3] Lib. iv. cap. xv. p. 510. tom. iii. oper.

gods : [1] *Εἰ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν τεχνῶν τούτων, κελεύεις ἅπαντας ἀθρόους διὰ ψηφίσματος ἑνὸς ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, οἴει ἄλλο μὲν ἂν τὸν γραφέα εἰπεῖν, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαλματοποιόν, καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄλλο; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὰ Δία τὸν Σκύθην, οὐδὲ τὸν Ἕλληνα, οὐδὲ τὸν Πέρσην, ἢ τὸν Ὑπερβόρειον· ἀλλὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα ψηφιζομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, πάντας δὲ πᾶσι διαφερομένους· οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, οὐ τὸ κακὸν ὅμοιον, οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, οὐ τὸ καλόν· νόμος μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται διασπώμενα καὶ σπαρασσόμενα· μὴ γὰρ ὅτι γένος γένει ὁμολογεῖ ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πόλις πόλει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἶκος οἴκῳ, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· ἐν τοσούτῳ δὲ πολέμῳ καὶ στάσει καὶ διαφωνίᾳ, ἕνα ἴδοις ἂν ἐν πάσῃ γῇ ὁμόφωνον νόμον καὶ λόγον, ὅτι ΘΕΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΤΗΡ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῷ· ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἕλλην λέγει καὶ ὁ Βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ ἠπειρώτης καὶ ὁ θαλάττιος, καὶ ὁ σοφὸς, καὶ ὁ ἄσοφος·* If there were a meeting called of all these several trades and professions, a painter, a statuary, a poet, and a philosopher, and all of them were required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think, that the painter would say one thing, the statuary another, the poet another, and the philosopher another? No, nor the Scythian neither, nor the Greek, nor the Hyperborean. In other things we find men speaking very discordantly to one another, all men as it were differing from all. The same thing is not good to all nor evil, honest nor dishonest. For law and justice itself are different every where; and not only one nation doth not agree with another therein, but also not one city with another city, nor one house with another house, nor one man with another man, nor, lastly, any one man with himself. Nevertheless, in this so great war, contention, and discord, you may find every where throughout the whole world, one agreeing law and opinion, that THERE IS ONE GOD THE KING AND FATHER OF ALL, and many gods, the sons of God, co-reigners together with God. These things both the Greek and the Barbarian alike affirm, both the inhabitants of the continent and of the sea-coast, both the wise and the unwise.—Nothing can be more full than this testimony of Maximus Tyrius, that the generality of the Pagan world, as well vulgar and illiterate as wise and learned, did agree in this, that there was one supreme God, the creator and governor of all. And to the same purpose was that other testimony before cited out of Dio Chrysostomus, [2] *περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, ὁμοίως δὲ Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων,* etc. that concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially concerning that Prince

[1] Diss. i. p. 4, 5. [2] Orat. xii. p. 201.

of all things, there was one agreeing persuasion in the minds of all mankind as well Barbarians as Greeks.—Where Dio plainly intimates also, that there was a more universal consent of nations in the belief of one God than of many gods.

It hath been already observed, that the several Pagan nations had vulgarly their peculiar proper names for the one supreme God. For as the Greeks called him Zeus or Zen, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians, Africans, and Arabians, Hammon. Which Hammon therefore was called by the Greeks the Zeus of the Africans, and by the Latins their Jupiter. Whence is that in Cicero's De Natura Deorum,[1] "Jovis Capitolini nobis alia species, alia Afris Ammonis Jovis," the form of the Capitoline Jupiter with us Romans is different from that of Jupiter Ammon with the Africans."—The name of the Scythian Jupiter also, as Herodotus tells us, was Pappæus or father. The Persians likewise had their Ζεὺς πατρῷος, as Xenophon styles him, their country Zeus or Jupiter (namely Mithras or Oromasdes,) who in the same Xenophon is distinguished from the sun, and called in Cyrus's proclamation in the Scripture, "the Lord God of heaven, who had given him all the kingdoms of the earth." Thus the Babylonian Bel is declared by Berosus (a priest of his) to have been that God, who was the maker of heaven and earth. And learned men conceive, that Baal (which is the same with Bel, and signifies Lord) was first amongst the Phenicians also a name for the supreme God, the creator of heaven and earth, sometimes called Beel samen, the Lord of heaven: as likewise that Molech, which signifies king, was, amongst the Ammonites, the king of their gods; and that Marnas (the chief God of the Gazites, who were Philistines) and signifies the Lord of men, was that from whence the Cretians derived their Jupiter, called the father of gods and men.

Origen[2] indeed contended, that it was not lawful for Christians to call the supreme God by any of those Pagan names, and probably for these reasons, because those names were then frequently bestowed upon idols, and because they were contaminated and defiled by absurd and impure fables. Nevertheless, that learned father does acknowledge the Pagans really to have meant τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, the God over all—by those several names: which yet Lactantius Firmianus would by no means allow of as to the Roman Jupiter, worshipped in the capitol, he endeavoring to confute it after this manner:[3] "Vana est persuasio eorum, qui nomen Jovis summo Deo tribuunt. Solent enim quidam errores suos hac excusatione defendere; qui convicti de uno Deo, cum id

[1] Lib. i. cap. xxix. p. 2923. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Contra Celsum, lib. i. p. 18.

[3] L. i. c. xi. (p. 76.)

negare non possunt, ipsum colere affirmant, verum hoc sibi placere ut Jupiter nominetur, quo quid absurdius? Jupiter enim sine contubernio conjugis filiæque, coli non solet. Unde quid sit apparet, nec fas est id nomen eo transferri, ubi nec Minerva est ulla nec Juno." It is a vain persuasion of those, who would give the name of Jupiter to the supreme God. For some are wont thus to excuse their errors, when they have been convinced of one God, so as that they could not contradict it, by saying, that themselves worshipped him, he being called by them Jupiter: than which what can be more absurd? since Jupiter is not worshipped without the partnership of his wife and daughter. From whence it plainly appears what this Jupiter is, and that the name ought not to be transferred thither, where there is neither any Minerva nor Juno.—The ground of which argumentation of Lactantius was this, because the great Capitoline temple of Jupiter had three sacella or lesser chapels in it, all contained under one roof, Jupiter's in the middle, Minerva's on the right hand, and Juno's on the left; according to that of the poet;

Trina in Tarpeio fulgent consortia templo.

Which Juno, according to the poetic theology, is said to be the wife of Jupiter, and Minerva his daughter, begotten not upon Juno, but from his own brain. Where it is plain, that there is a certain mixture of the mythical or poetical theology, together with the natural, as almost every where else there was, to make up that civil theology of the Pagans. But here (according to the more recondite and arcane doctrine of the Pagans) these three Capitoline gods, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno, as well as some others, may be understood to have been nothing else but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its several attributes and manifestations; Jupiter signifying the Divine power and sovereignty, as it were seated and enthroned in the heavens; Minerva, the Divine wisdom and understanding; and Juno the same deity, acting in these lower parts of the world. Unless we would rather with Macrobius,[1] physiologize them all three, and make Minerva to be the higher heaven, Jupiter the middle ether, and Juno the lower air and earth, all animated; that is, one God, as acting differently in these three regions of the world. Which yet seems not so congruous, because it would place Minerva above Jupiter.

Nevertheless it may justly be suspected, as G. I. Vossius[2] hath al-

[1] Saturnal. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 391, 392.

[2] De Theolog. Gentili, lib. viii. cap. xii. p. 750, 751.

ready observed, that there was yet some higher and more sacred mystery in this Capitoline trinity aimed at; namely, a trinity of Divine hypostases. For these three Roman or Capitoline gods were said to have been first brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, but before that into Phrygia by Dardanus, out of the Samothracian island; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian flood, if we may believe Eusebius. And as these were called by the Latins Dii Penates, which Macrobius thus interprets,[1] "Dii per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi possidemus," that is, the gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being;—but Varro in Arnobius, "Dii, qui sunt intrinsecus, atque in intimis penetralibus cœli," the gods, who are in the most inward recesses of heaven;—so were they called by the Samothracians *Κάβειροι*, or Cabiri, that is, as Varro[3] rightly interprets the word, *θεοὶ δυνατοὶ*, or divini potentes, the powerful and mighty gods.—Which Cabiri being plainly the Hebrew כבירים, gives just occasion to suspect, that this ancient tradition of the three Divine hypostases (unquestionably entertained by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongst the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Persians) sprung originally from the Hebrews; the first of these Divine hypostases, called Jove, being the fountain of the godhead; and the second of them, called by the Latins Minerva (which, as Varro[4] interprets it, was, that wherein "ideæ et exempla rerum," the ideas and first exemplars or patterns of things were contained,) fitly expressing the Divine Logos; and the third Juno, called "amor ac delicium Jovis,"[5] well enough answering (as Vossius thinks) to the Divine Spirit.

But Lactantius hath yet another objection[6] against the Roman Jupiter's being the supreme God; "Quid? quod hujus nominis proprietas non divinam vim sed humanam exprimit? Jovem enim Junonemque a Juvando esse dictos Cicero interpretatur. Et Jupiter quasi Juvans pater dicitur. Quod nomen in Deum minime convenit, quia juvare hominis est, etc. Nemo sic deum precatur, ut se adjuvet, sed ut servet, etc. Ergo non imperitus modo, sed etiam impius est, qui nomine Jovis virtutam summæ potestatis imminuit." What if we add, that the propriety of this word Jupiter does not express a Divine, but only a hu-

[1] Saturnal. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 391.

[2] Advers. Gentes. lib. iii. p. 155.

[3] De Lingua Latin. lib. iv. p. 66.

[4] Apud Augustinum de Civitate Dei, lib. vii. cap. xxviii. p. 141. tom. vii. oper.

[5] De Theol. Gen. l. viii. c. xii.

[6] P. 63.

man force? Cicero deriving both Jove and Juno alike *a juvando*, that is, from helping: for *juvans pater*, or a helping father, is not a good description of God; forasmuch as it properly belongeth to men to help. Neither doth any one pray to God to help him only, but to save him. Nor is a father said to help his son, whom he was the begetter of, etc. Wherefore he is not only unskilful, but impious also, who, by the name of Jove or Jupiter, diminishes the power of the supreme God.—But as this of Lactantius seems otherwise weak enough; so is the foundation of it absolutely ruinous, the true etymon of Jupiter (though Cicero knew not so much) being without peradventure, not *juvans pater*, but *Jovis pater*, Jove, the father of gods and men; which *Jovis* is the very Hebrew Tetragrammaton (however these Romans came by it) only altered by a Latin termination. Wherefore, as there could be no impiety at all in calling the supreme God Jove or Jovis, it being that very name which God himself chose to be called by; so neither is there any reason, why the Latins should not as well mean the supreme God thereby, as the Greeks did unquestionably by Zeus, which will be proved afterwards from irrefragable authority.

Especially if we consider, that the Roman vulgar commonly bestowed these two epithets upon that Capitoline Jupiter (that is, not the senseless statue, but that God who was there worshipped in a material statue) of Optimus and Maximus, the best and the greatest; they thereby signifying him to be a Being infinitely good and powerful. Thus Cicero in his De Nat. Deorum,[1] "Jupiter a poetis dicitur divum atque hominum pater, a majoribus autem nostris optimus, maximus." That same Jupiter, who is by the poets styled the father of gods and men, is by our ancestors called the best, the greatest.—And in his Orat. pro S. Roscio,[2] "Jupiter optimus maximus, cujus nutu et arbitrio cœlum, terra, mariaque reguntur;" Jupiter the best, the greatest, by whose beck and command, the heaven, the earth, and the seas are governed. As also the junior Pliny, in his panegyric oration, "Parens hominum deorumque, optimi prius, deinde maximi nomine colitur;" the father of men and gods is worshipped under the name, first of the best, and then of the greatest.—Moreover Servius Honoratus informs us, that the pontifices in their public sacrifices were wont to address themselves to Jupiter in this form of words; "Omnipotens Jupiter, seu quo alio nomine appellari volueris;" Omnipotent Jupiter, or by what other name soever thou pleasest to be called.—From whence it is plain, that the Romans, under the name of Jupiter, worshipped the omnipo-

[1] Lib. ii. cap. xxv. p. 2992. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Cap. xiv. p. 948. tom. iii. oper.

tent God. And, according to Seneca, the ancient Heturians, who are by him distinguished from philosophers, as a kind of illiterate superstitious persons (in these words, "Hæc adhuc Etruscis et[1] philosophis communia sunt, in illo dissentiunt") had this very same notion answering to the word Jupiter, namely, of the supreme Monarch of the universe. For, first, he sets down their tradition concerning thunderbolts in this manner: "Fulmina dicunt a Jove mitti, et tres illi manubias dant. Prima (ut aiunt) monet et placata est, et ipsius consilio Jovis mittitur. Secundam quidem mittit Jupiter, sed ex consilii sententia; duodecim enim deos advocat, etc. Tertiam idem Jupiter mittit, sed adhibitis in consilium diis, quos superiores et involutos vocant quæ vastat," etc. The Hetrurians say, that the thunderbolts are sent from Jupiter, and that there are three kinds of them; the first gentle and monitory, and sent by Jupiter alone; the second sent by Jupiter, but not without the counsel and consent of the twelve gods, which thunderbolt doth some good, but not without harm also; the third sent by Jupiter likewise, but not before he hath called a council of all the superior gods: and this utterly wastes and destroys both private and public States.—And then does he make a commentary upon this old Hetrurian doctrine, that it was not to be taken literally, but only so as to impress an awe upon men, and to signify, that Jupiter himself intended nothing but good, he inflicting evil not alone, but in partnership with others, and when the necessity of the case required. Adding, in the last place, "Ne hoc quidem crediderunt (Etrusci) Jovem qualem in capitolio, et in cæteris ædibus colimus, mittere manu sua fulmina; sed eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligunt, custodem rectoremque universi, animum ac spiritum, mundani hujus operis dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit." Neither did these Hetrurians believe, that such a Jupiter, as we worship in the capitol and in the other temples, did fling thunderbolts with his own hands, but they understood the very same Jupiter, that we now do, the keeper and governor of the universe, the mind and spirit of the whole, the lord and artificer of this mundane fabric, to whom every name belongeth.—And, lastly, that the vulgar Romans afterward, about the beginning of Christianity, had the same notion of Jupiter, as the supreme God, evidently appears from what Tertullian hath recorded in his book Ad Scapulam,[2] that when Marcus Aurelius in his German expedition, by the prayers of the Christian soldiers made to God, had obtained refreshing showers from heaven in a great drought, "Tunc populus adclamans Jovi Deo deorum, qui solus potens est, in Jovis nomine Deo nostro testimoni-

[1] Nat. Q. i. c. xli. (p. 536. tom. i. oper.) [2] Lib. iv.

um reddidit :" that then the people with one consent crying out, Thanks be to JUPITER THE GOD OF GODS, WHO ALONE IS POWERFUL, did thereby in the name of Jove or Jupiter give testimony to our God.—Where, by the way, we see also, that Tertullian was not so nice as Lactantius, but did freely acknowledge the Pagans by their Jupiter to have meant the true God.

As nothing is more frequent with Pagan writers, than to speak of God singularly, they signifying thereby the one supreme Deity, so that the same was very familiar with the vulgar Pagans also, in their ordinary discourse and common speech, hath been recorded by divers of the fathers. Tertullian in his book De Testimonio Animæ[1] and his Apologet.[2] instanceth in several of these forms of speech then vulgarly used by the Pagans: as "Deus videt, Deo commendo, Deus reddet, Deus inter nos judicabit, Quod Deus vult, Si Deus voluerit, Quod Deus dederit, Si Deus dederit," and the like. Thus also Minutius Felix :[3] "Cum ad cœlum manus tendunt, nihil aliud quam Deum dicunt, Et magnus est, et Deus verus est, etc. vulgi iste naturalis sermo, an Christiani confitentis oratio?" When they stretch out their hands to heaven they mention only God; and these forms of speech, He is great, and God is true; and, If God grant (which are the natural language of the vulgar,) are they not a plain confession of Christianity? And, lastly, Lactantius,[4] "Cum jurant, et cum optant, et cum gratias agunt, non deos multos, sed Deum nominant; adeo ipsa veritas, cogente natura etiam ab invitis pectoribus erumpit :" When they swear, and when they wish, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth, by a secret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them, whether they will or no.—And again: "Ad Deum confugiunt, a Deo petitur auxilium, Deus ut subveniat oratur. Et si quis ad extremam mendicandi necessitatem redactus, victum precibus exposcit, Deum solum obtestatur, et per ejus divinum atque unicum numen hominum sibi misericordiam quærit." They fly to God, aid is desired of God, they pray that God would help them; and when any one is reduced to extremest necessity, he begs for God's sake, and by his Divine power alone implores the mercy of men.—Which same thing is fully confirmed also by Proclus upon Plato's Timæus; where he observes, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world in all ages, than the many inferior gods: [5] τάχα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο

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[1] Cap. ii. p. 35. oper. edit. Venet.

[2] Cap. xvii. p. 175.

[3] In Octavio, cap. xviii. p. 171. edit. Gronov.

[4] Institut. Divin. lib. ii. cap. i. p. 159.

[5] P. 286.

ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι δὴ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν ἑαυταῖς προσεχεστέρων θᾶττον ἐπιλανθάνονται, τῶν δὲ ὑπερτέρων ἀρχῶν μᾶλλον μνημονεύουσι· Δρῶσι γὰρ μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτοὺς δι᾽ ὑπεροχὴν δυνάμεως, καὶ δοκοῦσιν αὐταῖς παρεῖναι δι᾽ ἐνέργειαν· ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν γίγνεται τὴν ἡμετέραν· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐν γῇ κειμένων οὐχ ὁρῶντες, ὁμῶς αὐτὴν ὁρᾷν δοκῶμεν τὴν ἀπλανῆ, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀστέρας διότι καταλάμπουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν ὄψιν τῷ ἑαυτῶν φωτί. Μᾶλλον οὖν καὶ τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς, λήθην ἴσχει καὶ ἀορασίαν τῶν προσεχεστέρων, ἢ τῶν ἀνωτέρων καὶ θειοτέρων ἀρχῶν· οὕτω τὴν πρωτίστην ἀρχὴν πᾶσαι θρησκεῖαι καὶ αἱρέσεις συγχωροῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ θεὸν πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπικαλοῦσι βοηθόν· θεοὺς δὲ εἶναι μετ᾽ αὐτὴν, καὶ πρόνοιαν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ, οὐ πᾶσαι πιστεύουσι· ἐναργέστερον γὰρ αὐταῖς καταφαίνεται τὸ ἓν τοῦ πλήθους· And perhaps you may affirm, that souls do sooner lose their knowledge of those things which are lower and nearer to them, but retain a stronger remembrance of those higher principles; because these do act more vigorously upon them, by reason of the transcendency of their power, and by their energy seem to be present with them. And the same thing happens as to our bodily sight; for though there be many things here upon earth, which none of us see, yet every one observes that highest sphere, and takes notice of the fixed stars in it, because these strongly radiate with their light upon our eyes. In like mannner does the eye of our soul sooner lose the sight and remembrance of the lower than of the higher and diviner principles. And thus all religions and sects acknowledge that one highest Principle of all, and men every where call upon God for their helper; but that there are gods, after and below that highest Principle, and that there is a certain providence descending down from these upon the universe, all sects do not believe; the reason whereof is, because the one or unity appears more clearly and plainly to them, than the many or a multitude.

Moreover we learn from Arrianus's Epictetus, that that very form of prayer, which hath been now so long in use in the Christian church, Kyrie Eleeson, "Lord, have mercy upon us," was anciently part of the Pagan's litany to the supreme God, either amongst the Greeks, or the Latins, or both, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι, (saith Epictetus,[1]) δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ, Κύριε ἐλέησον, invoking God, we pray to him after this manner, Lord, have mercy upon us. Now this Epictetus lived in the times of Adrian the emperor; and that this passage of his is to be understood of Pagans and not of Christians, is undeniably manifest from the context, he there speaking of those who used *auguria*, or divination by birds. Moreover in the writings of the Greekish Pagans, the supreme

[1] Lib. ii. cap. ii. [p. 186.]

God is often called *Κύριος*, or Lord. For not to urge that passage of the *τέλειος λόγος*, or Asclepian Dialogue, cited by Lactantius,[1] where we read of *ὁ Κύριος καὶ πάντων ποιητής*, the Lord and maker of all—Menander in Justin Martyr[2] styleth the supreme God *τὸν ὄντα πάντων Κύριον γενικώτατον*, the most universal Lord of all.—And Osiris in Plutarch is called *ἁπάντων Κύριος*, the Lord of all things.—And this is also done absolutely, and without any objection, and that not only by the LXX. and Christians, but also by Pagan writers. Thus in Plutarch's de Iside et Osiride, we read of *τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ ΚΥΡΙΟΥ, καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις*, the knowledge of the first intelligible, and the Lord—that is, of the supreme God. And Oromasdes is called *ὁ Κύριος*, the Lord, in Plutarch's life of Alexander; as *Νοῦς* also, *Κύριος*, by Aristotle,[3] that is, the supreme Ruler over all.—Thus likewise Plato in his sixth epistle ad Hermiam, etc. styles his first Divine hypostasis, or the absolutely supreme Deity, *τοῦ ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα Κύριον*, the father of the prince, and the cause of the world (that is, of the eternal intellect) the LORD. Again, Jamblichus writeth thus of the supreme God,[4] *Δεῖν ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν*, It is confessed, that every good thing ought to be asked of the Lord.—that is, the supreme God; which words are afterwards repeated in him also, p. 129, but depraved in the printed copy thus, *Δεῖν δὲ ὁμολογεῖν περὶ τοῦ κυρίου τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν ἐστί.* Lastly, Clemens Alexandrinus[5] tells us, that the supreme God was called not by one only name, but by divers diversely, namely, *ἤτο Ἕν, ἢ τ᾽ Ἀγαθὸν, ἢ Νοῖν, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ Ὄν, ἢ Πατέρα, ἢ Θεὸν, ἢ Δημιουργὸν ἢ Κύριον*, either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or the very Ens, or the Father, or the Demiurgus, or the Lord.—Wherefore we conclude, that this Kyrie Eleeson, or Domine Miserere, in Arrianus, was a Pagan litany or supplication to the supreme God. Though from Mauritius[6] the emperor's Stratagemata it appears, that in his time a Kyrie Eleeson was wont to be sung also by the Christian armies before battle.

And that the most sottishly superstitious and idolatrous of all the Pagans, and the worshippers of never so many gods amongst them, did notwithstanding generally acknowledge one supreme Deity over them all, one universal Numen, is positively affirmed, and fully attested by Aurelius Prudentius, in his Apothoesis,[7] in these words;

[1] Instit. Div. lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 419. [2] De Monarch. Dei. p. 108.
[3] De An. lib. i. cap. vii. [p. 16. tom. ii. oper.]
[4] Vit. Pyth. p. 89. [cap. xviii. p. 72. ed. Kusteri.]
[5] Stromat. lib. v. p. 695.
[6] Rigalt. Gloss. [7] Ver. 254.

Ecquis in Idolio recubans inter sacra mille,
Ridiculosque deos venerans, sale, cæspite, thure,
Non putat esse Deum summum, et super omnia solum?
Quamvis Saturnis, Junonibus, et Cytheræis,
Portentisque aliis, fumantes consecret aras;
Attamen in cœlum quoties suspexit, in uno
Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
Virtutem ratio, variis instructa ministris.

We are not ignorant, that Plato in his Cratylus[1] where he undertakes to give the etymologies of words, and amongst the rest of the word θεοὶ, writeth in this manner concerning the first and most ancient inhabitants of Greece; "that they seemed to him, like as other Barbarians at that time, to have acknowledged no other gods than such as were visible and sensible, as the sun, and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heaven. Which they perceiving to run round perpetually, therefore called them θεοὺς, from θέω, that signifies to run. But that when afterward they took notice of other invisible gods also, they bestowed the same name of θεοὶ upon them likewise." Which passage of Plato's Eusebius somewhere[2] would make use of, to prove, that the Pagans universally acknowledged no other gods but corporeal and inanimate; plainly contrary to that philosopher's meaning, who as he no where affirms, that any nation ever was so barbarous, as to worship senseless and inanimate bodies, as such, for gods, but the contrary: so doth he there distinguish from those first inhabitants of Greece, and other Barbarians, the afterward civilized Greeks, who took notice of invisible gods also. However, if this of Plato should be true, that some of the ancient Pagans worshipped none but visible and sensible gods (they taking no notice of any incorporeal beings), yet does it not therefore follow, that those Pagans had no notion at all amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen. The contrary thereunto being manifest, that some of those Corporealists looked upon the whole heaven and ether animated as the highest God, according to that of Euripides cited by Cicero,

[3] Vides sublime fusum, immoderatum æthera,
Qui tenero terram circumvectu amplectitur;
Hunc summum habeto divum, hunc perhibeto Jovem.

As also that others of them conceived, that subtile fiery substance,

[1] Page 263. oper. [2] Præparat. Evangel. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 29.
[3] De N. D. p. 223 [lib. ii. c. xxv. p. 2993.]

which permeates and pervades the whole world (supposed to be intellectual) to be the supreme Deity, which governs all; this opinion having been entertained by philosophers also, as namely, the Heraclitics and Stoics. And, lastly since Macrobius,[1] in the person of Vettius Prætextatus, refers so many of the Pagan gods to the sun; this renders it not improbable, but that some of those Pagans might adore the animated sun, as the sovereign Numen, and thus perhaps invoke him in that form of prayer there mentioned,[2] *Ἥλιε παντοκράτωρ, κόσμου πνεῦμα*, O omnipotent sun, the mind and spirit of the whole world, etc.—And even Cleanthes himself, that learned Stoic, and devout religionist, is suspected by some to have been of this persuasion.

Nevertheless we think it opportune here to observe, that it was not Macrobius's design, in those his Saturnalia, to defend this either as his own opinion, or as the opinion of the generality of Pagans, that the animated sun was absolutely the highest Deity (as some have conceived) nor yet to reduce that multiplicity of Pagan gods, by this device of his, into a seeming monarchy and nearer compliance with Christianity; he there plainly confining his discourse to the "dii duntaxat, qui sub cœlo sunt," that is, the lower sort of mundane gods;—and undertaking to show, not that all of these neither, but only that many of them were reducible to the sun, as polyonymous, and called by several names, according to his several virtues and effects. For, what Macrobius's own opinion was, concerning the supreme Deity, appeareth plainly from his other writings, particularly this passage of his commentary upon Scipio's dream,[3] where the highest sphere and starry heaven was called Summus Deus, the supreme God—"Quod hunc extimum globum, summum Deum vocavit, non ita accipiendum est, ut iste prima causa, et Deus ille omnipotentissimus existimetur; cum globus ipse, quod cœlum est, animæ sit fabrica, anima ex mente processerit, mens ex Deo, qui vere summus est procreata sit. Sed summum quidem dixit ad cæterorum ordinem, qui subjecti sunt; Deum vero, quod non modo immortale animal ac divinum sit, plenum inclytæ ex illa plurissima mente rationis, sed quod et virtutes omnes, quæ illam primæ omnipotentiam summitatis sequantur, aut ipse faciat, aut contineat; ipsum denique Jovem veteres vocaverunt, et apud theologos Jupiter est mundi anima." That the outmost sphere is here called the supreme God, is not so to be understood, as if this were thought to be the first Cause, and the most omnipotent God of all; for this starry sphere being but a part of the hea-

[1] Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 270. [2] Ibid. cap. xxiii. p. 313.
[3] Lib. i. cap. xvii. [p. 87.]

ven, was made or produced by soul. Which soul also proceeded from a perfect mind or intellect; and again, mind was begotten from that God, who is truly supreme. But the highest sphere is here called the supreme God, only in respect to those lesser spheres or gods, that are contained under it; and it is styled a God, because it is not only an immortal and Divine animal, full of reason derived from that purest Mind, but also because it maketh or containeth within itself all those virtues, which follow that omnipotence of the first summity. Lastly, this was called by the ancients Jupiter, and Jupiter to theologers is the soul of the world.—Wherefore, though Macrobius, as generally the other Pagans, did undoubtedly worship the sun as a great god, and probably would not stick to call him Jupiter, nor παντοκράτωρ, neither (in a certain sense) omnipotent, or the governor of all, nor perhaps Deum Summum, as well as the starry heaven was so styled in Scipio's dream, he being the chief moderator in this lower world; yet nevertheless, it is plain, that he was far from thinking the sun to be *primam causam*, or *omnipotentissimum Deum;* the first Cause, or the most omnipotent God of all. He acknowledging above the sun and heaven, first, an eternal Psyche, which was the maker or creator of them both; and then, above this Psyche, a perfect mind or intellect; and, lastly, above that mind a God, who was *vere summus*, truly and properly supreme, the first Cause, and the most omnipotent of all gods. Wherein Macrobius plainly Platonized, asserting a trinity of archical or Divine hypostases. Which same doctrine is elsewhere also further declared by him after this manner: [1] "Deus, qui prima causa est, et vocatur unus omnium, quæque sunt, quæque videntur esse, principium et origo est. Hic superabundanti majestatis fœcunditate de se mentem creavit. Hæc mens, quæ Νοῦς vocatur, qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem servat auctoris, animam vero de se creat posteriora respiciens. Rursus anima partem, quam intuetur, induitur, ac paulatim regredient respectu in fabricam corporum, in corporea ipsa degenerat:" God, who is, and is called the first Cause, is alone the fountain and original of all things, that are or seem to be; he by his superabundant fecundity produced from himself mind, which mind, as it looks upward towards its father, bears the perfect resemblance of its author, but as it looked downward produced soul. And this soul again, as to its superior part, resembles that mind from whence it was begotten; but working downwards produced the corporeal fabric, and acteth upon body.—Besides which, the same Macrobius tells us,[2] that "Summi et principis omnium Dei nullum simu-

[1] Somn. Scip. lib. i. cap. xiv. [p. 73.] [2] Ibid. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 9.

lacrum finxit antiquitas, quia supra animam et naturam est, quo nihil fas est de fabulis pervenire; de diis autem cæteris, et de anima, non frustra se ad fabulosa convertunt:" The Pagan antiquity made no image at all of the highest God, or prince of all things, because he is above soul and nature, where it is not lawful for any fabulosity to be intromitted. But as to the other gods, the soul of the world, and those below it, they thought it not inconvenient here to make use of images, and fiction or fabulosity.—From all which it plainly appears, that neither Macrobius himself, nor the generality of the ancient Pagans, according to his apprehension, did look upon the animated sun as the absolutely supreme and highest Being.

And perhaps it may not be amiss to suggest here, what hath been already observed, that the Persians themselves also, who of all Pagan nations have been most charged with this, the worshipping of the sun as the supreme Deity, under the name of Mithras, did notwithstanding, if we may believe Eubulus[1] (who wrote the history of Mithras at large,) acknowledge another invisible Deity superior to it (and which was the maker thereof, and of the whole world), as the true and proper Mithras. Which opinion is also plainly confirmed, not only by Herodotus, distinguishing their Jupiter from the sun,[2] but also by Xenophon in sundry places, as particularly where he speaks of Cyrus's being admonished in a dream of his approaching death, and thereupon addressing his devotion by sacrifices and prayers first to the *Ζεὺς πατρῷος*, the Persian Jupiter—and then to the sun, and the other gods. [3]*Ἔθυε τε Διΐ πατρῴῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ὡς Πέρσαι θύουσιν, ὧδε ἐπευχόμενος, Ζεῦ πατρῷε καὶ ἥλιε καὶ πάντες θεοὶ, δέχεσθε τάδε χαριστήρια*, etc. He sacrificed to their country (or the Persian) Jupiter, and to the sun, and to the other gods, upon the tops of the mountains, as the custom of the Persians is; praying after this manner: Thou, our country Jupiter (that is, thou Mithras or Oromasdes), and thou sun, and all ye other gods; accept, I pray you, these my eucharistic sacrifices, etc.—And we find also the like prayer used by Darius in Plutarch, *Ζεῦ πατρῷε Περσῶν*,[4] Thou our country Jupiter, or supreme God of the Persians.—Moreover, Herodotus and Curtius record, that in the Persian pomp and procession there was wont to be drawn a chariot sacred to Jupiter, distinct from that of the sun. But Cyrus's proclamation in the book of Esdras putteth all out of doubt; since that Lord God of heaven, who

[1] Apud Porphyr. de Antro Nymphar. p. 253, etc.
[2] Lib. i. N. 131. [3] Cyri. Inst. lib. viii. p. 184.
[4] De Fort. Alex. lib. ii.

is there said to have given Cyrus all the kingdoms of the earth, and commanded him to build him a house at Jerusalem, cannot be understood of the sun.

The Ethiopians in Strabo's time may well be looked upon as Barbarians; and yet did they not only acknowledge one supreme Deity, but also such as was distinct from the world, and therefore invisible; he writing thus concerning them: *Θεὸν νομίζουσι τὸν μὲν ἀθάνατον, τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αἴτιον τῶν πάντων, τὸν δὲ θνητὸν, ἀνώνυμόν τινα, ὡς δ' ἐπιτοπολὺ τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ βασιλικοὺς θεοὺς νομίζουσι.*[1] They believe, that there is one immortal God, and this the cause of all things; and another mortal one, anonymous; but for the most part they account their benefactors and kings gods also.—And though Cæsar[2] affirm of the ancient Germans, "Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt, et quorum operibus aperte juvantur, Solem, et Vulcanum, et Lunam;" yet he is contradicted by Tacitus, who coming after him, had better information: and others[3] have recorded, that they acknowledged one supreme God, under the name of Thau first, and then of Thautes, and Thutates. Lastly the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the Indians, Chinese, Siamenses and Guineans, the inhabitants of Peru, Mexico, Virginia, and New England (some of which are sufficiently barbarous), acknowledge one supreme or greatest God: they having their several proper names for him, as Parmiscer, Fetisso, Wiracocha, Pachacamac, Vitziliputzti, etc. though worshipping withal other gods and idols. And we shall conclude this with the testimony of Josephus Acosta: [4]"Hoc commune apud omnes pene Barbaros est, ut Deum quidem omnium rerum supremum et summe bonum fateantur; spirituum vero quorundam perversorum non obscura opinio sit, qui e nostris Barbaris Zupay vocari solent. Igitur et quis ille summus, idemque sempiternus rerum omnium opifex, quem illi ignorantes colunt per omnia doceri debent; mox quantum ab illo, illiusque fidelibus ministris, angelis, absint gens pessima cacodæmonum." This is common almost to all the Barbarians, to confess one supreme God over all, who is perfectly good; as also they have a persuasion amongst them of certain evil spirits, which are called by our Barbarians Zupay. Wherefore they ought to be first well instructed, what that supreme and eternal Maker of all things is, whom they ignorantly worship; and how

[1] Lib. xvii. p. 822.

[2] De Bello Gallico, lib. vi. cap. xxi. p. 125. edit. Cellarii.

[3] See Sched. de Diis Germ. [Syngr. i. cap. xii. p. 291.]

[4] De proc. Indor. Sal. lib. v. 479.

great a difference there is betwixt those wicked demons and his faithful ministers, the angels.

XXVIII. It hath been already declared, that according to Themistius and Symmachus, two zealous Pagans, one and the same supreme God was worshipped in all the several Pagan religions throughout the world, though after different manners. Which diversity of religions, as in their opinion it was no way inconvenient in itself, so neither was it ungrateful nor unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his honor, state, and grandeur, to be worshipped with this variety, than after one only manner. Now, that this was also the opinion of other ancienter Pagans before them, may appear from this remarkable testimony of Plutarch's in his book De Iside, where defending the Egyptian worship (which was indeed the main design of that whole book ;) but withal declaring, that no inanimate thing ought to be looked upon or worshipped as a god, he writeth thus : [1]*οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεὸς, τοὺς δὲ δωρουμένους ἡμῖν καὶ παρέχοντας ἀένναα καὶ διαρχῆ, θεοὺς ἐνομίσαμεν, οὐχ ἑτέρους παρ᾽ ἑτέρους, οἰδὲ Βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας, οὐδὲ νοτείους καὶ βορείους· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἥλιος, καὶ σελήνη, καὶ οὐρανὸς, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλασσα, κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ὀνομάζεται δὲ ἄλλως ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων, οὕτως ἑνὸς λόγου τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος καὶ μιᾶς προνοίας ἐπιτροπευούσης, καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων, ἕτεραι παρ᾽ ἑτέροις κατὰ νόμον γεγόνασι τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι· καὶ συμβόλοις χρῶνται καθιερώμενοι, οἱ μὲν ἀμυδροῖς, οἱ δὲ τρανωτέροις, ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα νόησιν ὁδηγοῦντες οὐκ ἀκινδύνως·* No inanimate thing ought to be esteemed for a god, but they who bestow these things upon us, and afford us a continual supply thereof for our use, have been therefore accounted by us gods. Which gods are not different to different nations; as if the Barbarians and the Greeks, the southern and the northern inhabitants of the globe, had not any the same, but all other different gods. But as the sun, and the moon, and the heaven, and the earth, and the sea, are common to all, though called by several names in several countries; so ONE REASON ordering these things, and ONE PROVIDENCE dispensing all, and the inferior subservient ministers thereof, having had several names and honors bestowed upon them by the laws of several countries, have been every where worshipped throughout the whole world. And there have been also different symbols consecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on men's understandings to divine things; though this hath not been without some hazard or danger of casting men upon one or other of these two inconveniences, either superstition or Atheism.—Where

[1] Page 377.

Plutarch plainly affirms, that the several religions of the Pagan nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and among these the Egyptians also, as well as others, consisted in nothing else, but the worshipping of one and the same supreme Mind, reason, and providence, that orders all things in the world, and of its ὑπουργοὶ δύναμις ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμέναι, its subservient powers or ministers, appointed by it over all the several parts of the world; though under different names, rites, and ceremonies, and with different symbols.

Moreover, that Titus Livius was of the very same opinion, that the Pagan gods of several countries, though called by several names, and worshipped with so great diversity of rites and ceremonies, yet were not for all that different, but the same common to all, may be concluded from this passage of his where he writeth of Hannibal: [1] "Nescio an mirabilior fuerit in adversis, quam secundis rebus. Quippe qui mistos ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus alius ritus, alia sacra, alli PROPE dii essent, ita in uno vinculo copulaverit, ut nulla seditio exstiterit." I know not whether Hannibal were more admirable in his adversity or prosperity: who having a mixed colluvies of all nations under him, which had different rites, different ceremonies, and almost different gods from one another, did notwithstanding so unite them all together in one common bond, that there happened no sedition at all amongst them.—Where Livy plainly intimates, that though there was as great diversity of religious rites and ceremonies among the Pagans, as if they had worshipped several gods, yet the gods of them all were really the same, namely, one supreme God, and his ministers under him. And the same Livy elsewhere declares this to have been the general opinion of the Romans and Italians likewise at that time; where he tells us how they quarrelled with Q. Fulvius Flaccus, for that when being censor, and building a new temple in Spain, he uncovered another temple dedicated to Juno Lacinia amongst the Brutii, and taking off the marble tiles thereof, sent them into Spain to adorn his new-erected temple withal; and how they accused him thereupon publicly in the senate-house in this manner, [2] "Quod ruinis templorum templa ædificaret, tanquam non iidem ubique dii immortales essent, sed spoliis aliorum alii colendi exornandique:" That with the ruins of temples he built up temples; as if there were not every where the same immortal gods; but that some of them might be worshipped and adorned with the spoils of others.[3]

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[1] Lib. xxviii. cap. xii. (p. 679.) [2] Doc. v.

[3] Lib. xlii. cap. iii. p. 1113.

The Egyptians were doubtless the most singular of all the Pagans, and the most oddly discrepant from the rest in their manner of worship; yet, nevertheless, that these also agreed with the rest in those fundamentals of worshipping one supreme and universal Numen, together with his inferior ministers, as Plutarch sets himself industriously to maintain it, in that forementioned book De Iside; so was it further cleared and made out (as Damascius informs us) by two famous Egyptian philosophers, Asclepiades and Heraiscus, in certain writings of theirs, that have been since lost: [1] *Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὔδημος οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· Οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην, εὑρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις δή τισι λόγοις, ὡς εἴη καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ, σκότος ἄγνωστον*, etc. *ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, ὅτι διαιρετικοί εἰσι πολλαχοῦ, τῶν καθ᾽ ἕνωσιν ὑφεστώτων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν διῃρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, ὡς ἔξεστι μαθεῖν τοῖς ἐκείνων συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχοῦσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις· λέγω δὲ τῇ Ἡραΐσκου ἀναγραφῇ, τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου καθόλου λόγου, πρὸς τὸν Πρόκλον γραφείσῃ τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ τῇ ἀρξαμένῃ γράφεσθαι συμφονίᾳ ὑπὸ Ἀσκληπιάδου τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Θεολόγους·* Though Eudemus hath given us no certain account of the Egyptians, yet the Egyptian philosophers of latter times have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in some Egyptian monuments, that, according to them, there is one principle of all things, celebrated under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated, etc. Moreover, this is to be observed concerning these Egyptians, that they are wont to divide and multiply things, that are one and the same. And accordingly have they divided and multiplied the first Intelligible, or the one supreme Deity, into the properties of many gods; as any one may find, that pleases to consult their writings: I mean that of Heraiscus, entitled, the Universal doctrine of the Egyptians, and inscribed to Proclus the philosopher; and that symphony or harmony of the Egyptians with other theologers, begun to be written by Asclepiades, and left imperfect.—Of which work as Asclepiades the Egyptian Suidas also maketh mention upon the word Heraiscus; *ὁ δὲ Ἀσκληπιάδης ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις βιβλίοις ἀνατραφεὶς, ἀκριβέστερος ἦν ἀμφὶ θεολογίαν τὴν πάτριον, ἀρχάς τε αὐτῆς καὶ μέσα διεσκεμμένος, ὡς ἔξεστιν εἰδέναι σαφῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὕμνων, ὧν συγγέγραφεν εἰς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων θεοὺς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματείας, ἣν ὥρμησε γράφειν περιέχουσαν τῶν θεολογιῶν ἁπασῶν συμφωνίᾳ·* But Asclepiades having been more conversant with ancient Egyptian writings, was more thoroughly instructed, and exactly skilled in his country the-

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1 Damasc. de Princ. M. S. [Vide Wolfii Anecdota Græca, tom. iii. p. 260.]

ology ; he having searched into the principles thereof, and all the consequences resulting from them ; as manifestly appeareth from those hymns, which he composed in praise of the Egyptian gods, and from that tractate begun to be written by him (but left unfinished), which containeth the symphony of all theologies.—Now, we say that Asclepiades's symphony of all the Pagan theologers, and therefore of the Egyptian with the rest, was their agreement in those two fundamentals expressed by Plutarch ; namely, the worshipping of one supreme and universal Numen, Reason and Providence, governing all things ; and then of his subservient ministers (the instruments of providence) appointed by him over all the parts of the world : which being honored under several names, and with different rites and ceremonies, according to the laws of the respective countries, caused all that diversity of religions that was amongst them. Both which fundamental points of the Pagan theology were in like manner acknowledged by Symmachus,[1] the first of them being thus expressed : "Æquum est quicquid omnes colunt, unum putari ;" that all religions agreed in this, the worshipping of one and the same supreme Numen :—and the second thus ; "Varios custodes urbibus mens divina distribuit ;" that the Divine Mind appointed divers guardian and tutelar spirits under him, unto cities and countries.—He there adding also, that "suus cuique mos est, suum cuique jus," that every nation had their peculiar modes and manners in worshipping of these ;—and that these external differences in religion ought not to be stood upon, but every one to observe the religion of his own country. Or else these two fundamental points of the Pagan theology may be thus expressed ; first, that there is one self-originated Deity, who was the *δημιουργός*, or maker of the whole world ; —secondly, that there are besides him other gods also, to be religiously worshipped (that is, intellectual beings superior to men) which were notwithstanding all made or created by that one. Stobæus[2] thus declareth their sense : *τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ἅμα τῷ κόσμῳ γενόμενον*, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him, together with the world.

XXIX. And that the Pagan theologers did thus generally acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, appears plainly from hence, because they supposed the whole world to be an animal. Thus the writer De Placitis Philos. and out of him Stobæus,[3] *οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον· Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ Δημόκρι-*

[1] Epistolar. lib. x. Epist. lxi. p. 442.

[2] Ecl. Phys. c. i. [l. i. p. 4.]

[3] Plut. l. ii. c. iii. Stob. ecl. Phys. c. xxv.

τος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ ἄτομα εἰσηγοῦνται καὶ τὸ κενον, οὔτε ἔμψυχον οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι, φύσει δέ τινι ἀλόγῳ· All others assert the world to be an animal, and governed by Providence; only Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, and those, who make atoms and vacuum the principles of all things, dissenting, who neither acknowledge the world to be animated, nor yet to be governed by providence, but by an irrational nature.—Where, by the way, we may observe the fraud and juggling of Gassendus, who takes occasion from hence highly to extol and applaud Epicurus, as one who approached nearer to Christianity than all the other philosophers, in that he denied the world to be an animal; whereas, according to the language and notions of those times, to deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist or to deny a God, was one and the same thing; because all the Pagans, who then asserted Providence, held the world also to be animated: neither did Epicurus deny the world's animation upon any other account than this, because he denied Providence. And the ground, upon which this opinion of the world's animation was built, was such as might be obvious even to vulgar understandings; and it is thus expressed by Plotinus, according to the sense of the ancients: [1]*ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸ ἄψυχον λέγειν, ἡμῶν, οἳ μέρος σώματος ἔχομεν τοῦ παντὸς, ψυχὴν ἐχόντων· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχεν, ἀψύχου τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος;* it is absurd to affirm, that the heaven or world is inanimate, or devoid of life and soul, when we ourselves, who have but a part of the mundane body in us, are endued with soul. For how could a part have life and soul in it, the whole being dead and inanimate?—Now, if the whole world be one animal, then must it needs be governed by one soul, and not by many. Which one soul of the world, and the whole mundane animal was by some of the Pagan theologers (as namely the Stoics) taken to be the *πρῶτος θεὸς*, the first and highest God of all.

Nevertheless, others of the Pagan theologers, though asserting the world's animation likewise, yet would by no means allow the mundane soul to be the supreme Deity; they conceiving the first and highest God to be an abstract and immoveable mind, and not a soul. Thus the Panegyrist, cited also by Gyraldus, invokes the supreme Deity doubtfully and cautiously, as not knowing well what to call him, whether soul or mind: [2]"Te, summe rerum sator, cujus tot nomina sunt, quot gentium linguas esse voluisti; quem enim te ipse dici velis, scire non possumus: sive in te quædam vis mensque divina est, quæ toto infusa mundo omnibus miscearis elementis, et sine ullo extrinsecus

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[1] En. iv. l. iii. c. vii. [de Dubiis animæ, lib. i. p. 576.]

[2] Hist. Deor. p. 12.

accedente vigoris impulsu, per te ipse movearis; sive aliqua supra omne cœlum potestas es, quæ hoc opus totum ex altiore naturæ arce despicias: Te, inquam, oramus," etc. Thou supreme Original of all things, who hast as many names as thou hast pleased there should be languages; whether thou beest a certain Divine force and soul, that infused into the whole world art mingled with all the elements, and without any external impulse moved from thyself; or whether thou beest a power elevated above the heavens, which lookest down upon the whole work of nature, as from a higher tower; thee we invoke, etc. —And as the supreme Deity was thus considered only as a perfect mind superior to soul, so was the mundane soul and whole animated world called by these Pagans frequently *δεύτερος θεός*, the second god. — Thus in the Asclepian Dialogue or Perfect Oration, is the Lord and Maker of all said to have made a second god visible and sensible, which is the world.

But, for the most part, they who asserted a God, superior to the soul of the world, did maintain a trinity of universal principles, or Divine hypostases subordinate; they conceiving that as there was above the mundane soul a perfect mind or intellect, so that mind and intellect, as such, was not the first principle neither, because there must be *νοητὸν* in order of nature before *νοῦς*, an intelligible before Intellect. Which first intelligible was called by them *τὸ ἓν* and *τἀγαθὸν*, the One and the Good, or unity and goodness itself substantial, the cause of mind and all things. Now as the tagathon, or highest of these three hypostases, was sometimes called by them *ὁ πρῶτος θεός*, the first God—and *νοῦς* or intellect *ὁ δεύτερος θεός*, the second god;—so was the mundane soul and animated world called *τρίτος θεός*, the third god. —Thus Numenius in Proclus upon Plato's Timæus, [1]*Νουμήνιος μὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεούς, πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον·*[2] *ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεός, ὡς ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιούργος διττός, ὅτε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεός, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον, ὁ τρίτος·* Numenius praising three gods, calls the father the first God, the maker the second, and the work the third. For the world, according to him, is the third god; as he supposes also two opificers, the first and the second God.—Plotinus in like manner speaks of this also, as very familiar language amongst those Pagans, [3]*καὶ ὁ κόσμος θεός, ὥσπερ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος*, and the world, as is commonly said, is the third god.

But neither they, who held the supreme Deity to be an immoveable mind or intellect, superior to the mundane soul (as Aristotle and Xen-

[1] P. 93. [2] P. 93. [3] En. 3. l. v. § 6. [p. 296.]

ocrates), did suppose that mundane soul and the whole world to have depended upon many such immoveable intellects self-existent, as their first Cause, but only upon one: nor they, who admitting a trinity of Divine hypostases, made the supreme Deity properly to be a monad above mind or intellect, did conceive that intellect to have depended upon many such monads, as first principles co-ordinate, but upon one only. From whence it plainly appears, that the Pagan theologers did always reduce things under a monarchy, and acknowledge not many independent deities, but one universal Numen (whether called soul, or mind, or monad) as the head of all. Though it hath been already declared, that those Pagans, who were trinitarians, especially the Platonists, do often take those their three hypostases subordinate (a monad, mind, and soul) all together, for the *τὸ θεῖον*, or one supreme Numen; as supposing an extraordinary kind of unity in that trinity of hypostases, and so as it were a certain latitude and gradation in the Deity.

Where by the way two things may be observed concerning the Pagan theologers: First, that according to them generally the whole corporeal system was not a dead thing, like a machine or automaton artificially made by men, but that life and soul was mingled with and diffused through it all: insomuch that Aristotle himself taxes those, who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms altogether dead and inanimate, as being therefore a kind of Atheists. Secondly, that how much soever some of them supposed the supreme Deity and first Cause to be elevated above the heaven and corporeal world, yet did they not therefore conceive, either the world to be quite cut off from that, or that from the world, so as to have no commerce with it, nor influence upon it; but as all proceeded from this first Cause, so did they suppose that to be closely and intimately united with all those emanations from itself (though without mixture and confusion,) and all to subsist in it, and be pervaded by it. Plutarch, in his Platonic Questions, propounds this amongst the rest,[1] *Τί δή ποτε τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν πατέρα πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν προσεῖπεν;* Why Plato called the highest God the father and maker of all?—To which he answers in the first place thus; *τῶν μὲν θεῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστι, ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων·* That perhaps he was called the father of all the generated gods, and of men, but the maker of the irrational and inanimate things of the world.—But afterward he adds, that this highest God might therefore be styled the father of the whole corporeal world also, as well as the maker, because it is no dead and inanimate thing, but endued with life: *ἐμψύχου γὰρ γένησις ἡ γένησίς ἐστι· καὶ*

[1] P. 100. par.

ποιητοῦ μὲν, οἷος οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὑφάντης, ἢ λύρας δημιουργὸς ἢ ἀνδρίοντος, ἀπήλλακται τὸ γενόμενον ἔργον· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀρχὴ καὶ δύναμις ἐγκέκραται τῷ τεκνωθέντι, καὶ συνέχει τὴν φύσιν, ἀπόσπασμα καὶ μόριον οὖσαν τοῦ τεκνώσαντος· Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ πεπλασμένοις ὁ κόσμος, οὐδὲ συνηρμοσμένοις ποιήμασιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ μοῖρα πολλὴ ζωότητος καὶ θειότητος, ἣν ὁ θεὸς ἐγκατέσπειρεν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατέμιξεν, εἰκότως ἅμα πατήρτε τοῦ κόσμον ζάου γεγονότος, καὶ ποιητὴς ἐπονομάζεται. Generation is the making or production of something animate. And the work of an artificer, as an architect or statuary, as soon as it is produced, departeth and is removed from the maker thereof, as having no intrinsic dependence upon him; whereas from him, that begetteth, there is a principle and power infused into that which is begotten, and mingled therewith, that containeth the whole nature thereof, as being a kind of avulsion from the begetter. Wherefore since the world is not like to those works, that are artificially made and compacted by men, but hath a participation of life and divinity, which God hath inserted into it, and mingled with it, God is therefore rightly styled by Plato, not only the maker, but also the father, of the whole world as being an animal.—To the same purpose also Plotinus: [1]γενόμενος δὴ οἷον οἶκος τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος, οὐκ ἀπετμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκοίνωσεν αὐτόν· ἔχει γὰρ ψυχὴν κρατούμενος οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων, κεῖται γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχούσῃ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὐκ ἄμοιρόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὕδασι δίκτυον τεγγόμενον ζωῇ· The word being made as a large and stately edifice, was neither cut off and separated from its maker, nor yet mingled and confounded with him. Forasmuch as he still remaineth above, presiding over it; the world being so animated, as rather to be possessed by soul, than to possess it, it laying in that great Psyche, which sustaineth it, as a net in the waters, all moistened with life.—Thus Plotinus, supposing the whole corporeal world to be animated, affirmeth it neither to be cut off from its maker (by which maker he here understands the mundane soul,) itself to be immersed into its body, the world, after the same manner as our human souls are into these bodies; but so to preside over it, and act it, as a thing elevated above it. And though, according to him, that second Divine hypostasis of nous or intellect be in like manner elevated above this mundane soul; and again, that first hypostasis or supreme Deity (called by him unity and goodness,) above Intellect; yet the corporeal world could not be said to be cut off from those neither; they being all three (monad, mind, and soul) closely and intimately united together.

XXX. The Hebrews were the only nation, who before Christianity

[1] En. iv. l. iii. c. ix. (p. 379.)

for several ages professedly opposed the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagan world. Wherefore it may be probably concluded, that they had the right notion of this Pagan Polytheism, and understood what it consisted in, viz. Whether in worshipping many unmade, self-originated deities, as partial creators of the world; or else in worshipping, besides the supreme God, other created beings superior to men? Now Philo plainly understood the Pagan Polytheism after this latter way; as may appear from this passage of his in his book concerning the Confusion of Languages, where speaking of the supreme God (the Maker and Lord of the whole world,) and of his *δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὶ* his innumerable assistant powers—both visible and invisible, he adds, [1]*καταπλαγέντες οὖν τινὲς τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἅπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν, ὧν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν κατιδὼν Μωϋσῆς φησι κύριε κύριε βασιλεῦ τῶν θεῶν, ἔνδειξιν τῆς παρ᾽ ὑπηκόους ἄρχοντος διαφορᾶς·* Wherefore some men being struck with admiration of both these worlds, the visible and the invisible, have not only deified the whole of them, but also their several parts, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, they not scrupling to call these gods. Which notion and language of theirs Moses respected in those words of his, Thou Lord, the king of gods; he thereby declaring the transcendency of the supreme God above all those his subjects called gods.—To the same purpose Philo writeth also in his Commentary upon the Decalogue, [2]*πᾶσαν οὖν τὴν τοιαύτην τερθρείαν ἀπωσάμενοι, τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς φύσει μὴ προσκυνῶμεν, εἰ καὶ καθαρωτέρας καὶ ἀθανατωτέρας οὐσίας ἔλαχον, ἀδελφὰ δ᾽ ἀλλήλων τὰ γενόμενα, καθ᾽ ὃ γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πατὴρ ἁπάντων ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων· καὶ πρῶτον τοῦτο καὶ ἱερώτατον πράγγελμα στηλιτεύσωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἕνα τὸν ἀνωτάτω νομίζειν τε καὶ τιμᾷν θεόν·* Wherefore removing all such imposture, let us worship no beings, that are by nature brothers and german to us, though endued with far more pure and immortal essences than we are. For all created things, as such, have a kind of german and brotherly equality with one another, the Maker of all things being their common father. But let us deeply infix this first and most holy commandment in our breasts, to acknowledge and worship one only highest God.—And again afterwards, *ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοσχερεστάτων μερῶν ὡς θεῶν πρόπολοίτε καὶ θεραπευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες·* They, who worship the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worship the subjects of the prince; whereas

[1] Page 345. [2] Page 753.

the prince alone ought to be worshipped. Thus, according to Philo, the Pagan Polytheism consisted in giving religious worship, besides the supreme God, to other created understanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.

Flavius Josephus, in his Judaic Antiquities,[1] extolling Abraham's wisdom and piety, writeth thus concerning him; *πρῶτος οὖν τολμᾷ θεὸν ἀποφήνασθαι δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων ἕνα*, which some would understand in this manner, that Abraham was the first, who publicly declared, that there was one God, the Demiurgus or maker of the whole world;—as if all mankind besides, at that time, had supposed the world to have been made not by one, but by many gods. But the true meaning of those words is this; that Abraham was the first, who, in that degenerate age, publicly declared, that the maker of the whole world was the one only God, and alone to be religiously worshipped; accordingly, as it follows afterwards in the same writer, *ᾧ καλῶς ἔχει μόνῳ τὴν τιμὴν καὶ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν ἀπονέμειν*, to whom alone men ought to give honor and thanks.—And the reason hereof is there also set down; *τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, εἰ καί τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελεῖ, κατὰ προσταγὴν τὴν τούτου παρέχειν ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ κατ' οἰκείαν ἰσχύν·* Because all those other beings, that were then worshipped as gods, whatsoever any of them contributed to the happiness of mankind, they did it not by their own power, but by his appointment and command;—he instancing in the sun and moon, and earth and sea, which are all made and ordered by a higher Power and Providence, by the force whereof they contribute to our utility. As if he should have said, that no created being ought to be religiously worshipped, but the Creator only. And this agreeth with what we read in Scripture concerning Abraham, that he called upon the name of the Lord, אל עולם, the God of the whole world—that is,[2] he worshipped no particular created beings, as the other Pagans at that time did but only that supreme universal Numen, which made and containeth the whole world. And thus Maimonides interprets that place, התחיל להודיע לעם שאין ראוי לעכוד אלא והלאל העולם[2] Abraham began to teach, that none ought to be religiously worshipped, save only the God of the whole world.—Moreover, the same Josephus afterwards in his twelfth book[4] brings in Aristæus (who seems to have been a secret proselyted Greek) pleading with Ptolemæus Philadelphus, in behalf of the Jews, and their liberty, after this manner; *τὴν βασιλείαν σου διέπον-*

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[1] Lib. i. cap. vii. p. xxviii. tom. i. oper. edit. Havercamp.

[2] Gen. 21. 23. [3] De Idol. c. i. § 7. (p. 7. edit. Voss.)

[4] Cap. 2. § 2. p. 586. tom. i. oper.

τος, τοῦ θεμένου τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς. τὸν γὰρ ἅπαντα συστησάμενον θεὸν, καὶ οὗτοι καὶ ἡμεῖς σεβόμεθα, Ζῆνα καλοῦντες αὐτὸν, ἑτοίμως ἀπὸ τοῦ σύμπασιν ἐμφύειν τὸ ζῆν, τὴν ἐπίκλησιν αὐτοῦ νοήσαντες· It would well agree with your goodness and magnanimity to free the Jews from that miserable captivity, which they are under; since the same God, who governeth your kingdom, gave laws to them, as I have by diligent search found out. For both they and we do alike worship the God, who made all things, we calling him Zene, because he gives life to all. Wherefore, for the honor of that God, whom they worship after a singular manner, please you to indulge them the liberty of returning to their native country.—Where Aristæus also, according to the sense of Pagans, thus concludes; Know, O king, that I intercede not for these Jews, as having any cognation with them, *πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων δημιούργημα ὄντων τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ γινώσκων αὐτὸν ἡδόμενον τοῖς εὐποιοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καί σε παρακαλῶ,* but all men being the workmanship of God, and knowing, that he is delighted with beneficence, I therefore thus exhort you.

As for the latter Jewish writers and Rabbins, it is certain, that the generality of them supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and to have worshipped all their other gods only as his ministers, or as mediators between him and them: Maimonides in Halacoth[1] עכו"ם describeth the rise of the Pagan Polytheism in the days of Enosh, after this manner: בימי אנוש טעו בני האדם טעות גדול ונבערה עצת חמי אותו הדור ואיוש עצמו מן הטועים היה וזו היתה טעותם: אמרו הואיל ואל בדא כוכבים אלו וגלגלים להנחת את העולם ונתנם במרום וחלק להם כבוד והם משמשים המשמשים לפיו דאויים הם לשבחם ולפארם ולחלוק להם כבוד וזהו רצון האל ברוך הוא לגדל ולכבד מי שגלו וכבדו כמו שהמלך רוצה כבדו לכבוד דעומדים לפניו וזהו טל מלך In the days of Enosh, the sons of men grievously erred, and the wise men of that age became brutish (even Enosh himself being in the number of them;) and their error was this, that since God had created the stars and spheres to govern the world, and placing them on high, had bestowed this honor upon them that they should be his ministers and subservient instruments, men ought therefore to praise them, honor them, and worship them; this being the pleasure of the blessed God, that men should magnify and honor those, whom himself hath magnified and honored, as a king will have his ministers to be reverenced, this honor redounding to himself. —Again, the same Maimonides in the beginning of the second chapter of that book writeth thus; עיקר הצווי העבודה זה שלא לעבוד אחד

[1] *i. e.* De Idolatria, cap. i. § 1. p. iii.

מבל הבדואים לא מלאד ולא גלגל ולא כוכב ולא אחד מן היסודות ולא אחד מבל הנבדאים מהן ואפ עלפי שחעובד יודע שהשם הוא האלהים והוא עובד הנבדא הזה על רדך שעבד אנוש ואנשי דודו תהלת הדי זה עבד עבודה זדה. The foundation of that commandment against strange worship (now commonly called idolatry) is this, that no man should worship any of the creatures whatsoever, neither angel, nor sphere, nor star, nor any of the four elements, nor any thing made out of them. For though he, that worships these things, know, that the Lord is God, and superior to them all, and worships those creatures no otherwise than Enosh and the rest of that age did, yet is he nevertheless guilty of strange worship or idolatry —And that, after the times of Enosh also, in succeeding ages, the Polytheism of the Pagan nations was no other than this, the worshipping (besides one supreme God) of other created beings, as the ministers of his providence, and as middles or mediators betwixt him and men, is declared likewise by Maimonides [1](in his More Nevochim) to have been the universal belief of all the Hebrews or Jews: ואתה יודעכי בל מיעובד שעבודם זדה לא יעבדה דעת שאין אלוה בלעדיה יה ולאדמה מעולם בלל מן העובדים ולא ידמה מן הבאים שהצודה אשד יעשת מן המתכות או מן האבכים והעצים שהצודת ההיא היה אשד בדאה השמים זהאדץ אבל אמנם ועבדוה על צד שהיא דמיון לדבר שחוא אמצעי בינם ויבן האלוה וזה ממה שלא יחלוק בו אחד מבעלי תודתנן You know, that whosoever committeth idolatry, he doth it not as supposing, that there is no other God besides that which he worshippeth, for it never came into the minds of any idolaters, nor never will, that that statue, which is made by them of metal, or stone, or wood, is that very God, who created heaven and earth; but they worship those statues and images only as the representation of something, which is a mediator between God and them.—Moses Albelda, the author of the book entitled, עולת תמיד Gnolath Tamid, resolves all the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, into these two principles, one of which respected God, and the other men themselves: [2] הא מועני לזה מצדו ית ואומדום כי הוא גבוה מעל גבוה ואא להדבק בו רך עי תאמצעיים כמנהג תמלד בו שהדוצים לשאול שאלה מה ממנו ישאלוה עי אמצעי ולכן עשים אותה העא כדי להודיד השפע האלתי על ידה: הב טועינין מצד עצמם וזח כי היות האדם גשמו אינו יכול להתבוד מעצמו אם לא ישים נגדו דבר מה מוחש יעודה ויעודדו להבין עצמי כדי שתדבק בו השגחתי יתבדך. The idolaters first argued thus in respect of God; that since he was of such transcendent perfection above men, it was not possible for men to be united to, or have communion with him, otherwise than by means of certain middle beings or mediators;

[1] P. 1. c. xxxvi. [2] Fol. 147.

as it is the manner of earthly kings, to have petitions conveyed to them by the hands of mediators and intercessors. Secondly, they thus argued also in respect of themselves; that being corporeal, so that they could not apprehend God abstractly, they must needs have something sensible to excite and stir up their devotion and fix their imagination upon.—Joseph Albo, in the book called Ikkarim, concludes that Ahab, and the other idolatrous kings of Israel and Judah worshipped other gods upon those two accounts mentioned by Maimonides and no otherwise, namely, that the supreme God was honored by worshipping of his ministers, and that there ought to be certain middles and mediators betwixt him and men: אחאב וזותו ממלכי ושדאל ויהודה היו טועין[1] אחד הכחות להגלגל ת משתי צדדין שאמדנו וגם שלמה טעה בזה עם היותם מאמינים במציאות השם ואחודתו אם כשהיו חושבים לגדד אח השם בזה ואם כשהיו חושבין לעשו ת סדסוד ואמצעיים בינם ובין השם ותב Ahab, and other kings of Israel and Judah, and even Solomon himself, erred in worshipping the stars, upon those two accounts already mentioned out of Maimonides, notwithstanding that they believed the existence of God and his unity; they partly conceiving that they should honor God in worshipping of his ministers, and partly worshipping them as mediators betwixt God and themselves.—And the same writer determines the meaning of that first commandment, (which is to him the second) "Thou shalt have no other gods before my face," to be this להכים אותם אמצעיים בינו ובינך אושתחשוב לדומם אותי בעבודתם Thou shalt not set up other inferior gods as mediators betwixt me and thyself, or worship them so, as thinking to honor me thereby.—R. David Kimchi (upon 2 Kings xvii.) writeth thus concerning that Israelitish priest, who, by the King of Assyria's command, was sent to Samaria to teach the new inhabitants thereof to worship the God of that land (of whom it is afterwards said, that they both feared the Lord, and served their idols;) אם יאמד להם שלא יהיו עיברים עבודח זדה כלל לא היו מאמינים שהיא דבר שנדלו בו כל האומות מקדם והוא אצלם כמו מושכל דאשין אד אמד להם שיהיו עיברים את אלוהיהם כמו שהי עוברים ובלבד שתהא כיונת האל בלבם כי אלא האלהים לא ורעי ולא ייטיבי כי אם ברצון האל אלא שעוברים אותם להיותם אמצעיים בינם ובין הבורא If he should have altogether prohibited them their idolatry, they would not have hearkened to him, that being a thing, which all those eastern people were educated in from their very infancy, insomuch that it was a kind of first principle to them. Wherefore he permitted them to worship all their several gods, as before they had done; only he required them to direct the intention of their minds to the God of Israel

[1] P. 3. c. xviii.

(as the supreme), for those gods could do them neither good nor hurt, otherwise than according to his will and pleasure; but they worshipped them to this purpose, that they might be MEDIATORS betwixt them and the Creator. In the book Nitzachon, all the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans is reduced to these three heads; first, עבדו משרתי השם לכבודו When they worshipped the ministers of God, as thinking to honor him thereby; — and, secondly, עברו תותם שיהיו מלוצים בערם When they worshipped them as orators and intercessors for them with God;—and, lastly, עבדו לעץ ואבן לזכדו When they worshipped statues of wood and stone for memorials of him. And though it be true, that Isaak Abrabanel (upon 2 Kings xvii.) does enumerate more species of Pagan idolatry, even to the number of ten, yet are they all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and there is no such thing amongst them to be found, as the worshipping of many unmade independent deities, as partial creators of the world.

Moreover, those rabbinic writers commonly interpret certain places of the Scripture to this sense, that the Pagan idolaters did notwithstanding acknowledge one supreme Deity, as that (Jeremy 10: 7.) "Who is there that will not fear thee, thou King of nations? For amongst all their wise men, and in all their kingdoms, there is none like unto thee; though they become all together brutish, and their worshipping of stocks is a doctrine of vanity:" for Maimonides thus glosseth upon those words: בלומד הכל יודעום שאתה הוא לבדך אבל טעותם וכסילותם שמדמים שזה ההבל דצונך הוא As if he should say, all the Gentiles know, that thou art the only supreme God, but their error and folly consisteth in this, that they think this vanity of worshipping inferior gods, to be a thing agreeable to thy will.—And thus also Kimchi in his Commentaries, מי לא יראך אפילו הגוים העובדים האלילים ראוי להם שיירדאוך כי אתה מלך עליהם בכל חבמי חגוים ובכל מלכיתם אומרים מאין כסוך יאינם עובדים הכזכבים אלא להיותם אמעעיים בינך ובינם ואמד הכמי הג ים כי הם יודעים כי הפסל אינו בלום ואם יעברו הכובכים לא יעברום אלא מפני שהם משדתיך לה והם אטצעיים Who will not fear thee? It is fit, that even the nations themselves, who worship idols, should fear thee, for thou art their King; and indeed amongst all the wise men of the nations, and in all their kingdoms, it is generally acknowledged, that there is none like unto thee. Neither do they worship the stars otherwise than as mediators betwixt thee and them. Their wise men know, that an idol is nothing; and though they worship stars, yet do they worship them as thy ministers, and that they may be intercessors for them. Another place is that, Malachi 1: 11, which though we read in the future tense, as a

prophecy of the Gentiles, yet the Jews understand it of that present time, when those words were written, "From the rising of the sun to the going down thereof, my name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure oblation, for my name is great amongst the Gentiles, saith the Lord of Hosts. But you profane it, etc.—Upon which words R. Solomon glosseth thus, מי שיש לו עין יודע שהוא אלוה שהוא על כולם יבבל מקום סחנדבים לשמי אפ אמומוה The Pagan Polytheists and idolaters know, that there is one God superior to all those other gods and idols worshipped by them: and in every place are there free-will offerings brought to my name, even amongst the Gentiles. And Kimchi agreeth with him herein, אפ על פי שהגייס עזבדים לצבא השמים סורים בי שאני הסבה הראשונה אלא שעיבדים אותם שיהיו אמצעיים ביני יבינם Although the Pagans worshipped the host of heaven, yet do they confess me to be the first Cause, they worshipping them only as in their opinion certain mediators betwixt me and them.—Whether either of these two places of Scripture does sufficiently prove what these Jews would have, or no; yet, however, is it evident from their interpretations of them, that themselves supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity, and that their other gods were all but his creatures and ministers. Nevertheless, there is another place of Scripture, which seems to sound more to this purpose, and accordingly hath been thus interpreted by Rabbi Solomon and others, Ps. 65: 6, where God is called מבטח בל קעזי אדע וים רתקים The confidence of all the ends of the earth, and of them that are afar off in the sea—that is, even of all the Pagan world.

Thus we see plainly, that the Hebrew doctors and rabbins have been generally of this persuasion, that the Pagan nations anciently, at least the intelligent amongst them, acknowledged one supreme God of the whole world; and that all their other gods were but creatures and inferior ministers; which were worshipped by them upon these two accounts, either as thinking, that the honor done to them redounded to the supreme; or else that they might be טליצין, סדסודים, and אסצעיים, their mediators, and intercessors, orators, and negotiators with him. Which inferior gods of the Pagans were supposed by these Hebrews to be chiefly of two kinds, angels, and stars or spheres. The latter of which the Jews, as well as Pagans, concluded to be animated, and intellectual: for thus Maimonides expressly;[1] בל הכוכבים והגלגלים בולן בעלי גפש וריעה והשבל הם והם חיים ועומרים וכמרין את מי שאמר והיה העולם בל אחד ואחר רפי גול ולפי מעלחו משבחין

[1] Jesude Hattotah c. iii. § 9.

ומפאדים ליוצרם כמו המל אכים The stars and spheres are every one of them animated, and endued with life, knowledge and understanding. And they acknowledge him, who commanded and the world was made, every one of them, according to their degree and excellency, praising and honoring him, as the angels do. And this they would confirm from that place of Scripture, Neh. 9: 6, "Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth with all things that are therein, the seas and all that is therein, and thou preservest them all; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee:" the host of heaven being commonly put for the stars.

XXXI. But, lastly, this same thing is plainly confirmed from the Scriptures of the New Testament also; that the Gentiles and Pagans, however Polytheists and idolaters, were not unacquainted with the knowledge of the true God, that is, of the one only self-existent and omnipotent Being, which comprehendeth all things under him: from whence it must needs follow, that their other many gods were all of them supposed to have been derived from this one, and to be dependent on him.

For first, St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans,[1] tells us, that these Gentiles or Pagans did *τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατέχειν*, hold the truth in unrighteousness, or unjustly detain and imprison the same.—Which is chiefly to be understood of the truth concerning God, as appears from that which follows, and therefore implies the Pagans not to have been unfurnished of such a knowledge of God, as might and ought to have kept them from all kinds of idolatry, however by their default it proved ineffectual to that end; as is afterward declared; [2]*οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει*, they liked not to retain God in the agnition, or practical knowledge of him.—Where there is a distinction to be observed betwixt *γνῶσις* and *ἐπίγνωσις*, the knowledge and the agnition of God—the former whereof, in this chapter, is plainly granted to the Pagans, though the latter be here denied them, because they lapsed into Polytheism and idolatry; which is the meaning of these words: [3]*μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει*, they changed the truth of God into a lie.—Again, the same apostle there affirmeth, that the *τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς*, that, which may be known of God, was manifest within them, God, himself having showed it unto them.—There is something of God unknowable and incomprehensible by all mortals, but that of God, which is knowable, his eternal power and Godhead, with the attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifest to

[1] Cap. i. 25. [2] V. 28. [3] V. 25.

all mankind from his works. "The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being clearly seen and understood by the things that are made." Moreover, this apostle expressly declareth the Pagans to have known God, in that censure, which he giveth of them : [1]*διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν, οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν*, that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God ;—because they fell into Polytheism and idolatry. Though the apostle here instanceth only in the latter of those two, their "changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and beasts, and creeping things." The reason whereof is, because this idolatry of the Pagans, properly so called, that is, their worshipping of stocks and stones, formed into the likeness of man or beast, was generally taken amongst the Jews for the grossest of all their religious miscarriages. Thus Philo plainly declareth : [2]*ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοσχερεστάτων μερῶν ὡς θεῶν πρόπολοί τε καὶ θεραπευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι μέν· (πῶς γὰρ οὔ, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες) ἧττον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικοῦσι, τῶν ξύλα καὶ λίθους, ἄργυρόν τε καὶ χρύσον, καὶ τὰς παραπλησίους ὕλας μορφωσάντων*, etc. Whosoever worship the sun, and moon, and the whole heaven, and world, and the chief parts thereof, as gods, do unquestionably err, (they honoring the subjects of the prince) but they are guilty of the less iniquity and injustice than those, who form wood and stone, gold and silver, and the like matters, into statues, to worship them, etc.—of which assertion he afterwards gives this account : *τὸ γὰρ κάλλιστον ἔρεισμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξέκοψαν, τὴν περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ θεοῦ προσήκουσαν ὑπόληψιν*, because these have cut off the most excellent fulcrum of the soul, the persuasion of the ever-living God, by means whereof, like unballasted ships, they are tossed up and down perpetually, nor can be ever able to rest in any safe harbor.—And from hence it came to pass, that the Polytheism of the Pagans, their worshipping of inferior gods (as stars and demons) was vulgarly called also by the Jews and Christians idolatry, it being so denominated by them *a famosiore specie.* Lastly, the apostle plainly declares, that the error of the Pagan superstition universally consisted (not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but) in joining creature worship, as such, some way or other, with the worship of the Creator : [3]*ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα*, which words are either to be thus rendered : They [religiously] worshipped the creature, besides the Creator"—that preposition being often used in this sense, as for example, in this of Aristotle, where he affirmeth

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[1] V. 21. [2] De Decal. p. 753. [3] V. 25.

concerning Plato, that he did [1]τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, (not make numbers to be the things themselves, as the Pythagoreans had done, but) unity and numbers to be besides the things ;—or τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, numbers to exist by themselves, besides the sensibles : he by numbers meaning, as Aristotle himself there expounds it, τὰ εἴδη, the ideas contained in the first Intellect (which was Plato's second Divine hypostasis) as also by τὸ ἓν, ὃ τοῖς εἴδεσι παρέχεται τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, that *ipsum unum*, or unity, which gives being to those ideas—is understood Plato's first Divine hypostasis. Or else the words ought to be translated thus : "And worshipped the creature above or more than the Creator," that preposition παρὰ being sometimes used comparatively so as to signify excess, as for example in Luke 13: 2. "Think you that these Galileans were ἁμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς Γαλιλαίους, sinners beyond all the Galileans ?" And, (ver. 4.) "Think you, that those eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, were ὀφειλέται παρὰ πάντας, debtors above all the men, that dwelt in Jerusalem ?" According to either of which interpretations, it is supposed, that the Pagans did worship the true God, the Creator of the whole world ; though they worshipped the creature also, besides him, or (perhaps in some sense) above him, and more than him also. But as for that other interpretation of παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which Beza chose rather to follow, that "they worshipped the creature, the Creator being wholly passed by," this is no true literal version, but only a gloss or commentary upon the words, made according to a certain preconceived and extravagant opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God or Creator, but universally transfer all their worship upon the creature only. But in what sense the Pagans might be said to worship the creatures above or beyond, or more than the Creator, (because it is not possible, that the creature, as a creature, should be worshipped with more internal and mental honor than the Creator thereof, looked upon as such) we leave others to inquire. Whether or no, because when religious worship, which properly and only belongeth to the Creator, and not at all to the creature, is transferred from the Creator upon the creature, according to a Scripture interpretation and account, such may be said to worship the creature more than the Creator ? Or whether because some of these Pagans might more frequently address their devotions to their inferior gods (as stars, demons, and heroes) as thinking the supreme God, either above their worship, or incomprehensible, or inaccessible by them ? Or, lastly, whether because the image, and statue-worshippers among the Pagans (whom

[1] Met. l. i. c. vi. [p. 272. tom. iv. oper.]

the apostle there principally regards) did direct all their external devotion to sensible objects and creaturely forms? However, it cannot be thought, that the apostle here taxes the Pagans merely for worshipping creatures above the Creator, as if they had not at all offended, had they worshipped them only in an equality with him; but doubtless their sin was, that they gave any religious worship at all to the creature, though in way of aggravation of their crime it be said, that they also worshipped the creature more than the Creator. Thus we see plainly, that the Pagan superstition and idolatry (according to the true Scripture notion of it) consisted not in worshipping of many creators, but in worshipping the creatures together with the Creator.

Besides this we have in the Acts of the Apostles an oration, which St. Paul made at Athens in the Areopagitic court, beginning after this manner: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive, that ye are in every way more than ordinarily religious;" for the word *δεισιδαιμονεστέρους* seems to be taken there in a good sense, it being not only more likely, that St. Paul would in the beginning of his oration thus captare benevolentiam, conciliate their benevolence, with some commendation of them, but also very unlikely, that he would call their worshipping of the true God by the name of superstition, for so it followeth: "for as I passed by and beheld your sacred things (or monuments) I found an altar with this inscription, *Ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ*, To THE UNKNOWN GOD." It is true, that both Philostratus[1] and Pausanias[2] write, that there were at Athens *Ἀγνώστων Θεῶν βωμοὶ*, altars of unknown gods:—but their meaning in this might well be, not that there were altars dedicated to unknown gods plurally, but that there were several altars, which had this singular inscription: To THE UNKNOWN GOD. And that there was at least one such, besides this Scripture record, is evident from that dialogue in Lucian's works entitled Philopatris,[3] where Critias useth this form of oath, *Νὴ τὸν Ἄγνωστον ἐν Ἀθήναις*, No, by the unknown god at Athens: and Triephon in the close of that dialogue speaketh thus: [4]*Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἄγνωστον ἐφευρόντες, καὶ προσκυνήσαντες, χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν ἐκτείναντες, τούτῳ εὐχαριστήσομεν, ὡς καταξιωθέντες*, etc. But we having found out that unknown God at Athens, and worshipped him, with hands stretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made subject to this power.—Which passages, as they do unquestionably refer to that Athenian inscription either upon one or more altars, so does the latter of them plainly imply,

[1] De Vita Apollonii, lib. vi. cap. iii. p. 232. [2] Lib. v. p. 199.

[3] Cap. ix. p. 122. edit. Gesneri. [4] Cap. xxiii. p. 203.

that this unknown God of the Athenians was the supreme Governor of the world. And so it follows in St. Paul's oration: ὃς οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν, Whom therefore you ignorantly worship (under this name of the unknown God) him declare I unto you, the God that made the world, and all things in it, the Lord of heaven and earth.—From which place we may upon firm Scripture authority conclude these two things: first, that by the unknown God of the Athenians was meant the only true God, he who made the world and all things in it; who in all probability was therefore styled by them Ἄγνωστος Θεός, the unknown God—because he is not only invisible, but also incomprehensible by mortals; of whom Josephus against Appion[1] writeth thus, that he is δυνάμει μόνον ἡμῖν γνώριμος, ὁποιος δὲ κατὰ οὐσίαν ἄγνωστος, knowable to us only by the effects of his power, but, as to his own essence, unknowable or incomprehensible.—But when in Dion Cassius the God of the Jews is said to be ἄῤῥητος καὶ ἀειδής, not only invisible, but also ineffable, and when he is called in Lucan, Incertus Deus, an uncertain God—the reason hereof seems to have been, not only because there was no image of him, but also because he was not vulgarly then known by any proper name, the Tetragrammaton being religiously forborn amongst the Jews in common use, that it might not be profaned. And what some learned men have here mentioned upon this occasion, of the Pagans sometimes sacrificing προσήκοντι θεῷ, to the proper and convenient god—without signifying any name, seems to be nothing to this purpose; that proceeding only from a superstitious fear of these Pagans (supposing several gods to preside over several things) lest they should be mistaken in not applying to the right and proper god, in such certain cases, and so their devotion prove unsuccessful and ineffectual. But that this unknown God is here said to be ignorantly worshipped by the Athenians, is to be understood chiefly in regard of their Polytheism and idolatry. The second thing, that may be concluded from hence, is this, that these Athenian Pagans did εὐσεβεῖν, religiously worship the true God, the Lord of heaven and earth—and so we have a Scripture confutation also of that opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God.

Lastly, St. Paul, citing this passage out of Aratus, a heathen poet, concerning Zeus or Jupiter,

Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν————

For we are his offspring—and interpreting the same of the true God,

[5] Lib. ii. cap. xv. p. 482.

"in whom we live and move, and have our being;" we have also here a plain Scripture acknowledgement, that by the Zeus of the Greekish Pagans was sometimes at least meant the true god. And, indeed, that Aratus's Zeus was neither a man born in Crete nor in Arcadia, but the Maker and supreme Governor of the whole world, is evident both from the antecedent and the subsequent verses. For Aratus's phenomena begins thus:

Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα———————

(which in Tully's version is "ab Jove musarum primordia") and then follows a description of this Zeus or Jupiter:

———————τὸν οὐδέποτ' ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν
Ἀρρήτον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαὶ,
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραὶ, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
Καὶ λιμένες· πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες·
Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

To this sense: Him, of whom we men are never silent; and of whom all things are full, he permeating and pervading all, and being every where; and whose beneficence we all constantly make use of and enjoy; for we are also his offspring.—Where Theon the scholiast writeth thus: *πάνυ πρεπόντως ὁ Ἄρατος τὴν τῶν ἄστρων διεξιέναι μέλλων θέσιν, τὸν πατέρα τούτων καὶ δημιουργὸν, Δία, ἐν πρώτοις προσφωνεῖ· Δία δὲ νῦν τὸν Δημιουργὸν ἀκουστέον·* Aratus being about to declare the position of the stars, doth, in the first place, very decorously and becomingly invoke Zeus, the father and maker of them: for by Zeus is here to be understood the Demiurgus of the world—or, as he afterward expresseth it, *ὁ τὰ πάντα δημιουργήσας θεὸς*, the God who made all things.—Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that this scholiast there adds, that some of these passages of the poet, and even that cited by the apostle, *τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν*, may be understood also in another sense, of the *Ζεὺς φυσικὸς*, the physical Jupiter; that is, the air; but without the least shadow of probability, and for no other reason as we conceive, but only to show his philological skill. However, this is set down by him, in the first place, as the genuine and proper sense of these words: *Πρὸς τὸ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶντε· εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ταῦτα ἐδημιούργησε πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις βιωφιλὲς, αὐτοῦ ἂν κληθείημεν, αὐτὸν πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν ἐπιγραφόμενοι·* This agreeth with that title of Jupiter, when he is called the father of gods and men: for if he made us, and all these other things for our use, we may be called his, and also style him our

father and maker."—And that this was the only notion, which the poet here had of Zeus or Jupiter, appears undeniably also from the following words; as,

———————ὁ δ᾽ ἥπιος ἀνθρώποισι
Δέξια σημαίνει———————

Who, as a kind and benign father, showeth lucky signs to men;—which to understand of the air were very absurd. And,

Αὐτὸς γὰρ τάγε σήματ᾽ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν
Ἄστρα διακρίνας· ἐσκέψατο δ᾽ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
Ἀστέρας·

For he also hath fastened the signs in heaven, distinguishing constellations, and having appointed stars to rise and set at several times of the year.—And from this,

Τῷ μιν ἀεὶ πρῶτον τε καὶ ὕστατον ἱλάσκονται,

Therefore is he always propitiated and placated both first and last.—Upon which the scholiast thus: ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν σπονδῶν, τῷ τὴν μὲν πρώτην σπονδὴν εἶναι θεῶν τῶν Ὀλυμπίων, δευτέραν δὲ ἡρώων, καὶ τρίτην Διὸς σωτῆρος· This perhaps refers to the libations, in that the first of them was for the heavenly gods, the second for heroes, and the last for Jupiter the Saviour.—From whence it plainly appears also, that the Pagans in their sacrifices (or religious rites) did not forget Jupiter the Saviour, that is the supreme God.

Lastly, from his concluding thus;

Χαῖρε πάτερ μεγα θαῦμα, μέγ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ·

Where the supreme God is saluted, as the great wonder of the world, and interest of mankind.

Wherefore it is evident from Aratus's context, that by his Zeus or Jupiter was really meant the supreme God, the maker of the whole world; which being plainly confirmed also by St. Paul and the Scripture, ought to be a matter out of controversy amongst us. Neither is it reasonable to think, that Aratus was singular in this, but that he spake according to the received theology of the Greeks, and that not only amongst philosophers and learned men, but even the vulgar also. Nor do we think, that that prayer of the ancient Athenians, commended by M. Atonninus for its simplicity, is to be understood oth-

wise, [1] *Ὕσον ὗσον ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, κατὰ τῆς ἀρούρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν πεδίων*, Rain, rain, O good (or gracious) Jupiter upon the fields and pastures of the Athenians :—upon which the Emperor thus : *ἤτοι οὐ δεῖ εὔχεσθαι, ἢ οὕτως ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλεύθερως* · We should either not pray at all (to God) or else thus plainly and freely.—And since the Latins had the very same notion of Jupiter, that the Greeks had of Zeus, it cannot be denied, but that they commonly by their Jupiter also understood the one supreme God, the Lord of heaven and earth. We know nothing, that can be objected against this from the Scripture, unless it should be that passage of St. Paul,[2] " In the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God." But the meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the world before Christianity, by their natural light, and contemplation of the works of God, did not attain to such a practical knowledge of God, as might both free them from idolatry, and effectually bring them to a holy life.

XXXII. But in order to a fuller explication of this Pagan theology,[3] and giving yet a more satisfactory account concerning it, there are three heads requisite to be insisted on ; first, that the intelligent Pagans worshipped the one supreme God under many several names ; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, that were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him ; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in images, statues and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. We begin with the first, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was Polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to several notions and considerations of him, from his several attributes and powers, manifestations, and effects in the world.

It hath been already observed out of Origen,[4] that not only the Egyptians, but also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other barbarian Pagans, had, beside their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one, amongst their priests and learned men ; and that the same was true concerning the Greeks and Latins also, is unquestionably evident from that account, that hath been given by us of philosophic theology ; where, by the vulgar theology of the Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. Austin concerning both these, [5] " Et civilis et fabulosa ambæ fabulosæ sunt, ambæque civiles ;" That both the

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[1] Lib. v. sect. 5. (sect. 8. p. 146.)

[2] 1 Corinth. 1: 21. [3] P. 314, 315. [4] P. 114, 115.

[5] Civ. D. lib. iv. cap. viii. (lib. v. cap. viii. p. 120. tom. vii. oper.)

fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was fabulous.—And by their more arcane and recondite theology, is doubtless meant that, which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which distinction of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but more expressly by Antistines, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; so was it owned and much insisted upon, both by Scævola, that famous Roman Pontifex, and by Varro, that most learned antiquary; they both agreeing, that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the true; and that there was another theology besides it, called by them natural, which was the theology of wise men and of truth: nevertheless granting a necessity, that in cities and commonwealths, besides this natural and true theology (which the generality of the vulgar were incapable of) there should be another civil or political theology, accommodate to their apprehensions; which civil theology differed from the natural, only by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it, and was therefore looked upon by them as a middle, betwixt the natural and the fabulous or poetical theology.

Wherefore it was acknowledged, that the vulgar theology of the Pagans, that is, not only their fabulous, but even their civil also, was oftentimes very discrepant from the natural and true theology; though the wise men amongst them, in all ages, endeavored as much as they could, to dissemble and disguise this difference, and by allegorizing the poetic fables of the gods, to bring that theology into some seeming conformity with the natural and philosophic; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by them excused upon the necessity of the vulgar.

The fabulous theology both of the Greeks and Romans did not only generate all the other gods, but even Jupiter himself also, their supreme Numen, it assigning him both a father and a mother, a grandfather, and a grandmother. And though the Romans did not plainly adopt this into their civil theology, yet are they taxed by St. Austin[1] for suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the capitol for a religious monument. And however this differed nothing at all from that atheistic doctrine of Evemerus,[2] That all the gods were really no other than mortal men,—yet was it tolerated and connived at by the politicians, in the way of necessary compliance with the vulgar, it

[1] De Civitate Dei, lib. v. cap. vii. p. 119.

[2] Apud Augustin. ubi supra.

being so extremely difficult for them to conceive any such living being or animal, as was never made, and without beginning. Insomuch, that Callimachus,[1] who would by no means admit of Jupiter's sepulchre, either in Crete or Arcadia (but looked upon it as a foul reproach to him) for this reason,

Σὺ δὲ οὐ θάνες· ἐσσὶ γαρ αἰεὶ,

Because he was immortal and could never die;—did notwithstanding himself attribute a temporary generation and nativity to him, as Origen[2] and others observe. Nevertheless, the generality of the more civilized and intelligent Pagans, and even of the poets themselves, did all this while constantly retain thus much of the natural and true theology amongst them, that Jupiter was the father both of gods and men; that is, the maker of the whole world, and consequently himself without father, eternal and unmade, according to that Peleadean oracle before cited out of Pausanias,

Ζεὺς ἦν, Ζεύς ἐστι, Ζεὺς ἔσσεται·———

Again, the civil theology of the Pagans, as well as the poetic, had not only many fantastic gods in it, but also an appearance of a plurality of independent deities; it making several supreme in their several territories and functions; as one to be the chief ruler over the heavens, another over the air and winds, another over the sea, and another over the earth and hell; one to be the giver of corn, another of wine; one the god of learning, another the god of pleasure, and another the god of war; and so for all other things. But the natural theology of the Pagans (so called) though it did admit a plurality of gods too, in a certain sense, that is, of inferior deities subordinate to one supreme; yet did it neither allow of more independent deities than one, nor own any gods at all, but such as were natural, that is, such as had a real existence in nature and the world without, and not in men's opinion only. And these Varro[3] concluded to be no other than, first, the Soul of the world, and then the animated parts thereof superior to men; that is, one supreme universal Numen unmade, and other particular generated gods, such as stars, demons, and heroes. Wherefore all the other gods besides these are frequently exploded by Pagan writers (as Cicero and

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[1] Hymno in Jovem, ver. 9. [2] Advers. Celsum, lib. iii. p. 137.

[3] Apud Augustin. de Civitate Dei, lib. v. cap. iv. v. p. 116. tom. vii. oper. et lib. vii. cap. v. vi. p. 128.

others) under the name of dii poetici, that is, not philosophical, but poetical gods; and dii commentitii and fictitii, that is, not natural and real, but feigned and fictitious gods.—They in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing else but so many several names and notions of one supreme Numen, according to his several powers and various manifestations, and effects in the world: it being thought fit by the wisdom of the ancient Pagan theologers, that all those manifold glories and perfections of the Deity should not be huddled up, and as it were crowded and crumpled together, in one general acknowledgement of an invisible Being, the maker of the world, but that they should be distinctly and severally displayed, and each of them adored singly and apart; and this too (for the greater pomp and solemnity) under so many personal names. Which perhaps the unskilful and sottish might mistake, not only for so many real and substantial, but also independent and self-existent deities.

We have before proved, that one and the same supreme God, in the Egyptian theology, had several proper and personal names given him, according to several notions of him, and his several powers and effects; Jamblichus himself, in that passage already cited, plainly affirming thus much; [1] *ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς*, etc. *τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἄμων κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλώσσαν λέγεται, συντελῶν δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς Φθὰ ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι᾽ ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας, ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει·* the demiurgical Mind and president of Truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and bringeth forth the hidden power of the occult reasons, contained within itself into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially effects all things with truth, Phtha; as it is productive of good things, Osiris; besides which it hath also several other names, according to its other powers and energies:—as, namely, Neith, (or according to Proclus's copy, *Νηϊθάς*, Neïthas) the tutelar god of the city Sais, from whence probably the Greek *Ἀθηνᾶ* was derived, (the Athenians being said to have been at first a colony of these Saites) and this is the Divine wisdom diffusing itself through all. So likewise Serapis, which though some would have to be the sun, is by others plainly described as an universal Numen. As Aristides in his eighth oration upon this god Serapis; [2] *Οἱ μὲν δὴ τῆς μεγάλης πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ πόλεως πολῖται, καὶ ἕνα τοῦτον ἀνακαλοῦσι Δία· ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολέλειπται δυνάμει περιττῇ, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων ἥκει, καὶ τὸ πᾶν πεπλήρωκε· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων θεῶν διῄρηνται αἱ δυνάμεις τε καὶ τιμαὶ, καὶ ἄλλους ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα ἄν-*

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[1] De Myst. Ægypt. (sect. 8. cap. iii. p. 159.) [2] P. 95.

θρωποι καλοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ κορυφαῖος πάντων, ἀρχὰς καὶ πέρατα ἔχει. They, who inhabit the great city in Egypt, call upon this god Serapis as their only Jupiter, he being supposed to be no way defective in power, but to pervade all things, and to fill the whole universe. And whereas the powers and honors of the other gods are divided, and some of them are invoked for one thing, and some for another; this is looked upon by them as the Coryphæus of all the gods, who contains the beginning and end of all things, and who is able to supply all wants.—Cneph is also described by Eusebius[1] as that Divine Intellect, which was the Demiurgus of the world, and which giveth life to all things, as he is by Plutarch[2] said to be *ἀγέννητος*, or unmade—so that this was also another Egyptian name of God; as likewise was Emeph and Eicton in Jamblichus;[3] though these may be severally distinguished into a trinity of Divine hypostases. Lastly, when Isis, which was sometimes called Multimammea, and made all over full of breasts, to signify her feeding all things, thus describes herself in Apuleius,[4] "Summa numinum, prima cœlitum, deorum dearumque facies uniformis, cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis;" as she plainly makes herself to be the supreme Deity, so doth she intimate, that all the gods and goddesses were compendiously contained in her alone, and that she (i. e. the supreme God) was worshipped under several personal names, and with different rites, over the whole Pagan world.—Moreover, this is particularly noted concerning the Egyptians by Damascius,[5] the philosopher, that *τὸ νοητὸν διηρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας*, they multiplied the first Intelligible (or the supreme Deity) breaking and dividing the same into the names and properties of many gods.—Now, the Egyptian theology was in a manner the pattern of all the rest, but especially of those European theologies of the Greeks and Romans.

Who likewise, that they often made many gods of one, is evident from their bestowing so many proper and personal names upon each of those inferior gods of theirs; the sun, and the moon, and the earth; the first whereof, usually called Apollo, had therefore this epithet of *πολυώνυμος*, commonly given to him, the god with many names.—Which many proper names of his Macrobius insisteth upon in his Sa-

[1] Ex Porphyrio, Præpar. Evangel. lib. iii. cap. xi. p. 115.

[2] De Iside et Osiride, p. 357. oper.

[3] De Myster. Ægypt. sect. 8. cap. iii. p. 158.

[4] Metamorph. lib. xii. p. 258, 259. edit. Elmenhorsti.

[5] MS. *περὶ πρώτων ἀρχῶν.*

turnalia, though probably making more of them than indeed they were. And the moon was not only so called, but also Diana, and Lucina, and Hecate, and otherwise; insomuch that this goddess also hath been styled Polyonymous as well as her brother, the sun. And lastly, the earth, besides those honorary titles, of bona dea, and magna dea, and mater deorum, the good goddess, and the great goddess, and the mother of the gods, was multiplied by them into those many goddesses, of Vesta, and Rhea, and Cybele, and Ceres, and Proserpine, and Ops, etc. And for this cause was she thus described by Æschylus;[1]

Καὶ Γαῖα πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴ μία·

Et Tellus multorum nominum facies una.

Now if these inferior gods of the Pagans had each of them so many personal names bestowed upon them, much more might the supreme God be polyonymous amongst them; and so indeed he was commonly styled, as that learned grammarian Hesychius intimates, upon that word *Πολυώνυμον, τὴν μονάδα οὕτως ἐκάλουν, καὶ ἐπίθετον Ἀπόλωνος*, they called the Monad thus, and it was also the epithet of Apollo—where, by the Monad according to the Pythagoric language, is meant the supreme Deity, which was thus styled by the Pagans *πολυώνυμον*, the Being that hath many names.—And accordingly Cleanthes thus beginneth that forecited hymn of his to him,

Κύδιστ᾽ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε,

Thou most glorious of all the immortal gods, who art called by many names.—And Zeno, his master, in Laertius,[2] expressly declareth, *ὁ Θεὸς πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις ὀνομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις*, God is called by many several names, according to his several powers and virtues—whose instances shall be afterwards taken notice of. Thus also the writer De Mundo;[3] *Εἷς δὲ ὢν πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατονομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν ἅπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμεῖ.* God, though he be but one, is polyonymous, and variously denominated from his several attributes, and the effects produced by him. "Quæcunque voles (saith Seneca,[4] illi propria nomina aptabis, vim aliquam effectumque cœlestium rerum continentia. Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse quot munera." You may

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[1] In Prometheo vincto, p. 29. edit. Guil. Canteri. Antwerp, 1580. 12mo.

[2] Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

[3] Cap. vii. p. 866. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

[4] De Ben. lib. i. (cap. vii. p. 427. tom. i. oper.)

give God whatsoever proper names you please, so they signify some force and effect of heavenly things. He may have as many names as he hath manifestations, offices and gifts.—Macrobius,[1] also, from the authority of Virgil, thus determines, unius Dei effectus varios pro variis censendos esse (or, as Vossius corrects it, censeri) numinibus," that the various effects of one God were taken for several gods—that is, expressed by several personal names; as he there affirmeth, the divers virtues of the sun to have given names to divers gods, because they gave occasion for the sun to be called by several proper and personal names. We shall conclude with that of Maximus Madaurensis,[2] before cited out of St. Austin: "Hujus virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas nos multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus proprium ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profecto videamur." The virtues of this one supreme God, diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names, because we are ignorant what his proper name is. Wherefore we thus worshipping his several divided members, must needs be judged to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.—With which latter words seemeth to agree that of the poet, wherein Jupiter thus bespeaks the other gods:

> Cœlicolæ, mea membra, Dei; quos nostra potestas
> Officiis divisa facit.

Where it is plainly intimated, that the many Pagan gods were but the several divided members of the supreme Deity, whether because, according to the Stoical sense, the real and natural gods were all but parts of the mundane soul; or else because all those other fantastic gods were nothing but personal names, given to the several powers, virtues, and offices of the one supreme.

Now the several names of God, which the writer De Mundo[3] instanceth in, to prove him polyonymous, are first of all such as these; *Βρονταῖος*, and *Ἀστραπαῖος*, the Thunderer and Lightner, *Ὑέτιος*, the Giver of Rain, *Ἐπικάρπιος*, the Bestower of fruits, *Πολιεὺς*, the Keeper of cities, *Μειλίχιος*, the Mild and Placable—under which notion they sacrificed no animals to him, but only the fruits of the earth; together with many other such epithets, as *Φίλιος*, *Ξένιος*, *Στράτιος*, *Τροπαιοῦχος*, *Καθάρσιος*, *Παλαμναῖος*, etc. and, lastly, he is called *Σωτὴρ* and *Ἐλευθέ-*

[1] Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 272.

[2] Epist. ad Augustin. vide Augustin. oper. tom. ii. epist xvi. p. 15.

[3] Cap. vii. p. 866. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

ριος, Saviour and Assertor.—Answerably to which, Jupiter had many such names given him also by the Latins, as Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator; the true meaning of which last, (according to Seneca[1]) was not that, which the historians pretend, "quod post votum susceptum, acies Romanorum fugientium stetit," because once after vows and prayers offered to him, the flying army of the Romans was made to stand—"sed quod stant beneficio ejus omnia," but because all things by means of him stand firm and are established.—For which same reason he was called also by them (as St. Austin informs us)[2] Centupeda, as it were, standing firm upon an hundred feet; and Tigillus, the beam, prop, and supporter of the world.—He was styled also by the Latins (amongst other titles) Almus and Ruminus,[3] *i. e.* He that nourisheth all things as it were with his breasts.—Again, that writer De Mundo addeth another sort of names,[4] which God was called by; as *Ανάγκη*, Necessity—because he is an immoveable essence, though Cicero gives another reason for that appellation; "Interdum Deum necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter esse possit, atque ab eo constitutum sit;" they sometimes call God Necessity, because nothing can be otherwise, than as it is by him appointed.—Likewise *Εἱμαρμένη*, because all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him unhinderably. *Πεπρωμένη*, because all things in the world are by him determined, and nothing left infinite (or undetermined.) *Μοῖρα*, because he makes an apt division and distribution of all things. *Αδράστεια*, because his power is such, as that none can possibly avoid or escape him. Lastly, that ingenious fable, (as he calls it) of the three fatal sisters, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, according to him, meant nothing but God neither, *ταῦια δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν οὖν ἀλλό τι, πλὴν ὁ Θεὸς, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων φησί;* all this is nothing else but God, as the noble and generous Plato also intimates, when he affirmeth God to contain the beginning, and middle, and end of all things.—And both Cicero and Seneca tell us, that, amongst the Latins, God was not only called Fatum, but also Natura, and Fortuna. "Quid aliud est natura (saith Seneca[5]) quam Deus, et divina ratio, toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta?" What is nature else, but God and the Divine Reason, inserted into the whole world and all its several parts?—He adding, that God and nature were no more two different things, than Annæus and Seneca. And, "Non-

[1] De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. vii. p. 427. tom. i. oper.

[2] De Civit. Dei. lib. vii. cap. xi. p. 131.

[3] Ruma Mamma.

[4] Acad. Q. l. i. (cap. vii. p. 2233. tom. viii. oper.)

[5] Ut supra.

nunquam Deum (saith Cicero) Fortunam appellant quod efficiat multa improvisa, et nec opinata nobis, propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum;" they sometimes call God also by the name of fortune, because he surpriseth us in many events, and bringeth to pass things unexpected to us, by reason of the obscurity of causes and our ignorance.—Seneca thus concludes concerning these, and the like names of God, "Omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, varie utentis sua potestate;" these are all names of one and the same God, variously manifesting his power.

But concerning most of these forementioned names of God, and such as are like to them, it was rightly observed by St. Austin, that[1] they had no such appearance or show of many distinct gods;" "Hæc omnia cognomina imposueruent uni Deo, propter causas potestatesque diversas, non tamen propter tot res, etiam tot deos eum esse coegerunt," etc. Though the Pagans imposed all these several names upon one God, in respect of his several powers, yet did they not therefore seem to make so many gods of them; as if Victor were one god, and Invictus another god, and Centupeda another god, and Tigillus another, and Ruminus another, etc. Wherefore there are other names of God used amongst the Pagans, which have a greater show and appearance of so many distinct deities, not only because they are proper names, but also because each of them had their peculiar temples appropriated to them, and their different rites of worship. Now these are of two sorts; first, such as signify the Deity according to its universal and all-comprehending nature; and, secondly, such as denote the same only according to certain particular powers, manifestations, and effects of it in the world. Of the first kind there are not a few. For, first of all, PAN, as the very word plainly implies him to be a universal Numen, and as he was supposed to be the Harmostes of the whole world, or to play upon the world as a musical instrument, according to that of Orpheus[3] or Onomacritus)

Ἁρμονίαν κόσμοιο κρέκων φιλοπαίγμονι μολπῇ,

So we have before showed, that by him the Arcadians and Greeks meant, not the corporeal world inanimate, nor yet as endued with a senseless nature only, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle or Divine spirit, which framed it harmoniously; and as being still kept

[1] Acad. Quæst. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 2233. tom. viii. oper.

[2] C. D. l. vii. c. xi. (p. 131.)

[3] In Hymno in Panem, p. 109. edit. Eschenbach.

in tune, acted and governed by the same. Which therefore is said to be the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind, and of the whole world, according to that other Orphic passage,

Βόσκων ἀνθρώπων γενεὴν, καὶ ἀτέρμονα γαῖαν.

Pascens humanum genus, ac sine limite terram.

And this Pan Socrates, in Plato's Phædrus, plainly invokes as the supreme Numen. Pan therefore is the one only God (for there cannot possibly be more than one Pan, more than one all or universe) who contained all within himself, displayed all from himself, framing the world harmoniously, and who is in manner all things.

Again, Janus, whom the Romans first invoked in all their sacrifices and prayers, and who was never omitted, whatsoever god they sacrificed unto, was unquestionably many times taken for a universal Numen, as in this of Martial,[1]

———Nitidique sator pulcherrime mundi.

And again in this of Ovid;[2]

Quicquid ubique vides, cœlum, mare, nubila, terras,
Omnia sunt nostra clausa patentque manu:
Me penes est unum vasti custodia mundi.

From which passages it also appears, that Janus was not the mere senseless and inanimate matter of the world, but a principle presiding over it. And without doubt all the beginnings of things were therefore referred to this Janus, because he was accounted the most ancient god, and the beginning of all things. St. Austin concluding him to be the same with Jupiter, therefore quarrels with the Pagans, (that is with their civil theology,) for thus making two gods of one: [3]"Cum ergo Janus mundus sit, et Jupiter mundus sit, unusque sit mundus, quare duo dii sunt Janus et Jupiter? Quare seorsum habent templa, seorsum aras, diversa sacra, dissimilia simulacra? Si propterea, qui alia vis est primordiorum, alia causarum, ex illa Jani, ex ista Jovis nomen, accepit; nunquid si unus homo in diversis rebus duas habeat potestates, aut duas artes, (quia singularum diversa vis est) ideo duo dicuntur artifices?" etc. Since therefore Janus is the world, and Jupiter is the world, and there is but one world, how can Janus and Jupiter be two

[1] Epigr. lib. x. epigr. xxviii. p. 411.
[2] Fast. 1. (v. 117.)
[3] C. D. l. vii. c. x. (p. 131.)

gods? Why have they their temples apart, their altars apart, distinct sacred things, and statues of different forms? If because the force of beginnings is one, and the force of causes another, he is therefore called Janus from the former, and Jupiter from the latter; I ask whether or no, if one man have two several arts about different things, he therefore be to be called two artificers? Or is there any more reason, why one and the same god, having two powers, one over the beginnings of things, and another over the causes, should therefore be accounted two gods?—Where, when Jupiter and Janus are both said to be the world, this is to be understood properly not of the matter, but the soul or mind of the world, as St. Austin himself elsewhere declares; [1]"Sit Jupiter corporei hujus mundi animus, qui universam istam molem, ex quatuor elementis constructam atque compactam, implet et movet;" Let Jupiter be the mind of this corporeal world, which both filleth and moveth that whole bulk, compounded and made up of the four elements.—Nevertheless, as the soul and body both together are called the man, so was the whole animated world, by the Pagans, called God. Now the forementioned argumentation of St. Austin, though it be good against the Pagans' civil theology, yet their own arcane and natural theology was unconcerned in it, that plainly acknowledging all to be but one God, which for certain reasons was worshipped under several names, and with different rites. Wherefore Janus and Jupiter, being really but different names for one and the supreme God, that conjecture of Salmasius seems very probable, that the Romans derived their Janus from *Ζανὸς*, the Ætolian Jupiter.

Genius was also another of the twenty select Roman gods; and that this was likewise a universal Numen, containing the whole nature of things, appears from this of Festus,[2] "Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obtineret rerum omnium generandarum;" They called that God, who hath the power of begetting or producing all things, Genius.—And [3]St. Austin also plainly declareth Genius to be the same with Jupiter; that is, to be but another name for the one supreme God; "Cum alio loco [Varro] dicit, Genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; talem autem mundi animum Deum esse, ad hoc idem utique revocat, ut tanquam universalis Genius, ipse mundi animus esse credatur. Hic est igitur, quem appellant Jovem."—And afterwards, "Restat ut eum singulariter et excellenter dicant deum Genium, quem dicunt mundi animum; ac per hoc Jovem." When Varro elsewhere calleth the

[1] C. D. l. iv. c. xi. (p. 76.)

[2] De Verborum Significat. lib. vii. p. 292. edit. Godofredi.

[3] C. D. l. vii. c. xiii. (p. 132.)

rational mind of every one, a genius, and affirmeth such a mind of the whole world, to be God; he plainly implieth, that God is the universal Genius of the world, and that Genius and Jupiter are the same. And though Genius be sometimes used for the mind of every man, yet the god Genius, spoken of by way of excellency, can be no other than the mind of the whole world, or Jupiter.

Again, that CHRONOS or SATURN was no particular Deity, but the universal Numen of the whole world, is plainly affirmed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where commending the fertility of Italy, he writeth thus: [1]*οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς παλαίους ἱερὰν ὑπολαβεῖν τοῦ Κρόνου τὴν χώραν ταύτην, τὸν μὲν δαίμονα τοῦτον οἰομένους εἶναι πάσης εὐδαιμονίας δοτῆρα, καὶ πληρωτὴν ἀνθρώποις· εἴτε Χρόνον αὐτὸν δεῖ καλεῖν, ὡς Ἕλληνες ἀξιοῦσιν, εἴτε Κρόνον ὡς Ῥωμαῖοι, πᾶσαν δὲ περιειληφότα τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν, ὁπότερον ἄν τις ὀνομάσοι·* Wherefore it is no wonder, if the ancients thought this country to be sacred to Saturn, they supposing this god to be the giver and perfecter of all happiness to men; whether we ought to call him Chronos, as the Greeks will have it, or Cronos, as the Romans; he being either way such a god, as comprehends the whole nature of the world. — But the word Saturn was Hetrurian (which language was originally Oriental) and being derived from סתר signifies *hidden;* so that by Saturn was meant that hidden principle of the universe, which containeth all things; and he was therefore called by the Romans Deus Latius, the hidden God—as the wife of Saturn in the pontifical books is Latia Saturni, and the land itself (which in the Hetrurian language was Saturnia) is in the Roman Latium; from whence the inhabitants were called Latins, which is as much as to say, the worshippers of the hidden God. Moreover, that Saturn could not be inferior to Jupiter, according to the fabulous theology, is plain from hence, because he is therein said to have been his father. But then the question will be, how Saturn and Jupiter could be both of them one and the same universal Numen? To which there are several answers. For, first, Plato, who propounds this difficulty in his Cratylus, solves it thus; that by Jupiter here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind or intellect (which Chronos is interpreted to be) as Chronos also depended upon Uranus or Cœlus, the supreme heavenly God, or first original Deity. — So that Plato here finds his trinity of Divine hypostases, archical and universal, *Τἀγαθὸν, Νοῦς* and *Ψυχὴ*, in Uranus, Chronos and Zeus; or Cœlus, Saturn and Jupiter. Others

[1] Rom. Ant. l. i. p. 24. Steph.

conceive, that, according to the plainer and more simple sense of Hesiod's Theogonia, that Jupiter, who, together with Neptune and Pluto, is said to have been the son of Saturn, was not the supreme Deity, nor the soul of the world neither, but only the Æther, as Neptune was the sea, and Pluto the earth. All which are said to have been begotten by Chronos or Saturn, the son of Uranus; that is as much as to say, by the hidden virtue of the supreme heavenly God. But the writer, De Mundo,[1] though making Jupiter to be the first and supreme God, yet (taking Chronos to signify immensity of duration or eternity) will have Jupiter to be the son of Chronos in this sense, because he doth διήκειν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα, continue from one eternity to another—so that Chronos and Zeus are to him in a manner one and the same thing. But we are apt to think, that no ingenious and learned Pagan, who well understood the natural theology, would deny, but that the best answer of all to this difficulty is this, that there is no coherent sense to be made of all things in the fabulous theology. St. Austin,[2] from Varro, gives us this account of Saturn, that it is he, who produceth from himself continually the hidden seeds and forms of things, and reduceth or receiveth them again into himself; which some think to have been the true meaning of that fable concerning Saturn, his devouring his male children, because the forms of these corporeal things are perpetually destroyed, whilst the material parts (signified by the female) still remain. However, it is plain, that this was but another Pagan adumbration of the Deity, that being also sometimes thus defined by them, as St. Austin likewise informs us, [3]"Sinus quidam naturæ in seipso continens omnia," a certain bosom, or deep hollow, and inward recess of nature, which containeth within itself all things.—And St. Austin himself concludes, that according to this Varronian notion of Saturn likewise, the Pagans' Jupiter and Saturn were really but one and the same Numen. De Civ. D. l. vii. c. xiii. Wherefore we may with good reason affirm, that Saturn was another name for the supreme God amongst the Pagans, it signifying that secret and hidden power,[4] which comprehends, pervades, and supports the whole world; and which produceth the seeds or seminal principles and forms of all things from itself. As also Uranus or Cœlus was plainly yet another name

[1] Cap. vii. p. 869. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

[2] De Civit. Dei. lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 132. tom. vii. oper.

[3] C. D. l. iv. c. xiii. [p. 77.]

[4] Thus in that old inscription, OPTIMUS MAXIMUS CŒLUS ÆTERNUS JUPITER.

for the same supreme Deity; (or the first Divine hypostasis) comprehending the whole.

In the next place, though it be true, that Minerva be sometimes taken for a particular god, or for God according to a particular manifestation of him in the Æther, (as shall be showed afterwards;) yet was it often taken also for the supreme God, according to his most general notion, or as a universal Numen diffusing himself through all things. Thus hath it been already proved, that Neith or Neithas was the same amongst the Egyptians, as Athena amongst the Greeks and Minerva amongst the Latins; which that it was a universal Numen, appears from that Egyptian inscription in the temple of this god, "I am all that was, is, and shall be." And accordingly Athenagoras tells us,[1] that Athena of the Greeks was *ἡ φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διήκουσα*, Wisdom passing and diffusing itself through all things—as in the book of Wisdom it is called *ἡ πάντων τεχνίτις*, the Artifex of all things, and is said *διήκειν καὶ χωρεῖν διὰ πάντων*, to pass and move through all things.—Wherefore this Athena or Minerva of the Pagans was either the first supreme Deity, a perfect and infinite mind, the original of all things; or else a second Divine hypostasis, the immediate offspring and first-begotten of that first original Deity. Thus Aristides in his oration upon Minerva, [2]*πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ κάλλιστα περὶ Ἀθηνᾶν τε καὶ ἐξ Ἀθηνᾶς· κεφάλαιον δὲ εἰπεῖν, τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ καὶ βασιλέως παῖς ἐστι μόνη δὴ μόνου· οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν ἐξ ὅτου ὁμοτίμου ποιήσειεν αὐτήν· ἀλλ' ἀναχωρήσας αὐτὸς εἰς αὐτὸν, αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννᾷ τε καὶ τίκτει τὴν θεόν· ὥστε ἔστι μόνη βεβαίως γνησία τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐξ ἴσου καὶ ὁμολογοῦντος ἑαυτῷ τοῦ γένους γενομένη*, etc. Wherefore all the most excellent things are in Minerva, and from her: but, to speak briefly of her, this is the only immediate offspring of the only maker and king of all things; for he had none of equal honor with himself, upon whom he should beget her, and therefore retiring into himself, he begot her and brought her forth from himself: so that this is the only genuine offspring of the first father of all.—And again, *Πίνδαρος δ' αὖ φησὶ, δεξιὰν κατὰ χεῖρα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὴν καθεζομένην, τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδέχεσθαι· ἀγγέλου μὲν γάρ ἐστι μείζων, ἡδὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἄλλοις ἄλλα ἐπιτάττει πρώτη παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παραλαμβάνουσα, ἀντ' ἐξηγητοῦ τινος οὖσα τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ εἰσαγωγέως ὅταν καὶ τούτου δέῃ·* Pindar also affirmeth concerning Minerva, that sitting at the right hand of her father, she there receiveth commands from him to be delivered to the gods. For she is greater than the angels, and commandeth them some one thing and some another, accordingly

[1] Legat. pro Christianis. cap. xix. p. 86. [2] P. 292.

as she had first received of her father; she performing the office of an interpreter and introducer to the gods, when it is needful.—Where we may observe, by the way, that this word angel came to be in use amongst the Pagans from Jews and Christians, about this very age that Aristides lived in; after which we meet with it frequently in the writings of their philosophers. Lastly, Aristides thus concludeth his oration upon Minerva; *σχεδὸν γὰρ δύναμιν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι λέγων τὶς αὐτὴν ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι· ὥστε τί δὴ μικρολογεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν μέρει πράξεις αὐτῆς διηγούμενον, ὅποτ' ἔξεστι τὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἔργα κοινὰ τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι φῆσαι καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς·* He that from what we have said will determine, that Minerva is as it were the power and virtue of Jupiter himself, will not err. Wherefore (not to enumerate all the minute things belonging to Minerva) we conclude thus concerning her, that all the works of Jupiter are common with Jupiter and Minerva. Wherefore that conceit, which the learned and industrious Vossius[1] sometimes seems to favor, that the Pagans' universal Numen was no other than a senseless nature, or spermatic reason of the whole world, undirected by any higher intellectual principle (which is indeed no better than downright Atheism), is plainly confuted from hence, they making wisdom and understanding, under these names of Neith, Athena, and Minerva, to be either the absolutely supreme Deity, or the first begotten offspring of it.

To Minerva may be added Apollo, who, though often taken for the sensible sun animated, and so an inferior deity, yet was not always understood in this sense, nor indeed then when he was reckoned amongst the twelve consentes, because the sun was afterwards added to them, in the number of the eight select gods. And that he was sometimes taken for the supreme universal Numen, the maker of the sun and of the whole world, is plainly testified by Plutarch (who is a competent witness in this case, he being a priest of this Apollo), writing thus concerning him in his Defect of Oracles: [2]*Εἴτε ἥλιός ἐστιν εἴτε κύριος ἡλίου, καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὁρατοῦ παντὸς, οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀπαξιοῦν φωνῆς τοὺς νῦν ἀνθρώπους, οἷς αἴτιός ἐστι γενέσεως καὶ τροφῆς, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ φρονεῖν.* Whether Apollo be the sun, or whether he be the lord and father of the sun, placed far above all sensible and corporeal nature, it is not likely that he should now deny his oracles to them, to whom himself is the cause of generation and nourishment, of life and understanding.

Moreover, Urania Aphrodite, the heavenly Venus or Love, was a universal Numen also, or another name of God, according to his more general notion, as comprehending the whole world; it being the same

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[1] De Idolatr. lib. vii. cap. i. p. 718. [2] P. 413.

with that Ἔρως, or Love, which Orpheus, and others in Aristotle made to be the first original of all things: for it is certain, that the ancients distinguished concerning a double Venus and Love. Thus Pausanias in Plato's Symposium:[1] Ἡ μέν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὴ καὶ οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα, Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὴ πάνδημον καλοῦμεν· ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ Ἔρωτα, τὸν μὲν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συνεργόν, πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δέ, οὐράνιον· There are two Venuses, and therefore two Loves; one the older and without a mother, the daughter of Uranus or heaven, which we call the heavenly Venus; another younger, begotten from Jupiter and Dione, which we call the vulgar Venus: and accordingly are there of necessity two Loves, answering to these two Venuses, the one vulgar, and the other heavenly. —The elder of these two Venuses is in Plato said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn, and by Orpheus[2] the oldest of all things, and πρῶτος γενέτωρ, the first begetter of all.—Upon which account, perhaps, it was called by the oriental nations Mylitta or Genitrix, as being the fruitful mother of all. This was also the same with Plato's τὸ πρῶτον καλὸν, the first fair;—the cause of all pulchritude, order and harmony, in the world. And Pausanias[3] the writer tells us that there were temples severally erected to each of these Venuses or Loves, the heavenly and the vulgar; and that Urania or the heavenly Venus, was so called, ἐπὶ ἔρωτι καθαρῷ καὶ ἀπηλαμένῳ πόθου σωμάτων, because the love belonging to it was pure, and free from all corporeal affection:—which, as it is in men, is but a participation of that first Urania, or heavenly Venus and Love, God himself. And thus is Venus described by Euripides in Stobæus,[4] as the supreme Numen:

> [5] Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅση θεός;
> Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν εἴποις, οὐδὲ μετρήσειας ἄν,
> Ὅση πέφυκε καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον διέρχεται·
> Αὕτη τρέφει δὲ κἀμὲ καὶ πάντας βροτοὺς, etc.

To this sense: Do you not see how great a god this Venus is? But you are never able to declare her greatness, nor to measure the vast extent thereof. For this is she, which nourisheth both thee and me, and all mortals, and which makes heaven and earth friendly to conspire

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[1] P. 108. [2] In Hymno in Venerem, p. 151. oper.

[3] In Bœotic. lib. ix. cap. xvi. p. 742.

[4] Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 97.

[5] Thus also by Æschylus, Ἐρᾷ μὴν ἁγνὸς οὐρανὸς, etc. Ἔρως δὲ γαῖαν λαμβάνει, etc.—τῶν δ' ἐγὼ παραίτιος. Grot. Excerp. p. 45.

together, etc.—But by Ovid this is more fully expressed, in his Fastorum :[1]

Illa quidem totum dignissima temperat orbem,
Illa tenet nullo regna minora Deo :
Juraque dat cœlo, terræ, natalibus undis ;
Perque suos initus continet omne genus.
Illa deos omnes (longum enumerare) creavit ;
Illa satis causas arboribusque dedit.

Where all the gods are said to have been created or made by Venus, that is, by the one supreme Deity. But, lastly, this is best of all performed by Severinus Boetius, a Christian philosopher and poet, in this manner :[2]

Quod mundus stabili fide
Concordes variat vices,
Quod pugnantia semina
Fœdus perpetuum tenent ;
Quod Phœbus roseum diem
Curru provehit aureo ; etc.
Hanc rerum seriem ligat,
Terras ac pelagus regens,
Et cœlo imperitans, AMOR, etc.
Hic si frœna remiserit,
Quicquid nunc amat invicem,
Bellum continuo geret.
Hic sancto populus quoque
Junctus fœdere continet ;
Hic et conjugii sacrum
Castis nectit amoribus, etc.
O felix hominum genus,
Si vestros animos AMOR,
Quo cœlum regitur, regat.

And to this Urania or heavenly Venus, was near of kin also that third Venus in Pausanias called Ἀποστροφία, and by the Latins Venus verticordia, pure and chaste Love—expulsive of all unclean lusts, to which the Romans consecrated a statue, as Valerius M. tells us, (l. viii. c. xv.) "quo facilius virginum mulierumque mentes a libidine ad pudicitiam converterentur ;" to this end, that the minds of the female sex might

[1] Lib. iv. ver. 91. [2] De Cons. lib. ii. Met. 8.

then the better be converted from lust and wantonness to chastity.—We conclude, therefore, that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was sometimes amongst the Pagans a name for the supreme Deity, as that which is the most amiable being, and first pulchritude, the most benign and fecund begetter of all things, and the constant harmonizer of the whole world.

Again, though Vulcan, according to the most common and vulgar notion of him, be to be reckoned amongst the particular gods, yet had he also another more universal consideration. For Zeno in Laertius[1] tells us, that the supreme God was called *Ἥφαιστος*, or Vulcan, *κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ*, as his hegemonic acted in the artificial fire.—Now Plutarch[2] and Stobæus[3] testify, that the Stoics did not only call nature, but also the supreme Deity itself (the Architect of the whole world), *τεχνιχὸν πῦρ*, an artificial fire—they conceiving him to be corporeal. And Jamblichus[4] making Phtha to be the same supreme God, amongst the Egyptians, with Osiris and Hammon, or rather, more properly, all of them alike the soul of the world, tells us, that Hephæstus, in the Greekish theology, was the same with this Egyptian Phtha; *Ἕλληνες εἰς Ἥφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθὰ τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες*, amongst the Greeks Hephæstus (or Vulcan) answers to the Egyptian Phtha.—Wherefore as the Egyptians by Phtha, so the Greeks by Hephæstus, sometimes understood no other than the supreme God, or at least the Soul of the world, as artificially framing all things.

Furthermore, Seneca[5] gives us yet other names of the supreme Deity according to the sense of the Stoics; "Hunc et liberum patrem, et Herculem, ac Mercurium nostri putant, Liberum Patrem, quia omnium parens, etc. Herculem, quod vis ejus invicta sit; Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est, numerusque, et ordo, et scientia." Furthermore, our philosophers take this auctor of all things to be Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury; the first, because he is the parent of all things, etc. the second, because his force and power are unconquerable, etc. and the third, because there is in and from him reason, number, order, and knowledge.—And now we see already, that the supreme God was sufficiently polyonymous amongst the Pagans; and that all these,

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[1] Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

[2] De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881. oper.

[3] Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 17.

[4] De Myster. Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. iii. p. 159.

[5] De Ben. lib. iv. cap. viii.

Jupiter, Pan, Janus, Genius, Saturn, Cœlus, Minerva, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Hephæstus, Liber Pater Hercules, and Mercury, were not so many really distinct and substantial gods, much less self-existent and independent ones; but only several names of that one supreme, universal, and all-comprehending Numen, according to several notions and considerations of him.

But, besides these, there were many other Pagan gods called by Servius *dii speciales*, special or particular gods;—which cannot be thought neither to have been so many really distinct and substantial beings (that is, natural gods), much less self-existent and independent, but only so many several names and notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to certain particular powers and manifestations of it. It is true, that some late Christian writers against the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans, have charged them with at least a trinity of independent gods, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, as sharing the government of the whole world amongst these three, and consequently acknowledging no one universal Numen. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that according to the more arcane doctrine and cabala of the Pagans, concerning the natural true theology, these three considered as distinct and independent gods, were accounted but dii poetici et commentitii, poetical and fictitious gods—and they were really esteemed no other than so many several names and notions of one and the same supreme Numen, as acting variously in those several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. For, first, as to Plato and Hades, called also by the Latins Orcus, and Dis (which latter word seems to have been a contraction of Dives to answer the Greek Pluto), as Balbus in Cicero[1] attributes to him, "omnem vim terrenam," all terrene power,—so others commonly assign him the regimen of separate souls after death. Now it is certain, that, according to this latter notion, it was by Plato understood no otherwise than as a name for that part of the Divine Providence, which exercises itself upon the souls of men after death. This Ficinus observed upon Plato's Cratylus: "Animadverte præ ceteris, Plutonum hic significare præcipue providentiam divinam ad separatas animas pertinentem." You are to take notice, that by Pluto is here meant that part of Divine Providence, which belongeth to separate souls.—For this is that, which, according to Plato, "binds and detains pure souls in that separate state with the best *vinculum* of all, which is not necessity, but love and desire; they being ravished and charmed as it were with those pure de-

[1] De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxvii. p. 2994. oper.

lights, which they there enjoy." And thus is he also to be understood in his book of Laws, writing in this manner concerning Pluto;[1] *Καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τοιοῦτον θεὸν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον, ὡς ὄντα ἀεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει ἄριστον· κοινωνία γὰρ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι, διαλύσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ᾗ κρεῖττον ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν, σπουδῇ λέγων·* Neither ought military men to be troubled or offended at this God Pluto, but highly to honor him, as who always is the most beneficent to mankind. For I affirm with the greatest seriousness, that the union of the soul with this terrestrial body is never better than the dissolution or separation of them.—Pluto, therefore, according to Plato, is nothing else but a name for that part of the Divine Providence, that is exercised upon the souls of men, in their separation from these earthly bodies. And upon this account was Pluto styled by Virgil,[2] the Stygian Jupiter. But by others Pluto, together with Ceres, is taken in a larger sense, for the manifestation of the Deity in this whole terrestrial globe; and thus is the writer De Mundo[3] to be understood, when he tells us, that God or Jupiter is *οὐράνιος τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπώνυμος ὢν φύσεως τε καὶ τύχης, ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὤν·* both celestial and terrestrial, he being denominated from every nature, forasmuch as he is the cause of all things.—Pluto therefore is *Ζεὺς χθόνιος* or *καταχθόνιος*, the terrestrial (also as well as the Stygian and subterranean) Jupiter: and that other Jupiter, which is distinguished both from Plato and Neptune, is properly *Ζεὺς οὐράνιος*, the heavenly Jupiter—God as manifesting himself in the heavens. Hence is it, that Zeus and Hades, Jupiter and Pluto, are made to be one and the same thing, in that passage, which Julian[4] cites as an oracle of Apollo, but others impute to Orpheus,

Εἷς Ζεὺς, εἷς Ἀΐδης,

Jupiter and Pluto are one and the same God. As also that Euripides, in a place before produced, is so doubtful whether he should call the supreme God (*τὸν πάντων μεδέοντα*, that takes care of all things here below) Zeus or Hades:

——————Ζεὺς, εἴτ' Ἀΐδης
Ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις·

Whether thou hadst rather be called Jupiter or Pluto.

Lastly, Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, in those verses of his

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[1] Lib. viii. (p. 642.) [2] Æneid. lib. vii. ver. 327.
[3] Cap. vii. p. 869. oper. Aristot.
[4] Orat. iv. in Regem. Solem, p. 136.

(afterward to be set down) makes Pluto in the first place (with many other Pagan gods) to be really one and the same with Jupiter.

That Neptune was also another name of the supreme God, from another particular consideration of him, namely, as acting in the seas (at least according to the arcane and natural theology of the Pagans), is plainly declared by divers of the ancients. Xenocrates in Stobæus,[1] and Zeno in Laertius,[2] affirm, that God as acting in the water is called Posidone or Neptune. To the same purpose Balbus in Cicero:[3] "Sed tamen his fabulis spretis ac repudiatis, Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intelligi, qui qualesque sint," etc. But these poetic fables concerning the gods being despised and rejected, it is easy for us to understand, how God passing through the nature of every thing, may be called by several names, as through the earth Ceres (and Pluto), through the seas Neptune, and through other parts of the world by other names:—so that all these titular gods were but so many several denominations of one supreme Deity. And Cotta afterward thus represents the sense of this theology:[4] "Neptunum esse dicis animum cum intelligentia per mare pergentem, idem de Cerere." Your meaning is, Neptune is a mind, which with understanding passes through the sea, and the like of Ceres through the earth.—Lastly, to name no more, Maximus Tyrius agreeth also herewith,[5] *κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία νοῦν πρεσβύτατον*, etc. *τὸν δὲ Ποσειδῶ, πνεῦμα διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἰόν, οἰκονομοῦν αὐτῶν τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν·* You are to call Jupiter that princely mind, which all things follow and obey, etc. and Neptune that spirit, which passing through the earth and sea, causes their state and harmony.

Lastly, That these three, Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, were not three really distinct substantial beings, but only so many several names for one supreme God (according to the true and natural theology of the Pagans), is thus plainly declared by Pausanias in his Corinthiacs;[6] he there expounding the meaning of a certain statue of Jupiter with three eyes (called the country Jupiter of the Trojans) in this manner: *τρεῖς δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμαίροιτο αὐτόν· Δία γὰρ ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύειν, οὗτος μὲν λόγος κοινὸς πάντων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων. Ὃν δὲ ἄρχειν φασὶν ὑπὸ γῆς ἔστιν ἔπος τῶν Ὁμήρου Δία ὀνομάζον καὶ τοῦτου,*

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[1] Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 56. [2] Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

[3] De N. D. lib. ii. (cap. xxviii. p. 2996.)

[4] De N. D. lib. iii. (cap. xxv. p. 3090.)

[5] Dissert. 30. (cap. xxix. p. 290.) [6] Lib. ii. cap. xxiv. p. 166.

Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος, καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια.

Αἰσχύλος δὲ ὁ Εὐφορίωνος καλεῖ Δία καὶ τὸν ἐν θαλάσσῃ· Τρισὶν οὖν ὁρῶντα ἐποίησεν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὅστις δὴ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας, ἅτε ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ ταῖς λεγομέναις λήξεσιν ἄρχοντα τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον θεόν· Now that this statue of Jupiter was made to have three eyes, one may guess this to have been the reason; because first the common speech of all men makes Jupiter to reign in the heaven. Again, he that is said to rule under the earth, is in a certain verse of Homer called Zeus or Jupiter too, namely, the infernal or subterraneous Jupiter, together with Proserpine. And, lastly, Æschylus, the son of Euphorion, calls that God, who is king of the sea also, Jupiter. Wherefore this statuary made Jupiter with three eyes to signify, that it is one and the same God, which ruleth in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth.—Whether Pausanias were in the right or no, as to his conjecture concerning this three-eyed statue of Jupiter, it is evident, that himself, and other ancient Pagans, acknowledged Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, to be but three several names, and partial considerations of one and the same God, who ruleth over the whole world. And since both Proserpine and Ceres were really the same with Pluto, and Salacia the same with Neptune; we may well conclude, that all these, Jupiter, Neptune, Salacia, Pluto, Proserpine, and Ceres, though several poetical and political gods, yet were really taken but for one and the same natural and philosophical God.

Moreover, as Neptune was a name for God, as manifesting himself in the sea, and ruling over it, so was Juno another name of God, as acting in the air. This is expressly affirmed both by Xenocrates in Stobæus,[1] and Zeno in Laertius.[2] And St. Austin[3] propounding this query, why Juno was joined to Jupiter as his wife and sister? makes the Pagans answer thus to it, "Quia Jovem (inquiunt) in æthere accipimus, in aëre Junonem;" because we call God in the ether Jupiter, in the air Juno.—But the reason, why Jupiter was feminine and a goddess, is thus given by Cicero,[4] "Effæminarunt autem eum, Junonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est aëre mollius;" they effeminated the air, and attributed it to Juno a goddess, because nothing is softer than it.—Minerva was also sometimes taken for a special or particular god, and then it was nothing (as Zeno informs us) but a name for the supreme

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[1] Ubi supra. [2] Ubi supra. [3] De Civit. Dei. lib. iv. cap. x. p. 74.

[4] De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxvi. p. 2994. tom. ix. oper.

God, as passing through the (higher) ether: which gave occasion to St. Austin thus to object against the Pagan theology: [1] "Si ætheris partem superiorem Minerva tenere dicitur, et hac occasione fingere poetas, quod de Jovis capite nata sit, cur non ergo ipsa potius deorum regina deputatur, quod sit Jove superior?" If Minerva be said to possess the highest part of the ether; and the poets therefore to have feigned her to have been begotten from Jupiter's head, why is not she rather called the queen of the gods, since she is superior to Jupiter?—Furthermore, as the supreme God was called Neptune in the sea, and Juno in the air, so by the same reason may we conclude, that he was called Vulcan in the fire. Lastly, as the sun and moon were themselves sometime worshipped by the Pagans for inferior deities, they being supposed to be animated with particular souls of their own; so was the supreme God also worshipped in them both (as well as in other parts of the world), and that under those names of Apollo and Diana. Thus the Pagans, appointing a God to preside over every part of the world, did thereby but make the supreme God polyonymous, all those gods of theirs being indeed nothing but several names of him. Which theology of the ancient Pagans, Maximus Tyrius, treating concerning Homer's philosophy (after he had mentioned his tripartite empire of the world, shared between Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto), thus declareth: [2] *Εὕροις δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλας παρ' Ὁμήρῳ ἀρχὰς καὶ γενέσεις παντοδαπῶν ὀνομάτων· ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀνόητος ὡς μύθων ἀκούει, ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ὡς πραγμάτων, ἔστιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀρχή· ἀλλ' Ἀθηνᾶ λέγεται*, etc. You may find also in Homer other principles and the originals of several names: which the ignorant hear as fables, but a philosopher will understand as things and realities. For he assigns a principle of virtue and wisdom, which he calls Minerva; another of love and desire, which he calls Venus; another of artificialness, and that is Vulcan, who rules over the fire. And Apollo also with him presides over dancings, the Muses over songs, Mars over war, Æolus over winds, and Ceres over fruits.—And then does he conclude thus, *Καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος Ὁμήρῳ ἄθεον, οὐδὲ δυνάστου ἄπορον, οὐδὲ ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μεστὰ θείων ὀνομάτων, καὶ θείων λόγων, καὶ θείας τέχνης·* So that no part neither of nature, nor of the world, is to Homer godless (or void of a God) none destitute of a ruler, or without a superior government; but all things full of Divine names, and of Divine reason, and of Divine art.—Where his *θεῖα ὀνόματα*, his Divine names—are nothing but several names of God, as manifesting

[1] C. D. lib. iv. cap. x. (p. 74.)

[2] Dissert. xvi. p. 163.

himself variously in the several things of nature, and the parts of the world, and as presiding over them.

Wherefore, besides those special gods of the Pagans, already mentioned, that were appointed to preside over several parts of the world, there are others, which are but several names of the supreme God neither, as exercising several offices and functions in the world, and bestowing several gifts upon mankind: as when in giving corn and fruits, he is called Ceres; in bestowing wine, Bacchus; in men's recovery of their health, Æsculapius; in presiding over traffic and merchandizing, Mercury; in governing military affairs, Mars; in ordering the winds, Æolus; and the like.

That the more philosophic Pagans did thus really interpret the fables of the gods, and make their many poetical and political gods to be all of them but one and the same supreme natural God, is evident from the testimonies of Antisthenes, Plato, Xenocrates, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (who allegorized all the fables of the gods accordingly,) and of Scævola the Roman Pontifex, of Cicero, Varro, Seneca, and many others. But that even their poets also did sometimes venture to broach this arcane theology, is manifest from those fragments preserved of Hermesianax the Colophonian amongst the Greeks, and of Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins; the former thus enumerating the chief Pagan gods, and declaring them to be all but one and the same Numen:

Πλούτων, Περσεφόνη, Δημήτηρ, Κύπρις, Ἔρωτες,
Τρίτωνες, Νηρεὺς, Τηθὺς, καὶ Κυανοχαίτης,
Ἑρμῆς θ' Ἥφαιστός τε κλυτός, Πὰν, Ζεύς τε καὶ Ἥρη,
Ἄρτεμις, ἠδ' ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων, εἷς Θεός ἐστι·

Pluto, Persephone, Ceres, et Venus alma, et Amores,
Tritones, Nereus, Tethys, Neptunus et ipse,
Mercurius, Juno, Vulcanus, Jupiter, et Pan,
Diana, et Phœbus Jaculator, sunt Deus unus.

The latter[1] pronouncing universally, that Jupiter Omnipotens is

———Deus unus et omnes,

one God, and all gods. Whether by his Jupiter he here meant the soul of the world only, as Varro would interpret him, agreeably to his own hypothesis, or whether an abstract mind superior to it; but probably he made this Jupiter to be all gods, upon these two accounts; first, as he

[1] Apud Augustin. de Civit. Dei, lib. vii. cap. ix. p. 131.

was the begetter and creator of all the other natural gods, which were the Pagans' inferior deities (as the stars and demons;) secondly, as that all the other poetical and political gods were nothing else but several names and notions of him.

We shall add, in the last place, that St. Austin, making a more full and particular enumeration of the Pagan gods, and mentioning amongst them many others besides the select Roman gods (which are not now commonly taken notice of,) does pronounce universally of them all, according to the sense of more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the same Jupiter:[1] "Ipse in æthere sit Jupiter, ipse in aëre Juno, ipse in mari Neptunus, in inferioribus etiam maris ipse Salacia, in terra Pluto, in terra inferiore Proserpina, in focis domesticis Vesta, in fabrorum fornace Vulcanus, in divinantibus Apollo, in merce Mercurius, in Jano initiator, in Termino terminator, Saturnus in tempore, Mars et Bellona in bellis, Liber in vineis, Ceres in frumentis, Diana in silvis, Minerva in ingeniis. Ipse sit prostremo etiam ille turba quasi plebeiorum deorum, ipse præsit nomine Liberi virorum seminibus, et nomine Liberæ fœminarum. Ipse sit Diespiter, qui partem perducat ad diem: ipse sit dea Mena, quam præfecerunt menstruis fœminarum, ipse Lucina, quæ a parturientibus invocatur, ipse opem ferat nascentibus, excipiens eos sinu terræ, et vocetur Opis. Ipse in vagitu os aperiat, et vocetur, Deus Vagitanus. Ipse levet de terra, et vocetur dea Levana. Ipse cunas tueatur et vocetur dea Cunina. Sit ipse in deabus illis, quæ fata nascentibus canunt, et vocantur Carmentes. Præsit fortuitis, voceturque Fortuna. In Diva Rumina mammam parvulis immulgeat. In Diva Potina potionem immisceat. In Diva Educa escam præbeat. De pavore infantium Paventia nuncupetur. De spe quæ venit Venilia; de voluptate Volupia. De actu Agenoria. De stimulis, quibus ad nimium actum homo impellitur, dea Stimula nominetur. Strenua dea sit, strenuum faciendo. Numeria quæ numerare doceat; Camæna quæ canere. Ipse sit et Deus Consus præbendo consilia; et Dea Sentia sententias inspirando. Ipse dea Juventas, quæ post prætextam excipiat juvenilis ætatis exordia. Ipse sit Fortuna Barbata, quæ adultos barba induit, quos honorare voluerit. Ipse in Jugatione Deo conjuges jungat; et cum virgini uxori zona solvitur, ipse invocetur et dea Virginensis invocetur. Ipse sit Mutinus, qui est apud Græcos Priapus, si non pudet. Hæc omnia quæ dixi, et quæcunque non dixi, hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter; sive sint, ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum; sive

[1] De Civ. D. l. vi. c. xi. (p. 76.)

virtutes ejus, quæ sententia velut magnorum multorumque doctorum est." Let us grant, according to the Pagans, that the supreme God is in the ether Jupiter; in the air Juno; in the sea Neptune; in the lower parts of the sea Salacia; in the earth Pluto; in the inferior parts thereof Proserpina; in the domestic hearths Vesta; in the smiths' forges Vulcan; in divination Apollo; in traffic and merchandize Mercury; in the beginnings of things Janus; in the ends of them Terminus; in time Saturn; in wars Mars and Bellona; in the vineyards Liber; in the corn-fields Ceres; in the woods Diana; and in wits Minerva. Let him be also that troop of plebeian gods; let him preside over the seeds of men under the name of Liber, and of women under the name of Libera; let him be Diespiter, that brings forth the birth to light; let him be the goddess Mena, whom they have set over women's monthly courses; let him be Lucina, invoked by women in child-bearing; let him be Opis, who aids the new-born infants; let him be Deus Vagitanus, that opens their mouths to cry; let him be the goddess Levana, which is said to lift them up from the earth; and the goddess Cunia, that defends their cradles; let him be the Carmentes also, who foretel the fates of infants; let him be Fortune, as presiding over fortuitous events; let him be Diva Rumina, which suckles the infant with the breasts; Diva Potina, which gives it drink; and Diva Educa, which affords it meat; let him be called the goddess Paventia, from the fear of infants; the goddess Venilia, from hope; the goddess Volupia, from pleasure; the goddess Agenoria, from acting; the goddess Stimula, from provoking; the goddess Strenua, from making strong and vigorous; the goddess Numeria, which teacheth to number; the goddess Camæna, which teaches to sing; let him be Deus Consus, as giving counsel; and Dea Sentia, as inspiring men with sense; let him be the goddess Juventas, which has the guardianship of young men; and Fortuna Barbata, which upon some more than others liberally bestoweth beards; let him be Deus Jugatinus, which joins man and wife together; and Dea Virginensis, which is then invoked, when the girdle of the bride is loosed; lastly, let him be Mutinus also (which is the same with Priapus amongst the Greeks,) if you will not be ashamed to say it. Let all these gods and goddesses, and many more (which I have not mentioned,) be one and the same Jupiter, whether as parts of him, which is agreeable to their opinion, who hold him to be the soul of the world; or else as his virtues only, which is the sense of many and great Pagan doctors.

But that the authority and reputation of a late learned and industrious writer, G. I. Vossius, may not here stand in our way, or be a preju-

dice to us, we think it necessary to take notice of one passage of his, in his book De Theologia Gentili, and freely to censure the same; where, treating concerning that Pagan goddess Venus, he writeth thus:[1] "Ex philosophica de diis doctrina, Venus est vel Luna (ut vidimus) vel Lucifer, sive Hesperus. Sed ex poetica ac civili, supra hos cœlos statuuntur mentes quædam a syderibus diversæ: quomodo Jovem, Apollinem, Junonem, Venerem, cæterosque Deos Consentes, considerare jubet Apuleius. Quippe eos (inquit,) natura visibus nostris denegavit: necnon tamen intellectu eos mirabundi contemplamur, acie mentis acrius contemplantes. Quid apertius hic, quam ab eo per Deos Consentes intelligi, non corpora cœlestia vel subcœlestia, sed sublimiorem quandam naturam, nec nisi animis conspicuam?" According to the philosophic doctrine concerning the gods, Venus is either the moon, or Lucifer, or Hesperus; but according to the poetic and civil theology of the Pagans, there were certain eternal minds, placed above the heavens, distinct from the stars: accordingly as Apuleius requires us to consider Jupiter and Apollo, Juno and Venus, and all those other gods called Consentes; he affirming of them, that though nature had denied them to our sight, yet notwithstanding, by the diligent contemplation of our minds, we apprehend and admire them. Where nothing can be more plain (saith Vossius) than that the Dii Consentes were understood by Apuleius, neither to be celestial nor subcelestial bodies, but a certain higher nature perceptible only to our minds. Upon which words of his we shall make these following remarks; first, that this learned writer seems here, as also throughout that whole book of his, to mistake the philosophic theology of Scævola and Varro, and others, for that which was physiological only (which physiological theology of the Pagans will be afterwards declared by us.) For the philosophic theology of the Pagans did not deify natural and sensible bodies only, but the principal part thereof was the asserting of one supreme and universal Numen, from whence all their other gods were derived. Neither was Venus, according to this philosophic and arcane theology, taken only for the moon, or for Lucifer, or Hesperus, as this learned writer conceives, but, as we have already proved, for the supreme Deity also, either according to its universal notion, or some particular consideration thereof. Wherefore the philosophic theology, both of Scævola and Varro, and others, was called natural, not as physiological only (in another sense,) as real and true; it being the theology neither of cities, nor of stages, or theatres, but of the world, and of the wise men in it:

[1] De Theolog. Gentili, lib. ii. cap. xxxi. p. 172.

philosophy being that properly, which considers the absolute truth and nature of things. Which philosophic theology therefore was opposed, both to the civil and poetical, as consisting in opinion and fancy only. Our second remark is, that Vossius does here also seem incongruously to make both the civil and poetical theology, as such, to philosophize; whereas the first of these was properly nothing but the law of cities and commonwealths, together with vulgar opinion and error; and the second nothing but fancy, fiction, and fabulosity. "Poetarum ista sunt," saith Cotta in Cicero;[1] "nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum authores, non fabularum." Those things belong to poets, but we would be philosophers, authors of things (or realities,) and not of fables.—Bu the main thing which we take notice of in these words of Vossius is this, that they seem to imply the Consentes, and select, and other civil and poetical gods of the Pagans, to have been generally accounted so many substantial and eternal minds, or understanding beings supercelestial and independent; their Jupiter being put only in an equality with Apollo, Juno, Venus, and the rest. For which, since Vossius pretends no other manner of proof than only from Apuleius's De Deo Socratis, who was a Platonic philosopher; we shall here make it evident, that he was not rightly understood by Vossius neither: which yet ought not to be thought any derogation from this eminent philologer (whose polymathy and multifarious learning are readily acknowledged by us,) that he was not so well versed in the niceties and punctilios of the Platonic school. For though Apuleius does in that book, besides those visible gods the stars, take notice of another kind of invisible ones, such as the twelve Consentes, and others, which (he saith) we may "animis conjectare, per varias utilitates in vita agenda, animadversas in iis rebus, quibus eorum singuli curant," make a conjecture of by our minds from the various utilities in human life, perceived from those things, which each of these take care of:—yet that he was no bigot in this civil theology, is manifest from hence, because in that very place, he declares as well against superstition, as irreligious profaneness. And his design there was plainly no other, than to reduce the civil and poetical theologies of the Pagans into some handsome conformity and agreement with that philosophical, natural, and real theology of theirs, which derived all the gods from one supreme and universal Numen: but this he endeavors to do in the Platonic way, himself being much addicted to that philosophy. "Hos deos in sublimi ætheris vertice locatos, Plato existimat veros, incorporales, animales sine ullo neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æviternos, corporis contagione sua quidem

[1] De Natur. Deor. lib. iii. cap. xxxi. p. 3096. tom. ix. oper.

natura remotos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porecto, etc. Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicujus rei mutua obstrictum, cur ego nunc dicere exordiar? Cum Plato cœlesti facundia præditus, frequentissime prædicet, hunc solum majestatis incredibili quadam nimietate et ineffabili, non posse penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modice comprehendi." All these gods placed in the highest ether Plato thinks to be true, incorporeal, animal, without beginning or end, eternal, happy in themselves without any external good. The parent of which gods, who is the Lord and author of all things, and who is alone free from all bonds of doing and suffering, why should I go about in words to describe him? since Plato, who was endued with most heavenly eloquence, equal to the immortal gods, does often declare, that this highest God, by reason of his excess of majesty, is both ineffable and incomprehensible.—From which words of Apuleius it is plain, that, according to him, the twelve Consentes, and all the other invisible gods were derived from one original Deity, as their parent and author. But then if you demand, what gods of Plato these should be, to which Apuleius would here accommodate the civil and poetic gods contained in those two verses of Ennius,

> Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,
> Mercurius, Jovi', Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo,

And the rest of this kind, that is, all their other gods (properly so called) invisible? we reply, that these are no other than Plato's ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which is the Divine intellect (and his second hypostasis) derived from his first original Deity, and most simple monad. For as Plato writeth in his Timæus: *Ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι,* This sensible world must needs be the image of another intelligible one. And again afterwards, [1]*τίνι τῶν ζώων αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησε; τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἰδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν· ἀτελεῖ γὰρ ἐοικὸς οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν. οὗ δ' ἔστι τἄλλα ζῶα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτῷ εἶναι τιθῶμεν. Τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῶα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς, ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα συνέστηκεν ὁρατά·* What animal was the pattern, according to whose likeness he that made this great animal of the world, formed it? Certainly, we must not think it to be any particular animal, since nothing can be perfect, which is made according to an imperfect copy. Let

[1] Plato in Tim. p. 30. [cap. xv. p. 238.]

us therefore conclude it to be that animal, which containeth all other animals in it as its parts. For that intelligible world containeth all intelligible animals in it, in the same manner as this sensible world doth us, and other sensible animals.—Wherefore Plato himself, here and elsewhere, speaking obscurely of this intelligible world, and the ideas of it, no wonder, if many of his Pagan followers have absurdly made so many distinct animals and gods of them. Amongst whom Apuleius accordingly would refer all the civil and poetic gods of the Pagans (I mean their gods, properly so called invisible) to this intelligible world of Plato's, and those several ideas of it. Neither was Apuleius singular in this, but others of the Pagan theologers did the like; as, for example, Julian in his book against the Christians: [1] *Θεοὺς ὀνομάζει Πλάτων τοὺς ἐμφανεῖς, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανὸν, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτοι τῶν ἀφανῶν εἰσιν εἰκόνες· ὁ φαινόμενος τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἥλιος, τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ μὴ φαινομένου· καὶ πάλιν, ἡ φαινομένη τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν σελήνη, καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἕκαστον, εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῶν νοητῶν· ἐκείνους οὖν τοὺς ἀφανεῖς θεοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας καὶ συνυπάρχοντας, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γεννηθέντας, καὶ προελθόντας, ὁ Πλάτων οἶδεν· εἰκότως οὖν φησὶν ὁ δημιουργὸς ὁ παρ᾽ αὐτῷ, θεοὶ, πρὸς τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λέγων, θεῶν, τῶν ἐμφανῶν δηλονότι· κοινὸς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων δημιουργὸς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὁ τεχνησάμενος οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἄστρα γενήσας τὰ τούτων ἀρχέτυπα·* Plato, indeed, speaketh of certain visible gods, the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and the heaven; but these are all but images of other invisible gods; that visible sun, which we see with our eyes, is but an image of another intelligible and invisible one: so likewise the visible moon, and every one of the stars, are but the images and resemblances of another moon, and of other stars intelligible. Wherefore Plato acknowledged also these other invisible gods, inexisting and coexisting with the Demiurgus, from whom they were generated and produced. That Demiurgus in him thus bespeaking these invisible and intelligible gods: Ye gods of gods, that is, ye invisible gods, who are the gods and causes of the visible gods. There is one common maker therefore of both these kinds of gods; who first of all made a heaven, earth, sea, and stars, in the intelligible world, as the archetypes and paradigms of these in the sensible. — Where St. Cyril in his Confutation writeth thus; *Ἔοικε δὲ διὰ τούτων ὁ γενναῖος ἡμῖν Ἰουλιανὸς, τὰς ἰδέας βούλεσθαι καταδηλοῦν, ἃς ποτὲ μὲν οὐσίας, καὶ ὑφεστάναι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς διϊσχυρίζεται Πλάτων, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐννοίας εἶναι θεοῦ διορίζεται· πλὴν ὅπως περ ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἀπαράδεκτον εἶναι φασὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶδε λόγον οἱ ταῦτα τεχνίται· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη χαιρέτω, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τερετίσματα γάρ ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν,*

[1] S. Cyril. cont. Jul. l. ii. p. 65.

οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον. This our excellent Julian, by his intelligible and invisible gods, seems here to mean those ideas, which Plato sometimes contends to be substances, and to subsist alone by themselves, and sometimes again determineth to be nothing but notions or conceptions in the mind of God. But however the matter be, the skilful in this kind of learning affirm, that these ideas have been rejected by Plato's own disciples; Aristotle discarding them as figments, or at least such, as being mere notions, could have no real causality and influence upon things.—But the meaning of this Pagan theology may be more fully understood from what the same St. Cyril thus further objecteth against it: *Προσεπάγει δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν δημιουργός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς, ὁ γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν τεχνησάμενος, ὅτε τοίνυν, καθὰ καὶ αὐτὸς διωμολόγηκεν ἐναργῶς, τούτων τε κἀκείνων γενεσιουργός ἐστιν ὁ ἀγέννητος θεὸς, πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγεννῆσθαι φησὶν αὐτοὺς, συνυπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ, πῶς, εἰπέ μοι, τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ συνυπάρξει τὸ γεννητόν; ἐνυπάξει δὲ κατὰ ποῖον τρόπον; ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀγένητον ὄντα τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, συνυπάρχειν ἀναγκαίως τῷ φύσαντι διϊσχυριζόμεθα, καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ, προελθεῖν δὲ γεννητῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ· ὁ δέ γε τῆς Πλάτωνος εὑρεσιεπείας συνήγορος ἀκριβὴς, ἀγέννητον μὲν εἶναι φησὶ τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεόν· ἐνυπάρχειν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθῆναι καὶ προελθεῖν τοὺς παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ γεγονότας, τὰ πάντα κυκῶν καὶ συγχέων·* The sense whereof seems to be this: Julian addeth, that the God of the universe, who made heaven and earth, is alike the Demiurgus, both of these sensible, and of the other intelligible things. If therefore the ingenite God be alike the creator of both, how can he affirm those things, that are created by him, to coexist with and inexist in him? How can that, which is created, coexist with the ingenite God? but much less can it inexist in him. For we Christians indeed affirm, that the unmade Word of God doth of necessity coexist with and inexist in the Father, it proceeding from him, not by way of creation, but of generation. But this defender of Platonic trifles, acknowledging the supreme God to be ingenite, affirmeth, notwithstanding, those things, which were made and created by him, to inexist in him; thus mingling and confounding all things.—Where, notwithstanding, Julian and the Platonic Pagans would in all probability reply, that those ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the first *Νοῦς*, or Intellect) proceeding from the highest hypostasis, and original Deity, by way of necessary and eternal emanation, are no more to be accounted creatures, than the Christian *Λόγος*; and therefore might, with as little absurdity, be said to exist with and in that first original Deity. But besides, the same Julian, elsewhere in that book of his, accommodates this Platonic notion also to the Pagan gods in particular,

in like manner as Apuleius had done before, he writing of Æsculapius after this canting way: [1]*Ὁ γὰρ Ζεὺς, ἐν μὲν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐξ ἑαυτοῖς τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἐγέννησεν, εἰς δὲ τὴν γῆν διὰ τῆς ἡλίου γονίμου ζωῆς ἐξέφηνεν· οὗτος ἐπὶ γῆς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ποιησάμενος πρόδον, ἐνοειδῶς μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώπου μορφῇ περὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ἐφάνη*, etc. Jupiter, amongst the intelligible things, generated out of himself Æsculapius, and by the generative life of the sun manifested him here upon earth, he coming down from heaven, and appearing in a human form, first about Epidaurus, and from thence extending his salutary power or virtue over the whole earth. — Where Æsculapius is, first of all, the eternal idea of the medicinal art or skill generated by the supreme God in the intelligible world; which afterward, by the vivific influence of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in a human form at Epidaurus. This is the doctrine of that Julian, who was so great an opposer of the incarnation of the eternal Logos in our Saviour Jesus Christ. Neither was this doctrine of many intelligible gods, and powers eternal (of which the archetypal world consisteth), first invented by Platonic Pagans, after the times of Christianity, as some might suspect; but that there was such a thing extant before amongst them also, may be concluded from this passage of Philo's: [2]*Εἷς ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀμυθήτους περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὺς καὶ σωτηρίους τοῦ γενομένου πάσας· δι' αὗ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων, ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, τὸ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε ἀρχέτυπον, ἰδέαις ἀοράτοις συσταθεὶς, ὥσπερ οὗτος σώμασιν ὁρατοῖς· καταπλαγέντες οὖν τινὲς τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἅπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαι* Though God be but one, yet hath he about himself innumerable auxiliatory powers, all of them salutiferous, and procuring the good of that which is made, etc. Moreover, by these powers, and out of them, is the incorporeal and intelligible world compacted, which is the archetype of this visible world, that consisting of invisible ideas, as this doth of visible bodies. Wherefore, some admiring, with a kind of astonishment, the nature of both these worlds, have not only deified the whole of them, but also the most excellent parts in them, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, which they scruple not at all to call gods.—Where Philo seems to speak of a double sun, moon, and heaven, as Julian did, the one sensible, the other intelligible. Moreover, Plotinus himself sometimes complies with this notion, he calling the ideas of the Divine Intellect *νοητοὺς θεοὺς*, intelligible gods;—as in that place before cited, where he exhorteth

[1] Cyr. C. Jul. l. vi. p. 200.

[2] De Confus. l. cccxlv. Par.

men, ascending upward above the soul of the world, θεοὺς ὑμνεῖν νοητοὺς, to praise the intelligible gods—that is, the Divine intellect, which as he elsewhere[1] writeth, is both εἷς καὶ πολλοὶ, one and many.

We have now given a full account of Apuleius's sense in that book De Deo Socratis, concerning the civil and poetical Pagan gods; which was not to assert a multitude of substantial and eternal deities or minds independent in them, but only to reduce the vulgar theology of the Pagans, both their civil and poetical, into some conformity with the natural, real, and philosophic theology; and this according to Platonic principles. Wherein many other of the Pagan Platonists, both before and after Christianity, concurred with him; they making the many Pagan invisible gods to be really nothing but the eternal ideas of the Divine Intellect (called by them the parts of the intelligible and archetypal world), which they supposed to have been the paradigms and patterns, according to which this sensible world, and all particular things therein, were made, and upon which they depended, they being only participations of them. Wherefore, though this may well be looked upon as a monstrous extravagancy in these Platonic philosophers, thus to talk of the Divine ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal paradigms of things, not only as substantial, but also as so many several animals, persons, and gods; it being their humor thus upon all slight occasions to multiply gods: yet nevertheless must it be acknowledged, that they did at the very same time declare all these to have been derived from one supreme Deity, and not only so, but also to exist in it; as they did likewise at other times, when unconcerned in this business of their Pagan Polytheism, freely acknowledge all these intelligible ideas to be really nothing else but νοήματα, conceptions in the mind of God—or the first Intellect (though not such slight accidental and evanid ones, as those conceptions and modifications of our human souls are); and, consequently, not to be so many distinct substances, persons, and gods (much less independent ones), but only so many partial considerations of the Deity.

What a rabble of invisible gods and goddesses the Pagans had, besides those their dii nobiles, and dii majorum gentium, their noble and greater gods (which were the consentes and selecti), hath been already showed out of St. Austin, from Varro, and others; as namely, Dea Mena, Deus Vagitanus, Dea Levana, Dea Cunina, Diva Rumina, Diva Potina, Diva Educa, Diva Paventina, Dea Venilia, Dea Agenoria, Dea Stimula, Dea Strenua, Dea Numeria, Deus Consus, Dea Sentia, Deus Jugatinus, Dea Virginensis, Deus Mutinus. To which might

[1] Vide Ennead v. lib. viii. cap. ix. p. 450.

be added more out of other places of the same St. Austin, as Dea Deverra, Deus Domiducus, Deus Domitius, Dea Manturna, Deus Pater Subigus, Dea Mater Prema, Dea Pertunda, Dea Rusina, Dea Collatina, Dea Vallonia, Dea Seia, Dea Segetia, Dea Tutilina, Deus Nodotus, Dea Volutina, Dea Patelena, Dea Hostilina, Dea Flora, Dea Lacturtia, Deo Matura, Dea Runcina. Besides which, there are yet so many more of these Pagan gods and goddesses extant in other writers, as that they cannot be all mentioned or enumerated by us ; divers whereof have every small, mean, and contemptible offices assigned to them, as their names for the most part do imply ; some of which are such, as that they were not fit to be here interpreted. From whence it plainly appears, that there was μηδὲν ἄθεον, nothing at all without a God—to these Pagans, they having so strong a persuasion, that Divine Providence extended itself to all things, and expressing it after this manner, by assigning to every thing in nature, and every part of the world, and whatsoever was done by men, some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over it. Now, that the intelligent Pagans should believe in good earnest, that all these invisible gods and goddesses of theirs were so many several substantial minds, or understanding beings eternal and unmade, really existing in the world, is a thing in itself utterly incredible. For how could any possibly persuade themselves, that there was one eternal unmade mind or spirit ; which, for example, essentially presided over the rockings of infant's cradles, and nothing else ? another over the sweeping of houses ? another over ears of corn ? another over the husks of grain ? and another over the knots of straw and grass, and the like ? And the case is the very same for those other noble gods of theirs (as they call them), the consentes and selecti ; since there can be no reason given, why those should, all of them, be so many substantial and eternal spirits self-existent or unmade, if none of the other were such. Wherefore, if these be not all so many several substantial and eternal minds, so many self-existing and independent deities, then must they, of necessity, be either several partial considerations of the Deity, viz. the several manifestations of the Divine Power and Providence personated, or else inferior ministers of the same. And thus have we already showed, that the more high-flown and Platonic Pagans (as Julian, Apuleius, and others) understood these consentes and select gods, and all the other invisible ones, to be really nothing else but the ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the Divine Intellect) ; that is, indeed, but partial considerations of the Deity, as virtually and exemplarily containing all things : whilst others of them, going in a more plain and easy way, concluded

these gods of theirs to be all of them but several names and notions of the one supreme Deity, according to the various manifestations of its power in the world ; as Seneca[1] expressly affirmeth, not only concerning Fate, Nature, and Fortune, etc. but also Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury (before mentioned by him), that they were "omnia ejusdem Dei nomina, varie utentis sua potestate," all names of one and the same God, as diversely using his power ;—Zeno in Laertius[2] concludes and as of all the rest : or else (which amounts to the same thing), that they were the several powers and virtues of one God fictitiously personated and deified ; as the Pagans in Eusebius apologize for themselves, that they did [3]*θεοποιεῖν τὰς ἀοράτους δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν*, deify nothing but the invisible powers of that God, which is over all.—Nevertheless, because those several powers of the supreme God were not supposed to be all executed immediately by himself, but by certain other *ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις*, subservient ministers under him, appointed to preside over the several things of nature, parts of the world, and affairs of mankind (commonly called demons) ; therefore were those gods sometimes taken also for such subservient spirits or demons collectively ; as perhaps in this of Epictetus : [4]*Πότε ὁ ζέφυρος πνεύσει ; ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ· σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ταμίαν τῶν ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἴολον·* When will Zephyrus, or the west wind, blow ? When it seemeth good to himself or to Æolus ; for God hath not made thee steward of the winds, but Æolus.

But for the fuller clearing of the whole Pagan theology, and especially this one point thereof, that their *Πολυθεία* was in great part nothing else but *Πολυωνυμία*, their Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods — nothing but the polyonomy of one god, or his being called by many personal proper names, two things are here requisite to be further taken notice of ; first, that, according to the Pagan theology, God was conceived to be diffused throughout the whole world, to permeate and pervade all things, to exist in all things, and intimately to act all things, Thus we observed before out of Horus Apollo,[5] that the Egyptian theologers conceived of God, as *τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκον πνεῦμα*, a spirit pervading the whole world ;—as likewise they concluded [6]*δίχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι*, that nothing at all consisted without God. — Which same theology was universally entertained also amongst the

[1] De Beneficiis, lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 427, 428.

[2] Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

[3] Pr. Ev. l. iii. c. xiii. p. 121.

[4] L. i. c. i. p. 85. [apud Arrian.]

[5] Hieroglyph. lib. i. cap. lxiv. p. 77.

[6] Ibid. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 29.

Greeks. For thus Diogenes the Cynic, in Laertius,[1] *αὐτοῦ πάντα πλήρη*, all things are full of him.—And Aristotle, or the writer De Plantis, makes God not only to comprehend the whole world, but also to be an inward principle of life in animals; [2]*τίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ζώου; τί ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ τὸ εὔγενες ζῶον, ὃ τὸν οὐρανὸν περιοδεύει, τὸν ἥλιον, τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ τοὺς πλανήτας.* What is the principle in the life or soul of animals? Certainly no other than that noble animal (or living being) that encompasses and surrounds the whole heaven, the sun, the stars, and the planets.—Sextus Empiricus thus represents the sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italic philosophers; [3]*μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναί τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων· ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς κόσμου διῆκον, ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἑνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα·* That we men have not only a conjunction amongst ourselves with one another, but also with the gods above us, and with brute animals below us; because there is but one spirit, which, like a soul, pervades the whole world, and unites all the parts thereof together.—Clemens Alexandrinus writeth thus of the Stoics, [4]*διὰ πάσης ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγουσι;* they affirm, that God doth pervade all the matter of the universe, and even the most vile parts thereof—which that father seems to dislike; as also did Tertullian,[5] when he represented their doctrine thus; "Stoici volunt Deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per favos;" the Stoics will have God so to run through the matter, as the honey doth the combs. Strabo testifies of the ancient Indian Brachmans, [6]*περὶ πολλῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁμοδοξεῖν, ὅτι γὰρ γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς λέγειν κἀκείνους, ὅτε διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν θεὸς, δι' ὅλου διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτοῦ·* That in many things they philosophized after the Greekish manner, as when they affirm, that the world had a beginning, and that it would be corrupted, and that the maker governor thereof pervades the whole of it.—The Latins also fully agreed with the Greeks in this; for though Seneca somewhere[7] propounds this question, "Utrum extrinsecus operi suo circumfusus sit Deus, an toti inditus?" Whether God be only extrinsically circumfused about his work, the world, or inwardly insinuating do pervade it all? yet himself else-

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1 Lib. vi. segm. 37. p. 333.

2 Lib. i. cap. i. [tom. iv. oper. Arist. p. 492.]

3 Adv. Mathem. p. 331. [lib. i. Advers. Physic. § 127. p. 580.]

4 Protrept. p. 44. [cap. v. p. 58. tom. i. oper.]

5 Advers. Hermogen. cap. xliv. p. 149.

6 Lib. xv. p. 730.

7 De Otio Sapientis, cap. xxxi. p. 347. tom. i. oper.

where[1] answers it, when he calls God "Divinum spiritum per omnia, maxima, ac minima, æquali intentione diffusum:" a Divine spirit, diffused through all things, whether the smallest or greatest, with equal intention. God, in Quintilian's theology,[2] is "spiritus omnibus partibus immistus;" and "Ille fusus per omnes rerum naturæ partes spiritus," a spirit which insinuates itself into, and is mingled with, all the parts of the world; and that spirit which is diffused through all the parts of nature. Apuleius[3] likewise affirmeth "Deum omnia permeare," that God doth permeate all things; and that "nulla res est tam præstantibus viribus, quæ viduata Dei auxilio, sui natura contenta sit;" there is nothing so excellent or powerful, as that it could be content with its own nature alone, void of the Divine aid or influence. And again, "Dei præstantiam, non jam cogitatio sola, sed oculi, et aures, et sensibilis substantia comprehendit;" that God is not only present to our cogitation, but also to our very eyes and ears, in all these sensible things.—Servius, agreeably with this doctrine of the ancient Pagans, determineth, that "nulla pars elementi sine Deo est," that there is no part of the elements devoid of god.—And that the poets fully closed with the same theology, is evident from those known passages of theirs, "Jovis omnia plena,"[4] and *μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαὶ*,[5] etc. i. e. "All the things of nature, and parts of the world, are full of God:"[6]—as also from this of Virgil:

——————Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.

Lastly, We shall observe, that both Plato and Anaxagoras, who neither of them confounded God with the world, but kept them both distinct, and affirmed God to be *οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον*,[7] unmingled with any thing;—nevertheless concluded, *αὐτὸν πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα*, that he did order and govern all things passing through and pervading all things;—which is the very same with that doctrine of Christian theologers,[8] *τὸν θεὸν διὰ πάντων ἀμιγῶς διήκειν*, that God permeates and passes through all things, unmixedly.—Which Plato al-

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[1] De Consol. ad Helveiam. cap. viii. p. 106.

[2] Instit. Orator. lib. vii. cap. iii. p. 412.

[3] De Mundo, p. 68. edit. Elmenhorstii.

[4] Virgil. Eclog. iii.

[5] Arati Phænomen. apud Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 708.

[6] Virg. Georg. lib. iv. (ver. 222.)

[7] Cratyl. p. 413.

[8] Joh. Damascen. de orthodoxa fide, lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 149. tom. i. oper. edit. Lequien.

so there in his Cratylus, plainly making *δίκαιον* to be a name for God, etymologizeth it from *διὰ ἰὸν*, i. e. passing through all things, and thereupon gives us the best account of Heraclitus's theosophy, that is any where extant (if not rather a fragment of Heraclitus's own) in these words; *ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν· διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναί τι διεξιὸν, δι᾽ οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον, οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἰέναι παντὸς, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαϊὸν, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας ἕνεκα, τὴν τοῦ κ δύναμιν προσλαβόν·* They who affirm the universe to be in constant motion, suppose a great part thereof to do nothing else but move and change; but that there is something, which passes through and pervades this whole universe, by which all those things that are made, are made; and this is both the most swift and the most subtile thing; for it could not otherwise pass through all things, were it not so subtile, that nothing could keep it out or hinder it; and it must be most swift, that it may use all things, as if they stood still, that so nothing might escape it. Since therefore this doth preside over, and order all things, permeating and passing through them, it is called *δίκαιον*, quasi *διαϊὸν;* the letter kappa being only taken in for the more handsome pronunciation.—Here we have therefore Heraclitus's description of God, namely this; *τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ τὸ τάχιστον, διὰ παντός διεξιὸν, δι᾽ οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται,* that most subtile and most swift substance, which permeates and passes through the whole universe, by which all things that are made, are made.—Now, saith Plato, some of these Heraclitics say, that this is fire, others, that it is heat; but he, deriding both these conceits, concludes with Anaxagoras, that it is a perfect mind, unmixed with any thing; which yet permeating and passing through all things, frames, orders, and disposes all.

Wherefore this being the universally received doctrine of the Pagans, that God was a spirit or substance diffused through the whole world, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if they called him, in several parts of the world and things of nature, by several names; or, to use Cicero's language,[1] no wonder, if "Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus," etc. if God, pervading the nature of every thing, were in the earth called Ceres, in the sea Neptune, in the air Juno, etc.—And

[1] De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2996. oper.

this very account does Paulus Orosius (in his historic work against the Pagans dedicated to St. Austin) give of the original of the Pagan Polytheism; [1] "Quidam, dum in multis Deum credunt, multos Deos, indiscreto timore, finxerunt;" that some, whilst they believe God to be in many things, have therefore, out of an indiscreet fear, feigned many gods:—in which words he intimates, that the Pagans' many gods were really but several names of one God as existing in many things, or in the several parts of the world, as the same ocean is called by several names, as beating upon several shores.

Secondly, the Pagan theology went sometimes yet a strain higher, they not only thus supposing God to pervade the whole world, and to be diffused through all things (which as yet keeps up some difference and distinction betwixt God and the world), but also himself to be in a manner all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology, from whence the theologies of other nations were derived, ran so high as this, is evident from that excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity, the Saitic inscription often mentioned, "I am all that was, is, and shall be." And the Trismegistic books insisting so much every where upon this notion that God is all things (as hath been observed) renders it the more probable, that they were not all counterfeit and supposititious; but that, according to the testimony of Jamblichus, they did at least contain δόξας Ἑρμαϊκάς, some of the old Theutical or Hermaical philosophy in them. And from Egypt, in all probability, was this doctrine by Orpheus derived into Greece, the Orphic verses themselves running much upon this strain, and the Orphic theology being thus epitomized by Timotheus, the chronographer; "That all things were made by God, and that himself is all things." To this purpose is that of Æschylus,

[2] *Ζεύς ἐστιν αἰθὴρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ᾽ οὐρανός·*
Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα, χῷ τι τῶν δ᾽ ἔθ᾽ ὑπέρτερον·

Et terra, et æther, et poli arx est Jupiter,
Et cuncta solus, et aliquid sublimius.

And again,

[3] *———Ποτὲ μὲν ὡς πῦρ φαίνεται*
Ἄπλαστον ὁρμῇ· ποτὲ δ᾽ ὕδωρ, ποτὲ δὲ γνόφος·
Καὶ θηρσὶν αὐτὸς γίνεται παρεμφερής,
Ἀνέμῳ, νέφει τε, κἀστραπῇ βροντῇ, βροχῇ·

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[1] Lib. vi. cap. i. (p. 416.) [2] Grot. Exc. p. 57. [3] Ib. p. 53.

——————Nunc ut implacabilis
Apparet ignis: nunc tenebris, nunc aquæ
Par ille cerni: simulat interdum feram,
Tonitrua, ventos, fulmina, et nubila.

As also this of Lucan, amongst the Latins,

——————Superos quid quærimus ultra?
Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris.[1]

Whereunto agree also these passages of Seneca the philosopher,[2] "Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non vides, totum." And [3]" Sic solus est omnia; opus suum et extra et intra tenet?" What is God? he is all that you see, and all that you do not see. And he alone is all things, he containing his own work not only without, but also within.—Neither was this the doctrine only of those Pagans, who held God to be the soul of the world, and consequently the whole animated world to be the supreme Deity, but of those others also, who conceived of God as an abstract mind, superior to the mundane soul, or rather as a simple monad, superior to mind also; as those philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, who described God to be one and all things, they supposing, that, because all things were from him, they must needs have been first in a manner in him, and himself all things. With which agreeth the author of the Asclepian Dialogue, when he maketh Unus omnia, and Creator omnium, One all things and the Creator of all things, to be but equivalent expressions; and when he affirmeth, that before things were made, "in eo jam tunc erant, unde nasci habuerunt;" they then existed in him from whom afterwards they proceeded. —So likewise the other Trismegistic books, when they give this account of God's being both all things that are, and all things that are not, *τὰ μέν γὰρ ὄντα ἐφανέρωσε, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, because those things, that are, he hath manifested from himself, and those things, that are not, he still containeth within himself;—or, as it is elsewhere expressed, he doth *κρύπτειν*, hide them and conceal them in himself. And Orphic verses gave this same account likewise of God's being all things, *Πάντα τάδε κρύψας*, etc. because he first concealed and hid them all within himself before they were made, and thence afterward from himself displayed them, and brought them forth into light: or because

[1] Lib. ix. v. 580.

[2] Natural. Quæst. lib. i. Præfat. p. 485. tom. i. oper.

[3] De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 247.

———*Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνι γαστέρι σύῤῥα πεφύκει.*

before they were produced, they were all contained together in the womb of God.

Now this was not only a further ground of that seeming Polytheism amongst the Pagans, which was really nothing but the polyonymy of one God, and their personating his several powers; but also of another more strange and puzzling phenomenon in their theology, namely, their personating also the parts of the world inanimate, and things of nature, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. It was before observed out of Moschopulus, that the Pagans did *ἑνὶ ὀνόματι τότε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τούτῳ θεὸν ὀνομάζειν,*[1] call the things in nature and the gods, which presided over them, by one and the same name.—As for example, they did not only call the god, which presideth over those arts that operate by fire, Hephæstus or Vulcan, but also fire itself: and Demeter or Ceres was not only taken by them for that god, who was supposed to give corn and fruits, but also for corn itself. So Dionysus or Bacchus did not only signify the god that giveth wine, but also wine itself. And he instancing further[2] in Venus, and Minerva, and the Muses, concludes the same universally of all the rest. Thus Arnobius, in his book against Pagans, "in usu sermonis vestri, Martem pro pugna appellatis, pro aqua Neptunum, Liberum Patrem pro vino, Cererem pro pane, Minervam pro stamine, pro obscœnus libidinis Venerem." Now we will not deny, but that this was sometimes done metonymically, the efficient cause and the ruling or governing principle, being put for the effect, or that which was ruled and governed by it. And thus was war frequently styled Mars; and that of Terence may be taken also in this sense,[3] "Sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus." And Plutarch (who declares his great dislike of this kind of language) conceives, that there was no more at first in it than this; *ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τὸν ὠνούμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος, ὠνεῖσθαί φαμεν Πλάτωνα, καὶ Μένανδρος τὸν ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὰ Μενάνδρου ποιήματα ὑποτιθέμενον, οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι, τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι τὰ τῶν θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ποιήματα καλεῖν οὐκ ἐφείδοντο, τιμῶντες ὑπὸ χρείας καὶ σεμνύνοντες·* As we, when one buys the books of Plato, commonly say that he buys Plato; and when one acts the plays of Menander, that he acts Menander; so did the ancients not spare to call the gifts and effects of the gods, by the names of those gods respectively, thereby honoring them also for their utility. —But he grants, that afterward this language was by ignorant persons

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[1] Page 229. [2] Lib. v. (p. 236.) [3] De Iside et Osir. p. 379.

abused, and carried on further, and that not without great impiety; *οἱ δὲ ὕστεροι ἀπαιδεύτως δεχόμενοι καὶ ἀμαθῶς ἠναστρέφοντες, ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ πάθη τῶν καὶ τὰς παρουσίος τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀποκρύψεις, θεῶν γενέσεις καὶ φθορὰς, οὐ προσαγορεύοντες μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομίζοντες, ἀτόπων καὶ τεταραγμένων δοξῶν αὐτοὺς ἐνέπλησαν·* Their followers mistaking them, and thereupon ignorantly attributing the passions of fruits (their appearances and occultations) to the gods themselves, that preside over them, and so not only calling them, but also thinking them to be the generations and corruptions of the gods, have by this means filled themselves with absurd and wicked opinions.—Where Plutarch well condemns the vulgar both amongst the Egyptians and Greeks, for that, in their mournful solemnities, they sottishly attributed to the gods the passions belonging to the fruits of the earth, thereby indeed making them to be gods. Nevertheless the inanimate parts of the world, and things of nature, were frequently deified by the Pagans, not only thus metonymically, but also in a further sense, as Cicero plainly declares; "Tum illud, quod erat a Deo natum, nomine ipsius Dei[2] nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Cererem appellamus, vinum autem Liberum: tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest major, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa res nominetur Deus." Both that which proceeds from God, is called by the name of a god, as corn is sometimes thus called Ceres, and wine Liber; and also whatsoever hath any greater force in it, that thing itself is often called a god too. Philo also thus represents the religion of the Pagans, as first deifying corporeal inanimate things, and then bestowing those proper personal names upon them: [3]*ἐκτεθειώκασι γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας ἀρχὰς, γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ· οἱ δ' ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας, καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας· οἱ δὲ μόνον τὸν οὐρανὸν, οἱ δὲ σύμπαντα κόσμον· τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρεσβύτατον, τὸν γενητὴν, τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως, τὸν στρατιάρχην τῆς ἀηττήτου στρατιᾶς, τὸν κυβερνήτην ὃς οἰκονομεῖ σωτηρίως ἀεὶ ἅπαντα, παρεκαλύψαντο, ψευδωνύμους προσρήσεις ἐκείνοις ἐπιφημίσαντες, ἑτέρας ἕτεροι· καλοῦσι γὰρ τὴν γῆν Κόρην, Δήμητρα, Πλούτωνα· τὴν δὲ θάλασσαν Ποσειδῶνα, δαίμονας ἐναλίους ὑπάρχους αὐτῷ προσαναπλάττοντες*, etc. *Ἥραν δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ τὸ πῦρ Ἥραν δὲ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον, καὶ ἥλιον Ἀπόλλωνα, καὶ σελήνην Ἄρτεμιν*, etc. Some have deified the four elements, the earth, the water, the air and the fire, some the sun and the moon, and the planets and fixed stars: others the heaven, others the whole world. But that highest and most ancient Being, the parent of all things, the chief prince of this great city, and the emperor of this invincible army, who governeth all things salutifer-

[1] Ibid. [2] De N. D. l. ii. p. 222. (cap. xxiii. p. 2987.
[3] De Decal. p. 751, 752.

ously, him have they covered, concealed, and obscured, by bestowing counterfeit personal names of gods upon each of these things. For the earth they called Proserpina, Pluto, and Ceres; the sea Neptune, under whom they place many demons and nymphs also as his inferior ministers; the air Juno; the fire Vulcan; the sun Apollo; the moon Diana, etc. and dissecting the heaven into two hemispheres, one above the earth, the other under it, they call these the Dioscuri, feigning them to live alternately one one day, and the other another.—We deny not here but that the four elements, as well as the sun, moon, and stars, were supposed by some of the Pagans to be animated with particular souls of their own, (which Ammianus Marcellinus[1] seems principally to call "spiritus elementorum," the spirit of the elements—worshipped by Julian) and upon that account to be so many inferior gods themselves. Notwithstanding which, that the inanimate parts of these were also deified by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence; because Plato, who in his Cratylus etymologizeth Dionysius from giving of wine, and elsewhere calls the fruits of the earth[2] *τὰ Δήμητρος δῶρα*, the gifts of Ceres—doth himself nevertheless, in compliance with this vulgar speech, call wine and water as mingled together in a glass (or cup) to be drunk, gods: where he affirmeth, that a city ought to be [3]*δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, τολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβῶν, ἀγαθὸν πόμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται*, so tempered, as in a cup, where the furious wine poured out bubbles and sparkles, but being corrected by another sober god, (that is, by water) both together make a good and moderate portion.—Cicero also tells us, that before the Roman admirals went to sea, they were wont to offer up a sacrifice to the waves. But of this more afterward. However, it is certain, that mere accidents and affections of things in nature were by these Pagans commonly personated and deified; as Time, in Sophocles' Electra,[4] is a god; *Χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρὴς Θεός*, for time is an easy god—and Love, in Plato's Symposium, where it is wondered at, that no poet had ever made a hymn *τῷ Ἔρωτι τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ*, to Love, being such and so great a god.—Though the same Plato, in his Philebus, when Protarchus had called Pleasure a goddess too, was not willing to comply so far there with vulgar speech; *τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου· καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον·* My fear, O Protarchus,

[1] Vide lib. xxi. cap. i. p. 263. [2] De Leg. p. 788.
[3] De Leg. l. vi. [4] Ex. Stobæo apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. veter. Comicor. et Tragic. p. 66.

concerning the names of the gods is extraordinary great: wherefore, as to Venus, I am willing to call her what she pleases to be called; but Pleasure, I know, is a various and multiform thing.—Wherefore it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did in some sense or other deify or theologize all the parts of the world, and things of nature. Which we conceive to have been done at first upon no other ground than this, because God was supposed by them, not only to permeate and pervade all things, to be diffused through all, and to act in and upon all, but also to be himself in a manner all things; which they expressed after this way, by personating the things of nature severally, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Only we shall here observe, that this was done especially (besides the greater parts of the world) to two sorts of things; first, such in which human utility was most concerned: thus Cicero,[1] "Multæ aliæ naturæ deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum, non sine causa, et a Græciæ sapientibus, et a majoribus nostris, constitutæ nominatæque sunt:" Many other natures of gods have been constituted and nominated, both by the wise men of Greece, and by our ancestors, merely for the great benefits received from them.—The reason whereof is thus given by him; "Quia quicquid magnam utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur:" Because they thought, that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, this was not without the Divine goodness.—Secondly, such as were most wonderful and extraordinary, or surprising; to which that of Seneca seems pertinent, "Magnorum fluminum capita veneramur;[2] subita et ex abdito vasti amnis eruptio aras habet; coluntur aquarum calentium fontes; et stagna quædam vel opacitas vel immensa altitudo sacravit." We adore the rising heads and springs of great rivers; every sudden and plentiful eruption of waters out of the hidden caverns of the earth hath its altars erected to it; and some pools have been made sacred for their immense profundity and opacity.

Now this is that, which is properly called the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying (in a certain sense) the things of nature, whether inanimate substances, or the affections of substances. A great part of which physiological theology was allegorically contained in the poetic fables of the gods. Eusebius, indeed, was of opinion, that those poetic fables were at first only historical and herological, but that afterwards some went about to allegorize them into physiological senses, thereby to make them seem the less impious and

[1] N. D. l. ii. p. 222.

[2] Ep. 41. (p. 101. tom. ii. oper.)

ridiculous: [1]τοιαύτη ἦν τὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς θεολογίας, ἣν μεταβαλόντες νέοι τινὲς, χθὲς καὶ πρώην ἐπιφυέντες, λογικώτερόν τε φιλοσοφεῖν αὐχοῦντες, τὴν δὲ φυσικωτέραν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἱστορίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσαντο, σεμνοτέρας τοῖς μύθοις προσεπινοήσαντες, etc. θεραπεῦσαι δὲ οὖν ὅμως οἷδε τὶ πατρικὸν εὑρεσιολογίας ἁμάρτημα προθυμηθέντες, ἐπὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις καὶ θεωρίας τοὺς μύθους μετεσκευάσαντο· Such was the ancient theology of the Pagans (namely, historical, of men deceased, that were worshipped for gods) which some late upstarts have altered, devising other philosophical and physiological senses of those histories of their gods, that they might thereby render them the more specious, and hide the impiety of them. For they being neither willing to abandon those fopperies of their forefathers, nor yet themselves able to bear the impiety of these fables (concerning the gods) according to the literal sense of them have gone about to cure them thus by physiological interpretations.—Neither can it be doubted, but that there was some mixture of herology and history in the poetic mythology; nor denied, that the Pagans of latter times, such as Porphyrius and others, did excogitate and devise certain new allegorical senses of their own, such as never were intended; Origen, before both him and [2] Porphyry, noting this of the Pagans, that when the absurdity of their fables concerning the gods was objected and urged against them, some of them did περὶ τούτων ἀπολογούμενοι ἐπ' ἀλληγορίας καταφεύγειν, apologizing for these things, betake themselves to allegories.—But long before the times of Christianity, those first Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were famous for the great pains which they took in allegorizing these poetic fables of the gods. Of which Cotta in Cicero[3] thus; "Magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno, post Cleanthes, deinde Chrysippus, commentitiarum fabularum reddere rationem, et vocabulorum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit, causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profecto confitemini, longe aliter rem se habere atque hominum opinio sit; eos, qui Dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras Deorum." Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chrysippus, took a great deal more pains than was needful, to give a reason of all those commentatious fables of the gods, and of the names that every thing was called by. By doing which they confessed, that the matter was far otherwise than according to men's opinion, inasmuch as they, who are called gods in them, were nothing but the nature of things. From whence it is plain, that, in the poetic theology, the Stoics took it for granted, that the natures of things were

[1] Pr. Ev. l. iii. c. vi. (lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 73.)

[2] l. iii. c. Cels. p. 123.

[3] De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxiv. p. 3089. tom. ix. oper.

personated and deified, and that those gods were not animal, nor indeed philosophical, but fictitious, and nothing but the things of nature allegorized. Origen also gives us a taste of Chryippus's thus allegorizing, in the interpreting[1] an obscene picture or table of Jupiter and Juno, in Samos; *λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασιν ὁ σεμνὸς φιλόσοφος, ὅτι τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ὕλη παραδεξαμένη, ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ, εἰς κατακόσμησιν τῶν ὅλων· ὕλη γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Σάμον γραφῇ, ἡ Ἥρα καὶ ὁ θεὸς ὁ Ζεύς.* This grave philosopher, in his writings, saith, that matter having received the spermatic reasons of God, containeth them within itself for the adorning of the whole world; and that Juno, in this picture in Samos, signifies Matter, and Jupiter God.—Upon which occasion that pious father adds, *καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους καὶ ἄλλους μυρίους, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος θέλομεν Δία καλεῖν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, ἀλλὰ καθαρὰν εὐσέβειαν εἰς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀσκοῦντες, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος χραίνομεν τὰ θεῖα·* For the sake of which, and innumerable other such-like fables, we will never endure to call the God over all by the name of Jupiter, but, exercising pure piety towards the Maker of the world, will take care not to defile Divine things with impure names.—And here we see again, according to Chrysippus's interpretation, that Hera or Juno was no animal nor real god, but only the nature of matter personated and deified; that is, a mere fictitious and poetic god. And we think it is unquestionably evident from Hesiod's Theogonia, that many of these poetic fables, according to their first intention, were really nothing else but physiology allegorized; and consequently those gods nothing but the natures of things personated and deified. Plato himself, though no friend to these poetic fables, plainly intimates as much, in his second De Rep.[2] *καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις, πεποιημένας οὔτ' ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν· ὁ γὰρ νέος, οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅ, τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή.* The fightings of the gods, and such other things, as Homer hath feigned concerning them, ought not to be admitted into our commonwealth, whether they be delivered in way of allegory, or without allegories; because young men are not able to judge when it is an allegory, and when not.—And it appears from Dionysius Halicarnass. that this was the general opinion concerning the Greekish fables, that some of them were physically, and some tropologically allegorical:[3] *μηδεὶς ὑπολάβοι με ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μύθων εἰσί τινες ἀνθρώποις χρήσιμοι, οἱ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύμενοι τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα δι' ἀλληγορίας, οἱ δὲ παραμυθίας ἕνεκα συγκείμενοι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων συμφορῶν,* etc. Let no man think me to be ignorant, that some of the Greekish fables are profitable to men, partly as declaring the works of nature by allegories, as being helpful

[1] L. iv. p. 196. [2] P. 378. (p. 430.) [3] L. ii. p. 68.

for human life, etc. Thus also Cicero, [1] "Alia quoque ex ratione, et quidem physica, magna fluxit multitudo Deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni refercerunt."

Eusebius,[2] indeed, seems sometimes to cast it as an imputation upon the whole Pagan theology, that it did *θειάζειν τὴν ἄψυχον οὐσίαν*, deify the inanimate nature—but this is properly to be understood of this part of their theology only, which was physiological, and of their mythology or poetic fables of the gods allegorized; it being otherwise both apparently false, and all one as to make them downright Atheists. For he that acknowledges no animant God, as hath been declared, acknowledges no God at all, according to the true notion of him; whether he derive all things from a fortuitous notion of matter, as Epicurus and Democritus did, or from a plastic and orderly, but senseless nature, as some degenerate Stoics, and Strato the Peripatetic; whose Atheism seems to be thus described by Manilius:[3]

> Aut neque terra patrem novit, nec flamma, nec aër,
> Aut humor, faciuntque Deum per quatuor artus,
> Et mundi struxere globum, prohibentque requiri
> Ultra se quidquam.

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, which consisted only in personating and deifying inanimate substances, and the natures of things, to be confounded (as it hath been by some late writers) with that philosophical theology of Scævola, Varro and others, (which was called natural also, but in another sense, as true and real) it being indeed but a part of the poetical first, and afterward of the political theology, and owing its original much to the fancies of poets, whose humor it was perpetually to personate things and natures. But the philosophic theology, properly so called, which, according to Varro,[4] was that, "de qua multos libros philosophi reliquerunt;" as it admitted none but animal gods, and such as really existed in nature, (which therefore were called natural) namely one supreme, universal Numen, a perfect soul or mind comprehending all, and his *ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις*, other inferior understanding beings his ministers created by him, such as stars and demons, so were all those personated gods, or natures of things, deified in the arcane theology, interpreted agreeably thereunto.

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[1] N. D. l. ii. p. 223. [cap. xxiv. p. 2990.]

[2] Præpar. Evang. lib. iii. cap. i. [3] Astronomic. lib. i. ver. 137.

[4] Apud Augustin. de Civit. Dei. lib. v. cap. v. p. 116. tom. vii. oper.

St. Austin often takes notice of the Pagans thus mingling, and, as it were, incorporating physiology with their theology, he justly condemning the same : as in his forty-ninth epistle ; [1]" Neque illinc excusantimpii sua sacrilega sacra et simulachra, quod eleganter interpretantur quid quæque significent : omnis quippe illa interpretatio ad creaturam refertur, non ad creatorem, cui uni debetur servitus religionis, illa quæ uno nomine Latria Græce appellatur." Neither do the Pagans sufficiently excuse their sacrilegious rites and images from hence, because they elegantly (and ingeniously) interpret, what each of those things signifieth. For this interpretation is referred to the creature, and not to the Creator, to whom alone belongeth religious worship, that which by the Greeks is called Latria.—And again in his book De Civ. D. l. vi. c. viii. " At enim habent ista physiologicas quasdam (sicut aiunt) id est, naturalium rationum interpretationes. Quasi vero nos in hac disputatione physiologiam quæramus, et non theologiam ; id est, rationem naturæ, et non Dei. Quamvis enim qui verus Deus est, non opinione sed natura sit Deus ; non tamen omnis natura Deus est." But the Pagans pretend, that these things have certain physiological interpretations, or according to natural reasons; as if in this disputation we sought for physiology, and not theology, or the reason of nature, and not of God. For although the true God be not in opinion only, but in nature God, yet is not every nature God.—But certainly the first and chief ground of this practice of theirs, thus to theologize physiology, and deify (in one sense or other) all the things of nature, was no other than what has been already intimated, their supposing God to be not only diffused through the whole world, and in all things, but also in a manner all things ; and that therefore he ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature, and parts of the world.

Wherefore these personated gods of the Pagans, or those things of nature deified by them, and called gods and goddesses, were for all that by no means accounted, by the intelligent amongst them, true and proper gods. Thus Cotta in Cicero : [2]" Cum fruges Cererem, vinum Liberum dicimus, genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato : sed ecquem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, Deum esse credat ?" Though it be very common and familiar language amongst us, to call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one to be so mad, as to take that to be really a god, which he feeds upon ? —The Pagans really accounted that only for a god, by the worshipping and invoking whereof they might reasonably expect benefit to them-

[1] Epist. cii. Quæst. iii. § xx. p. 212. tom. ii. oper. edit. Benedictin.

[2] De N. D. l. iii. p. 345. [c. xvi. p. 3071. tom. ix.]

selves, and therefore nothing was truly and properly a god to them, but what was both substantial, and also animant and intellectual. For Plato[1] writes, that the atheistic wits of his time therefore concluded the sun and moon, and stars, not to be gods, because they were nothing but earth and stones (or a certain fiery matter) devoid of all understanding and sense; and for this cause, *οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα*, unable to take notice of any human affairs. — And Aristotle[2] affirmeth concerning the gods in general, *ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα*, etc. that all men conceived them to live, and consequently to act, since they cannot be supposed to sleep perpetually as Endymion did.—The Pagans universally conceived the gods to be happy animals; and Aristotle there concludes the happiness of them all to consist in contemplation. Lucretius himself would not debar men of that language (then vulgarly received amongst the Pagans) of calling the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, wine Bacchus, and the Earth the mother of the gods too, provided that they did not think any of these, for all that, to be truly and really gods:

[3] Hic siquis mare Neptunum, Cereremque vocare
Constituit fruges, et Bacchi nomine abuti
Mavolt, quam laticis proprium proferre vocamen;
Concedamus, ut hic terrarum dictitet orbem
Esse deum matrem, dum non sit re tamen apse.

And the reason, why the earth was not really a goddess, is thus given by him;

Terra quidem vero caret omni tempore sensu.

Because it is constantly devoid of all manner of sense.—Thus Balbus[4] in Cicero tells us, that the first thing included in the notion or idea of a god is this; "Ut sit animans," That it be animant;—or endued with life, sense, and understanding. And he conceiving the stars to be undoubtedly such, therefore concludes them to be gods: "Quoniam tenuissimus est æther, et semper agitatur et viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque sensu acerrimo esse. Quare cum in æthere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intelligentiam. Ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda."

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[1] L. x. de Leg. [p. 665.]

[2] Magn. Moral. lib. v. cap. viii. p. 184. tom. iii. oper.

[3] L. ii. p. 165. [ver. 654. p. 380. ed. Havercamp.]

[4] N. D. l. ii. p. 220.

—Because the ether is most subtile, and in continual agitation, that animal, which is begotten in it, must needs be endued with the quickest and sharpest sense. Wherefore since the stars are begotten in the ether, it is reasonable to think them to have sense and understanding; from whence it follows, that they ought to be reckoned in the number of gods.—And Cotta[1] in the third book affirms, that all men were so far from thinking the stars to be gods, that "multi ne animantes quidem esse concedant," many would not so much as admit them to be animals—plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not possibly be gods. Lastly, Plutarch,[2] for this very reason, absolutely condemns that whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to inanimate things, as absurd, impious, and atheistical; *δεινὰς καὶ ἀθέους ἐμποιοῦσι δόξας, ἀναισθήτοις, καὶ ἀψύχοις, καὶ φθειρομέναις ἀναγκαίως ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων δεομένων καὶ χρωμένων φύσεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ὀνόματα θεῶν ἐπιφέροντες· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῆσαι θεοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεός·* They, who give the names of gods to senseless and inanimate natures and things, and such as are destroyed by men in the use of them, beget most wicked and atheistical opinions in the minds of men; since it cannot be conceived, how these things should be gods, for nothing, that is inanimate, is a god.—And now we have very good reason to conclude, that the distinction or division of Pagan gods (used by some) into animal and natural (by natural being meant inanimate) is utterly to be rejected, if we speak of their true and proper gods; since nothing was such to the Pagans but what had life, sense and understanding. Wherefore those personated gods, that were nothing but the natures of things deified, as such, were but "dii commentitii et fictitii," counterfeit and fictitious god—or, as Origen calls them in that place before cited, *τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα, σωματαποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων*, figments of the Greeks (and other Pagans) that were but things turned into persons and deified.—Neither can there be any other sense made of these personated and deified things of nature, than this, that they were all of them really so many several names of one supreme God, or partial considerations of him, according to the several manifestations of himself in his works. Thus according to the old Egyptian theology before declared, God is said to have both no name, and every name; or, as it is expressed in the Asclepian Dialogue, "Cum non possit uno quamvis e multis composito nomine nuncupari, potius omni nomine vocandus est, siquidem sit unus et omnia; ut necesse sit, aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsium omnium nomine nuncupari." Since he cannot be fully declared by

[1] De N. D. p. 241. D. [2] De Is. et Os. p. 377.

any one name, though compounded of never so many, therefore is he rather to be called by every name, he being both one and all things: so that either every thing must be called by his name, or he by the name of every thing.—With which Egyptian doctrine Seneca[1] seemeth also fully to agree, when he gives this description of God, "Cui nomen omne convenit," He to whom every name belongeth—and when he further declares thus concerning him, "Quæcunque voles illi nomina aptabis;" and, "Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse, quot munera," You may give him whatsoever names you please, etc.—and, There may be as many names of him as there are gifts and effects of his;—and, lastly, when he makes God and nature to be really one and the same thing, and every thing we see to be God. And the writer De Mundo[2] is likewise consonant hereunto, when he affirmeth, that God is *πάσης ἐπώνυμος φύσεως ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὤν*, or, may be denominated from every nature, because he is the cause of all things.—We say, therefore, that the Pagans in this their theologizing of physiology, and deifying the things of nature and parts of the world, did accordingly call every thing by the name God, or God by the name of every thing.

Wherefore these personated and deified things of nature were not themselves properly and directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans (who acknowledged no inanimate thing for a god) so as to terminate their worship ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the supreme God, or else at most in way of complication with him, whose effects and images they are; so that they were not so much themselves worshipped, as God was worshipped in them. For these Pagans professed, that they did [3]*τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ παρέργως, μηδὲ ὥσπερ τὰ βοσκήματα θεωρεῖν*, look upon the heaven (and world) not slightly and superficially; nor as mere brute animals, who take notice of nothing, but those sensible phantasms, which from the objects obtrude themselves upon them—or else, as the same Julian, in that oration, again more fully expresseth it, [4]*τὸν οὐρανὸν οὐχ ὥσπερ ἵππους καὶ βόας ὁρᾷν, ἤτι τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀμαθῶν ζώων· ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φανεροῦ τὴν ἀφανῆ πολυπραγμονεῖν φύσιν·* Not view and contemplate the heaven and world, with the same eyes that oxen and horses do, but so as from that, which is visible to their outward senses, to discern and discover another invisible nature under it.—That is, they professed to behold all things with religious eyes, and to see God in every thing, not only as pervad-

1 De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. vii. p. 427. tom. i. oper.

2 Cap. vii. p. 869. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

3 Julian. Orat. 4. [p. 148.]

4 P. 286.

ing all things, and diffused through all things, but also as being in a manner all things. Wherefore they looked upon the whole world as a sacred thing, and as having a kind of divinity in it; it being, according to their theology, nothing but God himself visibly displayed. And thus was God worshipped by the Pagans, in the whole corporeal world taken all at once together, or in the universe, under the name of Pan. As they also commonly conceived of Zeus and Jupiter, after the same manner; that is, not abstractly only (as we now use to conceive of God) but concretely, together with all that which proceedeth and emaneth from him, that is, the whole world. And as God was thus described in that old Egyptian monument, to be "all that was, is, and shall be;" so was it before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptians took the first God, and the universe, for one and the same thing; not only because they supposed the supreme God virtually to contain all things within himself, but also because they were wont to conceive of him, together with his overflowing, and all the extent of his fecundity, the whole world displayed from him, all at once, as one entire thing. Thus likewise do the Pagans in Plato[1] confound *τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν*, and *ὅλον τὸν κόσμον*, the greatest God, and the whole world together, as being but one and the same thing. And this notion was so familiar with these Pagans, that Strabo[2] himself, writing of Moses, could not conceive of his God, and of the God of the Jews, any otherwise than thus; *τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν*, namely, that which containeth us all, and the earth, and the sea, which we call the heaven and world, and the nature of the whole.—By which, notwithstanding, Strabo did not mean the heaven or world inanimate, and a senseless nature, but an understanding Being, framing the whole world, and containing the same which was conceived together with it: of which therefore he tells us, that, according to Moses, no wise man would go about to make any image or picture, resembling any thing here amongst us. From whence we conclude, that when the same Strabo,[3] writing of the Persians, affirmeth of them, that they did *τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι Δία*, take the heaven for Jupiter; and also Herodotus[4] before him, that they did *κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλεῖν*, call the whole circle of the heaven Jupiter—that is, the supreme God; the meaning of neither of them was, that the body of the heaven inanimate was to them the highest God, but that though he were an understanding nature, yet framing the whole

[1] De Leg. l. vii. p. 821.
[2] L. xvi. p. 761.
[3] Lib. xv. p. 697.
[4] Lib. i. cap. cxxxi. p. 55.

heaven or world, and containing the same, he was at once conceived together with it. Moreover, God was worshipped also by the Pagans, in the several parts of the world, under several names; as, for example, in the higher and lower ether, under those names of Minerva and Jupiter; in the air, under the name of Juno; in the fire, under the name of Vulcan; in the sea, under the name of Neptune, etc. Neither can it be reasonably doubted, but that when the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, they intended therein to worship that God, who acteth in the waves, and whose wonders are in the deep.

But besides this, the Pagans seemed to apprehend a kind of necessity of worshipping God thus, in his works, and in the visible things of this world, because the generality of the vulgar were then unable to frame any notion or conception at all of an invisible Deity: and, therefore, unless they were detained in a way of religion, by such a worship of God as was accommodate and suitable to the lowness of their apprehensions, would unavoidably run into Atheism. Nay, the most philosophical wits amongst them confessing God to be incomprehensible to them, therefore seemed themselves also to stand in need of some sensible props, to lean upon. This very account is given by the Pagans, of their practice, in Eusebius;[1] *ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα Θεὸν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φασὶ*, that God being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading or passing through all things, it was reasonable, that men should worship him, by and through those things that are visible and manifest.—Plato likewise represents this as the opinion of the generality of Pagans in his time, [2]*τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φαμὲν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν, οὔτε πολοπραγμονεῖν, τὰς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι·* That as for the greatest God, and the whole world, men should not busily and curiously search after the knowledge thereof, nor pragmatically inquire into the causes of things, it being not pious for them so to do.—The meaning whereof seems to be no other than this, that men ought to content themselves to worship God in his works, and in this visible world, and not trouble themselves with any further curious speculations concerning the nature of that which is incomprehensible to them. Which though Plato professeth his dislike of, yet does that philosopher himself also plainly allow of worshipping the first invisible God in those visible images, which he hath made of himself, the sun and moon, and stars. Maximus Tyrius[3] doth indeed exhort men to

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[1] Pr. Ev. lib. iii. cap. xiii.

[2] De Leg. lib. vii. p. 821. (p. 640.)

[3] Dissert. i. (p. 12.)

ascend up, in the contemplation of God, above all corporeal things; *τέλος τῆς ὁδοῦ οὐχ ὁ οὐρανὸς, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ σώματα, (καλὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ θεσπέσια, ἅτε ἐκείνου ἔγγονα ἀκριβῆ καὶ γνήσια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡρμοσμένα) ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα ἐλθεῖν δεῖ, καὶ ὑπερκύψαι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον*, etc. The end of your journey (saith he) is not the heaven, nor those shining bodies in the heaven, for though those be beautiful and Divine, and the genuine offspring of that supreme Deity, framed after the best manner, yet ought these all to be transcended by you, and your head lifted up far above the starry heavens, etc.—Nevertheless, he closes his discourse thus: [1]*εἰ δὲ ἐξασθενεῖς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ θέαν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὁρᾷν, καὶ προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἔγγονα, πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ὄντα, οὐχ ὅσα ὁ Βοιώτιος ποιητὴς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ τρισμύριοι μόνον θεοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ' ἄληπτοι ἀριθμῷ· τοῦτο μὲν κατ' οὐρανὸν αἱ ἀστέρων φύσεις*, etc. But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate that father and maker of all things; it will be sufficient for you for the present to behold his works, and to worship his progeny or offspring, which is various and manifold. For there are not only according to the Bœotian poet, thirty thousand gods, all the sons and friends of the supreme God, but innumerable. And such in the heaven are the stars, in the ether demons, etc.—Lastly, Socrates himself also did not only allow of this way of worshipping God, (because himself is invisible) in his works that are visible, but also commend the same to Euthydemus; [2]*ὅτι δὲ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι, τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾷν τοὺς θεούς·* That I speak the truth, yourself shall know, if you will not stay expecting, till you see the forms of the gods themselves, but count it sufficient for you beholding their works to worship and adore them.—Which afterward he particularly applies to the supreme God, who made and containeth the whole world, that being invisible, he hath made himself visible in his works, and consequently was to be worshipped and adored in them. Whether Socrates and Plato, and their genuine followers, would extend this any further than to the animated parts of the world, such as the sun, moon, and stars were to them, we cannot certainly determine. But we think it very probable, that many of those Pagans, who are charged with worshipping inanimate things, and particularly the elements, did notwithstanding direct their worship to the spirit of those elements, as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us Julian did, that is, chiefly the souls of them, all the elements being supposed by many of these

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[1] P. 14, 15. [2] Xenoph. Memor. lib. iv. (p. 633.)

Pagans to be animated, (as was before observed concerning Proclus;[1]) and partly also those demons, which they conceived to inhabit in them, and to preside over the parts of them; upon which account it was said by Plato, and others of the ancients, that πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, all things are full of gods and demons.

XXXIII. But that these physiological gods, that is, the things of nature personified and deified, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper gods, much less independent and self-existent ones, may further appear from hence, because they did not only thus personate and deify things substantial, and inanimate bodies, but also mere accidents and affections of substances. As, for example, first, the passions of the mind; τὰ πάθη θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, ἢ θεοὺς ἐτίμησαν, saith St. Greg. Nazianzen,[2] They accounted the passions of the mind to be gods—or at least worshipped them as gods; that is, built temples or altars to their names. Thus was Hope, not only a goddess to the poet Theognis,[3]

> Ἐλπὶς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μόνη θεὸς ἐσθλή ἔνεστιν,
> Ἄλλοι δ' οὔλυμπόνδ' ἐκπρολιπόντες ἔβαν·

(where he fancifully makes her to be the only Numen, that was left to men in heaven, as if the other gods had all forsaken those mansions and the world; but also had real temples dedicated to her at Rome, as that consecrated by Attilius in the Forum Olitorium, and others elsewhere, wherein she was commonly pictured or feigned, as a woman covered over with a green pall, and holding a cup in her hand.[4] Thus also Love and Desire were gods or goddesses too, as likewise were care, memory, opinion, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, clemency, concord, victory, etc. Which victory was, together with virtue, reckoned up amongst the gods of Plautus in the prologue of his Amphitryo; and not only so, but that there was an altar erected to her also, near the entrance of the senate-house at Rome, which having been once demolished, Symmachus earnestly endeavored the restoration thereof, in the reign of Theodosius; he amongst other things writing thus concerning it,[5] "Nemo colendam neget, quam profitetur optandam;" Let no man deny that right to be worshipped, which he acknowledgeth to be wished for, and to be desirable.—Besides all which,

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[1] P. 236, 237. [2] Orat. xxxiv. tom. i. oper. p. 546.

[3] In Sententiis, ver. 1131, 1132, p. 115.

[4] Vide Vossium. de Idololatr. lib. viii. cap. x. p. 748.

[5] Epistolar. lib. ix. Epist. lxi. p. 441.

Echo was a goddess to these Pagans too, and so was Night (to whom they sacrificed a cock) and Sleep and Death itself, and very many more such affections of things, of which Vossius has collected the largest catalogue, in his eighth book De Theologia Gentili. And this personating and deifying of accidental things was so familiar with these Pagans, that, as St. Chrysostom hath observed, St. Paul was therefore said by some of the vulgar Athenians to have been a setter forth of strange gods, "when he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection," because they supposed him, not only to have made Jesus a God, but also Anastasis or resurrection, a goddess too. Nay, this humor of theologizing the things of nature transported these Pagans so far, as to deify evil things also, that is, things both noxious and vicious. Of the former Pliny thus: [1]"Inferi quoque in genera describuntur, morbique, et multæ etiam pestes, dum esse placatas trepido metu cupimus. Ideoque etiam publice febri fanum in palatio dedicatum est, Orbonæ ad ædem larium ara, et malæ fortunæ Exquiliis." So great is the number of these gods, that even hell, or the state of death itself, diseases and many plagues are numbered amongst them, whilst with a trembling fear we desire to have these pacified. And therefore was there a temple publicly dedicated in the palace to the Fever, as likewise altars were elsewhere erected to Orbona, and to evil fortune.—Of the latter, Balbus in Cicero;[2] "Quo ex genere Cupidinis et Voluptatis, et Lubentinæ Veneris, vocabula consecrata sunt, vitiosarum rerum et non naturalium." Of which kind also are those names of lust, and pleasure, and wanton venery, things vicious, and not natural, consecrated and deified.—Cicero, in his book of Laws,[3] informs us, that at Athens there were temples dedicated also to contumely and impudence, but withal giving us this censure of such practices; [4]"Quæ omnia ejusmodi detestanda et repudianda sunt," All which kind of things are to he detested and rejected, and nothing to be deified, but what is virtuous or good.—Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that such evil things as these were consecrated to no other end, than that they might be deprecated. Moreover, as these things of nature, or natures of things, were sometimes deified by the Pagans plainly and nakedly in their own appellative names, so was this again sometimes done disguisedly, under other counterfeit proper names: as pleasure was deified under the names of

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[1] H. N. lib. ii. cap. vii.

[2] N. D. lib. ii. (cap. xxiii. p. 2988. tom. ix. oper.)

[3] Lib. ii. cap. xi. p. 3354. tom. ix. oper.

[4] Gruter's edition a little otherwise.

Volupia, and of Lubentina Venus; time, (according to the opinion of some) under the name of Kronos or Saturn, which as it produceth all things, so devours all things into itself again; prudence or wisdom likewise, under the names of Athena or Minerva. For it is plain, that Origen[1] understood it thus, when Celsus not only approved of worshipping God Almighty, in the sun, and in Minerva, as that which was lawful, but also commended it as a thing highly pious; he making this reply; εὐφημοῦμεν ἥλιον ὡς καλὸν θεοῦ δημιούργημα, etc. Ἀθηνᾶν μέντοι μετὰ ἡλίου τασσομένην, ἐμυθοποίησαν οἱ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι εἴτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις, εἴτε χωρὶς ἀπονοιῶν, φάσκοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς γεγενῆσθαι κεφαλῆς, καθωπλισμένην, etc. We speak well of the sun, as a good work of God's, etc. but as for that Athena or Minerva, which Celsus here joineth with the sun, this is a thing fabulously devised by the Greeks, (whether according to some mystical, arcane, and allegorical sense, or without it) when they say that she was begotten out of Jupiter's brain all armed. And again afterwards, ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγηται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, If it be granted, that by Athena or Minerva be tropologically meant prudence, etc.—Wherefore, not only according to the poetical, but also to the political and civil theology of the Pagans, these accidental things of nature, and affections of substances, personated, were made so many gods and goddesses; Cicero himself in his book of Laws approving of such political gods as these: [2]"Bene vero, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides, consecratur manu; quarum omnium Romæ dedicata publice templa sunt, ut illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent." It is well, that mind, piety, virtue, and faith, are consecrated, (all which have their temples publicly dedicated at Rome) that so they, who possess these things, (as all good men do) may think, that they have the gods themselves placed in their minds.—And himself makes a law for them in his own commonwealth, but with a cautionary provision, that no evil and vicious thing be consecrated amongst them: "Ast olla, propter quæ datur homini adscensus in cœlum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra sunto. Nec ulla vitiorum solemnia obeunto." Let them also worship those things, by means whereof men ascend up to heaven; and let there be shrines or temples dedicated to them. But let no religious ceremonies be performed to vicious things.

Notwithstanding all which, according to that theology of the Pagans, which was called by Varro natural, (whereby is meant not that which

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[1] C. Cels. lib. viii. p. 421. [2] Lib. ii. (cap. xi. p. 3354.)

was physiological only, but that which is true and real) and by Scævola philosophical; and which is by both opposed, not only to the poetical and fabulous, but also to the political and civil: I say, according to this theology of theirs, these accidental things of nature deified could by no means be acknowledged for true and proper gods; because they were so far from having any life and sense in them, that they had not so much as *ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, any real subsistence or substantial essence of their own. And thus does Origen dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologically interpreted to prudence,[1] *ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγηται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, παραστησάτω τις αὐτῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς ὑφεστηκυίας κατὰ τὴν τροπολογίαν ταύτην·* If Athena or Minerva be tropologized into prudence, then let the Pagans show what substantial essence it hath, or that it really subsists according to this tropology.—Which is all one, as if he should have said, let the Pagans then show, how this can be a god or goddess, which hath not so much as any substantial essence, nor subsists by itself, but is a mere accidental affection of substances only. And the same thing is likewise urged by Origen, concerning other such kind of gods of theirs, as Memory the mother of the muses, and the Graces all naked, in his first book; where Celsus contended for a multiplicity of gods against the Jews; that these things having not *ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, any substantial essence or subsistence, could not possibly be accounted gods, and therefore were nothing else but *Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα σωματοποιηθέντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων*, mere figments of the Greeks, things made to have human bodies, and so personated and deified.—And we think, there cannot be a truer commentary upon this passage of Origen's than these following verses of Prudentius, in his second book against Symmachus;[2]

> Desine, si pudor est, gentilis ineptia, tandem
> Res incorporeas simulatis fingere membris:

Let the Gentiles be at last ashamed, if they have any shame in them, of this, their folly, in describing and setting forth incorporeal things with counterfeit human members.—Where accidents and affections of things, such as victory was, (whose altar Symmachus there contended for the restoration of) are by Prudentius called "res incorporeæ," incorporeal things—accordingly as the Greek philosophers concluded, that *ποιότητες*, were *ἀσώματοι*, qualities incorporeal.—Neither is it possible, that the Pagans themselves should be insensible hereof; and accordingly we find, that Cotta in Cicero doth for this reason utterly banish and ex-

[1] Page 422. [2] Page 285.

plode these gods out of the philosophic and true theology:[1] "Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad hæc refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, spem, virtutem, honorem, victoriam, salutem, concordiam, cæteraque ejusmodi, rerum vim habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobismet insunt ipsis, ut mens, ut spes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia; aut optandæ nobis sunt, ut honos, ut salus, ut victoria. Quare autem in his vis deorum sit, tum intelligam, cum cognovero." Is there any need, think you, of any great subtilty to confute these things? For mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, health, concord, and the like, we see them to have the force of things, but not of gods. Because they either exist in us, as mind, hope, virtue, concord; or else they are desired to happen to us, as honor, health, victory (that is, they are nothing but mere accidents or affections of things,) and therefore how they can have the force of gods in them cannot possibly be understood.—And again, afterwards he affirmeth, "Eos qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum," that those, who, in the allegorical mythology of Pagans, are called gods, are really but the natures of things, and not the true figures or forms of gods.

Wherefore since the Pagans themselves acknowledged, that those personated and deified things of nature were not true and proper gods; the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme God, as manifesting himself in all the things of nature. For that *vis* or force, which Cicero[2] tells us, was that in all these things, which was called God or deified, is really no other, than something of God in every thing that is good. Neither do we otherwise understand those following words of Balbus in Cicero,[3] "Quarum rerum, quia vis erat tanta, ut sine Deo regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit:" Of which things because the force is such, as that it could not be governed without God, therefore have the things themselves obtained the names of gods;—that is, God was acknowledged and worshipped in them all, which was paganically thus signified, by calling of them gods.[4] And Pliny, though no very divine person, yet being ingenious, easily understood this to be the meaning of it; "Fragilis et laboriosa mortalitas in partes ista digessit, infirmitatis suæ memor, ut portionibus quisque coleret, quo maxime indigeret;" frail and toilsome mortality has thus

[1] N. D. l. iii. (cap. xxiv. p. 3088.)

[2] De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxiii. p. 2988. tom. ix. oper.

[3] N. D. l. ii. (cap. xxiii. p. 2988.)

[4] Nat. H. l. ii. c. vii.

broken and crumbled the Deity into parts, mindful of its own infirmity; that so every one, by parcels and pieces, might worship that in God, which himself most stands in need of.—Which religion of the Pagans, thus worshipping God, not entirely all together at once, as he is one most simple Being, unmixt with any thing, but as it were brokenly, and by piece-meals, as he is severally manifested in all the things of nature, and the parts of the world, Prudentius thus perstringeth in his second book against Symmachus;

> Tu, me præterito, meditaris numina mille,
> Quæ simules parere meis virtutibus, ut me
> Per varias partes minuas, cui nulla recidi
> Pars aut forma potest, quia sum substantia simplex,
> Nec pars esse queo.

From which words of his we may also conclude, that Symmachus, the Pagan, who determined, that it was one thing, that all worshipped, and yet would have victory, and such-like other things, worshipped as gods and goddesses, did by these and all those other Pagan gods beforementioned, understand nothing but so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme Deity, according to its several virtues or powers: so that when he sacrificed to Victory, he sacrificed to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory to kingdoms and commonwealths. It was before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris being mangled[2] and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the same thing, viz. the one simple Deity's being as it were divided (in the fabulous and civil theologies of the Pagans) into many partial considerations of him, as so many nominal and titular gods: which Isis, notwithstanding, that is true knowledge and wisdom, according to the natural or philosophic theology, unites all together into one. And that not only such gods as these, Victory, Virtue, and the like, but also those other gods, Neptune, Mars, Bellona, etc. were all really but one and the same Jupiter, acting severally in the world, Plautus himself seems sufficiently to intimate in the prologue of his Amphitryo in these words;

> Nam quid ego memorem, ut alios in tragœdiis
> Vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriam,

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[1] N. 236. (p. 289.)

[2] That Osiris was the supreme Deity, see the Egyptian inscription, in Theo. Smyrn. Mathem. c. xlvii. *Πρεσβύτατος πάντων βασιλεὺς Οσιρις* Osiris the most ancient king of all things.

Martem, Bellonam, commemorare quæ bona
Vobis fecissent? Queis benefactis meus pater,
Deum regnator, architectus omnibus.

Whereas there was before cited a passage out of G. I. Vossius's book De Theolog. Gent. which we could not understand otherwise than thus, that the generality of the Pagans by their political (or civil) gods, meant so many eternal minds independent and self-existent; we now think ourselves concerned to do Vossius so much right, as to acknowledge, that we have since met with another place of his in that same book, wherein he either corrects the former opinion, or else declares himself better concerning it, after this manner: That the Pagans generally conceived their political gods to be so many substantial minds (or spirits) not independent and self-existent, nor indeed eternal neither, but created by one supreme Mind or God, and appointed by him to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, as his ministers. Which same thing he affirmeth also of those deified accidents and affections, that by them were to be understood so many substantial minds of spirits created, presiding over those several things, or dispensing of them. His words in the beginning of his eighth book,[1] (where he speaks concerning these affections and accidents deified by the Pagans) are as followeth: "Hujusmodi deorum prope immensa est copia. Ac in civili quidem theologia considerari solent, tanquam mentes quædam, hoc honoris a summo Deo sortitæ, ut affectionibus istis præessent. Nempe crediderunt Deum, quem optimum, max. vocabant, non per se omnia curare, quo pacto, ut dicebant, plurimum beatitudini ejus decederet, sed, instar regis, plurimos habere ministros et ministras, quorum singulos huic illive curæ præfecisset. Sic justitia, quæ et Astræa ac Themis, præfecta erat actibus cunctis, in quibus justitia attenderetur; Comus curare creditus est comessationes; et sic in cæteris id genus diis, nomen ab ea affectione sortitis, cujus cura cuique commissa crederetur. Quo pacto si considerentur, non aliter different a spiritibus sive angelis bonis malisque, quam quod hi revera a Deo conditi sint; illæ vero mentes, de quibus nunc loquimur, sint figmentum mentis humanæ, pro numero affectionum, in quibus vis esse major videretur, comminiscentis mentes affectionibus singulis præfectas. Facile autem sacerdotes sua commenta persuadere simplicioribus potuerunt, quia satis videretur verisimile summæ illi menti, deorum omnium regi, innumeras servire mentes, ut eo perfectior sit summi dei beatitudo, minusque curis implicetur; inque tot famulantium numero, summi,

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[1] Page 735.

numinis majestas magis eluceat. Ac talis quidem opinio erat theologiæ civilis." Of such gods as these there was an innumerable company amongst the Pagans. And in their civil theology they were wont to be considered; as certain minds (or spirits) appointed by the supreme God, to preside over the affections of things; they supposing, that God, whom they called the best, and the greatest, did not immediately himself take care of every thing, since that must needs be a distraction to him, and a hinderance of his happiness; but that he had, as a king, many he and she ministers under him, which had their several offices assigned to them. Thus justice, which was called also Astræa and Themis, was by them thought to preside over all those actions, in which justice was concerned; and Comus over all revellings; and the like. Which gods, if considered after this manner, will no otherwise differ from angels, good and bad, than only in this, that these latter are beings really created by God, but the former the figments of men only; they, according to the number of affections, that have any greater force in them, devising and imagining certain minds to preside over each of them. And the vulgar might therefore be the more easily led into this persuasion by their priests, because it seemed reasonable to them, that that supreme Mind, who is the King of all the gods, should have many other minds as his subservient ministers under him, both to free him from solicitous care, and also to add to his grandeur and majesty. And such was the doctrine of the civil theology.—Where, though Vossius speaks particularly of that kind of Pagan gods, which were nothing but affections and accidents deified, (which no man in his wits could possibly suppose to be themselves true and proper gods, they having no subsistence of their own) that these by the generality of the vulgar Pagans were conceived to be so many created minds or spirits, appointed by the supreme God, to preside as his ministers over those several affections of substances; yet does he plainly imply the same of all those other political gods of these Pagans likewise, that they were not looked upon by them, as so many unmade, self-existent, and independent beings, but only as inferior minds or spirits, created by the supreme God, and by him appointed to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and having their several offices assigned to them. Wherefore, as to the main, we and Vossius are now well agreed, *viz.* that the ancient Pagans asserted no such thing as a multitude of independent deities; so that there only remain some particular differences of smaller moment betwixt us.

Ourselves have before observed, that Æolus was probably taken by Epictetus in Arrianus, (not indeed for one, but) for many created min-

isters of the supreme God, or demons collectively, appointed by him to preside over the winds, in all the several parts of the world. And the Pagans in St. Austin seem to interpret those deified accidents, and things of nature, after the same manner, as the names of certain unknown gods or demons, (one or more) that were appointed to preside over them respectively, or to dispense the same.[1] "Quoniam sciebant majores nostri nemini talia, nisi aliquo Deo largiente concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inveniebant, earum rerum nominibus appellabant deos, quas ab iis sentiebant dari; aliqua vocabula inde flectentes; sicut a bello Bellonam nuncupaverunt, non Bellum; sicut a cunis Cuninam, non Cunam; sicut a segetibus Segetiam, non Segetem; sicut a pomis Pomonam, non Pomum; sicut a bobus Bobonam, non Bovem. Aut certe nulla vocabuli declinatione sicut res ipsæ nominantur; ut Pecunia dicta est dea, quæ dat pecuniam, non omnino pecunia dea ipsa putata: Ita virtus, quæ dat virtutem, honor qui honorem, concordia quæ concordiam, victoria quæ victoriam dat. Ita, inquiunt, cum felicitas dea dicitur, non ipsa quæ datur, sed numen illud attenditur, a quo felicitas datur." Because our forefathers knew well, that these things do not happen to any, without the special gift and favor of some god; therefore were those gods, whose names they knew not, called from the names of those very things themselves, which they perceived to be bestowed by them, there being only a little alteration made in them; as when the god, that causeth war, was called not Bellum, but Bellona; the god, which presideth over infants' cradles, not Cuna, but Cunina, that which giveth corn, Segetia; and that which affordeth apples, Pomona, etc. But, at other times, this was done without any declension of the word at all, they calling both the thing, and the god, which is the bestower of it, by one and the self-same name. As Pecunia doth not only signify money, but also the goddess, which giveth money; Virtus, the goddess, which giveth virtue; Honor, the god, that bestoweth honor; Concordia, the goddess, that causeth concord; Victory, the goddess, which affordeth victory. So also when Felicity is called a goddess, by it is not meant that thing, which is given, but that Divine power, from whence it is given.—Here, I say, the Pagans may seem to have understood, by those deified things of nature, certain inferior gods or demons (one or more) the ministers of the supreme God, appointed by him to preside over those several things respectively, or to dispense the same. Neither can we deny, but that in so much ignorance and diversity of opinions, as there was amongst the Pagans, some might

[1] Civ. D. l. iv. c. xxiv. (p. 83. tom. vii. oper.)

possibly understand those political gods, and deified things also, after the way of Vossius, for so many single minds or spirits, appointed to preside over those several things respectively throughout the whole world, and nothing else. Nevertheless, it seemeth not at all probable, that this should be the general opinion amongst the civilized Pagans, that all those gods of theirs were so many single created minds or spirits, each of them appointed to preside over some one certain thing every where throughout the whole world, and nothing else. As, for example, that the goddess Victory was one single created she-spirit, appointed to bestow victory, to whosoever at any time enjoyed it, in all parts of the world ; and so, that the goddess Justice should be such another single mind or spirit, created to dispense justice every where, and meddle with nothing else. And the like of all those other accidental things, or affections deified, as virtue, honor, concord, felicity, etc.

And Lactantius Firmanius,[1] taking notice of that profession of the Pagans, to worship nothing but one supreme God, and his subservient ministers, generated or created by him, (according to that of Seneca in his exhortations, "Genuisse regni sui ministros Deum ;" That the supreme God had generated other inferior ministers of his kingdom under him," which were called by them also gods) plainly denies all the Pagan gods save one, to be the created ministers of that one supreme, he making this reply ; "Verum hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari, aut coli volunt, etc. Nec tamen illi sunt, qui vulgo coluntur, quorum et exiguus et certus est numerus." But these ministers of the Divine kingdom, or subservient created spirits, are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, or honored as such, etc. Nor indeed are they those gods, that are now vulgarly worshipped by the Pagans, of which there is but a small and certain number.—That is, the Pagan gods are reduced into certain ranks, and the number of them is determined by the utilities of human life ; of which their noble and select gods are but a few. Whereas, saith he, the ministers of the supreme God are, according to their own opinion, not twelve nor twenty, nor three hundred and sixty, but innumerable, stars and demons.

Moreover, Aristotle,[2] in his book against Zeno, (supposing the idea of God to be this, the most powerful of all things, or the most perfect Being) objecteth thus, that according to the laws of cities and countries, (that is, the civil theology) there seems to be no one absolutely

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1 De Fal. Rel. c. vii. [Instit. Divin. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 51.]

2 Arist. in Zen. Gor. p. 1246. [cap. iv. p. 841. tom. ii. oper.]

powerful Being, but one god is supposed to be most powerful as to one thing, and another as to another : εἴπερ ἅπαντα ἐπικράτιστον τὸν θεὸν λαμβάνει τοῦτο δυνατώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων, οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ κρείττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί· οὔκουν ἐκ τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἴληφε ταύτην κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν· Whereas Zeno takes it for granted, that men have an idea in their minds of God, as one the most excellent and most powerful Being of all ; this doth not seem to be according to law, (that is, the civil theology) for there the gods are mutually better one than another, respectively as to several things ; and therefore Zeno took not this consent of mankind, concerning God, from that which vulgarly seemeth.—From which passage of Aristotle's we may well conclude, that the many political gods of the Pagans were not all of them vulgarly looked upon as the subservient ministers of one supreme God ; and yet they generally acknowledging, as Aristotle himself confesseth) a monarchy, and consequently not many independent deities, it must needs follow, as Zeno doubtless would reply, that these their political gods were but one and the same supreme natural God, as it were parcelled out, and multiplied : that is, receiving several denominations, according to several notions of him, and as he exerciseth different powers, and produceth various effects. And this we have sufficiently proved already to have been the general sense of the chief Pagan doctors ; that these many political and popular gods were but the polyonomy of one natural God, that is, either partial considerations of him, or his various powers and virtues, effects and manifestations in the world, severally personated and deified.

And thus does Vossius himself afterward confess also, that, according to the natural theology, the many Pagan gods were but so many several denominations of one God ; though this learned philologer doth plainly straiten and confine the notion of this natural theology too much, and improperly call the God thereof the nature of things ; however, acknowledging it such a nature, as was endued with sense and understanding. His words are these : [1]" Dispar vero sententia theologorum naturalium, qui non aliud numen agnoscebant, quam naturam rerum, eoque omnia gentium numina referebant, etc. Nempe mens eorum fuit, sicut natura esset occupata circa hanc vel illam affectionem, ita numina nominaque deorum variare. Cum igitur ubicunque vim aliquam majorem viderent, ita divinum aliquid crederent ; eo etiam devenere, ut immanem deorum dearumque fingerent catervam. Sagaciores interim hæc cuncta, unum esse numen aiebant ; puta rerum naturam, quæ licet una foret, pro variis tamen effectis varia sortiretur nomina, vario

[1] L. viii. c. i.

etiam afficeretur cultu." But the case is very different as to the natural theologers, who acknowledged no other god, but the nature of things, and referred all the Pagan gods to that. For they conceived, that as nature was occupied about several things, so were the Divine powers and the names of gods multiplied and diversified. And whereever they saw any greater force, there did they presently conceit something Divine, and by that means came they at length to feign an innumerable company of gods and goddesses. But the more sagacious in the mean time affirmed all these to be but one and the same God ; to wit, the nature of things, which, though really but one, yet according to its various effects, both received divers names, and was worshipped after different manners.—Where Vossius calls the supreme God of these natural theologers the nature of things, as if the natural theology had been denominated from physics, or natural philosophy only ; whereas we have already showed, that the natural theology of Varro and Scævola, was of equal extent with the philosophic ; whose only Numen, that it was not a blind and unintelligible nature of things, doth sufficiently appear from that history thereof before given by us : as also that it was called natural in another sense, as real, and as opposite to opinion, fancy, and fabulosity, or what hath no reality of existence any where in the world. Thus does St. Austin distinguish betwixt "natura deorum,"[1] the true nature of the gods—and "hominum instituta," the institutes of men concerning them.—As also he sets down the difference betwixt the civil and natural theology, according to the mind of Varro, in this manner : "Fieri potest, ut in urbe, secundum falsas opiniones ea colantur et credantur, quorum in mundo vel extra mundum natura sit nusquam :" It may come to pass, that those things may be worshipped and believed in cities, according to false opinions, which have no nature or real existence any where, either in the world, or without it.—Wherefore, if instead of this nature of things, which was properly the god of none but only of such atheistic philosophers, as Epicurus and Strato, we substitute that great Mind or Soul of the whole world, which pervadeth all things, and is diffused through all (which was the true God of the Pagan Theists) : this of Vossius will be unquestionably true concerning their natural theologers, that, according to them, those many poetical and political gods before mentioned were but one and the same natural or real god ; who, in respect of his different virtues, powers, and effects, was called by several names, and worshipped after different manners ; yet nevertheless so, as that, according to those theologers, there were really also many other inferior

[1] C. D. l. vi. c. v. [p. 116. tom. vii.].

ministers of this one supreme God (whether called minds or demons), that were supposed to be the subservient executioners of all those several powers of his. And accordingly we had before this full and true account of the Pagans' natural theology set down out of Prudentius :[1]

> ——————In uno
> Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
> Virtutum ratio, variis instructa ministris.

viz. That it acknowledged one supreme omnipotent God, ruling over all, who displayeth and exerciseth his manifold virtues and powers in the world (all severally personated and deified in the poetic and civil theologies), together with the subservient ministry of other inferior created minds, understanding beings, or demons, called also by them gods.

It is very true, as we have already declared, that the more high-flown Platonic Pagans did reduce those many poetical and political gods, and therefore doubtless all the personated and deified things of nature too, to the Platonic ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which they affirmed to have been begotten from the supreme Deity, that is, from the first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity ; and which were commonly called by them *νοητοὶ θεοί*, intelligible gods,—as if they had been indeed so many distinct substances and persons. And, as we have also proved out of Philo, that this high-flown Paganic theology was ancienter than either Julian or Apuleius ; so do we think it not unworthy our observation here, that the very same doctrine is, by Celsus, imputed also to the Egyptian theologers, as pretending to worship brute animals no otherwise than as symbols of those eternal ideas : [2]*Καί φησί γε ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν Αἰγυπτίων καταγελᾷν, καὶ τοι πολλὰ καὶ οὐ φαῦλα παρεχόντων αἰνίγματα, ἐπὰν ἰδεῶν ἀϊδίων καὶ οὐχ (ὡς δοκοῦσι οἱ πολλοὶ) ζώων ἐφημερίων τιμὰς εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκωσιν·* Celsus also addeth, that we Christians deride the Egyptians without cause, they having many mysteries in their religion, forasmuch as they profess, that perishing brute animals are not worshipped by them, but the eternal ideas.—According to which of Celsus it should seem, that this doctrine of eternal ideas, as the paradigms and patterns of all things here below in this sensible world, was not proper to Plato, nor the Greeks, but common with them to the Egyptians also. Which eternal ideas, however supposed to have been generated from that first Divine hypostasis of the Platonic and Egyptian trinity, and

[1] In Apotheosi, ver. 191. [2] Orig. c. Cels. l. iii. p. 120.

called intelligible gods, were nevertheless acknowledged by them all to exist in one Divine intellect, according to that of Plotinus,[1] *οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά*, that the intelligibles exist no where of themselves, without Mind or Intellect ;—which Mind or Intellect being the second Divine hypostasis, these intelligible and invisible gods (however generated from God), yet are therefore said by Julian, in his book against the Christians, both to coexist with God, and to inexist in him. To which purpose also is this other passage of Julian's in his sixth oration : [2]*Πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχοι τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας· εἴτε ἀθανάτων ἀθανάτους· εἴτε ἐπικήρων οὐθνητὰς οὐδὲ ἐπικήρους, ἀϊδίους δὲ καὶ μενούσας ἀεὶ, αἳ καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν αἰτίαι τῆς ἀειγενεσίας.* For God is all things, forasmuch as he containeth within himself the causes of all things that any way are ; whether of immortal things immortal ; or of corruptible and perishing things, nor corruptible but eternal also, and always remaining ; which therefore are the causes of their perpetual generation, and new production.—Now these causes of all things contained in God are no other than the Divine ideas. Wherefore, from hence it plainly appears, that these Platonic and Egyptian Pagans, who thus reduced their multiplicity of gods to the Divine ideas, did not therefore make them to be so many minds or spirits, really distinct from the supreme God (though dependent on him too), but indeed only so many partial considerations of one God, as being all things, that is, containing within himself the causes of all things. And accordingly we find in Origen,[3] that, as the Egyptian theologers called their religious animals, symbols of the eternal ideas, so did they also call them symbols of God. *Τὰ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων σεμνολογούντων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, καὶ φασκόντων εἶναί τινα αὐτὰ καὶ Θεοῦ σύμβολα·* Celsus applauds the Egyptian theologers talking so magnificently and mysteriously of those brute animals worshipped by them, and affirming them to be certain symbols of God.

And now we have given some account of the Polyonomy of the one supreme God, in the theologies of the Pagans ; or of his being called by many proper personal names, carrying with them an appearance of so many several gods. First, that God had many several names bestowed upon him, from many different notions and partial considerations of him, according to his universal and all-comprehending nature. Janus, as the beginning of the world, and the first original of the gods.

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[1] Ennead. v. lib. v. p. 519. [2] P. 347.
[3] Orig. c. Cels. p. 102.

Whom therefore that ancient lyric poet, Septimius Apher, accordingly thus invoked ;[1]

> O cate rerum Sator ! O PRINCIPIUM DEORUM !
> Stridula cui limina, cui cardinei tumultus,
> Cui reserata mugiunt aurea claustra mundi :

Genius, as the great mind and soul of the whole world. Saturn, as that hidden source and principle, from which all forms and lives issue forth and into which they again retire ; being there laid up as in their secret storehouse : or else, as one of the Egyptian or Hermaic writers expresseth it, that which doth *πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν*, make all things out of itself, and unmake them into itself again ;—this Hetrurian Saturn, answering to the Egyptian Hammon, that likewise signified hidden, and is accordingly thus interpreted by Jamblichus,[2] *ὁ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων*, he that bringeth forth the secret power of the hidden reasons of things (contained within himself) into light.—God was also called Athena or Minerva, as wisdom diffusing itself through all things : and Aphrodite Urania, the heavenly Venus or Love. Thus Phanes, Orpheus's supreme God (so called according to Lactantius), [3]" Quia cum adhuc nihil esset, primus ex infinito apparuerit ;" because when there was yet nothing, he first appeared out of that infinite abyss ;—but according to Proclus, because he did *ἐκφαίνων τὰς νοητὰς ἑνάδας*, discover and make manifest the intelligible unities (or ideas) from himself ;—though we think the conjecture of Athanasius Kircherus[4] to be more probable than either of these, that Phanes was an Egyptian name) ; this Phanes, I say, was in the Orphic and Egyptian theology, as Proclus upon Plato's Timæus informs us, styled *ἁβρὸς ἔρως*, tender and soft Love.—And Pherecydes Syrus[5] likewise affirmed, *εἰς ἔρωτα μεταβεβλῆσθαι τὸν Δία μέλλοντα δημιουργεῖν*, that Jupiter was turned all into love, when he went about to make the world.—Besides which, there were other such names of the supreme God, and more than have been mentioned by us : as for example, Summanus amongst the ancient Romans, that afterward grew ob-

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1 Apud Terentium Maurum de Litteris, etc. inter Grammaticos veteres a Putschio editos, p. 2396.

2 De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. iii. p. 159.

3 Institut. Divin. lib. i. cap. v. p. 31.

4 In Œdipo Ægyptiaco, p. 498.

5 Apud Proclum. in Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. iii. p. 156.

solete: of which St. Austin[1] thus; "Romani veteres nescio quem Summanum, cui nocturna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis quam Jovem, ad quem diurna fulmina pertinebant. Sed postquam Jovi templum insigne ac sublime constructum est, propter ædis dignitatem, sic ad eum multitudo confluxit, ut vix inveniatur, qui Summani nomen, quod audiri jam non potest, se saltem legisse meminerit. The ancient Romans worshipped I know not what god, whom they call Summanus more than they did Jupiter. But after that a stately and magnificent temple was erected to Jupiter, they all betook themselves thither; insomuch that the name of Summanus, now not at all heard, is scarcely to be found in ancient writings.

Again, as the Pagans had certain other gods, which they called special; so were these but several names of the supreme God also, according to particular considerations of him, either as presiding over certain parts of the world, and acting in them; or as exercising certain special powers and virtues in the world; which several virtues and powers of one God, personated and deified by the Pagans, though they had an appearance also of many distinct gods, yet were they really nothing but several denominations of one supreme God; who as yet is considered as a thing distinct from the world and nature.

But lastly, as God was supposed by these Pagans, not only to pervade all things, and to fill all things, but also, he being the cause of all things, to be himself in a manner all things; so was he called also by the name of every thing, or every thing called by his name: that is, the several things of nature and parts of the world were themselves verbally deified by these Pagans, and called gods and goddesses. Not that they really accounted them such in themselves, but that they thought fit in this manner to acknowledge God in them, as the author of them all. For thus the Pagans in St. Austin: [2]"Usque adeone, inquiunt, majores nostros insipientes fuisse credendum est, ut hæc nescirent munera divina esse, non deos?" Can you think, that our Pagan ancestors were so sottish, as not to know, that these things are but Divine gifts, and not gods themselves?—And Cicero also tells us, that the meaning of their thus deifying these things of nature, was only to signify, that they acknowledged the force of all things to be Divine, and to be governed by God; and that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, was not such without the Divine goodness. They conceiving also, that the invisible and incomprehensible Deity, which was the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all its works and effects, in which it

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[1] C. D. lib. iv. cap. xxiii. (p. 82. tom. vii. oper.) [2] Ubi supra.

had made itself visible, accordingly as they declare in that place of Eusebius before cited in part; [1]*μὴ τὰ ὁρώμενα σώματα ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων μηδέγε τὰ αἰσθητα μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φήσουσι θεοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐν τούτοις ἀοράτους δυνάμεις, αὐτοῦ δη τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἕνα γὰρ ὄντα θεὸν, παντοίαις δυνάμεσι τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν·* that they did not deify those visible bodies of the sun, and moon, and stars, nor the other sensible parts of the world themselves, but those invisible powers of the God over all, that were displayed in them. For they affirm, that that God, who is but one, but yet filleth all things with his various powers, and passes through all things, forasmuch as he is invisibly and incorporeally present in all, is reasonably to be worshipped in and by those visible things.

Athanasius bishop of Alexandria, in his book against the Greeks, reduces all the false gods of the Pagans under two general heads; the first, poetical, fictitious, or fantastical gods; the second, creatures or real things of nature deified by them. His words are these: *Εἰ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς παρὰ ποιηταῖς λεγομένους θεοὺς, οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ὁ λόγος ἔδειξε, καὶ τοὺς τὴν κτίσιν θεοποιοῦντας ἤλεγξε πλανωμένους*, etc. Since this reason or discourse of ours hath sufficiently convinced, both the poetical gods of the Pagans to be no gods at all: and also that they, who deify the creatures, are in a great error; and so hath confuted the whole Pagan idolatry, proving it to be mere ungodliness and impiety; there is nothing now but the true piety left; he, who is worshipped by us Christians, being the only true God, the Lord of nature, and the Maker of all substances.—From whence we may observe, that, according to Athanasius, the Pagan poetic gods were no real things in nature, and therefore they could be no other, than the several notions and the powers of the one supreme God deified, or the several names of him. So that Athanasius's poetic gods, or *οἱ παρὰ ποιητοῖς μυθευόμενοι θεοὶ*, gods fabulously devised by the poets—were chiefly those two kinds of Pagan gods, first mentioned by us; that is, the various considerations of the one supreme Numen, according to its general notion, expressed by so many proper names; and, secondly, his particular powers diffused through the world, severally personated and deified. Which, considered as so many distinct deities, are nothing but mere fiction and fancy, without any reality. And this do the Pagans themselves in Athanasi-

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[1] Pr. Evan. lib. iii. cap. xiii. (p. 121.)

us acknowledge: [1] Ἴσως γὰρ ὡς αὐτοί φασί, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πέπλασται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅλως Ζεύς, οὐδὲ Ἥρα, οὐδὲ Ἄρης· πλάττονται δὲ τούτους, ὡς ὄντας, οἳ ποιηταὶ πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν ἀκουόντων· They say, that the names of those gods are merely fictitious, and that there does no where really exist any such Jupiter, or Saturn, or Juno, or Mars; but that the poets have feigned them to be so many persons existing, to the deception of their auditors.—Notwithstanding which that third sort of Pagan gods also mentioned by us, which were inanimate substances and the natures of things deified, may well be accounted poetical gods likewise; because though those things themselves be real and not feigned, yet is their personation and deification mere fiction and fancy: and however the first occasion thereof sprung from theological opinion or persuasion, that God, who is in all things, and is the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all things, especially he being himself invisible? yet the making of those things themselves therefore to be so many persons and gods, was nothing but poetic fiction and phantastry, according as their old mythology and allegorical fables of the gods run much upon this strain.

XXXIV. Hitherto have we declared the sense of the Pagans in general, those also being included, who supposed God to be a being elevated above the world, that they agreed in these two things: First, the breaking and crumbling, as it were, of the simple Deity, and parcelling out of the same into many particular notions and partial considerations, according to the various manifestations of its power and providence in the world; by the personating and deifying of which severally they made, as it were, so many gods of one. The chief ground whereof was this: because they considered not the Deity according to its simple nature, and abstractly only, but concretely also with the world, as he displayeth himself therein, pervadeth all, and diffuseth his virtues through all. For as the sun, reflected by grosser vapors, is sometimes multiplied, and the same object beheld through a polyedrous glass, by reason of those many superficies, being represented in several places at once, is thereby rendered manifold to the spectator: so one and the same supreme God, considered concretely with the world, as manifesting his several powers and virtues in it, was multiplied into several names, not without the appearance of so many several gods. Whereas πολυώνυμον with those ancient Pagans, was the same thing with πολυδύναμον, that which hath many names, all one with that which hath many powers: according to this of Callimachus[2] concerning Diana,

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[1] P. 14. (tom. i. oper. p. 17.) [2] Hymn. in Dianam, ver. 5, 6.

Δός μοι παρθενίην αἰώνιον, ἄππα, φυλάσσειν,
Καὶ Πολυωνυμίην·

And this of Virgil concerning Alecto,[1]

——————Tibi nomina mille,
Mille nocendi artes.

And accordingly the many Pagan gods are, in Plato's Cratylus, interpreted as the many powers of one God diffused through the world. And the Pagan theologers seemed to conceive this to be more suitable to the pomp, state and grandeur of the supreme God, for him to be considered diffusively, and called by many names, signifying his many several virtues and powers (polyonymy being by them accounted an honor) rather than to be contracted and shrunk all up into one general notion of a perfect mind, the maker or creator of the whole world. The second thing, in which the Pagans agreed, is their personating and deifying also the parts of the world, and things of nature themselves and so making them so many gods and goddesses too. Their meaning therein being declared to be really no other than this; that God, who doth not only pervade all things, but also was the cause of all things, therefore himself is in a manner all things, ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature and parts of the world; as also, that the force of every thing was Divine, and that in all things, that were beneficial to mankind, the Divine goodness ought to be acknowledged.

We shall now observe how both these forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, which were the chief grounds of the seeming Polytheism of the Pagans, were improved and carried on further by those amongst them, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity, than as the soul of the world. Which opinion, that it found entertainment amongst so many of them, probably might be from hence, because it was so obvious for those of them, that were religious to conceive, that as themselves consisted of body and soul, so the body of the whole world was not without its soul neither; and that their human souls were as well derived from the life and soul of the world, as the earth and water in their bodies was from the earth and water of the world. Now whereas the more refined Pagans, as was before observed, suppose God to pervade and pass through all things *ἀμιγῶς*, unmixedly—these concluded God to be (according to that definition of him in Quinctilian, taken in a rigid sense) "Spiritum

[1] Æneid. lib. vii. ver. 324.

omnibus partibus imistum ;" a spirit immingled with all the parts of the world—or else in Manilius's language,

Infusumque Deum cœlo, terrisque, fretoque,

Infused into the heaven, earth, and seas:—" Sacroque meatu conspirare Deum," and intimately to conspire with his own work the world—as being almost one with it. Upon which account he was commonly called Nature also, that being thus defined by some of the Stoics, "Deus mundo permistus;" God mingled throughout with the world;"—and "Divina ratio toti mundo insita," The Divine reason inserted into the whole world.—Which Nature, notwithstanding, in way of distinction from the particular natures of things, was called *κοινὴ φύσις*, and *communis natura*, the common nature. And it was plainly declared by them not to be a senseless nature; according to that of Balbus in Cicero, "Natura est, quæ continet mundum omnem, eumque tuetur; atque ea quidem non sine sensu, atque ratione:" It is nature, by which the whole world is contained and upheld, but this is such a nature, as is not without sense and reason.—As it is elsewhere said to be perfect and eternal Reason, the Divine Mind and Wisdom, containing also under it all the *λόγοι σπερματικοὶ*, the spermatic principles—by which the things of nature (commonly so called) are effected. Wherefore we see that such naturalists as these may well be allowed to be Theists (Moses himself in Strabo being accounted one of them); whereas those that acknowledge no higher principle of the world, than a senseless nature (whether fortuitous, or orderly and methodical), cannot be accounted any other than absolute Atheists. Moreover, this soul of the world was by such of these Pagans as admitted no incorporeal substance, itself concluded to be a body too, but *λεπτότατον καὶ τάχιστον*, a most subtile and most swift body—as was before observed out of Plato (though endued with a perfect mind and understanding, as well as with spermatic reasons,) which insinuating itself into all other bodies, did permeate and pervade the whole universe, and frame all things, inwardly mingling itself with all; Heraclitus and Hippasius thinking this to be fire, and Diogones Apolloniates air; whom Simplicius, who had read some of his then extant works, vindicates from that imputation of Atheism, which Hippo and Anaximander lie under.

Again, whereas the more sublimated Pagans[1] affirmed the supreme God to be all, so that he was nevertheless something above all too, he

[1] As Simplicius describeth God to be *πάντα πρὸ πάντων*, Omnia ante omnia. In Epictet. p. 234.

being above the soul of the world; (and probably Æschylus, in that forecited passage of his, is to be understood after this manner, *Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα καί τι τῶν δ' ὑπέρτερον*, Jupiter is the ether, Jupiter is the earth, Jupiter is the heaven; Jupiter is all things, and yet something higher than all, or above all:—) those Pagans, who acknowledged no higher Numen than the soul of the world, made God to be all things in a grosser sense, they supposing the whole corporeal world animated to be also the supreme Deity. For though God, to them, were principally and originally that eternal unmade soul and mind, which diffuseth itself through all things; yet did they conceive, that as the human soul and body, both together, make up one whole rational animal, or man; so this mundane soul, and its body the world, did in like manner, both together, make up one entire Divine animal, or God.

It is true, indeed, that as the human soul doth principally act in some one part of the body, which therefore hath been called the *hegemonicon* and *principale*, some taking this to be the brain, others the heart, but Strato in Tertullian[1] ridiculously, the place betwixt the eyebrows; so the Stoics did suppose the great Soul or Mind of the world, to act principally in some one part thereof (which what it was notwithstanding they did not all agree upon), as the hegemonicon or principale; and this was sometimes called by them emphatically God. But nevertheless they all acknowledged this mundane soul, as the souls of other animals, to pervade, animate, or enliven and actuate, more or less, its whole body, the world. This is plainly declared by Laertius in the life of Zeno:[2] *Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ ὅλον κόσμον ζῶον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ἢ τὸν οὐρανόν, ἢ τὸν ἥλιον· ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι, διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ζώων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἕξιν·* The Stoics affirm, that the world is governed by mind and providence, this mind passing through all the parts of it, as the soul doth in us: which yet doth not act in all parts alike, but in some more, in some less; it passing through some parts only as a habit (as through the bones and nerves), but through others as mind or understanding (as through that which is called the hegemonicon or principale.) So the whole world being a living and rational animal, hath its hegemonicon or principal part too, which according to Antipater is the ether, to Posidonius the

[1] De Anima, cap. xv. p. 169. [2] Lib. vii. segm. 138, 139. p. 452.

air, to Cleanthes the sun, etc. And they say also, that this first God is, as it were, sensibly diffused through all animals and plants, but through the earth itself only as a habit.—Wherefore the whole world being thus acted and animated by one Divine Soul, is itself, according to these Stoics, also the supreme God. Thus Didymus in Eusebius,[1] *ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον προσαγορεύουσι θεὸν*, the Stoics call the whole world God ;—and Origen against Celsus, *σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεὸν, Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον* · The Greeks universally affirm the world to be a god, but the Stoics, the first and chief God.—And accordingly Manilius,[2]

> Qua pateat mundum divino numine verti
> Atque ipsum esse Deum :

Whereby it may appear the world to be governed by a Divine Mind, and also itself to be God.—As likewise Seneca,[3] the philosopher, "Totum hoc quo continemur, et unum est, et Deus est;" this whole world, within which we are contained, is both one thing and God.—Which is not to be understood of the mere matter of the world, as it is nothing but a heap of atoms, or as endued with a plastic and senseless nature only ; but of it as animated by such a soul, as besides sense was originally endued with perfect understanding ; and as deriving all its godship from thence. For thus Varro[4] in St. Austin declares both his own and the Stoical sense concerning this point, "Dicit idem Varro, adhuc de naturali theologia præloquens, Deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi (quem Græci vocant *κόσμον*) et hunc ipsum mundum esse Deum. Sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem ; ita mundum Deum dici ab animo, cum sit ex animo et corpore." The same Varro discoursing concerning natural theology, declareth, that, according to his own sense, God is the soul of the world (which the Greeks call Cosmos), and that this world itself is also God. But that this is so to be understood, that as a wise man, though consisting of soul and body, yet is denominated wise only from his mind or soul ; so the world is denominated God, from its mind or soul only, it consisting both of mind and body.

Now if the whole animated world be the supreme God, it plainly follows from thence, that the several parts and members thereof must

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[1] P. Ev. l. xv. c. xxv. [p. 817.] l. v. p. 235.

[2] Lib. i. ver. 484, 485.

[3] Epistol. xcii. p. 323, tom. ii. opera. Vide etiam Epist. xcv. p. 355.

[4] C. D. l. vii. c. vi.

be the parts and members of God ; and this was readily acknowledged by Seneca ; [1] "Membra sumus corporis magni ;" We are all members of one great body :—and[2] " Totum hoc Deus est, socii ejus et membra sumus ;" this whole world is God, and we are not only his members, but also his fellows or companions—as if our human souls had a certain kind of fellowship also with that great Soul of the universe. And accordingly, the Soul of the world, and the whole mundane animal, was frequently worshipped by the Pagans, in these its several members ; the chief parts of the world, and the most important things of nature, as it were by piece-meal. Nevertheless it doth not at all follow from thence, that these were therefore to them really so many several gods ; for then not only every man, and every contemptible animal, every plant and herb, and pile of grass, every river and hill, and all things else whatsoever, must be so many several gods. And that the Pagans themselves did not take them for such, Origen observes against that assertion of Celsus,[3] " That if the whole were God, then the several parts thereof must needs be gods," or divine too : *ὡς εἶναι θεῖα οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, μέρη ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ φυτά· εἰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ, καὶ τὰ ὄρη, καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι· ἆρ' ἐπεὶ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεός ἐστιν, ἤδη καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι θεοί εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο φήσουσιν Ἕλληνες· τοὺς δ' ἐπιστατοῦντας (εἰ ἄρα δαίμονας, ἢ θεοὺς, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ὀνομάζουσι) ποταμοῖς καὶ θαλάσσαις, τούτους ἂν λέγοιεν θεούς. Καὶ τὸ καθολικὸν Κέλσου γίνεται καὶ καθ' Ἕλληνας ψεῦδος, ὅτι ἐάντι ὅλον ᾖ θεὸς, πάντως τὰ μέρη τούτου ἐστι θεῖα· κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖα ἔσται ζῶα, καὶ μυῖαι, καὶ σκνίφες, καὶ σκώληκες, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ὄφεων εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀρνέων, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων· ἅπερ οὐδ' οἱ λέγοντες θεὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, φήσουσιν·* From hence it would follow, that not only men must be divine and gods, but also all brute animals too (they being parts of the world) and plants to boot. Nay, rivers, and mountains, and seas, being parts of the world likewise (if the whole world be God), must, according to Celsus, needs be gods also. Whereas the Greeks themselves will not affirm this ; but they would only call those spirits or demons, which preside over these rivers and seas, gods. Wherefore this universal assertion of Celsus is false, even according to the Greeks themselves ; that if the whole be God, then all the parts thereof must needs be divine, or gods. It following from thence, that flies, and gnats, and worms, and all kinds of serpents, and birds, and fishes, are all divine animals, or gods : which they themselves, who assert the world to be God, will not affirm.—

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[1] Epist. xcv. p. 355. [2] Epist. xcii. p. 323. [3] L. v. p. 234.

Wherefore, though it be true, that the Pagans did many times personate and deify the chief parts of the world, and things of nature, as well as they did the several powers and virtues of the mundane soul, diffused through the whole world ; yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore look upon these, as so many true and proper gods, but only worship them as parts and members of one great mundane animal ; or rather, worship the Soul of the whole world, their supreme Deity, in them all, as its various manifestations. This St. Austin intimates, when writing against Faustus, the Manichean, he prefers even the Pagan gods before the Manichean :[1] "Jam vero cœlum, et terra, et mare, et aër, et sol, et luna, et cætera sydera omnia, hæc manifesta oculis apparent, atque ipsis sensibus præsto sunt. Quæ cum Pagani tanquam deos colunt, vel tanquam PARTES UNIUS MAGNI DEI (nam universum mundum quidam eorum putant MAXIMUM DEUM) ea colunt, quæ sunt. Vos autem, cum ea colatis, quæ omnino non sunt, propinquiores essetis veræ pietati, si saltem Pagani essetis, qui corpora colunt, etsi non colenda, tamen vera." Now the heaven, earth, sea, and air, sun, moon, and stars, are things all manifest and really present to our senses ; which, when the Pagans worship as gods, or as PARTS OF ONE GREAT GOD (for some of them think the whole world to be the GREATEST GOD), they worship things that are ; so that you, worshipping things that are not, would be nearer to true piety than you are, were you Pagans, and worshipped bodies too ; which though they ought not to be worshipped, yet are they true and real things.—But this is further insisted upon by the same St. Austin,[2] in his book De C. D. where after that large enumeration of the Pagan gods before set down, he thus convinces their folly in worshipping the several divided members, parts and powers, of the one great God, after that manner personated : "Hæc omnia quæ dixi, et quæcunque non dixi (non enim omnia dicenda arbitratus sum) hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter ; sive sint, ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sive virtutes ejus, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum ; quæ sententia velus magnorum, multorumque doctorum est. Hæc, inquam, si ita sunt, quod quale sit, nondum interim quæro, quid perderent, si unum Deum colerent prudentiori compendio ? Quid enim ejus contemneretur, cum ipse coleretur ? Si autem metuendem sit, ne prætermissæ sive neglectæ partes ejus irascerentur ; non ergo, ut volunt, velut unius animantis hæc tota vita est, quæ omnes simul continet deos, quasi suas

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[1] Lib. xx. contra Faustum, cap. v. p. 238. tom. viii. oper.

[2] L. iv. c. xi. [p. 76.]

VIRTUTES, vel MEMBRA, vel PARTES: sed suam quæque pars habet vitam a cæteris separatam, si præter alteram irasci altera potest, et alia placari, alia concitari. Si autem dicitur omnia simul, id est, totum ipsum Jovem potuisse offendi, si PARTES ejus non etiam singillatim minutatimque colerentur, stulte dicitur. Nulla quippe earum prætermitteretur, cum ipse unus, qui haberet omnia, coleretur." All these things, which we have now said, and many more, which we have not said (for we did not think fit to mention all), all these gods and goddesses, let them be one and the same Jupiter: whether they will have them to be his PARTS, or his POWERS, and VIRTUES, according to the sense of those, who think God to be the soul or mind of the whole world; which is the opinion of many and great doctors. This, I say, if it be so, which, what it is we will not now examine; what would these Pagans lose, if in a more prudent compendium, they should worship one only God? For what of him could be despised, when his whole self was worshipped? But if they fear, lest his parts pretermitted, or neglected, should be angry, or take offence; then it is not, as they pretend, the life of one great animal, which at once contains all the gods, as his virtues, or members, or parts, but every part hath its own life by itself, separate from the rest, since one of them may be angry, when another is pleased, and the contrary. But if it should be said, that altogether, that is, the whole Jupiter might be offended, if his parts were not worshipped all of them severally and singly; this would be foolishly said, because none of the parts can be pretermitted, when he, that hath all, is worshipped.

Thus do the Pagans in Athanasius[1] also declare, that they did not worship the several parts of the world, as really so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts, or members, of their one supreme God, that great mundane animal (or whole animated world) taken all together as one thing; *ἀλλ' ἴσως διαιρούμενα μὲν, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ λαμβανόμενα, ἐπιδεῆ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντα συνάπτοντες, καὶ ὡς ἓν ἀποτελοῦντες μέγα σῶμα, τὸ ὅλον Θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσι·* But the Pagans themselves will acknowledge, that the divided parts of the world, taken severally, are but indigent and imperfect things; nevertheless do they contend, that as they are by them joined all together into one great body (enlivend by one soul), so is the whole of them truly and properly God.—And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that though these Pagans verbally personated and deified, not only the several powers and virtues of the one supreme God, or mundane soul,

[1] Orat. contra Græcos, p. 31. tom. i. oper.

diffused throughout the whole world, but also the several parts of the world itself and the natures of things; yet their meaning herein was not to make these in themselves really so many several true and proper gods (much less independent ones), but to worship one supreme God (which to them was the whole animated world) in those his several parts and members, as it were by piece-meal, or under so many inadequate conceptions.

The Pagans therefore were plainly divided in their natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them conceiving him to be nothing higher than a mundane soul: whereas others of them, to use Origen's language, did *ὑπερβαίνειν πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν, καὶ μηδαμοῦ αὐτῆς νομίζειν ἵδρυσθαι τὸν Θεὸν, ἄνω καὶ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὰ σώματα ζητεῖν αὐτὸν,*[1] transcend all the sensible nature, and thinking God not at all to be seated there, looked for him above all corporeal things.—Now the former of these Pagans worshipped the whole corporeal world, as the body of God; but the latter of them, though they had higher thoughts of God, than as a mundane soul, yet supposing him to have been the cause of all things, and so at first to have contained all things within himself, as likewise that the world, after it was made, was not cut off from him, nor subsisted alone by itself, as a dead thing, but was closely united to him, and livingly dependent on him: these, I say, though they did not take the world to be God, or the body of God, yet did they also look upon it as *θεῖον*, as that which was Divine and sacred; and supposed, that God was to be worshipped in all, or that the whole world was to be worshipped as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch,[2] though much disliking the deifying of inanimate things, doth himself nevertheless approve of worshipping God in the whole corporeal world, he affirming it to be *ἱερὸν ἁγιώτατον καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον*, a most holy, and most god-becoming temple.—And the ancient Persians, or magi, who by no means would allow of worshipping God in any artificial temples made with men's hands, did notwithstanding thus worship God, *sub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, in the whole corporeal world, as his natural temple, as Cicero testifieth: [3]"Nec sequor magos Persarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammasse templa Græciæ dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum esset et domicilium:" Neither do I adhere to the Persian magi, by whose suggestion and persuasion Xerxes is said to have

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1 Cont. Cels. p. 260.

2 De Iside et Osir. p. 382.

3 De Leg. l. ii. p. 335.

burnt all the temples of the Greeks, because they inclosed and shut up their gods within walls, to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whose temple and habitation this whole world is.—And, therefore, when Diogenes Laertius[1] writeth thus of these magi, that they did *θεοὺς ἀποφαίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, τῶν δὲ ξοάνων καταγινώσκειν*, make fire and earth and water to be gods, but condemn all statues and images—we conceive the meaning hereof to be no other than this, that as they worshipped God in no temple, save only that of the whole world, so neither did they allow any other statues or images of him, than the things of nature, and parts of the world, such as fire, and earth, and water, called therefore by them, in this sense and no other, gods. For thus are they clearly represented by Clemens Alexandrinus, and that according to the express testimony of Dino;[2] *Θύειν ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ τοὺς Μάγους ὁ Δίνων λέγει, θεῶν ἀγάλματα μόνα τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ νομίζοντας. Οὐκ ἀπεκρυψάμην οὐδὲ τῶν τούτων ἄγνοιαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀποφεύγειν οἴοντα τῆς πλάνης, ἀλλ' εἰς ἑτέραν κατολισθαίνουσιν ἀπάτην. Ἀγάλματα μὲν θεῶν οὐ ξύλα καὶ λίθους ὑπειλήφασιν, ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες· οὐδὲ μὲν Ἴβιδας καὶ Ἰχνεύμονας, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι· ἀλλὰ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ὡς φιλόσοφοι·* Dinon affirmeth, that the Persian magi sacrificed under the open heavens, they accounting fire and water to be the only statues and images of the gods. For I would not here conceal their ignorance neither, who, thinking to avoid one error, fall into another; whilst they allow not wood and stones to be the images of the gods, as the Greeks do, nor Ichneumones and Ibides, as the Egyptians, but only fire and water, as philosophers.—Which difference betwixt the Pagan theologers, that some of them looked upon the whole world as God, or as the body of God, others only as the image, or the temple of God, is thus taken notice of by Macrobius upon Scipio's dream, where the world was called a temple. [3]"Bene autem universus mundus Dei templum vocatur, propter illos, qui æstimant, nihil esse aliud Deum, nisi cœlum ipsum, et cœlestia ista quæ cernimus. Ideo ut summi omnipotentiam Dei ostenderet posse vix intelligi, nunquam posse videri, quicquid humano subjicitur aspectui templum ejus vocavit; ut qui hæc veneratur ut templa, cultum tamen maximum debeat conditori; sciatque quisquis in usum templi hujus inducitur, ritu sibi vivendum sacerdotis." The whole world is well called here the temple of God, in way of opposition to those who think God to be nothing else but the heaven itself, and those heavenly things which we see (or the whole

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[1] Proëm. oper. segm. 6. p. 5.

[2] Protrept. p. 43. [cap. v. p. 56. edit. Potteri.]

[3] Lib. i. c. xiv.

sensible world animated) : wherefore Cicero, that he might show the omnipotence of the first supreme God to be such as could scarcely be understood, but not at all perceived by sense, he calleth whatsoever falleth under human sight, his temple ; that so he, that worshippeth these things as the temple of God, might in the mean time remember, that the chief worship is due to the maker and creator of them ; as also that himself ought to live in the world like a priest or mysta, holily and religiously.—And thus we see, that the Pagans were universally Cosmolatræ, or world-worshippers, in one sense or other ; not that they worshipped the world as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or at least as the temple or image of him. Neither of which terminated their worship in that, which was sensible and visible only, but in that great Mind or Soul, which framed and governeth the whole world understandingly ; though this was called also by them (not the nature of things, but) *φύσις κοινὴ*, the common nature, and *φύσις τοῦ παντὸς*, or *τῶν ὅλων*, the nature of the universe, because it contained under it the spermatic reasons, or plastic principles, of the whole world.

Furthermore, these Pagan Theists universally acknowledging the whole world to be an animal, and that mundane animal also to be a god ; those of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, did consequently all conceive it, as hath been already observed, to be either a second, or at least a third god. And thus Origen,[1] *σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεὸν, Στωικοὶ μὲν τὸν Πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν Δεύτερον, τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν Τρίτον*. The Greeks do plainly affirm the whole world to be a god ; some of them, as the Stoics, the first God ; others, as the Platonists, (to whom may be added the Egyptians also) the second god ; though some of these Platonists call it the third god. Those of the Platonists, who called the mundane animal, or animated world, the second god, looked upon that whole Platonic trinity of Divine hypostases (*Τἀγαθὸν, Νοῦς* and *Ψυχὴ*) all but as one first God : but those others of them, who called it a third god, supposed a great distinction betwixt those three hypostases, and made so many several gods of them ; the first, a monad, or simple goodness ; the second, mind or intellect ; the third, Psyche, or the universal soul, which also without any more ado they concluded to be the immediate soul of this corporeal world, existing likewise from eternity with it. Now this second god, which was the whole animated world, as well to the Egyptians as the Platonists, was by them both

[1] Contra Celsum, lib. i. p. 235.

said to be, not only the temple and image, but also the Son of the first God. That the Egyptians called the animated world the Son of God, hath been already proved ; and that the other Pagans did the like also, is evident from this of Celsus, where he pretends, that the Christians called their Jesus the Son of God, in imitation of those ancient Pagans, who had styled the world so ; [2]*Ὁπόθεν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς, Θεοῦ υἱὸν καλεῖν, σημαίνω· Ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ, τόνδε δὲ τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γενόμενον, παῖδά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἠΐθεον προσεῖπον. Πάνυ γὰρ ὅμοιος οὗτός τε κἀκεῖνος παῖς Θεοῦ·* Whence these Christians came to call their Jesus the Son of God, I shall now declare ; namely, because our ancestors had called the world, as made by God, the Son of God, and God. Now is there not a goodly similitude (think you) betwixt these these two sons of God, theirs and ours ?—Upon which words of his, Origen writeth thus : [3]*ᾠήθη δὲ υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἡμᾶς λέγειν, παραποιήσαντας τὰ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γενομένου, καὶ υἱοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ·* Celsus supposed us Christians to have borrowed this appellation of the Son of God from the Pagans, they calling the world, as made by God, the Son of God, and God.—Wherefore these Pagans, who looked upon the whole animated world only as the second God, and Son of God, did unquestionably also worship the first God, in the world, and that probably by personating and deifying his several parts and members too. Thus do we understand, what that was, which gave occasion to this mistake of late writers, that the Pagans worshipped the inanimate parts of the world, as such, for true and proper gods ; viz. their not perceiving, that they worshipped these only, as the parts or living members of one great mundane animal, which was to them, if not the first God, yet at least the second God ; the temple, image, and Son, of the first God.

And now have we, as we conceive, given a full account of the seeming Polytheism of the Pagans, not only in their poetical and fabulous, but also their political or civil, theology ; the former of which was nothing but fancy and fiction, and the conforming of Divine to human things ; the latter nothing but vulgar opinion and error, together with the laws and institutes of statesmen and politicians, designed principally to amuse the vulgar, and keep them the better in obedience and subjection to civil laws. Besides which, the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged another theology, which was neither fiction, nor mere opinion and law, but nature and philosophy, or absolute truth and reality ; according to which natural and philosophic theology of theirs,

[1] P. 329, 330, 331.

[2] Orig. Contra Cels. p. 308.

[3] Orig. contra Cels. p. 208.

there was only one unmade self-originated Deity, and many other created gods, as his inferior ministers. So that those many poetical and political gods could not possibly be looked upon otherwise, than either as the created ministers of one supreme God, whether taken singly or collectively; or else as the polyonymy and various denomination of him, according to several notions and partial conceptions of him; and his several powers and manifestations of the world personated and deified. Which latter we have already proved to have been the most generally-received opinion of the Pagan theologers; according to that of Euclides[1] the philosopher, ἓν Τἀγαθὸν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλοίμενον, there is one supreme Good (or highest Deity) called by many names:—and, according to that of Antisthenes before cited, That the many popular gods were but one and the same natural God, viz. as Lactantius adds, "Summæ totius artifex,"[2] the maker of the whole world.

We shall conclude with repeating what hath been already suggested, that though the intelligent Pagans did generally disclaim their fabulous theology; St. Austin telling us, that when the absurdities thereof were urged against them, they would commonly make such replies as these: [3] "Absit, inquiunt, fabularum est ista garrulitas;" and again, "Rursus, inquiunt, ad fabulas redis;" Far be it from us (say they) to think so or so, this is nothing but the garrulity of idle fables; and, You would bring us again to fables.—And though they owned another theology besides their civil, which was the natural and philosophical, as the only true; yet did they notwithstanding acknowledge a kind of necessity, that, in those times at least, there should be, besides the natural and philosophical theology, which the vulgar were not so capable of, another theology framed and held forth, that might be more accommodate to their apprehensions. Thus that Roman pontifex, Scævola, in St. Austin declareth,[4] "Expedire existimat falli in religione civitates," That it was expedient (as he thought) that cities and commonwealths should be deceived in their religion, or have something false or fabulous intermingled with it;—he giving this reason for the same, because the natural and philosophic theology contained many things in it which, though true, yet would be hurtful for the vulgar to know; as, for example, "Quod verus Deus nec sexum habeat, nec ætatem, nec definita corporis membra;" That the true God hath neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members; and that Hercules and Æsculapius, etc.

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[1] Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 106. p. 142. [2] Lib. i. cap. v.

[3] C. D. lib. iv. cap. x. (p. 75.)

[4] De Civit. Dei. lib. iv. cap. xxvii. p. 84. tom. vii. oper.

were not gods, but men, obnoxious to the same infirmities with others —and the like. And the learned Varro, in his book of religions,[1] publicly maintained the same doctrine: "Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat; et ideo Græcos teletas et mysteria, taciturnitate parietibusque clausisse," etc. that there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; as likewise many things false, of which it was expedient they should think otherwise: and that for this cause, the Greeks inclosed their teletæ or mysteries within walls, and kept them under a seal of secrecy.—Upon which of Varro St. Austin thus noteth: "Hic certe totum concilium prodidit sapientium, per quos civitates et populi regerentur:" Varro here plainly discovers and betrays the whole counsel and secrecy of statesmen and politicians, by whom cities and nations were governed, and their very arcanum of government, namely this, That people were to be deceived in their religion, for their own good, and the good of their governors.—The same father there adding, That evil demons were much gratified with this doctrine, and liked this fraud and imposture very well, which gave them an advantage to rule and tyrannize, as well over the deceivers as the deceived.—Lastly, Strabo, also,[2] though otherwise a grave and sober writer, speaks freely and broadly to the same purpose; *οὐ γὰρ ὄχλον τε γυναικῶν καὶ παντὸς ϊυδαίου πλήθους ἐπαγάγειν λόγῳ δυνατὸν φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ ὁσιότητα καὶ πίστιν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιΐας καὶ τερατείας·* It is not possible that women, and others of the vulgar sort, should be conducted and carried on towards piety, holiness, and faith, merely by philosophic reason and truth; but this must be done by superstition, and that not without the help of fables and prodigies or wonderful narrations.—From whence it is plain, that Strabo did not only allow a necessity of a civil theology, besides the the natural and philosophical, but also of a fabulous and poetical one too. And this is a thing the less to be wondered at in these Pagans, because some Christians also seem to acknowledge a kind of truth herein; Synesius himself writing after this manner:[3] *τὸ δὲ ῥᾷστον καταγελάσεται ὁ δῆμος· δεῖται γὰρ τερατείας·* That, which is easy and ordinary, will be contemned by the vulgar or common people; and therefore there is need of something strange and prodigious in religion for

[1] Apud Augustin. ubi supra, p. 88. [2] Lib. i. p. 18.

[3] In Encomio Calvitici, p. 73. oper. edit. Petavii.

them. Flavius Josephus[1] making this free acknowledgement, concerning the wise men among the Greeks, *ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι δοκοῦσι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι*, That they held the same things concerning God which the Jews did—adds notwithstanding afterwards, *εἰς πλῆθος δόξαις προκατειλημμένον, τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν*, that they were afraid to declare the truth of this their doctrine to the vulgar, prepossessed with other opinions.—And indeed they did not think it safe to declare the natural and true theology promiscuously to all: Plato[2] himself intimating as much in these words: *τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν·* That as it was hard to find out the maker of this universe, so neither, being found out, could he be declared to the vulgar.—Wherefore since God was so hard to be understood, they conceived it necessary, that the vulgar should be permitted to worship him in his works, by parts and piece-meal, according to the various manifestations of himself; that is, should have a civil theology at least, distinct from the natural and philosophical, if not another fabulous one too.

XXXV. We have now dispatched the first of those three heads proposed to be insisted on, viz. that the Pagans worshipped one and the same supreme God, under many personal names, so that much of their Polytheism was but seeming and fantastical, and indeed nothing but the polyonomy of one supreme God, they making many poetical and political gods of that one natural God; and thus worshipping God by parts and piecemeal, according to that clear acknowledgement of Maximus Madaurensis[3] before cited: "Unius summi Dei virtutes, per mundanum opus diffusas, nos multis vocabulis invocamus; et dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere videmur." The virtues of the one supreme God diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names; and so prosecuting, with our supplications, his as it were divided members, must needs be thought to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.—We shall proceed to the second head proposed, that besides this polyonymy of one supreme God in the poetical and civil theology of the Pagans, which was their seeming and fantastic Polytheism, they had another real Polytheism also; they acknowledging in their natural and philosophic theology likewise a multiplicity of gods, that is, of substantial understanding beings, superior to men, really existing in the world. Which though they were called by them gods, yet

[1] C. Ap. lib. ii. (sect. xvi. p. 482. tom. ii. edit. Havercamp.)

[2] In Timæo, cap. xiii. p. 236. edit. Fabricii.

[3] Apud Augustin. Epist. xvi. p. 15. tom. ii. oper.

were they not therefore supposed to be ἀγέννητοι and αὐτογενεῖς, unmade and self-existent, or independent beings—but all of them (one only excepted) γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, generated gods—according to the larger notion of that word before declared;[1] that is, though not κατὰ χρόνον, yet at least, ἀπ' αἰτίας γεννητοὶ, though not as made in time, yet as produced from a superior cause.—Plutarch propounding this for one amongst his Platonic questions, why ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεὸς, the highest and supreme God—was called by Plato, both the father and maker of all things, gives this reply to it in the words before cited; ἢ τῶν μὲν θεῶν τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστιν (ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐπονομάζει,) ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων, that perhaps he was said to be the father of all the generated gods, and of men (as he is also styled in Homer), but the maker of all other irrational and inanimate beings.—From which passage of Plutarch's it plainly appears, that the ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεὸς, the one highest God—being every way ἀγέννητος, unmade and unproduced — was thought to be the maker and father of all the other gods, therefore called γεννητοί. Which is further plainly declared elsewhere by the same Plutarch in these words:[2] Πλάτωνος πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦτε κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεννητῶν, τὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀΐδιον Θεὸν ἐπονομάζοντος· Plato calleth the one unmade and eternal God the father and maker of the world, and of all other things generated.—And though some of those many gods of Plato's were by him also called ἀΐδιοι, or eternal—yet were they likewise γεννητοὶ too, in another sense, that is, produced and derived by way of emanation, from that one who is every way ἀγέννητος, underived and independent upon any other cause.—And thus Proclus[3] universally pronounces: Τὸ εἶναι θεοὶ πάντες οἱ θεοὶ διὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἔχουσι θεόν· All the gods owe their being gods to the first God—he adding, that he is therefore called πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, the fountain of the Godhead.

Wherefore the many gods of the intelligent Pagans were derived from one God, and but ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις (as Plutarch somewhere calls them), the subservient powers, or ministers of the one supreme unmade Deity.—Which (as hath been before observed) was frequently called by these Pagans Θεὸς, God—κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or in way of eminency; as likewise were those other inferior or generated gods, in way of distinction from him, called θεοὶ, the gods.—And accordingly the sense of Celsus is thus represented in Origen:[4] Θεοὺς δημιουργοὺς εἶναι πάντων σωμάτων, μόνης ψυχῆς ἔργον οὔσης Θεοῦ· That the gods were the makers of the bodies of all animals, the souls of them only being the work of God.—Moreover, these inferior gods are styled by Ammianus Marcel-

[1] P. 327. [2] Sympos. lib. viii. cap. i. (p. 718.)
[3] Theol. p. lib. iii. cap. vii. (p. 132.) [4] Lib. iv. p. 200.

linus,[1] *substantiales potestates*, substantial powers—probably in way of distinction from those other Pagan gods, that were not substantial, but only so many names and notions of the one supreme God, or his powers severally personated and deified, which substantial powers of Am. Marcellinus[2] (as divination and prophecy was, by their means, imparted to men), were all said to be subject to that one sovereign Deity called Themis; "whom (saith he) the ancient theologers seated *in cubili et solio Jovis*," in the bed-chamber and throne of Jupiter—as indeed some of the poets have made her to be the wife of Jupiter, and others his sister. And Anaxarchus in Plutarch styles her *πάρεδρον τοῦ Διός*,[3] Jupiter's assessor—though that philosopher abused the fable, and grossly depraved the meaning of it, as if it signified *πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος θεμιτὸν εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον*, that whatsoever is done by the sovereign Power, is therefore just and right—whereas the true moral thereof was this, that justice or righteousness sits in council with God, and in his mind and will prescribes laws to nature and the whole world. Themis therefore was another name of God, amongst the Pagans, according to his universal consideration, besides those before mentioned: and when Plato in his book of Laws,[4] would have men to swear by the names of those three gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis;[5] these were but so many several partial notions of one supreme Deity; the meaning thereof being no other than this, as Pighius observeth, "Timore divino, veritate ipsa, ac æquitate sanciri debere juramenta. In Jove enim summi numinis potestatem, falsi ac perjurii vindicem; in Apolline veritatis lumen; in Themide, jus, fas, atque licitum esse intelligitur. Est enim Themis ipsa lex æterna atque universalis, mundo ac naturæ præscripta;" or, according to Cicero, "Ratio recta summi Jovis." And Ficinus, in his commentary as to the main agreeth herewith. So that, when the Pagan theologers affirmed the Numen of Themis to preside over the spirits of the elements, and all those other substantial powers, from whom divination was participated to men; their meaning therein was clearly no other than this; that there was one supreme Deity ruling over all the other gods, and that the Divine Mind, which prescribeth laws to nature and the whole world, and contains all the fatal decrees in it, according to the evolution of which things come to pass in the world, was the fountain from whence all divination proceeded; as these secrets were more or less imparted from thence to those inferior

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[1] Lib. xxii. [2] Histor. lib. xxi. cap. i. p. 263.
[3] Vit. Alex. (p. 596. tom. i. oper.) [4] Lib. xii. p. 685. oper.
[5] De Dea Themide, p. 39.

created spirits. The philosophy of the Pagan theology amongst the Greeks was plainly no other than this; that there is one unmade self-existent Deity, the original of all, and that there are many other substantial powers or spirits, created by it, as the ministers of its providence in the world: but there was much of poetry, or poetic fancy, intermingled with this philosophy, as the flourish to it, to make up their Pagan theology.

Thus, as hath been before declared, the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different senses; one unmade self-existent Deity, and many generated or created gods; Onatus[1] the Pythagorean declaring, that they, who asserted one only God, and not many, "understood not what the dignity and majesty of the Divine transcendency consisted in, namely, in ruling over gods;" and Plotinus conceiving, that the supreme God was most of all glorified, not by being "contracted into one," but "by having multitudes of gods, derived from him, and dependent on him;" and that the honor done to them redounded unto him. Where there are two things to be distinguished; first, that, according to the Pagan Theists, God was no solitary being; but that there were multitudes of gods, or substantial powers, and living understanding natures, superior to men, which were neither self-existent, nor yet generated out of matter, but all generated or created from one supreme. Secondly, that forasmuch as these were all supposed to have some influence, more or less upon the government of the world, and the affairs of mankind, they were therefore all of them conceived to be the due objects of men's religious worship, adoration and invocation; and accordingly was the Pagan devotion scattered amongst them all. Nor were the gods of the oriental Pagans neither mere dead statues and images, as some would conclude from the Scripture, but living understanding beings, superior to men (though worshipped in images) according to that reply of the Chaldeans in Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, when he required them to tell his dream: "There is none other, that can show this before the king, except those gods, whose dwelling is not with flesh;" that is, the immortal gods, or who are exalted above the condition of human frailty. Though some conceive, that these words are to be understood of a peculiar sort of gods; namely, that this was such a thing, as could not be done by those demons and lower aërial gods, which frequently converse with men, but was reserved to a higher rank of gods, who are above human converse. Now, as to the former of these two things, that God is no solitary being, but that there

[1] Libro περὶ θεοῦ καὶ θείου, apud Stobæum in Eclog. physic. lib. i. cap. i. p. 4.

are multitudes of understanding beings superior to men, the creatures and ministers of one supreme God; the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament fully agree with the Pagans herein. [1]"Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him;" and "Ye are come to an innumerable company of angels."[2] But the latter of them, that religious worship and invocation doth of right belong to these created spirits, is constantly denied and condemned in these writings, that being a thing peculiarly reserved to that one God, who was the creator of heaven and earth. And thus is that prophecy of Jeremy to be understood, expressed in the Chaldee tongue, that so the Jews might have it in readiness for those Chaldean idolaters, when they came into Babylon: [3]"Thus shall ye say unto them, The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens." That is, there shall come a time, when none shall be religiously worshipped any where upon the face of the whole earth, save only that God, who made the heavens and the earth, and he without images too. Which prophecy, but in part yet fulfilled, shall then have its complete accomplishment, when [4]"the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ." And thus is the controversy rightly stated betwixt the Pagans and the Christians by Lactantius:[5] "Sed fortasse quærat aliquis a nobis, quod apud Ciceronem quærit Hortensius: Si Deus unus est, quæ esse beata solitudo queat? Tanquam nos, qui unum esse dicimus, desertum ac solitarium esse dicamus. Habet enim ministros, quos vocamus nuntios. Et est istud verum, quod dixisse Senecam supra retuli; genuisse regni sui ministros Deum. Verum hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari aut coli volunt; quippe, qui nihil præter jussum ac voluntatem Dei faciant." As if we who say, there is but one God, therefore made a solitary and deserted Deity. Whereas we acknowledge, that God hath his ministers, whom we call angels: and we grant that to be true, which was before cited out of Seneca, that God hath generated or created ministers of his kingdom. But these are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, nor worshipped; forasmuch as they only execute the will and command of God. —And again afterward to the same purpose; "Si eos multitudo delectat, non duodecim dicimus, nec trecentos sexaginta quinque (ut Orpheus) sed innumerabiles, et arguimus eorum errores in diversum, qui tam paucos putant. Sciant tamen quo nomine appellari debeant; ne Deum

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[1] Dan. 7: 10. [2] Heb. 12: 22. [3] Jer. 10: 11. [4] Rev. 11: 15.
[5] Lib. i. (cap. vii. p. 50, 51.)

verum violent, cujus nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuunt," etc. If multitude delight them, we say not, that there are twelve, nor yet three hundred sixty five, as Orpheus, but innumerable. And we tax their error, on the contrary, who think them to be so few. Nevertheless, let them know, by what name they ought to be called, lest they violate the true God, whose name is profaned when it is given to many. —From which passages of Lactantius it plainly appeareth, that the main controversy between the Christians and the Pagans was then only this: whether or no the created ministers of the supreme God might be called gods, and religiously worshipped. But this Pagan objection against the solitary Deity of the Christians is by some ancient Christian writers also otherwise answered; namely, from those three hypostases or persons of the Trinity; they affirming upon that account, that though Christians did not acknowledge such a multitude of gods as the Pagans, yet did they not therefore make God a solitary and sterile being, before the creation neither, as the Jews did; but went in a middle way betwixt Jews and Pagans, they interpreting Moses's *faciamus hominem* to this sense.

XXXVI. We shall now show particularly what these many gods of the Pagans were. It hath been often observed, that the Pagans were divided in their philosophic or natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them thinking, τὸ Θεῖον ἐξῃρημένον εἶναι τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, that the supreme Deity was an abstract being, elevated above nature and the whole world—but others that he was nothing higher than an *anima mundi*, or soul of the world.—Now the former of these two were chiefly amongst the Greeks, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, who had accordingly several distinctions amongst them concerning their gods, as between the ὑπερκόσμιοι θεοὶ, and the ἐγκόσμιοι, the supermundane and the mundane gods—the θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι, and the γεννητοὶ, the eternal and the generated gods; that word *latter* being now taken in a narrower and more confined sense, for such as were made in time, or had a beginning of their existence: and lastly, the νοητοὶ θεοὶ, and the αἰσθητοὶ, the intelligible and the sensible gods. And the ὑπερκόσμιοι, ἀΐδιοι and νοητοὶ θεοὶ, supermundane, eternal, and intelligible gods, of these Pythagoreans and Platonists, were first of all and principally, those τρεῖς ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις, (as Plotinus calls them) those three divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles in the universe, viz. Tagathon or Hen, Nous and Psyche, or Monad, Mind and Soul. That this trinity was not first of all a mere invention of Plato's, but much ancienter than he, is plainly affirmed by

Plotinus in these words: [1]*Καὶ εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τούσδε μὴ καίνους, μὴ δὲ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρῆσθαι μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως, τοὺς δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι· μαρτυρίοις πιστωσαμένοις τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς εἶναι, τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν· ἥπτετο μὲν οὖν καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης·* That these doctrines are not new, nor of yesterday, but have been very anciently delivered, though obscurely (the discourses now extant being but explications of them), appears from Plato's own writings; Parmenides before him having insisted on them.

Now it is well known, that Parmenides was addicted to the Pythagoric sect, and therefore probable, that this doctrine of the Divine triad was one of the arcanums of that school also. Which is further confirmed from hence, because Numenius a famous Pythagorean entertained it as such. And Moderatus (as Simplicius informeth us) plainly affirmeth this trinity of principles to have been a Pythagoric cabala: [2]*οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὂν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται· τὸ δὲ Δεύτερον ἓν ὅπερ ἐστι τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ Τρίτον ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψυχικὸν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν·* This (Moderatus) declareth, that, according to the Pythagoreans, the first one or unity is above all essence; that the second one, which is that which truly is, and intelligible according to them, is the ideas; and the third which is physical or the soul, partaketh both of the first unity and of the ideas.—Lastly, we have Jamblichus's testimony also in Proclus to the same purpose; *τρεῖς εἶναι θεοὺς τούτους καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ὑμνουμένους·* That there were three gods also praised by the Pythagoreans.—Now we have before showed, that Pythagoras's philosophy was derived from the Orphic cabala, which Proclus[3] in another place thus fully testifieth; [4]*ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ παρ᾽ Ἕλλησι Θεολογία τῆς Ὀρφικῆς ἐστὶ μυσταγωγίας ἔκγονος· πρώτου μὲν Πυθαγόρου παρὰ Ἀγλαοφήμου τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὄργια διδαχθέντος· Δευτέρου δὲ Πλάτωνος ὑποδεξαμένου τὴν παντελῆ περὶ τούτων ἐπιστήμην, ἔκ τε τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ Ὀρφικῶν γραμμάτων·* All the theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphic Mystagoria; Pythagoras being first instructed by Aglaophemus in the Orphic Orgia, or mysteries concerning the gods; and Plato being the next, who received a perfect knowledge of all these Divine things, both out of the Pythagoric and the Orphic writings.—And that a trinity was part of that Orphic cabala, we have already proved out of

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[1] Enn. 5. lib. i. (p. 489.) [2] In Ar. Phys. fol. 50.

[3] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. ii. p. 94.

[4] Theol. Plat. lib. i. cap. v. (p. 13.)

Amelius, he affirming (in Proclus) that Plato's three kings were the same with Orpheus's trinity, of Phanes, Uranus, and Kronos. Moreover, since all these three, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, travelling into Egypt, were there initiated in that arcane theology of the Egyptians (called Hermaical) it seemeth probable (as was before observed) that this doctrine of a Divine triad was also part of the arcane theology of the Egyptians. It hath been also noted, that there were some footsteps of such a trinity in the Mithraic mysteries amongst the Persians, derived from Zoroaster; as likewise that it was expressly contained in the magic or Chalday oracles, of whatsoever authority they may be. Moreover it hath been signified, that the Samothracians had very anciently a certain trinity of gods, that were the highest of all their gods, and that called by a Hebrew name too, Cabbirim, or the mighty gods; and that from thence the Roman capitoline trinity of gods was derived; the second whereof was Minerva, which among the Latins, as Athena amongst the Greeks, was understood to signify the Divine wisdom. Lastly, the terniary or triad, was not only accounted a sacred number amongst the Pythagoreans, but also as containing some mystery in nature, was therefore made use of by other Greeks and Pagans, in their religious rites; as Aristotle informeth us: [1]*διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἁγιστείας τῶν θεῶν χρώμεθα τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ·* Wherefore from nature, and as it were observing her laws, have we taken this number of three, making use of the same in the sacrifices of the gods, and other purifications.—

Now since it cannot well be conceived, how such a trinity of Divine hypostases should be first discovered merely by human wit and reason, though there be nothing in it if rightly understood) that is repugnant to reason; and since there are in the ancient writings of the Old Testament certain significations of a plurality in the Deity, or of more than one hypostasis, we may reasonably conclude that, which Proclus asserteth of this trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles, to be true, that it was at first *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, a theology of Divine tradition or revelation—or a Divine cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterward communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. Neither ought it to be thought any considerable objection to the contrary, because the Platonists, Pythagoreans, and other Pagan theologers, did not express this their trinity, in the very words of the Athanasian Creed, nor according to the form of the Nicene council. Forasmuch as this mystery was gradually im-

[1] De Cœlo, lib. i. cap. v. (cap. i. p. 610. tom. I. oper.)

parted to the world, and that at first but sparingly to the Hebrews themselves, either in their written or oral cabala; but afterwards more fully under Christianity, the whole frame thereof was built thereupon. Nevertheless was it not so distinctly and precisely determined, nor so punctually and scrupulously stated among the Christians neither, till after the rising up of heresies concerning it. Nor when all was done, did the orthodox themselves at first universally agree, in the signification of the word Ὁμοούσιος, coessential or consubstantial.—Nor, lastly, is it a thing at all to be wondered at, that in such a difficult and mysterious point as this, there should be some diversity of apprehensions amongst the reputed orthodox Christians themselves; and much less therefore amongst Pagans and philosophers. However, we freely acknowledge, that as this Divine cabala was but little understood by many of those who entertained it amongst the Pagans, so was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated also.

For first, the Pagans universally called this their trinity of gods, τὸν Πρῶτον, τὸν Δεύτερον, and τὸν Τρίτον θεὸν, the first, the second, and the third god;—as the more philosophical amongst them called it also a trinity of causes, and a trinity of principles, and sometimes a trinity of opificers. Thus is this cabala of the trinity styled in Proclus,[1] ἡ τῶν Τριῶν θεῶν παράδοσις, the tradition of the three gods.—And accordingly is it said of Numenius by him,[1] that τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεοὺς, he did τραγῳδῶν καλεῖν, πάππον, ἔκγονον, ἀπόγονον, having praised the three gods, tragically or affectedly called them, the grandfather, the son, and the nephew;—Numenius thereby intimating, that as the second of these gods was the offspring of the first god, so the third, called the nephew of the first, was derived both from him and from the second; from the first as the grandfather, and from the second as the father of him. Harpocration, likewise, Atticus, and Amelius, are said by Proclus, to have entertained this same cabala or tradition of the three gods, the latter of these styling them βασιλέας τρεῖς, and τρίτον δημιουργὸν, three kings, and three opificers, or makers of the whole world. In like manner Plotinus,[2] speaking of the second of these three hypostases, (that is, νοῦς, the first mind or intellect) calls him δεύτερον Θεὸν, the second god; Καὶ Θεὸς αὕτη ἡ φύσις, καὶ Θεὸς Δεύτερος, προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν, πρὶν ὁρᾷν ἐκεῖνον· ὁ δὲ ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερίδρυται ἐπὶ καλῆς οὕτως οἷον κρηπίδος, ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήρτηται· ἔδει γὰρ ἐκεῖνον βαίνοντα μὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀψύχου τινὸς, μὴ δ᾽ αὖ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβηκέναι, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον πρὸ αὐτοῦ προϊόν· And this nature is God, I say a second God, offer-

[1] In Timæ. Plat. p. 93. [2] Enn. 5. lib. v. cap. iii. (p. 522.)

ing himself to view, before that other God can be seen, who is seated above, this being as it were the glorious throne of him. For it is not fit, that he should be immediately seated in any that is inanimate; nor in mere soul neither; but that there should be such an immense pulchritude and splendor shining before him, like the pomp and procession before the great king.—He also elsewhere mentions all these three gods together, making this world to be an image of them all: [1]*Εἰκότως οὖν λέγεται οὗτος ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν, ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος· ἑστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου, ἑστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινουμένου·* Wherefore this world may well be called an image, it depending upon that above (as an image in a glass) which is threefold. Whereof the first and second God always stand immoveably; the third likewise is in itself stable too, but accidentally moved, by reason of the mobility of matter and things below it.—And that we may here give a taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of these Platonists too, Porphyrius in the life of Plotinus[2] affirmeth, that both Plotinus and himself had sometimes experience of a kind of ecstatic union with the first of these three gods, that which is above mind and understanding: *πολλάκις ἐνάγοντι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τόν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοίαις, ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος ὁ μήτε μορφὴν, μή τέ τινα ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος· ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἅπαξ λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἑνωθῆναι·* Plotinus often endeavoring to raise up his mind to the first and highest God, that God sometimes appeared to him, who hath neither form nor idea, but is placed above intellect, and all that is intelligible; to whom I Porphyrius affirm myself to have been once united in the sixty-eigthth year of my age.—And again afterward, *τέλος αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν, τὸ ἑνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, ἔτυχε δὲ τετράκις που ὅτε συνήμην αὐτῷ τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου·* Plotinus's chief aim and scope was, to be united to and conjoined with the supreme God, who is above all; which scope he attained unto four several times, whilst myself was with him, by a certain ineffable energy.—That is Plotinus aimed at such a kind of rapturous and ecstatic union with the *Τὸ ἕν*, and *Τ᾽ αγαθὸν*, the first of the three highest gods, (called the one and the good) as by himself is described towards the latter end of this last book,[3] where he calls it *ἐπαφὴν*, and *παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα*, and *τὸ ἑαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ οἷον πάντων κέντρῳ συνάπτειν*, a kind of tactual union, and a certain presence better than knowledge, and the

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1 En. 2. lib. iii. cap. xviii. (p. 148.)

2 Cap. xxiii. p. 137. in Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. lib. iv. cap. xxvi.

3 De Bono vel Uno. Ennead. vi. lib. ix. cap. x. p. 772.

joining of our own centre, as it were, with the centre of the universe.—Thus we see, that the Platonic trinity is a trinity of gods, of which three gods therefore, the second and the third must of necessity be inferior gods, because otherwise they would be three independent gods; whereas the Pagan theology expressly disclaims a plurality of independent and self-originated deities.

But since, according to the principles of Christianity, which was partly designed to oppose and bear down the Pagan Polytheism, there is one only God to be acknowledged; the meaning whereof notwithstanding seems to be chiefly directed against the deifying of created beings, or giving religious worship to any, besides the uncreated, and the creator of all: moreover, since in the Scripture, which is the only true rule and measure of this Divine cabala of the trinity, though the λόγος or Word be said to have been with God, (that is, God the Father) and also itself to be God, (that is, not a creature) yet is it nowhere called another, or second God. Therefore cannot we Christians entertain this Pagan language of a trinity of gods, but must call it either a trinity of Divine hypostases, or subsistences, or persons, or the like. Nevertheless it is observable that Philo,[1] though, according to his Jewish principles, he was a zealous opposer of the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, yet did he not for all that, scruple to call the Θεῖον λόγον, the Divine Word, after the Platonic way, Δεύτερον Θεὸν a second God; as not suspecting this to clash with the principles of his religion, or that second commandment of the decalogue, "Thou shalt have no other gods before my face;" possibly because he conceived, that this was to be understood of creature-gods only: whereas his second god, the Divine λόγος or Word, is declared by him to be ἄϊδιος, eternal, and therefore, according to the Jewish theology, uncreated. However, this language of a second and third god, is not so excusable in a Jew, as it might be in a Pagan; because the Pagans according to the principles of their religion, were so far from having a scrupulosity against a plurality of gods, (so long as there was only one fountain of the Godhead acknowledged) that they rather accounted it an honor to the supreme God, as hath been already showed, that he should have many other not only titular gods under him, but also such as were religiously worshipped: wherefore besides this second and third god, they also did luxuriate in their other many creature-gods. And indeed St. Austin doth upon this account seem somewhat to excuse the Pagans for this their trinity of gods and principles, in these words: [2]"Liberis

1 Vide Eusebium. Præpar. Evangel. lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 323.

2 C. D. lib. x. cap. 23.

enim verbis loquuntur philosophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficillimis offensionem religiosarum aurium pertimescunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia, etiam in rebus, quæ in his significantur, impiam gignat opinionem. Nos autem non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur; sicut nec duos deos vel tres, nobis licitum est dicere, quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse fateamur." The philosophers use free language; nor in these things, which are extremely difficult to be understood, did they at all fear the offending of any religious and scrupulous ears. But the case is otherwise with us Christians; for we are tied up to phrases, and ought to speak according to a certain rule, lest the licentious use of words should beget a wicked opinion in any concerning those things, that are signified by them.—That is, though this might be in a manner excusable in the Pagans, because each of those three hypostases is God, therefore to call them severally gods, and all of them a trinity of gods and principles; they having no such rule then given them to govern their language by as this; "That though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet are they not three Gods, but one God:" yet is not this allowable for us Christians, to speak of a second or third God or principle, or to call the holy Trinity a trinity of Gods, notwithstanding that when we speak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost severally, we confess each of them to be God.

And indeed when the Pagans thus spake of a first, second, and third god, and no more, though having other innumerable gods besides, they did, by this language, plainly imply, that these three gods of theirs, were of a very different kind from all the rest of their gods; that is, not *θεοὶ γεννητοὶ*, but *ἀΐδιοι*, not created, but eternal and uncreated ones. And that many of them did really take this whole trinity of gods for the *τὸ Θεῖον* in general, the Divine Numen, and sometimes call it the first God too, in way of distinction from their generated gods, will be showed afterward. So that the *Πρῶτος Θεὸς*, the first god, was used in different senses by these Pagans, sometimes in a larger sense, and in way of opposition to all the *γεννητοὶ θεοὶ*, the generated or created gods, or the gods, that were made in time, together with the world; and sometimes again, more particularly, in way of distinction from those two other Divine hypostases eternal, called by them the second and third god. Which first of the three gods is also frequently by them called *Θεὸς*, God, emphatically and by way of excellency, they supposing a gradual subordination in these principles.

Neither was this trinity of Divine subsistences only thus ill-languaged by the Pagans generally, when they called it a trinity of gods; but also the cabala thereof was otherwise much depraved and adulterated by several of the Platonists and Pythagoreans. For first, the third of these three hypostases, commonly called Psyche, is by some of them made to be *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος*, the immediate soul of the corporeal world, informing, acting and enlivening it, after the same manner as the souls of other animals do their respective bodies; insomuch that this corporeal world itself, as together with its soul it makes up one complete animal, was frequently called the third god. This Proclus[1] affirmeth of Numenius the Pythagorean, *ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεὸς*, That the world, according to him, was the third god.—And Plotinus, being a great reader of this Numenius, seems to have been somewhat infected by him with this conceit also, though contrary to his own principles, from those words before cited out of him,[2] *ὁ κόσμος θεὸς, ὥσπερ συνηθὲς λέγειν, τρίτος*, the world, as is commonly said, is the third god.

Now, if the world be not a creature, then is there no created being at all, but all is God. But not only Timæus Locrus, but also Plato himself, calls it *θεῖον γεννητὸν*, that is, a created god, the word *γεννητὸν* being here put for that, which, after it once was not, is brought into being; which is the proper notion of a creature. So that the animated world is, by Plato, made to be only the chief of all the *γεννητοὶ θεοὶ*, that is, the creature-gods. Wherefore it is plain, that in this trinity of some Platonists and Pythagoreans, wherein the world is made to be the third god, there is a confused jumble of created and uncreated beings together. For the first of those gods is the father and fountain of all, or the original of the godhead. And the second, forasmuch as he is called by them, both *ποιητὴς*, and *δημιουργὸς*, the maker and the opificer of the whole world, he therefore can be no creature neither: whereas the third, which is said to be the world, was by Numenius himself also expressly called both *ποίημα* and *τὸ δημιουργούμενον*, the work, or thing made, that is plainly, the creature of both the former. Proclus[3] thus fully represents his sense; *Πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὥστε ὁ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττὸς, ὅτε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ*

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. ii. p. 93.

[2] This is a mistake, for Dr. Cudworth had not cited these words before, but they are to be found in Plotinus, Ennead. iii. lib. v. cap. vi. p. 296.

[3] Comment. in Timæum Platon, lib. ii. p. 93.

τρίτος· Numenius called the first of the three gods the father, the second of them the maker, and the third the work, or thing made; so that, according to Numenius, there were two opificers, or creators of the world, the first and the second god; and the world itself, (that is, the thing made and created by them both) is said to be the third god.

And that this notion of the Trinity is an adulterated one, may be also further concluded from hence, because, according to this hypothesis, they might have said, that there were three hundred and more gods, as well as that there are three; since all the other γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, generated gods—might have come into the number too, as well as the world, they being parts thereof, and gods that differ not in kind from it, but only in degree. Wherefore these philosophers ought not to have made a trinity of gods, distinguished from all the rest, but rather first to have distributed their gods into θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι and γεννητοὶ, that is, eternal or uncreated, and created gods, and then to have subdivided those created gods into the whole world, and the parts thereof animated.

But because it may be here alleged in favor of this spurious hypothesis of the Trinity, that the world was accounted the third god, only by accident, in respect of its soul, which is properly that third god; though Numenius, with others, plainly affirm the world itself, as ποίημα and δημιουργούμενον, as the work and thing made, to be the third; we shall therefore reply to this, that even the soul of the mundane animal itself, according to Timæus, and Plato, and others, is affirmed to be γεννητὸς θεὸς, a generated god—that is, such as was produced from non-existence into being, and therefore truly and properly a creature. Which Aristotle[1] observing, therefore took occasion to tax Plato as contradicting himself, in making the soul of the world a principle, that is, the third god, and yet supposing it to be ὕστερον καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ, not eternal, but made or created together with the heaven—of which something before. Wherefore we conclude, that this ancient cabala of the Trinity was depraved and adulterated by those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itself, or else ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον, an informing soul of the world—to be the third hypostasis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themselves, notwithstanding, call a trinity of causes and of principles.

And we think it highly probable, that this was the true reason, why Philo, though he admitted the second hypostasis of the Platonic and Pythagoric (if not Egyptian) Trinity, called by him θεῖος λόγος, the divine Word—and styled δεύτερος θεὸς, the second god—and, as Euse-

[1] Vide Metaphys. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 278. tom. iv. oper. et Physic. Auscultat. lib. viii. cap. i. p. 578. tom. i. oper.

bius[1] adds, *δεύτερον αἴτιον*, the second cause—yet he would not Platonize or Pythagorize any further, so as to take in that third god, or cause, supposed by many of them to be the soul of the whole world, as an animal; because he must then have offered violence to the principles of his own religion, in making the whole created world a god; which practice is, by him, condemned in the Pagans. It is true, that he somewhere sticks not to call God also the soul of the world, as well as the mind thereof, whether he meant thereby *τὸν πρὸ τοῦ λόγου θεὸν*, that God, who is before the Word—or else rather the Word itself, the second God (according to him the immediate creator and governor of the same); nevertheless, he does not seem to understand thereby such a deeply immersed soul, as would make the world an animal, and a god, but a more elevated one; that is, *ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον*, a super-mundane soul.

To this first depravation of that *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, that theology of Divine tradition—and ancient cabala of the Trinity, by many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans, may be added another, that some of them declaring the second hypostasis of their Trinity to be the archetypal world, or *τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν παγέντα κόσμον*, as Philo calls it, [2]the world that is compounded and made up of ideas—and containeth in it all those kinds of things intelligibly, that are in this lower world sensibly; and further concluding, that all these several ideas of this archetypal and intelligible world, are really so many distinct substances, animals and gods, have thereby made that second hypostasis not to be one God, but a congeries and heap of gods. These are those gods commonly called by them *νοητοὶ θεοὶ*, intelligible gods—not as before in way of distinction from the [3]*αἰσθητοὶ*, the sensible gods—(which is a more general notion of the word), but from those other gods of theirs (afterwards to be insisted on also) called *νοεροὶ θεοὶ*, intellectual gods. —Proclus upon Plato's Politia[4] concludes, that there is no idea of evil, for this reason, because if there were, *καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ἰδέα θεὸς ἔσται, ἐπείπερ πᾶσα ἰδέα θεὸς ὡς Παρμενίδης εἴρηκεν·* that very idea of evil also would itself be a god, because every idea is a god, as Parmenides hath affirmed.—Neither was Plotinus himself, though otherwise more sober, altogether uninfected with this fantastic conceit of the ideas being all of them gods, he writing thus concerning the second God, the first Mind or Intellect: [5]*γενόμενον δὲ ἤδη τὰ ὄντα σὺν αὐτῷ γεννῆσαι, πᾶν μὲν*

Præparat. Evang. lib. vii. cap. xiii.

2 De Opificio Mundi, p. 4.

3 P. 357.

4 De Deo Socratis, p. 43.

5 En. v. l. i. c. vii. [p. 489.]

τὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντας δὲ θεοὺς νοητοὺς, that he being begotten by the first God (that is, by way of emanation, and from eternity), generated all entities together with himself, the pulchritude of the ideas, which are all intelligible gods.—Apuleius[1] also (as hath been already noted) grossly and fulsomely imputes the same to Plato, in those words; "Quos deos Plato existimat, veros, incorporales, animales, sine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æviternos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto," etc.—And he with Julian and others reduces the greater part of the Pagan gods to these ideas of the intelligible, or archetypal world, as making Apollo, for example, to be the intelligible sun, the idea of the sensible; and Diana the intelligible moon, and the like for the rest. Lastly, it hath been observed also, that the Egyptian theologers pretended, in like manner, to worship these intelligible gods, or eternal ideas, in their religious animals, as symbols of them.

Plato indeed Platonized so far, as to suppose God to have made an archetypal and intelligible world, before he made this corporeal and sensible: [2]*Βουληθεὶς* (*ὁ Θεὸς*) *τὸν ὁρατὸν τουτονὶ κόσμον δημιουργῆσαι, προεξτύπου τὸν νοητὸν, ἵνα χρώμενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεστάτῳ παραδείγματι, τὸν σωματικὸν ἀπεργάσηται, πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα, τοσαῦτα περιέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη, ὅσαπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά. τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν συνεστῶτα κόσμον ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ ὑπονοεῖν ἀδύνατον·* God intending to make a visible world, first formed an intelligible one; that so having an incorporeal and most godlike pattern before him, he might make the corporeal world agreeably to the same, this younger an image of that older, that should contain as many sensible kinds in it, as the other did intelligible. But it is not possible (saith he) to conceive this world of ideas to exist in any place.—Nay, according to him, Moses himself philosophized also after the same manner in his Cosmopæia, describing, in the first five verses of Genesis, the making of an intelligible heaven and earth before the sensible: [3]*πρῶτον οὖν παρὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίει οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον, καὶ ἀέρος ἰδέαν καὶ κενοῦ, εἶθ' ὕδατος ἀσωμάτου οὐσίαν καὶ πνεύματος, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἑβδόμου φωτὸς, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν καὶ νοητὸν ἡλίου παράδειγμα*, etc. The Creator first of all made an incorporeal heaven and an invisible earth; the ideas of air and vacuum; incorporeal water and air; and last of all light, which was also the incorporeal and intelligible paradigm of the sun and stars, and that from whence their sensible light is derived.—But Philo does not plainly make these ideas of the intelligible and arche-

[1] De Deo Socratis, p. 43. [2] De Mun. Opif. p. 6. [p. 3, 4.]
[3] P. 6.

typal world to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; though he somewhere[1] takes notice of those, who, admiring the pulchritude of both these worlds, did not only deify the whole of them, but also their several parts; that is, the several ideas of the intelligible world also, as well as the greater parts of the sensible, an intelligible heaven and earth, sun and moon; they pretending to worship those Divine ideas in all these sensible things. Which high-flown Platonic notion, as it gave sanctuary and protection to the grossest and foulest of all the Pagan superstitions and idolatries, when the Egyptians would worship brute animals, and other Pagans all the things of nature (inanimate substances, and mere accidents), under a pretence of worshipping the Divine ideas in them; so did it directly tend to absolute impiety, irreligion, and Atheism; there being few that could entertain any thoughts at all of those eternal ideas, and scarcely any who could thoroughly persuade themselves that these had so much reality in them, as the sensible things of nature; as the idea of a house in the mind of an architect hath not so much reality in it as a material house made up of stones, mortar, and timber; so that their devotion must needs sink down wholly into those sensible things, and themselves naturally at length fall into this atheistic persuasion, That the good things of nature are the only deities.

Here therefore have we a multitude of Pagan gods supermundane and eternal (though all depending upon one supreme), the gods by them properly called *νοητοὶ*, intelligible—or the Divine ideas. And we cannot but account this for another depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala of the Trinity, that the second hypostasis thereof is made to be the archetypal world, and all the Divine ideas, as so many distinct substances, animals and gods; that is, not one god, but a whole world of gods.

But over and besides all this, some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans did further deprave and adulterate the ancient Hebrew or Mosaic cabala of the Trinity (the certain rule whereof is now only the Scriptures of the New Testament), when they concluded, that as from the third hypostasis of their Trinity, called *ἡ πρώτη ψυχή*, the first soul —there were innumerable other particular souls derived, namely, the souls of all inferior animals, that are parts of the world; so in like manner, that from their second hypostasis, called *ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς*, the first mind or intellect—there were innumerable other *μερικοὶ Νόες*, particular minds—or intellects substantial derived, superior to the first soul; and not only so, but also, that from that first and highest hypos-

[1] De Confusione Linguar. p. 345.

tasis of all, called *Τὸ ἕν*, and *Τἀγαθὸν*, the one, and the good—there were derived likewise many particular *Ἑνάδες*, and *Ἀγαθότητες*, unities and goodnesses substantial—superior to the first intellect. Thus Proclus[1] in his Theologic Institutions, *Μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἕν ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον, ἑνάδες· καὶ μετὰ νοῦν τὸν πρῶτον, νόες· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαί· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις·* After the first One (and from it), there are many particular henades or unities; after the first Intellect and from it, many particular noes, minds, or intellects; after the first Soul, many particular and derivative souls; and lastly, after the universal Nature, many particular natures, and spermatic reasons.—Where it may be *obiter* observed, that these Platonists supposed, below the universal Psyche, or mundane soul, a universal *φύσις*, or substantial nature also; but so as that besides it there were other particular *λόγοι σπερματικοὶ*, seminal reasons—or plastic principles also.

As for these noes, and that besides the first universal Mind or Intellect, there are other particular minds or intellects substantial, a rank of beings not only immutably good and wise, but also every way immoveable, and therefore above the rank of all souls, that are self-moveable beings; Proclus was not singular in this, but had the concurrence of many other Platonists with him; amongst whom Plotinus may seem to be one, from this passage of his besides others, *ὅτι ἀθάνατοι δὲ αἱ ψυχαὶ, καὶ νοῦς πᾶς, ἐν ἄλλοις διὰ πλειόνων εἴρηται·* that souls are immortal, and every mind or intellect, we have elsewhere largely proved.—Upon which words Ficinus thus: [2]"Hic, et supra et infra sæpe, per verba Plotini notabis, plures esse mentium animarumque substantias inter se distinctas, quamvis inter eas unio sit mirabilis." Here, and from many other places, before and after, you may observe, that according to Plotinus, there are many substantial minds distinct from souls, though there be a wonderful union betwixt them.—Moreover, that there was also above these noes, or immoveable but multiform minds, not only one perfect Monad, and first Good, but also a rank of many particular henades or monades, and agathotetes; was, besides Proclus and others, asserted by Simplicius also: [3]*ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάντα παράγει, τάτε πρῶτα, καὶ τὰ μέσα, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἑαυτῷ παράγει, μία ἀγαθότης πολλὰς ἀγαθότητας, καὶ μία ἑνὰς ἡ ὑπὲρ πάσας, πολλὰς ἑνάδας·* The highest good (saith he) produceth all things from himself, in several ranks and degrees; the first, the middle, and the last or lowest of all. But the first and the next to himself doth he produce like himself, one goodness many goodnesses, and one unity or

[1] N. xxi. [cap. xxi. p. 426.]

[2] P. 653. [Ennead. vi. lib. iv. cap. x.]

[3] In Epict. Ench. p. 9.

henade many henades.—And that by these henades and autoagathotetes he means substantial beings, that are conscious of themselves, appears also from these following words : [1]τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ παραγομένων, διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁμόφυες, οὐκ ἐξέστιν τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά, ἀκίνητα ὄντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀεὶ μακαριότητι ἱδρυμένα, οὐκ ἐνδεῆ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι αὐτοαγαθότητές εἰσι· Those beings, which are first produced from the first good, by reason of their sameness of nature with him, are immoveably and unchangeably good, always fixed in the same happiness, and never indigent of good or falling from it, because they are all essential goodnesses.—Where afterward he adds something concerning the νόες also, that though these were a rank of lower beings, and not αὐτοάγαθα, not essentially goodnesses, but only by participation ; yet, being by their own nature also immoveable, they can never degenerate, nor fall from that participation of good. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that some of these Platonists seem to take the word henades sometimes in another sense, and to understand nothing else thereby but the intelligible idea before mentioned ; though the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not wont to call these unities, but numbers.

And now have we discovered more of the Pagans' inferior gods, supermundane and eternal, viz. besides those νοητοὶ θεοὶ, those intelligible gods—troops of henades and autoagathotetes, unities and goodnesses ; and also of noes, immoveable minds or intellects ; or, as they frequently call them, θεοὶ ἑνιαῖοι, and θεοὶ νοεροὶ, henadical (or monadical) gods, and intellectual gods.

But since these noes, or νοεροὶ θεοὶ, are said to be all of them in their own nature a rank of beings above souls, and therefore superior to that first Soul, which is the third hypostasis of this Trinity : as all those henades or ἑνιαῖοι θεοὶ, those simple monadical gods, are likewise yet a higher rank of beings above the noes, and therefore superior to the second hypostasis also, the first Mind ; and yet all these henades and nous, however supposed by the philosophers to be eternal, forasmuch as they are particular beings only, and not universal, cannot be placed higher than in the rank of creatures ; it follows from hence unavoidably, that both the second and third hypostases of this Trinity, as well the first Mind as the first Soul, must be accounted creatures also ; because no created being can be superior to any thing uncreated. Wherefore Proclus, and some others of those Platonists, plainly understood this Trinity no otherwise, than as a certain scale or ladder of beings in the universe ; or a gradual descent of things from the first

[1] P. 11.

or highest, by steps downward, lower and lower, so far as to the souls of all animals. For which cause, Proclus, to make up this scale complete, adds to these three ranks and degrees, below that third of souls, a fourth of natures also; under which there lies nothing but the passive part of the universe, body and matter. So that their whole scale of all that is above body was indeed not a Trinity, but a quaternity, or four ranks and degrees of beings, one below another; the first of henades or unities, the second of noes, minds or intellects, the third of souls, and the last of natures; these being, as it were, so many orbs and spheres, one within and below another. In all which several ranks of being, they supposed one first universal, and unparticipated, as the head of each respective rank, and many particular or participated ones: as one first universal Henade, and many secondary particular henades; one first universal Nous, Mind, or Intellect, and many secondary and particular noes or minds; one first universal Soul, and many particular souls; and lastly, one universal Nature, and many particular natures. In which scale of being, they deified, besides the first Τὸ ἕν, and Τἀγαθὸν, One, and good—not only the first Mind, and the first Soul, but also those other particular henades and noes universally; and all particular souls above human: leaving out, besides them and inferior souls, that fourth rank of natures, because they conceived, that nothing was to be accounted a god, but what was intellectual and superior to men. Wherein, though they made several degrees of gods, one below another, and called some ἀϊδίους and some γεννητοὺς, some eternal, and some generated—or made in time; yet did they no where clearly distinguish betwixt the Deity properly so called, and the creature, nor show how far in this scale the true Deity went, and where the creature began. But as it were melting the Deity by degrees, and bringing it down lower and lower, they made the juncture and commissure betwixt God and the creature so smooth and close, that where they indeed parted was altogether undiscernible; they rather implying them to differ only in degrees, or that they were not absolute but comparative terms, and consisted but in more and less. All which was doubtless a gross mistake of the ancient cabala of the Trinity.

This is therefore that Platonic Trinity which we oppose to the Christian, not as if Plato's own Trinity, in the very essential constitution thereof, were quite a different thing from the Christian; itself in all probability having been at first derived from a Divine or Mosaic cabala; but because this cabala (as might well come to pass in a thing so mysterious and difficult to be conceived) hath been by divers of these Platonists and Pythagoreans misunderstood, depraved and adulterated,

into such a trinity, as confounds the differences between God and the creature, and removes all the bounds and land-marks betwixt them; sinks the Deity lower and lower by degrees (still multiplying of it, as it goes), till it have at length brought it down to the whole corporeal world; and when it hath done this, is not able to stop there neither, but extends it further still to the animated parts thereof, stars and demons; the design or direct tendency thereof being nothing else, but to lay a foundation for infinite Polytheism, cosmolatry (or world-idolatry,) and creature-worship. Where it is by the way observable, that these Platonic Pagans were the only public and professed champions against Christianity; for though Celsus were suspected by Origen to have indeed been an Epicurean, yet did he at least personate a Platonist too. The reason whereof might be, not only because the Platonic and Pythagoric sect was the divinest of all the Pagans, and that which approached nearest to Christianity and the truth (however it might by accident therefore prove the worst, as the corruption of the best thing), and by that means could with greatest confidence hold up the bucklers against Christianity and encounter it; but also because the Platonic principles, as they might be understood, would, of all other, serve most plausibly to defend the Pagan polytheism and idolatry.

Concerning the Christian Trinity, we shall here observe only three things: first, that it is not a trinity of mere names or words, nor a trinity of partial notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing. For such a kind of trinity as this might be conceived in that first Platonic hypothesis itself, called τὸ ἓν, and τἀγαθὸν, the one and the good—and perhaps also in that first person of the Christian Trinity; namely, of goodness, and understanding or wisdom, and will or active power, three inadequate conceptions thereof. It is true, that Plotinus was so high-flown, as to maintain, that the first and highest principle of all, by reason of its perfect unity and simplicity, is above the multiplicity of knowledge and understanding, and therefore does not so much as νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ, in a proper sense, understand itself: notwithstanding which, this philosopher himself adds, that it cannot therefore be said to be ignorant nor unwise neither; these expressions belonging only to such a being, as was by nature intellectual,[1] νοῦς μὲν γὰρ μὴ νοῶν, ἀνόητος; Intellectus nisi intelligat, demens merito judicatur.—And he seems to grant, that it hath a certain simple clarity and brightness in it, superior to that of knowledge; as the body of the sun has a certain brightness superior to that secondary light which streameth

[1] En. vi. lib. vii. cap. 37. (p. 729.)

from it; and that it may be said to be νόησις αὐτή, knowledge itself—that does not understand, as motion itself does not move. But this can hardly be conceived by ordinary mortals, that the highest and most perfect of all beings should not fully comprehend itself, the extent of its own fecundity and power, and be conscious of all that proceedeth from it, though after the most simple manner. And therefore this high-flown conceit of Plotinus (and perhaps of Plato himself too) has been rejected by the latter Platonists, as fantastical and unsafe: for thus Simplicius,[1] ἀλλὰ καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀκροτάτην, οὐ γὰρ ἄν τι τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ παραγομένων ἀγνοήσειεν· But it must needs have also the most perfect knowledge, since it cannot be ignorant of any thing, that is produced from itself.—And St. Austin,[2] in like manner, confutes that assertion of some Christians, that the λόγος, or eternal Word, was that very wisdom and understanding, by which the Father himself was wise; as making it nothing but an inadequate conception of God. But this opinion, that the Christian Trinity is but a Trinity of words, or mere logical notions and inadequate conceptions of God, hath been plainly condemned by the Christian church in Sabellius and others. Wherefore we conclude it to be a Trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons.

The second thing, that we observe concerning the Christian Trinity, is this: that though the second hypostasis or person thereof, were begotten from the first, and the third proceeded both from the first and second; yet are neither his second or third, creatures; and that for these following reasons. First, because they were not made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, as Arius maintained, that is, from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, nor can it be said of either of them, "Erat quando non erant," that once they were not, but their going forth was from eternity—and they were both coeve and coeternal with the Father. Secondly, because they were not only eternal emanations (if we may so call them) but also necessary, and therefore are they both also absolutely undestroyable and unannihilable. Now, according to true philosophy and theology, no creature could have existed from eternity, nor be absolutely undestroyable; and therefore that, which is both eternal and undestroyable, is *ipso facto* uncreated. Nevertheless, because some philosophers have asserted (though erroneously) both the whole world's eternity, and its being a necessary emanation also from the Deity, and consequently that it is undestroyable; we shall therefore further add,

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1 In Epict. p. 235.

2 De Trinit. lib. vi. cap. ii. iii. p. 598, 599. tom. viii. oper.

that these second and third hypostases or persons of the holy Trinity are not only therefore uncreated, because they were both eternal and necessary emanations, and likewise are unannihilable; but also because they are universal, each of them comprehending the whole world, and all created things under it: which universality of theirs is the same thing with infinity; whereas all other beings, besides this holy Trinity, are particular and finite. Now we say, that no intellectual being, which is not only eternal, and necessarily existent, or undestroyable, but also universal, or infinite, can be a creature.

Again, in the last place, we add that these three hypostases, or persons, are truly and really one God. Not only because they have all essentially one and the same will, according to that of Origen,[1] *θρησκεύομεν οὖν τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὄντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς βουλήσεως·* We worship the Father of truth, and the Son the truth itself, being two things as to hypostasis; but one in agreement, consent, and sameness of will:—but also because they are physically (if we may so speak) one also; and have a mutual *περιχώρησις*, and *ἐνύπαρξις*, inexistence and permeation of one another—according to that of our Saviour Christ, "I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." We grant, indeed, that there can be no instance of the like unity or oneness found in any created beings; nevertheless, we certainly know from our very selves, that it is not impossible for two distinct substances, that are of a very different kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other corporeal, to be so closely united together, as to become one animal and person; much less therefore should it be thought impossible for these three Divine hypostases to be one God.

We shall conclude here with confidence, that the Christian Trinity, though there be very much of mystery in it, yet there is nothing at all of plain contradiction to the undoubted principles of human reason, that is, of impossibility, to be found therein, as the Atheists would pretend, who cry down all for nonsense and absolute impossibility, which their dull stupidity cannot reach to, or their infatuated minds easily comprehend, and therefore even the Deity itself. And it were to be wished that some religionists and Trinitarians did not here symbolize too much with them, in affecting to represent the mystery of the Christian Trinity as a thing directly contradictious to all human reason and understanding; and that perhaps out of design to make men surrender up

[1] C. Cels. p. 386. (lib. viii.)

themselves and consciences, in a blind and implicit faith, wholly to their guidance; as also to debauch their understandings by this means, to the swallowing down of other opinions of theirs, plainly repugnant to human faculties. As who should say, he that believes the Trinity (as we all must do, if we will be Christians,) should boggle at nothing in religion never after, nor scrupulously chew or examine any thing; as if there could be nothing more contradictious, or impossible to human understanding propounded, than this article of the Christian faith.

But, for the present, we shall endeavor only to show, that the Christian Trinity (though a mystery, yet) is much more agreeable to reason, than that Platonic, or Pseudo-Platonic Trinity before described; and that in those three particulars then mentioned. For, first, when those Platonists and Pythagoreans interpret their third God, or last hypostasis of their Trinity, to be either the world, or else a ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, such an immediate soul thereof, as, together with the world its body, make up one animal god; as there is plainly too great a leap here betwixt their second and third hypostasis, so do they debase the Deity therein too much, confound God and the creature together, laying a foundation not only for cosmolatry, or world-idolatry in general, but also for the grossest and most sottish of all idolatries, the worshipping of the inanimate parts of the world themselves, in pretence as parts and members of this great mundane animal, and sensible god.

It is true, indeed, that Origen and some others of the ancient Christian writers have supposed, that God may be said, in some sense, to be the soul of the world. Thus in that book Περὶ Ἀρχῶν,[1] "Sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatum est, et ab una anima continetur, ita et universum mundum, velut animal quoddam immane, opinandum puto; quod quasi ab una anima, virtute Dei ac ratione teneatur. Quod etiam a sancta Scriptura indicari arbitror per illud, quod dictum est per prophetam; Nonne cœlum et terram ego repleo, dicit Dominus? et cœlum mihi sedes, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum; et quod Salvator, cum ait, non esse jurandum neque per cœlum, quia sedes Dei est, neque per terram, quia scabellum pedum ejus. Sed ut illud quod ait Paulus, Quoniam in ipso vivimus et movemur et sumus. Quomodo enim in Deo vivimus, et movemur, et sumus, nisi quod in virtute sua universum constringit et continet mundum?" As our own body is made up of many members, and contained by one soul, so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be looked upon as one huge great animal, which is contained as it were by one soul, the virtue and

[1] Lib. ii. cap. 1.

reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated by the Scripture in sundry places; as in that of the prophet, "Do not I fill heaven and earth?" And again, "Heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool." And in that of our Saviour, "Swear not at all, neither by heaven, because it is the throne of God, nor by the earth, because it is his footstool." And, lastly, in that of Paul to the Athenians, "For in him we live, and move, and have our being." For how can we be said to live and move, and have our being in God, unless because he by his virtue and power, does constringe and contain the whole world? and how can heaven be the throne of God, and the earth his footstool, unless his virtue and power fill all things both in heaven and earth?—Nevertheless, God is here said by Origen to be but *quasi anima*, as it were the soul of the world:—as if he should have said, that all the perfection of a soul is to be attributed to God, in respect of the world; he quickening and enlivening all things, as much as if he were the very soul of it, and all the parts thereof were his living members. And perhaps the whole Deity ought not to be looked upon, according to Aristotle's notion thereof, merely as ἀκίνητος οὐσία, an immovable essence; —for then it is not conceivable, how it could either act upon the world or be sensible of any thing therein; or to what purpose any devotional addresses should be made by us to such an unaffectible, inflexible, rocky, and adamantine Being. Wherefore all the perfection of a mundane soul may perhaps be attributed to God, in some sense, and he called, *quasi anima mundi*, as it were the soul thereof:—though St. Cyprian would have this properly to belong to the third hypostasis or person of the Christian Trinity, viz. the Holy Ghost. But there is something of imperfection also plainly cleaving and adhering to this notion of a mundane soul, besides something of a Paganity likewise, necessarily consequent thereupon, which cannot be admitted by us. Wherefore God, or the third Divine hypostasis, cannot be called the soul of the world in this sense, as if it were so immersed thereinto, and so passive from it, as our soul is immersed into, and passive from its body; nor as if the world, and this soul together, made up one entire animal, each part whereof were incomplete alone by itself. And that God, or the third hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, is not to be accounted, in this sense, properly the soul of the world, according to Origen himself, we may learn from these words of his;[1] "Solius Dei, id est, Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, naturæ, id proprium est; ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere." It is proper to the nature of God

[1] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, lib. i. cap. vi.

alone, that is, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to subsist without any material substance, or body, vitally united to it.—Where Origen affirming, that all created souls and spirits whatsoever, have always some body or other vitally united to them; and that it is the property only of the three persons of the holy Trinity, not to be vitally united to any body, as the soul thereof; whether this assertion of his be true or no (which is a thing not here to be discussed), he does plainly hereby declare, that God, or the third hypostasis of the Trinity, is not to be accounted in a true and proper sense, the soul of the world.

And it is certain, that the more refined Platonists were themselves also of this persuasion; and that their third God, or Divine hypostasis, was neither the whole world (as supposed to be animated) nor yet *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος*, the immediate soul of this mundane animal—but only *ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος*, a supermundane soul;—that is, such a thing as though it preside over the whole world, and take cognizance of all things in it, yet it is not properly an essential part of that mundane animal, but a being elevated above the same. For thus Proclus[1] plainly affirmeth, not only of Amelius, but also of Porphyrius himself, who likewise pretended to follow Plotinus therein; *μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀμέλιον ὁ Πορφύριος οἰόμενος τῷ Πλωτίνῳ συνᾴδειν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργὸν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν αὐτῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἀπέστραπται, τὸ αὐτοζῶον, ὡς εἶναι τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατὰ τοῦτον·* After Amelius, Porphyrius, thinking to agree with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the immediate opificer or maker of the world, and that mind or intellect, to which it is converted, not the opificer himself, but the paradigm thereof.—And though Proclus there makes a question, whether or no this was Plotinus's true meaning, yet Porphyrius is most to be accredited herein, he having had such an intimate acquaintance with him. Wherefore, according to these three Platonists, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyrius, the third hypostasis of the Platonic Trinity is neither the world, nor the immediate soul of the mundane animal; but a certain supermundane soul, which also was *δημιουργὸς*, the opificer and creator of the world,—and therefore no creature. Now the corporeal world being supposed, by these Platonists also, to be an animal, they must therefore needs acknowledge a double soul, one *ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον*, the immediate soul of this mundane animal, and another *ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον*, a supermundane soul, which was the third in their trinity of gods, or Divine hypostases, the proper and immediate opificer of the world. And the same, in all probability, was Plato's opinion also; and therefore that soul, which is

[1] In Timæ. p. 93, 94.

the only Deity, that in his book of Laws he undertakes to prove, was ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, a supermundane soul, and not the same with that ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, that mundane soul, whose genesis, or generation, is described in his Timæus; the former of them being a principle and eternal; and the latter made in time, together with the world, though said to be older than it, because in order of nature before it. And thus we see plainly, that though some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans, either misunderstood, or depraved the cabala of the trinity, so as to make the third hypostasis thereof to be the animated world, which themselves acknowledged to be ποίημα and δημιουργούμενον, a creature and thing made; yet others of the refined of them, supposed this third hypostasis of their trinity to be not a mundane, but a supermundane soul, and δημιουργὸν, not a creature, but the Creator or opificer of the whole world.

And as for the second particular proposed, it was a gross absurdity in those Platonists also, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, and hypostasis, not to be one God, or hypostasis, but a multitude of gods and hypostases; as also was that a monstrous extravagancy of theirs, to suppose the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and animals. Which, besides others, Tertullian in his book De Anima,[1] thus imputes to Plato: "Vult Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporeales, supermundiales, divinas, et æternas, quas appellat ideas, id est, formas et exempla, et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus; et illas quidem esse veritates, hæc autem imagines earum." Plato conceiveth that there are certain substances, invisible, incorporeal, supermundial, divine, and eternal; which he calls ideas, that is, forms, exemplars, and causes, of all these natural and sensible things; they being the truths, but the other the images.—Neither can it be denied but that there are some odd expressions in Plato, sounding that way, who therefore may not be justified in this, nor I think in some other conceits of his, concerning these ideas: as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of science, but also the proper and physical causes of all things here below; as, for example, that the ideas of similitude and dissimilitude are the causes of the likeness and unlikeness of all things to one another by their participation of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be at all doubted, but that Plato himself, and most of his followers, very well understood, that these ideas were, all of them, really nothing else but the *noëmata*, or conceptions, of that one perfect Intellect, which was their

[1] Page 320. Rig.

second hypostasis; and, therefore, they could not look upon them in good earnest, as so many distinct substances existing severally and apart by themselves out of any mind, however they were guilty of some extravagant expressions concerning them. Wherefore, when they called them *οὐσίαις*, essences or substances, (as they are called in Philo *ἀναγκαιόταται οὐσίαι*, the most necessary essences,) their true meaning herein was only this, to signify, that they were not such accidental and evanid things, as our conceptions are; they being the standing objects of all science, at least, if not the causes also of existent things. Again, when they were by them sometimes called animals also, they intended only to signify thereby, that they were not mere dead forms, like pictures drawn upon paper, or carved images and statues. And thus Amelius,[1] the philosopher,[2] plainly understood that passage of St. John the Evangelist, concerning the eternal *λόγος*, he pointing the words otherwise than our copies now do, *ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*, that which was made in him, was life: this philosopher glossing after this manner upon it, *ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν, καὶ ζωὴν, καὶ ὂν πεφυκέναι*, in whom whatsoever was made, was living, and life, and true being.—Lastly, no wonder, if from animals these ideas forthwith became gods too, to such men as took all occasion possible to multiply gods; in which there was also something of that scholastic notion, "Quicquid est in Deo, est Deus;" Whatsoever is in God, is God.—But the main thing therein was a piece of Paganic poetry; these Pagan theologers being generally possessed with that poetic humor of personating things and deifying them. Wherefore, though the ideas were so many titular gods to many of the Platonic Pagans, yet did Julian himself, for example, who made the most of them, suppose them all *συνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν*, to co-exist with God and in-exist in him—that is, in the first mind, or second hypostasis of their trinity.

Lastly, Whereas Proclus, and others of the Platonists, intermingle many particular gods with those three universal principles or hypostases of their Trinity, as *noes*, minds, or intellects, superior to the first soul; and henades and agathotetes, unities and goodnesses superior to the first intellect too; thereby making those particular beings, which must needs be creatures, superior to those hypostases, that are universal and infinite, and by consequence creaturizing of them: this hypothesis of theirs, I say, is altogether absurd and irrational also; there being no created beings essentially good and wise, but all by participation, nor

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1 Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. ix. cap. xix. p. 540.

2 So Clem. Al. S. Cyril, S. Aug. and other Latins.

any immovable natures amongst them, whose οὐσία is their ἐνέργεια, their essence, their operation; but all mutable and changeable, and probably, as Origen[1] and others of the fathers add, lapsible and peccable. "Nulla natura est, quæ non recipiat bonum et malum, excepta Dei natura, quæ bonorum omnium fons est; et Christi sapientia, sapientiæ enim fons est, et sapientia utique stultitiam recipere non potest; et justitia est, quæ nunquam profecto injustitiam capiet; et verbum est vel ratio, quæ utique irrationalis effici non potest; sed et lux est, et lucem certum est, quod tenebræ non comprehendent. Similiter et natura Spiritus Sancti, quæ sancta est, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim vel substantialiter sancta est. Siqua autem alia natura sancta est, ex assumptione hoc vel inspiratione Spiritus Sancti habet, ut sanctificetur, non ex sua natura hoc possidens, sed ut accidens; propter quod et decidere potest, quod accidit." There is no nature, which is not capable both of good and evil, excepting only the nature of God, who is the fountain of all good, and the wisdom of Christ; for he is the fountain of wisdom, and wisdom itself never can receive folly; he is also justice itself, which can never admit of injustice; and the reason and word itself, which can never become irrational; he is also the light itself, and it is certain that darkness cannot comprehend this light, nor insinuate itself with it. In like manner the nature of the Holy Ghost is such, as can never receive pollution, it being substantially and essentially holy. But whatsoever other nature is holy, it is only such in way of participation and by the inspiration of this Holy Spirit; so that holiness is not its very nature and essence, but only an accident to it; and whatsoever is but accidental may fail. All created beings therefore having but accidental goodness and wisdom, may degenerate and fall into evil and folly.—Which of Origen's is all one, as if he should have said, there is no such rank of beings as autoagathotetes, essential goodnesses, there being only one Being essentially good, or goodness itself. Nor no such particular created beings existing in nature as the Platonists call noes neither, that is, minds or intellects immoveable, perfectly and essentially wise, or wisdom itself, whose οὐσία is their ἐνέργεια, whose essence is their operation, and who consequently have no flux at all in them, nor successive action; (only the eternal word and wisdom of God being such) who also are absolutely ununitable to any bodies. It is true, that Origen did sometimes make mention of νοὲς, minds or intellects, but it was in another sense, he calling all souls, as first created by God, and before their lapse, by that name;

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[1] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, lib. i. cap. viii. p. 685.

which was as much as if he should have said, though some of the Platonists talk much of their noes, yet is there nothing answerable to that name, according to their notion of them; but the only noes really existing in nature, are unfallen, but peccable souls; he often concluding, that the highest rank of created beings are indeed no better than those which the Platonists commonly call ψυχαὶ, or souls. By which souls he understood first of all, beings in their own nature self-movable and active; whereas the noes of the Platonists are altogether immoveable and above action. And then again, such beings or spirits incorporeal, as exist not abstractly and separately from all matter, as the noes of the Platonists were supposed to do, but are vitally unitable to bodies, so as, together with those bodies, to compound and make up one animal. Thus, I say, Origen conceived even of the highest angelical, and archangelical orders, that they were all of them ψυχαὶ, souls, united to bodies, but such as were pure, subtle, and ethereal: however, he supposed it not impossible for them to sink down into bodies, more gross and feculent. And it is certain, that many of the ancient Christian writers concurred with Origen herein, that the highest created spirits were no naked and abstract minds, but souls clothed with some corporeal indument. Lastly, Origen's souls were also supposed to be all of them, endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or free will, and consequently to be self-improvable and self-impairable; and no particular created spirits to be absolutely in their own nature impeccable, but lapsible into vicious habits: whereas the Platonic noes are supposed to be such beings, as could never fall nor degenerate. And the generality of the Christian writers seemed to have consented, or conspired with Origen in this also, they supposing him, who is now the prince of devils, to have been once an angel of the highest order. Thus does St. Jerome[1] determine; "Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum non cadit; cætera, cum sint liberi arbitri, possunt in utramque partem suam flectere voluntatem." God is the only being, that is absolutely incapable of sin; but all other beings, having free-will in them, may possibly turn their will to either way;—that is, to evil as well as to good. It is certain, that God, in a sense of perfection, is the most free agent of all, neither is contingent liberty universally denied to him; but here it is made the only privilege of God, that is, of the holy Trinity, to be devoid of *liberum arbitrium*, namely, as it implieth imperfection, that is, peccability and lapsibility in it.

It is true, that some of the Platonic philosophers suppose, that even in that rank of beings, called by them souls, though they be not essen-

[1] Epistol. cxli.

tially immutable, but all self-moveable and active, yet there are some of them of so high a pitch and elevation, as, that they can never degenerate, nor sink down into vicious habits. Thus Simplicius for one; [1]ἀλλὰ αἱ μὲν πρῶται τῶν ψυχῶν, αἵτε προσεχῶς ὑπὸ αὐτοαγάθων παραχθεῖσαι, κἂν ἔσχόν τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὑφειμένον, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθότητες, ἀλλὰ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πλὴν ὡς συγγενεῖς πρὸς αὐτό, συμφυῶς τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναποσπάστως ὀρέγονται, καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν μονοειδῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τεταμένην ἔχουσι, οὐδέποτε ἀποκλίνουσαι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις ἀντ' ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν αἵρεσις, τάχα οὐκ ἂν εἴη προαίρεσις ἐκείνοις; εἰ μήτις αὐτὴν προαίρεσιν ὡς τὰ πρῶτα ἀγαθὰ αἱρουμένην καλοῖ· But the first and highest of souls, which were immediately produced from what are essentially good, although they have some abatement in them, they being not goodnesses essentially, but desirous of good, nevertheless are they so near a-kin to that highest good of all, as that they do naturally and indivulsively cleave to the same, and have their volitions always uniformly directed towards it, they never declining to the worser. Insomuch that if proæresis be taken for the choosing of one thing before another, perhaps there is no such thing as proæresis to be imputed to them, unless one should call the choosing of the first goods proæresis. —By these higher souls Simplicius must needs understand, either the souls of the sun, moon, and stars, or else those of the superior orders of demoniac or angelic beings. Where though he make a question, whether proæresis or deliberation belong to them, yet does he plainly imply, that they have none at all of that lubricous *liberum arbitrium* or free-will belonging to them, which would make them capable of vice and immorality as well as virtue.

But whatever is to be said of this, there seems to be no necessity at all for admitting that assertion of Origen's, that all rational souls whatsoever, even those of men and those of the highest angelical order, are universally of one of the same nature, and have no fundamental or essential difference in their constitution; and consequently that all the difference, that is now betwixt them, did arise only from the difference of their demeanor, or use of that power and liberty, which they all alike once had. So that thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers, were all made such by their merits; and human souls, though now sunk so low, yet are not absolutely incapable of commencing angels, or ascending to those highest altitudes: as it is not impossible, according to him, neither but that the highest angels also, the seraphim and cherubim might, in length of time, not only degenerate into devils, but also sink down into human bodies; his reason for

[1] In Epist. p. 12, 13.

which monstrous paradox is only this, that the Divine justice cannot otherwise well be salved, but God must needs be a προσωπολήπτης, an accepter of persons, should he have arbitrarily made such vast differences amongst intellectual beings. Which ground he also extendeth so far, as to the human soul of our Saviour Christ himself, as being not partially appointed to that transcendent dignity of its hypostatic union, but by reason of its most faithful adherence to the Divine word and wisdom, in a pre-existent state, beyond all other souls; which he endeavors thus to prove from the Scripture: [1] "Quod dilectionis perfectio, et affectus sinceritas, ei inseparabilem cum Deo fecerit unitatem, ita ut non fortuita fuerit, aut cum personæ acceptione, animæ ejus assumtio, sed virtutum suaram sibi merito delata; audi ad eum prophetam dicentem, Dilexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem; propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo lætitiæ præ participibus tuis: dilectionis ergo merito ungitur oleo lætitiæ anima Christi, id est, cum verbo Dei unum efficitur. Ungi namque oleo, lætitiæ, non aliud intelligitur quam Spiritu Sancto repleri. Præ participibus autem dixit; quia non gratia spiritus sicut prophetis ei data est, sed ipsius verbi Dei in ea substantialis inerat plenitudo." That the perfection of love, and sincerity of Divine affection, procured to this soul its inseparable union with the Godhead, so that the assumption of it was neither fortuitous nor partial, or with prosopolepsy (the acceptation of persons) but bestowed upon it justly for the merit of its virtues; hear (saith he) the prophet thus declaring to him, "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity: therefore hath God, even thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." The soul of Christ therefore was anointed with the oil of gladness, or made one with the word of God, for the merits of love and faithful adherence to God, and no otherwise. For to be anointed with the oil of gladness here properly signifies nothing else, but to be replenished with the Holy Ghost. But when it is said, that he was thus anointed above his fellows, this intimateth, that he had not the Holy Ghost bestowed upon him, only as the prophets and other holy men had, but that the substantial fulness of the word of God dwelt in him.—But this reason of Origen's seems to be very weak; because if there be a rank of souls below human, specifically differing from the same, as Origen himself must needs confess (he not allowing the souls of brutes to have been human souls lapsed, as some Pythagoreans and Platonists conceited, but renouncing and disclaiming that opinion, as monstrously absurd and irrational) there can be no reason given, why there might not be as well other ranks and orders of souls

[1] Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, lib. i. c. vi.

superior to those of men, without the injustice of prosopolepsy; as, besides Simplicius, Plotinus and the generality of other Platonists conceived.

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that souls, as such, are essentially endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or free-will, and therefore never in their own nature impeccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls upwards and downwards, and so makes them to be never at rest, denying them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by Divine grace; such as wherein they might be free from the fear and danger of ever losing the same. Of whom St. Austin[1] therefore thus: "Illum et propter alia nonnulla, et maxime propter alternantes sine cessatione beatitudines et miserias, et statutis seculorum intervallis ab istis ad illas, atque ab illis ad istas itus ac reditus interminabiles, non immerito reprobavit ecclesia; quia et hoc quod misericors videbatur, amisit, faciendo sanctis veras miserias, quibus pœnas luerent, et falsas beatitudines, in quibus verum ac securum, hoc est, sine timore certum sempiterni boni gaudium non haberent." The church hath deservedly rejected Origen, both for certain other opinions of his, and especially for those his alternate beatitudes and miseries, without end, and for his infinite circuits, ascents and descents of souls, from one to the other, in restless vicissitudes and after periods of time. Forasmuch as hereby he hath quite lost that very title of pitiful, or merciful, which otherwise he seemed to have deserved, by making so many true miseries for the best of saints, in which they should successively undergo punishment and smart; and none but false happiness for them, such as wherein they could never have any true or secure joy, free from the fear of losing that good which they possess.—For this Origenical hypothesis seems directly contrary to the whole tenor of the gospel, promising eternal and everlasting life to those, who believe in Christ, and perseveringly obey him; (1 John ii.), "This is the promise, that he hath promised us, even eternal life;" and Tit. 1: 2, "In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, hath promised." And, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life;" and lest all this should be taken for a periodical eternity only, (John 3: 26), "He that believeth in me, shall never die." And possibly this might be the meaning of Paul, (2 Tim. 1: 10), when he affirmeth of our Saviour Christ, that "he hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light, through the gospel;" not because he was the first, who had discovered, and published to the world, the soul's

[1] De Civitate Dei, lib. xxi. cap. xvii. p, 481. tom. viii. oper.

immortality, which was believed before, not only by all the Pharasaic Jews, but also by the generality of Pagans too ; but because these, for the most part, held their endless circuits and transmigrations of souls : therefore was he the first, who brought everlasting life to light, and gave the world assurance, in the faith of the gospel, of a fixed and permanent state of happiness, and a never-fading crown of glory to be obtained ; " Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out." Apoc. 3: 12.

Now the reason, why we mentioned Origen here, was because he was a person, not only thoroughly skilled in all the Platonic learning, but also one, who was sufficiently addicted to those dogmata, he being commonly conceived to have had too great a kindness for them ; and, therefore, had there been any solidity of reason for either those particular henades or noes of theirs, created beings above the rank of souls, and consequently, according to the Platonic hypothesis, superior to the universal Psyche also, (which was the third hypostasis in their trinity, and seems to answer to the Holy Ghost in the Christian) ; Origen was as likely to have been favorable thereunto as any other. But it is indeed manifestly repugnant to reason, that there should be any such particular, that is, created henades, and *αὐτοαγαθότητες*, essential goodnesses—superior to the Platonic first Mind ; or any such noes, and *αὐτοσοφίαι*, essential wisdoms—superior to their universal Psyche ; it being all one, as if, in the Christian Trinity, besides the first person, or the Father, one should suppose a multitude of particular paternities superior to the second ; and also, besides the second person, the Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons, or words, all superior to the third person, the Holy Ghost. For this is plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, to confound the Creator and creature together ; and to suppose a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a manifest contradiction in the very notion of them.

Wherefore, we shall here observe, that this was not the Catholic doctrine of the Platonic school, that there were such henades and noes, but only a private opinion of some doctors amongst them, and that of the latter sort too. For, first, as for those henades, as there are not the least footsteps of them to be found any where in Plato's writings, so may it be plainly gathered from them, that he supposed no such thing. Forasmuch as, in his second epistle, where he describes his trinity,[1] he doth not say of the first, *περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα*, about the first are the first—as he doth of the second, *δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα*, and of the third, *τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίνα*, about the second are the second, and about

[1] P. 707. oper.

the third the third—but of the first he saith, περὶ τὸν πάντων Βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, about the king of all things are all things, and for his sake are all things; and he is the cause of all things, that are good.—Wherefore here are no particular henades and autoagathotetes, unities and goodnesses, about the first Τὸ Ἓν and Τἀγαθὸν, One and Good; but all good things are about him, he being both the efficient and final cause of all. Moreover Plotinus, throughout all his works, discovers not the least suspicion neither of these henades and agathotetes, this language being scarcely to be found any where in the writings of any Platonists senior to Proclus; who also, as if he were conscious, that this *assumentum* to the Platonic theology were not so defensible a thing, doth himself sometime, as it were, tergiversate and decline it, by equivocating in the word henades, taking them for the ideas, or the intelligible gods before mentioned. As perhaps Synesius also uses the word, in his first hymn, when God is called by him

Ἑνοτήτων ἑνὰς ἁγνὴ,
Μονάδων μονάς τε πρώτη,

the first Henad of Henades, and the first Monad of Monades; that is, the first idea of good, and cause of all the ideas.—And as for the particular noes, minds or intellects, these indeed seem to have crept up somewhat before Plotinus's time; he, besides the passage before cited, elsewhere giving some intimations of them, as Enn. 6. l. iv. c. iv. [1]Ἀλλὰ πῶς ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ καὶ νοῖ πολλοὶ; but how can there be many souls, and many minds, and not only one, but many entia?—From which, and other places of his, Ficinus concluded Plotinus, himself really to have asserted, above the rank of souls, a multitude of other substantial beings, called νόες or νοῖ, minds or intellects. Nevertheless, Plotinus speaking of them so uncertainly, and making such an union betwixt all these noes and their particular respective souls, it may well be questioned, whether he really took them for any thing else but the heads and summities of those souls; he supposing, that all souls have a mind in them, the participation of the first Mind; as also unity too, the participation of the first Unity; whereby they are capable of being conjoined with both: [2]δεῖ νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, καὶ νοῦ ἀρχὴν, καὶ αἰτίαν, καὶ θεόν· ὥσπερ τὸ κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ· καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡμεῖς ἐφαπτόμεθα, καὶ σύνεσμεν, καὶ ἀνηρτήμεθα

[1] P. 847, 848. [2] Enn. l. v. c. xi. [lib. i. p. 492.]

ἐνιδρύμεθα δὲ, οἷ' ἂν συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ· There must needs be mind in us, as also the principle and cause of mind, God. Not as if he were divided, but because, though remaining in himself, yet he is also considered in many as capable to receive him. As the centre, though it remain in itself, yet is it also in every line drawn from the circumference, each of them, by a certain point of its own, touching it. And by some such thing in us it is, that we are capable of touching God, and of being united to him, when we direct our intention towards him. —And in the next chapter he adds, ἔχοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀργοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύτοις ἐνεργείαις τὰ πολλά· οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνεργοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείαις αἰεὶ, νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, etc. That though we have these things in us, yet do we not perceive them, being for the most part idle and asleep, as to these higher energies; as some never at all exercise them. However, those do always act; mind, and that which is before mind, unity; but every thing, which is in our souls, is not perceived by us, unless come to the whole, when we dispose ourselves towards it, etc.—Where Plotinus seems to make the noes, or minds, to be nothing else but something in souls, whereby they partake of the first Mind. And it is said of Porphyrius, who was well acquainted with Plotinus's philosophy, that he quite discarded and rejected these noes or intellects, as substances really distinct from the first Mind, and separate from souls. And it is certain, that such minds as these are nowhere plainly mentioned by Plato, he speaking only of minds in souls, but not of any abstract and separate minds, save only one. And though some might think him to have given an intimation of them in his δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, (before mentioned) his second about the second things, or second things about the second—yet by these may very well be understood the ideas; as by the third things about the third, all created beings. Wherefore we may conclude, that this Platonic, or rather Pseudo-Platonic trinity, which confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature, and that probably in favor of the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, is nothing so agreeable to reason itself, as that Christian Trinity before described, which distinctly declares, how far the Deity goes, and where the creature begins; namely, that the Deity extends so far as to this whole Trinity of hypostases; and that all other things whatsoever, this Trinity of persons only excepted, are truly and properly their creatures, produced by the joint concurrence and influence of them all, they being really but one God.

But, it is already manifest, that all the forementioned depravations and adulterations of that Divine cabala of the Trinity, and that spuri-

ious trinity, described, (which, because asserted by some Platonists, was called Platonical, in way of distinction from the Christian) cannot be justly charged, neither upon Plato himself, nor yet upon all his followers universally. But, on the contrary, we shall now make it appear, that Plato and some of the Platonists retained much of the ancient genuine cabala, and made a very near approach to the true Christian Trinity; forasmuch as their three hypostases, distinguished from all their other gods, seem to have been none of them accounted creatures, but all other things whatsoever the creatures of them.

First, therefore, we affirm, that Plato himself does, in the beginning of his Timæus, very carefully distinguish betwixt God and the creature, he determining the bounds between them after this manner: [1] *Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν· τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν· πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γινόμενον, ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι·* We being here to treat concerning the universe, judge it necessary to begin with a distinction betwixt that, which always is, and hath no ortus, or generation; and that, which is made, but never truly is. The former of which, being always like itself and the same, is comprehensible by intellection with reason, or is the object of knowledge; the latter of them, that which is made and perisheth, but never truly is, is not properly knowable, but opinable only, or the object of opinion, together with irrational sense. Now every thing, that is made, must of necessity be made by some cause.—The reason, why Plato, being to treat of the universe, begins here with this distinction, was, as Proclus[2] well observes, because *ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἡμῶν ἐννοίαις ἀπόκειται, τὸ εἶναί τι ἀεὶ ὄν·* it is either one of our common notions, or a thing mathematically demonstrable, that there must be something eternal, or which was never made, but always was, and had no beginning.—And it is evident by sense and experience, that all things are not such, but that some things are made and perish again, or generated and corrupted. Now the latter Platonists, being strongly possessed with a prejudice of the world's eternity, or that it had no beginning, have offered strange violence to Plato's text in this place, and wrested his words to quite a different sense from what he intended; as if by his *τὸ γιγνόμενον*, that which is made—he did not at all mean that, which had a beginning, but only that, whose

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[1] Cap. xii. p. 235. edit. Fabricii.

[2] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. i. p. 10.

duration is flowing and successive, or temporary, which might notwithstanding be without beginning; and as if he supposed the whole corporeal world to be such, which though it hath a successive and temporary duration, yet was without any beginning. And the current ran so strong this way, that even Boethius, that learned Christian philosopher, was himself also carried away with the force thereof, he taking it for granted, likewise, that Plato held the eternity of the world in this sense, that is, its being without beginning: [1] "Non recte quidam (saith he) qui cum audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coæternum putant. Aliud est enim, per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit; aliud interminabilis vitæ totam pariter complexum esse præsentiam; quod divinæ mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet, temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ." Some, when they hear Plato to have held, that the world had no beginning, nor shall never have an end, do not rightly from thence infer, that Plato therefore made the world coeternal with God, because it is one thing always to be, and another thing to possess an endless life all at once, which is proper to the Divine mind. Neither ought God to be thought older than the world, in respect of time, but only in respect of the simplicity of his nature.—To which purpose he adds afterwards, "Itaque si digna rebus nomina velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum quidem æternum, mundum vero dicemus esse perpetuum." Therefore, if we would give proper names to things agreeable to their natures, following Plato, we should say, that God was eternal; but the world only perpetual.—But as this doctrine of the latter Platonists quite frustrates Plato's design in this place, which was to prove or assert a God; because, if the world had no beginning, though its duration be never so much successive, yet would it not follow from thence, that therefore it must needs have been made by some other cause; so is it directly contrary to that philosopher's own words, himself there declaring, that by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, ortum, or that which is made—he did not understand only that, whose duration is successive but also τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχον, that which had a beginning of its generation—and τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενον, that which begun from a certain epocha of time—or that which once was not, and therefore must needs be brought into being by some other cause. So that Plato there plainly supposed all temporary beings once to have had a beginning of their

[1] Consol. Phil. l. v. Pro. 6.

duration, as he declareth in that very Timæus of his, that Time itself was not eternal, or without beginning, but made together with the heaven or world ;—and from thence does he infer, that there must of necessity be another eternal Being, viz. such as hath both a permanent duration, and was without beginning, and was the cause both of time and the world : forasmuch as nothing can possibly be made without a cause ; that is, nothing, which once was not, could of itself come into being, but must be produced by some other thing ; and so at last we must needs come to something, which had no beginning. Wherefore Plato, thus taking it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and flowing duration, was not without beginning ; as also that whatsoever was without beginning, hath a permanent duration or standing eternity ; does thus state the difference betwixt uncreated and created beings, or betwixt God and creature ; namely, that creature is that, whose duration being temporary or successive, once had a beginning ; and this is his *τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε*, that which is made, but never truly is, — and that which *ὑπ᾽ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται*, must of necessity be produced by some cause—but that whatsoever is without beginning, and hath a permanent duration, is uncreated or Divine ; which is his *τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον*, that which always is, and hath no generation, nor was ever made.—Accordingly as God is styled in the Septuagint translation of the Mosaic writings, *ὁ Ὢν*, he that truly is.

Now as for this *ἀΐδιος οὐσία* or *φύσις*, this eternal nature—which always is, and was never made, Plato speaks of it, not singularly only, as we Christians now do, but often in the Paganic way plurally also ; as when, in this very Timæus, he calls the world *τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα*, a made or created image of the eternal gods.—By which eternal gods he there meant doubtless that *τὸ πρῶτον*, and *τὸ δεύτερον*, and *τὸ τρίτον*, that first, and second, and third, which, in his second epistle to Dionysius, he makes to be the principles of all things ; that is, his trinity of Divine hypostases, by whose concurrent efficiency, and according to whose image and likeness, the whole world was made ; as Plotinus also plainly declareth in these words of his before cited : *οὗτος μὲν ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος, ἑστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ δευτέρον, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου·* This world is an image always iconized, or perpetually renewed (as the image in a glass is) of that first, second, and third principle, which are always standing—that is, fixed in eternity, and were never made. For thus Eusebius records, that, the ancient interpreters of Plato expounded this first, second, and

third of his in the forementioned epistle, of a trinity of gods ; [1]*ταῦτα οἱ τὸν Πλάτωνα διασαφεῖν πειρώμενοι, ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν ἀνάγουσιν, ἐπίτε τὸ Δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ Τρίτον τὴν τοῦ κόσμου Ψυχὴν, Θεὸν Τρίτον καὶ αὐτὴν ὁριζόμενοι εἶναι·* These things do the interpreters of Plato refer to the first God, and to the second cause ; and to the third the soul of the world, they calling this also the third god.—Wherefore we think there is good reason to conclude, that those eternal or uncreated gods of Plato in his Timæus, whose image or statue this whole generated or created world is said by him to be, were no other than his trinity of Divine hypostases, the makers or creators thereof. And it was before (as we conceive) rightly guessed, that Cicero also was to be understood of the same eternal gods, as Platonizing, when he affirmed, "A diis omnia a principia facta," that all things were at first made by the gods —and "a providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes constitutas esse ;" that the world and all its parts were constituted by the providence of the gods.[2]

But that the second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, viz. mind or intellect, though said to have been generated, or to have proceeded by way of emanation from the first called Tagathon, the Good, was notwithstanding unquestionably acknowledged to have been eternal, or without beginning, might be proved by many express testimonies of the most genuine Platonists : but we shall here content ourselves only with two, one of Plotinus writing thus concerning it, Enn. 5. l. i. c. vi. *ἐκποδὼν δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστω γένεσις ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ, τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ποιουμένοις*, etc. Let all temporal generation here be quite banished from our thoughts, whilst we treat of things eternal, or such as always are, we attributing generation to them only in respect of causality and order, but not of time.—And though Plotinus there speaks particularly of the second hypostasis or nous, yet does he afterwards extend the same also to the third hypostasis of that trinity, called Psyche, or the mundane soul ; which is there said by him likewise to be the word of the second, as that second was the word of the first ; *Καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος Νοῦ, Νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρείττων ἁπάντων Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτὸν, οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ, καὶ ἐνέργειά τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου·* That which is generated from what is better than mind, can be no other than mind, because mind is the best of all things, and every thing else is after it, and junior to it, as Psyche or soul, which is in like manner the word of mind, and a certain energy thereof, as mind is the word and energy of the first Good.—The other testimony is of Por-

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[1] Pr. Ev. l. xi. c. xx. [p. 541.]

[2] Plat. Timæ. p. 529. oper.

phyrius, cited by St. Cyril out of the fourth book of his philosophic history, where he sets down the doctrine of Plato after this manner: [1] *εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος περὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ οὕτως· ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τρόπον τινὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀνεπινόητον νοῦν γενέσθαι τε ὅλον καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστῶτα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία τῶν ὄντων· ὃ δὲ καὶ πρώτως καλὸν καὶ αὐτόκαλον, παρ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τῆς καλλονῆς ἔχον τὸ εἶδος· προῆλθε δὲ προαιώνιος ἀπ᾽ αἰτίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὡρμημένος, αὐτογένητος ὢν καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου κινουμένου πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τούτου ἡ πρόοδος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τούτου παρελθόντος αὐτογόνως ἐκ θεοῦ, παρελθόντος δὲ οὐκ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς τινος χρονικῆς, οὔπω γὰρ χρόνος, ἦν· ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ χρόνου γενομένου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστι τι ὁ χρόνος, ἄχρονος γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νοῦς·* Plato thus declareth concerning the first Good, that from it was generated a certain mind incomprehensible to mortals; in which subsisting by itself, are contained the things that truly are, and the essences of all beings. This is the first fair, and pulchritude itself, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten, and as its own parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way moved towards its generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begottenly. And that not from any temporal beginning, there being as yet no such thing as time; nor when time was afterward made, did it any way affect him; for mind is always timeless, and alone eternal.—Here, besides the eternity of mind or intellect, the second Divine hypostasis in the Platonic trinity, there are other strange and unusual expressions concerning it; for though it be acknowledged to have been generated from the first original Deity, yet it is called *αὐτοπάτωρ* and *αὐτογένητος*, its own parent, and its own offspring, and said to have sprung out *αὐτογόνως*, self-begottenly.

Now because this is so great a riddle or mystery, it is worth the while to consider its true meaning and the ground thereof; which is thus declared by Porphyrius. Mind, though it sprung from the first Good or supreme Deity from eternity, yet it is said to be self-begotten, because it did not spring from that, as any ways moved towards its generation, but as always standing still or quiescent. Which doctrine was before delivered by Plotinus[2] after this manner: *οὐ κινηθέντος φατέον γίγνεσθαι, εἰ γὰρ κινηθέντος αὐτοῦ τι γίγνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἂν γίγνοιτο, καὶ οὐ δεύτερον· δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴτι δεύτερον μετ᾽ αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος, οὐδὲ βουληθέντος, οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος, ὑποστῆναι αὐτό.* That, which was immediately generated from the first, did not proceed from it as any ways moved towards its gene-

[1] S. Cyril. C. Jul. lib. i. p. 32. [2] En. 5. lib. i. cap. vi. (p. 487.)

ration, because then it would not have been the second, but the third after that motion. Wherefore, if there be any second after that first Good, it must needs proceed from that first, as remaining immovable, and not so much as actively consenting thereto, nor willing it, which would be motion.—Now this in Porphyrius's language is paraphrased to be, a being produced from the first Good or original Deity, *αὐτογόνως*, self-begottenly—or in a way of self-generation. But the plain meaning thereof seems to be no other than this: that though this second Divine hypostasis did indeed proceed from the first God, yet was it not produced thence after a creaturely, or in a creating way, by the arbitrary will and command thereof, or by a particular fiat of the supreme Deity, but by way of natural and necessary emanation. Neither was Porphyrius singular in this language, we finding the very same expression of *αὐτοπάτωρ* and *αὐτόγονος*, self-parent, and self-begotten, in Jamblichus's Mysteries; where it is likewise by him applied not to the first Principle of all, but to a second Divine hypostasis,[1] *ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου, ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτόγονος.* From this one, the self-sufficient God made himself to shine forth into light; and therefore is he called Sui-Pater, and Seipso-genitus, his own father, and self-begotten.—But of this God or Divine hypostasis in Jamblichus more afterward. We cannot justify such kind of language as this in the Christian Trinity, because we have no warrant for it from the Scripture; though we are not ignorant that some late Divines have ventured to call the Christian Logos after the same manner *αὐτόθεον*, and *ex seipso Deum*, God from himself.

Dyonysius Petavius having rightly declared the doctrine of Arius, after this manner, that the Father was the only eternal God, and that the Son, or Word, was a creature made by him in time, and out of nothing; that is, after he had not been produced into being; subjoins these words: [2]"In ea vero professione, quod supra memoravi, planissime constat, germanum Platonicum Arium exstitisse." From the profession of this doctrine, it is most undeniably manifest (what was before affirmed) that Arius was a german or genuine disciple of Plato's. —But from what we have now cited out of Plato himself, and others of his most genuine followers, it is certain, that Petavius (though otherwise learned and industrious) was herein grossly mistaken, and that Arius was no Platonist at all. And, indeed, for either Plato or Plotinus to have denied the eternity of that second hypostasis of his, called

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[1] Jamblic. de Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. viii. cap. ii. p. 158.

[2] De Trin. lib. i. cap. viii. sect. 2. (tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog. p. 38.)

Nous, or Logos, and the son of the first, would have been all one as if they should have denied the eternity of wisdom and understanding itself; because according to them, this second hypostasis is essentially nothing but *αὐτοσοφία*, original wisdom itself—and, consequently, that very wisdom, by which God himself is wise. Which how far, or in what sense it is true, we do not here dispute. Nevertheless, Athanasius seems to have been fully of the same opinion with them herein, from this passage of his: [1]*Καὶ σοφία καὶ ἀληθειά ἐστιν ὁ Κύριος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλης σοφίας δεύτερος, ἀλλὰ μόνος οὗτος δι᾽ οὗ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν ὁ πατὴρ*, etc. Our Lord is both wisdom and truth, neither is he second from any other wisdom; but it is he alone, by whom the Father made all things. And again, *οὔτε γὰρ λόγος ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ λόγου πατὴρ*, for the Father of the Word is not properly himself the Word. And *οὐκ ἦν Λόγος ὁ τὸν Λόγον προέμενος, ἦν γὰρ ὁ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Σοφία γεγέννηται ὁ Κύριος· οὐκ ἦν οὖν σοφία ὁ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνείς· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤμην, φησὶν, ᾗ προσέχαιρεν·* That was not Word, which produced the Word, for the Word was with God. The Lord is Wisdom; therefore that was not Wisdom, which produced Wisdom, that speaks thus of herself, "His delight was with me."—But those latter words he citeth with approbation out of Dyonysius, bishop of Alexandria. And the same Athanasius affirmeth Arius, on the contrary to have maintained, that there was another Word and Wisdom senior to that Word and Wisdom in our Saviour Christ. To conclude, no Platonist in the world ever denied the eternity of that nous, or universal mind, which is the second hypostasis of their trinity; but, on the contrary, as hath been already observed, some of them seemed rather to attribute too much to it, in calling it *αὐτοπάτωρ* and *αὐτόγονος*, its own parent and its own offspring, as that which was self-begotten, though this but in a certain mystical sense; they otherwise not denying it to have proceeded also from the first Good, and to be the offspring thereof. Wherefore Plato,[2] who supposed the world not to have been eternal, asserting the eternity of that second hypostasis of his trinity, thereby plainly made it to be no creature, according to Athanasius's own doctrine: *εἰ ἀΐδιός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς, οὐκ ἦν κτίσμα, εἰ δὲ κτίσμα τυγχάνει, οὐκ ἦν ἀΐδιος.* If the son be eternal, he was no creature; and, on the contrary, if he be a creature, he was not eternal.—

Neither is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius,[3]

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[1] De Sent. Dion. tom. i. p. 567.

[2] P. 119. (tom. i. oper. in Disput. cum Ario.)

[3] In Somn. Scipion. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 73.

which Petavius urgeth to the contrary; wherein the first Cause is said *de se mentem creasse*, to have created Mind from itself; and again this Mind, *animam se creasse*, to have created from itself soul;—because it is certain, that these ancient Pagans did not then so strictly confine that word *creare*, (as we Christians now do) to that narrow sense and notion of the production of things in time; but used it generally for all manner of production or efficacy. But the chief ground of Petavius's mistake herein, besides his prejudice against Platonism in general, was his not distinguishing betwixt that spurious trinity of some Platonists, wherein the third hypostasis was the whole animated world, (which gave him occasion to write thus: "Tertius vero Deus manifeste creatus ab iisdem Platonicis putatur, quem et *ποίημα*, nominant;") and that other doctrine of those, who made it not to be the world itself, that is a creature, but the Opificer or Creator thereof.

But we grant, that there may be some more reason to make a question, whether Plato himself held the eternity of the mundane soul (commonly said to be the third hypostasis of his trinity) or no; because in his Timæus, though he acknowledged it to be senior to the world, yet does he seem to attribute a temporary generation, or nativity to it. Nevertheless, it is no way probable, that Plato's third principle of all things, in his epistle to Dionysius, and that Psyche, or soul of his, which is the only God, and in his tenth De Legibus he goes about to prove against the Atheists, should ever not have been; and therefore it is most reasonable to compound this business, thus, by supposing, with Plotinus and others, that Plato held a double Psyche, or soul, one *ἐγκόσμιον*, or mundane—which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world; whereby this world is properly made an animal, and a second, or created god; another *ὑπερκόσμιον*, supermundane, or separate; and which is not so much the form, as the artificer of the world. The first of which two Plotinus, calling it the heavenly Venus, thus describeth: [1] *τὴν δὲ οὐρανίαν λεγομένην, ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου, ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατον ἀκηράτου, μείνασαν ἄνω ὡς μὴ δὲ εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἐλθεῖν, μήτε ἐθελήσασαν, μήτε δυναμένην, ὅτι ἦν φύσεως μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φύσαν βαίνειν. Χωριστὴν οὖσαν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν· ὅθεν αὐτὴν τοιτῷ ἠνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι, ἣν δὲ καὶ θεὸν ἄν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι, ἄμικτον οὖσον, καὶ καθαράν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς*, etc. *ὅθεν οἰδ᾽ ἂν ἐκπέσοι, νοῦ ἐξηρτημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς, εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρτημένον· ἐφεπομένη δὲ τῷ Κρόνῳ, ἢ εἰ βούλει τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου Οὐρανῷ, ἐνήργησέ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν*

[1] En. 3. lib. v. cap. ii. (p. 293.)

καὶ ᾠκειώθη, καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε. This heavenly Venus which they affirm to have been begotten from Saturn, that is, from a perfect mind or intellect, must needs be that most divine soul (the third archical hypostasis) which being immediately begotten, pure from that which is pure, always remains above, so that it neither can nor will, ever descend down to these lower things, so as to be immersed in them; it being of such a nature, as is not inclinable to sink, or lapse downward. A certain separate substance, which doth not at all partake of matter, as the fable intimated, when it called it motherless; and therefore may it well be styled by us, not a demon, but a god.—Whence it comes to pass, that this soul can never fall, it being much more closely united and connected with that immovable Mind or Intellect, than that light which is circumfused about the sun, is connected with the sun. This Venus therefore following Kronos, or rather the father of Kronos, Uranus, acting towards it, and being enamored with it, begat love, Χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες, τὴν πρώτως ἐλλάμπουσαν τῷ οὐρανῷ, χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον θησόμεθα. Moreover, as we call this soul itself separate, so is this love of it, or begotten by it, a separate love.—After which, he speaks of another soul of the world, which is not separate from it, but closely conjoined therewith, he calling it a lower Venus and Love; namely, that other Venus, which in the fable is said to have been begotten from Jupiter himself (the superior soul of the world) and Dione, a watery nymph. We conclude, therefore, that though this lower mundane soul, might according to Plato, have a temporary production together with the world, or before it: yet that other superior and most divine soul, which Plotinus calls the heavenly Venus and Love, the son of Kronos without a mother, and which was truly the third hypostasis of Plato's trinity, was eternal, and without beginning. And thus according to the forementioned principle of Athanasius, none of these three hypostases of Plato's trinity were creatures, but all of them divine and uncreated.

Which, to make yet more evident, we shall further observe, first that Plato himself, in that second epistle of his to Dionysius, after he had mentioned his first, second, and third; that is his trinity of Divine hypostases, immediately subjoins those words: Ἡ οὖν ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ὀρέγεται μαθεῖν ποῖ᾽ ἄττα ἐστὶ, βλέπουσα εἰς τὰ αὑτῆς συγγενῆ ὧν οὐδὲν ἱκανῶς ἔχει· τοῦ δὴ βασιλέως πέρι καὶ ὧν εἶπον, οὐδέν ἐστι τοιοῦτο· The mind of man (as parturient) has always a great desire to know what these things are, and to that end does it look upon things cognate to it, which are all insufficient, imperfect and heterogeneous. But in that King of all things, and in the other, second and third, which I

spake of, there is nothing of this kind; that is, nothing like to these created things.

Secondly, The three hypostases of Plato's trinity are not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely undestroyable. For the first of them can no more exist without the second, nor the first and second without the third, than original light can exist without its splendor, corruscation or effulgency. And Plotinus, writing against some Gnostics in his time, who would make more of these Divine hypostases, or principles, than three, concludes, that there can be neither more of them, nor fewer, in this manner; [1] *οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προστησαμένους, εἶτα νοῦν μετ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ νοοῦν πρώτως εἶτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν· αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν, μήτε πλείω τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω· εἴτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῖν ταὐτὸ φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐδείχθη πολλαχῆ· λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τούτων,* etc. Wherefore we ought not to entertain any other principles; but having placed first the simple good, to set Mind, or the supreme Intellect next after it, and then the universal Soul in the third place. For this is the right order, according to nature, neither to make more intelligibles, (or universal principles) nor yet fewer than these three. For he, that will contract the number, and make fewer of them, must of necessity either suppose Soul and Mind to be the same, or else Mind and the first Good. But that all these three are diverse from one another, hath been often demonstrated by us. It remains now to consider, that if there be more than these three principles, what natures they should be, etc.—

Thirdly, As all these three Platonic hypostases are eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly supposed by them not to be particular, but universal beings; that is, such as do *περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον*, contain and comprehend the whole world under them—and preside over all things; which is all one as to say, that they are each of them infinite and omnipotent. For which reason are they also called by Platonic writers, *ἀρχαὶ*, and *αἴτια*, and *δημιουργοὶ* principles, and causes, and opificers of the whole world. First, as for *Νοῦς*, Mind, or understanding; whereas the old philosophers before Plato, as Anaxagoras, Archelaus, etc. and Aristotle after him, supposed Mind and Understanding to be the very first and highest principle of all: which also the magic or Chaldee oracles take notice of, as the most common opinion of mankind

"*Ον πρῶτον κλῄζεται ἔθνεα ἄνδρῶν,*

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[1] En. 2. lib. ix. cap. (p. 199.)

That Mind is generally by all men looked upon, as the first and highest God—Plato considering that unity was, in order of nature, before number and multiplicity; and that there must be *Νοητὸν* before *Νοῦς*, and Intelligible before Intellect—So that knowledge could not be the first: and, lastly, that there is a good transcending that of knowledge; made one most simple Good, the fountain and original of all things, and the first Divine hypostasis; and mind or intellect only the second next to it, but inseparable from it, and most nearly cognate with it. For which cause, in his Philebus,[1] though he agrees thus far with those other ancient philosophers, *ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς Νοῦς ἄρχει*, that Mind always rules over the whole universe—yet does he add afterward, [2]*ὅτι Νοῦς ἐστι γενούστης τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου*, that Mind is (not absolutely the first principle, but) cognate with the cause of all things; and that therefore it rules over all things; with, and in a kind of subordination to that first principle, which is Tagathon, or the highest Good; where, when Plato affirms, that Mind, or his second Divine hypostasis, is *γενούστης* with the first, it is all one as if he should have said, that it is *συγγενὴς*, and *ὁμοειδὴς*, and *ὁμογενὴς*, with it; all which words are used by Athanasius, as synonymous with *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential, or consubstantial. So that Plato here plainly and expressly agrees, or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of Arius, but with that of the Nicene council, and Athanasius; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not *ἑτερούσιος*, but *γενούστης*, or *ὁμοουσίος*, coessential or consubstantial with the first; and therefore not a creature.

And then as for the third hypostasis, called Psyche, or the superior mundane soul, Plato in his Cratylus, bestowing the name of Zeus, that is, of the supreme God upon it, and etymologizing the same from *ζῆν*, adds these words concerning it; *οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοῖς πᾶσιν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ᾗ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων·* There is nothing, which is more the cause of life to us and other animals, than this prince and king of all things; and that therefore God was called by the Greeks Zeus, because it is by him that all animals live.—And yet that all this was properly meant by him of the third hypostasis of his trinity, called Psyche, is manifest from those words of his that follow; where he expounds the poetic mythology beforementioned, making Zeus to be the son of Kronos; *εὔλογον δέ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία*, it is agreeable to reason, that Zeus should be the progeny or offspring of a certain great mind.—Now *ἔκγονος* and *γενούστης* are equivalent terms also; and therefore Plato here makes the third hypostasis of his trinity likewise to be *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential

[1] Oper. p. 80. edit. Ficini. [2] Page 30.

with the second: as he elsewhere made the second coessential with the first.

It is true, that by the δημιουργὸς, or opificer in Plato, is commonly meant nous or intellect, his second hypostasis; (Plotinus affirming as much, δημιουργὸς ὁ νοῦς Πλάτωνι,[1] The demiurgus to Plato is intellect.) Nevertheless, both Amelius, and Plotinus, and other Platonists, called his third hypostasis also δημιουργὸν, the artificer or opificer of the whole world; some of them making him to be the second from Mind or Intellect; others the third from the first Good, the supreme cause of all things; who was by Atticus and Amelius styled Demiurgus also. Wherefore, as was before suggested, according to the genuine and ancient Platonic doctrine, all these three hypostases were the joint-creators of the whole world, and of all things besides themselves; as Ficinus more than once declares the tenor thereof, [2]"Hi Tres uno quodam consensu omnia producunt," These three with one common consent produce all things—and before him Proclus,[3] πάντα ἀνήρτηται τοῦ ἑνὸς διὰ νοῦ μὲν καὶ ψυχῆς, all things depend upon the first One, by Mind and Soul—and accordingly we shall conclude in the words of Porphyrius, that the true and real Deity, according to Plato, extends to three Divine hypostases, the last whereof is Psyche or Soul.

From all which it appears, that Arius did not so much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and Athanasius; who, notwithstanding, made not Plato, but the Scripture, together with reason deducing natural consequences therefrom, their foundation. And that the Platonic trinity was a certain middle thing also betwixt the doctrine of Sabellius and that of Arius, it being neither a trinity of words only, or logical notions, or mere modes, but a trinity of hypostases; nor yet a jumbled confusion of God and creature (things heterousious) together; neither the second nor third of them being creatures, or made in time, but all eternal, infinite, and creators.

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian, or Pythagoric trinity, doth either agree or disagree with the Scripture doctrine, and that of the Christian church in several ages; we shall here further observe two things concerning it. The first whereof is this, that though the genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed none of their three archical hypostases to be indeed creatures, but all of them eternal, necessarily existent and universal or infinite, and consequently creators of the whole world; yet did they nevertheless assert an essential dependence of the second hypostasis upon the first, as also of the third both upon the first and second; to-

[1] En. v. l. i. [cap. viii. p. 489.] [2] In Plot. En. i. l. ii.

[3] Comment. in Timæum. Platon. lib. i. p. 66.

gether with a gradual subordination in them. Thus Plotinus, writing of the generation of the eternal Intellect, which is the second in the Platonic trinity, and answers to the Son or Word in the Christian: [1]*Τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀΐδιον γεννᾷ, καὶ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ. Τί οὖν χρὴ περὶ τοῦ τελειοτάτου λέγειν; μηδὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννᾷν, ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτὸν· Μέγιστον δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν Νοῦς καὶ Δεύτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ Νοῦς ἐκεῖνον, καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τούτου οὐδέν. Καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ, νοῦν εἶναι· Καὶ κρείττων ἁπάντων ὁ Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτόν. Οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τις·* That which is always perfect, generates what is eternal, and that which it generates, is always less than itself. What shall we therefore say of the most absolutely perfect Being of all? Does that produce nothing from itself? or rather does it not produce the greatest of all things after it? Now the greatest of all things after the most absolutely perfect Being, is mind or intellect; and this is second to it. For mind beholdeth this as its father, and standeth in need of nothing else besides it: whereas that first principle standeth in need of no mind or intellect. What is generated from that, which is better than mind, must needs be mind or intellect; because mind is better than all other things, they being all in order of nature after it and junior to it; as Psyche itself, or the first Soul; for this is also the word or energy of mind, as that is the word and energy of the first Good.—Again, the same is more particularly declared by him, concerning the third hypostasis called Psyche, that as it essentially dependeth upon the second, so is it gradually subordinate, or some way inferior to it. [2]*Ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾷ Νοῦς, νοῦς ὢν τέλειος. Καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ὄντα, γεννᾷν ἔδει, καὶ μὴ δύναμιν οὖσαν τοσαύτην ἄγονον εἶναι· Κρεῖττον δὲ οὐχ οἷόντε ἦν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ γεννώμενον, ἀλλ' ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ ὂν, εἴδολον εἶναι αὐτοῦ·* Perfect Intellect generates soul; and it being perfect, must needs generate, for so great a power could not remain sterile. But that, which is here begotten also, cannot be greater than its begetter; but must needs be inferior to it, as being the image thereof.—Elsewhere the same philosopher,[3] calling the first hypostasis of this trinity Uranus, the second Kronos, and the third Zeus (as Plato had done before) and handsomely allegorizing that fable, concludes in this manner concerning Kronos, or the second of these; *μεταξὺ ὢν πατρός τε ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἥττονος υἱέως,* That he is in a middle state or degree betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is less and inferior.—Again, the same thing is by that philosopher[4]

[1] Enn. v. l. i. c. vi. [p. 487.] [2] P. 489.

[3] P. 554. [Ennead. v. lib. viii. cap. xiii.]

[4] P. 513. [Ennead. v. lib. iii. cap. xvi.]

thus asserted in general, *ἐν τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν·* In the things generated from eternity, or produced by way of natural emanation, there is no progress upwards, but all downwards, and still a gradual descent into greater multiplicity.—We shall cite but only one passage more out of this philosopher, which containeth something of argumentation in it also :[1] *οὐ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὖν μὴ ταὐτὸν, οὐδέγε βέλτιον·* That which is generated, or emanateth, immediately from the first and highest Being, is not the very same thing with it, as if it were nothing but that repeated again and ingeminated ; and as it is not the same, so neither can it be better than it.—From whence it follows, that it must needs be gradually subordinate and inferior to it.

Which gradual subordination and essential dependence of the second and third hypostasis upon the first is by these Platonics illustrated several ways. Ficinus resembles it to the circulations of water, when some heavy body falling into it, its superficies is depressed, and from thence every way circularly wrinkled. " Alius (saith he) sic ferme profluit ex alio, sicut in aqua circulus dependet a circulo ;" one of these Divine hypostases doth in a manner so depend upon one another, as one circulation of water dependeth upon another.—Where it is observable also, that the wider the circulating wave grows, still hath it the more subsidence and detumescence, together with an abatement of celerity, till at last all becomes plain and smooth again. But, by the Pagan Platonists themselves, each following hypostasis is many times said to be *ἴχνος καὶ τόπος*, a print, stamp or impression, made by the former, like the signature of a seal upon wax. Again, it is often called by them *εἰκὼν*, and *εἴδωλον*, and *μίμημα*, an image, and representation, and imitation ; which if considered in *audibles*, then will the second hypostasis be looked upon as the echo of an original voice ; and the third as the repeated echo, or echo of that echo ; as if both the second and third hypostases were but certain replications of the first original Deity with abatement ; which though not accidental or evanid ones, but substantial, yet have a like dependence one upon another, and a gradual subordination. Or if it be considered in *visibles*, then will the second hypostasis be resembled to the image of a face in a glass, and the third to the image of that image reflected in another glass, which depend upon the original face, and have a gradual abatement of the vigor thereof. Or else the second and third may be conceived as two parhelii, or as a second and third sun. For thus does Plotinus[2] call

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[1] En. v. l. iii. c. xv. [p. 512.] [2] Ennead. v. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 487.

the universal Psyche, or third hypostasis, *εἰκόνα νοῦ σώζουσάν τε φῶς ἐκείνου*, the image of mind (which is the second) retaining much of the splendor thereof.—Which similitude of theirs, notwithstanding, they would not have to be squeezed or pressed hard : because they acknowledge, that there is something of dissimilitude in them also, which then would be forced out of them. Their meaning amounts to no more than this, that as an image in a glass is said *ἑτέρου εἶναι*, essentially to belong to something else, and to depend upon it ; so each following hypostasis doth essentially depend upon the former or first, and hath a subordination to it. But we meet with no expression in any of these Pagan Platonists so unhandsome and offensive, as that of Philo's, in his second book of allegories,[1] *σκία δὲ θεοῦ ὁ Λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, ᾧ καθάπερ ὀργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος ἐκοσμοποίει*, The word is the shadow of God, which he made use of, as an instrument, in the making of the world.—Notwithstanding which, the same writer doth call him elsewhere, more honorably a second god, and the son of the first God. As in the same place he doth also declare, that this shadow and image of God is itself the archetype of other things, *αὕτη δὲ ἡ σκία, καὶ ὥσανεὶ ἀπεικόνισμα, ἑτέρων ἐστὶν ἀρχέτυπον, ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνος, ἣ σκίαν νυνὶ κέκληκα, οὕτως εἰκὼν ἄλλο γίνεται παράδειγμα·* This shadow, and as it were image (of the first God) is itself the archetype and pattern of other things below it. As God is the pattern of this image, (which we call his shadow) ; so is this image itself another pattern or paradigm also. —But this dependence and subordination of the Divine hypostasis is most frequently illustrated in Platonic writings, by the *ἔκλαμψις* or *ἀπαύγασμα*, the effulgency or out-shining of light and splendor from the sun, and other luminous bodies ; the nous, or second hypostasis being resembled to that radious effulgency, which immediately encompassing them, is beheld together with them, and, as the astronomers tell us, augments their apparent diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, when they are beheld through telescopes, cutting off those luxuriant and circumambient rays. And the third hypostasis is resembled to the remoter and more distant splendor, which circling still gradually decreaseth. Thus Plotinus, [2]*πῶς οὖν καὶ τί δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον, περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρόν, ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος.* How should we consider this second hypostasis, otherwise than as the circumfused splendor, which encompasseth the body of the sun ; and from that always remaining is perpetually generated anew.

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[1] P. 79. Oper. [2] P. 487. [Ennead. v. lib. i. cap. vi.]

But this essential dependence, and gradual subordination of hypostasis in the Platonic trinity, will yet more fully appear from those particular distinctive characters, which are given to each of them. For the first of these is often said to be Ἓν πρὸ πάντων, one before all things —a simple unity, which virtually containeth all things. And as Plotinus writes, [1]οὕτως εἶχε πάντα ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐν δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ· This so containeth all things, as not being yet secrete and distinct; whereas in the second they are discerned and distinguished by reason — that is, they are actually distinguished in their ideas; whereas the first is the simple and fecund power of all things. Wherefore the second was called by Parmenides Ἓν πάντα, one actually all things—that is, in their distinct ideas. And the third, according to the same philosopher, as Plotinus[2] tells us, was Ἓν καὶ πάντα, one and all things;—as having still more multiplicity and alterity in it. One effectively all things. That which doth actively display, and produce into being, what was virtually or potentially contained in the first; and ideally or exemplarily in the second. Accordingly the first of these is sometimes said to be Πάντα ἑνικῶς, all things unitively;—the second Πάντα νοερῶς, all things intellectually;—and the third, Πάντα ψυχικῶς, all things animally;—that is, self-movably, actively and productively. Again, the first of these is commonly styled Τ' ἀγαθὸν, the Good, or Goodness itself, above mind and understanding—and also ὑπερούσιον, above essence—ineffable and incomprehensible. And sometimes also φῶς ἁπλοῦν, a simple light—the second Νοῦς, Λόγος, Σοφία, Unity and Goodness—only by participation, or Ἀγαθοειδὴς, Boniform—but essentially and formally; mind, or understanding, reason and wisdom, all-comprehending, or infinite knowledge. The third, Ψυχὴ, self-movable soul—goodness and wisdom by participation, but essentially and formally, infinite self-activity, or effectiveness; infinite, active, perceptive, and animadversive power. Sometimes it is styled also Ἀφροδίτη and Ἔρως, Venus and Love; but differently from that of the First Good, which is Love too; but a love of redundancy, or overflowing fulness and fecundity: [3]ὂν γὰρ τέλειον, τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν, μὴ δὲ ἔχειν, γὴ δὲ δεῖσθαι, οἷον ὑπερεῤῥύη, καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκε πάντα, That which being absolutely perfect, and seeking, or wanting nothing, as it were, overflowed; and by its exuberant redundancy produced all things.—Whereas this latter is a love of infinite activity. Of the first, it is said, by

[1] P. 513. [Ennead. v. lib. iii. cap. xv.]

[2] Ennead. v. lib. i. cap. viii. p 490. oper.

[3] Plot. 494. (Ennead. v. lib. ii. cap. i.)

Plotinus, that it is ἀνενέργητος, above all manner of action—for which cause, the making of the world is not properly ascribed to him, though he be the original fountain of all: according to that of Numenius,[1] *Καὶ γὰρ οὔτε δημιουργεῖν ἐστι χρῶεν τὸν πρῶτον, καὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος Θεοῦ (τοῦ υἱοῦ) χρὴ εἶναι, καὶ νομίζεσθαι πατέρα τὸν πρῶτον Θεόν·* Neither is it fit to attribute the architecture of the world to the first God, but rather to account him the father of that god, who is the artificer.—Who again speaks further to the same purpose thus: *τὸν μὲν πρῶτον Θεὸν ἀργὸν εἶναι ἔργων ξυμπάντων καὶ βασιλέα·* It is to be acknowledged, that the first God is void of all manner of work or action, he being the King of all things.—Of the second, to whom the energy of intellection is attributed, it is said, notwithstanding, that his *οὐσία* in his *ἐνέργεια*, his essence, his operation; and that he is *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, though a multiform, yet an immoveable nature. He therefore is properly called the demiurgus, as the contriving architect, or artificer, in whom the archetypal world is contained, and the first paradigm, or pattern of the whole universe. But the third is a kind of movable deity, *τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον* (as Plotinus speaks) *καὶ νοῦ φῶς, καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου·* That, which moveth about mind, or intellect, the light or effulgency thereof, and its print or signature, which always dependeth upon it, and acteth according to it.—This is that, which reduces both the fecundity of the first simple good, and also the immovable wisdom and architectonic contrivance of the second into an act or energy. This is the immediate, and, as it were, manuary opificer of the whole world, and *τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντὸς*, that which actually governs, rules, and presideth over all.—Amelius, in that passage of his before cited out of Proclus, calling these three Divine hypostases three minds, and three kings, styles the first of them *Τὸν ὄντα*, Him that is—the second *Τὸν ἔχοντα*, Him that hath—and the third *Τὸν ὁρῶντα*, Him that beholds.—In which expressions, though peculiar to himself, he denotes an essential dependence, and gradual subordination in them.

Now that which is most liable to exception in this Platonic scale or gradation of the Deity, seems to be the difference betwixt the first and the second. For whereas the essential character of the second is made to be understanding, reason, and wisdom, it seems to follow from hence that either the first and second are really nothing else but two different names, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; or else, if they be distinct hypostases, or persons, that the first of them must needs be *ἄνους* and *ἄλογος*, devoid of mind, reason, and wisdom—which

[1] Eus. Pr. Ev. lib. xi. cap. xviii. (p. 537.)

would be very absurd. To which all the reply we can make, is as follows: First, that this is indeed one peculiar arcanum of the Platonic and Pythagoric theology, (which yet seems to have been first derived from Orpheus and the Egyptians, or rather from the Hebrews themselves) that whereas the Pagan theologers generally concluded, *νοῦν πάντων προγενέστατον*, that Mind and Understanding, properly so called was the oldest of all things—the highest principle and the first original of the world; those others placed something above it, and consequently made it to be not the first, but the second; which they did chiefly upon these three following grounds. First, because understanding, reason, knowledge, and wisdom, cannot be conceived by us mortals, otherwise than so as to contain something of multiplicity in them; whereas it seems most reasonable to make the first principle of all, not to be a number of multitude, but a perfect monad, or unity. Thus Plotinus,[1] *ἀόριστον μὲν νόησις ὥσπερ ὄψις, ὁριζομένη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ· διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ νοῦς· διὸ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλά*, etc. Intellection, as well as vision, is in its own nature an indefinite thing, and is determined by the intelligible: therefore, it is said, that ideas as numbers, are begotten from infinite duality and unity; and such is intellect, which consequently is not simple, but many, it contemplating many ideas; and being compounded of two, that which is understood, and that which understands.—And again elsewhere, [2]*τὸ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου νοητοῦ, οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε κόσμος νοητός, ἁπλούστερον δὲ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ πολύ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολύ τοῦτο ἐξ οὐ πολλοῦ*, etc. The principle of every thing is more simple than the thing itself. Wherefore the sensible world was made from Intellect, or the Intelligible; and before this, must there needs be something more simple still. For many did not proceed from many; but this multiform thing, Intellect, proceeded from that, which is not multiform, but simple, as number from unity—To this purpose does he also argue in these words: [3]*εἰ τὸ νοοῦν τι πλῆθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ μὴ πλήθει τὸ νοεῖν μὴ εἶναι· ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον· ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοιεῖν, καὶ νοῦς ἔσται·* If that which understands be many, or contain no multitude in it, then that which contains no multitude, does not properly understand; and this is the first thing: but intellection and knowledge properly so called are to be placed among things, which follow after it, and are second.—And he often concludes, *ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ φύσει εἶναι το*

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1 Page 518. (Ennead. v. lib. iv. cap. ii.)

2 Page 514. (Ennead. v. lib. iii. cap. xvi.)

3 Page 535. (Ennead. v. lib. vi. cap. iii.)

γινώσκειν· That knowledge, properly so called, by reason of its multiplicity) belongs to the second rank of being, and not the first.—Another ground or reason is, because, in order of nature, there must be *Νοητὸν* before *Νοῦς*, something Intelligible before Intellect; and from hence does Plotinus conclude,[1] *τὸ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον, οὔτε τῷ εἶναι, οὔτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεύτερον, καὶ γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτὸ*, etc. That to understand is not the first, neither in essence, nor in dignity, but the second; a thing in order of nature, after the first Good, and springing up from thence, as that which is moved with a desire towards it.—Their third and last ground or reason is, because intellection and knowledge are not the highest Good, that therefore there is some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to intellect. Which consideration Plato much insisteth upon, in his sixth book De Republica. Now upon these several accounts do the Platonists confidently conclude, [2]*ὅτι Θεὸς κρείττων Λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, παρασχὼν ταῦτα οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα·* that the supreme Deity is more excellent and better than the *Λόγος* (Reason, or the Word) Intellect and Sense, he affording these things, but not being these himself.—And [3]*τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς καὶ πᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἓν δηλονότι οὐ Λόγος· πῶς οὖν ἐξ οὐκ λόγου Λόγος· καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ·* that, which was generated from the first principle, was Logos (Word or Reason) manifold; but the first principle itself was not Word: if you demand, therefore, how Word, or Reason, should proceed from that which is not Word or Reason? we answer, as that, which is boniform, from goodness itself.—With which Platonic and Pythagoric doctrine exactly agreeth Philo the Jew also, [4]*ὁ πρὸ τοῦ Λόγου, Θεὸς κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ πᾶσα λογικὴ φύσις, τῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν πάντων ἐν τῇ βελτίστῃ καὶ τινι ἐξαιρέτῳ καθεστῶτι ἰδέᾳ, οὐδὲν θέμις ἦν γένητον ἐξομοιωθῆναι·* that God, which is before the Word or Reason, is better and more excellent than all the rational nature; neither is it fit, that any thing, which is generated, should be perfectly like to that which is originally from itself and above all.—And, indeed, we should not have so much insisted upon this, had it not been by reason of a devout veneration, that we have for all the Scripture mysteries; which Scripture seems to give no small countenance to this doctrine, when it makes in like manner an eternal Word and Wisdom to be the second hypostasis of the Divine Triad, and the first-begotten Son, or offspring of God the Father. And Athanasius,

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[1] Page 536. [2] Plot. 512. (Ennead. v. lib. iii. cap. xiv.)

[3] Page 514. (cap. xvi.)

[4] Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 323.

as was before observed, very much complieth here also with the Platonic notion, when he denies that there was any λόγος or σοφία, any Reason or Wisdom—before that Word and Son of God, which is the second hypostasis of the holy Trinity. What then? shall we say that the first hypostasis or person in the Platonic trinity (if not the Christian also) is ἄνους and ἄλογος, senseless and irrational—and altogether devoid of mind and understanding? Or would not this be to introduce a certain kind of mysterious Atheism; and, under pretence of magnifying and advancing the supreme Deity, monstrously to degrade the same? For why might not senseless matter as well be supposed to be the first original of all things, as a senseless, incorporeal being? Plotinus, therefore, who rigidly and superstitiously adheres to Plato's text here, which makes the first and highest principle of all to be such a being, as, by reason of its absolute and transcendent perfection, is not only above understanding, knowledge, and reason, but also above essence itself (which therefore he can find no other names for, but only Unity and Goodness substantial); and, consequently, knowledge and wisdom to be but a second, or postnate thing, though eternal; but, notwithstanding, does seem to labor under this metaphysical profundity; he sometimes endeavors to solve the difficulty thereof after this manner, by distinguishing of a double light; the one simple and uniform, the other multiform or manifold; and attributing the former of these to the supreme Deity only, (whose simple original light he resembles to the luminous body of the sun itself;) the latter of them to the second hypostasis, as being the ἔκλαμψις or ἀπαύγασμία, the circumambiant fulgor, or outshining splendor of that sun. Thus Enn. v. lib. vi. cap. 4.[1] τὸ παρέχον τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, φῶς ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν, that from which this multiform light of Νοῦς, or Intellect (the second hypostasis,) is derived, is φῶς ἁπλοῦν, another most simple light.—As he elsewhere accordingly writeth of the first Principle, or supreme Deity, that it is ἐν νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν, in knowledge or understanding, but of a different kind from that understanding of the second hypostasis, called Intellect. —Sometimes again, this philosopher subtilly distinguisheth betwixt νόησις αὐτή, intelligence itself, and τὸ νοοῦν, or τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· that which doth understand, or which hath intelligence in it; making the the first principle to be the former of these two, and the second hypossis of their trinity to be the latter: [2]οὐδ' ἡ νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· δύο οὖν πάλιν αὖ ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίνεται· τοῦτο δὴ οὐδαμῇ δύο· Intelligence itself doth not understand, but that which hath intelligence: for

[1] Page 536. [2] Page 537.

in that, which doth understand, there is a kind of duplicity. But the first principle of all hath no duplicity in it.—Now that duplicity, which he fancies to be in that, which hath intelligence, is either the duplicity of him that hath this intelligence, and of the intelligence itself, as being not the same; or else of him and the τὸ νοητὸν, the intelligible, or object of his intellection—intellect supposing an intelligible in order of nature before it. And from this subtilty would he infer, that there is a certain kind of imperfection and indigence in that which doth understand, or hath intelligence, ἔνδεες τὸ νοοῦν, ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρῶν, That which understandeth is indigent as that which seeth.—But perhaps this difficulty might be more easily solved, and that according to the tenor of the Platonic hypothesis too, by supposing the abatement of their second hypostasis to consist only in this, that it is not essentially τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν, goodness itself, but only ἀγαθοειδὴς, boniform, or good by participation —it being essentially no higher than Νοῦς, Λόγος, and Σοφία, Mind, Reason, and Wisdom—for which cause it is called by those names, as the proper characteristic thereof. Not as if the first were devoid of wisdom, under pretence of being above it; but because this second is not essentially any thing higher. As in like manner, the third hypostasis is not essentially wisdom itself, standing or quiescent, and without motion or action; but wisdom as in motion, or wisdom moving and acting.

The chief ground of this Platonic doctrine of an essential dependence, and therefore gradual subordination, in their trinity of Divine hypostases, is from that fundamental principle of their theology, that there is but one Original of all things, and μία πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, only one Fountain of the Godhead; from whence all other things whatsoever, whether temporal or eternal, created or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore this second hypostasis of their trinity, since it must accordingly derive its whole being from the first, as the ἀπαύγασμα from the φῶς, the splendor from the original light—must of necessity have also an essential dependence upon the same; and, consequently, a gradual subordination to it.

For though they commonly affirm their second hypostasis to have been begotten from their first, and their third from their second; yet do they by no means understand thereby any such generation as that of men; where the father, son, and grandson, when *adulti* at least, have no essential dependence one upon another, nor gradual subordination in their nature, but are perfectly coequal, and alike absolute. Because this is but an imperfect generation, where that, which is begotten, doth not receive its whole being originally from that which did

beget, but from God and nature; the begetter being but either a channel or an instrument, and having been himself before begotten or produced by some other. Whereas the first Divine hypostasis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the sole principle and original of all things, and therefore must the second needs derive its whole essence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely, in a way of natural emanation, as light is from the sun; and, consequently, though coeternal, have an essential dependence on him, and gradual subordination to him.

Moreover, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or trinity of hypostases subordinate, from hence; because by this means there will not be so vast a chasm and hiatus betwixt God and the highest creatures, or so great a leap and jump in the creation, as otherwise there must needs be: nor will the whole Deity be screwed up to such a disproportionate height and elevation, as would render it altogether incapable of having any intercourse or commerce with the lower world; it being, according to this hypothesis of theirs, brought down by certain steps and degrees nearer and nearer to us. For if the whole Deity were nothing but one simple monad, devoid of all manner of multiplicity, as God is frequently represented to be, then could it not well be conceived by us mortals, how it should contain the distinct ideas of all things within itself, and that multiform platform and paradigm of the created universe, commonly called the archetypal world. Again, were the Deity only an immovable mind; as Aristotle's god is *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, an absolutely immovable substance—whose essence and operation are one and the same; and, as other theologers affirm, that whatsoever is in God, is God; it would be likewise utterly inconceivable, not only, how there should be any liberty of will at all in God (whereas the same theologers, contradicting themselves, zealously contend notwithstanding, that all the actions of the Deity are not necessary, and but few of them such), but also, how the Deity should have any commerce or intercourse with the lower world; how it should quicken and actuate the whole, be sensible of all the motions in it, and act *pro re nata* accordingly; all which the instincts and common notions of mankind urge upon them. Neither can they be denied without raising the very foundations of all religion, since it would be to no more purpose, for men to make their devotional addresses to such an immovable, inflexible, and unaffectible Deity, than to a senseless adamantine rock. But these difficulties (as the Platonists pretend) are all removed by that third hypostasis in their trinity; which is a kind of movable deity. And thus are all the phenomena of the Deity, or the different common

notions in the minds of men concerning it, though seemingly repugnant and clashing with one another, yet, in their opinion, fairly reconciled and solved by this trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate.

Lastly, They pretend also, that according to this hypothesis of theirs, there may be some reasonable satisfaction given to the mind of man, both why there are so many Divine hypostases, and why there could be no more: whereas, according to other ways, it would seem to have been a mere arbitrary business; and that there might have been either but one solitary Divine hypostasis, or but a duality of them; or else they might have been beyond a trinity, numberless.

The second thing, which we shall observe concerning the most genuine Platonical and Parmedian trinity, is this; that though these philosophers sometimes called their three Divine hypostases, not only τρεῖς φύσεις, three natures, and three principles, and three causes, and three opificers, but also three gods, and a first, and second, and third god; yet did they often, for all that, suppose all these three to be really one Θεῖον, one Divinity, or Numen. It hath been already proved from Origen and others, that the Platonists most commonly called the animated world the second god, though some of them, as for example Numenius, styled it the third god. Now those of them, who called the world the second god, attributed indeed (not more, but) less divinity to it, than those, who would have it to be the third god. Because these latter supposed, that soul of the world to be the third hypostasis of their trinity; but the other taking all these three Divine hypostases together, for one supreme and first God, called the world the second god: they supposing the soul thereof to be another soul inferior to that first Psyche, which was properly their third hypostasis. Wherefore this was really all one, as if they should have called the animated world the fourth god; only by that other way of reckoning, when they called it a second god, they intimated, that though those three Divine hypostases were frequently called three gods, yet were they, notwithstanding, really all but one Θεῖον, Divinity or Numen; or, as Plotinus speaks, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, the Divinity which is in the whole world.—Thus when God is so often spoken of in Plato singularly, the word is not always to be understood of the first hypostasis only, or the Tagathon, but many times plainly of the πρῶτον, and δεύτερον, and τρίτον, the first, and second, and third altogether; or that whole Divinity, which consisteth or is made up of these three hypostases. And this will further appear from hence, because when the whole world is said in Plato to be the image of the eternal gods, as also by Plotinus, of the first, second, and third, by whom it is always produced anew, as the image in a glass is; this

is not to be understood, as if the world being tripartite, each third part thereof was severally produced or created by one of those three; nor yet can it be conceived, how there could be three really distinct creations of one and the same thing. Wherefore the world having but one creation, and being created by those three Divine hypostases; it follows, that they are all three really but one Creator and one God. Thus when, both in Plato and Plotinus, the lives and souls of all animals, (as stars, demons and men) are attributed to the third hypostasis, the first and great Psyche, as their fountain and cause after a special manner; accordingly as in our Creed, the Holy Ghost is styled "the Lord and giver of life;" this is not so to be understood, as if therefore the first and second hypostasis were to be excluded from having any causality therein. For the first is styled by Plato also, *αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν·* the cause of all good things—and therefore doubtless chiefly of souls; and the second is called by him and others too, *αἴτιον* and *δημιουργὸς*, the cause and artificer of the whole world,—We conclude, therefore, that souls being created by the joint concurrence and influence of these three hypostases subordinate, they are all really but one and the same God. And thus it is expressly affirmed by Porphyrius in St. Cyril,[1] *ἄχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, μετ᾽ αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον, τὸν δημιουργόν· τρίτην δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν· ἄχρι γὰρ ψυχῆς τὴν θεότητα προελθεῖν·* that the essence of the Divinity proceeds or propagates itself (by way of descent downwards) unto three hypostases or subsistences. The highest God is the Tagathon, or supreme Good; the second next after him is the Demiurgus so called, the architect or artificer of the world; and the soul of the world, that is the third: for the Divinity extendeth so far as to this soul.—Here we plainly see, that though Porphyrius calls the three Divine hypostases three gods; yet does he at the very same time declare, that *ἡ θείου οὐσία* and *θεότης*, the essence of the Godhead and the Divinity extends itself to all these three hypostases, including the third and last also (which they call the mundane soul) within the compass of it. And, therefore, that even according to the Porphyrian theology itself, (which could not be suspected to affect any compliance with Christianity) the three hypostases in the Platonic trinity are *ὁμοούσιοι*, coessential, both as being each of them God, and as being all one God. St. Cyril himself also acknowledging as much; where he writeth thus of the Platonists: [2]*τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ὑποτιθέμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρισάμενοι·* That

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[1] Contra Julian. lib. viii. p. 271. [2] Ibid, p. 270.

supposing three hypostases, which have the nature of principles (in the universe), they extend the essence of God to all these three hypostases.

Indeed, many conceive, that the Platonists making the three hypostases of their trinity to be thus gradually subordinate one to another, could not, for that very reason, acknowledge them to be one Divinity: but the Platonists themselves do, upon this very account and no other, declare all these three to be one Divinity, because they have an essential dependence and gradual subordination in them; the second being but the image of the first, and the third the image both of the first and second. Whereas, were these three supposed to be perfectly coequal, and to have no essential dependence one upon another, they could not by these Platonists be concluded to be any other than three co-ordinate gods, having only a generical or specifical identity; and so no more one, than three men are one man: a thing, which the Platonic theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconsistent with the perfect monarchy of the universe, and highly derogatory from the honor of the supreme God and first Cause. For example, should three suns appear in the heaven all at once, with coequal splendor, and not only so, but also be concluded, that though at first derived (or lighted and kindled) from one, yet they were now all alike absolute and independent; these three could not so well be thought to be one sun, as three that should appear gradually differing in their splendor, two of them being but the *parhelii* of the other, and essentially depending on it; forasmuch as the second would be but the reflected image of the first, and the third but the second refracted. At least those three coequal suns could not so well be thought to be one thing, as the sun, and secondary splendor, (which can neither be beheld without the sun, nor the sun without them) might be accounted one and the same thing.

The Platonists, therefore, first of all suppose such a close and near conjunction betwixt the three hypostases of their trinity, as is nowhere else to be found in the whole world. To this purpose Plotinus:[1] *ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν, οὐ χωρισθεὶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μετ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν· ὡς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ· ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὦσι μόνοι, τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ᾖ τὸ γεννῆσαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι·* Intellect is said to behold the first Good; not as if it were separated from it, but only because it is after it, but so as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there betwixt intellect and soul. Every thing which is begotten, desires and loves that which begat it; especially

[1] En. v. lib. i. cap. vi. (p. 488.)

when these two (that which begat, and that which is begotten) are alone, and nothing besides them. Moreover, when that which begot, is absolutely the best thing, that, which is immediately begotten from it must needs cohere intimately with it and so as to be separated from it only by alterity.—Which is all one as if he should have said, that these three Divine hypostases are so intimately conjoined together, and united with one another, as that they are *tantum non*, only not—the very self-same. Again, the Platonists further declare, that these three hypostases of their trinity are ἀδιαίρετοι, absolutely indivisible and inseparable, as the ἀπαύγασμα is ἀδιαίρετον from the φῶς, the splendor indivisibly conjoined with the light or sun.—Which similitude also Athanasius often makes use of to the same purpose. Thirdly, these Platonists seem likewise to attribute to their three Divine hypostases just such an Ἐμπεριχώρησις, circumincession, or mutual in-being, as Christians do. For as their second and third hypostases must needs be in the first, they being therein virtually contained; so must the first likewise be in the second and third; they being as it were but two other editions thereof; or itself gradually displayed and expanded. But to speak particularly, the first must needs be in the second, the Tagathon in the Nous, and so both of them really one and the same God; because the common notions of all mankind attribute understanding and wisdom to the Deity: but according to the principles of Plato, Plotinus and others, the Deity does not properly understand any where but in the second hypostasis, which is the mind and wisdom of it. And the emperichoresis of the second or third hypostases was thus intimated by Plato also; [1]Σοφία μὴν καὶ Νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην. Οἰκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει, βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι. Where having spoken of that Divine wisdom and mind, which orders all things in the world, he adds: "But wisdom and mind can never be without soul (that is cannot act without it); wherefore, in the nature of Jupiter, is at once contained both a kingly mind and a kingly soul." Here he makes Jupiter to be both the second and third hypostases of his trinity, Nous and Psyche; and, consequently, those two to be but one God. Which Nous is also said to be both the γενούστης, i. e. of the same kind, and coessential with the first Cause of all things. To conclude: as that first Platonic hypostasis, which is itself said to be above mind and wisdom, is properly wise and understanding in the second; so doth the first and the second move and act in the third. Lastly, all these three hypostases, Tagathon, Nous, and

[1] Phileb. p. 30. (p. 80.)

Psyche, are said by the Platonists to be one *Θεῖον*, or Divinity; just in the same manner as the centre, immovable distance, and movable circumference of a sphere or globe, are all essentially one sphere. Thus Plotinus expressly, writing of the third hypostasis, or Psyche: [1]*σεμνὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος προσαρμόττων κέντρῳ, εὐθὺς μετὰ κέντρον αὐξηθεὶς, διάστημα ἀδιάστατον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα, εἰ τ᾽ αγαθόν τις καὶ τὸ κέντρον τάξειε, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον, ψυχὴν δε κατὰ κύκλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξειε·* For this Psyche, or third hypostasis, is a venerable and adorable thing also; it being the circle fitted to the centre, an indistant distance (forasmuch as it is no corporeal thing). For these things are just so, as if one should make the Tagathon, or first Good, to be the centre of the universe; in the next place, Mind or Intellect to be the immovable circle, or distance; and, lastly, Soul to be that, which turns round, or the whole movable circumference, acted by love or desire.—These three Platonic hypostases, therefore, seem to be really nothing else but infinite goodness, infinite wisdom, and infinite active love and power, not as mere qualities or accidents, but as substantial things, that have some kind of subordination one to another; all concurring together to make up one *θεῖον*, or Divinity, just as the centre, immovable distance, and movable circumference, concurrently make up one sphere.

We have now given a full account of the true and genuine Platonic and Parmenidian or Pythagoric trinity; from which it may clearly appear, how far it either agreeth or disagreeth with the Christian. First, therefore, though some of the latter Platonists have partly misunderstood, and partly adulterated that ancient cabala of the Trinity, as was before declared, confounding therein the differences between God and the creature, and thereby laying a foundation for infinite Polytheism; yet did Plato himself, and some of his genuine followers (though living before Christianity) approach so near to the doctrine thereof, as in some manner to correspond therewith, in those three fundamentals before mentioned. First, in not making a mere trinity of names and words, or of logical notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; but a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons. Secondly, in making none of their three hypostases to be creatures, but all eternal, necessarily existent, and universal; infinite, omnipotent, and creators of the whole world, which is all one, in the sense of the ancients, as if they should have affirmed them to be *homoousian*. Lastly, in supposing these three Divine hypostases, however sometimes pagan-

[1] Page 409. (Enn. iv. lib. iv. cap. xvi.)

ically called three gods, to be essentially one Divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Arianism is commonly supposed to approach nearer to the truth of Christianity than Photinianism, so is Platonism undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Arianism; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that and Sabellianism, which in general was that mark, that the Nicene council also aimed at.

Notwithstanding which, there is a manifest disagreement also betwixt the Platonic trinity, as declared, and the now received doctrine in the Christian church; consisting in a different explication of the two latter points mentioned. First, because the Platonists dreamed of no such thing at all, as one and the same numerical essence, or substance of the three Divine hypostases. And, secondly, because, though they acknowledged none of those hypostases to be creatures, but all God; yet did they assert an essential dependence of the second and third upon the first, together with a certain gradual subordination; and therefore no absolute coequality. And this is the true reason, why so many late writers have affirmed Platonism to symbolize with Arianism, and the latter to have been indeed nothing else but the spawn of the former; merely because the Platonists did not acknowledge one and the same numerical essence, or substance of all their three hypostases, and asserted a gradual subordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account some of the ancients also have done the like, as particularly St. Cyril (contra Jul. lib. i.); he writing thus concerning Plato: [1]*Τεθεώρηκε μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὑγιῶς εἰσάπαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ Ἀρείου πεφρονηκόσιν, ἐν ἴσῳ διαιρεῖ, καὶ ὑφίστησιν, ὑποκαθεμένας τε ἀλλήλαις τὰς ὑποστάσεις εἰσφέρει·* Plato did not thoroughly perceive the whole truth of the Trinity, but, in like manner with those who follow Arius, divided the Deity, or made a gradation in it, and introduced subordinate hypostases:—as elsewhere the same pious father also taxes the Platonists, for not declaring the three hypostases of their trinity to be, in his sense, homoousian, that is, absolutely coequal. But though we have already proved, that Platonism can by no means be confounded with Arianism, because it directly confronted the same in its main essentials, which were, *Erat quando non erat*, or the second hypostasis being made *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, together with its being mutable and lapsable; since, according to Platonism, the Nous is essentially both eternal and immutable: yet that the most refined Platonism differed from the now-received doctrine of the Christian church, in respect to its gradual subordination, is a thing so unquestionably evident, as that it can by no means be dissembled, palliated or excused.

[1] Page 34.

Over and besides which, it cannot be denied, but the best of Plato's followers were sometimes also further extravagant in their doctrine of the Trinity, and spake at random concerning it, and inconsistently with their own principles; especially where they make such a vast and disproportionate distance betwixt the second and third hypostases thereof; they not descending gradually and orderly, but as it were tumbling down from the former of them to the latter. Thus Plotinus himself, when having spoken magnificently of that soul of the world, which is his third hypostasis, he subjoins immediately, [1]ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, καὶ ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῇς, λαβὼν κεκαθαρμένην, εὑρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον ὃ ἦν ψυχή· That this soul of ours is also uniform (or of the same species) with that mundane soul; for if any one (saith he) will consider it as in itself pure and naked, or stripped from all things adventitious to it, he shall find it to be in like manner venerable. —Agreeably whereunto doth this same philosopher, elsewhere call that mundane soul πρεσβυτέραν καὶ ἀδελφὴν, that is but the elder sister of our human souls.—Which, as it rankly savors of philosophic pride and arrogancy, thus to think so magnificently of themselves, and to equalize in a manner their own souls with that mundane soul; so was it a monstrous degradation of that third hypostasis of their trinity, and little other than an absolute creaturizing of the same. For if our human soul be ὁμοειδὴς, of the same kind or species with the third hypostasis of the trinity; then is it not only ὁμότιμος, of like honor or dignity, but also, in the language of the Christian church, ὁμοούσιος, coessential with our human souls (as our Saviour Christ, according to the Arians in Athanasius,[2] is said to be ὁμοούσιος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, coessential with us men). From whence it will follow, that either that must be a creature, or else our human souls Divine. Wherefore, unless these Platonists would confine the Deity wholly to their first hypostasis, which would be monstrously absurd for them, to suppose that first eternal Mind and Wisdom, by which the world was made, to be a creature; they must of necessity make a vast leap or jump betwixt the second and third of their hypostases; the former of them being that perfect Wisdom, which was the Architect or Demiurgus of the world, whilst the latter is only the elder sister of all human souls. Moreover these Platonists, by their thus bringing down the third hypostasis of their trinity so low, and immersing it so deeply into the corporeal world, as if it were the informing Soul thereof, and making it to be but the elder sister of our created souls, did doubtless therein designedly lay a foun-

[1] Tom. i. p. 557. (libro. de Sententia Dionys.)

[2] Enn. v. lib. i. cap. ii. (p. 483.)

dation for their Polytheism and creature-worship (now vulgarly called idolatry) that is, for their cosmolatry, astrolatry, and demonolatry. For thus much is plainly intimated in this following passage from Plotinus: [1]διὰ ταύτην ὁ κόσμος ὅδε θεός· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεὸς ὅτι ἔμψυχος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα· This whole corporeal world is made a god by the soul thereof. And the sun is also a god, because animated; as likewise are all the stars therefore gods.—Where he afterwards adds, τὴν δὲ θεοῖς αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι, ἀνάγκῃ πρεσβυτέραν θεὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι· That which is to these gods, or goddesses, the cause of their being gods, must needs itself be the elder god or goddess.—So that this third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity called the mundane soul, is but a kind of sister goddess with the souls of the sun, moon, and stars, though elder indeed than they; they being all made goddesses by her. Where there is a confused jumble of things contradictious together; that Soul of the world being at once supposed to be a sister to other souls, and yet, notwithstanding, to deify them; whereas this sisterly relation and consanguinity betwixt them would, of the two, rather degrade and creaturize that mundane soul, which is their third god, or Divine hypostasis, than advance and deify those particular created souls. Here therefore we see the inconvenience of these Platonic βαθμοὶ, stories, stairs, and gradations in the Deity, that it is a thing liable to be much abused to creature-worship and idolatry, when the distances are made so wide, and the lowest of the Deity is supposed to differ but gradually only from the highest of created beings. And because Porphyrius trod in Plotinus's footsteps here, as elsewhere, this was, in all probability, the true reason why the Arians (as Socrates recordeth[2]) were by Constantine called Porphyrianists; not because their trinities were exactly the same, but because Arius and Porphyrius did both of them alike (though upon different grounds) make their trinity a foundation for creature-worship and idolatry. But, nevertheless, all this (as many other things) was but heedlessly and inadvertently written by Plotinus; he, as it were, drowsily nodding all the while, as it was also but supinely taken up by Porphyrius after him: it being plainly inconsistent with the genuine tenor of both their hypotheses, thus to level the third hypostasis of the trinity with particular created souls, and thereby to make so disproportionate a distance, and so vast a chasm, betwixt it and the second. For Plotinus himself, when in a more sober mood, declares, that third hypostasis not to be the immediate, informing soul of the corporeal world, but a higher separate soul, or superior Venus, which also was the De-

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[1] Enn. v. lib. i. cap. ii. (p. 483.) [2] Vide lib. i. cap. ix. p. 32.

miurgus, the maker, both of other souls and of the whole world. As Plato had before expressly affirmed him to be the Inspirer of all life, and Creator of souls, or the Lord and Giver of life; and likewise declared, that amongst all those things, which are *ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς συγγενῆ*, congenerous and cognate with our human souls—there is *οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο*, nothing any where to be found at all alike unto it.—So that Plato, though he were also a star-worshipper and idolater, upon other grounds, yet in all probability would he not at all have approved of Plotinus's *ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα*, our souls being of the same species with that third hypostasis of the Divine triad; but rather have said, in the language of the Psalmist, "It is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture."

Notwithstanding all which, a Christian Platonist, or Platonic Christian, would in all probability, apologize for Plato himself, and the ancient and most genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, after this manner. First, that since they had no Scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct their steps in the darkness of this mystery, and to confine their language to a regular uniformity; but theologized all freely and boldly, and without any scrupulosity, every one according to his own private apprehensions; it is no wonder at all, if they did not only speak, many times unadvisedly, and inconsistently with their own principles, but also plainly wander out of the right path. And that it ought much rather to be wondered at, that living so long before Christianity, as some of them did, they should in so abstruse a point, and dark a mystery, make so near an approach to the Christian truth afterward revealed, than that they should any where fumble or fall short of the accuracy thereof: they not only extending the true and real Deity to three hypostases, but also calling the second of them, *λόγον*, reason or word too, (as well as *νοῦν*, mind or intellect) and likewise the Son of the first hypostasis, the Father; and affirming him to be the *δημιουργὸς* and *αἴτιον*, the artificer and cause of the whole world; and, lastly, describing him, as the Scripture doth, to be the image, the figure and character, and the splendor or brightness of the first. This, I say, our Christian Platonist supposes to be much more wonderful, that this so great and abstruse a mystery, of three eternal hypostases in the Deity, should thus by Pagan philosophers, so long before Christianity, have been asserted, as the principle and original of the whole world; it being more indeed than was acknowledged by the Nicene fathers themselves: they then not so much as determining, that the Holy Ghost was an hypostasis, much less that he was God.

But particularly as to their gradual subordination of the second hy-

postasis to the first, and of the third to the first and second; our Platonic Christian, doubtless, would therefore plead them the more excusable, because the generality of Christian doctors, for the first three hundred years after the apostles' times, plainly asserted the same; as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Titianus, Irenæus, the author of the Recognitions, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Lactantius, and many others. All whose testimonies, because it would be tedious to set down here, we shall content ourselves only with one of the last mentioned: [1]"Et Pater et Filius Deus est; sed ille quasi exuberans fons, hic tanquam defluens ex eo rivus: Ille tanquam sol, hic tanquam radius a sole porrectus." Both the Father and the Son is God; but he as it were an exuberant fountain, this as a stream derived from him: he like to the sun, this like to a ray extended from the sun.—And though it be true that Athanasius,[2] writing against the Arians, does appeal to the tradition of the ancient church, and amongst others cites Origen's testimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute coequality of him with the Father, as would exclude all dependence, subordination, and inferiority; those ancients so unanimously agreeing therein, that they are by Petavius[3] therefore taxed for Platonism, and having by that means corrupted the purity of the Christian faith, in this article of the Trinity. Which how it can be reconciled with those other opinions of ecclesiastical tradition being a rule of faith, and the impossibility of the visible church's erring in any fundamental point, cannot easily be understood. However, this general tradition or consent of the Christian church, for three hundred years together after the apostles' times, though it cannot justify the Platonists, in any thing discrepant from the Scripture, yet may it in some measure doubtless plead their excuse, who had no Scripture revelation at all, to guide them herein; and so at least make their error more tolerable or pardonable.

Moreover, the Platonic Christian would further apologize for these Pagan Platonists after this manner: That their intention in thus subordinating the hypostases of their trinity was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of coordinate and independent gods, which

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[1] Instit. lib. iv. cap. xxix. [p. 514.]

[2] Vide Epistol. de Synodi Nicænæ contra Hæresin Arian. Decretis, tom. i. oper. p. 277.

[3] Vide lib. i. de Trinitate, cap. iii. p. 20. et cap. iv. p. 24. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.

they supposed an absolute coequality of them would infer. And that they made only so much subordination of them, as was both necessary to this purpose, and unavoidable; the juncture of them being in their opinion so close, that there was *μηδὲν μεταξυ*, nothing intermedious—or that could possibly be thrust in between them. But now again, on the other hand, whereas the only ground of the coequality of the persons in the holy Trinity is, because it cannot well be conceived, how they should otherwise all be God; since the essence of the Godhead, being absolute perfection, can admit of no degrees; these Platonists do on the contrary contend, that notwithstanding that dependence and subordination, which they commonly suppose in these hypostases, there is none of them, for all that, to be accounted creatures, but that the general essence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, truly and properly belongeth to them all: according to that of Porphyrius before cited, *ἄχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν*, the essence of the Godhead proceedeth to three hypostases.—Now these Platonists conceive, that the essence of the Godhead, as common to all the three hypostases of their trinity, consisteth (besides perfect intellectuality) in these following things: First, in being eternal, which as we have already showed, was Plato's distinctive character betwixt God and the creature. That whatsoever was eternal, is therefore uncreated; and whatsoever was not eternal, is a creature; he by eternity meaning, the having not only no beginning, but also a permanent duration. Again, in having not a contingent but necessary existence, and therefore being absolutely undestroyable; which perhaps is included also in the former. Lastly, in being not particular, but universal *ἓν καὶ πάντα*, one and all things, or that which comprehends the whole; which is all one as to say, in being infinite and omnipotent, and the creator of the whole world. Now, say these Platonists, if any thing more were to be added to the general essence of the Godhead besides this, then must it be self-existence, or to be underived from any other, and the first original, principle, and cause of all; but if this be made so essential to the Godhead, or uncreated nature, as that whatsoever is not thus originally of itself, is therefore *ipso facto* to be detruded and thrust down into the rank of creatures; then must both the second and third hypostases, as well in the Christian as the Platonic Trinity, upon this supposition, needs be creatures, and not God; the second deriving its whole being and godship from the first; and the third, both from the first and second; and so neither first nor second being the cause of all things. But it is unquestionable to these Platonists, that whatsoever is eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, and omnipotent, and the creator of all

things, ought therefore to be religiously worshipped and adored as God, by all created beings. Wherefore this essence of the Godhead, that belongeth alike to all the three hypostases, being, as all other essences, perfectly indivisible, it might be well affirmed, according to Platonic grounds, that all the three Divine hypostases (though having some subordination in them) yet in this sense are coequal, they being all truly and alike God or uncreated. And the Platonists thus distinguishing betwixt *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, the essence of the Godhead, and the distinct hypostases or personalities thereof, and making the first of them to be common, general, and universal, are not without the consent and approbation of the orthodox fathers herein; they determining, likewise, that in the Deity, essence or substance differs from hypostasis, as *τὸ κοινὸν* from *τό καθ' ἕκαστον*, that which is common and general, differs from that which is singular and individual.—Thus, besides many others, St. Cyril, [1]*ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ γένος, ἢ εἶδος, ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει·* The essence or substance of the Deity differs from the hypostasis, after the same manner as a genus or species differs from an individuum.—So that, as well according to these fathers as the Platonists, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons agree in, is not singular, but generical or universal; they both supposing each of the persons also to have their own numerical essence. Wherefore according to this distinction betwixt the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the particular hypostasis, (approved by the orthodox fathers) neither Plato, nor any intelligent Platonist, would scruple to subscribe that form of the Nicene council, that the Son or Word, is *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential, consubstantial, and coequal with the Father. And we think it will be proved afterwards, that this was the very meaning of the Nicene council itself, that the Son was coessential or consubstantial with the Father, merely because he was God, and not a creature.

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would doubtless acknowledge also all the three hypostases of their trinity to be homoousian, coessential or consubstantial, yet in a further sense than this; namely, as being all of them one *Θεῖον* or Divinity. For thus, besides that passage of Porphyrius before cited, may these words of St. Cyril be understood concerning them; [2]*μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ προσήκειν*

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[1] This seems to be a mistake for *Theodoret*, in whom we find these very words: Dialog. i. advers. Hæres. tom. ii. oper. p. 297. Though the same thing is said in other words in St. Cyril, Dialog. i. de Trinitate, p. 408. tom. v. oper. ed. Auberti.

[2] Contra Julian. lib. viii. p. 270.

ἰσχυρίζονται· That, according to them, the essence of God extendeth to three hypostases, or comprehendeth three hypostases in it :—that is, not only so as that each of these three is God ; but also, that they are not so many separate and divided gods, but all of them together one God or Divinity. For though the Platonists, as Pagans, being not so scrupulous in their language, as we Christians are, do often call them three gods, and a first, second, and third god ; yet, notwithstanding, as philosophers, did they declare them to be one θεῖον or Divinity ; and that, as it seems, upon these several accounts following : First, because they are indivisibly conjoined together, as the splendor is indivisible from the sun. And then, because they are mutually inexistent in each other, the first being in the second, and both first and second in the third. And, lastly, because the entireness of the whole Divinity is made up of all these three together, which have all μίαν ἐνέργειαν, one and the same energy or action *ad extra.* And therefore as the centre, radious distance, and moveable circumference, may be all said to be coessential to a sphere; and the root, stock, and boughs, or branches, coessential to an entire tree : so, but in a much more perfect sense, are the Platonic Tagathon, Nous, and Psyche, coessential to that ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, that Divinity in the whole universe. Neither was Athanasius a stranger to this notion of the word ὁμοούσιος, also, he affirming [1] τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια καὶ ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι τῆς ἀμπέλου, that the branches are coessential with, and indivisible from, the vine ;—and illustrating the Trinity by that similitude. Neither must it be thought, that the whole Trinity is one, after the very same manner that each single person thereof is in itself one, for then should there be a Trinity also in each person. Nor that it is so called undivided, as if three were not three in it; (which were to make the mystery contemptible :) but because all the three hypostases, or persons, are indivisibly and inseparably united to each other, as the sun and the splendor, and really but one God. Wherefore, though there be some subordination of hypostases, or persons, in Plato's trinity, (as it is commonly represented) yet this is only *ad intra* within the Deity itself, in their relation to one another, and as compared amongst themselves ; but, *ad extra,* outwardly, and to us, are they all one and, the same God, concurring in all the same actions ; and, in that respect, without any inequality, because in identity there can be no inequality.

Furthermore, the Platonic Christian would, in favor of these Platonists, urge also, that, according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must of necessity be some dependence and subordination of the per-

[1] De Sent. Dionys. p. 556. [tom. i. oper.]

sons of the Trinity, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority, not only τάξεως, but also ἀξιώματος, of dignity as well as order, amongst them. First, because that which is originally of itself, and underived from any other, must needs have some superiority and pre-eminence over that, which derives its whole being and godship from it, as the second doth from the first alone, and the third from the first with the second. Again, though all those three hypostases, or persons, be alike omnipotent, *ad extra*, or outwards, *ad intra*, inwards, or within the Deity itself, are they not so; the Son being not able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter is absolutely the cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account was that first of these three hypostases (who is the original fountain of all) by Macrobius[1] styled, omnipotentissimus Deus, the most omnipotent God; he therein implying the second and third hypostases, Nous and Psyche, to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect equality with him, as within the Deity they are compared together; however, *ad extra*, or outwardly, and to us, they being all one, are equally omnipotent. And Plotinus writeth also to the same purpose: [2] *εἰ τέλειόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι*, etc. If the first be absolutely perfect, and the first Power, then must it needs be the most powerful of all beings; other powers only imitating and partaking thereof.—And accordingly hereunto would the Platonic Christian further pretend, that there are sundry places in the Scripture, which do not a little favor some subordination and priority, both of order and dignity, in the persons of the holy Trinity; of which none is more obvious than that of our Saviour Christ, "My Father is greater than I:" which, to understand of his humanity only, seemeth to be less reasonable, because this was no news at all, that the eternal God, the creator of the whole world, should be greater than a mortal man, born of a woman. And thus do divers of the orthodox fathers, as Athanasius himself, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Chrysostom, with several others of the Latins, interpret the same to have been spoken, not of the humanity, but of the Divinity of our Saviour Christ. Insomuch that Petavius himself, expounding the Athanasian Creed, writeth in this manner: [3] "Pater major Filio, rite et catholice pronuntiatus est a plerisque veterum; et origine prior sine reprehensione dici solet." The Father is, in a right

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[1] In Somnium Scipion. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 87.

[2] P. 517. [Enn. v. lib. iv. cap. i.]

[3] De Trin. p. 863.

catholic manner, affirmed, by most of the ancients, to be greater than the Son; and he is commonly said also, without reprehension, to be before him in respect of original.—Whereupon he concludeth the true meaning of that Creed to be this, that no person in the Trinity is greater or less than other, in respect of the essence of the Godhead common to them all: "Quia vera Deitas in nullo esse aut minor aut major potest;" because the true Godhead can be no where greater or less:—but that, notwithstanding, there may be some inequality in them, as they are *hic Deus*, and *hæc persona;* this God, and that person.—It is true, indeed, that many of those ancient fathers do restrain and limit this inequality only to the relation of the persons one to another, as the Father's begetting, and the Son's being begotten by the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeding from both; they seeming to affirm, that there is otherwise a perfect equality amongst them. Nevertheless several of them do extend this difference further also; as, for example, St. Hilary, a zealous opposer of the Arians, he in his book of Synods writing thus; [1] "Siquis unum dicens Deum, Christum autem Deum, ante secula Filium Dei, obsecutum Patri in creatione omnium, non confitetur, anathema sit." And again, "Non exæquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri, sed subjectum intelligimus." And Athanasius himself, who is commonly accounted the very rule of orthodoxality in this point, when he doth so often resemble the Father to the ἥλιος, or to the φῶς, the sun, or the original light, and the Son to the ἀπαύγασμα, the splendor or brightness of it, (as likewise doth the Nicene council and the Scripture itself;) he seems hereby to imply some dependence of the second upon the first, and subordination to it; especially when he declareth, that the three persons of the Trinity are not to be looked upon as three principles, nor to be resembled to three suns, but to the sun, and its splendor, and its derivative light: [2] *οὐδὲ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσάγομεν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑπεθέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι φῶς· οὕτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἴδαμεν·* For it appears from the similitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendor; so that we acknowledge only one principle.—As also where he approves of this of Dionysius of Alexandria,[3] *ὁ δὲ γε Θεὸς αἰώνιόν ἐστι φῶς, οὔτε ἀρξάμενον, οὔτε· λῆξόν ποτε· οὐκοῦν αἰώνιον προσκείται καὶ*

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[1] P. 1178 and 1182. oper. ed. Benedict.

[2] Cont. Ar. Or. iv. p. 467. (tom. i. oper.)

[3] P. 565. (lib. de Sententia Dionys. contra Arian. tom. i.)

σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ἄναρχον καὶ ἀειγενὲς προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ· God is an eternal light, which never began, and shall never cease to be; wherefore there is an eternal splendor also coexistent with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, shining out before him.—For if the Son of God be as the splendor of the sun *ἀειγενὴς*, always generated—then must he needs have an essential dependence upon the Father, and subordination to him. And this same thing further appears from those other resemblances, which the same Dionysius maketh of the Father and the Son, approved in like manner also by Athanasius; viz. to the fountain and the river; to the root and the branch; to the water and the vapor; for so it ought to be read *ὕδατος*, and not *πνεύματος*, as appeareth from his book of the Nicene synod, where he affirmeth the Son to have been begotten of the essence or substance of the father: [1]*ὡς τοῦ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀτμὶς*, as the splendor of the light, and as the vapor of the water;—adding: *οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, οὔτε ἡ ἀτμὶς, αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστὶν, ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ ἥλιος· οὔτε ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας·* For neither the splendor nor the vapor is the very sun and the very water; nor yet is it alien from it, or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effluxes from the essence or substance of them; as the Son is an efflux from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is no way diminished or lessened thereby. Now all these similitudes, of the fountain and the river, the root and the branch, the water and the vapor, (as well as that of the sun and the splendor) seem plainly to imply some dependence and subordination. And Dionysius doubtless intended them to that purpose, he asserting, as Photius informeth us, an inferiority of power and glory in the second, as likewise did Origen before him; both whose testimonies, notwithstanding, Athanasius maketh use of, without any censure or reprehension of them. Wherefore, when Athanasius, and the other orthodox fathers, writing against Arius, do so frequently assert the equality of all the three persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to Arius only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as *ἑτεροούσιον*, of a different essence from him—one being God and the other a creature; they affirming, on the contrary, that he was equal to the Father, as *ὁμοούσιος*, of the same essence with him;—that is, as God, and not a creature. Notwithstanding which equality there might be some subordination in them, as *hic Deus*, and *hæc persona*, (to use Petavius's language,) this God and that person.

And thus does there seem not to be so great a difference betwixt

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[1] Page 275. (tom. i. oper.)

the more genuine Platonists and the ancient orthodox fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity, as is by many conceived. However, our Platonic Christian would further add, that there is no necessity at all from the principles of Platonism itself, why the Platonists should make any other or more subordination in their Trinity, than the most severely orthodox fathers themselves. For, according to the common hypothesis of the Platonists, when the character of the first hypostasis is supposed by them to be infinite goodness; of the second, infinite wisdom; and of the third, infinite active love and power, (these not as accidents and qualities, but as all substantial) it is more easy to conceive, that all these are really but one and the same God, than how there should be any considerable inferiority in them. But, besides this, there is another Platonic hypothesis (which St. Austin[1] hinteth from Porphyrius, though he professeth he did not well understand it) where the third hypostasis is made to be a certain middle betwixt the first and second. And this does Proclus also sometimes follow, calling the third in like manner *μέσην δύναμιν*, a middle power, and *σχέσιν ἀμφοῖν*, the relation of both the first and second to one another.—Which agreeth exactly with that apprehension of some Christians, that the third hypostasis is as it were the nexus betwixt the first and second, and that love, whereby the Father and Son love each other. Now, according to this latter Platonic hypothesis, there would seem to be not so much a gradation or descent, as a kind of circulation in the Trinity. Upon all which considerations, the Platonic Christian will conclude, that though some junior Platonists have adulterated the notion of the Trinity, yet either there is no such great difference betwixt the genuine Platonic Trinity, rightly understood, and the Christian; or else, that as the same might be modelled and rectified, there need not be.

But though the genuine Platonists do thus suppose the three hypostases of their Trinity to be all of them, not only God, but also one God, or *μία θεότης*, one entire Divinity; — upon which latter account, the whole may be said also by them, to have one singular or numerical essence: yet notwithstanding it must be acknowledged, that they nowhere suppose each of these three hypostases to be numerically the very same, or to have no distinct singular essences of their own; this being, in their apprehensions, directly contradictious to their very hypothesis itself, and all one as if they should affirm them, indeed not to be three hypostases, but only one. Nevertheless the Christian Platonist would here also apologize for them after this manner; that

1 De Civ. D. lib. x. cap. xxiii. Cum dicit medium, non postponit, sed interponit.

the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church were generally of no other persuasion than this, that that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular and individual, but only one common and universal essence or substance; that word substance being used by them as synonymous with essence, and applied to universals likewise, as it is by the Peripatetics, when they call a man, or animal in general, *substantiam secundam*, a second substance.—Now this is evident from hence, because these orthodox fathers did commonly distinguish in this controversy of the Trinity, betwixt *Οὐσία* and *Ὑπόστασις*, the essence or substance of the Godhead—and the hypostases or persons themselves, after this manner; namely, that the hypostasis or person was singular and individual, but the essence or substance common and universal. Thus does Theodoret pronounce of these fathers in general, [1]*κατάγε τὴν τῶν πατέρων διδασκαλίαν, ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἴδιον, ἢ τὸ γένος ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἔχει Ἡ ΟΥΣΙΑ πρὸς ΤΗΝ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΝ·* According to the doctrine of the fathers, as that which is common differs from that which is proper, and the genus from the species or individuum, so doth essence or substance, differ from hypostases; that is to say, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which is common to all the three hypostases, or whereby each of them is God, was concluded by the fathers, not to be one singular or individual, but one general or universal essence and substance; Theodoret, notwithstanding, there acknowledging, that no such distinction was observed by other Greek writers betwixt those two words *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, essence or substance and hypostasis, as that the former of them should be restrained to universals only, generical or specifical essences or substances; but that this was peculiar to the Christian fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity. They in the meantime not denying, but that each hypostasis, prosopon, or person, in the Trinity, might be said in another sense, and in way of opposition to Sabellius, to have its own singular, individual, or existent essence also; and that there are thus, [2]*τρεῖς οὐσίαι*, three singular existent essences in the Deity, as well as *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, three hypostases; an hypostasis being nothing else to them but an existent essence: however, for distinction's sake, they here thought fit thus to limit and appropriate the signification of these two words, that a singular and existent essence should not be called essence, but hypostasis; and by

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[1] Dial. i. adv. Hær. (tom. ii. oper. p. 297.)

[2] Greg. Nyssen. adv. Eunem. lib. xii. (p. 301. tom. ii. oper.)

οὐσία, essence or substance, should be meant that general or universal nature of the Godhead only, which is common to all those three singular hypostases or persons, or in which they all agree. We might here heap up many more testimonies for a further confirmation of this; as that of St. Basil: [1]ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν· What common is to proper, the same is essence or substance (in the Trinity) to the hypostases.—But we shall content ourselves only with this full acknowledgement of D. Petavius: [2]In hoc uno Græcorum præsertim omnium judicia concordant, οὐσίαν, id est, essentiam sive substantiam, aut naturam (quam φύσιν vocant) generale esse aliquid et communi, ac minime definitum; ὑπόστασιν vero proprium, singulare, et circumscriptum, quod ex illo communi et peculiaribus quibusdam notis ac proprietatibus veluti componitur." In this one thing do the judgments and opinions of all the Greeks especially agree, that Usia, essence or substance, and nature, which they call Physis (in the Trinity), is something general, common and undetermined; but hypostasis is that, which is proper, singular, and circumscribed, and which is, as it were, compounded and made up of that common essence or substance, and certain peculiar notes and properties, or individuating circumstances.

But, besides this, it is further certain, that not a few of those ancient fathers, who were therefore reputed orthodox, because they zealously opposed Arianism, did entertain this opinion also, that the three hypostases or persons of the Trinity, had not only one general and universal essence of the Godhead, belonging to them all, they being all God; but were also three individuals, under one and the same ultimate species, or specific essence and substance of the Godhead; just as three individual men (Thomas, Peter, and John), under that ultimate species of man; or that specific essence of humanity, which have only a numerical difference from one another. Wherefore an hypostasis, or person (in the Trinity) was accordingly thus defined by some of these fathers (viz. Anastasius and Cyril[3]) to be "Essentia cum suis quibusdam proprietatibus ab iis, quæ sunt ejusdem speciei, numero differens;" an essence or substance, with its certain properties (or individuating circumstances), differing only numerically from those of the same species with it.—This doctrine was plainly asserted and industriously pursued (be-

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1 Ep. 369. (Ep. cccxlix. tom. ii. oper. p. 1046. edit. Paris 1638.)

2 De Trin. lib. iv. cap. vii. (sect. ii. p. 215. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.)

3 Vide Exposition. Compendiar. Fidei Orthodox. in Bibliothec. Patrum, p. 677. tom. xv. edit. Paris, 1645.

sides several others both of the Greeks and Latins), especially by Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Martyr, and Damascen; whose words, because Petavius[1] hath set them down at large, we shall not here insert. Now these were they, who principally insisted upon the absolute coequality and independent coordination of the three hypostases or persons in the Trinity, as compared with one another. Because, as three men, though one of them were a father, another a son, and the third a nephew, yet have no essential dependence one upon another, but are naturally coequal and unsubordinate, there being only a numerical difference betwixt them; so did they in like manner conclude, that the three hypostases, or persons of the Deity (the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), being likewise but three individuals, under the same ultimate species, or specific essence of the Godhead, and differing only numerically from one another, were absolutely coequal, unsubordinate, and independent: and this was that, which was commonly called by them their *ὁμοουσιότης*, their coessentiality or consubstantiality. Wherefore it is observable, that St. Cyril, one of these theologers, finds no other fault at all with the Platonic trinity, but only this, that such an homoousiotes, such a coessentiality or consubstantiality as this was not acknowledged therein; [2]*ἐλελοίπει δ' ἂν πρὸς τοῦτο αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν, εἰ τὸν τῆς ὁμοουσιότητος λόγον ἐφαρμόττειν ἤθελον ὑποστάσεσι ταῖς τρισὶν, ἵνα καὶ μία νοοῖτο τῆς θεότητος φύσις, τὸ τρίχιδες οὐκ ἔχουσα πρὸς ἑτερότητα φυσικὴν, καὶ τό γε δὴ δεῖν ἀλλήλων ἐν μείοσιν ὁρᾶσθαι ὑποστάσεις.* There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonic trinity for an absolute agreement of it with the Christian, had they but accommodated the right notion of coessentiality or consubstantiality to their three hypostases; so that there might have been but one specific nature or essence of the Godhead, not further distinguishable by any natural diversity, but numerically only, and so no one hypostasis any way inferior or subordinate to another.—That is, had these Platonists complied with that hypothesis of St. Cyril and others, that the three persons of the Trinity were but three independent and co-ordinate individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, as Peter, Paul, and John, under that species or common nature of humanity, and so taken in this coessentiality or consubstantiality of theirs, then had they been completely orthodox. Though we have already showed, that this Platonic trinity was, in another sense, homoousian; and perhaps it will appear afterwards, that it was so also in the very

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[1] Lib. iv. de Trinit. cap. ix. sect. iv. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.

[2] Cont. Jul. lib. viii. p. 270.

sense of the Nicene fathers and of Athanasius. Again, these theologers supposed the three persons of their trinity to have really no other than a specific unity or identity; and because it seems plainly to follow from hence, that therefore they must needs be as much three gods, as three men are three men; these learned fathers endeavored with their logic to prove, that three men are but abusively and improperly so called three, they being really and truly but one, because there is but one and the same specific essence or substance of human nature in them all; and seriously persuaded men to lay aside that kind of language. By which same logic of theirs, they might as well prove also, that all the men in the world are but one man, and that all Epicurus's gods were but one god neither. But not to urge here, that, according to this hypothesis, there cannot possibly be any reason given, why there should be so many as three such individuals in the species of God, which differ only numerically from one another, they being but the very same thing thrice repeated; and yet that there should be no more than three such neither, and not three hundred, or three thousand, or as many as there are individuals in the species of man; we say, not to urge this, it seems plain, that this trinity is no other than a kind of tritheism, and that of gods independent and coordinate too. And therefore some would think, that the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity, taken with all its faults, is to be preferred before this trinity of St. Cyril and St. Gregory Nyssen, and several other reputed orthodox fathers; and more agreeable to the principles both of Christianity and of reason. However, it is evident from hence, that these reputed orthodox fathers, who were not a few, were far from thinking the three hypostases of the Trinity to have the same singular existent essence, they supposing them to have no otherwise one and the same essence of the Godhead in them, nor to be one god, than three individual men have one common specifical essence of manhood in them, and are all one man. But as this trinity came afterwards to be decreed for tritheistic; so in the room thereof started there up that other trinity of persons numerically the same, or having all one and the same singular existent essence; a doctrine, which seemeth not to have been owned by any public authority in the Christian church, save that of the Lateran council [1] only.

And that no such thing was ever entertained by the Nicene fathers and those first opposers of Arianism, might be rendered probable in the first place from the free confession and acknowledgment of D. Pe-

[1] The fourth general Lateran council held in 1215, under pope Innocent III.

tavius (a person well acquainted with ecclesiastic antiquity); and for this reason especially, because many are much led by such new names and authorities: [1] "In eo præcipuam vim collecasse patres, ut æqualem patri natura excellentiaque filium esse defenderent, citra expressam SINGULARITATIS mentionem, licet ex eo conjicere. Etenim Nicæni isti præsules, quibus nemo melius Arianæ sectæ arcana cognovit, nemo, qua re opprimenda maxime foret, acrius dijudicare potuit, nihil in professionis suæ formula spectarunt aliud, nisi ut æqualitatem illam essentiæ, dignitatis, æternitatis astruerent. Testatur hoc ὁμοουσίου vox ipsa, quæ arx quædam fuit catholici dogmatis. Hæc enim æqualitatem potius essentiæ, quam SINGULARITATEM significat, ut capite quinto docui. Deinde cætera ejusdemmodi sunt in illo decreto, ut, etc. The chief force, which the ancient fathers opposed against the Arian heretics, was in asserting only the equality of the Son with the Father, as to nature or essence, without any express mention of the SINGULARITY of the same. For those Nicene bishops themselves, who did understand best of any the secrets of the Arian faction, and which way it should especially be oppugned, aimed at nothing else, in their confession of faith, but only to establish that equality of essence, dignity, and eternity, between them. This does the word homoousios itself declare, it signifying rather equality, than SINGULARITY, of essence, as we have before showed. And the like do those other passages in the same decree; as, That there was no time when the Son was not; and, That he was not made of nothing, nor of a different hypostasis, or essence.—Thus does Petavius clearly confess, that this same singularity of numerical essence was not asserted by the Nicene council, nor the most ancient fathers, but only an equality or sameness of generical essence; or else that the Father and Son agreed only in one common essence or substance of the Godhead, that is, the eternal and uncreated nature.

But the truth of this will more fully appear from these following particulars: First, because these orthodox anti-arian fathers did all of them zealously condemn Sabellianism, the doctrine whereof is no other than this, that there was but one hypostasis, or singular individual essence, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and, consequently, that they were indeed but three several names, or notions, or modes, of one and the self-same thing. From whence such absurdities as these would follow, that the Father's begetting the Son was nothing but one name, notion, or mode of the Deity's begetting another; or else the same Deity, under one notion, begetting itself under another notion. And

[1] De Trin. l. iv. c. xiii. [§ vii. p. 248. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.]

when again the Son, or Word, and not the Father, is said to have been incarnated, and to have suffered death for us upon the cross, that it was nothing but a mere logical notion or mode of the Deity, that was incarnate and suffered, or else the whole Deity under one particular notion or mode only. But should it be averred notwithstanding, that this trinity, which we now speak of, was not a trinity of mere names and notions, as that of the Sabellians, but of distinct hypostases or persons; then must it needs follow (since every singular essence is an hypostasis according to the sense of the ancient fathers) that there was not a trinity only, but a quaternity of hypostases, in the Deity. Which is a thing, that none of those fathers ever dreamed of.

Again, the word homoousios, as was before intimated by Petavius, was never used by Greek writers otherwise than to signify the agreement of things, numerically differing from one another in some common nature or universal essence, or their having a generical unity or identity, of which sundry instances might be given. Nor indeed is it likely, that the Greek tongue should have any name for that, which neither is a thing in nature, nor falls under human conception, viz. several things having one and the same singular essence. And, accordingly, St. Basil interprets the force of this word thus: [1]*ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως, οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ τί ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον ἀλλ'* [3] *ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ·* That it plainly takes away the sameness of hypostasis, that is, of singular numerical essence (this being that which the ancient fathers meant by the word hypostasis): for the same thing is homoousios, coessential or consubstantial with itself, but always one thing with another.—Wherefore as *τὸ ὁμοούσιον* and *συγγένεια* are used by Plotinus as synonymous, in these words concerning the soul, [2]*θείων μεστὴ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον*, that it is full of Divine things, by reason of its being cognate or congenerous, and homoousius with them; so doth Athanasius in like manner use them, when he affirmeth [3]*τὰ κλήματα εἶναι ὁμοούσια καὶ συγγενῆ τῆς ἀμπέλου*, that the branches are homoousios (coessential or consubstantial) and congenerous with the vine, or with the root thereof.—Besides which, the same father uses *ὁμογενὴς* and *ὁμοειδὴς*, and *ὁμοφυὴς*, indifferently for *ὁμοούσιος*, in sundry places; none of which words can be thought to signify an identity of singular essence, but only of generical or specifical. And thus was the word

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[1] In Epist. (Epist. ecc. p. 1070. tom. ii. oper.)

[2] En. iv. lib. vii. cap. x. (p. 464.)

[3] Epist. de Sent. Dion. p. 556. (tom. i. oper.)

homoousios plainly used by the council of Chalcedon,[1] they affirming, that our Saviour Christ was *ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα*, coessential or consubstantial with the Father, as to his Divinity; but coessential or consubstantial with us men, as to his humanity.—Where it cannot reasonably be suspected, that one and the same word should be taken in two different senses in the same sentence, so as, in the first place, to signify a numerical identity, but, in the second, a generical or specifical only. But, lastly, which is yet more, Athanasius himself speaketh in like manner of our Saviour Christ's being homoousios with us men: [2]*εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁμοούσιος ἐστιν ἡμῖν υἱός, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῖν ἔχει γένεσιν, ἔστω κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς ἀλλότριος κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἄμπελος τοῦ γεωργοῦ·* If the Son be coessential or consubstantial (or of the same essence or substance) with us men, he having the very same nature with us, then let him be in this respect a stranger to the essence or substance of the Father, even as the vine is to the essence of the husbandman.—And again, a little after, in the same epistle, *ἢ λέγων μὴ εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἴδιον, τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, ἐφρόνει τοῦτον ὁμοούσιον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων·* Or did Dionysius,[3] think you, when he affirmed the Word not to be proper to the essence of the Father, suppose him therefore to be coessential or consubstantial with us men?—From all which it is unquestionably evident, that Athanasius did not, by the word homoousios, understand that which hath the same singular and numerical essence with another, but the same common generical or specifical only; and, consequently, that he conceived the Son to be coessential or consubstantial with the Father after that manner.

Furthermore, the true meaning of the Nicene fathers may more fully and thoroughly be perceived, by considering what that doctrine of Arius was, which they opposed and condemned. Now Arius maintained the Son or Word to be *κτίσμα*, a creature, made in time, and mutable or defectible; and, for that reason, as Athanasius tells us, *ἑτ-*

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[1] Vide tom. ii. Concilior. p. 456. edit. Harduini.

[2] Tom. i. p. 556. (de sentent. Dionys.)

[3] Thus also in his first epistle to Serapion, *ἄνθρωποί γ' οὖν ὅμοιοι καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα ἔχοντες ὁμοούσιοί ἐσμεν ἀλλήλων·* We men being alike, and having the sameness of nature, are consubstantial with one another. And, p. 170. *ὥσπερ οὖν μαίνοιτ' ἄν τις γέγων, τὴν οἰκίαν ὁμοούσιον τοῦ οἰκοδόμου, καὶ τὸ σκάφος τοῦ ναυπηγοῦ, οὕτως προπόντως ἄν τις εἴποι, πάντα υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρός·* It were madness to say, that a house is coessential or consubstantial with the builder, or a ship with a shipwright; but is proper to say, that every son is coessential or consubstantial with his father.

ἑρούσιον and ἀλλοτριούσιον, of a different essence or substance from the Father, (that which is created being supposed to differ essentially or substantially from that which is uncreated.)—Wherefore the Nicene fathers, in way of opposition to this doctrine of Arius, determined, that the Son or Word was not thus ἑτερούσιος, nor ἀλλοτριούσιος, but ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρί, coessential or consubstantial with the Father;—that is, not a creature, but God; or agreeing with the Father in that common nature or essence of the Godhead. So that this is that οὐσία, essence or substance of the ancient fathers, which is said to be the same in all the three hypostases of the Trinity, as they are called God; not a singular existent essence, but the common, general, or universal essence of the Godhead, or of the uncreated nature, called by St. Hilary,[1] "Natura una, non unitate personæ, sed generis;" one nature, not by unity of person, but of kind.—Which unity of the common or general essence of the Godhead is the same thing also with that equality, which some of the ancient fathers so much insist upon against Arius; namely, an equality of nature, as the Son and Father are both of them alike God, that essence of the Godhead (which is common to all the three persons) being, as all other essences, supposed to be indivisible. From which equality itself also does it appear, that they acknowledged no identity of singular essence, it being absurd to say, that one and the self-same thing is equal to itself. And with this equality of essence did some of these orthodox fathers themselves imply, that a certain inequality of the hypostases or persons also, in their mutual relation to one another, might be consistent. As for example, St. Austin writing thus against the Arians:[2] "Patris, ergo et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, etiamsi disparem cogitant potestatem, naturam saltem confiteantur æqualem:" Though they conceive the power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be unequal, yet let them, for all that, confess their nature at least to be equal.—And St. Basil likewise:[3] "Though the Son be in order second to the Father, because produced by him, and in dignity also, (forasmuch as the Father is the cause and principle of his being) yet is he not, for all that, second in nature, because there is one Divinity in them both."—And that this was indeed the meaning, both of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius, in their Homoousiotes, their coessentiality or consubstantiality, and coequality of the Son with the Father; namely, their having both the same common essence of the God-

1 De Synodis, [seu Fide Orientalium, § lxxvi. p. 1193. oper.]

2 Cont. Serm. Arian. c. xviii. [p. 451. tom. viii. oper.]

3 3 Cont. Eunom. [p. 79. tom. ii. oper. edit. Par. 1615.]

head; or that the Son was no creature, as Arius contended, but truly God or uncreated likewise, will appear undeniably from many passages in Athanasius, of which we shall here mention only some few. In his epistle concerning the Nicene council, he tells us how the Eusebian faction subscribed the form of that council, though afterward they recanted it:[1] *πάντων τε ὑπογραψάντων ὑπέγραψαν καὶ οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον τούτοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν οἷς αἰτιῶνται νῦν οὗτοι· λέγω δὲ τῷ ἐκ τῆ οὐσίας, καὶ τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ, καὶ ὅτι μήτε κτίσμα ἢ ποίημα, μήτε τῶν γεννητῶν ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός· ἀλλὰ γέννημα καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος.* All the rest subscribing, the Eusebianists themselves subscribed also to these very words, which they now find fault with; I mean, of the essence or substance, and coessential, or consubstantial, and that the Son is no creature or facture, or any of the things made, but the genuine offspring of the essence or substance of the Father.—Afterwards he declareth, how the Nicene council at first intended to have made use only of Scripture words and phrases against the Arians:[2] *τῆς συνόδου βουλομένης τὰς μὲν τῶν Ἀρειανῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας λέξεις ἀνελεῖν· τὰς δὲ τῶν γραφῶν ὁμολογουμένος φωνὰς γράψαι, ὅτι τε υἱός ἐστιν οὐκ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐ κτίσμα οὐδὲ ποίημα· ἴδιον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γέννημα·* As that Christ was the Son of God, and not from nothing, but from God, the word and wisdom of God, and consequently, no creature or thing made. But when they perceived, that the Eusebian faction would evade all those expressions by equivocation, *ἠναγκάσθησαν λοιπὸν λευκότερον εἰπεῖν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. καὶ γράψαι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι τόν υἱὸν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ κοινὸν καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ τε υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν γενετῶν νομίζεσθαι·* They conceived themselves necessitated, more plainly to declare, what they meant by being from God, or out of him; and therefore added, that the Son was out of the substance of God, thereby to distinguish him from all created beings.—Again, a little after, in the same epistle, he adds: *ἡ σύνοδος τοῦτο νοοῦσα, καλῶς ὁμοούσιον ἔγραψεν, ἵνα τήντε τῶν αἱρετικῶν κακοήθειαν ἀναστρέψωσι· καὶ δείξωσιν ἄλλον εἶναι τῶν γενητῶν τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο γράψαντες εὐθὺς ἐπήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ κτιστόν· ἢ τρεπτόν· ἢ ποίημα· ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἁγία καὶ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία.* The synod perceiving this, rightly declared, that the Son was homoousios with the Father; both to cut off the subterfuges of heretics, and to show him to be different from the creatures. For after they had decreed this, they added immediately, They who say, that the Son of God was from things that are not, or made, or mutable, or a creature, or of another sub-

[1] p. 251. [2] p. 267.

stance or essence, all such does the holy and catholic church anathematize. Whereby they made it evident, that these words, Of the Father, and coessential or consubstantial with the Father, were opposed to the impiety of those expressions of the Arians, that the Son was a creature or thing made, and mutable, and that he was not before he was made; which he that affirmeth, contradicteth the synod, but whosoever dissents from Arius, must needs consent to these forms of the synod.—In this same epistle, to cite but one passage more out of it,[1] *χαλκὸς, στίλβων καὶ χρυσὸς*, etc. *ἀλλ' ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτερούσια ἀλλήλων· εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ υἱὸς οὕτως ἐστὶν, ἔστω κτίσμα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ μὴ ὁμοούσιος, εἰ δὲ υἱός ἐστι λόγος, σοφία, εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀπαύγασμα, εἰκότως ὁμοούσιος ἂν εἴη·* Brass and gold, silver and tin, are alike in their shining and color; nevertheless in their essence and nature are they very different from one another. If therefore the Son be such, then let him be a creature as we are, and not coessential (or consubstantial;) but if he be a Son, the word, wisdom, image of the Father,[2] and his splendour, then of right should he be accounted coessential and consubstantial.—Thus, in his epistle concerning Dionysius, we have *ἕνα τῶν γενητῶν εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν*, and *μὴ ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί·* the Son's being one of the creatures, and his not being coessential or consubstantial with the Father—put for synonymous expressions, which signify one and the same thing.

Wherefore it seemeth to be unquestionably evident, that when the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church maintained, against Arius, the Son to be homoousion, coessential or consubstantial with the Father, though that word be thus interpreted, Of the same essence or substance, yet they universally understood thereby, not a sameness of singular and numerical, but of common or universal, essence only; that is, the generical or specifical essence of the Godhead; that the Son was no creature, but truly and properly God. But if it were needful, there might be yet more testimonies cited out of Athanasius to this purpose. As from his epistle De Synodis Arimini et Seleuciæ, where he writeth thus, concerning the difference betwixt those two words; *Ὁμοιούσιον*, of like substance—and *Ὁμοούσιον*, of the same substance, — *Οἴδατε γὰρ καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σχημάτων καὶ ποιοτήτων λέγεται ὅμοιον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐχ Ὁμοιότης, ἀλλὰ ταυτότης ἂν λεχθείη· ἄνθρωπος γοῦν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅμοιος λέγεται οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν—τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ Ὁμοφυεις εἰσι· καὶ πάλιν ἄνθρωπος κυνὶ οὐκ Ἀνόμοιος λέγεται ἀλλ' Ἑτεροφυής· Οὐ κοῦν τὸ Ὁμοφυὲς καὶ Ὁμοούσιον, το δὲ*

[1] Page 272.
[2] Page 561.
[3] Page 928. tom. i. oper.
[4] Page 929.

Ἑτεροφυὲς καὶ ἑτερούσιον. For even yourselves know, that similitude is not predicated of essences, or substances, but of figures and qualities only. But of essences, identity or sameness is affirmed, and not similitude. For a man is not said to be like to a man, in respect of the essence or substance of humanity, but only as to figure or form; they being said, as to their esence, to be congenerous, of the same nature or kind with one another. Nor is a man properly said to be unlike to a dog, but of a different nature or kind from him. Wherefore that, which is congenerous, of the same nature, kind, or species, is also homoousion, coessential or consubstantial (of the same essence or substance), and that, which is of a different nature, kind or species, is heterousion, (of a different essence or substance.)—Again, Athanasius, in that fragment of his against the hypocrisy of Meletius, etc. concerning consubstantiality, writeth in this manner:[1] *Ὁ τοίνυν ἀναιρῶν τὸ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, λέγων δὲ ὅμοιον, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ εἶναι Θεόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐξηγούμενος τὸ Ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ὅμοιον τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἑτέραν τὴν οὐσίαν λέγει, Θεῷ δὲ ὁμοιωμένην· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἶναι πρεπόντως λέγει μὴ φρονῶν ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρώπου οὐσίας· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ οὐσίαν, ἐκ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὁμοιώματι καθάπερ ἀνδριὰς ἀνθρώπῳ· ἢ ὡς ἄνθρωπος Θεῷ, δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁμοούσιον μὲν λέγων, ὁμοούσιον δὲ οὐ φρονῶν· Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν Βούλεται τὸ Ὁμοούσιον ἀκούεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν, περὶ μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ ἵνα διαβάλλῃ ταύτην, Ἑλληνικὴν ῥῆσιν εἰρηκέναι τὸ ὁμοούσιον ῥῆμα τοῦ ἐν Ἕλλησιν ἔθους ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ κείμενον ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν παραστῆσαι*, etc. He that denies the Son to be homoousion, consubstantial with the Father, affirming him only to be like to him, denies him to be God. In like manner, he, who retaining the word homoousion or consubstantial, interprets it notwithstanding only of similitude or likeness in substance, affirmeth the Son to be of another different substance from the Father, and therefore not God; but like to God only. Neither doth such a one rightly understand those words, "Of the substance of the Father," he not thinking the Son to be so consubstantial, or of the essence and substance of the Father, as one man is consubstantial, or of the essence or substance of another who begat him. For he who affirmeth, that the Son is not so of God, as a man is of a man, according to essence or substance; but that he is like him only as a statue is like a man, or as a man may be like to God, it is manifest, that such a one, though he use the word homoousios, yet he doth not really mean it. For he will not understand it, according

[1] Tom. i. oper. p. 572.

to the customary signification thereof, for that, which hath one and the same essence or substance; this word being used by Greeks and Pagans in no other sense, than to signify that, which hath the same nature; as we ought to believe concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.—Where we see plainly, that though the word homoousios be interpreted, That which hath one and the same essence or substance, yet is this understood of the same common nature, and as one man is of the same essence or substance with another. We might here also add to this the concurrent testimonies of the other orthodox fathers; but to avoid tediousness, we shall omit them, and only insert some passages out of St. Austin to the same purpose. For he, in his first book, contra Maxim. (chap. xv.[1]) writeth thus: "Duo veri homines, etsi nullus eorum filius sit alterius, unius tamen et ejusdem sunt substantiæ. Homo autem alterius hominis verus filius nullo modo potest nisi ejusdem cum patre esse substantiæ, etiamsi non sit per omnia similis patri. Quocirca verus Dei filius, et unius cum patre substantiæ est, quia verus filius est; et per omnia est patri similis, quia est Dei filius." Two true men, though neither of them be son to the other, yet are they both of one and the same substance. But a man, who is the true son of another man, can by no means be of a different substance from his father, although he be not in all respects like unto him. Wherefore the true Son of God is both of one substance with the Father, because he is a true Son, and he is also in all respects like to him, because he is the Son of God. Where Christ, or the Son of God, is said to be no otherwise of one substance with God the Father, than here amongst men the son is of the same substance with his father, or any one man with another. Again, the same St. Austin, in his Respons. ad Sermonem Arianorum,[2] expresseth himself thus: [3] "Ariani nos vocitant homoousianos, quia contra eorum errorem, Græco vocabulo ὁμοούσιον defendimus, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum; id est, unius ejusdemque substantiæ, vel, ut expressius dicamus, essentiæ (quæ οὐσία Græce appellatur) quod planius dicitur unius ejusdemque naturæ. Et tamen siquis istorum, qui nos homoousianos vocant, filium suum non cujus ipse esset, sed diversæ diceret esse naturæ, exhæredari ab ipso mallet filius, quam hoc putari. Quanta igitur impietate isti cæcantur, qui cum con-

[1] Cap. xvi. § ii. p. 503. tom. viii. oper. ed. Benedict.

[2] Cap. xxxvi. p. 458. tom. viii. oper.

[3] To the same purpose is that in his second book, chap. vi. "Diversa quidem substantia est Deus Pater, et Homo Mater: non tamen diversa substantia est Deus Pater et Deus Filius: sicut non est diversa substantia, Homo Mater, et Homo Filius.

fiteantur unicum Dei filium, nolunt ejusdem naturæ cujus pater est confiteri, sed diversæ atque imparis, et multis modis rebusque dissimilis, tanquam non de Deo natus, sed ab illo de nihilo sit creatus; gratia filius, non natura." The Arians call us homoousians, because, in opposition to their error, we defend the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be in the language of the Greeks homoousios, that is, of one and the same substance; or, to speak more clearly, essence, this being in Greek called *ousia*, which is yet more plainly thus expressed, of one and the same nature. And yet there is none of their own sons, who thus call us homoousians, who would not as willingly be disinherited, as be accounted of a different nature from his father. How great impiety therefore are they blinded with, who, though they acknowledge, that there is one only Son of God, yet will not confess him to be of the same nature with his Father, but different and unequal, and many ways unlike him, as if he were not born of God, but created out of nothing by him, himself being a creature, and so a son, not by nature, but grace only.—Lastly (to name no more places) in his first book De Trinitate,[1] he hath these words: "Si filius creatura non est, ejusdem cum patre substantiæ est. Omnis enim substantia, quæ Deus non est, creatura est; et quæ creatura non est, Deus est. Et si non est filius ejusdem substantiæ, cujus est pater, ergo facta substantia est." If the Son be not a creature, then is he of the same substance with the Father; for whatever substance is not God, is creature; and whatever is not creature, is God. And therefore, if the Son be not of the same substance with the Father, he must needs be a made and created substance, and not truly God.

Lastly, That the ancient orthodox fathers, who used the word homoousios against Arius, intended not therein to assert the Son to have one and the same singular or individual essence with the Father, appeareth plainly from their disclaiming and disowning those two words, *Ταυτοούσιον* and *Μονοούσιον*. Concerning the former of which, Epiphanius thus: [2] *Καὶ οὐ λέγομεν Ταυτοούσιον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ λέξις παρά τισι λεγομένη, Σαβελλίῳ ἀπεικασθῇ· Ταυτὸν δὲ λέγομεν τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει.* We affirm not the Son to be tautoousion, (one and the same substance with the Father) lest this should be taken in way of compliance with Sabellius; nevertheless do we assert him to be the same in Godhead, and in essence, and in power.—Where it is plain, that when Epiphanius affirmed the Son to be the same with the Father in Godhead and essence, he understood this only of a generical or spe-

[1] Cap. vi. p. 534, 535. tom. viii. oper.

[2] Hær. 76. N. 7. [Hæres. Anomæor. p. 920. tom. i. op.]

cifical, and not of a singular or individual sameness; namely, that the Son is no creature, but God also, as the Father is: and this he intimates to be the true and genuine sense of the word homoousios; he therefore rejecting that other word tautoousios, because it would be liable to misinterpretation, and to be taken, in the Sabellian sense, for that, which hath one and the same singular and individual essence, which the word homoousios could not be obnoxious to. And as concerning that other word monoousios, Athanasius himself, in his Exposition of Faith, thus expressly condemns it: *οὔτε γάρ υἱοπατέρα φρονοῦμεν, ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι Μονοούσιον καὶ οὐχ Ὁμοούσιον·* We do not think the Son to be really one and the same with the Father, as the Sabellians do, and to be monoousios, and not homoousios; they thereby destroying the very being of the Son.—Where ousia, essence or substance, in that fictitious word monoousios, is taken for singular or existent essence, the whole Deity being thus said, by Sabellius, to have only one singular essence or hypostasis in it: whereas in the word homoousios is understood a common or universal, generical or specifical essence; the Son being thus said to agree with the Father in the common essence of the Godhead, as not being a creature. Wherefore Athanasius here disclaimeth a monoousian trinity, as Epiphanius did before a tautoousian; both of them a trinity of mere names and notions, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same singular essence or hypostasis; they alike distinguishing them from the homoousian trinity, as a trinity of real hypostases or persons, that have severally their own singular essence, but agree in one common and universal essence of the Godhead, they being none of them creatures, but all uncreated, or creators. From whence it is plain that the ancient orthodox fathers asserted no such thing as one and the same singular or numerical essence, of the several persons of the Trinity; this, according to them, being not a real trinity, but a trinity of mere names, notions, and inadequate conceptions only, which is thus disclaimed and declared against by Athanasius;[1] *Τριὰς δέ ἐστιν οὐχ ἕως ὀνόματος μόνου, καὶ φαντασίᾳ λέξεως, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ὑπάρξει Τριάς·* The Trinity is not a trinity of mere names and words only, but of hypostases, truly and really existing.—But the homoousian Trinity of the orthodox went exactly in the middle, betwixt that monoousian trinity of Sabellius, which was a trinity of different notions or conceptions only of one and the self-same thing, and that other heteroousian trinity of Arius, which was a trinity of separate and heterogeneous substances (one of which only was God, and

[1] Epistol. ad Serapion. tom. i. oper. p. 202.

the other creatures); this being a trinity of hypostases or persons numerically differing from one another, but all of them agreeing in one common or general essence of the Godhead or the uncreated nature, which is eternal and infinite. Which was also thus particularly declared by Athanasius; [1] *οὔτε ἔλαττόν τι φρονεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τοὺς νῦν κατὰ Καιάφαν Ἰουδαίους, καὶ εἰς Σαβέλλιον περιπέσῃ· οὔτε πλεῖον ἐπινοεῖ, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πολυθεότητα κατακυλισθῇ·* The catholic church doth neither believe less than this homoousian Trinity, lest it should comply with Judaism, or sink into Sabellianism; nor yet more than this, lest, on the other hand, it should tumble down into Arianism, which is the same with Pagan Polytheism and idolatry;—it introducing in like manner the worshipping of creatures together with the Creator.

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[1] Ad Serap. Ep. p. 202.

END OF VOL. I.